NORTH KOREAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF MOSCOW CLUES TO FUTURE TIES?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000100970001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 27, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE
DOC NO flh gf_1129-37
OIR 3
P & PD /
Central Intelligence Agency
27 February 1987
NORTH KOREAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF MOSCOW
Clues to Future Ties?
Summary
P'yongyang's radio and press radically changed the quality and
quantity of their reporting on North Korean-Soviet ties in the 1980s,
reflecting an increasingly positive view of ceremonies, events, and issues
that has paralleled--and in some cases preceded--tangible progress in the
relationship. The change was particularly apparent in 1986, when North
Korea and the Soviet Union dramatized common anti-US themes in their
rhetoric. Problems remain in the relationship, but we believe the two
sides are closer now than at any time since 1948. Judging from the
pattern in media coverage, we expect the
warmer atmosphere in North Korean-Soviet relations to continue in 1987.
Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 27 February 1987 was used in its preparation. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Korea Branch, Northeast
Asia, OEA,
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Media Analysis as a Gauge: The Rationale for a Close Look
The warming trend in Soviet-North Korean relations that began in 1983 was
clearly signaled by President Kim II-son 's visit to Moscow in May 1984. Since then,
evidence of the improved relationship, has included:
? Soviet aid in building a nuclear power plant in North Korea.
? A recent unprecedented joint naval exercise.
But P'yongyang also has altered its public behavior, offering Moscow greater
support in the media, as well as changing its treatment of Soviet-North Korean relations:
? Pyongyang has significantly upgraded its rhetoric marking major Soviet-North
Korean anniversaries and celebrations.
? The North has also expanded media support for Soviet foreign policy and security
proposals.
Sometimes, however, North Korean and Soviet media accounts of the same event
have been very different--and occasionally one country has failed to report an event
that received play in the other's press. Explanations include North Korea or Soviet
disapproval of an issue or exaggeration of an event's importance for use in domestic or
international propaganda. For example, items such as Soviet banquet toasts and
birthday greetings to Kim Chong-il, Kim II-song's son and apparent successor, play
prominently in the North Korean media but not infrequently are omitted from the Soviet
press.
Our review of P'yongyang's media treatment of the Soviets since the 1960s
confirms patterns that in some cases presage tangible steps. P'yongyang's public
commentary consistently mirrored the declining state of bilateral relations in the 1970s.
Compared with that period, in the past three years the North Korean press has
significantly increased both the number of its items about Moscow and the effusion of
its rhetoric.
The Historical Perspective
In the 1970s, the media reflected P'yongyang's correct but cool ties to Moscow
as the Soviets significantly reduced their public backing as well as shipments of military
equipment. P'yongyang rarely noted Soviet foreign policy initiatives, and it virtually
ignored milestones in US-Soviet relations--including President Nixon's trip to Moscow
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in 1972, SALT I that same year, and the strategic arms limitation talks during the
Ford-Brezhnev summit in Vladivostok in 1974. The only notable exception came in June
1979, when P'yongyang radio briefly reported, without comment, the conclusion of the
SALT II agreement at the Vienna summit. P'yongyang's coverage of events that were
bad news for Moscow reflected the same treatment. For example, NATO's decision in
December 1979 to allow the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)--a
major policy defeat for the Soviet Union--received no attention in North Korean media.
P'yongyang similarly tempered its public treatment of ceremonial milestones.
Observances of the Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty of 1961 are a case in point.
Ceremonies marking the 10th, 15th, and 20th anniversaries indicated a steady downward
slide in the relationship:
? In 1971, P'yongyang's celebration was far less lavish than its observance that
year of a similar treaty with China, and it did not reciprocate the visit of a
high-level Soviet delegation to mark the occasion.
? P'yongyang failed even to hold rallies in 1976 and downplayed traditional
messages of Kim II-song and Premier Pak Song-chol to their Soviet counterparts.
In the same vein, the Soviet Union's congratulatory message to the North Korean
leadership omitted the salutation "Dear Comrades," the first time the Soviets had
dropped the greeting to P'yongyang on a major anniversary.
