AFGHAN INSURGENTS' RESPONSES TO CHANGES IN MOSCOW'S STRATEGY: TWO SCENARIOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000700810001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 16, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
16 December 1987
Afghan Insurgents' Responses to
Changes in Moscow's Strategy: Two Scenarios
SUMMARY
This memorandum provides a speculative discussion of possible
insurgent responses to major changes in Soviet strategy in
Afghanistan involving two scenarios:
--a complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan,
or,
--Soviet adoption of an "enclave" strategy--for example,
concentrating forces at a few major bases--that is not
intended as a first step toward leaving the country.
If the Soviets withdraw completely, we believe political
power in the largely non-Pashtun northern and western provinces
would remain in the hands of major regional commanders such as
Masood and Ismail Khan, although there would be some loosening of
their control once the Soviet threat was removed. In the
Pashtun-dominated provinces of southern and eastern Afghanistan,
we believe the regional commanders would have to compete for
power with tribal figures and returning refugees. The leaders of
the Pakistan-based resistance alliance--except for
Gulbuddin--would become irrelevant politically once the flow of
arms from Pakistan becomes unnecessary, in our view.
Under the scenario of a withdrawal of Soviet forces to a few
enclaves, we believe the major resistance field commanders would
be strengthened politically and almost certainly would not reduce
military activity. A Soviet withdrawal to enclaves would be
widely interpreted by the guerrillas as a sign of weakness and
would spur them to intensify their efforts against the Soviets
This typescript was prepared by
Afghanistan Branch, South Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and
South Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and should be
directed to Chief, South Asia Division
L
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and the Kabul regime. The absence of the Soviets from the
countryside also would give field commanders greater scope for
conducting a methodical development of their own political
We believe the Shia-controlled Hazarajat area of central
Afghanistan will remain a wild card under either scenario. The
Shia are likely to continue to fight amongst themselves, united
only in a determination to prevent a Sunni-dominated Kabul from
reexerting control over the region.
Scenario I: Soviet Withdrawal
Under this scenario, we believe political authority in Afghanistan
would rest primarily with the major field commanders rather than the seven
Peshawar-based resistance party leaders. Except for Hizbi Islami faction
leader Gulbuddin --whose party Is well established and organized--the
alliance chiefs in Pakistan, despite their efforts at self-promotion, would
become largely irrelevant to Afghan politics once they ceased to be the
conduit for arms. In our view, the party chiefs could not count on the
support the commanders who were affiliated with them during the war.
In our opinion, most field commanders--even powerful commanders like
Masood--would lose some of their political authority simply because they
will have less call on their followers' loyalty without an immediate Soviet
threat. We estimate the Pashtun commanders in the southern and eastern
provinces will lose more personal power than will their non-Pashtun peers
in the north and west. Although the war has weakened the traditional
tribal structure of Pashtun society, we do not believe that it has been
dismantled permanently. The absence of the Soviet threat and the return of
large numbers of refugees who have maintained tribal traditions in camps in
Pakistan and Iran, almost certainly will pit the Pashtun insurgent military
leaders against returning hereditary, tribal, and religious leaders.
Although we expect some non-traditional Pashtun commanders--especially
Mullah Malang in Qandahar, Abdul Haq in Kabul, and Jalaluddin Haggani in
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Paktia--to retain considerable political influence after the war, they
almost certainly will have to share power with traditional tribal leaders.
This could lead to an inherently unstable and violent political situation,
perhaps, for a period of time, resembling contemporary Lebanon.
Major non-Pashtun commanders such as Masood and Ismail Khan are likely
to retain political leadership in the northern and western provinces, in
our view. Both men have devoted considerable time and resources to
developing their own political organizations during the war, creating a
rudimentary social infrastructure that delivers some educational, medical,
and agricultural services and will survive the war. They are also both
charismatic leaders whose personal demeanor--especially their religious
piety and reputations for evenhandedness--and military activities during
the war won the allegiance and trust of diverse groups. Moreover, Masood
and Ismail Khan will have a postwar advantage over the Pashtun commanders
in that their Tajik, Turkmen, Shia, and Uzbek followers share a common
desire to prevent a resurgence of the prewar Pashtun dominance over Afghan
political and social affairs. This antipathy toward traditional political
arrangements among the non-Pashtuns, in our opinion, will replace some of
the "organizational glue" once provided by the Soviet occupation and will
help to limit the sort of internecine fighting that probably will prevail
'
in the country
s Pashtun regions.
We believe these regional developments could lead to a situation in
which postwar Afghanistan will be divided into Pashtun and non-Pashtun
dominated regions roughly along the line of the Hindu Kush mountains. This
postwar division is being facilitated now by the impact of the war, which
is prompting many Pashtuns resettled forcibly in the northern provinces by
the Afghan monarchy in the 19th century to return to their traditional
tribal homelands along the Pakistani border. In our view, the northern,
non-Pashtun provinces are likely to be moderately peaceful--although
incidents of political violence, especially between Jamiat and Gulbuddin
forces, will be quite common--and administered relatively effectively in
the postwar period. The southern Pashtun provinces are likely to be
characterized by far greater political violence and the return of a
tribally governed society Control of Kabul
We believe Pashtun and non-Pashtun leaders probably will clash most
sharply over the issue of who dominates the central government in Kabul.
