IRANIAN THREATS TO PERSIAN GULF STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000700390001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 29, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700390001-9
25X1
IC6
DATE 7-? -ef7
DOC NO A/FM- P1 e7-39067
OIR
P PD
Central Intelligence Agency
Washingtort1C20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 June 1987
Iranian Threats to Persian Gulf States
Summary
Iran believes persuading the Arab states of the Persian
Gulf to distance themselves from the US protection of Kuwaiti
shipping is a key element in its effort to force the US and
Kuwait to back down. Tehran apparently perceives that overt
opposition or even neutrality on the part of the Gulf states
will weaken US and Kuwaiti resolve. Iran in recent months
has intensified the use of the three principal instruments it
employs to influence Gulf states' policy: terrorism and the
threat of terrorism, military pressure in the Gulf, and
efforts to cultivate good bilateral relations. Once the US
protective regime is implemented, the prospects for
Iranian-sponsored terrorism and conventional attacks against
the Gulf states will increase. Military clashes between the
US and Iran would further heighten the risk to the Gulf
states.
Kuwaiti-superpower cooperation has heightened the
concerns of other Gulf states about Iranian intentions in the
Gulf. Most Gulf states believe that a greater US presence in
the Gulf will provoke Iran and consequently they have been
This memorandum was prepared at the request of Ambassador Robert B.
Oakley, NSC, by Persian Gulf Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Questions and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division
NESA M 87-20067
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700390001-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700390001-9
25X1
reluctant to raise the profile of their relationship with the
United States. Many Gulf states have reacted to Iran's
growing hostility by signaling their desire for accommodation
rather than confrontation. Some have even taken steps to
improve relations with Tehran believing such a course will
deter Iranian aggression. Nonetheless, the Gulf states will
look to the United States for support in the event of
sustained Iranian attacks.
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
Two recent events indicate Iran has adopted a more confrontational
approach to the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council as the
implementation of the US protective regime nears. Iran on 26 June took
full control of Abu Musa island in the lower Gulf. The island is claimed
by Sharjah, one of the states in the United Arab Emirates, but has been
held jointly with Iran since 1971. Iranian forces lowered Sharjah's flag
and expelled Sharjan workers. Tehran's transparent excuse was the alleged
uncertainties created by the abortive coup against Sharjah's ruler, who has
maintained friendly relations with Iran. By the time Iran seized the
island, the political situation in Sharjah had been resolved with the
former ruler back in power, although forced to share power with his
brother.
Also on 26 June, Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani in his weekly prayer
sermon directed some of the most explicit threats against Persian Gulf
states any Iranian leader has made since the US agreed to the reflagging of
Kuwaiti ships. He called the states in the southern Gulf the servants of
the West and asserted they were more vulnerable than Iran to attacks on
their water purifiers and oil facilities. He said in the event of war,
their installations would not be safe, even if the states themselves were
not directly involved in the conflict.
. In our judgment, Rafsanjani's speech markedly intensified Iran's
attempt to intimidate the Gulf states into opposing the US protective
regime by raising the threat of expanded conflict. Rafsanjani also
signaled Tehran's intensified belligerency by explicitly threatening the
states of the lower Gulf. These states--the UAE and Oman--have throughout
the Iran-Iraq war maintained a more moderate posture toward Iran than other
Gulf states.
Rafsanjani's willingness to antagonize the friendlier Gulf states as
part of Iran's strategy for confronting the US indicates the seriousness
with which Tehran views increased superpower involvement in the Gulf. It
also suggests Tehran perceives that increased intimidation might push the
wary Oman and UAE into working actively against increased US intervention.
2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700390001-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700390001-9
25X1
The Terrorist Threat
In our judgment, Rafsanjani's remarks are a clear indication of
willingness eventually to initiate attacks against any of the Gulf states
if other methods fail to force the US and Kuwait to back down. Terrorism
is likely to be one of Tehran's primary instruments.
