USSR-AFGHANISTAN: REEVALUATION IN MOSCOW?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000800150001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 10, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washingon, D. C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
10 April 1987
USSR-Afghanistan: Reevaluation in Moscow?
Summary
Over the past year, the Soviets have made numerous public
statements of their interest in a political settlement that would
enable them to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. These
have been accompanied by tactical negotiating concessions--most
recently an 18-month withdrawal timetable at the UN-sponsored
proximity talks in Geneva, Afghan leader Najib's proposal of a
coalition that could include the resistance, and a six-month
unilateral ceasefire that beaan on 15 January. There is also a
arowin4 body of evidence
that suggests that some authorities in noscow
feel acutely the drawbacks of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan
and are considering whether to settle for less than a Communist-
dominated satellite in Kabul.
This series of Soviet public and private moves is not
inconsistent, of course, with a campaign to decrease the
immediate political costs of involvement in Afghanistan while
holding fast to the ultimate goal of securing a regime dominated
by Soviet clients. Nevertheless, evidence suggesting that the
be considering whether to lower their si hts has been
iets ma
S
y
ov
ersisten
In addition, our best evidence is that the Soviets o
not regard the war as winnable in the near term, and they
apparently feel the various costs of their involvement in
Afghanistan at least strongly enough to pursue increasingly risky
diplomatic tactics.
If these tactics produce no movement from the other side and
if we have underestimated the various costs of Soviet involvement
and the degree of flexibility under Gorbachev, the Soviets might
in the near future initi-ate serious exploration of some of the
This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Third World Activities Division
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SOV M 87-20040CX
oPY O75
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"lesser" solutions that they have discussed informally. We
believe that, at a minimum, they would require that the
government be "friendly," nonaligned, neutral, include
representatives of the Afghan communist party, guarantee the
safety of members of the present regime, not permit foreign
military bases or listening posts in Afghanistan, and not be
dominated by Islamic fundamentalists.
Introduction
Soviet negotiating tactics and private signals of a keen
interest in a political solution of the Afghan situation appear
to represent increasingly sophisticated ploys for obtaining a
settlement on Soviet terms. Najib's "national reconciliation"
initiatives and Kabul's 18-month timetable proposal offer no
evidence that Moscow has reduced its goal of leaving behind in
Kabul a regime that is dominated by its clients. Moreover, the
position taken by Soviet officials in formal, hi h-level
discussions remains essentially hard-line.
Although the Soviets probably are increasingly conscious of
the drawbacks of their involvement in Afghanistan, there is as
yet no evidence that they have defined their dilemma as a choice
between accepting the "demotion" of--or even abandoning--the
present regime, or staying on indefinitely. Even the many Soviet
signals of distress and willingness to settle for less could be
meant merely to lure the opposing players, especially Pakista
into the belief that now is the time to meet Moscow half way.
Serious exploration by the Soviets of solutions that did not
guarantee the dominance of the Afghan party would represent a
watershed in Soviet foreign policy: Moscow has never allowed, in
practice or in theory, a country once embarked on the path to
socialism under Soviet tutelage to reverse its course. There is
presumably serious concern within the Soviet leadership that
jettisoning the Kabul regime would undermine Moscow's standing in
Eastern Europe as the guarantor of party supremacy and would also
cause Third World client regimes to doubt Soviet constancy.
There is also probably concern that Moscow's international
position could suffer should other countries conclude that it was
weak and susceptible to Western pressure. Any Soviet leader who
agreed to a settlement that would leave him open to the charge
that he had "lost" Afghanistan would thus do so in the knowledge
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that this might sooner or later contribute to costing him his
job.
For several reasons, however, we cannot simply dismiss as a
sophisticated disinformation campaign the growing body of
evidence that suggests that the Soviet leadership is casting
about for ways to extricate the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and
may even be divided on how far to go to achieve this. The
evidence has persisted over several months and now is coming from
a wider variety of Soviet and other sources. We believe,
moreover, that the Soviets do not regard a military victory as
attainable in the near term and assume from their recent
diplomatic tactics that they feel the various costs of their
involvement in Afghanistan at least strongly enough to take new
risks:
-- Moscow would presumably recognize that signals of distress
might encourage the other side to persist in its demands.
-- Talk of Soviet withdrawal and resistance participation in
a coalition threatens to undermine the morale of the
present regime to the extent that it could unravel
-- Increased Soviet domestic coverage of the war's hardships
and of the efforts of the Soviet government to end the
conflict could raise unrealistic expectations among the
Soviet population that a solution is in the offing.
