THE PHILIPPINES: EXPLORING VIEWS ON THE US MILITARY BASES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000200970001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 24, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
24 August 1987
The Philippines: Exploring Views on the US Military Bases
SUMMARY
Philippine public opinion will probably play an unprecedented role in
negotiations between Manila and Washington about the future of US bases
at Clark and Subic, especially since the new Constitution specifies that a
new military bases agreement that must be negotiated by 1991 may also
be submitted to a referendum. A variety of polls indicates a majority of
Filipinos support the continued presence of the US military facilities and a
national plebiscite now would probably reflect that sentiment.
Nonetheless, poll results also suggest widespread ignorance and
ambivalence about aspects of the bases, such as the perceived increased
risk of nuclear attack. Between now and 1991, the Philippine leaders who
will determine the terms of a new agreement and the public who will
ultimately accept or reject it are susceptible to well-directed propaganda
campaigns by either side that play 'to the public's concerns on such issues
as sovereignty, the economic impact, or nuclear weapons.
This memorandum was prepared by I I Office of East
Asian Analysis. Information available as of 24 August 1987 was used in its preparation.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Southeast Asia
Division, OE
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Filipinos on the Bases--A Sampling of Public Opinion
"It is the United States that needs the bases more. I would not
simply say let the United States do its own thing, that we want to
be free from this. We can't even if we wished to. We have five to
six years and within that time let's see what happens to (Russian
and US arms talks). We are not makers of our own destiny."
"They (the bases) are helpful. If the bases were not there
many Filipinos would lose their jobs. Many Filipinos benefit from
them." --Manila security guard.
"I hear that Filipinos are treated as second-class citizens
inside the bases. We are like foreigners inside our own country ....It
is also true what they say that the military bases are under Filipino
command only superficially and ceremonially. We have to have
equality. Even if they pay millions. for rent we should have
sovereignty in our country." --Manila university student.
"We are afraid of war.... I wonder if the bases are for our
defense, or are they...(going to) embroil us in another war." --Mita
Pardo de Tavera, now Secretary of Social Welfare.
"We all know [sic] that the US pays rental for its bases in
Spain, Greece, Turkey, and where have you. Why are we Filipinos
getting the short end of the stick?...It's time to cut ourselves fully
free from the apron strings of America." --Columnist Max Soliven.
Philippine public opinion surveys on the bases are scarce, and most of them
predate the Aquino administration. Almost all of the polls we reviewed, however, show
a generally positive attitude toward the bases (see appendices.) USIA polls taken in
1985 and 1986 show that across age groups, educational levels, and for both urban and
rural areas, the majority believe the bases should be kept or even expanded. The most
recent data, from June 1987, show a substantial majority of the population favor
retaining the US facilities--at least under certain circumstances--with only a small
minority of respondents believing that the military bases agreement should be allowed
to lapse or be terminated.
Attitudes on the base-related issues appear to vary with education. Respondents
with no more than a high school education were most strongly committed to the bases.
Polls suggest that the better educated--a group we believe is more representative of
Philippine decisionmakers--are the group most critical of the basing arrangements,
however. Respondents with only an elementary school education generally appear to be
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groups responded that they did not know.
The polls further indicated that older respondents, rural interviewees, and those
who had attended only elementary school often responded by saying they "did not
know.' " This distinction is most evident in the responses to questions in a 1985 USIA
poll asking if the bases are worth the risks they involve. About 30 percent of these
attack. University-educated respondents registered the highest rate of concern.
poll are similar; 57 to 75 percent linked the bases with an increased risk of nuclear
When asked to indentify the benefits of the bases to the Philippines, the majority
of all respondents in the polls we examined saw a definite economic and security
advantage to the US military presence. However, Filipinos in all groups are clearly
concerned by the added risk of nuclear attack they believe the bases represent.
