AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000600700001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 6, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
79-80 IMC/CB
?Top-Seeret?
Afghanistan Situation Report
6 January 1987
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
2
PEACE OFFERS TAKE SHAPE
The Revolutionary Council announced that it will extend
its six-month cease-fire offer if the resistance ceases
combat and resupply activities, but the offer is
unlikely to attract many insurgents, who dismiss it as
the latest regime propaganda.
BEIJING DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN WITH ISLAMABAD
Chinese officials reaffirmed their hardline stance on
Afghanistan during meetings with Pakistan Foreign
Minister Yaqub Khan, who was in Beijing from 24-29
December.
IN BRIEF
PERSPECTIVE
AFGHANISTAN: GROWING PROWESS OF THE JAMIAT-I-ISLAMI
Despite problems with factionalism and rising
transportation costs, the Jamiat-i-Islami has become
the dominant insurgent group in northern and western
Afghanistan.
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This document was prepared by the Office of Near
Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of
Soviet Analysis.
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PAKISTAN
International boundary
Province boundary
* National capital
9 Province capital
Railroad
Road
0 50 100 150 200 Kilometers
0 5 160 140 200 Mlles
0
Ic
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PEACE OFFERS TAKE SHAPE
Kabul announced more details of its peace overtures on
Saturday. The Revolutionary Council said Kabul would
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extend its six-month cease-fire offer--which is to
start 15 January--if the resistance halted all attacks
and resupply activities and if foreign journalists
stopped entering the country illegally. In addition,
the government would set up national reconciliation
commissions at the village, district, subdistrict, and
provincial levels to serve as intermediaries between
the regime and its opponents. Kabul would also give
limited autonomy to areas that cooperated, including
the right to create organs of local government, to
elect local leaders, and to sign truces with local
opposition groups. The Revolutionary Council also
declared Islam the official state religion. Details of
national reconciliation" are to be handled by a
Supreme Extraordinary Commission for National
Reconciliation, composed of party, government,
religious and tribal figures, according to press
accounts. The commission will be led by Abdul Rahim
Hatif, head of the National Fatherland Front.
Press reports indicate that some prominent exile
figures--former Prime Minister Yussuf and ex-diplomats
Tabibi and Pazhwak--are now in Kabul for talks with the
regime.
COMMENT: The national reconciliation process is
unlikely to attract any significant resistance figures
and those exiles pursuing negotiations are likely to be
discredited in resistance circles. Although opponents
of the Soviet invasion, they have not been active
participants in the jihad and almost certainly did not
obtain prior resistance approval for the talks. Moscow
may be planning to use them as intermediaries between
the regime and the resistance leadership. By placing
the reconciliation process under the direction of the
head of the Fatherland Front--a puppet organization
completely controlled by the PDPA--Najib, however, has
signaled that the talks must be held on the regime's
terms.
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BEIJING DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN WITH ISLAMABAD
According to a senior official in China's Foreign
Ministry, Beijing and Islamabad focused on Afghanistan
during Pakistan Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan's visit to
Beijing on 24-29 December. The Chinese agreed with
Yaqub's assessment of recent Soviet "gestures" as more
a change in tactics than in strategy. When US Embassy
officials inquired whether Beijing or Islamabad were
contemplating a response to the Soviet initiatives, the
MFA official replied that until Moscow takes some
concrete action toward resolving the Afghanistan issue,
no response would be warranted.
The Chinese publicly reiterated
their position that the key to a political solution in
Afghanistan is the early withdrawal of Soviet troops.
According to press reports, Chinese Foreign Minister Wu
Xuegian called for unconditional implementation of UN
resolutions concerning Afghanistan, the quick
withdrawal of foreign troops, and the true resolution
of an independent, neutral, and nonaligned Afghanistan.
The Chinese official told US Embassy officers that
Foreign Minister Yaqub agreed with his Chinese hosts
that to encourage a "reasonable timetable" of Soviet
withdrawal--one measured in months, not years--
political and military pressure on the Soviets must
continue.
