CHINA: DENG UNDER PRESSURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000200570001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 10, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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? Central Intelligence Agency
10 June 1987
China: Deng Under Pressure
Summary
Conflict within the Chinese leadership has become increasingly
evident since the ouster of Hu Yaobang in January. Although some
clashes probably have been over patronage and policy issues, we believe
Deng Xiaoping's conservative rivals, most notably Peng Zhen, are trying to
challenge Deng's authority and primacy. Conservative inroads, particularly
within the party's propaganda department, and the current stalemate over
economic reforms suggest that Deng's power has eroded. We are less
sure, however, whether this represents a temporary setback for Deng or a
more fundamental shift in the balance of power. Much depends on a key
unknown--whether Deng still commands the loyalty of his traditional allies
among party elders and the military. Although Deng and Zhao Ziyang
appear to have taken the offensive recently, stressing the importance of
moving ahead with reform, we may not be able to gauge the strength of
the conservative and reform camps until the results are in from this
summer's preparatory meetings for the October party congress.
This memorandum was prepared by :::]Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 5 June 1987 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Political Assessments Branch,
China Division,
DATE
DOC NO NL 87-20113
OIR 3
P & PD (
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An Embattled Deng?
Since January, Deng in our judgment has been acting as if he is on the defensive.
He may feel vulnerable not only for having sponsored the now disgraced Hu Yaobang as
party chief, but perhaps even more for his own longstanding record of ideological
pragmatism--probably an easier target for his rivals than his policies, which have been
formally endorsed by the Central Committee. Indeed, Deng and his allies have gone to
extraordinary lengths over the past several months to polish Deng's orthodox ideological
credentials and, by extension, to distance him from Hu's alleged ideological deviations:
? A new, revised edition of Deng's "Build Socialism With Chinese
Characteristics"--selections from his speeches and inscriptions--contains
criticism of Hu for inattention to ideology. -
? Party leaders, including Acting General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and party elder
Wang Zhen, have gone out of their way to note Deng's long espousal of
conservative themes.
? The propaganda treatment of Deng's book and others of his works has been
unusually obsequious and reminiscent of the cult of Mao Zedong.
Deng's meetings with an unusually broad array of foreign dignitaries seem an
attempt to rally support and counter the growing conservative voice in the media. He
has commented extensively on current Chinese politics during talks with visitors who, in
ordinary times, would never have rated an audience. Deng seems determined to remind
the public that he is still in charge and to make sure that special points he wants to
make either get into the official press or into the classified media summaries for
cadres: I
? In March, Deng used a meeting with Canada's governor general to put political
structural reform--a key point of contention last summer between reformers and
conservatives--back on the agenda.
? In an April meeting with the President of Gambia, Deng pointedly omitted
referring to China's effort against bourgeois liberalism while summarizing China's
policies as "opening up and reform." He has repeated this formulation on several
occasions.
New China News Agency foreign press summaries such as Cankao Ziliao ("Reference
Material") and Cankao Xiaoxi ("Reference News") contain both edited and unabridged
articles and are compiled for official use. Chinese leaders frequently demonstrate a
thorough knowledge of Hong Kong and Western media coverage of China, which
almost certainly is acquired from classified press materials and like publications.
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? Deng has used sessions with the Gambians and other delegations to reminisce
about his experiences during the Cultural Revolution era, perhaps in part to
soothe anxious foreign investors by again disavowing Cultural Revolution - style
movements, but also to warn his rivals against the hazards of open political
warfare.
? In remarks that the official press did not publicize, Deng told a visiting Spanish
official that, contrary to the emphasis on China's current effort against rightist
phenomena, the "main struggle" should be against the leftist trend and "nostalgic
leftists" within the party.
? Deng noted ambiguously to Bulgarian party chief Zhivkov that "old fighters have
their strong points and problems. . they may even be involved in disputes and
complications." Such problems, Deng allowed, should be solved "when we are
still alive." He may have been referring to problems between China and the
Soviet Bloc, or among Chinese themselves.
Recent remarks by Zhao clearly allude to top-level infighting. On 17 May, the
Beijing-controlled Wen Wei Po of Hong Kong summarized Zhao's speech to a recent
unidentified conference, where the acting party chief railed against "certain comrades"
who attack the reforms under the guise of protecting ideological purity. Zhao reportedly
pointed out that deepening the drive against bourgeois liberalism did not mean
organizing a Mao-style mass campaign and creating a tense political atmosphere,
remarks that were echoed in sharply worded People's Daily editorials of 17 and 22 May.