Furthermore, there are gaps in our information on important
aspects of the Afghan equation from the Soviet perspective that
preclude our total confidence in the judgment that the Soviets
still aim at a Communist-dominated Afghanistan and are unlikely
to revise this goal. We do not know enough about how much the
Soviets feel the various costs of the war and the relative
importance that they assign them. Nor do we know the extent to
which Afghanistan plays into other issues that are apparently
dividing the Soviet leadership. If Gorbachev and his supporters
are convinced that Afghanistan stands in the way of their
domestic and international goals, if they are more ideologically
flexible than some of their predecessors, and, finally, if they
are able to prevail over more conservative forces in the Soviet
leadership, Soviet policy on Afghanistan could change more
quickly and more fundamentally than we expect. We have therefore
undertaken to review the evidence that such a shift might occur
and to speculate on the key issues and alternatives for the
Soviets in considering what they might live with in
Afghanistan.
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Second Thoughts in Moscow?
The Evidence
Over the past year, General Secretary Gorbachev has referred
to the situation in Afghanistan as a "bleeding wound," stated
that Afghan political forces outside the country might be
included in the government, and claimed that Moscow seeks only a
neutral, nonaligned Afghanistan free from outside interference.
Soviet commentary has stressed that the Afghan revolution, while
"irreversible," was not "socialist" but "national democratic," a
distinction that is probably intended to make the regime more
palatable internationally and within Afghanistan and to lend
credibility to Soviet claims of flexibility. Conceivably,
however, it could be meant to prepare the ground at home and
abroad for a settlement that fell short of Moscow's original goal
of a client regime. At the same time, Soviet domestic coverage
of the war has focussed increasingly on problems that Soviet
troops face in Afghanistan and the progress of reconciliation
efforts--a move that could also be aimed to prepare the domestic
audience for such a development.
These public pronouncements have been accompanied by a
series of gestures associated with the indirect negotiations
between Afghanistan and Pakistan in Geneva:
-- The Soviets had Kabul give up its insistence that
Islamabad accept direct talks as a condition for
continuing negotiations.
-- Reversing previous statements that withdrawal was a
bilateral matter between Moscow and Kabul, the Soviets
have allowed the issue to become part of the Geneva
negotiations; an initial offer of a four year withdrawal
timetable has been reduced to 18 months.
-- The Soviets conducted a withdrawal of six regiments--
albeit largely a sham--and claimed that it was a gesture
of good will.
-- The Soviets had Kabul accept in principle UN monitoring of
a settlement.
-- Moscow had Najib announce a six month ceasefire beginning
15 January and, in a reversal of previous policy,
"national reconciliation" proposals that could lead to a
coalition government with resistance participation.
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At the same time, Soviet officials at home and abroad have
claimed that settlement of
the Afghan problem is a high priority for Gorbachev because
Soviet involvement is an impediment to both his domestic and
international goals. Some of these officials have added that
Gorbachev and other members of the Soviet leadership regard the
original decision to invade as a blunder.
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Debates in the Leadership?
There are also indications that these efforts to find ways
to end or alleviate the costs of Soviet involvement in
Afghanistan are generating some opposition at home
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-- The Soviet media in early April reported insurgent rocket
attacks into Soviet territory, alleging US prompting and
citing a US official's statement about the vulnerability
of the Soviet-Afghan border. This public acknowledgement
of the incident could reflect the efforts of hardliners to
drive home the continued validity of the security concerns
that prompted the 1979 invasion.
Terms of the Debate
A careful reading of the evidence suggests that the
leadership's discussions and debates focus on the following
questions:
-- Is the war a no win proposition? If it can be won, will
it take years or even decades? Does this play into the
hands of the US?
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-- Does Soviet security require a Communist satellite in
Kabul? If not, is a genuine coalition possible? Could a
government led by present members of the resistance be
tolerated? Could such a government's neutrality be
guaranteed or would the US fill the vacuum left by the
Soviet departure? Would it be irrevocably hostile to the
Soviet Union? How much of a threat would an Islamic
fundamentalist regime pose? Can at least the safety of
regime members be guaranteed? Can even a bloodbath and
prolonged instability be tolerated?
-- Would the domestic and international advantages to be
gained by withdrawing before the regime is stabilized
outweigh the blow to Soviet prestige and the defeat for
socialism that this would constitute? What would be the
effect in Eastern Europe? Among Soviet clients in the
Third World? How much advantage would be gained in
dealings with the West? With Islamic nations? With
China?