Iran has
substantial networks among the Shia populations of the Gulf that provide
assets for terrorist operations. Some militant Shias have been brought to
Iran for religious and paramilitary training and infiltrated back into
their native countries. Pro-Iranian cells are most prevalent in Kuwait,
Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. Some almost certainly exist in
Saudi Arabia. Pro-Iranian Shias probably lack the capabilities to threaten
the immediate survival of any Gulf government. They can, however, foment
serious security problems and probably increase sectarian tension between
Shias and Sunnis by conducting selective terrorist acts.
Oil facilities, government and commercial offices, and desalinization
plants are likely to be targetted first. If Iran decides to escalate
further, the assassination of officials and diplomats will become more
likely.
Kuwait remains the most immediate target./
/Radical Shias this year
have conducted four bombings against oil and gas facilities and commercial
offices and have staged demonstrations to protest tougher government
security measures.
Once the US protective regime is implemented, Bahrain is likely to
become a target for renewed Iranian subversion because of its large Shia
population and the presence of the US Middle East Force. Iranian-backed
Shias in 1981 attempted the violent overthrow of the government.
The longer the US protection program remains in force, the more likely
Iran is to activate terrorism and subversion against other Gulf states with
large Shia populations--such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The terrorist
threat will increase further if there are military clashes in the Gulf
between the US and Iran; for example, US tactical retaliation against
Iranian ships attempting to strike escorted ships. US retaliation against
Iranian territory almost certainly would lead to sharply increased
Iranian-sponsored terrorism against the Gulf states. Iran might even
sponsor attacks against Saudi targets, although Saudi Arabia probably will
remain a lower priority for Iranian terrorism than other Gulf states
because of the value Tehran places on good bilateral relations with Riyadh.
3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700390001-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700390001-9
25X1
The Conventional Threat
If the above methods fail to obtain Iran's objectives, the Iranians
would be increasingly likely to use conventional military forces against
the Gulf states. Iran has the largest naval force in the Persian Gulf, and
despite equipment and personnel problems that limit the effectiveness of
its ships and aircraft, it represents a significant threat to the Gulf
Arabs. Moreover, the rapidly growing Revolutionary Guard naval forces pose
a threat of expanded attacks on Gulf shipping and could provide support to
terrorist operations. The Iranian Air Force has 50-60 operational aircraft
to use against Gulf shipping or mainland targets. Iran has used these
aircraft effectively in the past, but is increasingly hampered by parts
shortages and unreliable munitions.
Some of Iran's alternatives against the Gulf states are:
-- Attacks on ships in the trade of Gulf states other than Kuwait,
including the mining of additional Gulf shipping lanes;
-- Selective air strikes against Gulf oil or economic targets;
-- The use of Silkworm missiles against Gulf shipping;
-- An invasion of Kuwait's Bubiyan Island or--less likely--an invasion
of Kuwait proper.
Iran is unlikely to launch systematic attacks on critical Gulf oil
facilities unless its own oil exports are reduced substantially.
Iran's regular and Revolutionary Guard military forces have confronted
Gulf Arab forces in the past. Last year, Iranian naval units twice fired
on aircraft of the United Arab Emirates and an Iranian F-4 fired warning
shots at an Omani reconnaissance aircraft. Iranian ships regularly
challenge Omani patrol boats and trespass into Omani and UAE waters.
Recently, despite limited Kuwaiti patrolling, Iranian forces laid mines in
the deep-water channel leading to Kuwait's ports. Additionally, the
Revolutionary Guard has employed rubber rafts and other mall craft for
landing infiltrators in the UAE without detection by coastal patrols.
While all the Gulf states will risk being subjected to some form of
Iranian violence, Tehran probably will attempt to use terrorism and other
forms of intimidation selectively in an effort to foster divisions among
the GCC states on how to deal with the US protective regime. Iran probably
will privately signal its willingness to refrain from attacks on those GCC
states that oppose--or at least do not support--the US presence. Iran's
ability to fine tune its operations, however, will be limited by the extent
11
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000700390001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700390001-9
25X1
of the assets it can mobilize against any one of the GCC states. States
with large Shia populations and those most vulnerable to conventional
Iranian attacks--even if they are conciliatory toward Iran--will continue
to run the risk of Iranian-sponsored subversion, if their allies in the GCC
continue to show hostility toward Iran. Tehran will attempt to fuel these
potential divisions; that seems to be the message Rafsanjani delivered in
his speech last Friday by threatening the relatively friendly states in the
lower Gulf.
