IMPLICATIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000700420001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 2, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/05/07 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000700420001-5 25X1
Central Intelligence Agency
DATE 7-6-t7
DOC NO /liFiff 81-2CV 70
OIR
P & PD
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
2 July 1987
IMPLICATIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN
Summary
A Soviet proposal to convene an international conference to
break the diplomatic deadlock on Afghanistan likely would reap
propaganda benefits for Moscow and impair resistance unity and
the insurgents' ties to Pakistan. We believe the Soviets might
view such a conference as a means to delay negotiations on a
withdrawal timetable, increase the legitimacy of the Afghan
regime, and weaken the resistance or, conceivably, to arrive at a
settlement.
Although Pakistan and the resistance almost certainly would
agree to participate in an international conference, we foresee
more risks for them than benefits. There would be disagreements
between insurgent moderates and fundamentalists as well as
between the insurgents and the Pakistanis during the
negotiations, reflecting the different goals of the insurgent
factions and Islamabad. US interests in strengthening resistance
unity and Pakistan's commitment to the resistance would be hurt
by public quarreling.
**********
Rumors about a Soviet proposal for an international conference on
Afghanistan with the Soviet Union, the Afghan communist regime, Pakistan,
the Afghan resistance, and the United States listed as participants have
circulated widely in the past month. The reports followed a series of
articles written in May for the Times of India by Lawrence Lifschultz, an
This memorandum was prepared by LSouth
Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and\
Third World Activities Division, Office of Soviet Analysis.
Information as of 2 July 1987 was used in preparation of this memorandum.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, South
Asia Division
NESA M#87-20070
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000700420001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700420001-5
25X1
American journalist who reportedly spent two weeks in the Soviet Union
researching the article. According to Lifschultz's account, which cites
interviews with unnamed Soviet officials, Moscow is planning to propose a
roundtable conference in order to break the current diplomatic deadlock on
Afghanistan.
\the Soviets have not publicly confirmed these press stories/
Would the Soviets Propose an International Conference?
We believe that Moscow's assessment of the results of its recent policy
initiatives on Afghanistan, including the "national reconciliation"
proposals, pressure on Pakistan, and overtures to former Afghan monarch
Zahir Shah, will determine whether it will propose an international
conference. The Soviets are particularly likely to do so if they judge
that the risk of further deterioration in the Kabul regime could be
contained. We see several reasons why Moscow might want to sponsor such a
conference:
--The Soviets would hope that it would continue to focus attention
on arrangements for a new Afghan government and away from the
withdrawal timetable, the primary issue now at Geneva.
--Moscow would gain by having Islamabad and the resistance talk
directly to Kabul for the first time.
--The Soviets may hope that the need to agree on a single negotiating
position would lead to serious rifts among the opposing players.
--If the offer were refused, Moscow could claim that its flexibility
had been frustrated again by the intransigence of the United States,
Pakistan, and the insurgents.
--If Moscow is serious about devising a face-saving arrangement
in Afghanistan as the prerequisite for agreement on a short
withdrawal timetable, it may judge a conference would offer the
best chance of a compromise that would preserve minimum Soviet
interests.
The drawbacks for Moscow might not be great enough to keep it from
making a conference proposal. Soviet proponents of a conference would
argue that by agreeing to talk to the resistance for the first time, the
Soviets would be giving up little more than they have already by having
2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000700420001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700420001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Kabul claim that a coalition with the resistance is possible. The Soviets
have already shown they are willing to take the risk that talk of
withdrawal and a compromise political arrangement in Afghanistan might
demoralize and fracture the present regime and raise expectations of a
settlement among the Soviet public. Moscow might be willing to see these
risks intensified by a roundtable conference if it judged a settlement
might result or if disruption within the alliance and among its supporters
appeared highly likely.
Kabul's Reaction
We believe the Kabul regime continues to have little stomach for the
Soviet-mandated cease-fire and national reconciliation campaign and would
be reluctant to see Moscow propose a five-party international conference.
Najib and other Afghan communists--including both his supporters and
opponents--have seen an increase in factionalism since the introduction of
the January peace proposals. The peace initiative, with its implicit
signal of a Soviet withdrawal, has also greatly undermined the confidence
of party and government cadre in the reliability of Soviet protection.
Najib almost certainly would expect a five-party conference--especially
coming on the heels of several significant military setbacks for Afghan
forces this spring--to further weaken the cohesion and governing
effectiveness of the ruling party. He would also argue that sitting at a
negotiating table with the resistance would undercut Kabul's claim to be
the sole voice of the Afghan people.
If Moscow proposes a conference, Kabul will have no choice but to
participate. The Afghan regime would much prefer in any case to be sitting
at the conference table than worrying about what the Soviets might be
arranging behind its back. We believe Najib and his supporters would
insist that Najib himself head Kabul's delegation. He probably would argue
that his participation in a conference would help to negate recent rumors
that Moscow is prepared to conclude a settlement giving him at best a
subsidiary role. He would also contend that such a role would increase
international perceptions of him as a legitimate national leader. Najib
probably also would claim--with justification, in our opinion--that his
presence would ease the Soviets' negotiating task by creating tension .
between the Pakistanis and insurgent chiefs who have made the PDPA General
Secretary's removal a requisite for a peace settlement.