Sixty-eight percent of the Manila respondents in USIA's June poll said that the bases
added at least a fair amount to the risk of being a target. Findings from the 1985 USIA
Filling in the Gaps--Filipinos' Views on The Issues
We believe that the probases view of the majority conceals many underlying
attitudes on the bases issue. In our judgment, Filipinos' opinions of the US military
installations are a mixture of attitudes about several core issues involving sovereignty
and the US role in the Philippine economy, with security concerns playing a secondary
Manila's approval, such as to backstop operations in the Middle East.
To antibase Filipinos, however, the bases are overt symbols of their country's
close--some would say stifling--connection to its former ruler. They argue that
symbolic concessions do not alter the fact that the agreement allows the United States
"unhampered" use for military operations, and because Manila has no control over US
activities at the facilities, the bases violate sovereignty. Some nationalists worry that
Washington could use the bases in a manner inimical to Philippine interests and without
bases are within Philippine facilities under a Philippine military commander.
National sovereignty. In our judgment, sovereignty is probably the single most
important issue dividing opponents and supporters of the bases. Probases Filipinos
argue that the bases are the result of an agreement between two sovereign states, and
point to US concessions to Manila's sensitivities during earlier reviews of the agreement
as signs of good faith. During the 1970s, for example, Washington reduced the area
under US control at both Clark Air Base and Subic Bay, and also conceded that the US
of the adult population would fall into this category.
The 1980 Philippine census indicated that about 64 percent of the population lived in
rural areas. Based on data extrapolated from the 1980 census, we estimate that the
over-40 age group will constitute about 20 percent of the population in 1990.
Current statistics on the number of people who have completed only primary
education are unavailable, but 1980 data from UNESCO indicate that about 65 percent
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The left, including the Communist Party, argues that the bases are Trojan horses,
allowing Washington to intervene at will in Philippine affairs. Accusations in the local
press about alleged covert intelligence activities launched from the bases help to
confirm these fears. In addition, opponents believe that preservation of the bases so
dominated US relations with the Marcos government that the US turned a blind eye to
Marcos's self-enrichment, and that continuing a relationship based so strongly on the
bases only presages a similar "US-Aquino dictatorship."
The provisions that give the United States primary legal jurisdiction over US
personnel and offenses against the United States or US personnel and their dependents
are another facet of the military bases agreement that many Filipinos view as an affront
to Philippine sovereignty. The United States uses similar procedures with its NATO
allies, but some Filipinos view these arrangements as a criticism of their judicial system
and a reminder of their former colonial status.. This perception is inflamed by
sensationalist press exposes on alleged criminal behavior by US personnel or brutality
Economic considerations. Polling data suggest that most Filipinos agree hosting
the US bases makes good economic sense. In addition to bringing in nearly $200
million a year in economic and military assistance, the bases are the second-largest
employer in the country, -after the Philippine Government itself. There are approximately
40,000 jobs for Filipinos. on Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base, plus sizable off base
employment generated by the US presence. A recent USIA publication estimates that,
all told, the bases add over $500 million a year. to the Philippine economy, an amount
equivalent to about 1.5 percent of national income. Closing the bases, supporters say,
would lead to a surge in unemployment--a concern echoed by working class Filipinos
recently interviewed by a U.S researcher.
Many opponents believe the economic argument exaggerates the value of the
bases. They argue that the US installations spawn a 'brothel economy" of bars;
prostitution, and narcotics trafficking rather than solid development, while increasing the
country's dependence on aid and. "other hand-outs" from the United States. In any
event, most Filipinos are probably embarrassed by the tacky sprawl outside the US
facilities, and those opposed to the bases see Olongapo and Angeles City as miniature
examples of the Philippines' "distorted" economic relationship with the United States.
Antibase Filipinos also argue that the bases' removal would not be an economic
calamity because industrial development at the same sites could .absorb the former
employees' and allow the Philippines to pursue "truly independent" economic
Mutual Defense and Security Issues. Defense Secretary Ileto has argued
publicly that the US military presence provides a security umbrella for the Philippines
that Manila cannot afford to develop. According to polling data, a strong majority of
Filipinos--between 70 and 80 percent, depending on how the question is
formulated--appear to agree that the bases deter foreign aggression.
