INDIA'S ACTIONS AND INTENTIONS ON AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000700540002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 9, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
9 October 1987
India's Actions and Intentions on Afghanistan
Summary
Prime Minister Gandhi views the Afghan issue as an
irritant in India's relations with the USSR and the United
States, but he does not believe India can do anything that
could significantly influence the outcome of the Afghan
conflict. Given the signs that US-Soviet relations are
improving, Gandhi likely will arrive in Washington with some
optimism that in due course the Soviets will withdraw from
Afghanistan and the United States will reduce its military
assistance to Pakistan, G ndh
continues to avoid public
criticism of either Moscow or the Kabul regime. In fact,
New Delhi's increasing diplomatic contacts with Kabul and
official statements supporting Kabul's national
reconciliation initiatives may assist the efforts of Kabul
and Moscow to legitimize the Afghan government and weaken
support for Pakistan's resolution on Afghanistan at the UN
General Assembly.
This memorandum was prepared by
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, at the request of the
National Security Council. Information as of 8 October 1987 was used
in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA
NESA M 87-20092C
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Gandhi is unlikely to be receptive to any US effort to
persuade New Delhi to criticize the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan or to limit Indian diplomatic assistance to
Kabul's Third World initiative. He probably believes the
costs to New Delhi are manageable and that the policy keeps
Indo-Soviet relations on track. Gandhi is likely to be
receptive to US arguments that India encourage a role for
former Afghan King Zahir Shah or non-sectarian political
parties in an interim and post-settlement government.
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Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's overriding interest in the Afghan
situation is to reduce US and Soviet involvement in South Asia. India
believes the United States sells Pakistan conventional weapons and
subordinates its concerns about nuclear proliferation to advance US
interests in supporting the Afghan resistance and in obtaining access
to Pakistani military facilities. Gandhi is concerned about the
Soviet military encroachment in Afghanistan and has continued his
mother's efforts to distance New Delhi from Moscow--without losing the
benefits of Indo-Soviet economic and military ties. Gandhi is also
interested in limiting Islamabad's influence in a post-withdrawal
Afghanistan so that a Pakistani-backed Islamic fundamentalist regime
in Kabul does not cause problems for India. His concern is that
India's 90 million Muslims could be more susceptible to the influence
of an Islamic-ruled Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan after what could
be perceived by Indian Muslims as an Islamic victory over the Soviets
in Afghanistan.
encouraged by Soviet officials.
Gandhi believes Gorbachev wants a
pol cal settlement-in Afghanistan, albeit one that would leave a
regime warmly disposes to Moscow. Gandhi may calculate that New Delhi
can contribute to a political resolution of the Afghan conflict by
promoting increased diplomatic activity. He likely approved the
exchange of visits by Indian and Afghan foreign ministers earlier this
year with this hope in mind--an expectation that probably was
Gandhi would face some domestic opposition if he were to be more
forthcoming with Washington on the Afghan issue. Leftist officials in
his government and Congress Party, some opposition politicians, and
media officials are quick to take issue with US
policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. They regularly claim that
cooperation between the United States, Pakistan, and the People's
Republic of China on the Afghan issue is a cover for collssion against
India. They assert that Islamabad trades on its aid for Afghan
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refugees and insurgents to acquire modern military equipment from the
United States for use against India. There is no comparable Indian
lobby pressing for an Indian hard line against the Soviet presence in
Moscow and Kabul Exerting Pressure
The Soviets and Afghans view India as key in their drive to
increase the Kabul regime's international legitimacy primarily because
of New Delhi's influential position in such organizations as the
United Nations, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC), and the Nonaligned Movement (NAM). Moscow and Kabul almost
certainly believe that even superficially warmer Afghan-India
relations are useful for softening anti-Afghan sentiments in Third
World-dominated forums. Since Afghan Foreign Minister Wakil visited
India in February, two additional delegations have gone to New Delhi
for talks: a high-ranking group from the Central Committee of the
ruling People's Democratic Part of Af hanistan and nel led the
Minister of Education.
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Gandhi's Response to Pressure
New Delhi will continue to listen to Moscow's and Washington's
arguments on the Afghan issue, but is unlikely to undertake a dramatic
move on either side's behalf in the near term. Indian officials
probably consider restraint in their public statements about the
Soviet presence in Afghanistan and diplomatic introductions for Afghan
delegations a small price to pay to help kee the militar and
economic pipeline from the Soviets open.
For now, Gandhi's involvement in Sri Lanka in July probably is
about as big a gamble as he will be willing or able to take in the
foreign policy arena. He is likely to be preoccupied with domestic
issues, given continuing difficulties with the Sikhs, the aftermath of
the drought and the political challenge being mounted by the
opposition. i -1
Gandhi's willingness to increase Indian diplomatic activity on
Afghanistan--thus far to the benefit of Kabul and Moscow--may reflect
New Delhi's efforts to protect its interests in Afghanistan in
anticipation of a Soviet withdrawal, but it may also provide an
opening for the US. We believe Gandhi would be likely to permit
Indian diplomatic activity to encourage a role for the former Afghan
King or non-sectarian political parties in an interim and post-
settlement government largely to limit Islamabad's influence. He
would take a harder line in India's Afghan policy in the unlikely
event that the Soviets made an incursion into Pakistan or Islamabad
agreed to give United States forces permanent access to military
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SUBJECT: India's Actions and Intentions on Afghanistan
25X1 NESA M 87- 20092C
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ahir-Kehii
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