PAKISTAN/USSR: THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN AGAINST PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000700470001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 7, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
7 August 1987
PAKISTAN/USSR: The Soviet Campai n Against
Pakistan's Nuclear Progam
Summary
For the past few years Moscow has campaigned actively against
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, attacking it in both the
press and private demarches. Although Moscow's criticism is
consistent with its longstanding desire to limit the spread of
nuclear weapons, it also is exploiting the issue to its own
advantage in South Asia. Soviet attacks on the Pakistani program
escalate during periods of tension with Islamabad--usually over
Afghanistan--and subside when Moscow is seeking improved
bilateral ties.
The Soviets have charged the United States with complicity in
helping Pakistan develop nuclear weapons in return for
Islamabad's cooperation in projecting military power into South
Asia and serving as a supply base for the resistance forces in
Afghanistan. Moscow hopes to pressure Pakistan into backing away
from its nuclear weapons program and, perhaps more importantly,
into modifying its policy toward Afghanistan. Moscow also is
seeking to undermine US-Pakistani relations, strengthen relations
with India, portray the United States as a threat to regional
This memorandum was prepared by
the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a contribution
from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
Information as of 7 August 1987 was used in its preparation. Questions and
comments should be addressed to Chief, Issues and Application Division
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stability, and project an image of a respectable superpower
seeking peaceful solutions to regional problems. The Soviets
have demonstrated some caution in their exploitation of the
issue, probably because they do not want Indo-Pakistani tensions
to get out of control and because they do not want India to
activate its own nuclear weapons program.
If the United States cuts aid to Pakistan as a result of
Islamabad's nuclear procurement activities, Moscow probably will
soften its criticism of Pakistan in an effort to exploit the
strain in US-Pakistani relations. If Pakistan subsequently backs
away from its support for the Afghan resistance, Moscow almost
certainly will seek improved relations with Pakistan in order to
further prospects for a favorable political settlement in
Afghanistan. The Soviets might reduce their criticism of
Pakistan's nuclear program, but would continue to counsel
restraint in Islamabad in order to maintain credibility in India.
Should Pakistan test a nuclear device, Moscow will protest
strongly and launch a major propaganda campaign against
Soviet Comment on Pakistan's Nuclear Capabilities
Moscow's public campaign against Pakistan's nuclear weapons program
has drawn heavily on Western and Indian press reporting. In October 1985,
TASS cited a Western report that Pakistan had "already created the
necessary components for a nuclear bomb" and had "even tested the explosive
device" to trigger the nuclear reaction. Shortly thereafter, the Soviets
cited Indian press reports that Pakistan had the necessary technology to
produce two nuclear bombs annually.
--From May through July 1986, Soviet media criticism of
Pakistan was particularly harsh. Pravda went beyond
normal Soviet rhetoric to assail Pakistan for its
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"criminal involvement" in Afghanistan.
--Air and ground attacks into border areas of Pakistan from
Afghanistan increased sharply in the first half of 1986.
From the summer of 1986 until the spring of 1987, Moscow's
anti-Pakistan propaganda mill was muted
This parallelled a generally softer line by Moscow toward
Pakistan which may have reflected a perception b the Kremlin that its
polic of pressure had been counter roductiv
By late 1986, Moscow and Kabul had
embarked on their "peace offensive" in Afghanistan and were trVing to pull
Islamabad into the campaign for "national reconciliation."
By the spring of 1987, the Soviet attitude toward Pakistan and its
nuclear program had again toughened, and pressure on the border with
Afghanistan intensified. When a leading Pakistani nuclear scientist, A.
Q. Khan, made a statement that a bomb had "already been tested on a
simulator,"* the Soviets gave the statement extensive publicity. One Soviet
press account cited US experts as having concluded that Pakistan was
capable of producing "four or five Hiroshima-sized weapons annually."
