THE INSURGENT MILITARY CHALLENGE: A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT NICARAGUA, EL SALVADOR, AND THE PHILIPPINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000500560001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 25, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000500560001-2
i
DATE 1-1-6f
DOC NO q7
OIR
P$PD
25 A1Y^ 1:Q'
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
SUBJECT: The Insurgent Military Challenge: A Compara-
tive Look at Nicaragua. El Salvador, and the
1. Attached for your information is our comparison of the
insurgent military challenge in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and the
Philippines. It argues that the Nicaraguan rebels have improved
their military capabilities and are incorporating tactics common
t
th
i
o
e
nsurgencies in El Salvador and the Philippines.
2. This memorandum was prepared by Forei n
Subversion and Instability Center, Office of Global Issues. Your
Chief, Foreign u v rsion and Instability Center
Office f Global Issues
Directorate of Intelligence
Attachment:
GI M 87-20147
25X1
25X1
')GV-I
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000500560001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000500560001-2
SUBJECT: The Insurgent Military Challenge: A Comparative Look
at Nicaragua, E1 Salvador, and the Philippines
OGI/FSIC/I (20 Aug 87)
Distribution:
1 - The Honorable Frank C. Carlucci, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
1 - The Honorable Donald P. Gregg, Assistant to the
Vice President for National Security Affairs
1 - The Honorable Jose S. Sorzano, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
1 - D. Barry Kelly, Special Assistant and Intelligence
Programs Senior Director for National Security Affairs
1 - The Honorable Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs
1 - William G. Walker, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Inter-American Affairs
1 - Morris D. Busby, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Inter-American Affairs
1 - The Honorable Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs
1 - The Honorable Morton I. Abramowitz, Assistant Secretary
of State for Intelligence and Research
1 - Dr. Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
1 - Robert S. Pastorino, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Inter-American Affairs
1 - Major George L. Butler,. U.S. Air Force, Acting Director
of Strategic Plans and Policy, Department of Defense
1 - Rear Admiral Anthony Less, U.S. Navy, Deputy Director for
Politico-Military Affairs, Department of Defense
1 - Colonel John A. Cash, U.S. Army, Defense Intelligence
Officer for Latin America, Department of Defense
1 - Lieutenant General Leonard H. Perroots, USAF
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
1 - Lieutenant General Sidney T. Weinstein, U.S. Army,
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
1 - Lieutenant General William E. Odom, U.S. Army,
Director, National Security Agency
1 - Arthur W. Long, Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary
for National Security, Department of the Treasury
1 - The Honorable Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs
1 - Vice Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, U.S. Navy, Assistant to
1 - Kenneth Rosen, Deputy Chief of the Central American
Joint Intelligence Team, Department of Defense
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000500560001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000500560001-2
SSCI, Attn:
7B02
HPSCI, Attn:
7B02
ADCI, 7D60 HQ
DDCI, 7D6011 HQ
DCI/DDCI/Executive
Staff, 7E
SA/DCI/IA, 7E12 HQ
Executive Director
, 7D55 HQ
Executive Secretar
y, 7E12 HQ
Executive Registry
, 7E12 HQ
HQ
HQ
12 HQ
Comptroller, 7C21 HQ
D/Congressional Affairs, 7D43
Congressional Affairs, Att:
HQ
NIO/LA (R.D. Vickers, Jr.), 7E62 HQ
7B04 HQ
NIO/GPF (Maj.Gen. Larry D. Budge), 2E49 HQ
C/LA/DO, 3C3202 HO
- DDI, 7E44 HQ
ADDI, 7E44 HQ
C/PES/DI, 7F24 HQ
D/CPAS, 7F16 HQ
PDB Staff, 7F30 HQ
- CPAS/ILS, 7G50 H
- SCIO/CPAS, 7F27 HQ
- PPS/PO/RPB, 3D02 HQ
- CPAS/IMC/CB/DI, 7G07
HQ
- CPAS/ISS/DI, 7G50 HQ
- CPAS/CDPB/CC/DI, GH25 HQ
DD/OGI, D/OGI/DI, 3G00 HQ
OGI/DI Research Director, 3G00 HQ
C/OGI/PG, 3G04 HQ
OGI/PS/DI, 3G04 HQ
OGI/FSIC/DI, 3G13 HQ
OGI/FSIC/AM/DI, 3G13 HQ
OGI/FSIC/CMP/DI, 3G13 HQ
OGI/ISID/DI, 2G28 HQ
OGI/GD/WH/DI, 2G00 HQ
C/OGI/ECD/DI, 3G46 HQ
C/AL/LDA/DI, 1H39 HQ
D/ALA/DI, 3F45 HQ
PS/ALA/DI, 4F21 HQ
C/ALA/MCD/DI, 4F29 HQ
DC/ALA/MCD/DI, 4F29 HQ
C/ALA/MCD/NIC/DI, 4F29 HQ
C/ALA/MCD/CA/DI, 4F39 HQ
C/ALA/MCD/MX/DI, 4F39 HQ
C/ALA/MCD/CU/DI, 4F39 HQ
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000500560001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000500560001-2
1 - C/ALA/MCD/CAR/DI 4F21 H
5 - OGI/FSIC/I
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000500560001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000500560001-2
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
20 August 1987
The Insurgent Military Challenge: A Comparative Look at
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and the Philippines
Summary
Over the past eight months, the Nicaraguan rebels have
significantly improved their military capability. We believe
this turn of events is due, in large part, to the utilization of
strategies and methods similar to those that have long been
employed by the insurgents in El Salvador and the Philippines. A
heavy emphasis on small-unit tactics, coupled with prolonged
guerrilla operations, has been particularly effective in
preventing the Sandinistas from bringing their superior
conventional forces and firepower advantages to bear against the
rebels. In several other categories of combat proficiency--
