PROSPECTS FOR THE INDO-SRI LANKAN PEACE ACCORD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000700750001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 27, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000700750001-9
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DATE / Z-~
DOC NO (1La .r1 f7-20
OIR 3
PAPD
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
27 November 1987
Prospects for the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord
Summary
The Indo-Sri Lankan peace accord after four months is encountering
obstacles neither Indian Prime Minister Gandhi nor Sri Lankan President
Jayewardene envisioned. Tamil resistance to the Indian military has been stiff
and casualties high. Jayewardene has managed to win ratification of the accord
in Sri Lanka's Parliament and he hopes that provincial council elections soon to
be held will maintain the accord's momentum. Continuing unrest in the north
and east, disagreement between Colombo and New Delhi over the powers of the
provincial government, and the lack of a clearly defined role for Tats l
moderates is apt to delay the election timetable for at least several months.
Fighting between the Indians and Tamil insurgents is not likely to be as
intense over the next few months as the recent Indian operations around Jaffna.
If there has been no agreement between New Delhi and the insurgents by mid-
1988, the Tamils will have had time to regroup and may launch more aggressive
and systematic attacks on Indian forces.
Serious outbreaks of violence between Tamils and Sinhalese are likely if
the Indians and Sri Lankans cannot show progress on the accord by next
summer and India may decide there is little chance to settle the island's ethnic
problem. Gandhi may look for face-saving ways to withdraw Indian
troops, possibly by arguing that India faced a more compelling national security
threat from Pakistan or China. Jayewardene might try to minimize the damage
to his political credibility by postponing elections scheduled for early 1989, but
such a move would only fuel political dissent.
This memorandum was prepared by Subcontinent 25X1
Branch, South Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis.
Information as of 23 November was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and should he directed to Chief, South Asia Divisions 25X1
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With the implementing legislation
for the peace accord passed by the
parliament in Colombo, both Sri Lanka
President Jayewardene and Indian Prime
Minister Gandhi are planning for provincial
council elections in Sri Lanka's Northern
and Eastern Provinces. The security
situation probably is too unsettled, however,
to meet the late December schedule both
leaders seek. Other senior Indian and Sri
Lankan officials appear more realistic and
are indicating elections are unlikely before
next sprin
Even if Indian military forces are able to end
the violence in the two provinces soon, we
believe the two leaders have failed
to establish a clearcut strategy for the
participation of Tamil moderates in the
elections.
India's Goals
Over the short term, Gandhi still
hopes that he can sufficiently weaken the
main Tamil insurgent group, the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam, to force them to
adhere to the accord. At the same time,
we believe he does not want to weaken them
so much that they cannot be used as an
Indian lever against the government in
Colombo in the future. New Delhi therefore
almost certainly will remain open to
the possibility of resuming a political
dialogue with the Tigers. New Delhi
probably had such a motive in mind when it
recently announced a cease-fire following the
Tigers' release of 18 Indian soldiers. if the
Tigers are willing to surrender most of their
weapons and publicly agree to abide by the
accord, we believe New Delhi would press
Colombo for more concessions to the
Tigers. If the Tigers resist, Gandhi
is prepared to continue trying to quash the
insurgents militarily.
Over the long term, we believe
Gandhi anticipates he can extract Indian
troops from their difficult peacekeeping
mission after implementing the accord. We
expect that he is prepared to keep
Indian forces in Sri Lanka at least through
next year. This would enable the Indians to
keep a lid on a new outbreak of 'i'amil-
Sinhalese violence as Colombo prepares for
the December 1988 referendum to determine
the future status of the Northern and
Eastern Provinces and the presidential and
parliamentary elections that follow in early
1989. Assuming the referendum and the
presidential and parliamentary elections are
held successfully, Gandhi likely will claim
the accord has been implemented and
withdraw his troops.
Next Steps
We expect New Delhi to undertake
additional steps to will over the Tamils
during the coming weeks in order to
establish a favorable atmosphere for the 25X1
provincial council elections:
--It likely will press moderate 'T'amil
leaders now residing in India to
return to Sri Lanka to get the
provincial administration under way,
realizing the moderates arc the
most acceptai,k Tamils to
Colombo. We believe most will
hesitate to become involved in the
face of insurgent threats
and assassinations.
--if the Tigers publicly adhere to the
accord and stop fighting, the Indians
probably will allow some Tiger
representation on the provincial
council. The Indians are unlikely to
agree, as they did prior to the recent
fighting, to allow the 'T'igers
to dominate the council.
--New Delhi may seek candidates for
the council from Tamil insurgent
groups who are rivals to the 'T'igers 25X1
to broaden "Tamil representation and
add legitimacy to the council in the
face of insurgent claims of exclusion.
Such a move would help New Delhi
counter criticism from Indian 'T'amils
angered by the Indian offensive on
.Iaffna.
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--Indian officials will continue and
perhaps intensify their relief efforts
among the Tamil populace to
weaken support for the Tigers.
India also may begin returning Sri
Lankan Tamil refugees from India
to the Eastern Province. This
would be popular with the 'T'amils
but might spark a Sinhalese
backlash.
--If the Tigers do not come to terms,
the Indians will continue to pursue
their leaders, attempt to split their
leadership by co-opting some
deputies, and hope to wear the
guerrillas down.
