CARIBBEAN BASIN: IMPACT OF AN END TO THE US SUGAR QUOTA

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• Publication Date: August 20, 1987
• Content Type: MISC

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Central Intelligence Agency
DATE DOC NO~f 1
OIR .3
P & PD__L _
Washinpn. D. C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
20 August 1987
CARIBBEAN BASIN: IMPACT OF AN END TO THE US SUGAR QUOTA
Summary
An abrupt termination of US sugar quotas, in our
opinion, would create problems for a number of
Caribbean and Central American countries already
experiencing severe economic difficulties. Although
.area leaders generally recognize the need to reduce
dependence on the volatile sugar market, the sudden
elimination of the quota system would undermine foreign
exchange earnings, raise unemployment, and potentially
slow. efforts to diversify agricultural exports. The
negative effects would be particularly strong in the
Dominican Republic, St. Kitts-Nevis, and Belize, where
preferential sugar sales to the.United States account
for a significant proportion of total export earnings.
.Even a gradual phasing-out of quotas would cause some
economic dislocations, although the continuation of
generous foreign assistance--in the form of European
Economic Community (EEC) sugar quotas for most
This typescript was requested by Eugene J. McAllister, Special
Assistant to the President and Executive Secretary, Economic
Policy Council,..The-White House. It follows an earlier
typescript.-that-more generally assessed international reactions
to. US sugar po.licy done b the Office of Global Issues. This
report was prepared:by Office of
African;:~and Latin American Analysis, with a contribution by
Office of Global Issues. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Middle America-
Caribbean Division, ALA
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Caribbean islands and large-scale US aid to Central
American countries--would cushion the impact. Any
worsening of the economic situation resulting from an
end to the quota system also would create additional
political problems for fragile democratic governments
in several countries, but we doubt such action would
provoke a domestic crisis anywhere, with the possible
exception of the Dominican Republic.
The abrupt lifting of the US quota almost
certainly would harm US relations with area
governments, at least over the near term. At a
minimum, such action would generate anti-US sentiment
and severe criticism. It would also probably further
undermine support for the Caribbean Basin Initiative
and raise fears of deep cuts in the US economic aid
program. Without special access to the US sugar
market, the Caribbean Basin countries probably would
lobby harder for increased economic assistance and
could become less cooperative with Washington in
counternarcotics efforts and other areas of mutual
concern.
Dependence on the US Sugar Quota
Dependence on the US sugar quota varies widely. Among the
Caribbean islands, the Dominican Republic and St. Kitts-Nevis are
the most heavily dependent, deriving about 25 and 50 percent of
their respective export earnings from sugar sales (see Table 1).1
According to the International Sugar Organization, sales to the
United States under the sugar quota comprise nearly two thirds of
the Dominican Republic's sugar exports and almost 20 percent of
St. Kitts-Nevis' (see Table 2).
Other Caribbean countries depend substantially less on the
US sugar quota. IMF and World Bank reports indicate that sugar
represents less than 10 percent of the total export earnings of
Jamaica, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados. Moreover,
under the Lome Convention, these countries--aside from Haiti--
depend largely on European Economic Community (EEC) quotas, which
have increased slightly in recent years to help cushion
reductions in US purchases. According to US Embassy reports,
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago consider the United States to be
a residual market for sugar not sold to the United Kingdom or
other EEC countries.
The Central American countries--with the exception of
Belize, where sugar accounts for 25 to 40 percent of export
earnings--earn only a small share of their export earnings from
This paper considers only those countries presently covered
under the Caribbean Basin Initiative.
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sugar. Their heavy reliance on the US market, however, has
magnified the impact of recent cuts in the US quota (see Figure
1). In 1986, for example, about 40 percent of the region's total
sugar exports went to the United States. According to Embassy
reporting,, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Panama rely on the US
market to absorb nearly 60 percent of their sugar.exports.
Guatemala and Honduras shipped about 25 percent of their exports
to the United States in 1986,-while Belize. sent roughly 50
percent.