? By 1981, General Secretary Brezhnev--not even mentioning Kim II-song by
name--had downgraded his "warm congratulations" of 1976 to merely
"congratulations." Unlike Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hu Yaobang, he
voiced no support for Korean reunification or Kim II-song's confederation
proposal. At the same time, Beijing upgraded its message to Kim I1-song who, in
turn, emphasized that North Korea's relations with China were "bloodsealed" and
"militant."
The Warming Trend
Viewed against the backdrop of the 1970s, Kim II-song's visit to Moscow in May
1984--his first in 23 years--signified a dramatic realignment in P'yongyang's relations.
The message from that visit, since underscored in the media, has been the North's
closer identification with Soviet interests, and cooler ties to Beijing. Still, media
reporting suggests the relationship has grown at a measured ace, which is perhaps not
surprising given the arms-length nature of past ties.
To determine whether tell-tale media clues foreshadowed the possibility of
progress during Kim's visit in 1984, we discovered that, in the months preceding Kim's
trip, the press contained hints of a new direction in policy. Our retrospective analysis of
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radio and newspaper reporting indicates P'yongyang had begun to upgrade its treatment
of Soviet affairs--a move reciprocated by Moscow--in 1983. Even so, examples of the
new state of affairs were relatively few and far between:
? In September 1983, P'yongyang, for the first time in several years, took a clearly
positive stand on a Soviet position by supporting Moscow's version of the Korean
Airlines 007 shootdown. P'yongyang's action occurred just after Moscow
withdrew from the Interparliamentary Union meeting in Seoul. Although we have
no evidence of a causal link between the IPU withdrawal and P'yongyang's stance
on the KAL shootdown, we surmise the North welcomed Moscow's boycott.
? Four months later, North Korean media reported that, for the first time, the Soviet
Union sent official New Year's greetings to Kim II-song as well as Kim Chong-il,
suggesting Moscow had softened--although not abandoned--its disapproval of
the elder Kim's plans for dynastic succession.
? In the same month, the Soviet press promptly reported North Korea's proposal for
tripartite talks with the United States and South Korea. They did so without
comment, however, suggesting displeasure over Moscow's exclusion from the
talks.
? The clearest indication that Kim II-song would visit Moscow occurred about a
month before the trip. On 10 April 1984, KCNA published the text of a TASS
interview with Kim.
providing little clue to the extent of cooperation that has since transpired.
Media treatment of the Kim-Chernenko summit in May 1984 was restrained,
Although North Korean media portrayed the
troop withdrawal.
a banquet speech on 23 May. Moreover, North Korean media reported that Chernenko
"warmly hailed" Korean economic achievements and indicated Soviet support for a US
meeting in generally favorable terms, they did not specifically endorse Soviet foreign
policy positions. But both sides hinted at fundamental agreement on broad goals--for
instance, repeating their opposition to "imperialist aggression," a phrase used by Kim in
that the treaty had served to consolidate friendship.
Given the more detailed Soviet media accounts of the talks, North Korea's
treatment suggests that P'yongyang's self-styled "independence" may have inhibited an
admission of the extent of Soviet interests in Northeast Asia. For example, only TASS
reported that Kim and Chernenko emphasized the importance of the 1961 treaty for the
development of bilateral relations and the "preservation of peace in the Far East." Six
years earlier--the last time both sides referred to the treaty--Moscow had noted merely
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Kim's visit was followed by a distinctly more positive tone in North Korean-Soviet
protocol coverage. One of the first upbeat signs occurred in July 1984, when the two
sides marked their treaty anniversary:
? In P'yongyang, the North Korean delegation to the Soviet Embassy's reception
was prominently reported to include three full Politburo members. Since 1971
the anniversary had not drawn more than one North Korean official at the
Politburo level, and in many years the turnout was led by an alternate member.
? P'yongyang's media coverage of the anniversary--including reports of ceremonies
in Moscow for the first time in a decade--was also the most extensive in years.
P'yongyang's characterization of relations with Moscow warmed noticeably,
echoing language used during Kim's visit. Nodong Sinmun, the official Korean
Workers' Party newspaper, called the two countries "friendly neighbors linked by a
river" and "class brothers and intimate comrades-in-arms." Similar, but much
less effusive, language had last appeared in 1979.
? Moscow also upgraded its treatment of the anniversary--Soviet officials
attending a reception at the North Korean Embassy were of a higher level than
those attending the year before.
