IRANIAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: GROWING PRAGMATISM AND EFFECTIVENESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000600900001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 25, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000600900001-3
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000600900001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000600900001-3 25X1
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
25 March 1987
Iranian National Security Policy:
Growing Pragmatism and Effectiveness
Summary
Iran over the past year has pursued its foreign policy
objectives with a more sophisticated blend of its diplomatic,
military, and terrorist assets. This effort is a refinement
of the pragmatic approach to foreign policy that became
evident about three years ago. The Iranians are becoming
more adept at combining elements of a "revolutionary"
approach with elements of traditional diplomatic tactics,
thereby drawing on assets the Shah never had. They also are
showing more skill at tactical diplomatic manipulation and
maneuvering. The Iranians' apparent belief that they are
pursuing a successful foreign policy based in part on
terrorism will strengthen their reluctance to compromise
their basic goals or to abandon their intimidating tactics.
This paper was prepared byl Ithe Persian Gulf Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
NESA M 87-20025C
Copy _ o
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000600900001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000600900001-3
Iran's increased integration of its national security policies is most
evident in its relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Tehran
has gained increased leverage against them by coordinating three key
instruments of foreign policy: terrorism and the threat of terrorism,
military successes against Iraq and military pressure in the Gulf, and
efforts to cultivate good bilateral relations.
Iran's increasing skill at using its assets to best advantage when
dealing with the Gulf states is shown in the way it has exploited terrorism
over the past year. Tehran has learned that the threat of terrorism alone
gives it significant leverage against the Gulf states, which are well aware
of their vulnerability to Iranian-sponsored subversive activity. Iran has
used terrorism and sabotage selectively while continuing to expand the
recruitment and training of dissidents that give it the potential to
increase its operations. When Iran has turned to terrorism, it has been
used primarily to further Iranian national interests, rather than to export
In addition to terrorism, Iran exerts direct pressure against the Gulf
states by attacking their shipping, and three times last year it fired on
their aircraft. Iran over the past year has increased the strength and
range of its air and naval forces in the southern Gulf and has expanded the
scope of its antishipping operations. Iranian attacks on Gulf shipping
increased throughout 1986. For the first time, Iran began conducting night
attacks. Iran's recently acquired Chinese Silkworm antiship missiles
significantly increased its ability to attack and sink ships in the Strait
Tehran realizes the Gulf states' fear of Iran rises each time it scores
a major military success against Iraq, and it has played on those fears to
bolster its diplomatic efforts to drive a wedge between the Arab states and
Iraq and to get them to reduce their support for Baghdad. After Iran's
successes at Al Faw and near Al Basrah, it launched a media blitz
emphasizing the inevitability of an Iranian victory and threatening
retaliation against Iraq's Arab supporters.
Iran balances the use of the military, terrorist, and propaganda sticks
with an energetic use of the diplomatic carrot. Tehran frequently sends
envoys to Gulf capitals to proclaim Tehran's desire for good bilateral
relations, if only the Arab states would stop supporting Iraq. Successful
military campaigns like the capture of Al Faw and the advances near Al
Basrah bring a spurt of such activity. Tehran in these meetings tries to
exploit the Gulf states' recognition that Iran is a regional power that
they will have to deal with over the long term. The Iranian message to the
GCC states--stated with varying degrees of explicitness--is: show
restraint in your support for Iraq, and Iran in return will not sponsor
terrorism against you or agitate among your potentially subversive Shia
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000600900001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000600900001-3
populations, or treat you as an enemy once the war ends.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, because of their financial support for Iraq
and their influence in determining OPEC policy, are the main Gulf targets
of Iranian manipulation. Iran has tailored its use of pressures to meet
the different challenge posed by each.
Saudi Arabia
In early 1986, Saudi Arabia's high oil production was driving down
revenues, resulting in grievous damage to Iran's financial position. Iran,
determined to alter Saudi policies, used the full range of its resources:
--After the victory at Al Faw, Iranian public statements singled out
Saudi Arabia as a potential target of retaliation. Deputy Foreign
Minister Sheikh-ol-Eslam, a leading Islamic radical and taker of
hostages at the US Embassy in 1979, was sent to Riyadh to state the
Iranian position.
--In the spring of 1986, Iran for the first time in 13 months attacked
Saudi tankers in the Gulf. The attacks were conducted sporadically
for only a few weeks, but Iran also began improving its ability to
conduct air and ship attacks in the lower Gulf. Thus, although the
attacks on Saudi ships ended, Iran demonstrated to the Saudis its
potential for expanding the conflict against Saudi Arabia and other
GCC states.
--Similarly, the sabotage of Kuwaiti oil facilities by well-placed
bombs in June reminded Saudi Arabia and other Gulf oil producers of
the vulnerability of their installations.
