LOYA JIRGA: KEY TO POWER IN POST-SOVIET AFGHANISTAN?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000700330002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 5, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
5 June 1987
Loya Jirga: Key to Power
in Post-Soviet Afghanistan?
Summary
The Loya Jirga--a "Great Council" of tribal, religious and
civic leaders--has been described by both the Afghan resistance
and the Kabul regime as the key to power in Afghanistan. Loya
Jirgas have been called only a few times in Afghan history,
usually to recognize a new king or approve a ruler's new policy
direction but have served as the model for most Afghan
legislatures and advisory councils. The Kabul regime has made
several attempts to use gatherings it calls "jirgas" to enhance
its own legitimacy. Some resistance leaders have also tried to
set up two Loya Jirgas, probably in the hope of unifying the
resistance, creating a true government-in-exile, and further
highlighting the Kabul regime's lack of legitimacy.
We believe that a Loya Jirga may be useful to make the
transition from a post-Soviet interim regime to a permanent
Afghan government. Under the auspices of an interim regime, a
Loya Jirga that included representatives of all factions could
determine the form and makeup of the final government. The
crucial questions for a Loya Jirga are its membership and agenda.
Although members of a Loya Jirga are traditionally bound to
uphold the jirga's decisions, an assembly that is widely
perceived as being rigged or that excludes important interest
groups could stimulate further strife.
This memorandum was prepared by Afghanistan Branch, South
Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome 71 should be directed to the Chief, South Asia
Division
NESA M 87-20060
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Political Power and the Loya Jirga
There are three traditional sources of law in Afghan society: Islam,
tribal codes, and the decisions reached by jirgas. Obedience and respect
in traditional Afghan society are based less upon a leader's lineage than
upon how well that leader fulfills his duty according to the dictates of
Islam and the tribal codes. Afghan kings ruled by divine sanction rather
than by divine right, and a ruler who disregarded Islamic and tribal codes
was considered to be a usurper.
the jirga--along with difficulties of
communication and transportation--limited the power of Afghan central
governments. Because the jirga vote is the basis of a leader's
legitimacy--and a second vote could revoke that confirmation--the result
has often been an unstable government preoccupied with keeping the tribes
happy. However, the institution also gave traditional Afghan governments a
wide institutional base and degree of popular legitimacy rare among
traditional societies.
The first recorded Loya Jirga elected Ahmad Shah Abdali in 1747 as
paramount chief and the first King of Afghanistan. Subsequent jirgas were
called to strengthen a ruler's claim to the throne or to approve
controversial programs. The most blatant pre-Soviet attempt to engineer a
Loya Jirga's decision was made by King Amanullah in 1928. After a jirga of
about 1,000 of Afghanistan's most influential tribal, ethnic and religious
leaders rejected the King's reforms--which included calls, for separation of
mosque and state, the unveiling and emancipation of women, enforced
monogamy and compulsory education--the King disbanded it and convened a
smaller jirga of about 100 government employees and supporters who promptly
passed his program. However, the first gathering was widely perceived as
the true Loya Jirga, and King Amanullah--who by defying its ruling had
proven himself unIslamic--was deposed.
Jirga and Democracy
All adult men are eligible to be delegates to a Loya Jirga and all
delegates have an equal right to speak. Decisions are made either by
consensus or a show of hands. The decision of a Loya Jirga is binding upon
all participants, and anyone who disregards the ruling is severely
punished. Despite the similarity with the New England-style "town hall
democracy," where all members of a community have their say, the jirga is
not entirely democratic. Historically, jirga representatives were usually
the tribal and religious elite and often appointed to the jirga by the very
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elite's control over the population since--through the jirga--they served
as many villages' only link with the central government. In return for
their support, tribal leaders lobbied the crown for gifts and arms, which
they then used to cement their own
positions.
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Use of Jirgas by the PDPA and the Soviets
The PDPA has repeatedly staged jirgas in an attempt to gain a popular
mandate and bolster its claim to legitimacy. In addition to arranging
several tribal jirgas, the Ministry of State Security (KHAD) brought about
2,000 tribesmen to Kabul in April 1985 to convene a People's Loya Jirga.
According to the US Embassy in Kabul, delegates were forced to sign a
unanimous statement praising the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Attendees
who questioned the document or procedure were imprisoned for "pro-rebel
sympathies."
