INDICATORS FOR MONITORING THE NICARAGUAN INSURGENCY: A USER'S GUIDE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000100120003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: MISC

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INDICATORS FOR MONITORING
THE NICARAGUAN INSURGENCY:
A` USER 9 S. GUIDE
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This User's Guide was prepared by analysts in the Office of
African and Latin American Analysis and the Office of Global
Issues. Any questions or comments may be directed to the Chief,
Middle America-Caribbean Division, ALA,
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INSURGENCY INDICATORS
Presence in Country 1
Geographic Extent of Operations 2
Command, Control, and Complexity of Operations 3
Intelligence and Security Capabilities 4
Military Initiative 5
Combat Proficiency 6
Troop Morale and Discipline 7
Availability of Weapons, Ammunition, and Equipment 8
Logistic Support Capabilities 9
Insurgent Leadership Quality/Charisma 10
Cohesion and Unity 11
Appeal of Movement Inside Nicaragua 12
Development and Expression of Political Program 13
Cooperation of Rural Population 14
Urban Support 15
Cooperation by Central American States 16
Foreign Support and Recognition 17
REGIME INDICATORS
Command and Control 18
Strategy and Tactics 19
Intelligence and Security, 20
Military Aggressiveness 21
Mobility/Presence in Countryside 22
Combat Effectiveness 23
Recruitment and Retention 24
I Availability of Weapons Ammunition, and Equipment 25
Logistic Support 26
Ability to Assimilate Equipment and Operate without
Foreign Advisers 27
Directorate Unity and Cohesion 28
Civilian/Military Relations 29
Internal Security 30
Political Institutions 31
Ability to Mobilize Mass Support 32
j Control of Political Opposition 33
1 Ability to Defuse Religious and Ethnic Discontent 34
Ability to Deflect Public Dissatisfaction with
Regime's Economic Performance 35
Foreign Political/Diplomatic Support 36
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INTRODUCTION
The system of indicators described in this User's Guide has
been designed to assist those with an interest in the military
situation in Nicaragua. The system of indicators is not intended
to give a net assessment of the war, nor to predict who will win
and how soon. Instead, it defines general levels of weakness and
strength in those areas that historically have been important to
successful insurgencies and the stability of Marxist-Leninist
regimes. Viewed over time, the indicators illustrate trends, but
they should not be viewed in isolation because growing strength
on one side may be offset by corresponding strength on the other
side.
The system consists of two matrices, one arraying nine
military and eight political indicators for assessing the
capabilities of the anti-Sandinista insurgents and a second
arraying ten military and nine political indicators for assessing
the Sandinista side of the equation. This guide includes backup
material on each of the indicators, laying out the analytical
process our analysts go through each month in filling out the-
matrix. The backup material consists of a sheet on each
indicator that includes:
-- A list of key measures used to assess insurgent or regime
performance with regard to that indicator.
-- A description of what level of activity one would expect
to find if insurgent or regime performance against that
indicator were deficient, weak, moderate, substantial, or
strong. In essence, we have established a scale for each
indicator and then defined levels of activity at various
points along that scale.
The factors and descriptions reflect the present situation in
Nicaragua, but are based on analysis of a variety of historical
insurgencies. In each case, the end points describing deficient
or strong capabilities were set first, and then levels of weak,
moderate, and substantial performance were defined at mid points
along this spectrum. The system was designed by a panel of
political, military, and economic analysts who follow Nicaragua
on a daily basis.
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andinista Insurgency
The Anti-Sandinista
Key Indicators
I
Il
Presence in country
2 Geographic extent of operations
3 Command, control, and complexity of operations
4 Intelli nce and security
4 Intelligence and security
5 Military initiative
5 Military initiative
6 Combat pmfidenry
6 Combat proficiency
proficiency
Troop morale and discipline
7 Troop morale and discipline
LL 8
10 Leadership quality and charisma
11 Cohesion and unity
12 Appeal of movement inside Nicaragua
13 Development and expression of political program
r
14 Cooperation of rural population
15 Urban support
16 Cooperation by Central American states
17 Foreign suppport and recognition
a
O Deficient Q Substantial
(3 Weak ? Strong
0 Moderate
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
(3
(3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(3
(3
(3
High
(3
(3
0
(3
(3
(3
(3
(3
(3
(3
(3
(3
High
(3
(3
(3
(3
0
0
(3
(3
(3
(3
(3
(3
High
0
0
0
0
CO
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
High
0
(3
(3
(3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
High
0
0
(3
0
0
0
0
0
(3
0
0
0
Med
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Low
Availability of weapons/ammunition/equipment
(3
(3
(3
(3
(3
(3
(3
0
?
