CHANGING BERLIN'S AIR REGIME: THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW, EAST BERLIN, AND WESTERN CAPITALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000800100001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 23, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
23 March 1987
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Changing Berlin's Air Regime: The View from Moscow,
East Berlin, and Western Capitals
Summary
We believe the Soviets would see a US initiative to
renegotiate the air regime over East Germany as an opportunity to
advance their goal of undermining Western rights in Berlin. It
would allow Moscow to appear forthcoming on a traditionally 'hot'
East-West issue, and new possibilities would arise for creating
West German pressure on US arms control positions by implicitly
linking progress on Berlin to movement in the Geneva negotiations.
In 1984 the Soviets themselves suggested a similar renegotiation
on the air corridors. Although movement on Berlin would further
Moscow's efforts to burnish its already improving image in
Western Europe and especially West Germany, Gorbachev probably
does not want negotiations on the Berlin air regime to eclipse
arms control discussions with the United States, which remain the
centerpiece of his efforts. 25X1
The East Germans would probably object to certain aspects
of the proposal--particularly those highlighting Allied rights in
Berlin and the corridors. Moscow's sensitivity to East Berlin's
concerns over the proposal's restatement of four-power rights
would be another complicating factor. Moreover, the proposed
increase in north-south flights over the GDR by Western airlines
would raise the specter of increased Western intelligence-
gathering. The opportunity offered by the changes in the status
quo and the chance to become directly involved, however, could
SOV M 87-20029
EUR M 87-20045
This memorandum was prepared in the European Assessments Division of the
Office of Soviet Analysis and in the East European and West European Divisions
of the Office of European Analysis. This paper was prepared to respond to
questions raised in the Berlin IG working group on the air corridor regime. 25X1
d to the Director of
t
di
e
rec
Comments and questions are welcome and should be
European Analysis to the Chief, European
Assessments Division, SOVA
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bring East Berlin to overlook the drawbacks. The East Germans
would be particularly attracted to the prospect of expanding
flights to Western Europe. 25X1
A US proposal to renegotiate the Berlin air regime would
probably receive a favorable response in West Germany and at
least acquiescence in London and Paris. The West Germans--
including the West Berliners--would respond most favorably,
seeing it as a chance to promote closer ties between West Berlin
and the Federal Republic, to intensify intra-German contacts, and
to improve the East-West atmosphere. Sensitive to prospects of
erosion of their postwar rights in Berlin, however, he French
and the British are likely to be much more cautious. 25X1
The following analysis is based
1
largely on indirect
.
evidence. We have no current information
or Allied thinking on many of the issues
on
that
Soviet,
will be
East German,
raised by
the proposed initiative.
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2. The 3 September 1971 Quadripartite Agreement reasserted
British, French, American, and Soviet rights in Berlin. Since
then the Soviets have tried to chip away at various elements of
Western rights in the city. We believe the Soviets would accept
a US initiative to renegotiate the air regime because they would
see it as an opportunity to advance their goal of undermining
Allied rights there.
-- In 1984, the Soviets changed their unilateral practice
of reserving portions of the air corridors during
military operations to reservations covering the entire
lengths of corridors (See Map). This forced Allied
flights to take off or land at very steep angles or to
circle down; both methods increased the risk of
accidents.
-- In 1986 the Soviets allowed the East Germans to proceed
with an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to force diplomats
accredited to the GDR or the Allied missions to meet East
German passport and visa requirements when crossing into
East Berlin from West Berlin. This was a bold attempt to
show that the dividing line between the eastern and western
sectors of the city is an international border.
-- More recently, Moscow has ignored Western protests that the
East Germans are violating the demilitarized status of
Berlin by using confidence-building measures established at
the Conference on Disarmament in Europe--inviting observers
to military maneuvers--to induce the 35 CSCE participants
to attend a military briefing in East Berlin. 25X1
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Box
The Berlin Air Regime
The three Western powers and the Soviets agreed on
Allied air access to West Berlin in late 1945. In February
1946, the four occupying powers created the Berlin Air
Safety Center (BASC) to regulate air traffic. Three
corridors were established, connecting West Berlin to
Hamburg, Hannover, and Frankfurt. Following the Berlin
blockade of 1948-49, the four occupying powers again agreed
in the New York and Paris agreements of May and June 1949 on
joint management of the corridors and guaranteed access for
the Western powers.