Security Cooperation
In retrospect, clues in the media that the two countries were cooperating more
closely preceded concrete evidence of the warmer relationship. After Kim's 1984 trip to
Moscow, North Korean-Soviet security cooperation surfaced as a recurrent theme in
P'yongyang media:
? For example, in August 1984, during the 39th anniversary celebration of Korea's
liberation from Japanese rule, North Korea paid special attention to the Soviet
role in defeating Japan. Kim II-song's anniversary message to Moscow, carried
by KCNA, was the warmest in over 20 years, referring to the Soviet Union as
North Korea's "liberator."
? A Nodong Sinmun editorial echoed the "liberator" theme and went on to praise
current Soviet domestic and foreign policies. By contrast, editorials on the
anniversary for more than a decade had contained no more than a brief reference
to the Soviet Union's past assistance.
In 1986, both P'yongyang and Moscow spoke out repeatedly on the UN peace
theme. North Korea has vocally backed Soviet policy stances that complement its own
attempt to project a moderate, peaceful image.
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In November 1985, P'yongyang abandoned its traditional silence on US-Soviet
summits, praising Gorbachev's performance in Geneva and endorsing his proposal for a
collective Asian discussion of regional security issues. During the 1970s, P'yongyang
had consistently turned aside Moscow's periodic efforts to elicit approval of a collective
security arrangement. The endorsement--made in a speech by Foreign Minister Kim
Yong-nam marking the October Revolution as well as a Nodong Sinmun
editorial--apparently impressed Moscow. The Soviets reciprocated in February 1986 via
a TASS statement that supported P'yongyang's condemnation of Team Spirit and the
North's unilateral suspension of military exercises. The Soviet pronouncement was the
clearest statement in nearly 20 years supporting P'yongyang on a peninsular issue.
In 1986, North Korean calls for a nuclear-free zone on the peninsula were echoed
in Moscow, forging a new common stand:
? The Soviet Foreign Ministry issued its most authoritative statement of support for
North Korea in 26 years, seconding P'yongyang's antinuclear theme. Gorbachev
also included the refrain in his Navy Day speech in Vladivostock in July.
? Less than three weeks later, North Korea's Foreign Ministry followed up,
expressing "full support" for Gorbachev's announcement of an extended nuclear
test moratorium. The declaration marked P'yongyang's first formal statement
supporting a Soviet position in 25 years.
Both sides have used the peace theme to demonstrate their broader accord:
? As part of its campaign to add tension-reduction proposals to the proposed
agenda for North-South talks, the North announced in September 1986 that
150,000 troops were to be assigned to civilian construction projects.
P'yongyang's "initiative" was picked up by Pravda and aired on Moscow television.
Such use of military personnel is not new, and, in this case, probably rooted in
economic necessity--North Korea is grappling with shortages of raw materials,
energy, and labor. But the attention given the alleged action also is consistent
with P'yongyang's year-long propaganda campaign to portray itself as a
peace-loving nation.
? Similarly, in September, P'yongyang's role as host of an international antinuclear
conference was well publicized both in North Korea and the Soviet Union. Pravda
and TASS highlighted those sections of the conference declaration praising
Soviet nuclear disarmament proposals and Gorbachev's extended nuclear testing
moratorium, and condemning the Strategic Defense Initiative.
? Common themes figured prominently in press coverage of Kim II-song's October
1986 visit to Moscow. Both Kim and Gorbachev condemned US imperialism,
reiterated Gorbachev's Vladivostok proposals for Asian security, and praised the
Soviet position at the Reagan-Gorbachev talks at Reykjavik. P'yongyang's media
accounts of the summit were more extensive and effusive than the reports of
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Kim's 1984 visit. Upon Kim's return, KCNA publicized a Korean Workers' Party
communique proclaiming the two leaders reached "full consensus on all the
questions discussed."
? Both North Korean and Soviet media harshly criticized the US announcement in
November of plans to deploy Lance missiles in the South, asserting that
Washington had escalated the arms race while praising Moscow and P'yongyang
for their peaceful initiatives.
? During the same month, North Korea acknowledged Soviet interest in an
intra-Korea issue--the Kumgangsan Dam--by replaying Soviet media coverage
that mirrored P'yongyang's line.