Nevertheless, press reports and unclassified sources
indicate skepticism in some segments of the population about the value of the bases to
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Philippine defense. Many Filipinos--including some senior officials and legislators--are
so preoccupied with their country's internal problems that they doubt that there is, or
will be in the near future, a credible external threat.
Opponents of the bases also argue that if Manila allows the storage of nuclear
weapons at the US facilities, then the Philippines is in danger of a nuclear accident or a
nuclear attack. Although propaganda from the Soviets and the Philippine radical left
fans these anxieties, we believe they are made plausible by Japanese attacks on US
military installations in Central Luzon during World War II, and nuclear accidents at Three
Mile Island and Chernobyl.
From the standpoint of internal security, we believe some Filipinos view the
bases as assurance that the United States would intervene militarily if the Communists
appeared on the brink of victory. In a recent survey of local officials, for instance, a
significant number said that the removal of the bases would allow the Communists to
ASEAN AND JAPAN-KOREA VIEWS
ASEAN. We believe Manila's neighbors regard Clark Air Base and Subic
Naval Bases as contributing significantly to regional security, if only because
they demonstrate a commitment by Washington to the area. Thailand and
Singapore are probably the most anxious that the US facilities remain; they have
repeatedly expressed concern to US officials about the possibility of a
withdrawal from the Philippines. Both regard the Soviet presence at Cam Ranh
and increased Soviet military activity in the region as a threat.
Malaysia and Indonesia share the pro-Western orientation of their ASEAN
neighbors, but avoid public identification as US allies and view internal
subversion as their major security problem
Malaysia and Indonesia thus would probably view the departure of the United
States from Clark and Subic with greater equanimity than Thailand or Singapore.
Indonesia has also been in the forefront of efforts to establish a nuclear
weapons-free zone in Southeast Asia--a proposal Singapore and Thailand do
not support.
Japan and South Korea. We believe Tokyo and Seoul view a strong US
military presence in Asia, including the Philippine bases, as vital to their
security. The Philippine bases extend the reach of US forces safeguarding
important national interests. In the event of war in Northeast Asia, both bases
would furnish logistical support for US, Japanese, and South Korean forces. In
recent subministerial consultations in Manila, Japanese officials explicitly stated
for the first time the importance of the bases to regional security, US diplomats
report. Japanese Foreign Minister Kuranari has also warned ASEAN publicly that
a nuclear weapons-free zone would undermine Washington's ability to carry out
its defense commitments in the area.
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Nevertheless, we believe there is little any of these countries can do to
convince Manila, if it should decide against the bases, that the US facilities are
in the Philippines' best interests. All of the Asian allies are sensitive to charges
of meddling in their neighbor's affairs, Japan particularly so. Moreover, Tokyo
and Seoul do not generally discuss security issues with Manila. Unless the
ASEAN nations are willing, in our judgment, to compensate Manila for hosting
the bases as a contribution to regional security, their clout with Philippine
decisionmakers will be minimal. None of the Asian states--with the possible
exception of South Korea--would be willing to host replacement facilities.
Outlook: Vulnerabilities and Opportunities for the United States
We believe that perceptions of the public mood will play an important role in
shaping Manila's negotiating positions and the agreement ultimately reached with the
United States. When Washington and Manila start to review the existing
agreement--probably sometime next year--the Philippine Congress and executive
branch will become particularly sensitive to public reactions expressed in
demonstrations, press commentaries, and other public forums. The new Philippine
Congress has already signaled its intention to direct official policy on the bases.
Moreover, under the new Constitution, should Manila and Washington succeed in
negotiating a new agreement, the Congress decides whether to require a national
plebiscite on the draft.
Because we lack historical polling data, we have no basis for 'ud in how
Philippine attitudes about the bases may have changed over time.
In our opinion, antibase activists will target the substantial
number of Filipinos who either have no opinion on the bases or who favor their
retention only under certain circumstances, such as restricted operations or greatly
increased compensation.