0
0
0
High
9 Logistic support
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
High
Political Capablities
(3
(3
(3
(3
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
High
(3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(3
High
(3
(3
Q
(3
(3
(3
(3
(5
(3
Q
Q
Q
Med
Q
Q
Q
a
Q
Q
Q
(3
Q
Q
Q
Q
High
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Med
0
0
0
0
0
01
01
0
0
0
0
0
High
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
High
O
(3
0
0
0
0
CO
0
0
0
0
0
High
M Level of confidence
Me in judgment
Low~
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i
I
The Sandinista Regime
Key Indicators
0 Weak
C Moderate
0 Strong
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
I Command and control
0
0
0
C
0
0
0
C
C
C
C
C
High
2 Strategy and tactics
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
High
3 Intelligence and security
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
High
4 Military aggressiveness
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
Med
5 Mobility/Presence in countryside
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
High
6 Combat effectiveness
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
Med
7 Recruitment and retention
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
High
8 Availability of weapons and equipment
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
High
9 Logistic support
0
0
C
C
C
C
C
C
0
0
0
J
High
10 Ability to assimilate equipment and
operate without foreign advisors
C
C
C
C
0
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
Med
Political Capabilities
I I Directorate unity and cohesion
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
.C
C
C
Med
12 Civilian/ military relations
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
Med
13 Internal security
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
High
14 Political institutions
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
Med
15 Ability to mobilize mass support
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
-ow
16 Control of political opposition
C
C
C
0
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
High
17 Ability to defuse religious/ethnic discontent
0
0
0
0
0
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
Med
18 Ability to deflect disatisfaction with economic performance
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
Med
19 Foreign political/diplomatic support
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
Med
Hight Level of confidence
Low JT in judgment
1986 1987
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Presence in Country
DESCRIPTION: Number of troops maintained inside Nicaragua. Creation of
safehavens inside Nicaragua.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Vast majority of rebels are outside Nicaragua.
OF LEVELS: Little ability to operate inside except for
cross-border raids. No safehavens.
Half of rebel combatants operate inside
Nicaragua for several months to a year at a
time, but still totally dependent on external
bases. No safehavens in Nicaragua.
MODERATE: More than half of combatants operate inside
Nicaragua for several months to a year at a
time. Some transitory safehavens in Nicaragua.
Substantial dependence on bases in Honduras for
food, medical care, and resupply.
SUBSTANTIAL: Majority of combatants always inside Nicaragua.
Rebel headquarters moves into Nicaragua. Some
permanent safehavens established inside. Depots
and caches of supplies established inside.
STRONG: Vast majority of rebels operate permanently
inside Nicaragua. Rebel headquarters and most
logistics based inside. Most camps in Honduras
abandoned. Rebel family members move back to
Nicaragua.
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Geographic Extent of Operations
DESCRIPTION: Ability to operate in the various regions of Nicaragua.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Rebels generally operate in proximity
OF LEVELS: to borders.
MODERATE:
SUBSTANTIAL:
STRONG:
Operate only in a few isolated areas at a time.
Other fronts are sporadic or dormant more than
90 percent of the time. Not able to enter urban
or heavily defended areas.
Can operate in most rural regions simultaneously
most of the time. Operations in urban or
heavily defended areas are rare.
Can operate in all rural areas most of the time
with occasional forays into urban and heavily
defended areas.
Operate in all five regions of Nicaragua
simultaneously. Operate in urban areas as well
as rural.
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 Command, Control, and Complexity of Operations
DESCRIPTION: Ability to plan and execute operations effectively. Strategic
Command maintains control over troops in the field. Flexibility
and appropriateness of tactics. Quality and effectiveness of
military leaders. Ability to coordinate multi-unit and combined-
arms operations.
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DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Field commanders operate independently.
OF LEVELS: Little or no ability to coordinate multi-unit
operations. Poor communications. Tactical
inflexibility and use of inappropriate tactics.
No clear objectives set or met.
Field Commanders occasionally use flexibility
and appropriate small-unit tactics but have
difficulty coordinating actions. Plans are
communicated, but some commanders fail to carry
out orders or to work together. Few multi-unit
operations take place. Initial objectives
rarely met because of weak leadership.