Special access to US and European markets, along with
domestic subsidies, has helped to insulate the uncompetitive,
labor-intensive sugar industries of the Caribbean Basin from low
world prices. Exporters protected by US and--in the case of most
Caribbean islands and Belize--EEC quotas'receive premium prices
for their sugar, ranging between 17 and 20 cents per pound. Even
so, lack of mechanization, relatively high labor costs, generous
domestic support prices, and inefficient management of nationally.
owned sugar companies have kept domestic production costs near
the US and EEC preferential prices. Most. producers argue,
correctly in our view, that the steep financial. losses incurred
by selling sugar on the world market--at the.current average
price.of six cents per pound--would be unsustainable (see Figure
2).
Coping with Low Prices and Quota Reductions
Individual countries have adjusted in varying degrees to low
world sugar prices and previous US reductions in quotas, largely
by implementing policies designed to improve the profitability of
their sugar industries and to develop higher-value exports.
-- The Dominican Republic has encouraged production of
pineapples, melons, tomatoes, and other crops on some
land formerly used for sugar. In addition, the
government has aggressively promoted foreign investment
in agroindustries and tourism-to cushion the impact of
falling sugar revenues..
--..By increasing mechanization and upgrading some sugar
mills, Jamaica's Prime Minister Seaga since 1981 has
managed.to close three state-owned sugar mills and lay
off 10,000 workers without 'reducing production.
-- The Haitian Government, in recent years a net importer of
cheaper foreign sugar, has closed unprofitable sugar
mills, according to the US Embassy, and laid off more
than 3,000 sugar mill workers.
-- Trinidad and Tobago recently announced plans to dismantle
the government's sugar monopoly, its biggest moneylosing
firm,,and to.sell the land at reduced prices..
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-- Barbados' efforts to promote tourism, manufacturing, and
agricultural diversification are paying off; these
sectors have absorbed many displaced sugar workers, and
electronic components have replaced sugar as the
country's single largest export item.
-- By contrast, St. Kitts-Nevis lacks the funds to mechanize
its sugar industry and expand irrigation to produce
alternate crops. As a result, the 40-percent drop in
sugar export earnings has not been made up in other
sectors, and foreign merchandise sales dropped by 25
percent between 1981 and 1985.
Nevertheless, only two Caribbean countries have
significantly reduced their sugar production. Barbados and the
Dominican Republic cut production by 27 and 14 percent,
respectively, between 1981 and 1985. Bridgetown attributes much
of its success to the use of cash incentives to shift production
to such alternate crops as cotton, peanuts, and onions and to
convert marginal lands to pasture. The US agricultural attache
and press reporting indicate successful government incentives to
cultivate alternate crops were partly responsible for production
declines in the Dominican Republic; reduced operating capital and
problems in contracting Haitian sugar cane workers, however, also
were factors.
Central American countries generally have done somewhat less
than their Caribbean counterparts to curtail dependence on the US
sugar market. Moreover, maintenance of high domestic sugar
prices and other direct subsidies for cane producers have helped
to increase production in five of the six countries since 1980,
notwithstanding declines in the US quota. Output and employment
in the sugar industry have increased particularly fast in El
Salvador and Guatemala, even though overall agricultural
production has slumped in both countries. In Honduras, only 5
percent of land allocated to cane production has been shifted to
other crops, primarily basic grains. The notable exception to
this trend is Panama, where sugar production has declined by 40
percent in the last three years as private growers have shifted
nearly one third of.the land once devoted to sugar cane to other
crops.
Attempts to boost sugar sales to nontraditional markets have
met with some success, although the industry's relative lack of
competitiveness is hampering these efforts. El Salvador's state
sugar monopoly, for example, lost three cents on every pound of
sugar it sold to non-US markets in 1986, according to Embassy
reporting. Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica have boosted
sales to new markets, particularly the Soviet Union, and Belize
recently signed an agreement to export sugar to the People's
Republic of China, according to press reports.
