SOVIET STRATEGY ON AFGHANISTAN AFTER THE SUMMIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000800090001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 29, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 December 1987
Soviet Strategy on Afghanistan After the Summit
Summary
of US support for the resistance--appeared designed to shift the onus for
concluding a settlement onto the United States. Gorbachev also seemed to insist
that implementation would require establishment of a coalition government, but
other Soviets at the summit and some Soviet media statements since have denied
that Moscow requires this linkage. Soviet follow-through on this alleged delinkin
General Secretary Gorbachev's stance on Afghanistan at the Washington
summit--linking implementation of a 12-month troop withdrawal timetable to an end
would probably indicate a decision to leave the Kabul regime to its fate.
Soviet statements and media commentary, and Soviet officials say
Afghan clients. The withdrawal and coalition issues remain associated in most
It is doubtful, however, that the Soviets have made a decision to sacrifice their
that the Kabul regime is a "reality" with which the resistance will have to
negotiate. Moreover, Moscow has continued to signal its commitment to Afghan
leader Naiibullah and his regime and to maintaining extensive ties with Afghanistan.
Mixed Signals from Moscow
The Soviets have recently been engaged in a concerted
campaign to shift the onus for failure to conclude an Afghan
settlement onto the United States. At the Washington summit,
General Secretary Gorbachev linked implementation of the 12-month
troop withdrawal timetable announced last month by Afghan leader
Najibullah to the end of US support for the resistance. He
stated that from the time an agreement entered into effect Soviet
troops would not conduct offensive operations. He also pressed
the United States to lean on the resistance to be responsive to
This memorandum was prepared in the office of Soviet Analysis
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Regional Policy Division
SOV M 87-20128X
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Since the summit, numerous Soviet officials have
Kabul's efforts to open negotiations on a coalition government.
repeated these points.
In Washington Gorbachev seemed to maintain that withdrawal
was also dependent on establishment of a coalition, although
other Soviets at the summit and a Soviet media commentator soon
denied that Moscow insists on this linkage. The two issues
nonetheless remain associated in most Soviet statements and media
commentary. Soviet delinking would be tantamount to abandoning
the Kabul regime. It is unlikely that Moscow would give up
efforts to secure the dominance of their clients in favor of a
settlement that guaranteed them nothing before trying to
negotiate at least a minority position for the People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in a new Afghan
government. Some Pakistani officials have argued that the
Soviets might be prepared to sign a Geneva agreement without
parallel provisions for a new government because Moscow means to
renege on it once the weapons pipeline to the resistance has been
shut down. Because international condemnation for such a move
intensify Soviet domestic dissatisfaction over the war, the
Soviets are not, in our view, likely to pursue this strategy.
would probably fall on Moscow--whatever pretext the Soviets
pleaded--and because dashed expectations might significantly
We do not believe that the Soviets are ready to sacrifice
25X1
their Afghan clients. They continue to insist
that the regime is a "reality" and that the resistance
friendly regime.
stronger ties between Soviet republics and Afghan provinces,
suggesting that Moscow remains committed to maintaining extensive
links with Afghanistan and wants to reassure Kabul of this. Even
if the conference's call represents a long-term Soviet effort to
expand nonmilitary links in the hope of maintaining influence
should Moscow eventually withdraw its troops, the Soviets almost
certainly realize that, at this stage, such ties probably would
not survive without the presence of Soviet troops to prop up a
will have to negotiate with it. A major Soviet-Afghan offensive
this month to relieve the siege of Khowst was portrayed in the
Soviet media as the result of the insurgents' refusal to enter
negotiations, in particular to agree to the regional ceasefires
called for by Najibullah last month. Moreover, a Soviet party
Central Committee conference addressed by "Second Secretary"
Ligachev and attended by other Politburo members discussed
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We believe that the statements of some Soviet officials that
withdrawal is not linked to formation of a coalition reflect
Moscow's effort to gain credibility for its claim that it has
never sought to impose political arrangements on Afghanistan and
to reinforce its efforts to draw the United States into the
settlement process. This would be a further development of the
longstanding Soviet effort to divide the resistance and its
supporters. The Soviets may also be seeking to avoid formal,
detailed discussion of a coalition. After accepting in principle
a Pakistani invitation last spring for First Deputy Foreign
Minister Vorontsov to visit Islamabad--a meeting at which the
Pakistanis hope to pin down Soviet ideas on the question--Moscow
has made a series of excuses to delay it.
The mixed Soviet signals in Washington, in the Soviet media,
and elsewhere may, however, reflect a division among the Soviet
leadership over what is an acceptable outcome in Afghanistan.
Even if Gorbachev and his allies have concluded that an orderly
withdrawal and a neutral, nonaligned Afghanistan with no
guaranteed PDPA role sufficiently meet Soviet interests, they are
unlikely to pursue a face-saving settlement in the absence of a
leadership consensus. They have spent considerable political
capital pushing Gorbachev's domestic program past conservative
opponents and are unlikely to assume the political risks entailed
in accepting an outcome that the conservatives would regard as a
defeat.
The Timing of Withdrawals
Gorbachev confirmed in Washington that a 12-month timetable
for the withdrawal of Soviet troops would be proposed at the next
round of UN-mediated talks in Geneva, which will probably convene
in February. He suggested that in certain circumstances--which
Najibullah had said in November were resistance observance of a
ceasefire and the success of talks on constructing a coalition--
the timetable might be further reduced. The Soviets have refused
to be pinned down on a date for commencing the withdrawal but
have hinted that it might be determined during or soon after the
Geneva session. They have evaded discussion of the phasing of a
pullout, in particular the withdrawal of the bulk of Soviet
troops early in the timeframe, which the Soviets know Pakistan
will require before agreeing to a timetable of more than a few
months. They have also recently suggested that they will insist
on a more elaborate monitoring mechanism than the present draft
Geneva accords provide, potentially a time-consuming and divisive
exercise. Both the resistance and Kabul have expressed
reservations about a UN force, for instance.