MODERATE: Field commanders consistently show flexibility
and use appropriate tactics but sometimes have
difficulty coordinating actions. Plans and
objectives are communicated, but not always
achieved due to uneven leadership.
SUBSTANTIAL: Commanders, staffs and troop units exhibit good
teamwork and frequently achieve objectives.
Appropriate tactics and flexibility are used.
Only the most difficult multi-unit operations
prove too much for the leadership to handle.
STRONG: Leadership performs well and has confidence of
the troops. Successful at planning and
executing complex multi-unit operations. Troops
in field exhibit tactical flexibility and
respond swiftly to changes in plan. Objectives
are clearly set and communicated. All elements
of the force work together.
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DESCRIPTION: Ability to obtain, evaluate, and act on information about
strength, disposition, and plans of enemy forces.
Counterintelligence and communications security limit the
effectiveness of government intelligence operations.
Intelligence and Security Capabilities
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Government agents have penetrated many levels.
OF LEVELS: Consistent use of unsecure communications.
Plans and operations nearly always tipped off.
Enemy strength, disposition, and plans not known
or considered. Almost totally reliant on
foreign generated intelligence.
Some penetrations by government agents.
Frequent use of unsecure communications. Some
information on enemy available but only
occasionally acted on. Little effort to obtain
own intelligence.
MODERATE: Efforts made to ensure secure communications but
with occasional lapses. Efforts made to
identify and isolate enemy penetrations. Most
enemy units located, and intelligence regularly
considered in planning.
SUBSTANTIAL: Secure communications used-but some vulnerable
to enemy. Many enemy penetrations identified
and isolated. Nearly all enemy units located
and some plans known. Own collection networks
developed and information usually acted upon.
STRONG: Enemy penetrations identified and isolated.
Communications secure. All major government
forces known and located. Knowledge of enemy
plans. Intelligence used in planning operations
and largely gathered through own networks.
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DESCRIPTION: Rebels ability to initiate clashes by their own action or efforts
to expand area of operations. Freedom of movement. Ability and
willingness to attack defended targets and carry out symbolic,
spectacular operations. Ability to obtain favorable casualty
ratio over government.
INSURGENCY INDICATOR #5
Military Initiative
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Most clashes initiated by government.
OF LEVELS: Rebels always on the run or in hiding. Hit only
soft targets such as undefended economic
installations and civilians. Casualty ratio
favors government.
Rebels limited to moving only at night or in bad
weather. Initiate clashes infrequently and rely
mostly on road ambushes, mining, and attacks on
soft targets. Casualty ratio about even with
government.
MODERATE: Rebels and government initiate action about
equally. Rebels dominate at night and in bad
weather, government during daylight. Occasional
symbolic attacks on defended targets. Casualty
rates higher for government troops than for
rebels. Rebels able to infiltrate borders and
move from region to region. -
SUBSTANTIAL: Rebels initiate most clashes. Government
response limited to sweep operations by a few
mobile units with Air Force support. Rebels
able to challenge government daylight air
superiority. Casualty ratio favors rebels by at
least 2:1. Rebels frequently target defended
military installations with hit-and-run attacks.
STRONG: Government forces pinned to defending fixed
targets. Rebels strike anywhere at anytime.
Rebels able to move in strength during daylight.
Casualty ratio favors guerrillas substantially.
Ability to stand up to large government units
and overrun isolated ones.
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DESCRIPTION: Individual soldiers' effectiveness in combat. Knowledge of basic
military skills (patrolling, map reading, security, weapons
maintenance and operation). Maintain fire discipline, minimize
civilian casualties. Effectiveness of training. Ability to
operate and maintain complex weapons
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Combatants lack basic skills, waste ammunition,
OF LEVELS: allow weapons to deteriorate, cause civilian
casualties. Frequently subject to ambush.
Unable to remain in field because of poor
physical condition and unsanitary habits.
Frequently flee combat and abandon weapons,
wounded.
Combat Proficiency
Majority of combatants lack basic skills or
perform poorly under fire. Only a few elite
units can be trusted to stay in the field or
perform difficult missions. Field maintenance
of crew-served weapons is poor and little cross-
training available. Inadequate target
acquisition causes friendly and civilian
casualties.
MODERATE: Majority of combatants utilize basic military
skills, and many are trained to operate complex
weapons. Soldiers perform well in combat but
are frequently victims of ambush. Fire
discipline is practiced most of the time, but
civilian casualties sometimes result.