The regime also held jirgas in 1985 to elect members of local councils
in Kabul, Feyzabad, and Saranj. According to the US Embassy in Kabul, a
single slate of candidates was presented to the delegates minutes prior to
the voting. The Embassy reported that regime officials reportedly stood by
with cameras in order to discourage "no" votes. Small children were
counted among the voters, and according to a Western journalist, one
woman's "election" consisted of a summons from the local party
headquarters, where she was given a plane ticket to Kabul and a prepared
speech to deliver upon her arrival. Few Afghans took these staged jirgas
seriously, according to Embassy reporting, and many Kabul residents joked
that members of a tribal jirga convoked in September 1985 probably were
resistance fighters taking advantage of regime bribes and a free trip to
Kabul, according to diplomatic reporting.
Despite this lack of support, the Kabul regime appears intent on using
jirga-type assemblies to demonstrate "mass support" for their program. The
government claims that all Afghans are represented by local party members
in regional jirgas. Representatives elected by these regional jirgas then
take part in district-level jirgas, which, in turn, report to
provincial-level jirgas--a system closely modeled on the Soviet party
system, but given an Afghan veneer with the name "jirga."
Resistance Attempts at a Jirga
The resistance has also used the jirgas to settle internal disputes,
adjudicate differences with Pakistani tribes and to win over pro-Kabul
tribes.
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The Pakistani government has
encouraged the use of jirgas among
representatives of resistance and refugee groups to settle conflicts in
camps.
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In our view, the greatest roadblock to a resistance Loya Jirga is the
question of the council's composition. Attempts by traditionalist
resistance leader Ahmad Gailani to form Loya Jirgas in 1980 and 1984 in
order to create a government-in-exile under former King Zahir Shah fell
through after boycott threats from fundamentalist resistance leaders.
Fundamentalist leaders, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar oppose the
participation of Afghans who have not taken direct part in the resistance
struggle. A younger generation of battle-tested commanders is also likely
to contest the chiefs and mullahs who previously made up many jirgas1
membership. We also believe that traditionalist groups such as Ahmed
Gailani's National Islamic Front of Afghanistan are likely to contest the
legality of any Loya Jirga not formed along traditional lines, and might
succeed in blocking any council not to their liking.
Prospects
We believe that a Loya Jirga may be useful to make the transition from
a post-Soviet interim regime to a permanent Afghan government. Under the
auspices of an interim regime, a Loya Jirga that included representatives
of all factions could determine the form and makeup of the final
government. The crucial questions for a Loya Jirga are its membership and
agenda. Although members of a Loya Jirga are traditionally bound to uphold
the jirga's decisions, an assembly that is widely perceived as being rigged
or that excludes important interest groups could stimulate further strife.
We believe, however, that a Loya Jirga that is widely recognized as a true
national assembly can serve as the basis for mutual recognition between
warring Afghan factions and a free and neutral government.
I.
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SUBJECT: Loya Jirga: Key to Power in Post-Soviet Afghanistan?
NESA M 87-20060
Distribution
EXTERNAL
1 - Lt. General John Moellering, USA (JCS)
1 - The Honorable Donald P. Gregg, (NSC)
1 - Dr. Fritz Ermarth (NSC)
1 - Lt. General Colin L. Powell, USA, (NSC)
1 - Dr. Darnell Whitt (DoD)
1 - Vincent Cannistraro (DoD)
1 - Ms. Sandra Charles (DoD)
1 - Andrew Marshall (DoD)
1 - Charles Dunbar (State)
1 - Robert Peck (State)
1 - George Harris (State)
1 - Ron Lorton (State)
1 - Herbert Ha ert State)
1 - (DIA)
1 - (DIA)
1 (DIA)
1 - Rena Epstein (State)
INTERNAL
1 - DIR/DCl/DDCI
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS/NESA
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - C/PES
6 - CPAS/IMB/CB
1 - PDB Staff
1 - NID Staff
1 - C/DO/NE
1 - SOVA/TWA/A
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - DC/NESA/SO
1 - C/NESA/PG
1 - C/NESA/IA
1 - C/NESA/AI
1 - C/NESA/SO/PB
Exec Staff
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1 - C/NESA/SO/A
1 - C/NESA/SO/S
1-
(DDI/NESA/SO/A
1 - Typescript File
(5 June 87) 25X1
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