USSR-AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET MILITARY DEFECTORS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000800020001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 18, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Washington. D. C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
18 February 1987
USSR-Afghanistan: Soviet Military Defectors ,
Central Intelligence Agency
Summary
defections.
This memorandum addresses why Soviet soldiers have defected
from the Soviet army in Afghanistan, recent trends in the numbers
of defections, and the impact on the Soviet military and Soviet
society. It also speculates on the effects of an increase in
Most defectors are motivated by personal rather than
ideological considerations, primarily abuse from officers and
senior soldiers. Potential defectors are strongly deterred by
stories of bad treatment from the insurgents, and the number of
defectors appears to be dropping, possibly because of increased
Soviet security efforts. Moscow is very sensitive to military
.defections, in part due to rising domestic awareness of this
issue, and has recently raised alleged mistreatment of Soviet
prisoners in diplomatic channels. Any increase in defections
would lead to redoubled security, es ally if defectors included
older soldiers or officers. eci 25X1
This memorandum was prepared by the Third 25X1
World Activities Division, Office of Soviet Analysis, with a
contribution from
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World Activities, SOVA 25X1
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There are no reliable numbers for Soviet soldiers now in the
hands of the various insurgent groups. Current estimates range
from 50 to several hundred scattered around Afghanistan. Of these,
some are actual prisoners being held against their will; others
are deserters--or former prisoners--who never planned to join the
insurgents, but are now cooperating either voluntarily or under
pressure; and an unknown but probably small percentage are
defectors who actively sought out the mujahideen, either to join
the resistance or as a way of escaping to, the West.
--Few insurgent groups inside Afghanistan have the resources
or inclination to keep prisoners for long, and most Soviets
captured, especially in combat, are killed.
--A few are probably kept imprisoned at insurgent bases near
the Pakistani border, and a growing number are used for prisoner
exchanges.
Motivation. The majority of those who remain alive have done
so by cooperating to various degrees with their captors. These
include Soviet Muslims, who identify to some extent with the
insurgents and can expect to adapt readily to life in Afghanistan.
Others--probably a majority--are Slavs. Almost all are conscripts
in the early months of their Afghan tour--none have been officers.
In front of the mujahideen defectors and deserters tend to
stress disgust with communism and commitment to Islam as their
reasons for deserting, but almost all who have had a chance to
talk with Western observers say the immediate causes were
personal. Common reasons include loneliness and boredom but above
all poor treatment, including repeated physical abuse, by officers
and older soldiers. This is sometimes accompanied by racial
prejudice. Many had been in trouble for insubordination,
black-marketeering, and other offenses and deserted in part to
avoid additional punishment.
Most potential defectors and deserters are deterred by
widespread stories of mujahideen cruelty and mistreatment of
prisoners, and uncertainty of how they may be received by Pakistan
or the West. Examples of successful defection, especially good
treatment by the insurgents, would do more than anything else to
encourage imitation.
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Both defectors and deserters may be vaguely attracted to the
West but their first desire is simply to escape the military.
Several former POWs exfiltrated to the West eventually went back
to the USSR. A Soviet private who sought asylum at the US embass
in Kabul in November 1985 returned after four days.
defectors and cooperating prisoners than earlier in the war. Most
defectors interviewed over the past two years defected between
1981 and 1984. This does not, however, reflect any noticeable
improvement in the treatment of junior soldiers or other factors
affecting morale.
--Soviet security at fixed garrisons has gotten tighter, with
more extensive minefields and perimeter positions. Opportunities
to fraternize with the local population, never great, have been
'reduced.
knew the local area and could count on help from friends.
Trends. If anything, there appear to be fewer Soviet
Fear of fighting or death in combat is not a major cause of
desertion, but defectors often cite their disgust at atrocities
against civilians, which they either heard about or experienced
firsthand, as contributing factors in their decision. As is
often the case, discipline in the rear areas and among support
troops--who constitute the majority of Soviet forces in
Afghanistan--appears to be lower than in combat units. Most
desertions occurred from fixed posts and garrisons by soldier
some cases, to disillusion with the Soviet system altogether.
--The increase in information about the war in the Soviet
Union and in pre-tour briefings of Soviet troops makes it less
likely that soldiers will be shocked by the reality of the war and
desert in reaction to an unexpected situation. Early on, soldiers
were told they would be fighting US and Chinese mercenaries, and
that the local population was firmly on their side. Many defectors
say growing awareness that the Afghans almost universally oppose
them contributed to their distrust of military authorities and, in
Impact on the Military. The effect on military morale of past
desertions is probably slight. The numbers are small, and in most
cases the authorities can cover up the truth or plausibly claim
the deserter was an obvious malcontent.
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A higher desertion rate would raise Soviet fears of a collapse
of morale and lead to more stringent security measures. It might
also result in more serious attempts to reform the military's
deeply entrenched tradition of abusing junior soldiers by holding
officers more responsible for the welfare of their men. 25X1
Domestic Implications. Most Soviet citizens probably know
little about specific defections, although they are generally
aware that such actions take place. Several deserters who made
their way to the West and later redefected have received domestic
press coverage. Soviet media have followed a contrived scenario
in presenting these cases--the "deserter" was captured or
kidnapped, and criticized the Soviet system only under the
influence of drugs or torture. Official efforts to indoctrinate
the Soviet population, however, are undermined to an extent by
foreign radio, the rumor mill, and samizdat. Interested segments
of the population, including soldiers themselves, know that some
deserters have made it to the West, that deserters are pursued and
fired upon, and those who redefect receive sentences of10-15
years for treason, regardless of promises of leniency.
Over the last two years, Moscow has shown greater concern
about getting its prisoners back, possibly reflecting more
domestic awareness of this issue.
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--In December 1986 the Soviet ambassador to Washington
presented the State Department with a demarche implying it held
the US responsible for alleged POWs being held in Pakistan.
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SOVA/TWAD
19 Feb 1987
DDI/Richard Kerr
NIO/USSR
NI0/NESA
SOV M 87-2001&C--X
CIA
USSR-Afghanistan: Soviet Military Defectors
D/SOVA
C/SOYA/RIG
C/SOVA/RIG/TWAD
C/NESA/SA
Copy No.
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NSC Staff
Colin Powell, Deputy Director 98
Fritz Ermarth
Robert Oakley 7
Barry Kelly 11
Mary Henhoeffer 13
James Collins 29
State Department
Michael Armacost, Undersecretary of State 3
Edward Djerejian, Assistant Secretary Near East/S. Asia 4
Robert Peck, Deputy Assistant Secretary Near East/S. Asia 14
Charles Dunbar, Special Assistant for Afghanistan 15
Jay Taylor, INR 16
Defense Department
Fred Ikle, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy 6
Richard Araitage, Assistant Secretary, ISA 2
Lt. Gen. John Moellering, Assistant to Chairman, JCS 5
Capt. Gary Hughes, Office of JCS 19
Walter Jajko 10
Michael Obyrne 17
Vincent Cannistraro 8
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