SUBSTANTIAL: Nearly all combatants trained in basic military
skills and practice them most of the time. A
few elite specialized units trained to perform
highly complex missions. Troops react well
under fire, including enemy ambushes.
STRONG: Vast majority of combatants experienced with
good application of basic military skills.
Maintain fire discipline. Soldiers operate and
maintain complex weapons and are cross-trained
to perform others' tasks. Civilian casualties
minimal. Rebels rarely abandon weapons and
usually remove all their casualties.
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Troop Morale and Discipline
DESCRIPTION: Commitment to rebel cause. Willingness to follow orders and
respect authority. Insurgent confidence vis-a-vis government
forces. Willingness to take risks. Confidence in medical
evacuation/treatment of wounded. Confidence in ultimate victory.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Most troops avoid combat, reluctant to take
OF LEVELS: risks. Frequent mutinies and acts of rebellion
against own officers. Frequent human rights
abuses. High desertion rate. Acceptance of
government amnesty. Troops have little or no
hope of victory. Believe government soldiers
superior.
Only a few elite units act with confidence.
Many others flee from combat, abandon weapons
and wounded. Occasional mutinies and acts of
rebellion. Many unwilling to take risks.
Desertions and dropouts continue to erode
strength. Confidence in victory highly
dependent on foreign support, little confidence.
in own efforts.
MODERATE: Majority of troops willing to enter combat with
a few instances of individual heroism.
Desertion/dropout rate does not exceed
recruitment. Mutinies rare. Loyalty to cause
as well as individual leaders. Monitor own
human rights abuses.
SUBSTANTIAL: Troops willing to fight and take risks most of
the time. Believe they are superior man-to-man
although enemy may have better support Weapons.
Follow orders and respect authority most of the
time.
STRONG: High esprit. Confidence in ultimate success.
Acts of individual heroism are frequent. Orders
routinely followed. Very low desertion/dropout
rate. Confidence in superiority over government
units even against Air Force. Human rights
abuses rare, handled by internal judicial
system. High confidence in medical system.
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Availability of Weapons, Ammunition, and Equipment
DESCRIPTION: Reliable and consistent external supply. Appropriate weapons and
equipment for type of warfare/threat. Ability to acquire,
produce, and modify arms/equipment on their own. Ability to
capture weapons/supplies from enemy. Sufficient stores available
in Central America.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Insurgents lack external support. Frequent
OF LEVELS: shortages of ammunition, other supplies. Little
or no ability to produce or acquire on their
own. Lose more weapons than they capture.
Inappropriate weapons for type of conflict.
External benefactors unreliable. Periodic
shortages. Relatively little ability to obtain
sufficient stores through capture. Some weapons
inappropriate, hard to maintain. Forced to seek
many different types of ammunition.
MODERATE: External benefactors provide most needs, but
with frequent delays. Types of weapons mostly
appropriate but still require multiple types of
ammunition. Capture more weapons/supplies than
they lose, but not enough to depend on. Stores
on hand adequate most of the time.
SUBSTANTIAL: External benefactors provide what is needed, but
long-term reliability in question. All
appropriate types of weapons acquired but some
not in sufficient quantities. Stocks of most
weapons in Central America sufficient with
ability to supplement from capture. Some effort
made to seek multiple sources or produce items
on their own.
STRONG: External benefactors provide whatever is needed,
reliable over long term. Weapons mix
appropriate for threat/type of conflict.
Significant ability to obtain weapons/supplies
through capture or their own effort. Multiple
benefactors. Sufficient quantities stockpiled
in Central America.
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Logistic Support Capabilities
DESCRIPTION: Ability to live off the land, acquire food, etc., inside
Nicaragua. Effectiveness of logistics management system.
Availability of adequate overland, maritime and airborne delivery
systems. Development of non-combatant support personnel. Setting
up depots, caches, inside Nicaragua. Security of external
logistics bases, lack of restrictions by foreign powers.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Little or no ability to live off the land.
OF LEVELS: Little emphasis on logistics. management.
Delivery systems inadequate to support combat
operations beyond border area. No caches or
bases inside Nicaragua. Foreign powers severely
restrict use of outside bases.
Rebels able to obtain food inside the country
but reliant on outside deliveries for all other
support. Delivery systems unreliable, overly
dependent on one means. No caches or depots
inside. Most units unable to sustain combat
operations inside for more than a few months at
a time. Foreign powers frequently restrict use
of external bases.