Media Omissions: Tacit Signs of Disagreement
The increasingly positive media treatment of bilateral issues and events. suggests
that North Korean-Soviet ties are stronger than would be indicated solely by other, more
tangible measures of the relationship. Nonetheless, we do not underestimate the
differences. Like information on improvements in Soviet-North Korean connections, the
indicators of friction are sparse. Frequently our best clues of policy disagreements are
gleaned not from what press statements say, but from what they omit:
? The Soviets have given only lipservice to P'yongyang's demand to cohost the
1988 Olympics with Seoul and have failed to support the North's threat of a
boycott.
? In contrast to Moscow, P'yongyang recognizes Prince Sihanouk's Cambodian
coalition. The Soviet press does not publicize events related to Kim II-song's
personal friendship with Sihanouk.
? Perhaps most important, Soviet coverage of its North Korean relations reveal
Moscow's reluctance to approve Kim Chong-il as Kim II-song's heir.
Moreover, on several of these and other issues, the Chinese are more supportive
than the Soviets:
? The Chinese press has publicized periodic North Korean calls for Vietnamese
withdrawal from Cambodia.
? China implicitly blessed the elder Kim's succession plan by giving Kim Chong-il
the red-carpet treatment during his visit to Beijing in 1983. He has not yet
visited Moscow.
Notwithstanding the North's shift toward the Soviets, we believe P'yongyang is
reluctant to abandon its image of fierce independence and self-proclaimed status as a
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Nonaligned nation. In fact, public behavior
the North's sensitivity on this score:
highlights
? During the 25th anniversaries of the Soviet and Chinese treaties in July 1986,
North Korea tried to balance its position between the two sides, dispatching full
Politburo members to both Moscow and Beijing.
? North Korean media frequently extol the virtues of Kim II-song's philosophy of
chuche or self-reliance.
Implications
We believe analysis of the media remains a useful complement to other
intelligence in gauging the direction of North Korean-Soviet relations. There are several
areas that bear watching to discern how bilateral ties may change:
? Economic cooperation. The Soviets have been tightfisted on economic issues,
demanding balanced trade and repayment on debt obligations, and we do not
expect Moscow to change its tack significantly in the near term. But a rise in
media attention to bilateral economic issues--articles on joint exploitation of
North Korean resources, for example--in consonance with new trade agreements
and exchanges of economic delegations, could be a tipoff of improved
cooperation in this area. To date, media accounts of economic meetings have
been vague, and terms of agreements have not been publicized.
? Defense cooperation. Public references to defense agreements historically have
been sparse on details, but nonetheless indicators of broader accord. In
December 1986, for example, KCNA described the aim of Soviet General Lizichev's
visit to P'yongyang as the expansion of military cooperation "in accordance" with
the Kim-Gorbachev summit. We would read such statements as well as reports
of visits of military delegations, or articles on each other's defense posture, as
barometers of the defense relationship. They could offer tipoffs of possible new
Soviet aid or joint military exercises.
? New common policy themes. North Korea's media have hinted that P'yongyang is
inching toward an acknowledgement of its role in the Socialist community. For
example, occasionally P'yongyang will use codewords that traditionally imply
membership in the Soviet Bloc, such as "proletarian internationalism." More
frequent use of such terms would suggest further movement in this area. In
January 1987, the North Korean Vice Foreign Minister joined his counterparts from
the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Mongolia at a meeting
in Moscow for the first time. North Korean attendance at the first Asian
Communist party convention in Mongolia this summer would provide evidence of
a convergence of policy interests.
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? Cooperation Abroad. Evidence is sparse on collusion between Moscow and
P'yongyang in the Third World and elsewhere. Although we do not expect to see
radical changes soon, we cannot rule out cooperation as a result of closer North
Korean-Soviet ties. Media features on topics such as joint military or economic
aid to third countries, or increased rhetorical support for diplomatic overtures,
could mark such a new direction in policy.
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Appendix: Chronology of Selected Events
The following chronology presents the key events in North Korea's relations with
the Soviet Union and China, including a short description of P'yongyang's media
treatment. We also list in boldface selected developments involving the major powers
in Asia to provide a backdrop to relations between North Korea and its major allies.