In addition, we believe antibase groups will focus on highly emotional issues
surrounding the bases, such as sovereignty, the nuclear threat, prostitution, AIDS, and
alleged brutality against local citizens by US servicemen. Claims that Washington has
fleeced Manila in past agreements and that Filipino base workers are underpaid relative
to their counterparts on other US overseas bases are sure to be common themes.
The presence of a vocal, well-organized minority opposed to the bases will
probably intimidate many officials who privately favor the bases and strengthen Manila's
determination not to be seen as giving in to US pressure. Moreover, we believe that
antibases rhetoric strikes a sympathetic cord with many officials and politicians, because
they believe Washington has given other countries better compensation packages and
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are bitter about perceptions that the United States has failed to deliver on its funding
commitments and to reward the Philippines for its return to democracy. An underlying
lack of realism about how much Manila can extract from Washington will probably
further complicate matters: some Philippine officials reportedly believe that a
comparison with US base agreements elsewhere suggests a five-year package of at
least $2-5 billion, while some politicians are already urging that the United States
assume Manila's $28 billion foreign debt in exchange for a new basing agreement.
Furthermore, although we have little information, we suspect the Soviets of
covert efforts to bring about the closure of the US facilities. US diplomats report there
is evidence, for example, that Moscow is using disinformation about AIDS to fan
Filipinos' opposition to the bases, and Soviet spokesmen periodically warn that the
Philippines could become a target in a nuclear exchange between Moscow and
Washington. The Soviets also play down the importance of their facilities in Vietnam
and hint that they might relinquish their foothold in Vietnam once the United States left
its bases in the Philippines.
Opportunities for the United States. Because polling results indicate a level of
support that would probably help the United States if a referendum were held now, the
United States may be able to exploit opportunities to build on existing goodwill.
Washington's continuing efforts to help the Aquino government with economic and
military aid could- strengthen the position of Philippine officials who argue that the US
relationship is a plus for Manila. In addition, greater visibility to the economic benefits
of the bases, more publicity surrounding US aid projects, especially in rural areas, and
showcasing of charitable activities by US military personnel could help win over that
segment of the public that appears to have no fixed views on the fate of the US bases.
In our judgment, Philippine decisionmakers will be watching closely for signs that
Washington is treating Manila as a fully equal ally and is responsive to their concerns.
Furthermore, as negotiations approach, Manila will be scrutinizing the whole of
US-Philippine ties for indications of a US desire to be helpful. Senior officials and
legislators have already mentioned publicly that they want increased concessions on
bilateral trade and investment issues, for example. Manila might also view a well-
publicized AIDS testing program as helpful in dampening public controversy over health
concerns in areas surrounding the bases.
One resource that the United States can use to its advantage is information. We
believe the Philippine policymakers lack access to basic facts and documents that could
help in making an educated decision about the bases. For example, US officials report
that neither the executive branch nor the Congress has the staff resources needed to
research, analyze, and recommend positions on key issues such as the bases-. A
willingness by the United States to share the necessary information in a manner that
does not appear to try to persuade or condescend would more than likely be viewed
favorably by Aquino and the Senate.
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In any case, time could also play on the US side. Whether the negotiations take
place in conjunction with the 1988 review or after, they will undoubtedly move slowly.
This will provide US negotiators the opportunity to better assess the Philippine players
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What Should Happen to the Bases -- by Age Group
General Age Group I Age Group II Age Group III Age Group IV*
18-24 25-39 40-60
USIA FOREIGN OPINION NOTE 11/86
Expand 19
Leave as they are 53
Reduce 14
Remove them completely 6
Don't know 17
MANILA 0311 1/87 ATENEO-SWS (POLL 10/86)
What should be done about the Bases?