In the wake of this episode, the Soviets intensified their propaganda
campaign against Pakistan and made a series of demarches on the nuclear
issue. They approached the United States, charging that Pakistan's nuclear
program was accelerating and calling on Washington to prevent Pakistan from
exploding a nuclear device. Moscow stressed that such an explosion would
damage international non-proliferation efforts and fundamentally change the
strategic situation on the sub-continent.
*In reporting Khan's statement, TASS acknowledged that the scientist
subsequently had repudiated his statement about Pakistan's nuclear
potential, but recalled that in 1984 Khan had blurted out comments about
Pakistan's capacity for developing an atomic bomb.
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The recent arrest in Philadelphia of an individual of Pakistani
extraction charged with trying to export from the United States material
which could be used in the enrichment of uranium for nuclear arms triggered
more critical Soviet commentary. TASS charged that Pakistani agents had
tried to purchase such equipment and technology in the West for years. The
article claimed that US intelligence had information that the Pakistani
bomb would be analogous to those developed in the United States during
World War II and would have a yield of 10-15 kilotons.
Soviet Charges About the US Role
The Soviets have coupled their attacks on the Pakistani program with
allegations about US support for the program. They hope to undermine
US-Pakistani relations, limit US-Pakistani military cooperation on
Afghanistan, and weaken the prospects for better relations between the
United States and India. They may even hope to help provoke US
Congressional moves to cut aid to Pakistan.
Soviet charges of US complicity in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program
have been directed primarily at Indian audiences and have emphasized the
premise that Pakistan could not manufacture nuclear weapons without outside
assistance. Moscow has charged that Washington has supplied Pakistan with
the means to deliver nuclear weapons--even as it verbally "restrains"
Pakistan from producing such weapons--and has accused the United States of
violating the Symington Amendment, which provides for the cutoff of US
assistance to any country importing technology for unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities.
During its intense campaign against the Pakistani program in mid-1987,
the Soviet press elaborated on these earlier themes. Pravda stated that
the United States had trained Pakistani nuclear physicists, delivered a
nuclear reactor to Pakistan, and "resorted to various ruses and illegal
actions" in order to export nuclear technology to Pakistan. It explained
that the United States was indulging Pakistan because the latter serves as
a "bridgehead for the undeclared war against Afghanistan" and because
having an "obedient ally, armed to the teeth, and, moreover, possessing
nuclear weapons...fits well into US strategic plans in Asia."
Izvestiya charged Washington with having passed nuclear technology to
Pakistan and accused the Reagan administration of having justified
extending military aid to Pakistan by reassuring Congress that Pakistan
does not intend to create nuclear weapons--even though Pakistan itself
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refuses to give such assurances. The article indicated that the
administration has been reluctant to provide Congress with such assurances
this year, because it would be "laughable" and was therefore asking
Congress to make an exception to the law banning military sales to nations
pursuing a nuclear weapons program.
The Indian Angle
Soviet propaganda play to Indian fears of
Pakistan's nuclear capability and complement domestic pressure in India to
reassess its long-standing public policy of not developing nuclear weapons.
During the visit to India of the US
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in August 1987, Soviet
broadcasts to India were particularly harsh in their attacks on the United
States for its failure to restrain Pakistan's nuclear ambitions
While seeking to exploit the nuclear issue with India, the Soviets
have shown occasional restraint--possibly because they do not want
Indo-Pakistani friction to get out of control and do not want the Indians
to activate their own nuclear weapons program. During a visit to India in
the spring of 1987, when Indo-Pakistani tension was high, CPSU Party
Secretary Anatoliy Dobrynin tried to calm Indian fears. According to press
reports, he told a meeting of parliamentarians at an All-India Congress
Committee reception that, although the Soviet Union shared India's general
perceptions of threats in the subcontinent, it did not agree with the
"paranoia" of the ruling Congress party. In response to questions, he
specifically played down the threat from Pakistan, saying that the USSR was
not aware of Pakistan's having a nuclear bomb.