MODERATE: Some rebel units able to live off land and
remain inside for a year or more. Delivery
systems experience frequent delays and
occasional shortfalls. Emphasis on logistics
management and development of civilian support
structure. Multiple means of delivery
available. Minimal foreign interference in
operations of external bases.
SUBSTANTIAL: Rebels begin to develop civilian support
structure inside Nicaragua. Caches and depots
set up in some remote areas. Less dependence on
one delivery system. Supplies delivered when
needed but not always in sufficient quantity.
STRONG: Significant support from local population.
Bases, depots, and caches maintained inside
Nicaragua. Well developed logistics system with
trained personnel. Multiple and reliable
delivery systems.
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INSURGENCY INDICATOR #10
Insurgent Leadership Quality/Charisma
DESCRIPTION: Measures the presence of strong leaders within the movement, their
ability to provide effective leadership, the level of their
popular appeal both within the movement and among ordinary
Nicaraguans, and their international image.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Little or no name recognition outside the
OF LEVELS: movement. Military perceived as making all
important decisions.
WEAK: Well-known within the movement and perceived to
have some say in decisionmaking process.
MODERATE: Perceived as providing leadership within the
movement. Significant name recognition in
Nicaragua. Modest international visibility.
SUBSTANTIAL: Well-known in domestic and international
circles. Influential in military
decisionmaking. Known to command strong
loyalties of insurgent rank and file.
STRONG: Leader(s) perceived as fully representing the
movement on military and political matters.
Recognized as having full authority to speak for
movement in meetings with foreign governments
and as commanding strong loyalties within the
movement.
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Cohesion and Unity
DESCRIPTION: Shared commitment and unified strategy. Speak with one voice.
Absence of backstabbing. All factions represented, overcoming
political, ethnic, and social differences. Factions share
supplies, conduct joint operations.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Factions break away from movement, cut separate
OF LEVELS: deals. Always at each others throats. No
unified political/military structure. No
coordination of military actions. Rival rebel
units fight each other.
Most factions join weak and quarrelsome
political structure, but some refuse to
cooperate. Forces rarely cooperate in field and
refuse to share supplies. Ethnic and political
differences dominate discussion. Criticism by
outside factions damages credibility.
MODERATE: All factions united in loose political
structure, but retain own agendas. Some
cooperation in the field, but factions continue
to operate separately. Movement able to agree
only on the broadest of goals.
SUBSTANTIAL: Single unified military/political structure in
which all factions have a voice. Troops in
field and some lower-echelon leaders
occasionally fail to cooperate. Some friction
over leadership positions and perceived
domination by one faction.
STRONG: All factions agree to common goal. Belong to
unified political/military structure.
Coordination of military actions routine. No
discrimination in sharing of supplies,
intelligence.
11
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 _.I . J.1.11..:. -1 11
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DESCRIPTION
L
Rebels tainted by mercenary image and
association with Somoza regime, but benefit
somewhat from Sandinista shortcomings. Human
rights abuses continue to be a problem. Most
Nicaraguans lack confidence in rebels ability to
win.
MODERATE: Rebels perceived as possible alternative to
Sandinistas, but population remains apathetic
toward both the insurgents and the regime. Both
insurgents and regime perceived equally as
violators of human rights and heavily influenced
by foreign powers.
SUBSTANTIAL: Rebels benefit from Sandinistas' negative image,
and population begins to identify with them.
Human rights, nationalist and political image
improve, but majority not confident rebels will
topple the regime.
STRONG:
Rebels perceived as democratic, nationalist,
respectful of human rights, and a viable
alternative to the regime. Benefit fully from
negative perceptions of Sandinistas.
SECRET
INSURGENT INDICATOR #12
Appeal of Movement Inside Nicaragua
Rebels shed association with Somoza regime. Human rights image
improves. Effectiveness in highlighting government abuses of
Church, economy, political rights. Appeal to nationalism,
persuade people they are homegrown.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Rebels perceived as bringing return of Somoza
OF LEVELS: regime. Human rights abuses perceived to be
rampant. Rebels unable to benefit from
Sandinista shortcomings and dependence on Cuba
and Soviet Bloc. Insurgents widely perceived as
foreign mercenaries.
12
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 I__.-1_Y_L I i 111.. 1 !L1 .