Retain 48
Keep, regardless of terms 29
Keep if the rent is right 18
Remove
MANILA BULLETIN 6/86 (Phil Lawyers Assoc)
Bases should be retained after 91 67
Bases should not be retained after 91 33
PROJECT FALCON USIA 1985
Expand
leave as they are
Reduce
Remove completely
Don t know
USIA FILIPINOS ON PHIL-AM RELATIONS 8/85
Expand
Leave as they are
Reduce
Remove
Don't know
28.2 26.8 27.2 31
44.5 44.7 44.5 44.4
15.3 19.3 16.9 9.2
3.7 3.9 3.7 3.4
8.2 5.3 7.6 11.9
30 35 29 29
39 37 40 39
8 9 9 5
6 7 7 5
17 12 15 22
BBC 1984-85 SURVEY RESULTS*
The US bases should be kept/tolerated
Agree 43
Disagree 23
Undecided 34
*Note: AGI=18-24,AGII=25-34,
AGIII=35-44, AGIV=45 and over
35
28
37
37 43 51
25 22 18
36 34 28
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Appendix B
What Should Happen to the Bases -- by Education
USIA FOREIGN OPINION NOTE 11/86
Expand
19
Leave as they are
53
Reduce
14
Removed them completely
6
Don't Know
17
MANILA 0311 1/87 ATENEO-SWS (POLL 10/86)
What should be done about the Bases?
Retain
Keep, regardless of terms
48
Keep if the rent is right
29
Remove
18
MANILA BULLETIN 6/86 (Phil Lawyers Assoc)
Bases should be retained after 91
67
Bases should not be retained after 91
33
PROJECT FALCON USIA 1985
Expand
28.2
20.5
31.1 33.8
Leave as they are
44.5
51.1
45.3 36.4
Reduce
15.3
19.2
15.2 11.2
Remove completely
3.7
5.4
3.5 2
Don't know
8.2
3.8
4.8 16.5
USIA FILIPINOS ON PHIL-AM RELATIONS 8/85
Expand
30
27
35 29
Leave as they are
39
45
38 36
Reduce
8
12
8 5
Remove
6
9
6 5
Don't know
17
8
13 25
BBC
1984-85 SURVEY RESULTS
The US bases should be kept/tolerated
Agree
43
Disagree
23
Undecided
34
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Appendix C
What Should Happen to the Bases -- by Region
USIA SURVEY OF 600 MANILANS (JUNE 87)
Expand
Leave as they are
Reduce
Remove completely
Don't know
If plebiscite were held today...
Most people would vote to keep bases
Most people would vote against
Don't know
22
51
16
9
3
62
23
15
PROJECT FALCON USIA 1985
Expand
28.2
30.6
24.8
Leave as they are
44.5
43.3
46.3
Reduce
15.3
12.8
19
Remove completely
3.7
2.6
5.3
Don't know
8.2
10.7
4.6
USIA FILIPINOS ON PHIL-AM RELATIONS 8/85
Expand
30
31
30
27
Leave as they are
39
38
40
38
Reduce
8
5
11
16
Remove
6
5
8
9
Don't know
17
21
11
10
BBC
1984-85 SURVEY RESULTS
The US bases should be kept/tolerated
Agree
43
48
Disagree
23
22
Undecided
34
30
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Appendix D
Atti
tudes
About the Bases -- by Education
USIA PROJECT FALCON
Gene
(1985)
ral,
University
High
School
Elementary
School
Bases are worth the risks
Strongly Agree
12
14
10.2
10.6
Agree somewhat
38.6
41.1
40.6
33.9
Disagree somewhat
22.7
24.7
24.8
18.7
Strongly disagree
6.4
8.5
6.6
4
Don't know
20.4
10.8
17.7
33.3
How much help are bases
preventing nuclear war
improving security?
A great deal
in
and
32.7
32.5
34.9
30.8
A fair amount
42
42.8
43.9
39.3
Not very much
9.5
13.5
9.3
5.5
None
2.8
5.1
1.9
1.2
Don't know
13
6.2
10
23.2
How much do bases add to risk of
nuclear attack?
A great deal
32.9
40.8
32.2
25.1
A fair amount
32.1
32.7
31.7
31.9
Not very much
13.8
14.3
17.3
9.7
None
5
5.2
5.4
4.3
Don't know
16.2
7
13.4
28.9
How useful are bases to peace
and security of Philippines?