COMMENT: Beijing's public and private treatment of
Yaqub's visit indicates that the Chinese will maintain
their hardline stance on Afghanistan. Foreign Minister
Wu Xuegian's public promise to provide full assistance
to Pakistan in safeguarding its independence and
territorial integrity was probably calculated to
bolster Islamabad's resolve during the upcoming
indirect talks in Geneva and send a direct message to
Moscow. By reassuring Islamabad both publicly and
privately, Beijing seeks to keep Pakistan from moving
toward a separate peace with Moscow. The Chinese may
worry that Islamabad is prepared to compromise on the
timetable for Soviet withdrawal, hence Beijing's
private encouragement of a short Soviet troop
withdrawal schedule.
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INBRIEF
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since mid-
October, the Soviets have expanded their
major logistics base at Pol-e Khomri to
include a large, double-fence secured
munitions storage facility and an increased
petroleum storage capacity of approximately
162,000 gallons.
--Since late November 15 medium tanks, 15 BRDM-
2 armored reconnaissance vehicles, and 42
BTR-70/80 armored personnel carriers were
delivered to Soviet forces in Afghanistan
from the Soviet Union
They are probabl
battle-damaged equipment.
replacements for
-On 28 December Afghan Prime Minister
Keshtmand participated in a ceremony
inaugurating a 56-kilometer electric power
transmission line from the Soviet Union to
Konduz city. The project is part of Moscow's
plan to extend transmission lines from the
Soviet border into several areas of northern
Afghanistan and eventually to Kabul. The
Soviet Union began supplying electricity to
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Afghanistan in June 1985 with the comoleion
of a line to Mazar-e Sharif.
--Reconstruction and modernization of the
Salang Tunnel--a key part of the main road
linking the Soviet Union and Kabul--was
recently completed, according to official
Soviet press reports. Since 1979, the volume
of traffic through the tunnel has increased
significantly, resulting in frequent
bottlenecks. Soviet officials claim the
modernization work has increased the tunnel's
capacity by a factor of three. The project--
which began in late 1984--was financed with
Soviet assistance.
--The volume of trade between Afghanistan and
the Soviet Union in 1986 increased 6.7% over
1985. According to Kabul press reports,
Afghanistan exported goods worth $360 million
to the USSR and imported $600 million in
Soviet goods in 1986. Afghanistan's
principal export to the Soviet Union is
natural gas; food supplies and petroleum
products are important imports.
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PERSPECTIVE
Afghanistan:
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Growing Prowess of the Jamiat-i-Islami
The Jamiat-i-Islami, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, has
become the dominant insurgent group in northern and
western Afghanistan. Rabbani's popularity among
insurgents and his ability to select dynamic and
competent field commanders has helped him forge a
highly motivated organization. Still, factionalism and
difficulties in meeting transportation costs for
supplies could limit the Jamiat's influence unless
Rabbani moves quickly to correct the problems.
Leadership in Peshawar--How the Jamiat Works
Rabbani exercises final authority over all major
decisions and leadership appointments.
Under Rabbani is a staff of advisers and committees
administering the organization from Peshawar. The
primary role of the Peshawar-based hierarchy is to
obtain and distribute money and weapons to the
insurgency inside Afghanistan.
--The Military Planning Commission, chaired by
Engineer Ayyub, weighs arms requests from
Jamiat field commanders and formulates
military strategy and policies.
Rabbani formed the
commission in late November 1986 to replace
the Military Commission headed by his deputy,
Musa Tawana. The Military Commission was
formed last spring to allocate munitions but
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had apparently ceased functioning by summer
because of Tawana's poor leadership
capabilities.
--Engineer Ayyub also heads the Military
Committee, a separate organization coequal to
the Military Planning Commission that is
responsible for insurgent training and the
receipt, storage, and transport of nearly all
Jamiat weapons and supplies.
--The Political Committee, headed by Engineer
Ishaq, is the Jamiat's liaison with Pakistani
authorities, private international support
groups, and foreign embassies. It
aggressively pursues contacts with foreign
journalists and seeks to arrange publicity
for the Jamiat.
