THE DOBRYNIN VISIT TO EAST BERLIN: MORE THAN A PARISH CALL?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000700930001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 28, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
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DATE c -5- j 7
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Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
28 January 1987
The Dobrynin Visit to East Berlin: More than a Parish Call?
to manage the frictions.
Summary
The Soviets probably used Dobrynin's visit to East Berlin on
January 19 through 20 to pressure East Germany to follow Moscow's
lead in dealing with the post-election West German government.
The coolness in East German media coverage of the visit indicates
persistent differences between Moscow and East Berlin over intra-
German relations and a range of political and economic issues. -
East German leader Honecker's defiant restatement during the
visit of positions known to diverge from Moscow's suggests that
continued rough sledding in Soviet-East German relations lies
ahead. Honecker's upcoming meetings with Shevardnadze (February)
and Gorbachev (June) should shed light on the ability of both sides
Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze.
1. Soviet party secretary and International Department Chief
Dobrynin visited East Berlin from 19 through 20 January for talks
with his GDR counterpart Hermann Axen and East German leader
Honecker. The visit--Dobrynin's first to Eastern Europe since he
became party secretary--occurred almost simultaneously with the
Soviet announcement of an early February visit to East Germany by
European Division, EURA 25X1
European Assessments Division SOVA or the Chief, East
This memorandum was prepared in the European Assessments Division of the 25X1
Office of Soviet Analysis and in the East European
Division of the Office of European Analysis It elaborates on a
response to a request from Fritz Ermarth, Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs on the National Security Council
Staff. Comments and questions are welcome and should he directed to the Chief, 25X1
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Soviet Motives and Objectives
2. The Soviet media characterized the Dohrynin visit as a
"detailed exchange of views" on international and bilateral issues
but gave no further details. Soviet Ambassador to East Berlin
Kochemasov told the British ambassador that the meetings dealt with
the Geneva negotiations and Afghanistan.
3. Although these subjects may have been discussed
peripherally and we lack other direct evidence on the substance of
the talks, we do not find Kochemasov's "read out" credible. Based
on the timing and context of the visit--less than a week before the
West German elections (25 January)--we believe Dobrynin forcefully
reminded Honecker to follow Moscow's lead closely in dealings with
the new Kohl government. As the election campaign entered its
final stretch, the Soviets had avoided contributing to a Kohl
victory by blatant interference. Nevertheless, Moscow made it
clear--through a calculated cooling of relations with the FRG in
November and December 1986--that it was prepared to put a
rapprochement on ice to pressure Kohl to be more accommodating to
Soviet views on security issues such as SDI.
4. The choice of Dobrynin--who, according to Soviet
Ambassador to the FRG Kvitsinsky, is charged with overseeing
Soviet-West German exchanges at all levels--underscored Moscow's
determination to keep the East Germans in lock step with Soviet
policy towards the FRG. Additionally, Dobrynin may have reminded
them of high-level Soviet concerns expressed in talks on trade and
oil deliveries stretching into December 1986. For the past year,
the Soviets have been pressing the East Germans to increase their
deliveries of high quality, high technology goods and consumer
products to the USSR and to participate in joint ventures.
5. We do not believe that the Soviets used the Dobrynin visit
to discuss plans for any new moves to woo Bonn. Had they done so,
the GDR's response would have been more favorable than its cool
media treatment suggests (see paragraphs 7-8 below). Dobrynin may
even have made the journey to warn Honecker that the Soviets, for
their own tactical reasons, will prolong a chill in political
relations with Bonn to exploit perceived divergences between Kohl
and Foreign Minister Genscher over East-West issues as well as
between the Kohl government and certain sectors of the West German
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public. In this context, we believe Dobrynin probably told
Honecker not to interpret the recently rescheduled April visit to
West Germany of Soviet deputy premier Antonov as the start of a new
warming trend.
6. From the standpoint of Soviet leadership politics, the
visit underscores Dobrynin's status as a key player on a broad
range of East-West issues while marking a new public role for him
in Moscow's dealings with its East European allies. Given the
persistent rumors that Dobrynin may replace Shevardnadze, both the
Afghanistan and the East Berlin trips may have been designed to
heighten Dobrynin's visibility as a spokesman for the leadership on
3
East German Handling of the Visit
7. Signs of strain and a distinct GDR coolness are evident in
official East German reporting on Dobrynin's meeting with
Honecker. If Dobrynin had conveyed a message that Honecker found-
to his liking, there would have been a much more positive media
rendition of their meeting. The GDR leader "warmly reciprocated"
the fraternal greetings sent by Gorbachev but otherwise--contrary to
normal practice--there was no characterization of the meeting's
atmosphere or the degree of cordiality in the exchange.
8. Honecker, according to our reading of GDR media
reporting, used the occasion to restate forcefully a number of
East German policies that have been sources of friction with the
Soviets in the past.
-- He reiterated the "active contribution" of the East
Germans to the quest for peace by virtue of efforts to
promote "dialogue" with "all forces of reason and
realism." Since the INF deployments of 1983, this
phrasing has been shorthand for asserting the "role of
small states" in furthering detente. More specifically,
this claim is aimed at promoting intra-German
rel ati ons.
-- He declared that "there must be no return to the
situation before Reykjavik." Although East Berlin has
dutifully blasted the United States for its commitment
to SDI, GDR commentary has repeatedly stressed the
obligation of both superpowers to return to the
negotiating table. The technologically advanced GDR
3 Dobrynin, however, was not promoted to Politburo status at the January 1987
Central Committee plenum as had been rumored.
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most likely fears being sucked into the Soviet counter-
SDI effort that will make an in reasin Soviet claim on
scarce East German resources.