Iran's hostile attitude continued until the OPEC meeting in August
brought an agreement to end the price war by reverting to a
production-sharing scheme. As part of the accord, Saudi Arabia agreed to
reduce production substantially. Riyadh's oil policy was primarily
motivated by domestic budgetary pressure to gain additional revenue, but it
also signaled a desire for less tense relations with Iran by letting Tehran
take the lead in working out the agreement. Since the OPEC meeting, Saudi
Arabia has taken other steps that Iran interprets as conciliatory gestures,
including:
--Removing Saudi Oil Minister Yamani, the architect of Riyadh's drive
to regain market share, even if it meant driving down oil prices.
The Iranians considered Yamani their chief antagonist on OPEC pricing
issues.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000600900001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000600900001-3
--Cooperating with Iran in the OPEC meetings in October and December,
which resulted in production agreements that have increased prices 50
percent since last summer.
--Pressing Iraq to restrain oil production in support of the OPEC
accord reached in December and restricting Iraqi oil exports through
the petroline in Saudi Arabia from November to March. Although the
restrictions probably were the result primarily of technical
problems, Riyadh apparently did not discourage the notion that they
were an attempt to show Iran and other OPEC members that the Saudis
were trying to restrain Iraq's exports, as well as support the OPEC
accords.
--Allowing middlemen to ship refined Saudi petroleum products to Iran,
at a time when Iran was experiencing shortages because of Iraqi air
The Iranians seem to believe that the status of their relations with
Saudi Arabia is a significant gain for their foreign policy. Their maximum
objective is an end to Saudi support for Iraq, but they believe they have
scored an important victory now that Riyadh and Baghdad are experiencing
strained relations over Iraqi production levels at a time that ties between
Riyadh and Tehran are improving. The Iranians probably believe that their
success at reasserting a prominent role in OPEC has made a mockery of
attempts by the Arabs or other countries to isolate Iran as an outlaw
state. They are also likely to interpret the Saudis' retreat from oil
production policies that were damaging Iran's ability to finance its war
effort as further evidence that the Arabs are unwilling to sacrifice their
own security for Iraq.
~-has played a shrewd diplomatic game by raising the possibility that
the removal of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn might offer a way for the war
to end. We doubt that the Arabs consider this a serious proposal for now,
although the removal of Saddam is the one issue on which Iran and the Arabs
eventually might come to share. Iran's reasoning
probably goes like this:
the Iranians hint at some flexibility in
their hardline demands calling for the ouster of the entire Ba'thist
regime as a condition for peace. This places the Arabs in an
uncomfortable position. If the Arabs reject the proposal outright,
Iran can accuse them of frustrating a potential compromise that might
work to the Arabs' advantage. The Arabs, no matter how much public
praise they may heap on Saddam Husayn, have a longstanding suspicion
of Iraqi intentions and remember when Saddam was an arch-enemy.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000600900001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000600900001-3
--If the Arab states engage in a dialogue they risk
dealing a serious blow to Saddam's prestige and creating in Iraq the
type of instability that might weaken its war effort.
--If Saddam were removed and his ouster led to serious disorder that
Iran believed gave it a chance to achieve a military victory, Iran
could always renege on its agreement and continue the conflict
Kuwait has come under even more pressure than Saudi Arabia, because it
has been the most willing of the GCC states to stand up to Iran. The
preponderance of Iranian attacks in the Gulf are directed against Kuwaiti
shipping, and criticism of Kuwait by Iranian media and leaders continues
without letup.
Iran has also sponsored sabotage against Kuwaiti oil facilities. The
bombings in June 1986 damaged vulnerable points, causing a temporary
disruption of production. In January, when Iran was trying to prevent
Kuwait from hosting the Islamic Conference summit, bombs exploded
simultaneously at three Kuwaiti oil facilities. Kuwaiti officials arrested
11 Shias, some from prominent families with ethnic links to Iran.
Within a few days of the bombings, an Iranian
Kuwait so far is resisting Iranian pressure, but it may pay a price.
The arrest of Kuwaiti Shias are likely to heighten sectarian tensions;
Shias constitute one-third of the native population. The terrorist
activities also are a warning to other Gulf states, especially those that
are more vulnerable to Iranian-sponsored subversive activities by their
Shia population.
Dealing With the West
Iran's melding of the revolutionary and traditional strains of its
foreign policy together with skillful tactical maneuvering has been
demonstrated best in its recent relations with France. Tehran has
exploited France's desire to use Iran's influence over Hizballah to gain
freeedom for the French hostages in Lebanon and the French perception of
Iran's geostrategic importance to gain significant concessions from Paris,
while surrendering almost nothing in return.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000600900001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000600900001-3
Tehran has made tactical compromises that make it appear conciliatory,
without sacrificing its maximum demands. Last year, for example, France
and Iran seemed to be making steady progress toward improved relations
after the French expelled some leading anti-Khomeini exiles and agreed in
principle to repay the loan, with a partial repayment to be made
immediately. The negotiations subsequently stalled.