Very useful
31.1
30.5
32.8
30
Rather useful
50.9
53.9
53.1
45.4
Not useful
4.8
8.2
3.6
2.4
Harmful
2.2
3.9
2
0.6
Don't know
11
3.5
8.3
21.7
How much the bases contribute
to the economy
A great deal
20.4
21.9
21.8
17.9
A fair amount
56
56.8
58
53.2
Not very much
11.4
14.8
10.8
8.2
None at all
3.1
3.3
1.6
1.3
Don't know
10
3.2
7.7
19.4
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Attitudes About the Bases -- by Region
USIA PROJECT FALCON (1985)
Bases are worth the risks
Strongly Agree
12
10
14.9
16.7
15
Agree somewhat
38.6
37.1
40.8
40.5
38.6
Disagree somewhat
22.7
21.9
25.1
21.3
35.3
Strongly disagree
6.4
5.2
8.2
10.3
4.7
Don't know
20.4
26.7
11.1
11.2
6.5
How much help are bases i
preventing nuclear war an
improving security?
A great deal
n
d
32.7
31.7
34.2
34
26.9
A fair amount
42
42.4
41.4
41.9
47.8
Not very much
9.5
7.8
12.1
11.7
19.6
None
2.8
1.9
5
6.3
2.8
Don't know
13
16.9
7.3
7
2.8
How much do bases add to
nuclear attack?
A great deal
risk
of
32.9
27.7
40.5
42
38.8
A fair amount
32.1
30.9
33.9
31.3
38.9
Not very much
13.8
13.6
14.1
15
15.2
None
5
5.7
3.9
4.7
3.2
Don't know
16.2
22.1
7.6
7
3.8
How useful are bases to peace
and security of Philippines?
Very useful
31.1
31.1
31
29.7
38.3
Rather useful
50.9
49.2
53.3
52.8
51.4
Not useful
4.8
3.5
6.8
7.3
5.4
Harmful
2.2
1.1
3.8
5.2
3.6
Don't know
11
15
5.1
5
1.2
How much the bases contribute
to the economy
A great deal
20.4
18.7
23.4
25.3
32.5
A fair amount
56
55.8
56.2
51.5
57.5
Not very much
11.4
11.2
11.6
13.2
7.2
None at all
3.1
1
3.7
5
0.9
Don't know
10
13.3
5.1
5
2
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/25: CIA-RDP90T00114R000200970001-0
USIA FOREIGN OPINION NOTE 11/86
Bases are rather useful to
Philippine
Agree
security
82
Disagree
7
Bases help at
least fair
amount to de
ter nuclear war and
increase security of US and allies
Agree
68
Di
sagree
20
Bases add at least fair amount
to risk of Philippine being
nuclear target
Agree
65
Disagree
24
Bases are worth the risk
Agree
56
Disagree
31
Bases contribute at least a fair
amount to Philippine economy
Agree
75
Disagree
16
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/25: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000200970001-0
PHILIPPINES: EXPLORING VIEWS ON THE US MILITARY BASES
DISTRIBUTION:
WHITE HOUSE/OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING
1 - DON GREGG, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT, RM 298, OLD
EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING
1 - JAMES H. KELLY, SENIOR STAFF MEMBER EAST ASIA, RM 302, OLD EXECUTIVE
OFFICE BUILDING
1 - DAVID LAUX, DIRECTOR OF ASIAN AFFAIRS RM 493, OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE
BUILDING
1 - ALAN THOMAS, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL RM 303, OLD EXECUTIVE
OFFICE BUILDING
1 - RICHARD CHILDRESS, DIRECTOR OF ASIAN AFFAIRS RM 392, OLD EXECUTIVE
OFFICE BUILDING
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVES
1 - THE HON FRANK C. CARLUCCI, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS, RM 493, OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
1 - CDR ED CAHILL, JOINT SPECIAL OPS AGENCY RM 2C840, PENTAGON
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1 - THE HON. GEORGE P. SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE RM, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
1 - DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ANALYSIS FOR EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC, RM 8840,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1 - JOHN C. MONJO, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, RM 6205,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1 - CURTIS KAMMEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY RM 6531, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
