LEBANON: IRANIAN AND SYRIAN INFLUENCE WITH THE HOSTAGE CAPTORS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000600790001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 30, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
30 January 1987
Lebanon: Iranian and Syrian Influence
with the Hostage Captors
Summary
Iran has significant influence with the radical
Shia Hizballah organization responsible for the recent
wave of kidnapings in West Beirut, but Tehran does not
control Hizballah's activities. Despite Iran's
considerable support--which includes money, arms and
training--and shared ideological objectives, Tehran
does not dictate Hizballah's decisions. In our view,
Hizballah has its own agenda in the hostage
affair--focused on freeing imprisoned terrorists in
Germany and Kuwait--which motivates its terrorism.
Syria has a fundamentally antagonistic relationship
with Hizballah which is held in check only by Syria's
"strategic alliance" with Iran. Syria has little or no
means of influencing the captors as long as it remains
committed to the Iranian alliance but will try to take
credit for any hostage release to boost its
international standing.
The recent kidnapings in Beirut of US and German citizens by
Hizballah elements underscores the organization's determination
to up the ante against the dwindling Western presence in the
Lebanese capital. The kidnapings were precipitated by the arrest
This memorandum was prepared by the Levant 25X1
Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, and the Iran-Iraq
Branch, Persian Gulf Division, Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis. Information as of 30 January 1987 was used in 25X1
its preparation. Questions and comments should be addressed to
Chief, Arab-Israeli Division NESA M#87-20013C 25X1
Copyo of
25X1
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of Muhammad Hammadi--one of the hijackers of TWA flight 847 in
1985 and a key,-Hizballah security commander--by German security
officials
14
on
January.
We believe that all kidna in s were carried out b
elements of Hizballah.
--Two organizations have publicly claimed
responsibility for kidnaping of the Western
hostages: they are the Organization of oppressed
on Earth and the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation
of Palestine. We believe that these organizations
are cover names for Mughniyah's apparatus or other
closely related elements of Hizballah.
Mughniyah's consistent objective since 1984 has
been to free 17 Shia prisoners--one of whom is his
brother-in-law--held in Kuwait. We believe this
remains his basic' objective.
Iran's Role: Influence Not Control
We believe recent developments support our longstanding
judgment regarding the relationship between Iran and the hostage
takers in Lebanon: Iran has considerable influence with the
hosta e holders but does not control them.
Iran continues to provide
.significant *Support to Hizballah in Lebanon and has been involved
i
n many Hizballah activities, including terrorism.
Iran continues to support a broad range of Hizballah
activities in Lebanon. It provides military training and
equipment, engages in political and religious indoctrination and
proselytizing, and finances social welfare projects throughout
the Lebanese Shia areas.
We have no evidence that Iran ordered the kidnaping of any of
the Western hostages kidnaped in Lebanon since 1984.
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Nonetheless, Tehran clearly has profited from the continued
detention of the hostages, deriving considerable olitical,
military, and economic benefits. i
Tehran, however, is neither able to completely dominate the
Hizballah captors nor unilaterall control develo ments in the
hostage crisis.
o no believe that Iran, if it eci ed its own interests
would be served by releasing all the Western hostages, could
simply order the release and have that order carried out.
We believe the Iranians' primary reason for engaging in the
recent initiative toward the United States was to use the
American hosta es as awns tc ain military equipment and spare
marts
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Syria's Role: On the Margins
Syria currently has only marginal influence with the
Hizballah. President Assad has been unwilling to confront
directly the organization in Lebanon or prevent its
supporters--the Iranian Revolutionary Guards--from using Damascus
as a crucial transit point for personnel and supplies between
Tehran and Lebanon's Syrian-occupied Bekaa Valley.
--Assad's long animosity toward Saddam Husayn's regime
in Iraq, Syria's dependence on Iranian oil, and a
convergence of certain goals--such as a forced Israeli
withdrawal from South Lebanon--account for the "blind
eye" he has often turned on Hizballah activities in
r_t
His patent inability to influence the hostage-holders greatly
frustrates Assad, however: he wants to demonstrate to the West
that Damascus has uncontested control over Syrian-occupied
Lebanon and an irrefutable role to play in regional affairs.
--In our view, the growth of the Hizballah organization
and the number of hostages it is hiding in crowded West
Beirut suburbs has outstripped Assad's ability to
forcibly intervene and secure hostage releases.
Hizballah's expanded autonomy and activities in Lebanon
have significantly diminished its responsiveness to
Syrian concerns.
--The 1,000-1,500 Syrian troops in West Beirut are
unable to police the city given the complex mosaic of
militia factions at work.
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--Syria has often even failed in its attempts to merely
stage-mar,rage hostage releases.
Assad will be unable to take a more active role in the
hostage problem unless he decides to confront Tehran directly by
prohibiting the Revolutionary Guard--a primary source of
Hizballah's supplies--from using Damascus International Airport
as transit point into and out of Lebanon.
Assad is unlikely to risk a complete rupture with Tehran,
however: Syria's economic crisis has increased its dependence on
Iranian oil shipments and Assad's enmity toward Iraqi president
Husayn ensures his continued support for Iran in the Gulf war.
The recent Islamic summit in Kuwait offered Assad a convenient
venue for abandoning his "strategic alliance" with Iran. Assad's
decision not to do so underscores, in our view, both his
commitment to Iran and ^,s realization of the heavy costs Syria
would nay f , d
-- r
vorce
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25X1
SUBJECT: Lebanon: Iranian and Syrian Influence with the
Hostage Captors
NESA M#87-20013,C-
DISTRIBUTION:
Internal:
Cys 1-10 - DDI
11 - DIR/DCI/DDCI Exec Staff
12 - ADDI
13 - NIO/NESA
14 - NIO/CT
15 - C/PES
16 - PDB Staff
17 - NID Staff
18-23 - CPAS/IMD/CB - oes v3/e0 3 a~~I"
24 - D/NESA
25 - DD/NESA
26 - C/PPS
27-28 - NESA/PPS (1 copy to analyst for sourcing)
29 - C/NESA/SO
30 - C/NESA/IA
31 - C/NESA/PG
32 - NESA/PG/I
33 - C/NESA/AI
34-38 - NESA/AI/L
DI/NESA/AI/L
DI/NESA/PG/I
F
30 Jan 87
30 Jan 87
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/14: CIA-RDP90T00114R000600790001-6