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Development and Expression of Political Program
DESCRIPTION: Extent to which rebels develop comprehensive political program
with wide appeal inside Nicaragua. Development of means to
disseminate their message to the people. Set up working political
institutions in exile. Recruit and train political cadres and
attempt to establish own political administration over areas
inside Nicaragua in which they operate.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: No coherent political program and little
OF LEVELS: attention given to non-military matters. Lack
of political cadres, radio, and printing presses
to disseminate message. No attempts to
proselytize the population. No political
institutions inside or outside the country.
Political program developed but poorly
articulated. Lack means of dissemination inside
the country. Propaganda limited to external
radio broadcasts. Little attention to
development of political cadres. Most political
activity limited to exile community.
MODERATE: Comprehensive political program announced. Some
attempt made to articulate it inside Nicaragua,
but development of political cadre and grass-
roots organizations lags. Functioning political
institutions in exile.
SUBSTANTIAL: Clearly stated political program that appeals to
economic and social needs. Attempts made to
form government in exile and begin extending
administration to occupied areas. Extensive
external propaganda apparatus. Movement focuses
attention on internal political cadres and
dissemination of its message to the people.
STRONG: Well-developed political program that addresses
both post-war political organization and the
specific needs and aspirations of the people.
Extensive propaganda and grass-roots
dissemination network that has both external
broadcasts and internal political cadres working
to advance the movement. Establishment of
shadow government in exile and in occupied areas
of the country.
13
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 I ~ I II II ~ III
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Cooperation of Rural Population
DESCRIPTION Extent to which peasants provide shelter, food, and intelligence
to rebels. Willingness to be recruited as combatants or temporary
support personnel. Confidence in rebels' ability to provide them
physical security. Response to rebels' civic action programs.
Willingness to engage in sabotage and other visible antiregime
activities.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Population provides little support to rebels and
OF LEVELS: informs government troops of their presence.
Rebels unable to recruit enough new combatants
to replace losses. Peasants fearful of any
association with guerrillas.
Population mostly apathetic. Does not cooperate
with government, but distrusts insurgents and
fears regime reprisals. Some provide food and
temporary shelter. Population has little
knowledge of rebel civic action.
MODERATE: Much of rural population supports rebels with
food, shelter, and information, but unwilling to
take more visible action against the government
such as sabotage because not confident that
rebels can protect them. Sufficient new
recruits join rebels to replace their losses.
SUBSTANTIAL: Majority of population passively supports
rebels, and some are willing to carry out
sabotage and other visible acts. Those with
long association with the guerrillas are more
trustful than those in areas where the rebels
have not maintained a consistent presence.
Population accepts rebel civic action.
STRONG: Population strongly supports rebels. Provides
food, shelter, intelligence, and enough new
recruits to allow continuing growth of the
force. Temporary support personnel relieve
rebels of many logistics duties. Population
confident of own security in siding with rebels,
and participates in rebel administration and
civic action programs.
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 _1 I i I II II ~ III
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DESCRIPTION: Extent to which urban dwellers provide recruits, intelligence,
shelter, and other support to insurgents. Operation of front
groups to disseminate rebels' message, provide personnel for
demonstrations. Willingness to engage in active, visible
antiregime acts such as sabotage, bombings, graffiti. Extent of
ties with private sector businessmen, Church, labor unions, and
opposition political parties. Degree of confidence in rebels'
ability to assure secrecy and otherwise shield their supporters
from regime security services.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Little of no urban support for insurgents.
OF LEVELS: Other opposition groups inside Nicaragua
publicly disavow the rebels. Population not
willing to take any visible action against
regime.
Urban Support
Some urban dwellers provide passive support to
rebels, but most remain apathetic or hostile.
Internal opposition groups meet clandestinely
with rebels outside Nicaragua, but little or no
cooperation results in the country. Only a few
willing to oppose the regime actively.
Moderate: Many urban dwellers provide clandestine support
to the rebels, and some join their ranks. Front
groups and legal parties sponsor strikes and.
demonstrations in coordination with the rebels.
Graffiti, posters, and pamphlets supporting the
rebels occasionally appear in the cities.
SUBSTANTIAL: Majority of population clandestinely supports
rebels. Sabotage, strikes, demonstrations, and
other acts of defiance become routine. Attacks
on military and security personnel by armed
civilians begin. Internal opposition groups
clandestinely support insurgents and agree to
front some of their activity.