What Next?
It is possible that the Soviets devised Najib's present
reconciliation policy in the expectation that Pakistan's domestic
difficulties, war-weariness in Afghanistan, and the homesickness
of the refugees gave it a chance of success in the near term. In
this, they may have been misled by their Afghan allies.
Once the Soviets have concluded that the current "national
reconciliation" initiative has failed, we expect them to try
again with new proposals. At this point, they could become
convinced that their original aims in Afghanistan were
unrealistic. The nature and extent of such a shift might be
difficult to gauge, as some Soviet behavior could be common to
opposing strategies. For example, a public reiteration of their
commitment to the present regime and to the gains of the Afghan
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revolution could mean no change in their position, but the
Soviets might feel obligated to make such statements even if they
were seeking a compromise solution, since the fragile Kabul
regime might otherwise come unglued in the interim. On the other
hand, more forthcoming Soviet discussion of such questions as
Afghan neutrality and the composition of possible coalition
governments would not necessarily mean that Moscow had decided to
settle for less than a Communist-dominated regime. The Soviets
benefit too much from the public relations value of negotiations
not to offer the prospect of concessions that will keep alive the
interest of the other side.
Against this background and recognizing the pitfalls, we are
nevertheless persuaded that there is, in fact, discussion--and
perhaps even debate--in Moscow over whether Soviet security and
prestige require a client regime in Kabul and whether, even if it
is attainable in the long term, the price is worth paying. The
following examines the various options likely to be raised in
such internal Soviet discussions.
Lowered Sights
We believe, on the basis of most of our information, that if
the Soviets were to conclude that they must aim for less, at a
minimum Moscow would require a government in Kabul that has some
Communist participation and that was friendly, nonaligned and
neutral. Soviet officials have consistently indicated that their
understanding of nonalignment and neutrality for Afghanistan
would prohibit foreign--especially US--bases and listening posts
there and Afghan participation in military alliances. The
Soviets could well probe for such an arrangement if they had made
the calculation that it would at least, because of the expected
disunity of the other side, leave the Afghan party in a position
to regain power eventually.
There is some evidence that Moscow could tolerate even a
government with no Communist participation, as long as it was not
dominated by Islamic fundamentalists and was willing to guarantee
the safety of former regime members. (Moscow probably believes
that Islamic fundamentalists would be the most likely to conduct
a bloody purge of the present regime and to seek to foment
Islamic discontent in the neighboring Soviet Moslem republics.)
Soviet acceptance of such an outcome would probably mean that
Moscow had discounted its oft-stated fear that the US would ride
into Kabul on the coattails of the resistance. It would also
indicate that Moscow had determined, as the Indians believe, that
a solution that avoids a bloodbath is sufficient to save face and
that, ultimately, no Afghan government can afford to be hostile
to the Soviet Union.
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If Moscow were serious about exploring these questions, we
would expect the Soviets to raise and discuss them at length not
just in private, "off-the-record" sessions, but in high-level
formal meetings with Pakistani officials and in discussions of
regional issues with US officials. Moscow would want assurances
that the US would cease military aid to the resistance, use its
influence to secure resistance observance of a settlement, and
strictly observe Afghan neutrality. In the Geneva talks, we
would expect the Soviets to suggest a withdrawal timetable of
less than a year, to be implemented simultaneously with other
provisions of an agreement.
If a reassessment of this sort is being considered, Moscow
apparently is not yet persuaded that such a reduced goal is
attainable. Some of the Soviets who have discussed such
arrangements with foreign interlocutors have indicated pessimism
over the possibility of compromises of this sort, saying that
while Moscow could live with them in theory, in practice
Afghanistan's social, political, and cultural traditions and the
rancor built up during the prolonged conflict make them
impossible.
Cut and Run
It is highly unlikely that the Soviets have decided that
within the near future they will withdraw their troops and accept
whatever situation develops in Afghanistan--including the almost
certain collapse of the regime. Reports that the Soviets do not
care about post-withdrawal instability and are ready to live with
a bloodbath of their clients do not strike us as credible,
especially in the absence of evidence that the costs of the
Afghan war are far greater for the Soviets than we have been able
to discern or that they perceive the advantages of unilateral
withdrawal to be more clearcut and compelling even in the face of
obvious drawbacks than is apparent to us.