The 1946 agreement also established the Berlin Control
Zone (BCZ), an area with a 20-English-mile (32-kilometer)
radius around the Allied Control Authority (ACA) building in
downtown Berlin. The circle is defined as an area of "free
flight" for US, Soviet, French, and British aircraft. The
BCZ specifically has a 10,000-foot ceiling. The three
corridors intersect at a spot 35 English miles (56
kilometers) from the ACA and 15 English miles 24
kilometers) from the western edge of the BCZ.
The 1946 Four Power Agreement on Rules of Flight
remains the basis for Allied air access to West Berlin.
The agreement stipulates that each corridor is to be 20
English miles (32 kilometers) wide and that the minimum
corridor cruising altitude is to be 1,000 feet. The Soviets
contend that the base of the corridor is 2,500 feet. While
the Allies reject this Soviet position, it is not a serious
point of contention as Allied planes do not normally fly
below this altitude. The agreement did not specify an
altitude ceiling for the corridors. The Soviets long have
claimed a ceiling of 10,000 feet, the same as that for the
BCZ. The Allies reject this interpretation in principle,
but accept it in practice as few Allied flights have
exceeded 10,000 feet since 1960. Only when Soviet
reservations cover lower altitudes do the Allies fly over
this ceiling.
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3. We believe the Soviets would be willing to move forward
on--and might even welcome--the proposed initiative because of
the benefits they foresee from holding such talks. The Soviets
would gin up their propaganda apparatus to take credit for any
positive changes that accrued to either Germany and at the very
least obscure American credit for considering the desires of Bonn
h
e
and West Berlin. At the same time, Moscow will parade in t
world media its claim that the Quadripartite Agreement applies
only to West Berlin.
-- The Soviets may see the initiative as tailor-made for
further efforts to woo the Europeans by exhibiting
flexibility on an issue that is crucial for East-West,
intra-European, and intra-German relations.
4. In addition, we believe the Soviets would be favorably
disposed to the suggested change in our flight profiles in the
corridors. The Soviet chief air controller in Berlin in 1984
informally raised a similar idea as a means of resolving Allied
concerns over the number of corridor reservations. They may also
try to expand the agenda to suit their own interests and try to
codify other changes in the current regime, such as setting
ceilings, or even reasserting their claim that Soviet interests
and needs take precedence in the corridors.
5. In terms of broader East-West issues, the Soviets may
find useful linkage between restructuring of the Berlin air
regime and their desire to increase German pressure on the United
States for more flexibility in arms control negotiations. They
might hope to trade on West German desires for furthering intra-
German relations and an increased presence in West Berlin to
generate this pressure. If an INF agreement has not been
concluded before the initiative is announced, the Soviets may try
to contrast their forthcoming attitude on Berlin with alleged
American footdragging on arms control.
6. The principal disadvantage for Soviet arms control
desires is the possibility that a highly public negotiating
process would complicate keeping the Geneva talks centerstage.
The Soviets would also be concerned that the initiative will
bring Bonn and Washington closer together on East-West issues.
Moscow almost certainly will also object to--or seek to
block--any attempts to strengthen ties between West Berlin and
West Germany, especially the authorization of West German airline
(Lufthansa) flights to the city. The Soviets may also worry that
approving an increase in the current minimal numbers of north-
south Western civil air flights in East German airspace would
augment suspected Western intelligence-gathering capabilities.
Soviet permanent military installations and other associated
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military exercise activity are located within photographic range
of established flight paths in East German airspace.