Signs of Conservative Strength
If Deng seems on the defensive, it may be because China's more orthodox
leaders are engaged in a full court press to weaken Deng and his allies while seeking
support for themselves. An example is the March session of the National People's
Congress, where Peng Zhen and the NPC Standing Committee--a conservative
bastion--sidetracked a vital enterprise management reform and, by so doing, also
prevented an important measure to regulate enterprise bankruptcy from going into
effect. The annual NPC session in fact was dominated by Peng and his conservative
allies and to us seemed deliberately stage-managed to undermine the authority of Zhao
and the reforms--and, implicitly, Deng:
? Zhao's report on the work of the government was criticized from the floor, and
the final version incorporated criticisms of the government for inattention to
grain production and ideological work.
? The NPC endorsed only "in principle" a reform that would allow villages a
measure of self-government and referred it to Peng's Standing Committee for
final review.
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? A Hu Yaobang protege was ousted as Minister of Public Security and was
replaced by a provincial official who once served as
Peng Zhen's secretary.
? After the close of the NPC, a group of People's Delegates in Tianjin sharply
criticized construction projects under the authority of Mayor Li Ruihuan, a
reformer who has been mentioned as a possible successor to Zhao Ziyang.
Another group in Sichuan criticized the provincial party committee, led by a Zhao
protege, for a "lack of drive" in effecting economic retrenchment.
The State Education Commission, headed by Vice Premier Li Peng--widely
reported to be a conservative favorite--also has been unusually active in advancing an
orthodox point of view. In April and May the commission sponsored forums on
ideological work. Sharing the dais with archconservatives Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun, Li
delivered an "important speech" at the May session, according to Chinese press
accounts. The commission also promulgated regulations that for the first time since the
Cultural Revolution require students to spend time working in factories or the
countryside. This is at once a distinctly conservative response to last year's student
demonstrations and a retreat from the longstanding reformist emphasis on academic
Moreover, the official media have had a distinctly conservative cast since Hu
Yaobang's ouster and have vigorously pushed orthodox economic and political themes
while assiduously promoting the visibility of conservative leaders. All but eclipsed by
Deng and Hu 6 months ago, prominent old-guard figures are now able to get their every
public appearance and utterance replayed in the daily press. Meanwhile, ideologues led
by Politburo member Hu Qiaomu, Secretariat member Deng Liqun, and the new
propaganda chief Wang Renzhi apparently are presiding over an attempted consolidation
of conservative influence in the party's propaganda organs:
? Wang chaired a convocation of orthdox propagandists in January, where
participants aired grievances against reformers for controlling access to the
media. He attended and blessed a similar session in April that, according to the
Hong Kong press, worked out a battle plan to purge the Chinese media. Such
plans seem to accord with tough new party directives--leaked to Hong Kong
journalists--but run counter to Deng's efforts to contain the antibourgeois
liberalism drive.
? A recently established State Media and Publications Office led by Du Daozheng,
the conservative former editor of Guangming Ribao, apparently will be the
executive arm of the literary offensive. According to Du, the office has authority
to shut down publications and discipline editorial staff.
Conservatives have also asserted their control in ongoing party affairs. For
example, a party circular issued in early February passed down rural rectification
guidelines established by old-guard leader Bo Yibo that redirected the campaign away
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from promoting economic reform as mandated by Hu toward comfortably conservative
lines. Bo, whose remarks--issued as Central Document 3 of 1987--were the first official
account of Hu Yaobang's mistakes, has taken a prominent hand in day-to-day affairs
since Hu's fall. at least until recently he has headed
the team in charge of personnel work for the 13th Party Congress.
Recent leadership changes publicized in Hong Kong's Communist press may also
work to advance orthodox interests. Deng and Zhao almost certainly had to approve the
transfer of State Planning Commission chief Song Ping to the party Organization
Department, but the appointment places a septuagenarian in the conservative mold as
head of personnel work just when the leadership is deliberating organizational moves
before the party congress. Vice Premier Yao Yilin, a longtime disciple of Chen Yun, will
serve as acting planning minister and will return that post to Politburo standing for the
first time since 1982, when Yao last led the commission.
Key Uncertainties
Despite the obvious increase in conservative influence, it is much less clear
whether conservative leaders--Peng Zhen, Chen Yun, Hu Qiaomu, Bo Yibo, Deng
Liqun--are acting in concert or even have a common set of goals. We suspect the
more hardline ideologues like Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun are attempting to curb the
power of Deng and his reform allies in order to block policies they regard as politically
destabilizing or anathema to Marxism-Leninism. Others--who perhaps include Wang
Zhen--seem determined to resist Deng's repeated efforts to push them into retirement
and may only be trying to protect their own positions and to advance their proteges at
the party congress. In contrast, we think Peng Zhen (and perhaps Bo Yibo) is trying to
mount a challenge to Deng's primacy
Pang Zhen has clearly been the most active and visible of conservative leaders
since Hu Yaobang's downfall. He has used a variety of forums to air his views, and has
done so in a way that we interpret as a proffering of leadership credentials. He
2 Wang, a longtime ally of Deng, seems to have taken a middle course since January.
He has been in the forefront of senior leaders attacking the trend toward bourgeois
liberalism but has also grouped Deng with Mao as author of "classic Marxist" writings
on art and literature.