Gulf States: Handling the Threat
Most Gulf states have reacted to the increase in diplomatic and
military pressure by signaling they want accommodation rather than
confrontation. Already, several Gulf states have taken steps to improve
relations with Iran, weakening the Gulf Cooperation Council and reinforcing
Tehran's perception that support for Iraq can be eroded further. Most are
reluctant to accept a closer relationship with the United States because it
would open them to Iranian charges of complicity in US military
intervention in the Gulf. Gulf states generally believe that a greater US
presence in the region would increase domestic threats and provoke Iran.
Nonetheless, the Gulf states still view the United States as their final
security guarantor against Iranian expansionism.
Kuwait's request for Soviet and US protection of its ships was a bold
move in defiance of Iran. Over the past year, Kuwait has changed its image
as a fence straddler and hardened its stand against Iran because it
perceives that Tehran is threatening its sovereignty. Kuwait sought US and
Soviet naval protection to deter Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti-bound shipping
generally, and specifically, attacks on the most vulnerable ships in
Kuwait's merchant fleet.
Kuwait is unlikely to curtail its support for Iraq or to renounce its
deal to secure US and Soviet protection, despite increasing Iranian
pressure. Kuwait is hoping to galvanize regional support for its naval
protection arrangements and sent senior Kuwaiti officials on a major
diplomatic offensive last week to Gulf states, as well as to Jordan, Syria,
Egypt and Iraq.
Saudi Arabia privately has urged the United States not to cut and run,
has endorsed the Kuwaiti reflagging effort, and has indicated the Gulf
states night consider assisting the US effort. Nonetheless, Riyadh fears
that increased superpower presence in the region will lead to greater
potential for conflicts involving the Saudis.
5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700390001-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700390001-9
25X1
Despite private expressions of appreciation for Washington's -
willingness to protect Gulf shipping, most GCC states, except for Kuwait,
would prefer to put the reflagging plan in abeyance or limit the number of
sailings if a face saving mechanism could be found. At the same time, they
would oppose a public US decision to shelve the project entirely because
this would be seen as bowing to Iranian pressure.
Oman has been the most eager to improve ties with Iran and play down
its relationship with the United States. The Omanis have urged
postponement of the reflagging plan and have also cancelled next month's
joint military exercise with the United States fearing that Tehran would
view it as full military cooperation.
The United Arab Emirates, which has a sizeable Iranian community, is
eager to maintain its lucrative commercial ties to Tehran. An Iranian
attack on a UAE oil field last fall exposed the Emirates' vulnerability and
confirmed its inability to confront Iran. In the UAE, Dubai, which has the
heaviest concentration of Iranians, allows the US use of its drydock
facilities and occassional ship visits, but appears reluctant to approve a
noticeable increase in the use of these facilities in support of US
operations in the Gulf.
Bahrain may be moving toward easing tensions with Iran and is
considering a high-level visit to Iran. Manama is concerned that its
largely Shia population and the presence of the US Middle East Force make
it a prime target. Bahrain has endorsed US presence in the region, but has
indicated it has done all it can do to assist the United States.
The Gulf states are aware of the vulnerability of their petroleum and
associated facilities. Nonetheless, their response to terrorist violence
has generally been firm./
Significant deficiencies in the internal security services of
the Gulf states, however, will continue to limit their ability to counter
Iranian subversion. Manpower shortages, lack of training, and bureaucratic
infighting are prevalent.
6
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700390001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700390001-9
25X1
SUBJECT: Iranian Threats
NESA M 87-20067
Distribution:
to Persian Gulf States
25X1
1 - Ambassador Robert Oakley, NSC
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - 1410/CT
1 - C/PES
1 - C/NID
1 - C/PDB
6 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - C/OGI
1 - DO/NE
25X1
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS/NESA
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - C/NESA/AI
1 - C/NESA/IA
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - C/NESA/PG
1 - C/NESA/PG/I
1 - C/NESA/PG/P
1 - PG/P
25X1
1 - PG/I
1 - PG/I
6 - PG/file
DI/NESA/PG/I
(29Jun87)
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700390001-9
25X1