PAKISTAN: UPDATE ON AFGHANISTAN GAME-PLAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000700880001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 29, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700880001-5 25X1
DATE -Z7
FiLF
Doc No /0//sir N1 8"7-20130
OIR 3
P f, PD DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 December 1987
Pakistan: Update on Afghanistan Game-Plan
SUMMARY
President Zia and senior Pakistani policymakers remain
skeptical that Moscow will quickly and irrevocably withdraw
from Afghanistan. Islamabad believes Soviet signals that it
would accept a 12-month withdrawal timetable are credible but
is wary of Soviet hints about delinking the timetable from
agreement on an interim government. Zia fears the Soviets
would wait for supplies to the resistance to be cut off and
then find an excuse to resume hostilities. He wants prior
agreement on a transitional government headed by Zahir Shah
with resistance and, Kabul regime representation. Islamabad
seeks a withdrawal timetable under 12 months, but would accept
12 months if the interim government issue is resolved and the
bulk of the Soviet troops are withdrawn swiftly. Pakistan
would try to assist the withdrawal by encouraging the
resistance not to harass the departing Soviets and to refrain
from taking revenge on Kabul regime officials. Zia believes he
can gain the Peshawar-based alliance's consent for such an
agreement and is ready to use Pakistan's control over supplies
to press reluctant leaders to acquiesce.
We believe President,Zia and senior Pakistani policymakers remain wary
of Soviet intentions in Afghanistan. Prior to the Reagan-Gorbachev summit,
Zia noted to Ambassador Raphel the Russians have a way of increasing
expectations on Afghanistan before key meetings then not delivering. After
the summit Zia asked the Ambassador to convey to President Reagan his
warning that we should remain on our guard. Senior Ministry of Foreign
Affairs officials have recently contrasted Soviet rhetoric about Moscow's
desire to withdraw with evidence that the Soviets are augmenting
fortifications in Kabul and Jalalabad and with their continuing efforts to
This memorandum was prepared by Pakistan/Bangladesh
Branch, South Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis. Comments and he directed to Chief, South Asia
Division F L"
NESA M# R7-2nll0
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undermine Pakistani resolve by border shellings, bombings and terrorist
attacks inside Pakistan.* The Pakistanis attach great significance to the
planned, but as yet unscheduled, talks in Islamabad with Soviet First
Deputy Foreign Secretary Vorontsov. Zia believes that if these talks take
place they will force Moscow to prove its sincerity. If the talks do not
occur, Pakistani suspicions will be reinforced and the Pakistanis will o
to Geneva in February anticipating little Soviet flexibility. 25X1
The post-summit statements by Zia and his advisors suggest they are
wary of agreeing to a withdrawal timetable before the composition and
implementation of an interim government is worked out. Zia sees the
bilateral talks with Vorontsov and the next round of Geneva talks as
crucial to the possibility of securing a Soviet withdrawal in 1988. We
think Zia has concluded that in Geneva the Soviets will table a 12-month
timetable while details of the interim arrangement remain unclear. The
Pakistanis are skeptical of Soviet hints that they are willing to delink
the two. They doubt that the Soviets will withdraw until they are certain
that the transitional government will prevent a rapid takeover by the
resistance and will protect the safety of those members of the Kabul regime
who remain in Afghanistan. 25X1
Zia has stressed that under the draft Geneva accords, military aid to
the Afghan resistance must end 60 days after the agreement is signed. He
and former intelligence chief General Akhtar maintain that the Soviets
could renege a few months after beginning a withdrawal and after supplies
to the resistance had been halted. They argue that it would then be
extremely difficult, and entail major logistical and political problems,
for Pakistan to resume supplying the resistance.
Zia may be overstating the logistical difficulties in resuming aid but
not the political problems. Zia and the military's resolve to continue
supporting the resistance fighters in the field remains high in our
judgment. Prime Minister Junejo and other senior Muslim League leaders,
however, are more susceptible to signs of war weariness among Pakistanis.
We believe that if Islamabad formally commits itself to ending assistance
and the pipeline is shut down, Junejo would be extremely reluctant to agree
to reopen it. In the end we think that he would succumb to pressure from
Zia and the military to restart aid, but the debate could provoke a major
* In fact, the construction and expansion of Soviet military facilities in
Afghanistan continues at a steady pace despite recent hints the Soviets
might withdraw.