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Soviet Views on an Interim Government
Whether or not Moscow will ultimately insist that an interim
coalition be in place before Soviet troops begin to withdraw,
Soviet officials have consistently stressed the centrality of
such arrangements. Gorbachev stated in Washington that Moscow
seeks only a neutral and nonaligned Afghanistan that would not
threaten Soviet security. However, the Soviets have not so far
shown much interest in working out the details and guarantees of
Afghanistan's future status. Vorontsov told US officials in
November that Kabul might be receptive to neutrality on the
Austrian model, but he said that.the question must be resolved by
the interim government.
Some Soviets, including Vorontsov in his talks with US
officials in November, have recently suggested that Moscow does
not require that the PDPA dominate this government or any
permanent set-up or that any particular positions be reserved for
the PDPA. A few Soviets--mostly mid-level officials--have even
implied that Moscow requires only a face-saving presence for the
PDPA, whose leading figures might be evacuated to the USSR. In
general, however, the Soviets have continued to insist that a
coalition must reflect Afghan political realities and provide a
role for the PDPA commensurate with its alleged influence and
experience. In Washington, Gorbachev put in a plug for
Najibullah's recent offer to give the opposition 50% of the
ministerial portfolios and the premiership. The Soviets have
also suggested that they will insist on an arrangement that
minimizes the influence of fundamentalist resistance elements.
The Soviets have, since the promulgation of Kabul's national
reconciliation initiative, made a concerted but unsuccessful
25X1 effort to attract former king Zahir Shah and other Afghan exiles
into joining a coalition with the PDPA. Vorontsov said in
November that Zahir could take the lead in forming an interim
coalition and that the United States should urge him to become
active. The Soviets have been short on concrete ideas about a
new government, however, and have generally avoided situations in
which detailed discussion of the question might be expected of
them.
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the Soviets do intend to withdraw before their clients are
secure, the PDPA does not seem to have gotten the message.
Despite these suggestions that Moscow and Kabul do not see
eye to eye on a settlement and. Soviet withdrawal, there is no
evidence of serious disagreement, of panic and desertion from
regime ranks, or of regime efforts to sabotage Moscow's
diplomacy. Moscow has continued to endorse Kabul's proposals for
a coalition, which would leave the PDPA in control. Soviet media
reported both Najibullah's assumption of the presidency and the
adoption of the new Afghan constitution with approval, and
Najibullah was given a prominent reception at the October
Revolution celebrations in Moscow. Moreover, the regime was
probably encouraged by the Soviet party Central Committee's call
this month for building more extensive ties with Afghanistan. If
not approved beforehand by Moscow.
How Will Moscow Handle Kabul?
Vorontsov told US officials in November that the Kabul regime
still had a "ruling party mentality" from which the Soviets were
trying to wean it. Several Soviets have claimed that Moscow is
urging the regime to deal with the opposition and that the United
States should do the same with the resistance. Some Soviets and
East Europeans have also suggested that Najibullah's assumption
of the presidency and purges of party opponents last fall were
inside Pakistan.
How Will Moscow Handle Islamabad?
The Soviet strategy for dealing with Pakistan has recently
been much the same as its strategy for dealing with the United
States. The Soviets have cited Kabul's 12-month timetable
proposal, pressed the Pakistanis to cut off aid to the insurgents
so that it can be implemented, and urged them to lean on the
resistance to discuss a coalition with the PDPA. In the case of
Pakistan, however, Moscow probably calculates that its diplomacy
will create not only international but domestic pressure for
Islamabad to be cooperative. Moreover, Soviet efforts have been
reinforced by the Afghan regime's continuing campaign of sabotage
the resistance to deal with Kabul.
offering some earnest of their good faith, such as pressure on
The Soviets may also be using Vorontsov's promised visit as a
tease to prod the Pakistanis into making proposals beforehand or
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How Will Moscow Handle Cordovez?
The Soviets have encouraged UN negotiator Cordovez to pursue
his plan for setting up talks on a new government among
representatives of the resistance, the exiles, and the PDPA. In
these negotiations, no positions would be set aside beforehand
for any party. Vorontsov told US officials in November, however,
that Cordovez's ideas were worth developing but should not be
implemented by him because this issue lay outside the UN mandate.
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SUBJECT: Soviet Strategy on Afghanistan After the Summit
External Distribution
White House
Peter W. Rodman
Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs (Foreign Policy)
Room 372, Old EOB
Dr. Fritz Ermarth
Special Assistant to the President, NSC
Room 368, Old EOB
Department of State
The Honorable Michael H. Armacost
Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs
Room 7240, Department of State
Mark R. Parris
Director of Soviet Union Affairs
European and Canadian Affairs
Room 4217, Department of State
Wayne Limberg
Chief, INR/SEE/FP
Room 4843, Department of State
Zalmay Khalilzad
Policy Planning Staff
Room 7330, Department of State
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SUBJECT: Soviet Strategy on Afghanistan After the Summit
Internal Distribution
SA/DCI
ED/DCI
Executive Registry
DDI
Senior Review Panel
OCPAS/IMD/CB
Chairman, NIC
Vice Chairman, NIC
NIC/AG
NIO/USSR-EE
NIO/NESA
PDB Staff
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