including numerical strength, armament, and total casualties
inflicted in the target country--the Nicaraguan rebels are also
now exhibiting the signs of progress that for many years have
been associated with insurgent success in the Philippines,
El Salvador and elsewhere. As a result, for the first time since
its inception, the Nicaraguan insurgency--like its two Communist
counterparts--is posing a serious, albeit not regime-threatening,
military threat to'the host government. 25X1
Nevertheless, in any comparison between the relatively young
insurgency in Nicaragua and the older, more established guerrilla
movements in El Salvador and the Philippines, the deficiencies of
the Nicaraguan rebels become quite evident, in our view. Unlike
their Marxist counterparts, the Nicaraguan guerrillas have
developed few of the organizational infrastructures in-country
that have proven critical to insurgent success in numerous cases
since World War II; the most glaring of these weaknesses include
an inability to .bring wthe war to the country's most populous
capable of attracting significant popular support. 25X1
This memorandum was requested by the National Intelligence
Officer for Latin America, and prepared by
Office of Global Issues. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief. Foreign Subversion and Instability
Ce n + e
r
GI M-87-20147
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000500560001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000500560001-2
~~X1
The Insurgent Military Challenge: A Comparative Look at
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and the Philippines
Introduction
Based on our analysis of insurgencies since World War II, we
judge most insurgencies that have attempted to achieve their
objectives through purely military means have failed. The vast
majority of successful guerrilla movements complement their armed
components with appealing political programs and functional
infrastructures. The former garners popular support and new
recruits for the guerrillas' cause. The latter not only provides
a basis for successfully managing the movement's progress, but
lays a strong foundation for running the country in the event of
an insurgent victory.
Nevertheless, a credible and effective military capability--
as one integral part of a well-coordinated, multi-faceted
effort--is critical, in our view,
ultimately succeed. when
judged solely by combat performance, the Nicaraguan rebels are
now pursuing a tactical and strategic course that has proven to
be extremely beneficial to more established insurgencies like
those in El Salvador and the Philippines.
Combat Activity
Insurgent military success, in our judgment, is heavily
dependent on an ability to:
o Employ small-unit tactics,
o Sustain prolonged guerrilla operations in-country,
o Mass troops for occasional multi-unit attacks,
o Engage government forces in several areas simultaneously.
These courses of action frequently permit the guerrillas to
offset any advantage the incumbent regime may have in terms of
superior conventional forces. Moreover, few governments can
widely disperse their counterinsurgency troops without severely
Insurgencies often rely on small-unit ambushes to
demonstrate their military capability. Government patrols,
isolated garrisons, vulnerable economic projects, individual
military vehicles and small convoys are prime targets. The
Communist insurgents in the Philippines and El Salvador,
have scored many military
victories by engaging in such small-unit combat. We judge it to
2 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000500560001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000500560001-2
be especially significant that the Nicaraguan rebels apparently
have overcome their previous reluctance to engage in--and profit
Many successful insurgencies occasionally stage spectacular
attacks either to publicly demonstrate their proficiency,
highlight their opponent's military vulnerabilities, or strike at
a key target of opportunity. Such raids also usually demonstrate
an ability to mass forces as necessary for an assault on a
provincial city or a major government outpost or garrison. Both
the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador and
the New People's Army (NPA) in the Philippines already have
carried out such operations this year--the former attacking a
major Salvadoran military garrison at El Paraiso in March and the
latter in May raiding the town of Flora and attacking a police
station in Quezon. The Nicaraguan Resistance (NR) has recently
begun to demonstrate an ability to successfully launch similar
raids. A rebel attack on Abisinia--a resettlement camp
garrisoned by Sandinista military personnel--in June and an
assault on San Jose de Bocay--the Sandinistas' main forward base
in north central Nicaragua--in July indicates, in our view, that
the NR is moving in a direction militarily that has long proven
beneficial to other, more established insurgencies. 25X1
Finally, all three insurgencies apparently are able to
acquire good intelligence on their opponent's troo dispositions
and strongpoints, In general, 25X1
such data allows guerrilla commanders to more easily move their
forces from one area to another; this, in turn, complicates a
government's counterinsurgency efforts by forcing its troops to
attempt to defend simultaneously many localities and potential
targets--an impossible task, in our opinion, for most Third World
military establishments. We believe effective use of such
intelligence information will become increasingly important to
the NR as it attempts, in the coming months, to expand the pace
and scope of its military operations throughout Nicaragua.