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particularly has exploited the National Peoples Congress as a personal megaphone.
Peng has frequently spoken and published on ideological topics, attempting in our view
to upstage Deng as a theorist. Peng frequently uses his articles to remind readers of
his ties to Mao and other party patriarchs:
? Peng held a highly publicized press conference that was the media event of the
NPC session. He praised Deng--disingenuously, in our view--as China's "idea
man" and sole indispensable elder on the Politburo Standing Committee, while
disavowing any ambition to sit on that body. Peng went on to volunteer that, if a
vote were taken then, he "could only elect Deng." Significantly, he omitted
mentioning Zhao.
? In a pointed bit of political symbolism, Peng left Beijing immediately after the
NPC for the old Jiangxi revolutionary base area, where he invoked the traditions
of Chinese Communism.
? From Jiangxi, Peng journeyed to the Shenzhen and Xiamen Special Economic
Zones, where he alluded to criticism of the SEZs but gave his own guarded
approval to the open door activities there.
Although conservative party elders may agree that Deng has grown too powerful
and must be reined in, we remain skeptical in the absence of stronger evidence that
they are cooperating in more than a loose fashion. Indeed, given their disparate
interests, we believe Deng may yet be able to play them off against each other and
defuse any threat. Much depends, however, on Deng's ability to command the loyalty of
the military and such longtime allies as Yang Shangkun, Xi Zhongxun, and Wang Zhen,
whose support has lent legitimacy to Deng's reform efforts and helped keep other old
We believe Deng continues to have the backing of the military and his old
cronies, but he almost certainly is concerned about the possibility of defections from the
ranks of his veteran supporters. Evidence of their wavering loyalt is sketchy and
contradictory. Peng is said to
have mobilized the support of senior military officials--including Yang
Shangkun--against Deng at the Beidaihe meetings last summer. The Hong Kong paper
Cheng Ming, citing official sources, ran a similiar story in January, lending some
credence to this story. Yang, however, has loyally supported Deng and Zhao in public
since January, and reformers seemed intent that Yang establish credentials as a leader
of international stature during his May visit to the United States. Moreover, another
recent report in Asiaweek, which claims to have inside sources in Beijing, says that
Deng in a show of strength recently took over from Bo Yibo the "Committee of Nine" in
charge of personnel changes at the 13th Party Congress.
The depth of Peng Zhen's and other party elders' strength in the party and
bureaucracy is equally unclear at present. These leaders of course have long possessed
networks of supporters. Since 1978, however, most conspicuous personnel movements
have involved the promotion of reformists that would seem to give Deng and his allies a
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decided edge as the party congress approaches. Indeed, aside from the recent push in
the propaganda and security departments--it is unclear whether the new personnel chief
is a staunch traditionalist--conservative personnel gains have either been unobtrusive or
Given the fluidity of the present situation, however, we may not be able to
accurately gauge the balance between the conservative and reform camps until after
this summer's preparatory meetings for the October party congress. At such meetings,
Deng has always played for strategically placed appointments of key allies in high posts
in the party and government. Decisions on personnel matters, including the choice of a
successor to Zhao Ziyang as premier, therefore probably will offer the best indicators of
Deng's and his rivals' political strength.
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Subject: China: Deng Under Pressure
Distribution:
White House and National Security Council
1 - Don Gregg, Special Assistant to the Vice President, NSC, Room 298,
The White House
1 - Douglas Paal, Director of Asian Affairs, The White House,
Room 493, OEOB
Department of State
1 - Stapleton Roy, Deputy Assistant Secretary, East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Room 6205
1 - Richard Williams, Director, Office of Chinese Affairs (EAP/C),
Room 4318
1 - Joan Plaisted, Deputy Director of Economic Affairs, Office of
Chinese Affairs (EAP/C), Room 4318
1 - John Danylyk, Chief, INR/EC Communist Economic Relations Division,
Room 8662
1 - G. Eugene Martin, Office of Chinese Affairs (EAP/C), Room 4318
1 - Richard Solomon, Director Policy Planning Staff, Room 7311
1 - Tom Fingar, Chief, INR/EAP/CH, Room 8840
1 - Chris Clarke, INR/EAP/CH, Room 8840
Department of Defense
1 - Rear Admiral Baker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia, ISA,
Room 4E817, Pentagon
Ed Ross, OSDISA, 4C840, Pentagon
Lieutenant Colonel Eden M. Woon, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
China Plans and Policy, FESA J-5, Room 2E973. Pentagon
1 - Major Ron Tom, China Staff Officer, Hq. Dept. of the Army, DAMO-SSA,
Room 3B516, Pentagon
1 - Chris Madison, Office of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, DAMI-Fll, Room 2A474, Pentagon
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Central Intelligence Agency
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