--The Finance Committee, headed by Ahmed Zia,
is responsible for financing the political
and humanitarian operations of the Jamiat and
also occasionally provides money to
individual commanders to cover the cost of
weapons transportation into Afghanistan.
--The Regulation and Procedures Committee,
formed in April 1986 reviews the organization
and the administrative procedures of all
Jamiat committees. It is redefining
procedures for allocating arms and
ammunition,
The Jamiat hierarchy in Peshawar also includes
"provincial houses.
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The Panjsher Valley House, representing insurgent
commander Ahmed Shah Masood, is the most influential,
Masood is the only party
commander represented by his own house, and as a
result, he alone receives a separate allocation of
weapons from the party outside the provincial
distribution.
In addition to having a representative in these houses,
each major Jamiat commander has a personal delegate in
Peshawar that petitions directly for support. Despite
numerous, overlapping formal and informal procedures
involved in requesting and transporting weapons and
ammunition, the Jamiat system seems to work well. Most
field commanders say they are relatively well supplied
and that the needed materiel reaches troops inside
Afghanistan.
Leadership Inside Afghanistan
The provincial Amir (or chief) and provincial military
commander are the two most important Jamiat positions
inside the country,
Both are elected by a majority of local party
commanders and are approved by Rabbani.
--The provincial Amir exercises overall
political, military, and administrative
leadership of Jamiat elements in his province
and is responsible for submitting reports to
Peshawar regarding the general status of the
insurgency there. He usually commands an
insurgent group of his own but rarely holds
the position of provincial military commander
as well.
--The provincial military commander is
typically the strongest and most influential
commander in the province, as measured by his
manpower, organization, and contacts with
other commanders. He is responsible for
organizing combat operations, improving
military cooperation among various Jamiat
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field commanders, and for coordinating
insurgent activity with other resistance
groups,
--The relative strength of the Amir and
provincial military commander varies,
depending on the local situations and
personalities. In Parvan and Kapisa
Provinces, for instance, Masood holds both
positions. In Konduz Province, however,
provincial military commander Arif Khan is
considered the more important political
leader, while Amir Rahmattulah--the nominal
political chief--exercises little influence,
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Province
Provincial Amir
Kabul
Lowgar
Vardak
Kapisa and
Parvan
Laghman
Ghazni
Paktika
Paktia
Nangarhar
Konarha
Badakhshan
Takhar
Konduz
Baghlan
Bamian
Samangan
Balkh
Jowzjan
Mohammad Anwar
Dr. Anam
Maulavi Mohisherin
Ahmad Shah Masood
Mohammad Ismail
Tariq
Khulilullah Hotuk
Maulavi Abdul
Rahim
Abdul Ghaful
Jaglan Saifurrahman
Dr. Mohammad Sadiq
Aryunpur
Sayed Ahmad
Qari Rahmattullah
Abdul Hag Haqjo
Maulavi Rahimullah
Maulavi Mohammad
Zahir
Maulavi Mohammad
Alam
Maulavi Mohammad
Zahir
Faryab,
Badghi sat,
Ghowr, Herat,
Farah, Nimruz,
Helmand, Zabol,
and Qandahar Ismail Khan
Oruzgan Unknown
Provincial Military
Commander
Unknown
Dr. Fazlullah
Jek Jorun Hamashagul
Ahmad Shah Masood
Hamid
Dalili
Maulavi Mirza
Mohammad
Miagul Sahibzada
Unknown
Mohammad Salim
Abdul Basir Khalid
Qazi Islammudin
Mohammad Arif
Shamsurrahman
Faiz Mohammad
Arshad Farid
Alam Khan
Abdul Wahab
Allahuddin
Unknown
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Weaknesses in the Jamiat
Despite its organizational strengths, the Jamiat has
significant problems. We believe Rabbani's
nonconfrontational leadership style and his tendency to
procrastinate over tough decisions have been continuing
sources of tension with ?art o ? ?
commanders.