1 - CHARLES SALMON, DIRECTOR OFFICE OF PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS, RM 5311,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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1 - DAVID LAMBERTSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND
PACIFIC AFFAIRS, RM 6205, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1 - DR. JACK SHEERIN, PLANNING AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS STAFF, RM 3425,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1 - SCOTT BUTCHER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OFFICE OF PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS, RM
5311, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1 - MAJORIE NIEHAUS, OFFICE OF ANALYSIS FOR EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC/SA,
RM 8647, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1 - NANCY BASHOVEN, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, RM 7424,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1 - PETER W. RODMAN, DIRECTOR POLICY PLANNING STAFF, RM 7311,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1 - RICHARD CLARK, JR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ANALYSIS, RM
6535, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1 - RICHARD HERMANN, OFFICE OF ANALYSIS FOR EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC/SA,
RM 8647, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1 - ROBERT DUBOSE, DIRECTOR OFFICE OF GLOBAL ISSUES, RM 2844,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1 - THE HON MORTON ABRAMOWITZ, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE RM
6531, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1 - THE HON MICHAEL H. ARMACOST, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS, RM 7240, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1 - THE HON GASTON SIGUR, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND
PACIFIC AFFAIRS, RM 6205, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1 - ROB HUGHES, OFFICE OF PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS RM 5311, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
1 - REAR ADMIRAL EDWARD B. BAKER, JR, DIRECTOR. EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC
REGION, OSD/ISA, RM 4C839, PENTAGON
1 - REAR ADMIRAL JAMES D. COSSEY, OFFICE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, RM 4C839, PENTAGON
1 - JOHN J. SLOAN, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC,
RM 2C238, PENTAGON
1 - BRIG GEN (P) CRAIG H. BOICE, OJCS, J33 US ARMY, RM 2D921, PENTAGON
1 - BRIG GEN PHILIP M DREW, USAF, ASSIST DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR
POLITICS-MILITARY, OJCS, RM 2E976, PENTAGON
1 - CAPT RENEE GOING, HQ USAF/INER, RM 48-879, PENTAGON
1 - CAPT REGINALD AVERY, USA, ARMY ITAC, BUILDING 213 STOP 314 WASH
NAVY YARD, RM, WASHINGTON, DC 20734
1 - CHARLES E. DOWNS, OSD/ISA/EAPR VIA SUE BENJAMIN CIA REP NMIC
PENTAGON, RM 2D901A, PENTAGON
1 - LT CDR BILL MASON, CNO/OP-612C RM 4E-475, PENTAGON
1 - LT COL EDWARD HAYDASH, HQDA (DAMI-FII) RM 2A474, PENTAGON
1 - COL TIM BUCHANAN, OJCS/J-5/FESA RM 2E973, PENTAGON
1 - LT COL RICHARD A. RICE, J5 FESA RM 2E973, PENTAGON
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1 - LT COL WILLIAM WISE, USAF, ASSISTANT FOR REGIONAL POLICY AND
CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS, RM 4C839, PENTAGON
1 - LT J.G. FIJOL, NAVOPINTCEN WORLD NAVIES, RM, WASHINGTON, DC
1 - LTC ROBERT COOEY, USAF, HQ USAF/INER RM 4B-870, PENTAGON
1 - LTC MIKE O'HARA, HQ USMC/INTP RM, NAVY ANNEX
1 - REAR ADMIRAL W. 0. STUDEMAN, DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
NOP-009, RM 5C600, PENTAGON
1 - ROB HUDDLESTON, JSI/3B RM 1C938B, PENTAGON
1 - THE HON RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, RM 43808, PENTAGON
1 - KARL D JACKSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE EAST ASIA AND
PACIFIC AFFAIRS, RM 4E816, PENTAGON