Insurgent Reaction
The insurgents almost certainly would feel required to accept an
invitation to a five-party conference. Because the seven party chiefs of
the resistance alliance have long claimed to be ready to deal directly with
the Soviets, they probably believe that an alliance failure to accept an
invitation would not only alienate their principal external
3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000700420001-5
Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/05/07 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000700420001-5 25X1
backers--Pakistan, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and China--but also
weaken support for the resistance in the Third World. Although the
alliance leaders would tacitly recognize the legitimacy of the Kabul
government by attending, they probably would estimate that this negative
factor would be more than counterbalanced by the international prestige
they would derive from having "forced" a superpower to the negotiating
table.
In our opinion, the resistance alliance eventually would be able to
form a conference delegation. Such a group, however, almost certainly
would have a strong Islamist cast--the Islamists most oppose direct contact
with Kabul and most distrust the Pakistanis and the United States--in order
to persuade Sayyaf, Khalis, Gulbuddin, and perhaps Rabbani to participate.
In the course of the conference's proceedings, we believe there would be
little flexibility in the alliance's negotiating position. Moreover, US or
Pakistani pressure on the insurgents to accommodate Soviet-Afghan demands
probably would destroy the alliance's negotiating consensus, thereby either
splitting the delegation into its Islamist and moderate components or
prompting the group to walk out in order to maintain its unity.
The Pakistani Reaction
US diplomats in Islamabad say that the Pakistanis are intrigued by the
press articles suggesting the Soviets will propose a conference. Foreign
Ministry officials in Islamabad have stated that the reported Soviet offer
is similar to proposals made since 1979 by the British, the Organization of
Islamic Conferences, and Iran (see annex). Some of these officials implied
to US diplomats that the Pakistani Government probably would be receptive
to a Soviet call for an international conference. Pakistani Foreign
Minister Yaqub Khan, however, expressed doubt about the reports to US
officials, saying that if the Soviets wanted to raise the subject of an
international 7onference, they could do so directly with the Pakistanis.
We believe Pakistan would have little choice but to accept a Soviet
invitation to attend an international conference on Afghanistan. To reject
such an invitation, in Islamabad's eyes, would be to invite domestic
discontent over Pakistan's unwillingness to explore every avenue for a
settlement in Afghanistan and hand a major international propaganda victory
to Moscow and Kabul.
Nonetheless, we believe Islamabad would find itself caught in a dilemma
if Moscow were to make a formal proposal. If the Afghan regime were made a
conference participant, Pakistan would have to decide whether or not to sit
at the same table, thus implicitly recognizing the communist regime after
seven years of nonrecognition. Even if Islamabad simply declared that its
participation did not imply diplomatic recognition, such a development
4
25X1
25X1
neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700420001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/05/07 CIA-RDP90T00114R000700420001-5 25X1
would hurt Pakistan's efforts to prevent other governments from recognizing
Kabul.
More serious, however, would be Pakistan's fear that the conference
would expose and enlarge rifts between the insurgents and Pakistan that
could be exploited by Moscow. The fundamentalist resistance leaders, such
as Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and Yunus Khalis, disagree with Pakistan over issues
such as composition of an interim Afghan government. This problem would
become acute if the Soviets tabled an offer that would be acceptable to
Pakistan--such as acceptance of former King Zahir Shah as head of a neutral
interim government--but rejected by some or all of the resistance
delegation. Islamabad would then be faced with the unpalatable choice of
pressuring the resistance leaders to be accommodating--and thereby risking
a breakup of the resistance alliance--or having all or part of the
resistance walk out of the conference. Either option would, in Pakistan's
view, provide Moscow with a propaganda victory by giving credence to Soviet
charges that the insurgents cannot be taken seriously as a party to
negotiations.
Implications for the Afghan Regime
Despite the near certainty that a conference would increase party
factionalism, we believe that Kabul's attendance could yield a diplomatic
gain for the Soviet-Afghn side. Kabul has scored several important
diplomatic successes since its peace offensive began--including recognition
by Zimbabwe and Cyprus and its outmaneuvering of Pakistan at a recent
ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement. Participation in a
conference with Washington and Islamabad would clearly enhance the regime's
stature, even if resistance leaders were present. Kabul and Moscow almost
certainly believe that the regime's participation in a five-party
conference would pave the way for additional diplomatic gains in the Third
World and lead to a reduction of anti-Kabul sentiment in the United
Nations, the Islamic Conference, and the Non-Aligned Movement. Indeed,
even if the conference failed, Moscow and Kabul almost certainly would win
international plaudits for having tried to orchestrate a political
settlement of the war.