Despite the poor performance of Central American sugar
industries, government mismanagement and poorly developed
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infrastructure have hampered diversification to more profitable
agricultural crops and byproducts. In El Salvador and Honduras,
for example, a failure to maintain competitive exchange rates has
stifled trade and private investment. Throughout the region, the
poor quality of roads is a primary impediment preventing
increased production of perishable fruits and vegetables,
according to Embassy reporting. Meanwhile, the fall in world oil
prices has largely sidetracked efforts to develop nascent
industries to produce fuel alcohol from sugar in Costa Rica, El
Salvador, and Belize.
Domestic Impact of Quota Termination
An abrupt end to the preferential imports under the US sugar
quota for the Caribbean Basin would have negative economic and
political ramifications for the region. Such a move would
substantially hurt the region's ability to sustain its sugar
industries financially and cause sizable foreign exchange losses
in some countries, at least over the short run. For example,
assuming these countries could sell the same volume of sugar
assigned under the 1987 quota on the international market at
world rather than preferential prices, total sugar earnings for
the Caribbean Basin countries would drop from a projected $134
million in 1987 to $44 million (see Table 3). Although scheduled
US economic aid, particularly to Central America, and EEC sugar
quota arrangements with many Caribbean countries would help to
offset this decline, several countries--including the Dominican
Republic, St. Kitts-Nevis, and Belize--would be substantially
less insulated from the impact. An end to the quota also would
exacerbate domestic political difficulties by adding to already
unacceptable levels of unemployment. Nevertheless, it is
unlikely that it would provoke a domestic political crisis in any
country, with the possible exception of the Dominican Republic.
The Caribbean Islands
Dominican Republic. Among the Caribbean Basin countries,
the Dominican Republc Would be the most severely hurt by an end
to its US sugar quota. We believe such a move, on top of the
Dominican Republic's already serious financial problems, would
substantially weaken President Joaquin Balaguer. According to US
Department of State reporting, the Dominican Republic is the only
country in the region that will earn almost as much from sugar
sales to the United States this year as it will receive in US
economic assistance.
St. Kitts-Nevis. St. Kitts-Nevis probably would be the only
other Caribbean island hurt seriously by a lifting of the US
quota. The US Consulate in Antigua estimates that sugar
production employs 35 percent of St. Kitts' labor force. Despite
.'See the Appendix for a detailed-as-sessment of the impact on the
Dominican Republic.
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a dramatic expansion in tourism, the Consulate indicates that
this industry is unlikely to create enough jobs over the next few
years to replace even half of those expected to be lost in the
sugar sector. As a result, a sudden end to US sugar imports, in
our view, would significantly increase the island's current 30-40
percent rate of unemployment and undermine its efforts to
diversify agricultural exports. We believe, nonetheless, that
lack of strong opposition to the centrist government of Prime
Minister Simmonds, continued EEC sugar quotas, and the safety
valve of steady emigration would prevent problems in the sugar
industry from radicalizing local politics.
Other Caribbean Countries. Other Caribbean countries would
be much less affected because of their relative lack of
dependence on sugar exports to the United States. Haiti is
likely to continue to remain a net sugar importer over the near
term. Moreover, scheduled increases in US and multilateral aid
over the next several years will more than offset the small
financial losses resulting from Haiti's inability to re-export
cheap imported sugar to the United States. US Department of
Agriculture officials expect EEC quotas--which absorb the major
share of sugar exported by Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and
Tobago--to continue in the near term at present levels and to
absorb much of their excess sugar production over the next few
years.
Central America
Belize. Of the Central American countries, Belize probably
would face the most serious fallout from an elimination of its US
sugar quota. The slack economy already has sparked criticism of
Prime Minister Esquivel, and additional declines in the sugar
industry would make economic revitalization more difficult.
Embassy reporting indicates that the small left wing of the
opposition party hopes to capitalize on economic discontent to
win national elections in 1989. Marijuana production--90 percent
of which is destined for US markets, according to US Embassy
reporting--already is a major source of income in Belize and
almost certainly will increase as production of sugar becomes
less. profitable.