9 September 1948 North Korean Communists establish the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea in
P'yongyang.
July 1961 North Korea signs friendship treaties with China
and the Soviet Union.
February 1965 The United States begins bombing North
Vietnam. Improved North Korean-Soviet
relations during 1965-68 may stem from hopes
Soviet support would help counter US power
in Asia.
1966
January 1968
January 1968
The Chinese Cultural Revolution strains
China's ties to North Korea. Posters in Beijing
call Kim II-song a "fat revisionist" and a
"disciple of Khrushchev."
China refuses an invitation to the Soviet
Communist Party Congress, starting a long
period of noncommunication.
North Korean commandos attack the South
Korean presidential mansion in an abortive
effort to assassinate Park Chung Hee.
North Korea seizes the USS Pueblo, an
intelligence-gathering ship operating near the
coast. Moscow gave minimal media coverage
to the incident, omitting any mention of its
role in settling the crisis, illustrating a cool
state of North Korean-Soviet relations.
November 1968 North Korean commandos infiltrate the east
coast of South Korea and terrorize a village.
The series of violent acts in 1968 reinforces
North Korea's image of dangerous
unpredictability.
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April 1969
April 1970
China and the Soviet Union clash along their
border, leading to a further deterioration in
relations.
North Korean fighters shoot down a US EC-121
reconnaissance plane. As with the Pueblo
incident, Soviet media reports did not mention
Moscow's intervention--Soviet ships helped
the United States search for the downed
aircraft.
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visits P'yongyang
to mend relations damaged by the Cultural
Revolution.
President Nixon visits Moscow and Beijing.
North Korean apprehension over the China trip
is probably a factor in a temporary increase in
P'yongyang's contacts with Moscow:
? The two exchange high-level delegations.
? The Soviets provide additional economic and
military assistance.
1972 The US-China Shanghai communique
criticizes (Soviet) "hegemony."
August 1974
South Korean President Park narrowly escapes
assassination by a North Korean agent; Mrs.
Park is killed.
April 1975 The United States withdraws from Vietnam.
August 1976
North Korean soldiers attack a UN Command
tree-cutting team at Panmunjom, killing two
US officers.
October 1978 China and Japan normalize relations.
November 1978 The Soviet Union and Vietnam sign a treaty
that gives Moscow access to military facilities
in Vietnam.
North Korean-Soviet friction over Cambodia
begins as P'yongyang denounces Vietnam's
invasion of Cambodia.
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December 1978 North Korean media report the normalization
of US-China relations but do not comment on
its implications for the Korean peninsula.
P'yongyang probably fears its interests could
be sold out in US-China discussions about
Korea.
February 1979 China launches a limited border war with
Vietnam.
December 1979 Soviet forces invade Afghanistan. North
Korea criticizes the move.
September 1981 The IOC selects Seoul to host the 1988
Summer Olympics.
September 1982 Following a series of high-level exchanges, Kim
I1-song receives a red-carpet welcome during
his 11-day visit to China.
October 1982
January 1983
May 1983
Soviet press and cultural officials visit South
Korea for the first time to attend an
international conference.
Kim II-song tells Japanese reporters it is
inconceivable Beijing or Moscow could
recognize the "illegitimate" authorities in Seoul.
South Korean and Chinese officials conclude
direct negotiations--their first official
contact--to resolve the hijacking of a Chinese
airliner.
Kim Chong-il visits China. The trip marks
Chinese recognition of Kim 11-song's
succession plans.
1 September 1983 Soviets shoot down a South Korean
passenger plane over Sakhalin Island. The
halt in Soviet contacts with South
Korea--including Moscow's withdrawal from
the Interparliamentary Union meeting in
Seoul--is accompanied by an improvement in
Soviet-North Korean relations. For example,
P'yongyang media cover Soviet INF initiatives
and Andropov's "peace" initiatives.
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22 September 1983 P'yongyang radio echoes the Soviet allegation
that KAL 007 was on a spy mission into Soviet
airspace.
28 September 1983 Chinese Communist Party leader Deng
Xiaoping meets with US Secretary of
Defense Weinberger in Beijing. Their talks
include discussions on Korea.
9 October 1983 Chun Doo Hwan narrowly escapes a North
Korean assassination attempt in Rangoon; 17
South Korean officials are killed.
