AFGHANISTAN: THE RESISTANCE ALLIANCE'S VIEWS ON THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000700300001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 27, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE 6-- ~l~
DOC NO 4/ESh /1 g?-2D0S
O I R
P & PD
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
27 May 1987
Afghanistan: The Resistance Alliance's Views on
the Political Settlement of the War
Summary
We believe that the thinking of the seven leaders of the resistance
alliance about a political settlement of the war is rudimentary at besc.
The alliance's formal negotiating position--which was issued last January--
calls for a quick, three-to-four month, logistically-based Soviet
withdrawal to be overseen by an interim government. The interim regime
would also devise Afghanistan's post-Soviet political system. Insurgent
leaders have offered no particulars about how this transitional process
would be managed or about who would tate in it
Because the alliance is not part of the Geneva negotiating process and
is not always well informed by Islamabad about the content of the
discussions, we believe the insurgent leaders have not been forced to draft
a realistic and coherent plan for political negotiations. In our opinion,
there is no alliance consensus on issues such as the formation of a
resistance government-in-exile-, the modalities for electing a
representative assembly to form an interim government, or possible roles
for former Afghan King Zahir Shah, other prominent Afghan exiles, or the
Afghan communists in a post-Soviet government. We believe, moreover, that
there is little prospect of the alliance reaching a durable consensus on
these issues and considerable risk that the alliance would break-up if
Pakistan tried to force it to reach a consensus.
We believe only direct negotiations between Moscow and the resistance
or the inclusion of the alliance in the Geneva process, or in another
international forum such as the Iranian-proposed four-party conference
-4 1 and South Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are unIice or Near Eastern
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division and should be
NESA M 87-20057
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among Kabul, Moscow, Islamabad, and the resistance, would generate
effective pressure on the seven leaders to produce a comprehensive and
detailed negotiating position for the alliance.
The Alliance and the Geneva Process
Because the alliance is neither a party to the Geneva negotiations nor,
talks, tends to think about a political settlement of the war only
during Geneva rounds. During these periods, the alliance worries primarily
about being sold out by Islamabad and loudly and publicly proclaiming the
necessity of securing a logistically-based Soviet withdrawal. Once a
Geneva session ends, the seven parties and their leaders generally return
to fighting the war and continuing traditional interparty and interpersonal
In our opinion, there is little chance of persuading the seven alliance
leaders to establish consensus policy positions for the Geneva process as
long as they are not a party to it. We also believe it unlikely the
Pakistans can force them into such unanimity.
Alliance Thinking on a Political Settlement
The alliance has been trying without success to craft a united
political approach to settling the war since Kabul and Moscow announced
their cease-fire and national reconciliation initiatives early this year.
The seven leaders staged a successful public rally to announce their
rejection of the peace proposals on 17 January, and to declare--without
giving any details--that they had agreed an interim government should
oversee a Soviet withdrawal and devise Afghanistan's future political
system. Their subsequent deliberations, however, have produced much
acrimony but neither details nor unanimity on how to flesh out these
points. Indeed, the discussions about the various facets of a political
settlement appear to be weakening alliance cohesion by widening the gap
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dividing the tradionalist leaders--Nabi, Mojadedi, and Gailani--from the
Islamists--Khalis, Rabbani,and Sayyaf. Radical Islamist Gulbuddin
fluctuates between the two groupings and, in our opinion, is most
interested in blocking an alliance consensus that would leave him the odd
man out
We believe that on three major policy questions there is substantive
disagreement between alliance groupings:
--Zahir Shah: The traditionalist leaders support a figurehead
leadership role for Zahir Shah in an interim government largely
because their parties and families prospered during the royalist
period. They also see alliance acceptance of a Zahir-led interim
regime as a useful ploy for inducing the Soviets to wtthdrnw_
am a party leader Rabbani--who generally promotes
compromise in the alliance--probably quashed the last chance of the
resistance supporting Zahir when he recently said that the former
King was "not the solution" to forming an interim government. The
traditionalist-verus-Islamist differences over Zahir are mirrored in
their opposing views on the desirability of giving prominent Afghan
exiles--those who served pre-1978 governments--posts in an interim
regime.