.El Salvador. The severe social, political, and economic
problems facing El Salvador also would be substantially increased
by an end to its US quota. Marxist-Leninist insurgents already
are exploiting the country's faltering economy to increase
popular discontent with the government and boost their own base
of support. Because of this, the ruling Christian Democrats
probably would not quickly abandon the sugar industry even if
financial pressures intensified; it employs nearly 35,000 full-
and part-time workers in a country where roughly one half of the
labor force is unemployed or underemployed. Scheduled US
economic and military aid would help to cushion the impact of
mounting financial losses from quota reductions and to shore up
President Duarte's political position.
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Honduras. Honduras also would face increasing financial
losses if it no longer had preferential access to the US sugar
market. As in El Salvador, however, US assistance over the next
few years probably would cover some losses and preserve
politically sensitive employment while sputtering efforts to
diversify the economy dragged on.
Guatemala. Although the Guatemalan economy remains
stagnant, its relative diversity, the government's promising
efforts at economic reform, and scheduled US balance-of-payments
support probably would negate much of the impact of an end to its
quota. Government officials are committed to policies--including
exchange rate adjustments and streamlining of bureaucracy--that
will encourage new private investment and diversification.
Costa Rica. With a stable democracy, a modestly expanding
economy, and scheduled US economic aid, Costa Rica probably could
make a relatively smooth transition to an end of the quota. The
ensuing probable decline in sugar sales to the United States
would complicate the politically difficult agricultural reforms-
San Jose faces to reduce its large budget deficit.
Panama. Panama's largely service-oriented economy probably
would be little affected by an elimination of its quota. State-
owned production and processing plants account for 90 percent of
sugar exports, but Panama City already has begun to reduce its
role in the agricultural sector and is likely to suffer minimal
financial losses. New private investment can be redirected to
alternate crops. With unemployment already exceeding 10 percent,
joblessness stemming from displacement of sugar workers would
pose further political problems for the regime. The military,
however, has developed goodwill in rural areas with aggressive
civic action programs, and such support probably would help to
Implications for Relations-With the United States
Caribbean Basin governments and media have responded to past
sugar quota cuts by criticizing US trade and foreign policies,
but there have been no significant public protests. The
strongest reaction in Central America has come from Belize, where
Prime Minister Esquivel publicly called the 1985 cut a "cruel
blow" and even the staunchly pro-US media attacked the decision.
Esquivel wrote President Reagan requesting that Belize's quota be
restored to a higher level with no future erosions. Salvadoran
and Guatemalan officials have expressed concern both officially
and publicly about the balance-of-payments impact of past quota
cuts on their countries. Of the Caribbean countries, the
Dominican Republic and St. Kitts-Nevis have made the loudest
protests, publicly and through diplomatic channels. Government
leaders in both countries have requested increased quotas and
special exemptions from further cutbacks. On the positive side,
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we know of no instances of popular anti-US demonstrations or
violence in any of the Caribbean Basin countries associated with
past cuts in the quota.
We judge that the Caribbean Basin countries--individually
and through regional organizations--would mount formal protests
should the United States eliminate the import quotas. Leaders in
the region more recently have criticized Washington for cutting
other economic aid programs, particularly to Jamaica. Barbados,
Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago--each struggling to cope with
severe economic difficulties caused by a world glut of such key
exports as electronic components, bauxite, and petroleum--almost
certainly would argue that the US quota is needed to help cover
the heavy financial costs of the domestic sugar industry and
thereby ease the economic and political costs of diversification.
Regional governments would lobby even more heavily for increased
US assistance to prevent serious economic decline and to help
ensure political stability.
Elimination of the quota also could hurt cooperation with
Washington in several key areas:
Such a move probably would undermine public and private
support for the Caribbean Basin Initiative and raise
fears of further deep cuts in the US economic aid
program.
-- A cut in the sugar quota could weaken area cooperation
with Washington in counternarcotics efforts. Regardless
of the quota, production of illicit drug crops is likely
to accelerate as sugar production becomes less
profitable.
