IRAN-IRAQ: DETERMINING WHO STARTED THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000700730002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 25, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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en ra intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
25 November 1987
Iran-Iraq: Determining Who Started the Iran-Iraq War
Summary
Iran insists that it will not consider a
ceasefire in its war with Iraq until an
international tribunal determines who started the
war. Each side argues that the other was
responsible for initiating hostilities, and
imposition of UN sanctions.
Baghdad are unlikely to agree on the formation of a
tribunal in the near term since both insist on
"sympathetic" members. For the forseeable future
Iran will not be content with a tribunal ruling in
its favor; it will insist on the punishment of
Saddam Husayn and reparations as well. Iran
realizes that such an outcome is highly unlikely,
but supporting the idea of a tribunal strings along
the current UN diplomatic effort, and avoids
outright rejection of UN Resolution 598 and the
contributed to the conflict s origins. Whatever
the merits of each side's arguments, Tehran and
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Copy of .20
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consultation with the two belligerents, the formation of such a
body. Iran, however, insists that the tribunal reach a
determination, punish the aggressor, and assess reparations
before the resolution's other provisions on a cease-fire and an
Iranian withdrawal from Iraqi territory are implemented. Iraq
argues that the resolution should be implemented sequentially, in
which case the tribunal would be constituted only after a cease-
fire and Iranian withdrawal.
The Iraqi Case Against Iran
Baghdad argues that its invasion of Iran in September 1980
was justified because Tehran had been trying since early 1979 to
overthrow the Iraqi regime. Baghdad contends that Tehran
repeatedly called for uprisings against President Saddam Husayn
in radio broadcasts and provided material and financial support
to Iraqi Shia and Kurdish dissidents. (Shias comprise 60 to 65
percent of the Iraqi population, but Sunnis dominate the
government.) According to the Iraqis, Shia assassins engaged in
an Iranian-directed terrorist campaign in Baghdad that culminated
in an attempt to kill then Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and
another Iraqi minister in April 1980.
Iran also sought to undermine the Iraqi regime through a
campaign of diplomatic and military harassment, according to
Iraqi officials. Tehran allegedly took over two Iraqi consulates
in western Iran in November 1979, frequently shelled Iraqi border
posts, and violated Iraqi air space. The border violations
culminated in the shelling of three Iraqi border towns on 4
September--an incident Baghdad claims marked the beginning of the
war.
Despite these provocations, Iraq asserts that it made a
sustained effort to establish better relations with Tehran. Iraq
claims it sent a congratulatory message to Khomeini in February
1979 immediately after his return from exile to Tehran and in
subsequent months offered to meet with top Iranian officials.
The Iranian Case Against Iraq
Iran asserts that its attempt to undermine the Iraqi regime
was a justified response to hostile Iraqi policies. According to
Iranian officials, Iraq provided material and financial aid to
Iran's Arab and Kurdish minorities, and to former officials of
the Shah's regime. They allege that this hostile campaign
involved direct support for the takeover of the Iranian Embassy
in London by Iranian Arab dissidents and assassination attempts
against Iranian officials, including Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh
in April 1980. Tehran also argues that Iraqi military forces
violated the Iranian border frequently in 1979 and 1980, prior to
the Iraqi invasion in September 1980.
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The Iranians claim that their attempts to undermine Saddam's
regime were also justified by his discriminatory policies towards
Iraq's Shia population. Iraq systematically excludes the Shias
from power and executed their leader Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-
Sadr and 70 Shia activists in 1980.
A Review of the Evidence
Iraq initially sought an accommodation with Iran after the
Shah's departure in January 1979. Although Baghdad regretted
that Khomeini returned to Iran from Paris later in the same
month, it hoped that it could work with Iranian moderates such as
Prime Minister Bazargan to prevent a resurgence of Iranian
support for Iraqi Kurds. According to reporting at the time from
the US Interests Section in Baghdad, Iraq frequently called in
the Iranian ambassador in Baghdad during the first half of 1979
to express concern about political turmoil in Iran and to urge
Tehran to implement the provision of the 1975 Algiers Accord in
which the Shah agreed to end support for Iraqi Kurdish
Relations between the two countries began to deteriorate
sharply after Iraq arrested al-Sadr in June 1979 on suspicion of
fomenting Iraqi Shia unrest with Iranian support. Khomeini had
known al-Sadr during the Iranian cleric's exile in the Iraqi city
of Najaf from 1965 to 1978. In retaliation for the arrest,
Tehran broadcasted repeated calls for the overthrow of Saddam's
regime. Baghdad responded with its own hostile propaganda
broadcasts, but did not call for the overthrow of the Iranian
government.
Both sides almost certainly were providing significant
amounts of material and financial support to each other's
dissidents by late 1979.
