TUNISIA: PROSPECTS FOR THE BEN ALI REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000700670002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 16, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/29: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700670002-7
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D.C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
16 November 1987
Tunisia: Prospects for the Ben Ali Regime
Summary
President Ben Ali's initial actions bode well for
the country's near term stability as he endeavors to
accommodate opposition groups. He is opening up the
political system stifled by former President Bourguiba,
while promising to continue his predecessor's strongly
pro-Western foreign policies. Most Tunisians and
foreign governments have responded favorably to the
takeover. Ben Ali's biggest challenge remains how to
handle the Islamic fundamentalists and still maintain
the support of the ruling party and Army. He will
continue to be wary of Libya, making improved relations
conditional upon firm guarantees from Tripoli of
non-interference in Tunisian affairs. The President
probably also views US security assistance as vital to
Tunisia's stability, but he may not be as open publicly
as Bourguiba in embracing the United States given the
perception among some Tunisians that he has close links
On 7 November, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, the country's Prime
Minister for five weeks, announced that he had removed
84-year-old President Bourguiba from office for reasons of mental
health. Ben Ali, an Army General and former Interior Minister
This orandum was prepared by
the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division
Office of
,
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a contribution from
comments h be directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division
East Division, Office of Leadership Analysis. Information as of
13 November 1987 was used in its preparation. Questions and
NESA M# 87-20108
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/29: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700670002-7
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
16 November 1987
Tunisia: Prospects for the Ben Ali Regime
Summary
President Ben Ali's initial actions bode well for
the country's near term stability as he endeavors to
accommodate opposition groups. He is opening up the
political system stifled by former President Bourguiba,
while promising to continue his predecessor's strongly
pro-Western foreign policies. Most Tunisians and
foreign governments have responded favorably to the
takeover. Ben Ali's biggest challenge remains how to
handle the Islamic fundamentalists and still maintain
the support of the ruling party and Army. He will
continue to be wary of Libya, making improved relations
conditional upon firm guarantees from Tripoli of
non-interference in Tunisian affairs. The President
probably also views US security assistance as vital to
Tunisia's stability, but he may not be as open publicly
as Bourguiba in embracing the United States given the
perception among some Tunisians that he has close links
to Washington.
On 7 November, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, the country's Prime
Minister for five weeks, announced that he had removed
84-year-old President Bourguiba from office for reasons of mental
health. Ben Ali, an Army General and former Interior Minister
This memorandum was prepared by
the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a contribution from
comments should be directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division
East Division, Office of Leadership Analysis. Information as of
13 November 1987 was used in its preparation. Questions and
the Near East-North Africa Branch, Asia-Near
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/29: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700670002-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/29: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000700670002-7
o I I
with a reputation for toughness, assumed the Presidency. His
term of office extends until 1991, when both the President and
members of the National Assembly are required by law to seek a
The Constitution allows for Ben Ali's assumption of power
upon a determination that the President is "incapacitated." A
team of six medical doctors, including some of Bourguiba's
personal physicians, rendered the judgment earlier that day. It
is true that Bour uiba had grown increasingly feeble in recent
years,
sparked renewed violence by fundamentalists.
but in our view, the
timing of the takeover probably was linked to Bourguiba's
insistence that the leader of the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI)
and other fundamentalists sentenced to long prison terms in
September be retried and sentenced to death. We believe that
such action would have damaged Tunisia's credibility abroad and
The Domestic Front
outside the capital.
There has been no negative reaction to Ben Ali's takeover in
Tunisia. We believe most Tunisians breathed a sigh of relief
over the non-violent transition of power, given widespread
concern about Bourguiba's increasingly erratic behavior. The
former President, while being treated with the respect due the
country's founder, has hPPn sent- to live in a government villa
political prisoners.