The Dominican Republic and Belize probably would issue the
most vehement protests over elimination of the quota and probably
are the two countries where US interests stand the greatest
chance of suffering. Dominican President Balaguer, who prides
himself on being one of Washington's longstanding and staunchest
allies, would interpret any cuts as a personal affront. The
Balaguer administration already has sharply criticized the United
States for cutting economic aid to the Dominican Republic and for
not pressuring the IMF and other official creditors for financial
help. An end of the US quota probably would foster closer
relations between Santo Domingo and Havana.,3 In Belize,
President Esquivel already is criticized by government and
opposition leaders for being too closely aligned with the United
States. US action to cut the quota would increase anti-US
sentiment and probably would make Esquivel hesitant to continue
cooperation with Washington's counternarcotics efforts.
While the other Caribbean and Central American countries
would strongly protest elimination of the quota, their
3See Appendix for more details.
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displeasure probably would be tempered by other economic and
political considerations.
-- In St. Kitts, President Simmonds' desire to maintain US
assistance in other areas, particularly tourism, probably
would prevent a significant worsening in bilateral
relations.
-- The end of the quota would strain relations with the
Central American democracies, but concern with regional
security issues would prevent any serious bilateral
rifts.
-- Panama's relations with the United States are strained by
recent political unrest and we do not believe cuts in the
quota would have a significant further impact.
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Appendix
The Dominican Republic: A Special Case
The Dominican Republic's heavy dependence on sugar and
lack of access to EEC special sugar arrangements make the
country particularly vulnerable to any cut in the US quota.
The Dominican Republic since 1981 has made a concerted
effort to diversify agricultural production, reducing sugar
output by 20 percent in 1986 alone, according to IMF
reports. Still, the sugar industry remains the country's
second largest employer after light industry.
An end to the US quota would worsen the country's
deteriorating foreign financial situation by sharply
reducing sugar export earnings. The US Embassy reports
these sales fell to about $140 million in 1986, compared
with $530 million in 1981, due partly to falling world sugar
prices and previous reductions in the US quota. Although
increased foreign exchange inflows from other sources--such
as coffee, meat, and tropical fruit exports, tourism, and
remittances from overseas--partially offset lost sugar
income, the country's overall foreign currency earnings
still dropped slightly over this period. Moreover, foreign
debt amortization payments more than quadrupled to roughly
$950 million annually, severely draining the country's
Balaguer's popularity initially helped to shield him
from major political challenges after he resumed office in
1986, but his inability to revive the economy has begun to
erode his support and to increase resistance to negotiating
an IMF program, a linchpin to further foreign debt
reschedulings. The public's expectations of rapid economic
progress and fears that Balaguer will tighten austerity
measures have increased his political troubles over the past
few months. The US Embassy in recent weeks has reported
strikes and other disturbances in cities throughout the
country, illegal land seizures in rural areas, and the
arrest of 700 peasant squatters in a northern province. The
government, fearing urban riots, resumed exchange-rate
controls in June to stabilize the currency. The specter of
the violent leftist-led demonstrations in 1984 in which more
than 70 people were killed--following the Jorge Blanco
administration's belt-tightening to secure IMF funds--
probably will cause Balaguer to continue shying away from a
formal IMF program.
In these circumstances, the President almost certainly
would view a US decision to abolish the country's quota as
yet another signal that the United States takes for granted
the country's more than two decades of political stability
and his own close relationship with Washington. US Embassy
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reporting reveals that the President already feels
personally slighted by cuts in US Economic Support Funds,
which dropped from a peak of roughly $135 million during
1984 and 1985 to $20 million this year. Balaguer reportedly
has been irked further by Washington's reluctance to
disburse even this reduced amount until Santo Domingo
secures a new IMF agreement, a move he apparently fears
would provoke further unrest. The President also faults
Washington for not pushing harder to convince the IMF of the
political need to allow the Dominican Republic to formulate
its own recovery program, rather than requiring the country
to meet specific quarterly economic targets set by the IMF.