Rab ani as come under pressure from party
mo erates and field commanders to take firm action
against his personal adviser Sayyed Nurullah--leader of
the party's contentious fundamentalist clique and
personal adversary of Herat commander Ismail Khan.
Rabbani's reluctance to check Nurullah has tended to
promote factionalism within the organization and we
believe it could reduce the pffectivAripis of the Jamiat
in Herat.
Jamiat military commanders in the field and political
officials in Pakistan often are at loggerheads.
Resistance fighters complain that Peshawar-based
officials are unsympathetic to the cause and have only
a superficial understanding of the local military
situations because they refuse to travel into the war
zone. Although Rabbani urges all of his staff
officials to visit the field commands, most are
reluctant to take the risk and leave comfortable
offices in Peshawar,
Jamiat military leaders aiso generally believe,
that the
insurgent
er bases inside
Peshawar officials feel threatened by
commanders who develo inde ende t ?o
Afghanistan.
The dominance of northern Tajik advisers in the
Jamiat's formal hierarchy has generated ethnic tensions
in the oraanization.
approximately 150 of the 200 Jamiat
otticials in Peshawar are Tajiks from Badakhshan,
Takhar or Konduz Provinces. Although numerous Pashtun
members hold upper-level positions, there are concerns
among Pashtuns, Tajiks from other provinces, and Uzbeks
that they will be denied influential positions in the
party. Some Jamiat military commanders--including
Mohammed Anwar, a Pashtun from Kabul Province and Dr.
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Fazlullah, a Tajik from Lowgar--are displeased with
Peshawar because they believe too much of the Jamiat's
Runnort and attention goes to the north,
The Jamiat's Fighting Capability
Despite tensions between field commanders and the
Peshawar leaders, the Jamiat has been one of the most
successful insurgent groups militarily, particularly in
northern and western Afghanistan. Jamiat field
commanders are generally well trained, disciplined, and
highly motivated. Building on his successes in the
Panjsher Valley, Masood is now working to improve
cooperation in his newly-established seven-province
insurgent front in the north. In the west, Ismail
Khan's forces have repeatedly prevented the Soviets and
Afghan regime from consolidating control of Herat.
Many Jamiat commanders have a national concept of the
guerrilla struggle. The party's relatively
sophisticated communications network generates
cooperation among commanders and keeps them aware of
fighting in other parts of the country.
Kabul Province commander Mohammad
Anwar increases his interdiction efforts on the Kabul-
Jalalabad road in order to take pressure off Masood
when his forces are being attacked in the Panjsher
Valley. in
Lowgar Province, several area Jamiat commanders
cooperated to keep local Soviet and regime troops busy
in mid-September so they could not be deployed to Herat
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to take part in the Soviet and Afghan offensive aaains
Ismail Khan's forces there.
Poor leadership in some provinces degrades military
performance. The Jamiat position in Balkh Province,
for example, continues to decline because the party has
not been able to recover from the assassination of
provincial commander Zabiullah Khan two years ago. The
provincial leadership which replaced him, because of
weak personalities and lack of experience, has not been
able to maintain unity and cooperation among Jamiat
forces
Currently on the battlefield, meeting transportation
costs is a key concern among Jamiat commanders. As a
result of Rabbani's visit to the US in June, displeased
conservative Arab donors cut off their financial
support to the Jamiat--funds frequently used to pay for
the transportation of weapons, ammunition, and supplies
into the country. The cost of transportation has also
escalated because of an increased demand for trucks and
pack animals and a greater risk of Soviet interdiction.
The loss of the Arab funding, together with increased
transportation costs, will strain insurgent finances
and tend to hindAr rnnmhat effectiveness from time to
time.
The Jamiat's continued conflicts with Gulbuddin
Hikmatyar's Hizbi-Islami hurts military performance.
Gulbuddin--jealous of Masood's growing political and
military power in the north--directs attacks against
Jamiat forces in the northeast and interferes with
their operations against the Soviets and Afghan regime.
Masood and other Jamiat commanders have pressed Rabbani
to take a firmer line with Gulbuddin, with no results.
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