--Insurgent-Sponsored Elections: Despite Gulbuddin's announcement on
8 May that the alliance had decided to hold elections for a
representative assembly--with Afghan refugees electing 20 percent of
the members and Afghans residing in Afghanistan electing the
remainder--there is no conclusive evidence that all seven leaders
support the plan.,
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We also believe that the concept of a popular western-style election
along the lines described by Gulbuddin--an institution that is
fundamentally foreign to the traditional Afghan political system--
will continue to be discussed without resolution in alliance
counsels. Because the moderate parties are politically strongest in
the refugee camps they probably will insist on assembly elections in
which the refugees elect a majority of the members. The Islamists,
on the other hand, are strongest inside Afghanistan and so probably
will demand elections based inside the country. We believe the
alliance leaders almost certainly will be unable to bridge the gaps
separating the interests of their individual parties and agree on
the modalities for conducting an election.
In our opinion, it is much more likely that the seven parties will
eventually agree to convene a loya jirgha--the traditional Afghan
deliberative body composed of tribal, religious, and ethnic elders--
to make decisions about the alliance's negotiating posture and the
shape of the post-Soviet Afghan political system. Even this
traditional method of procedure, however, will be the subject of
intense debate among the party leaders over such issues as which
non-resistance roups will be allowed to participate in the forum.
--The PDPA'S Future: The traditionalist leaders apparently would
acquiesce in a limited PDPA role--if the party sheds itself of Najib
and his closest colleagues--in an interim government and in
post-Soviet elections. The traditionalists believe such a
concession would be a useful tool for persuading the Soviets to
withdraw and that, in any event, the PDPA would inevitably be
overwhelmed once deprived of Moscow's protection. The Islamists
view any role for the atheistic PDPA as a betrayal of the jihad and
those who have died in the fighting. We believe that the issue of
the PDPA's future divides the alliance most clearly and potentially
most destructively along ideological lines.
Without formal inclusion of the alliance in the Geneva process, in
another international forum, or the inception of direct talks between
Moscow and the insurgents, we believe that the seven party leaders are
unlikely to reach a durable consensus policy regarding a political
settlement of the war. Formal participation in any of these forums would,
in our opinion, force the insurgents' hand; they have consistently
justified the lack of a formal insurgent negotiating position by citing the
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fact that the alliance is not a participant. We believe, in fact, that
without the pressure exerted by preparing to participate in formal
negotiations, inter-party discussions about such topics as elections, Zahir
Shah, and the PDPA's future--particularly if the Pakistanis try to force an
alliance consensus on any of these issues--probably will further divide the
alliance parties. Moreover, these interparty discussions would give
Gulbuddin ample opportunity to practice his divisive style of politics and
perhaps cause an open split between the traditionalist and Islamist
groupings.
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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: The Resistance Alliance's Views on
the Political Settlement of the War
NESA M 87-20057
DISTRIBUTION
External
1 - The Honorable Michael Armacost (State)
1 - Lt. Gen. John Moellering, USA
1 - Edward P. Djerejian State
1 - Lt. Gen. Colin L. Powell, USA
1 - The Honorable Fred C. Ikle (DoD)
1 - The Honorable Richard Armitage (DoD)
1 - Dr. Darnell Whitt (DoD)
1 - Vincent Cannistrarro (DoD)
1 - Ms. Sandra Charles (DoD)
1 - Andrew Marshall (DoD)
1 - The Honorable Charles Dunbar (State)
1 - Robert Peck (State)
1 - George Harris (State)
1 - Ron Lorton (State)
1 - Herbert Hagerty (State)
1 - Richard Solomon (State)
1 - DIR/DCI/DDCI Exec Staff
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS/NESA
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - C/PES
6 - CPAS/IMB/CB
1 - PDB Staff
1 - NID Staff
1 - C/DO/NEO
1 - SOVA/TWA/A
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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: The Resistance Alliance's Views on
the Political Settlement of the War
1 - C/NESA/PG
1 - C/NESA/AI
1 - C/NESA/IA
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - DC/NESA/SO
1 - C/NESA/SO/P
1 - C/NESA/SO/S
1 - C/NESA/SO/A
1 - Typescript File
(27May87)
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