In the event of an end to the US quota, we judge that
Balaguer probably would resort to further improving
relations with Cuba and to expansionary economic measures to
try to save face domestically and make good on his campaign
promises of renewed economic growth. According to US
Embassy reporting, Balaguer already has sought closer ties
to Cuba in part to divert vocal leftist attention from his
failure to garner more tangible benefits from his
relationship with the United States.
L
Embassy reporting indicates that Balaguer
as reverted to populist policies--including price controls
on basic commodities, make-work public projects, and
inflationary monetary policies--to try to disarm his
opponents. Further populist measures to boost his
popularity would reduce the country's eligibility for US and
IMF assistance and scuttle hopes for foreign debt relief.
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Table 1
CARIBBEAN BASIN: KEY SUGAR TRENDS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
Sugar Production
Millio
n US $
thousand metric tons
1981
1985
1981 Export
Earnings
Of Which:
Sugar
1985 Export
Earnings
Of Which:
Sugar
TOTAL
7,314
8,959
10,796
t 933
8,022
1 425
Barbados
------
+ 137---
~-
100 _-
--
_- -195 --
--- ----
26
332
Belize
, 98
t
102
75
43
64
23
Costa Rica
2,521
2,950 .
f- - 1,009 --
---42
934
11
Dominican
Republic
1,075
921
19188
534
735
190
El Salvador
21,263
-- ----
3,455
-
798
--
.
-
-
15
679
34
Guatemala
443
600
1
1,29
1
--
85
1,131
46
Haiti
50
51 __-
--~_.._._...158_._~
0
217 - +
-- - --- 4
Honduras
212 I
-
235 (
---~ _
784
47
805
22
Jamaica
195
222
974
46
547
45
Panama
185
170
494
53
301... - ~
-- - - -~ 27
St. Kilts-----
Nevis I
30
32 1
25
16
19
9
Trinidad-
Tobago
105 1i
115
3,761 I
27
2,212 22
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Table 2
CARIBBEAN BASIN: DEPENDENCE ON SPECIAL SUGAR EXPORT ARRANGEMENTS
1984
1985 '
1986
Total 1
Total 1
Total
T
Exports'
% to U.S.
% to EEC
Exports
% to U.S.
% to EEC
1
Exports
% to U.S.
% to EEC
Barbados
85.9
8.7
85.5
77.8
22.6
68.8
88.4
13.7
58.4
Belize
101.5
36.4 rn
43.4
95.5
13.6
46.9
105
52.8
41.9
Costa Rica
83.6
100
0
3.1
. 2
85.5
885.1
69.4
1
721.6
64.4
0
_-__...
367.22
64.9
0
Republic
El Salvador
78.3
100
0
115.5
46.6
0
103.9
33.5
0
Guatemala
304.4
43
0
127.8
80.4
0
428.33
29.7
3.1
Haiti
15.7
100
0
ni
ni
ni
ni
ni
ni
Honduras
93.1
55.1
0
112.5
52.4
0
118
25.1
0
Jamaica
160.4
18.7
81.3
152.1
13.4
.86.5
1443
6.2
88.2
Panama
82.4
100
0
77.7
100
0
58.6
62.4
0
St. Kitts-
28.5
46
51
25.2
18.7
79
no
no
no
Nevis
Trinidad-
49.9
0
100
62
15.2
84.8
no
no
no
Tobago
ISO May 1987
1. Thousand Metric Tons
2. Jan-Aug
3. USDA estimate Oct-Sep market year.
NI (net importer)
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 t _ I J1 I
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Caribbean Basin:
Reliance on US Commercial Sugar
Sales and Foreign Assistance
Million US $
1987 Sugar US Economic
Sales to US* Assistance
(FY 1987 Authorized)
Income From US Sugar
Sold at World
Prices**
Total
134
946
44.5
Barbados
3
0
1.0
Belize
7
10
2.3
Costa Rica
7
117
2.3
Dominican Republic
61
69
20.3
El Salvador
10
302
3.3
Guatemala
17
116
5.7
Haiti
3
98
1.0
Honduras
6_
128
2.0
Jamaica
4
78
1.3
Panama
10
19
3.3
St. Kitts-Nevis
3
9-
1.0
Trinidad-Tobago
3
0
1.0
* Projected imports under the US sugar quota in 1987 at roughly 18 cents
per pound.