Implications
The Iranians' perception that they are implementing an effective,
coordinated national security policy while continuing a war that the
international community almost unanimously condemns will reinforce their
belief in their capacity to force other countries to deal with Iran on
Iran's terms. Statements by Iranian leaders and media in recent months
have emphasized the theme that Iran, by remaining true to its Islamic
principles, has proven the permanence of the revolution, gained increased
international respect, and forced other countries to take the initiative to
improve relations.
Iranian leaders have become accustomed to winning victories over their
opponents largely without compromise, and they apparently expect the trend
to continue. These successes include: the overthrow of the Shah; the
clerics' rise to dominance over the secular and leftist elements of the
anti-Shah coalition; the holding of American hostages in Tehran and the US
military pullout from Lebanon; the expulsion of the Iraqi invaders from
Iranian soil; and the continuation of the war with sufficient arms
procurement despite international condemnation.
The Iranians are adept practitioners of the art of compromise when it
comes to commercial transactions, but on major political issues they appear
to approach negotiations with the perception that they eventually will be
able to manipulate their adversaries into making the most concessions.
Their willingness to use terrorism and to exploit the holding of hostages
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000600900001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000600900001-3
while denying approval of such tactics gives them bargaining chips
unavailable to their interlocutors, a fact the Iranians use to maximum
advantage.
The variety of instruments of violence available to the Iranians
permits them to keep regional tension high and to apply steady pressure on
their rivals without using any one instrument with such force that it
invites retaliation. At any one time, for example, Iran can undertake any
one or a combination of the following: attack tankers in the Gulf, with
either planes or missiles; have its air force attack aircraft or offshore
oil platforms of neighboring countries; or, sponsor terrorist incidents
against Gulf states. By using each tactic sparingly, Iran stops short of
the level of provocation that might trigger more tangible military
cooperation among the GCC states or superpower intervention. In addition
to these threats of direct action against the Arab states, Iran sends a
message to the Gulf states by manipulating the intensity of the fighting
against Iraq and the level of Tehran's support for activity by anti-Iraqi
Kurds.
Of particular importance, Iran's ability to manipulate the level of
tension in the Gulf through a variety of methods makes the degree of
Iranian-sponsored terrorism less reliable as an indicator of Iranian
moderation in foreign relations. The number of terrorist incidents
traceable to Iran have declined in recent years, but the overall level of
Iranian-sponsored violence against the Gulf states has increased. Iran's
potential for even greater levels of violence also has increased because it
has acquired more powerful antiship missiles and has continued to expand
its terrorist assets.
The increased integration of Iran's war policy, terrorist assets, and
diplomacy suggests a more centralized control of foreign policy. The trend
toward a more coherent decision-making process has been underway for
several years, gradually replacing the chaotic conditions prevalent in the
immediate aftermath of the revolution. The improved integration:
--Enhances Iran's ability to use its assets to further Iranian national
interests.
--Helps compensate for Iran's weaknesses, including its isolation on
the issue of the war, its lack of regional allies, and its current
economic troubles.
--Reduces the prospect that foreign countries will be able to exploit
factionalism to gain advantage in bilateral relations, or to
deliberately foster domestic divisions.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000600900001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000600900001-3
Factional infighting among key foreign policy decision makers has been
muted but not eliminated. Some prefer more emphasis on export of the
Islamic revolution, at the expense of normal diplomatic relations with
other states. Some want to end the war and further improve relations with
the Arab states and the West. For now, the radical and conservative groups
seemed to have reached a modus vivendi that balances to Iran's advantage
the policies favored by each.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000600900001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000600900001-3
SUBJECT: Iranian National Security Policy:
Growing Pragmatism and Effectiveness
NESA M 87-20025C
Distribution:
Copy 1 - The Honorable Donald P. Gregg, Ofc of the VP
2 - Mr. Robert B. Oakley, NSC
3 - The Honorable Richard W. Murphy, State
4 - Mr. George S. Harris, State
5 - Mr. Peter Burleigh, State
6 - Ambassador Robert H. Pelletreau, ISA
7 - Mr. Roger Pajak, Treasury
8-
9 - DIR/DCI/DDCI/Exec Staff
10 - DDI
11 - VC/NIC
12 - NIO/NESA
13 - DO/NE
14 - DO/NE
15 - DO/NE
16 - C/PES
17 - C/CSG
19-24 - CPAS/IMD/CB 4 r~~ Q /t& S M? Y- z -S 7
25 - D/NESA
26 - DD/NESA
27 - C/PPS/NESA
28-29 - NESA/PPS
30 - C/NESA/AI
31 - C/NESA/IA
32 - C/NESA/SO
33 - C/NESA/PG
34 - C/NESA/PG/I
35 - PG/I
36-43 - NESA/PG DI/NESA/PG/II I(24Mar87)
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/01 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000600900001-3