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Pakistani Views on a Timetable
Zia's objective is a swift Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan
with guarantees that Soviet forces will not be reinserted.
we believe
that Islamabad is prepared to accept 12 months if Soviet military
activities are "restrained" during the withdrawal phase and if the bulk of
Soviet troops are withdrawn quickly. Foreign Secretary Sattar told
reporters last week that the time frames proposed by the two states are so
close that they are "negotiable."
We believe the Pakistanis envision that the Soviets would limit
military action strictly to self-defense. The Pakistanis would use their
influence with the Peshawar resistance leaders in an attempt to secure a
Pakistani Views on-an Interim Government
We believe Pakistani linkage of agreement on the timetable with
agreement on an interim government is grounded on three assumptions:
--only after both have been negotiated can Pakistan be reasonably
assured the Soviets will honor a withdrawal commitment;
--Pakistan can persuade the resistance alliance to support a
settlement only after both the withdrawal timeframe and the
composition of an interim government are clear,
--only then will large numbers of refugees trust a cease-fire and
return to Afghanistan.
We do not anticipate Islamabad will significantly alter this position.
Islamabad has not, in our view, thought through its position on the
composition of a transitional government. We think the Pakistanis intend
their consultations with the US to assist them in formulating their
position. Zia will be seeking Washington's input into devising a formula
to increase his leverage over the alliance when it comes time to impose a
settlement on the resistance. Zia's approach to an interim government
appears to be based on his assessment of what he can persuade the
resistance alliance to accept. Implicit in the Pakistani approach is the
calculation that the Peshawar alliance can be used to control the field
commanders in Afghanistan.
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We anticipate that any interim government arrangement Zia agrees to
will contain the following elements:
--it will be headed, at least nominally, by former King Zahir Shah as
a figure acceptable to Moscow;
--the present Kabul regime will be represented, probably through
secondary figures, but it will not be allowed a dominant role;
--the resistance alliance will receive representation at least equal
to that of the Kabul regime;
--an interim government and its successors will be pledged to be
neutral and non-aligned, guarantees essential to secure Soviet
agreement.\
We speculate that Zia also will offer a pledge to use Pakistan's
influence on the resistance to persuade it to'refrain from reprisals
against Kabul regime officials. Foreign Secretary Sattar's statements to
Ambassador Raphel indicate the Pakistanis believe fear of a "bloodbath" is
a major factor in Soviet reluctance to withdraw. We judge Pakistani
leverage over the resistance on this issue is limited and speculate that 25X1
Islamabad may seek to augment any pledge by securing from resistance
leaders a list of regime figures the Soviets must take into exile.
How Does Cordovez Fit In?
Islamabad, in our judgment, sees the Geneva process headed by UN
Special Negotiator Diego Cordovez as serving two useful functions. The
process helps focus world attention on Afghanistan thereby increasing
pressure on Moscow to leave. It also demonstrdtes the government's
commitment to the Pakistani public to seek an end to the war and the
repatriation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Publicly, Islamabad is
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committed to full cooperation with Cordovez.
We believe the Pakistanis have concluded privately that there is little
Cordovez can do to bring about a settlement. We judge Islamabad will
continue to cooperate with Cordovez but will resist his efforts to expand
his role into issues of substance. Islamabad is convinced that an end to
the war lies in Moscow, not Geneva or Kabul. Moreover, the Pakistanis
appear to be growing wary of Cordovez. i
Islamabad also is skeptical of Cordovez' ongoing talks with Afghan exiles
in Europe and his efforts to meet directly with resistance leaders in
Peshawar. The Pakistanis think that he has exaggerated the importance of
the European exiles and has little grasp of the realities of Afghan
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Distribution:
EXTERNAL
1 - The Honorable Michael H. Armacost (New State)
INTERNAL
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - DCI/DDCI Exec Staff
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/USSR
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - C/AI/D
1 - C/IA/D
1 - C/PG/D
1 - C/NESA/SO/A
1 - C/NESA/SO/P
1 - D/SOVA
1 - DD/SOVA
1 - C/SOVA/RIG/RPD
1 - C/DO/
1 - DO/NE
1 - C/PES
- CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - NID Staff
1 - PDB Staff
1 - C/PPS
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - SO/A
1 - SO/P
1 - SOVA/RPD/NESA
1 - File
DDI/NESA/SO (31 December 1987)
5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700880001-5