During 1980, both sides almost certainly conducted terrorist
operations against the other's officials. We suspect--but have
no evidence--that Iran gave direct support to Iraqi dissidents
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who were involved in a major campaign to assassinate Iraqi
officials that culminated in attempts to kill Iraqi Deputy Prime
Minister Tariq Aziz on 2 April and the Iraqi Minister of
Information twelve days later.
As bilateral relations deteriorated, Iraq began preparing
for war during the first half of 1980.
either side since the deterioration of relations began in mid-
1979, the speed with which Iraq mobilized strongly suggests that
Baghdad was looking for a pretext to attack. On 22 September,
nine Iraqi divisions invaded Iran along a 700-kilometer front.
Iraq did not begin to mobilize
its troops until after the Iranian shelling of the Iraqi border
towns of Khanaqin, Badrah, and Zurbatiyah on 4 September.
Although this was the most serious border violation committed by
The Tribunal's Prospects
sanctions.
Whatever the merits of each side's case, we believe that the
UN Secretary General will have an extremely difficult time
setting up an international tribunal satisfactory to both sides.
Iran almost certainly will insist on approving prospective panel
members and will expect that they will reach a verdict quickly,
punish Saddam Husayn, and assess reparations. Even if a panel
issues a verdict generally favorable to Iran, Tehran probably
will continue to seek a military victory over Iraq unless the
panel unexpectedly manages to extract reparations and arranges
for Saddam's removal from office. Because Iran realizes such an
outcome is highly unlikely, we believe that its near term goal in
supporting the idea of an international tribunal probably is to
string along the current UN diplomatic effort to avoid outright
rejection of UN Resolution 598 and the imposition of UN
certainly will not pay reparations to Iran, but might encourage
the wealthy Gulf Arab states to do so if Iran helps end the war.
Iraq will also insist on choosing sympathetic panel members
who believe Iran shares responsibility for the war. Iraq almost
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A panel, assuming that one is ever created, would face the
prospect of reaching a Solomon-like decision to determine the
causes of the war. It probably would stress the seminal event--
the Iraqi invasion. If it did, Tehran might be encouraged to end
the war. But panel members would also likely feel obligated to
take into consideration Iran's hostile acts toward Iraq prior to
the war, in part to avoid totally alienating Baghdad and its
Persian Gulf allies, some of whom might be willing to pay
reparations to Iran as part of a settlement that ends the war.
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Short History of Past Iran-Iraq Border Disputes
Border clashes between the predecessor states of Iran and
Iraq date back centuries. Wars between the Ottoman and Persian
Empires ended in treaties demarcating new borders in 1639, 1727,
1746, and 1823. The Shatt al Arab sovereignty issue first arose
in 1837, when the Turks destroyed the present-day Iranian city of
Khorramshahr because they feared that its growing commercial
importance would threaten the port of Basrah. Great Britain and
Russia intervened to halt the escalating tensions and forced
Persia to sign a treaty in 1847 that granted the Ottoman Empire
sovereignty over the river, but allowed Persian ships to use it.
Persia, and subsequently Iran, chaffed under this arrangement and
Tehran began increasingly to ignore Iraqi sovereignty over the
Shatt after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. 25X1
The border dispute was temporarily resolved by an Algerian-
sponsored agreement in 1975. Iraq formally agreed to move the
border from the east bank of the river to the middle of the
maritime channel. In return, the Shah agreed to end his support
for Iraqi Kurdish dissidents and to evacuate a thin 130-mile
strip of disputed territory along the central border. Iraq
renounced the Algiers accord on 17 September 1980, asserting that
Iran had continued to support the Kurds and had failed to
evacuate the disputed territory. US Interests Section sources at
the time indicated that both charges were true.
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SUBJECT: Iran-Iraq: Determining Who Started the
Iran-Iraq War
Distribution:
Copy 1 - Ambassador Robert B. Oakley. NSC
2
3 - Mr. Edward P. Djerjian, State
4 - Ms. Sandra Charles, ISA
5 - Mr. Peter Burleigh, State
6 - Mr. George Harris, State
7
8 - Mr. Roger Pajak, Treasury
9 - Mr. Alan Eastham, State
10 - DIR/DCI/DDCI/Exec Staff
11 - DDI
12 - VC/NIC
13 - NIO/NESA
14 - DO/NE
15 - DONNE
16 - DONNE
17 - C/PES
18 - C/NID
19-24 - CPAS/IMD/CB
25 - D/NESA
26 - DD/NESA
27 - C/PPS/NESA
28-29 - NESA/PPS
30 - C/NESA/AI
31 - C/NESA/IA
32 - C/NESA/SO
33 - C/NESA/PG
34 - C/NESA PG I
35 - PG/I
36-43 - NESA PG I
DI/NESA/PG/I I(25Nov87)
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