October 1983 Two South Korean officials attend an
international conference in Shanghai.
November 1983
November 1983
January 1984
February 1984
April 1984
Chinese media report a fairly balanced view of
the Rangoon bombing, reporting both Burma's
announcement blaming P'yongyang, and the
North's official denial of the charges. Moscow
reports only P'yongyang's denial.
Moscow deploys 10 TU-16 Badgers and two
TU-95 Bears at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, the
first Soviet deployment of bombers outside the
Warsaw Pact area since the 1962 Cuban
missile crisis.
Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang makes an
official visit to Washington.
Moscow begins deployment of two of its
three aircraft carriers to the Western Pacific.
In March a Soviet aircraft carrier task force
supports its first joint amphibious exercise
with Vietnam.
Pyongyang media carry Kim 11-song's TASS
interview, the clearest precursor of Kim's trip a
month later.
April 1984 President Reagan travels to China.
April 1984 Moscow announces its boycott of the Los
Angeles Olympics.
May 1984
Kim II-song travels to the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe, his first trip to Moscow in 23
years.
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June. 1984
August 1984
P'yongyang announces its boycott of the Los
Angeles Olympics on the final day for
applications, citing concern over its athletes'
safety. North Korea does not refer directly to
the Soviet boycott.
after China's foreign investment regulations.
North Korean Premier Kang Song-san visits
China. Soon after his return North Korea
promulgates its joint venture law--patterned
August 1984
P'yongyang reports a meeting between the
Soviet Ambassador in North Korea and Kim
Chong-il--who rarely meets foreigners. The
meeting may be an oblique acknowledgement
of Kim's status as designated successor .to Kim
11-song.
November 1984 Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa,
accompanied by military representatives, visits
North Korea to conclude a border treaty: Both
North Korean and Soviet media report his
meetings with Kim II-song on the 20th and
with Kim Chong-il on the 23d.
30 November 1984 P'yongyang and Beijing announce Kim II-song's
unofficial visit to China on 26-28 November.
Differences in the two sides' media treatment
reflect a strain in ties.
January. 1985
North Korea and China sign a new aid
agreement. Chinese media report
P'yongyang's thanks for economic assistance,
but North Korean media fail to report the
agreement.
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April 1985
April 1985
May 1985
July 1985
August 1985
North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam
visits Moscow. P'yongyang publicizes a joint
communique attesting to "consensus on all
problems discussed at the talks," a break with
its longstanding practice of not issuing joint
communiques. The communique may be
evidence of an effort to strengthen ties with
the Soviets.
South Korean diplomats visit China for the
first time to attend an international
conference.
Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Hu
Yaobang visits North Korea. Neither side
claims, as was customary in the past, that
their standard "unanimity of views" extends to
foreign affairs.
Kim II-song indirectly criticizes Chinese policy
by saying that, despite its attempts to bolster
its economy through increased contacts with
the outside world, North Korea would "never"
introduce foreign capital and thus risk
becoming a "subjugated" economy.
General Secretary Gorbachev revives the
"zone of peace" and "Asian security"
concept, first initiated by Brezhnev in 1969,
during Prime Minister Gandhi's visit. Both
ideas aim to exclude US influence from Asia.
The 40th anniversary of Korean liberation from
Japanese rule reveals a new focus on
Soviet-North Korean security ties. China does
not send a delegation.
North Korea accedes to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty in return for Soviet
agreement to help construct a nuclear power
plant.
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January 1986
Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visits
North Korea. P'yongyang endorses the Soviet
proposal for Asian collective security and gives
stronger support for the Soviet-backed
government in Afghanistan--thus broadening
the gap with China.
January 1986
June 1986
North-South talks are halted as P'yongyang
protests the announcement of the US-South
Korean joint exercise Team Spirit 1986.
A delegation of Korean People's Army political
officers visits Moscow. The visit is
reciprocated by General Lizechev in December.
June-July 1986 North Korea calls for military tripartite
talks--including the two Koreas and the United
States--to reduce tension on the Korean
peninsula.
July 1986
September 1986
October 1986
October 1986
Moscow and P'yongyang exchange air and
naval contingents during the 25th anniverary of
their friendship treaty, marking the first official
visit by North Korean warships to a foreign
port.