Implications for Pakistan and the Resistance
We see little to be gained and much that can be lost by Pakistan in
attending an international conference on Afghanistan, especially if the
conference is a new Soviet effort to sow discord between the resistance and
the Pakistanis. Despite declarations to the contrary, Pakistan would be
seen to have given de facto diplomatic recognition to the Kabul regime.
Islamabad would probably be further handicapped by having the Afghan
alliance participate in the conference because the resistance could
potentially exercise a veto over negotiations, something that the
Pakistanis have wanted to avoid.
5
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700420001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700420001-5 25X1
In our view, the insurgents also stand to lose more than they gain by
attending a five-party conference. Internal alliance disagreements about
Islam and dealing directly with Najib's regime, when added to the guerrilla
chiefs' intense personal rivalries and lack of diplomatic sophistication,
are likely to make the insurgents relatively inflexible negotiators. We
believe, for example, that the insurgent delegation probably would walk out
of a conference which decided to discuss a Soviet-Afghan proposal for a
coalition government formed around Najib. Such a proposal probably would
appear conciliatory and "reasonable" to an international audience, thereby
making alliance intransigence appear to be a major impediment to a
political settlement.
Nonetheless, we do not foresee an international conference leading to a
complete split between Islamabad and the Afghan resistance. Even if the
conference was unsuccessful, the basic relationship between the two sides
would remain. The insurgents and refugees would still depend on Pakistan
for aid and support, and Pakistani leaders--particularly President
Zia--would still feel morally and religiously compelled to support the
refugees and resistance. Moreover, Islamabad would still be faced with
Soviet troops on its Western border. The Pakistanis would retain the
option of returning to the UN-brokered negotiations in Geneva.
Implications for the United States
The United States' interests in furthering Afghan insurgent unity and
strengthening Pakistan's commitment to the insurgents probably would not be
served by an international conference, especially if the United States
actually participated. Washington might be dragged into infighting among
the resistance groups, thereby tarnishing its image among the insurgents.
Potential disagreements between Washington and Islamabad on the content of
an Afghan settlement could become public during the conference and damage
bilateral ties. Moreover, Soviet propagandists would blame a failure of
the conference to arrive at a settlement of the Afghan conflict on US
pressure on Pakistan and the resistance.
If Washington did not participate in an international roundtable, the
risk to US interests would be somewhat less because differences between the
United States and Pakistan would be more easily muted. Islamabad likes to
take the lead on diplomatic initiatives toward Afghanistan and would
probably prefer that Washington not be a party to negotiations. Moscow,
however, has often said that the United States is the key to a7, Afghan
settlement and might insist on US participation.
6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700420001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000700420001-5 25X1
ANNEX
Past Proposals for International Conferences on Afghanistan
There have been several unsuccessful initiatives to hold an
international roundtable conference on Afghanistan since 1979, according to
US diplomatic reporting:
--The European Economic Community, led by Great Britain, proposed
in February 1980 that an international conference be convened to
work for Afghanistan's neutrality under international guarantees
in return for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. This meeting would
have included the Afghan regime, the Soviet Union, Iran, Pakistan,
and the United States.
--Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev offered to hold a conference on
Afghanistan in 1980, including the Afghan regime and neighboring
countries.
--The Organization of Islamic Conferences tried to sponsor a conference
in Switzerland in August 1980 by inviting the Afghan regime,
resistance representatives, Iran, and Pakistan. According to
Pakistani officials, all the parties showed up except for the Kabul
delegation.
--Iran proposed a roundtable meeting on Afghanistan this year with
the Soviet Union, the Afghan regime, the resistance, Pakistan, and
Iran as participants.
7
25X1
npclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700420001-5
25X
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700420001-5 25X1
SUBJECT: Implications of an International Conference on Afghanistan
MESA M# 87-20070
DISTRIBUTION
EXTERNAL
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
- Robert H. Baraz (State)
- Mark Parris (State)
- Ron Lorton (State)
- Charles Dunbar (State)
- Robert Peck (State)
- George Harris (State)
- Rena Epstein (State)
- Herbert Hagerty (State)
- Lt. General John Moellering, USA (JCS)
- Ambassador Robert Oakley (NSC)
- Dr. Fritz Ermarth (NSC)
- Lt. General Colin L. Powell, USA (JCS)
- Dr. Darnell Whitt (DOD)
- Vincent Cannistraro (DOD)
- Ms. Sandra Charles (DOD)
- Andrew Marshall (DOD)
INTERNAL
1 - DCl/DDCI Exec Staff
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - CPAS/ILS
6 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - MID Staff
1 - PDB Staff
1 - C/PPS
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - C/NESA/PG
1 - C/NESA/AI
1 - C/NESA/IA
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - C/NESA/SO/P
8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700420001-5
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700420001-5
25X1
1 - C/NESA/SO/A
1 - C/NESA/SO/S
4 - C/SOVA/TWA/A
DDI/NESA/SO/P/
(2July87)
9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700420001-5
25X1
25X1