Although we expect the Kabul government to be weak and its reach limited in
the postwar era, control over its administration will nonetheless
remain--as it has throughout Afghan history--the most important and
prestigious symbol of national political preeminence. Pashtun leaders will
expect to reign supreme in Kabul as they have under monarchical,
parliamentary, and communist systems of government since 1820. The
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non-Pashtuns, on the other hand, will strive for at least an equal role in
the Kabul administration as evidence that they no longer inhabit the lower
levels of Afghanistan's ethnic pecking order. Given the well-armed and
militarized nature of postwar Afghan society, and the fact that most
insurgent parties are well established in the Kabul area, we believe that
an armed battle for supremacy in the capital is strong possibility.
Whatever the ethnic composition of the postwar government in Kabul, it
will be dominated by Islamists, in our view. The importance of religion in
the government probably will moderate the historic insularity of the
Afghans and could result in active support for other "Muslim liberation"
movements around the world. Because Kabul is likely to be sitting on a
mountain of weapons in the postwar period, the Afghan government probably
will be tempted to assist other Islamic guerrillas--particularly in the
Middle East--either with the excess arms at its disposal or through the
provision of military training. We doubt, however, that Kabul's Islamic
regime would seek to export its revolution in a fashion similar to the
In addition to being Islamic, we believe the postwar Kabul regime is
also likely to be xenophobic. It will welcome international financial aid
for economic reconstruction but will be hostile toward a large foreign
presence--especially a Western presence--to administer the assistance. The
Pashtun and non-Pashtun regions of the country will be largely autonomous,
paying little heed to Kabul save for paying some taxes and acquiescing in
the capital's day-to-day conduct of economic policy, defense issues, and
In this decentralized political environment, we believe Iran, the USSR,
and Pakistan would have ample opportunity to manipulate the country's
diverse political groupings. All three governments have an interest in
preventing the triumph of any single group in Afghan politics--Tehran to
avoid Sunni persecution of the country's Shia minority, Moscow to preserve
leftist. influence and block the consolidation of radical fundamentalist
power in Kabul, and Islamabad to defuse the Pashtun nationalist movement.
Scenario II: Moscow Adopts an Enclave Strategy
A withdrawal of Soviet forces from the Afghan countryside to a few
major bases, in our estimate, would motivate the insurgents to keep
fighting, ensure the continued political relevance of the Pakistan-based
alliance leaders, and legitimize the field commanders' demands for loyalty
from their followers. The Soviet presence would remain undiminshed--albeit
less far flung--and for that reason would remain the fundamental factor
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We believe that the insurgents would interpret a Soviet enclave
strategy as an additional sign of Soviet-Afghan weakness. After the
redistribution of Soviet forces, the guerrillas probably would first
concentrate on attacking Afghan regime facilities and units left to fend
for themselves in outlying areas. They would then then begin applying
pressure against Soviet bases with long-range weaponry and by further
disrupting their lines of communication. We would also expect a
Politically, a Soviet withdrawal to enclaves would keep the alliance
leaders' relevant because of the guerrillas unabated need for a continuing
flow of arms from Pakistan. Such a Soviet maneuver would also, however,
give the insurgent field commanders a more conducive environment in which
to build their own political organizations. The absence of the Soviets
from most rural areas almost certainly would allow commanders--especially
those in the northern and western provinces who are already far along in
the process--to be more thorough and methodical in building the
infrastructure of their political organizations. In the southern and
eastern Pashtun provinces, we would expect that the easing of Soviet
pressure inherent in an enclave strategy would quicken the resurgence of
tribal politics and intertribal conflict. In our opinion, however, neither
the non-Pashtuns' building of political infrastructure nor an increase in
Pashtun tribal rivalries would more than marginally decrease the overall
military tempo of the insurgency
We believe the chief political benefit accruing to the guerrillas from
a Soviet enclave strategy would be the creation of an environment in which
the postwar Afghan political system would be shaped and partially
stabilized while the war was in progress. In our view, this situation
would hasten the permanent creation of semi-autonomous Pashtun and
non-Pastun areas in Afghanistan and could result in a more stable and less
violent political atmosphere within the two major ethnic regions during the
immediate postwar period. If such a regional sorting-out process occurred
during the war, however, we believe the postwar Pashtun-versus-non-Pashtun
clash for control of Kabul would be more intense because ethnic leaders
would have less need to devote time and resources to solidifying their own
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SUBJECT: Afghan Insurgents' Responses to
Changes in Moscow's Strategy: Two Scenarios
NESA M# 87-20122
Distribution:
EXTERNAL
1 - Ambassador Robert Oakley (National Security Council)
1 - The Honorable John D. Negroponte (The White House)
1 - The Honorable Richard L. Armitage (Pentagon)
1 - The Honorable Michael H. Armacost (State)
1 - Vice Admiral Jonathan T. Howe (Pentagon)
1 - The Honorable Donald P. Gregg (Old Executive Office Building)
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - DCI/DDCI Exec Staff
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/USSR
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - C/AI/D
1 - C/IA/D
1 - C/PG/D
1 - C/NESA/SO/A
1 - DO/NE
1 - C/PES
6 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - NID Staff
1 - PDB Staff
1 - C/PPS
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - SO/A
(17 December 1987)
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