Outlook
The Soviets will continue to work to prevent Pakistan from exploding a
nuclear device and to focus attention on Washington's "complicity" in
Pakistan's actions. They will emphasize Pakistan's success in importing
nuclear technology and materials, attributing this to US collusion. They
will ignore US efforts to cut off nuclear technology to Pakistan and US
success in obstructing some nuclear transactions.
In exploiting the nuclear issue, the Soviets will continue to ignore
Islamabad's rationale for its nuclear program--that it is needed as a
deterrent against India--as well as President Zia's claims that Pakistan
does not intend to take the final step of assembling a weapon. In order to
avoid antagonizing India, Moscow will not endorse Pakistani proposals for
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New Delhi and Islamabad to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and accept
full scope safeguards, a nuclear free zone, or other verification measures,
despite Soviet endorsement of nuclear free zones in other areas of the
world. The Soviets presumably believe--as do we--that India is not likely
to accept any nuclear arrangement in the region which limits its options,
even if this position leads to a nuclear-armed Pakistan. Moscow's failure
to put pressure on India with respect to these issues strongly supports our
belief that the Soviets are less concerned with non-proliferation per se
than with exploiting the issue to gain additional leverage in South Asia,
particularly vis-a-vis the war in Afghanistan.
If the United States cuts aid to Pakistan as a result of Islamabad's
nuclear procurement activities, the Soviets may soften their criticism of
Pakistan, hoping to encourage the latter to alter its policy toward
Afghanistan. If Pakistan should respond to these events by backing away
from support for the Afghanistan resistance, Moscow will be even more
likely to seek improved relations with Islamabad in order to achieve
movement toward a favorable political settlement in Afghanistan. Under
these circumstances, Moscow probably will be less critical, publicly and
privately, of Pakistan's nuclear program. In order to maintain its
credibility with India, however, the Soviets will have to continue to
counsel restraint in Islamabad. And, should Pakistan test a nuclear
device, the Soviets will feel compelled to protest strongly and to mount a
propaganda campaign against Islamabad.
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SUBJECT: PAKISTAN/USSR: The Soviet Campaign Against
Pakistan's Nuclear Program
NESA M 87-200 76C
Copy 1 - Mr. Ronald Lorton INR/State
2 - DE/DIA
3 - Patrick N. Theros PM/ISP/State
4 - Shirin Tahir-Kheli NSC
5 - Sandra L. Charles NESA/INR/Pentagon
6 - Robert Peck State
7 - Aaron Miller State
8 - Lt. Col. Robert Kirkpatrick, USMC INA/DOD
9 - Mark S. Pernell DAMI-FII/Pentagon
10 - Stephen Cohen PPS/State
11 - Herbert Hagerty State
12 - David Hatcher DOD
13 - DIA
14 - Edward D ere an State
15 - Darnell Whitt Pentagon
16 - Wendy Chamberlin State
17 - George S. Harris INF/NESA State
18 - Grant Smith NEA/INS State
19 - Wayne Limberg State
20 - Robert Baraz State
21 - Fritz Ermarth NSC
22 - Michael Ussery State
23 - Marion Creekmore State
24 - Edwin Gnehm DOD
25 - Richard Soloman State
26 - NSA
27 - Frederick F. McGoldrick State
28 - Robert E. Upchurch INR/PMA/NS State
29 - Alan Eastham State
30 - Tyrus Cobb
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NESA M 87-200 76C
copy 31 - D/DCI-DDCI/Exec Staff
32 - Executive Registry
33 - DDI
34 - ADDI
35 - NI0/NESA
36 - NI0/AL
37 - NI0/SOVIET
38 - D/NESA
39 - DD/NESA
40 - C/PPS/NESA
41-42 - PS/NESA
43 - C/PES
44-49 - CPAS/IMB/CB
50 - PDB Staff
51 - NID Staff
52 - D/SOVA
53 - C/SOVA/NIG
54 - C/SOVA/TWAD
55 - EURA/IAD/RPI
56 - FBIS/AG
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74 - Typescript File
DI/NESA/IA/I
Aug 87
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