Insurgent Armament
Small arms are the staple weapon in the inventories of
insurgencies worldwide. Availability of such armament--
particularly assault rifles, machineguns, pistols., and assorted
handguns--facilitates the rapid expansion of combatant ranks with
available recruits. Most insurgencies rely on captured
government stocks or sympathetic foreign suppliers to meet their
needs; the latter either supply the arms directly or provide
funds to purchase them.
In comparison with the NPA, the NR and the FMLN not only are
better provisioned with small arms and munitions but more
dependent on direct,* foreign-supplied shipments of weapons. At
present,- for example, the vast majority of the rebels in
Nicaragua possess operable firearms; replacement weapons and
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000500560001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000500560001-2
ammunition are largely resupplied through airdrops. Similarly,
the Salvadoran rebels are generally believed to have sufficient
weapons to arm all,of their 6,000-8,000 combatants; although the
majority of these arms came from foreign sources and transited
Cuba and Nicaragua before reaching the
FMLN also actively supplements its inve
guerrillas' hands, the
ntories with arms captur
ed
or stolen from the Salvadoran armed for
ces. The NPA, on the
other hand, has more recruits than weap
ons
25X1
no more
than 12,000 of the
2bAi
Communists, 17,000 regulars are currently armed,
Moreover, because 25X1
the majority of the NPA's weapons have been ca tured over h
years from government forces, the arms are not 25X1
in uniformly excellent condition. 25X1
war against the Sandinistas.
Despite the Nicaraguan rebels' currently strong armaments
position, we believe their near total reliance on external
support also represents a potentially serious weakness. In our
view, while'a reduction or cut-off of such aid--in terms of
direct arms shipments to the Salvadoran guerrillas or funds from
front groups and sympathizers abroad to the Philippine insurgents
to purchase arms--would not cripple either Communist insurgency,
such a turn of events could imperil the continuation of the NR's
viable counterinsurgency campaign--obliged to defend static
targets--needs to put 10 government troops in the field for each
Insurgent Numerical Strength
The actual number of guerrilla combatants represents another
important barometer of the seriousness of the threat against a
government. An insurgency with numerous combatants can strike
effectively at widely dispersed targets, taxing an incumbent
regime's ability to defend territory. According to a variety of
open source literature, military analysts generally agree that a
.guerrilla fighter.
currently enjoys a more advantageous force ratio vis-a-vis its
government opponents than does either the NPA or the FMLN.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000500560001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000500560001-2
Nonetheless, we judge any comparative advantage the NR
enjoys in this category over the NPA and the FMLN is tempered by
the Nicaraguan rebels' lack of non-combatant supporters,
especially in key urban areas. The NPA, for example, is believed
to have a. mass base of over half a million active sympathizers.
These supporters--labeled masas by the Salvadoran rebels--
provide logistic, courier, and intelligence assistance to
guerrilla combatants in both the Philippines and El Salvador.
They also engage in strikes, demonstrations, and other civilian-
related activities. In our judgment, these non-combatants
greatly enhance any insurgency's challenge to an incumbent
Total Casualties
We believe a final indicator of the relative seriousness of
an insurgency's military threat is the number of deaths caused
measured against total population figures. Relatively high
ratios can erode civilian and government morale, complicate
military recruiting, and divert the young adult male population
from more productive economic activity. A comparatively high
casualty rate also provides a rough index of the extent of the
social disruption caused by an active-insurgency.
We estimate total casualties inflicted by the three
insurgencies since approximately 1982 at about 17,000 in the
Philippines, 30,000 in El Salvador, and roughly 35,000 in
Nicaragua. The total insurgency-related casualties in Nicaragua
appear especially high when measured against the small total
Nicaraguan population of 3,300,000. In our view, this
comparatively high ratio reflects, at a minimum, the seriousness
of the overall disruption to the Nicaraguan social structure
currently being caused by the NR's activities.
Conclusion
In our judgment, the NR's increasing proficiency, at a
minimum, has established the movement's credentials as a serious
military threat to the incumbent regime. The NR is successfully
making a determined effort to address several of its most serious
military deficiences. We believe the relative effectiveness of
this campaign is due, in large measure, to the employment of
tactics and strategies that the FMLN and the NPA have long turned
to their advantage. An increasing reliance on small-unit
tactics, coupled with a newly developed ability to both maintain
a substantial military force in-country and expand its zones of
operation, has proven particularly effective against the
Sandinistas' counterinsurgency efforts.
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000500560001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000500560001-2
The anti-Marxist insurgency in Nicaragua, however, still
lags considerably behind its more established counterparts in
El Salvador and the Philippines in most comparative categories.
A paucity of key organizational infrastructures in-country, an
inability to bring the war to Nicaragua's populous western
coastal regions, a heavy reliance on external support, and the
lack of many aspects of a popularly-supported political program
probably remain the most powerful cons s, in our view, on
the NR's future maturation.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90TO0114R000500560001-2
25X1