7. The initiative could create friction between Moscow and
East Berlin because a new air regime agreement will reaffirm
four-power rights in Germany. The Soviet Minister in West Berlin
told our Minister recently that Moscow wants to keep the air
corridors because their existence provides justification for the
Soviet role in Berlin. The East Germans, however, reject the
wartime concept of a "greater Berlin," and only grudgingly accept
the reality of the air corridors. To avoid alienating its
client, Moscow has followed a convoluted logic by insisting on
maintenance of its four-power status, but accepting GDR control
in East Berlin and generally supporting or abetting efforts to
undercut the legal basis for the allied presence in the city.
The Soviets will probably assuage East German sensibilities over
being reminded that they do not have complete sovereignty over
their airspace by arguing that a new accord could strengthen the
East German position and pointing out that East Berlin's
misgivings over the Quadripartite Agreement proved to be
unfounded.
East German Equities
8. East Germany would be obliged to hew to the line set
down by the Soviets because Berlin and intra-German affairs are
so sensitive to Moscow. In principle, however, the GDR would
welcome any initiative on the Berlin air regime in which it was
recognized as an actively interested party.
-- The special quadripartite arrangements for Berlin--
especially the air regime--have long stuck in the GDR's
craw as an infringement on its sovereignty.
-- East Germany's Air Law, passed by the Volkskammer in
1983, is a marker setting forth the regime's claim to
full sovereignty over its airspace, except where
existing agreements--read: quadripartite agreements--
are in effect.
9. The East German regime would likely see a number of
tangible as well as potential advantages accruing to it from the
Berlin initiative:
-- Regular intra-German air service, even if constrained by
a prohibition on cross-border flights, would be a boost
to the GDR's goal of normalizing ties to the FRG on a
state-to-state basis. Such air service would be
financially remunerative and allow East Germany to
increase its official presence in key West German
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cities. At the very least, it would offer another
opportunity to conduct intra-German relations.-
East Germany would probably calculate that initial
limitations on intra-German air service in a new
agreement would be eroded over time, especially because
of pressure from Lufthansa on the Western allies.
Meanwhile, carriage by Interflug and Lufthansa might
help to undercut the viability of Allied-approved
service by Pan American, British Air, and Air France.
-- More generally and perhaps most significantly, just the
prospect of changing the Berlin status quo is welcome to
the East Germans because they have always had the most
to gain from changes. If their Soviet patron is able to
produce a net loss for the Allies, then the GDR is very
likely to end up with a few slices from the salami. In
s an
i
ve a
sum, they might well view the Berlin initiat
opportunity to strengthen their position.
10. Nevertheless the East Germans will also have problems
with the proposed initiative:
They are likely to oppose the closer West Berlin-FRG
ties that are clearly one goal of the Allied proposal.
The GDR has been particularly aggressive on status
issues in the past year. For example, it challenged the
West with its attempt to impose passport and visa
requirements between East and West Berlin last May-June
and more recently made two attempts to use CDE-mandated
notification of military exercises to infringe on
Berlin's demilitarized status.
-- The East Germans would oppose non-Allied flights in the
corridors on sovereignty grounds.
-- They might well fear increased potential for
intelligence gathering by Western--including NATO
countries'--airlines on the proposed north-south
routes.
The West German Equities
11. We expect a positive West German response--from both
Bonn and West Berlin. The rationale will be primarily political,
but economic considerations will also be important. Although
officials in Bonn almost certainly will take the lead, the
applause--and "advice"--from West Berlin, and Governing Mayor
F_ I
Diepgen, will be the loudest.
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12. The political reasons for supporting the US initiative
are numerous:
The West Germans consistently seek to expand the ties
between West Berlin and West Germany, and many will see
the initiative as one such opportunity. On two
occasions Diepgen has urged US officials in Washington
to stretch the opportunities offered by the
Quadripartite Agreement to their limits. And Diepgen
has followed his own advice, pressing, for example, to
establish a German Cultural Foundation in West Berlin--
recently approved by the federal and state
governments. Diepgen was reportedly even prepared to
propose the direct election of West Berlin
representatives to the Bundestag during his most recent
visit to Washington.