-- Finally, Honecker forcefully stated that his way of
doing things was working--a pointed reminder to the
Soviets that, despite uneasiness with such Gorbachev
policies as glasnost, the GDR is fulfilling Moscow's
demand for high levels of economic performance while
maintaining order and stability. Such an assertion
would he even more pointed if unconfirmed reports that
the Soviets want Honecker to step down are true.
Outlook
appropriate interlocutor with Moscow.
9. Early Soviet media reporting on the FRG elections
attributes the decline in voter support for the Christian
Democrats to a rejection of Kohl's backing of US arms control
policies and his allegedly "anti-Soviet" posture. The Soviets
clearly wel come the strong showing of the Free Democrats and the
increased prominence of Foreign Minister Genscher, who is as an
advocate of better West German relations with the USSR. For the
next month or so, the Soviets probably will adopt a wait-and-see
attitude towards Bonn as they determine the pace and direction of
any new West German initiatives. They will also look for subtle
ways to build up Genscher in place of Kohl as the most
sacrificing to Soviet political objectives.
10. In this context, Moscow will monitor intra-German
relations even more closely and send frequent warnings to ensure
that East Berlin sends no signals that run counter to the Soviet
game plan. From East Germany's perspective, the Dobrynin visit
is likely to increase friction with the Soviets. The East
Germans--who already are at odds with the Soviets on a range of
economic and political issues, including a visceral dislike for
Gorbachev's policy of glasnost--would be very unhappy with an
extended, Soviet-mandated chill on intra-German relations. They
have made clear their readiness to deal with Kohl and have a list
of short-term economic goals--for example, the West German-
financed electrification of railroad lines--which they would resent
11. On balance, however, Honecker will remain wary of
pushing the Soviets too far, especially on core issues such as
intra-German relations. He has nonetheless signaled his
intention of promoting East German interests, even though he is
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aware that intransigence on relations with Bonn could cost him
his job--as it did for his predecessor Walter Ulbricht.
12. High-level bilateral meetings over the next six months
will provide an opportunity to assess the ability of both sides
to manage the tensions in their relationship and to determine how
-rapidly such tensions are mounting.
-- Shevardnadze arrives in East Berlin in early February
and, among other things, probably will repeat Dohrynin's
message.
-- Gorbachev himself should visit East Berlin in June for a
meeting with Honecker and other party chiefs at the
annual meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political
Consultative Committee.
13. Other indicators of how well both sides are managing
the frictions in their relationship would include, among others: -
-- Increased unscheduled high-level meetings.
-- Increasingly harsh Soviet rhetoric against West Germany,
with or without support from East Berlin.
-- Announcement of the signing of a significant number of
Soviet-East German economic or scientific-technical
agreements.
- Announcement of a Gorbachev or Honecker trip to the
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SUBJECT: The Dobrynin Visit to East Berlin: More Than a Parish Call?
Mr. Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Fritz Ermarth
Special Assistant to the President
Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs ,
National Security Council Staff
Room 368, Old EOB
Ronald St. Martin
Director, Crisis Management Center
Room 303, Old FOR
Barry Kelley
Intelligence Program, National Security Council
Room 300
EOB
Michael K. Bohn
Director
White House Situation Room
State
Mr. Robert Baraz
Director of Analysis for the Soviet Union & Western Europe, INR
Room 4F58
Department of State
Mr. Mark R. Parris
Director of Soviet Union Affairs
Room 4217
Department of State
Ambassador H. Allen Holmes
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Room 7327
Department of State
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Jenonne R. Walker
Deputy Director, Bureau Politico-Military Affairs
Room 7325
Department of State
Mr. John Evans
Deputy Director of Soviet Union Affairs
Rm. 4217
Department of State
Mr. Charles H. Thomas
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and
Canadian Affairs
Room 6226
Department of State
Mr. Bill Courtney
Special Assistant, Office of Under Secretary of State
Room 7240
Department of State
Mr. Richard Solomon
Director
Policy Planning Staff
Room 7311
Department of State
Mr. Ray Caldwell
Director, Office of European Security and Political Affairs
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Room 6227
Department of State
Mr. Barry Lowenkron
Policy Planning Staff
Room 7316
Department of State
Mr. David Johnson
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Room 6515A
Department of State
Mr. Richard A. Clarke
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regional Analysis, INR
Room 4F58
Department of State
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Mr. Ray Firehock
Chief, Intelligence Division, ACDA
Room 5499
New State
Mr. Algis Avizienis
INR/SEE/EE
Room 4752
Department of State
Mr. Harry J. Gilmore
Director, Office of Central European Affairs
Room 4232
Department of State
Mr. William Bodde
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Room 6226
Department of State
Mr. Wayne Merry
Officer in Charge, Berlin and GDR Affairs
Office of Central European Affairs
Room 4228
Department of State
Rozanne L. Ridgway
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Room 6226, Dept of State
Mr. Darnell M. Whitt
Intelligence Adviser to Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, DoD
Room 4D840
The Pentagon
Mr. James Morrison
Director of Regional Policy, DASD/ISP
Room 1D469
The Pentagon
Dr. Wynfred Joshua
DIO for European and Soviet Political/Military Affairs
Room 2C238
The Pentagon
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Mr. John Kachold
OASD/ISP/Regional Policy
Room 1D469
The Pentagon
DIA
OR-3 Western European Policy
Bolling AF Base
Other
Byron Jackson
Director, Office of Intelligence Liaison
Room 6854 Main Commerce
Department of Commerce
Douglas Mullholland
Special Assistant to the Secretary (National Security)
Room 4324
Department of Treasury
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