Up the Military Ante
Soviet resort to an all-out or even a
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substantially larger military effort would probably have to be
preceded by a series of events on the ground that convinced the
Soviets that a military victory was possible, by a leadership
struggle that ended with putative Kremlin hardliners on top, or
by a decision by the leadership that compromise is unreachable
and a continuation of the status quo is intolerable. Our best
evidence, however, is that the Soviets do not regard the war as
winnable in the near term, even if more troops are introduced,
and that they are not, in any case, willing to sustain the
greater costs of a substantially increased military presence in
Af hanistan.
Old Model, New Clothes
If the current initiatives are nothing more than an attempt
to deflect international criticism and to wear down the unity and
resolve of the opposition, Moscow will probably devise a follow-
on combination of carrots and sticks in an attempt to pressure
and entice Islamabad into a cosmetic settlement that leaves the
present regime in control. Increased pressure would probably
take the form of stepped-up military activity within Afghanistan
and on the Pakistani border and increased covert oerations,
.
perhaps solicitin India's participation
The bulk of our evidence so far indicates that the Soviets
remain convinced that their original goal is realistic. Moscow
is particularly likely to continue this strategy if it sees the
need to reduce or counteract the political costs of its
involvement but judges that longterm trends are sufficiently in
its favor to justify maintaining its present military and
political commitment. Among the trends that would affect Soviet
thinking in this regard would be their assessment of the long-
term prospects for cadre development in Afghanistan, the limited
ability so far of the resistance to organize politically,
Pakistan's internal problems, the prospect that the US-Pakistani
relationship might unravel over the nuclear issue or with a new
administration in Washington, donor fatigue, and the simple
dissipation of international interest over time. Continuation of
the current strategy could also, however, result from the
inability of the Soviet leadership to reach a consensus on how it
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SUBJECT: USSR-Afghanistan: Reevaluation In Moscow
External Distribution
NSC
1 Lieutenant General Colin Powell, USA
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
2 Dr. Fritz Ermarth
Special Assistant to the President for
European and Soviet Affairs
NSC
Room 368, Old EOB
3 Robert Oakley
Special Assistant to the President for
Near East/South Asian Affairs
NSC
Room 348, Old EOB
4 The Honorable Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs
NSC
Room 298, Old EOB
State
5 Ambassador H. Allen Holmes
Director of Politico-Military Affairs
Room 6531, Department of State
6 The Honorable Michael H. Armacost
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Room 7240, Department of State
7 The Honorable Richard W. Murphy
Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 6242, Department of State
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SUBJECT: USSR-Afghanistan: Reevaluation In Moscow
External Distribution
8 The Honorable Robert Peck
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Near East and South Asian Affairs
Room 6244, Department of State
9 Ambassador Charles Dunbar
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 5515, Department of State
Desiree Millikin
Afghanistan Desk Officer, NEA/PAB
Room 5247, Department of State
11 Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway
Assistant Secretary for
European and Canadian Affairs
Room 6226, Department of State
12 Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz
Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 6531, Department of State
13 Mark R. Parris
Director of Soviet Union Affairs
Room 4217, Department of State
14 Robert H. Baraz
Director, INR/SEE
Room 4758, Department of State
15 Wayne Limberg
Chief, INR/SEE/FP
Room 4843, Department of State
16 Zalmay Khalilzad
Policy Planning Staff
Room 7330, Department of State
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SUBJECT: USSR-Afghanistan: Reevaluation In Moscow
External Distribution
DoD
17 Dr. Darnell Whitt
Intelligence Adviser to the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Room 4E838, The Pentagon
18 It. Gen. Dale A. Vesser
Director, J-5 Plans and Policy
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E996, Pentagon
19 Lt. Gen. Leonard H. Perroots, USAF
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Room 3E258, Pentagon
20 The Honorable Richard L. Armitage
Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
Room 4E808, The Pentagon
21 Dr. Wynfred Joshua
DIO for European and Soviet Politico-Military Affairs
Defense Intelligence Agency
Room 2C238, The Pentagon
22 Col. Walter P. Lang
DIO for Near East and South Asia
Defense Intelligence Agency
Room 2C238, The Pentagon
Other
23 Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, USA
Director, National Security Agency
T532/CDB
Fort Meade, MD
24 Chief, NSA, A2
Room 3NO15
Fort Meade, MD
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SUBJECT: USSR-Afghanistan: Reevaluation In Moscow
External Distribution
Other
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NSA - A 055
Room 2AO814
Fort Meade, MD
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