While less outspoken, officials in Bonn generally share
Diepgen's objective. West German governments
traditionally seek opportunities to reinforce the
extensive federal presence in West Berlin, especially if
ways can be found to avoid a sharp Soviet response.
Indeed, that may make the US initiative all the more
attractive. Renegotiating the Berlin air regime under
Allied auspices presents much smaller risks than other
moves taken by Bonn, such as the establishment of the
federal headquarters of the Environmental Protection
Office in West Berlin.
More generally, party leaders, media spokesmen, and
pundits of all stripes are likely to applaud a US
proposal that promises to promote East-West
cooperation. Although Berlin is no longer a focal point
of international tension, it remains a symbol of the
postwar confrontation between East and West in general,
and the United States and the USSR in particular.
Berlin also remains a symbol of the country's postwar
division and its limited sovereignty, and we expect
support from Bonn and West Berlin for an initiative that
promises to enhance the German role in the city. This
applies especially to the Berlin air regime, from which
West Germans are excluded. Indeed, Lufthansa and its
chairman Heinze Ruhnau appear to be leading a campaign
to win the right to service the former capital. Ruhnau
has stated publicly his belief that Lufthansa will some
day fly there again, and the company has published
several brochures highlighting the history of its
service in Berlin.
7
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13. Economic--primarily commercial--considerations will be
nearly as strong.
We believe West German officials will see the proposal
as a means of strengthening West Berlin's economy by
increasing the number of travelers and visitors, while
making the city appear as a more lucrative and safer
investment market. Although it has improved
considerably over the last few years, West Berlin's
economy remains dependent on the good will and largesse
of the Federal Republic, and West German policy has long
been one of enhancing the city's economic viability.
Diepgen even spoke dreamily in Washington of making
Berlin an international transportation hub.
-- From a West Berliner's perspective, this proposal may
address two additional complaints. Officials in the
West often express their fear that East Berlin is
gaining in international stature at the West's
expense. Although the economy in the East is clearly no
match for its counterpart west of the Wall, the West has
been suffering a loss in air travel because of the
cheaper fares offered at East Berlin's Schoenefeld
airport. At the same time, officials in West Berlin
have complained often and publicly about Pan American's
service to West Berlin.
14. There is still a downside to this broad West German
endorsement. In fact, the negative aspects stem directly from
the strength of this support--Bonn and West Berlin will be hard
to please. We believe that West German representatives will
continually press for more than the United States or its Allies
in Berlin are willing to give.
-- A chief advocate almost certainly will be Lufthansa and
its chairman, Ruhnau. He can be expected to press for
direct service between the Federal Republic and Berlin
via the corridors, and any attempts to prevent Lufthansa
from crossing the intra-German border are likely to be
resisted.
A model agreement for regular service between
Duesseldorf and Leipzig already exists. The proposal
acquired Bonn Group approval over a year ago once the
Kohl government amended the proposal to ensure that this
service would not undercut Allied service to West
Berlin.
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Numerous West German and West Berlin leaders--again,
Governing Mayor Diepgen is a prime example--have
displayed little concern for or understanding of the
principles underlying Allied status in Berlin, and they
can be expected to show as little concern here,
especially in German-to-German talks. Diepgen and
others appear to believe that only Allied officials and
activities can harm or enhance Allied status in Berlin;
the Germans, on the other hand, inhtheir view enjoy a
relative freedom to do as they w
15. It is difficult at this point to predict just how West
German and West Bephowever, would a
agenda. Past experience, One method may be to take their case to the public. The
West German media offer a convenient vehicle with which
to reach a public that has an emotional interest in--but
little knowledge of--Berlin affairs.
The West Germans may also try to use public statements
to present the Allies with faits accomplis. On a number
of occasions they have stated that agreement existed--
for example, that talks on a bilateral accord on SDI
research had reached an early consensus--when, in fact,
that was not the case.