Ben Ali has taken positive steps to garner support for his
government. He has indicated to the media that he will
liberalize the political system and the press. The government
has stated that it will allow parties full participation in
politics. Ben Ali has released the nation's chief labor leader
from house arrest and is allowing prominent dissidents in exile
to return, including former Prime Minister Mzali. Most of those
detained during the takeover, including Bourguiba's son, have
been released. The government is considering amnesty for other
In our view, the President's mimimal changes in the Cabinet
and military indicate continuity in economic policy and support
from the officer corps. His reappointment to the Cabinet of
Bourguiba's key economic ministers suggests the new government
will maintain its structural adjustment economic program under
IMF and World Bank auspices. In addition, Ben Ali promoted
several senior military officers and appointed an Army general to
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/29: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000700670002-7
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be Minister of Interior. We believe these moves are designed to
reassure foreign creditors and guarantee stability.
The International Scene
The new government has emphasized that it will maintain
Bourguiba's pro-Western foreign policy. A senior Tunisian
official has reaffirmed to US diplomats in Tunis the country's
traditional friendship with the United States and the regime's
desire to forge even closer cooperation. Foreign reaction to the
takeover has been uniformly positive, especially from France, the
country's principal ally. According to the US Embassy in Paris,
French officials are satisfied with the change in Tunis.
25X1
Regional reactions also have been supportive of the Ben Ali
government. Algerian diplomats have told US officials in Algiers
that they had been concerned about the political situation in
Tunisia, given the growing political instability of the Bourguiba
government. We believe the failure of the Algerian press to
mention Bourguiba--except for his health--or his legacy is a
clear indication that Algiers accepts the Ben Ali regime. Libyan
leader Qadhafi also congratulated Ben Ali.
Outlook
We believe that Ben Ali is taking the right steps to renew
public confidence in the government. He probably will continue
to move cautiously in dealing with his opponents. His moves will
give him the public support over the short term to meet some of
the political, economic, and social needs of the country. We
believe it is unlikely that Bourguiba or his supporters will
launch an immediate challenge to Ben Ali. In our view, even if
they did, it would have a dim chance of success.
For its part, the MTI approved of the takeover, and along
with other opposition groups is pressing for political freedoms.
Ben Ali has decided to postpone further trials of fundamentalists
in order to avoid any protests against his government, and his
ministers have hinted that those in jail who did not commit
serious crimes may be released in a year.
Given Ben Ali's hardline stance toward the fundamentalists in
the past as the nation's security chief, however, we doubt he
will give in to the MTI's basic demand to become a political
party. Indeed, the new foreign minister has stated that the
crackdown against the fundamentalists will continue -- probably
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/29: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700670002-7
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I I
referring to their violence. Nevertheless, Ben All must find
means other than repression to deal with them because they
represent the greatest threat to the regime. For example, he
probably will end government prohibitions against Islamic dress
and other apolitical manifestations of Islam.
A problem of lesser magnitude for Ben Ali is maintaining the
support of the ruling Destourian Socialist Party (PSD) and the
Army. Bourguiba's PSD has ruled the country since independence
31 years ago, and its leaders will be concerned that new freedoms
for the opposition would weaken their positions of power.
We also believe Ben Ali will be wary of Libya. Nevertheless,
the President probably will continue to improve relations with
Triopli and eventually seek a resumption of diplomatic ties. We
doubt, however, that he will succumb to pressure from Algeria to
allow Libya to become a member of the treaty linking Tunisia with
Algeria and Mauritania unless Qadhafi offers firm guarantees of
non-interference, possibly including the cessation of Libyan
Implications for the United States
Ben Ali almost certainly views security and economic aid from
the West, including the United States, as crucial to the
stability of Tunisia and the legitimacy of his regime. Like
Bourguiba, he probably regards US assistance as vital to deter
possible Libyan subversion.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/29: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000700670002-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/29: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000700670002-7
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/29: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700670002-7
NESA M# 87-20108
Tunisia: Prospects for the Ben Ali Regime
External Distribution:
1 - The Honorable Robert B. Oakley (NSC)
1 - Mr. Donald Gregg (NSC)
1 - Mr. Edward W. Gnehm, Jr. (Pentagon)
1 - Colonel Jeffrey Levy, USAF (Pentagon)
1 - Ms. Mary Ann Casey (State)
1 - Ms. Janean L. Mann (State)
1 - Mr. Charles Duefler (State)
1 - Mr. Michael Usser State)
1 - (DIA)
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1 - Mr. David Johnson (State)
1 - DIR/DCI/DDCI Exec Staff
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/29: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700670002-7