The Sinhalese Factor
Jayewardene is likely to concentrate
over the next few months on maintaining
Sinhalese support for the accord. I-Ie will be
m indfui that both the main Sinhalese
opposition party--the Sri Lankan Freedom
Party under the leadership of Mrs. Sirimavo
Bandaranaike--as well as politicians in his
own ruling, United National Party are
looking ahead to the presidential and
parliamentary elections in 1989.
Politicians on both sides will increasingly
key their reactions to Jayewardene's efforts
'o implement the accord to what they
believe is best for their own political careers.
We believe the 81- vear old
.layewardene also may be
growing increasingly concerned k the peace
accord will break down once he leaves office
in 1989. He has proposed signing a
friendship treaty with India that he believes
will help to ensure a long-term
commitment between the two cot.tntrics.
I)~:spite Jayewardene's public
adherence to the accord, we believe New
Delhi has some doubts about his intentions
to follow through on the agreement in the
manner in which New Delhi intends.
.laycwardenc wants to prevent a merger of
the Northern and Eastern provinces
that would strengthen the Tamils' political
role in Sri Lanka and encourage the
insurgents' goal for a separate state. India,
on the other hand, insists the merger is one
of the conditions of the accord.
India probably calculates it can give
.layewardene some leeway now in order to
achieve at least minimum progress on the
accord, but it likely will grow angry over
continuing differences as both parties grapple
with the procedural process for the
provincial council elections.
Outlook
Despite their weakened position
after the offensive, 'T'iger leaders probably
believe they have time on their side.
Fighting between the Indians and Tigers will
not he as intense over the next few months
as the recent Indian operations around
Jaffna. The Tigers will use the period to
recover from their loss es;. 'they also are
likely to try conciiiatoi tactics, such as the
recent release of the Indian soldiers, to test
India's willingness to make concessions.
New Delhi and Colombo will hold firm -to
their demands that the 't'igers surrender their
weapons and abide by the accord. By mid-
1988, if no agreement has been reached
between the Tigers and New Delhi, the
Tigers will have had time to regroup and will
be in a better position to launch more
aggressive and systematic attacks on Indian
forces. Such attacks could occur about the
time that New Delhi and Colombo are ready
to hold provincial council elections and
disrupt implementation of the accord
We believe the security situation in
Sri I,anka will deteriorate significantly if
.laycwardenc and Gandhi arc unable to begin
to show progress on the accord by next
summer. (here would be more
widespread outbreaks of violence between
'1'arnils and Sinhalese, and India
may conclude there is little chance to settle
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the island's ethnic problem. Gandhi would
then begin to look for face-saving ways to
withdraw Indian troops, possibly arguing
that India faced more compelling national
security threat such as renewed tensions on
the Indo-Pakistani or Sino-Indian borders.
Jayewardene might try to minimize the
damage to his political credibility by
postponing presidential and parliamentary
elections, arguing that conditions were too
unstable. Such a move, however, would
only fuel political unrest within the Sinhalese
community.
Over the months ahead, both
Gandhi and Jayewardene will look to the
United States for continued support for their
efforts to make the peace accord work.
Gandhi might expect Washington to
publicly acknowledge the magnitude of the
problems he faces in intervening in Sri
Lanka but will be extremely sensitive to any
interpretation that Indian forces are bogged
down. Jayewardene would expect US
support in any decision he might make to
postpone elections and US
economic assistance to bolster the country's
ailing economy in the face of more fighting.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000700750001-9
December Gandhi and /ayewardene seeking to hold
provincial elections; April May more likely
dates.
PEACE ACCORD
1987
1988
1989
29 July
LOOKPIG AFEAD FOR 14X)-SRI LANCAN
First anniversary of the signing of the
peace accord.
iO October First anniversary of the Indian military
offensive on /a f fna .
December Referendum to determine if Sri Lanka 's
Northern and Eastern Provinces to merge.
January Sri Lanka's presidential elections to be held.
March Sri Lankan parliamentary elections anticipated.
November Indian parliamentary elections scheduled.
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SRI LANKA: TAMIL INSURGENT AREAS
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000700750001-9 25X1
SUBJECT: Prospects for the Indo-Sri Lankan
Peace Accord
NESA M 87-20116 Internal Distribution
1-DCI/DDCI Executive Staff
7D60
1-Executive Registry
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1-DDI
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6C40
L__]
1 DC/DDO/NE
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1-C/D0/NE/RR
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1-NID Staff
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1-CPAS/ISS
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6-CPAS/IMD/CCB
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1-C/NESA/PPS
2G1 1
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1-C/S0/D/NESA
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1-DC/SO/D/NESA
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1-C/S0/A/NESA
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1-C/S0/PB/NESA
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1-C/S0/S/NESA
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1-C/PG/NESA
7G00
1-C/AI/NESA
6G02
1-C/IA/NESA
6G17
1-C/IA/I/NESA
6G17
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/16: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000700750001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700750001-9
SUBJECT: Prospects for the Indo-Sri
Peace Accord
NESA M 87-20116
External Distribution v
Ms. Shirin R. Tahir-Kehli (NSC)
Mr. Donald Camp (State)
Mr. Jeffrey Lundstead (State)
Mr. George S. Harris (State)
Mr. H. Allen Holmes (State
Mr. Grant Smith (State)
Mr. Robert A. Peck (State)
Mr. Walter Andersen (State)
Mr. Robert Flaten (State)
Mr. Edward Djerejian (State)
Mr. Edward W. Gnehm Jr. (State)
(DIA)
Mr. Marc S. Palevitz (DOD)
(CIA Rep/Pentagon)
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/16: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700750001-9