1 - LT GEN LEONARD H. PERROOTS, DIRECTOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
RM 3E258, PENTAGON
1 - DIA/DB2C DIAC, RM C2137, BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE
1 - DIA/DB-2C1 DIAC, RM DB4E2, BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE
1 - DIA JSI-3B, RM 1C938, PENTAGON
1 - DIA/DB-2C1 DIAC, RM C245A, BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE
1 - DIA/DE-2 DIAC, RM 3B-823, BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE
1 - USA, DIA/DB-2C (P TEAM) DIAC, RM C2417-B, BOLLING AIR
FORCE BASE
1 - DIA/JSI-3B DIAC, RM 1C938B, PENTAGON
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
1 - ROGER SEVERANCE, DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE PACIFIC BASIN, RM 3820,
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
1 - ROBERT A. CORNELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR TRADE AND
INVESTMENT POLICY, RM 3208, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
1 - JAMES NORRIS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR RM 6724, AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVEL
1 - MICHAEL CROSSWELL, OFFICE OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING RM 6851,
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVEL
1 - BILL NANCE, OFFICE OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS RM 3214, AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVEL
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/25: CIA-RDP90T00114R000200970001-0
1 - CHARLES GREENLEAF, OFFICE OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS RM 6212, AGENCY
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVEL
1 - RAY ALBRIGHT, VP/ASIA DIVISION RM 1129, WASHINGTON, DC
1 - CHARLES SILVER, PHILIPPINE OFFICER RM 766, WASHINGTON, DC 20547
1 - CHIEF, JAPAN, OFFICE OF EAST ASIAN ANALYSIS NORTHEAST ASIA, RM 4G31,
HEADQUARTERS
1 - RESEARCH DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EAST ASIAN ANALYSIS SYSTEMS
DEVELOPMENT STAFF, RM 4G48, HEADQUARTERS
1 - NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, ANALYTIC GROUP RM 7E47,
HEADQUARTERS
1 - CHIEF, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL RM 7E62, HEADQUARTERS
1 - DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EAST ASIAN ANALYSIS RM 4F18, HEADQUARTERS
1 - DDI, RM 7E44, HEADQUARTERS
1 - SENIOR REVIEW PANEL, RM 7842, HEADQUARTERS
1 - PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF STAFF, RM 7F30, HEADQUARTERS
1 - EA, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER RM 7E62, HEADQUARTERS
1 - CHIEF, EARM 5D00, HEADQUARTERS
1 - INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT STAFF, OFFICE OF CURRENT PRODUCTION AND
ANALYTIC SUPPORT, RM 7G50, HEADQUARTERS
6 - CONTROL BRANCH, OFFICE OF CURRENT PRODUCTION AND ANALYTIC
SUPPORT, IMC, RM 7G07, HEADQUARTERS
1 - SPECIAL ASSIST. DISSEM ANALYSIS, OFFICE OF CURRENT PRODUCTION AND
ANALYTIC SUPPORT, RM 7G50, HEADQUARTERS
1 - DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE
ASSISTANT, RM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS
1 - DIRECTOR, DDCI, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE STAFF, RM
7D60, HEADQUARTERS
1 - CHIEF, PRODUCT EVALUATION STAFF RM 2G25, HEADQUARTERS
1 - DIRECTOR, LDA/EA RM 1H18, HEADQUARTERS
1 - PRODUCTION OFFICER, OFFICE OF EAST ASIAN ANALYSIS SYSTEMS
DEVELOPMENT STAFF, RM 4G48, HEADQUARTERS
1 - CHIEF, SOUTHEAST ASIAN ISLANDS BRANCH, RM 4F38, HEADQUARTERS
1 - CHIEF, SOUTHEAST ASIA INDOCHINA, THAILAND, MALAYSIA, RM 4F24,
HEADQUARTERS
1 - CHIEF, OFFICE OF EAST ASIAN ANALYSIS SOUTHEAST ASIA DIVISION, RM
4F38, HEADQUARTERS
1 - FBIS/AG RM 1014, KEY BUILDING
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/25: CIA-RDP90T00114R000200970001-0
1-
HEADQUARTERS
1 - A/NIO/EA RM 7E48, HEADQUARTERS
1 -
25X1
25X1
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