China sends a team to the Seoul Asian
Games on the first direct flight from China to
South Korea.
Chinese President Li Xiannian visits North
Korea. Chinese media portrayals of the trip
are warmer than P'yongyang media accounts.
The first joint North Korea-Soviet naval
exercise marks a growing defense relationship.
President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev meet at Reykjavik. P'yongyang
supports the Soviet position at the talks.
Visiting US Defense Secretary Weinberger
receives a warm welcome from China. The
reception underscores Beijing's willingness to
widen its defense relationship with
Washington.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP90T00114R000100970001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000100970001-1
Kim 11-song visits Moscow. North Korean
media exude lavish praise for the results of the
talks.
November 1986 The United States announces its deployment
of Lance missiles in South Korea. The
decision is criticized by P'yongyang and
Moscow as another act of US aggression
leading to nuclear war.
December 1986 KCNA reports that Soviet General Lizichev
heads a delegation to P'yongyang for talks on
expanding North Korean-Soviet military
cooperation.
December 1986 Kim II-song calls for high level political and
military talks between North and South Korea.
January 1987
North Korea sends a representative to a
meeting of deputy Foreign Ministers in
Moscow--including officials from Vietnam,
Cambodia, Laos and Mongolia. Soviet media
shows an interest in both intra-Korean and
Asian regional issues by calling for an
improvement in Chinese-Soviet ties, and
backing the North's new talks proposal.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000100970001-1
 I Ji ;. I I -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP90T00114R000100970001-1
SUBJECT: North Korean Media Treatment of Moscow: Clue to Future Ties?
Distribution:
Original - Files
1 - David L. Blakemore, Director, Office of Korean Affairs,
Room 5315, Dept. of State
1 - Ted Kloth, Room 5315, Dept. of State
1 - Bill Newcomb, INR/EC/CER, Room 8442, Dept. of State
1 - Cora Foley, INR, Room 8666, Dept. of State
1 - Paul Ray, INR/EAP, Room 8840, Dept. of State
1 - Joseph A. Mussomeli, East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Room 5315, Dept. of State
1 - James Gagnon, Room 5315, Dept. of State
1 - Scott Goddin, Office of Pacific Basin, Room 2310
1 - Wallace Knowles, OASD/ISA/EAPR, Room 4C840,
Dept. of Defense, Pentagon
1 - Col. Smith, Dept. of Army/Foreign Intelligence
Division/NE Asia, Room 2A575, Pentagon
1 - Maj. Dong, Dept. of Army/Current Intelligence
Division/NE Asia, 2B575, Pentagon
1 - Jay Sloan, Defense Intelligence Officer/EA/P,
Room 2C238, DIA
1 - Col. Ned Murata, DOD/OJCS/J-5/Northeast Asia,
Dept. of Defense, Room 2E973, Pentagon
1 - Director, DCI/DDCI/Executive Staff (7E 12)
1 - NIO/EA (7E 62)
1 - C/PPS/DO (3D 01)
1 - C/EA/RR (5E 18)
1 - OGI/FSIC/PI (2G 28)
1 - OEA/NEA/Korea Branch (4G 43)
1 - OEA/NEA/Japan Branch (4G 31)
1 - OEA/NEA/STI Branch (4G 43)
1 - OEA/NEA Division (4G 43)
1 - OEA/China Division (4g 32)
1 - OEA/SEA Division (4F 24)
1 - D/OEA (4F 18)
1 - C/Production/OEA (4G 48)
1 - FBIS Analysis Group (1014 Key Bldg.)
1 - DDI (7E 47)
1 - Senior Review Panel (5G 00)
1 - Office of Legislative Liaison (713 14)
1 - PDB Staff (7F 30)
5 - CPAS/IMC/CG (7G 07)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP90T00114R000100970001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP90T00114R000100970001-1
1 - CPAS/ILS (7F 50)
1 - C/PES (7F 24)
1 - NIC/AG (7E 47)
1 - DDO/EA Division (5D 00)
1 - DDO/EA
1 - DDO/EA
1 - DDO/EA
1 -DDI
1 - DDI
1 -DDI
DDI/OEA/NA/Korea 26 February 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP90T00114R000100970001-1