** Assumes sugar sales diverted from the US market at the 1987 volume and
sold at a world market price of 6 cents per pound.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000100390001-5
Figure 1
Caribbean Basin: U.S. Sugar Import Quota 1
1500 (1000 Metric Tons)
1 raw value
10/1/82- 9/26/83- 10/1/84- 12/i 85-
9/30/83 9/30/84 11/30/85 12/31/86
vii ;..Jim f' ~~/ - -v / 7'i %.w'.., ' ~ "?
1. Quota year determined annually by USDA.
V1187-
12/31/87
M3 Other Caribbean
I?/3 Costa Rica
123 El Salvador
? Panama
0-3 Guatemala
Dom. Republic
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000100390001-5
FIGURE 2
AVERAGE RAW SUGAR PRICES*, 1975-1987
O ---T-- -- -----T ---1
1975 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
? NO. 11 CONTRACT PRICE (F.O.B. CARIBBEAN).
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000100390001-5
Orig - Eugene J. McAllister, Special Assistant to the
President for Economic Affairs, Rm 216, Old EOB
1 - Alan Tracy, Assistant to the President for Food
Aid and Agricultural Trade, Rm 216, Old EOB
1 - Gordon Rausser, Senior Staff Economist for
Agriculture, Council of Economic Advisors,Rm 322,
Old EOB
1 - Randall Davis, Associate Director for Natural
Resources, Rm260, Old EOB
1 - Stephen Danzansky, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director of International
Economic Affairs, NSC, g__365, Old EOB
1 - Michael Smith, USTR,\
1 - Geza Feketekuty, USTR
1 - Suzanne Early, USTR,
1 - Jon Rosenbaum, USTR,~
BW09, CHB
BW09, CHB
BW09, CHB
BW09, CHB
1 - Ellen Terpstra, Rm 212-A North Bld, US Department
of Agriculture
1 - Daniel Amstutz, Rm 212-A North Bld, US Department
of Agriculture
1 - Dan Crafts, Rm 4324, Treasury
1 - Robert Cornell, Rm 4324, Treasury
1 - Hazen Gale, Rm 4324, Treasury
1 - Douglas McMinn, Assistant Secretary for Economics
and Business Affairs, Rm 6828, State Department
1 - W. Allen Wallis, Under Secretary for Economic
Affairs, Rm 7256, State Department
1 - Terence Byrne, Acting Director, Office of Economic
Analysis, Rm 8722, State Department
1 - Carl Kundiff, Director, Office of Food Policy and
Programs, Rm 3427, State Department
1 - Ralph Ives, International Economist, Primary
Commodities Division, Rm 1015, Commerce Department
1 - DCI, 7D60
1 - DCI Executive Staff, 7E12
1 - DDI, 7E44
1 - O/DDI, 7E44
1 - LA/NIO, 7E62
1 - NIC/AG, 7E47
1 - PDB Staff, 7F30
1 - C/DDI/PES, 2G25
1 - DDI/CPAS/ILS, 7G50
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB, 7G07
1 - D/OGI, 3G00
1 - C/SRD/OGI, 3G46
1 - C/PRB/OGI, 3G46
5 - OGI, 3G46
1 - D/ALA, 3F45
1 - DD/ALA, 3F45
2 - ALA/PS, 4F21
1 - ALA/Research Director, 4F44
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 i
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1 - C/MCD
1 - DC/ALA/MCD
1 - C/ALA/MCD/CAR
1 - C/ALA/MCD/CA
1 - __]ALA/MCD/CA
1 - ALA/MCD/CARIB
1 - MCD Files
1 - CAR Files
C/ALA/MCD/CAR/JB/jd/19 Aug 87
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 i ..I JI ._ I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/07: CIA-RDP90T00114R000100390001-5
CARIBBEAN BASIN: IMPACT OF AN END OF THE US SUGAR QUOTA 25X1
ALA/MCD/CA/CARIB
(20aug87)
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