London's Reaction
16. The UK probably would not object formally toprivately
renegotiation of the Berlin aviation proceedures, but
would want to be reassured that a new air regime--specifically
those elements covering the corridors-- would not weaken Allied
jurisdiction in Berlin. Although the British traditionally try
to avoid tension over Berlin, they may believe that opening the
aviation question will ultimately raise more trouble than it is
worth. Nevertheless, if the other Allies accept a proposal we
would not expect London to stand in the way. In fact, the
British have already approved the FRG proposal for regular
Duesseldorf-Leipzig service in the Bonn Group.
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London always has emphasized the 25X6
need for revitalizing West Berlin's economy, and would
welcome a profitable new route for British air-lines.
-- At the same time, the British are concerned about
preserving the special status of Berlin, and they may
fear that negotiating changes in the air corridor regime
might set a precedent that the Soviets could exploit by
demanding further changes and concessions in the
future. The British also fear that Berliners could
interpret such a proposal as a sign of lessened Allied
commitment, weakening popular morale in Berlin.
-- The British probably also would be skeptical that a new
air agreement would permanently resolve the issue of
Soviet airspace reservations, believing that Moscow's
unilateral extension of reservation limits in 1984
suggests that the Soviets may do that again if it suits
their interest. London, according to US Embassy
reports, doubts Moscow's explanation that its unilateral
action was prompted solely by Western fielding of INF
and that the reservations issues could be resolved once
an agreement on INF has been reached.
French Reaction
17. In view of French behavior in the Bonn Group and
Berlin, we would expect the French to be less amenable to a US
initiative, but we do not think they would block agreement if the
other Allies concur. Paris certainly shares with the United
States and the United Kingdom a desire to solve the problem of
Soviet airspace reservations. The French have also been active
in trying to expand commercial air service from France to East
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Berlin and East Germany, and they would presumably be amenable to
an agreement facilitating such expanded service.
-- Paris can be expected, however, to bargain hard to
maximize the benefits received by its national carrier,
Air France, and this could obstruct the negotiations.
Paris also has yet to grant full approval to Bonn's
proposal for the regular service between Duesseldorf and
Leipzig. 25X1
18. The French tend to be sticklers about strict observance
of Berlin's quadripartite status, and will probably play the role
of watchdog in that regard as negotiations progress. Currently,
Paris is also concerned by what it sees as the possibility of a
runaway chain reaction in US-Soviet relations, in which the US
might be tempted to make concessions that could undermine
European security.
-- Although the French will probably support a negotiating
change in Berlin air practices, they may seek
reassurance that Washington does not plan to offer major
concessions to the Soviets in return for a better deal 25X1
on aviation. In Bonn Group discussions they have even
expressed skepticism about whether north-south f s
through Tegel airport are feasible or desirable.
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'. I I
SUBJECT: Changing the Berlin Air Regime: The View from Moscow,
East Berlin and Western Capitals
External Distribution:
Peter Sommer
Staff Member, National Security Council
Room 361
EOB
State
John R. Byerly
Attorney Adviser, L/EBC
Rm. 6420
Department of State
T. Michael Peay
Assistant Leagal Adviser for Canadian Affairs
and European Affairs
Rm. 5527A
New State
Janice Bay
Director, Aviation Negotiations
Rm. 5531
Department of State
Curtis Kamman
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Rm. 6531
Department of State
Mr. Harry J. Gilmore
Director, Office of Central European Affairs
Room 4232
Department of State
Erwin von den Steinen
Director
Office of Aviation Programs and Policy
Rm. 5531
Department of State
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Nelson Ledsky
Principal Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff
Rm. 7311
Department of State
Michael Habib
Deputy Director of Central European Affairs, EUR/CE
Rm. 4228
Department of State
RADM Joseph S. Donnell, III
Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, JCS
Rm. 2E996
The Pentagon
Mr. James Morrison
Director of Regional Policy, DASD/ISP
Room 1D469
The Pentagon
Jack Maresca
Deputy Assistant Secretary
European and NATO Policy
Rm. 4D822
The Pentagon
Other
Robert Mallalieu
Industrial Analyst, International Aviation
Department of Transportation
Rm. 6401
4000 7th Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20590
2
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The Berlin Air Regime
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