STRONG: Urban population openly supports rebels,
provides food, shelter, information, and
recruits. Willing to carry out acts of
sabotage. Internal political parties and other
groups agitate for insurgents and disseminate
their message.
1 15
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/03: CIA-RDP90TOO114R000100120003-2
INSURGENCY INDICATOR #16
Cooperation by Central American States
DESCRIPTION: Degree to which neighboring governments allow rebels to conduct
political activities in their own territory. Governments provide
clandestine training. Tolerate insurgent military activity in
their territory. Permit use of their territory for supply
operations and propaganda generation.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Neighbors deny use of their territory for
OF LEVELS: all rebel activity. Agree to cooperate with
Sandinistas in policing borders.
WEAK: Neighboring countries allow insurgent political
organizations to operate there. No military
activity permitted.
MODERATE: Neighbors allow full range of insurgent
political activity. Some also permit
clandestine military activity with restrictions.
SUBSTANTIAL: All neighbors allow open political activity and
some clandestine military activity. Some
provide training and other assistance and allow
insurgent bases on their territory.
All neighboring countries allow use of their
territory for all rebel activities, including
launching attacks into Nicaragua. Openly
provide military and political training.
ii
16
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/03: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000100120003-2
WEAK:
INSURGENCY INDICATOR #17
Foreign Support and Recognition
DESCRIPTION: Recognition by foreign governments of rebel organizations.
Willingness to meet with leaders publicly. Rebels have positive
image abroad, are considered appealing alternative to the
Sandinistas. Treatment in international organizations. Ability
to raise funds abroad, gain assistance of foreign political
parties and other non-governing organizations.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Foreign governments condemn rebels and actively
OF LEVELS: oppose them. Refuse to meet their leaders.
Forced to close offices abroad. Unable to raise
funds or other support from foreign political
parties or other organizations. Rebels
perceived as right-wing military organization
trying to bring back Somoza regime.
1
1
Foreign governments unwilling to meet rebels and
offer no open or private sympathy for their
cause. Rebels perceived as losers. Some minor
support from right-wing political parties.
MODERATE: West European and Latin American governments
willing to meet privately with rebel political
leaders. Rebels allowed to open offices, raise
funds, conduct political activity. Insurgency
perceived as having legitimate grievances
against the Sandinistas.
SUBSTANTIAL: Rebels have wide and open access to foreign
leaders. Rebels widely perceived in a positive
way with a favorable human rights image.
Political parties and other non-government
groups provide funds and other assistance.
STRONG: Many foreign governments (especially in Europe,
Latin America) recognize state of belligerency.
Granted observer status in international
organizations. Rebels recognized as desirable
alternative to Sandinistas.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/03: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000100120003-2
DESCRIPTION: Ability to plan and execute complex or multi-unit operations.
Quality and effectiveness of military leaders. Cooperation
between combat units, higher headquarters, different services.
Ability to coordinate combined arms operations.
1
IL
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Operations frequently fail due to lack of
OF LEVELS: planning and poorly stated objectives. Local
commanders fail to cooperate and operate
independently. Orders frequently fail to reach
intended units and central authority has little
idea what troops are doing. Rampant rivalries
between services prevent coordination.
REGIME INDICATOR #1
Command and Control
Operations often fail due to poor communications
and weak leadership. Multi-unit, combined arms,
and joint-service operations nearly always prove
difficult.
MODERATE: Plans and objectives are communicated, but not
always achieved due to uneven leadership.
Individual units perform well but have
difficulty coordinating actions with other
units. Combined arms operations generally are
effective, but interservice differences hinder
some efforts.
SUBSTANTIAL: Commanders, staffs, and troop units exhibit good
teamwork and frequently achieve objectives.
Only the most difficult multi-unit operations
prove too much to handle.
STRONG: Plan and execute complex operations effectively.
Objectives set and clearly communicated.
Leadership performs well at all major functions
and has confidence of troops. All services work
together to achieve objectives.
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 1 L__I_ Jill.. .1 11
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Strategy and Tactics
DESCRIPTION: Armed forces have clear-cut objectives. Use small unit tactics,
patrolling, and deemphasize armor/multibattalion sweeps. Degree
of garrison mentality. Pay attention to interdiction/
infiltration and foreign sanctuaries. Appropriate use of
firepower to minimize civilian casualties. Build up militia and
other local defense forces.
DEFINITION
OF LEVELS: DEFICIENT: No clear-cut objectives. Sole emphasis on
military dimension, excessive use of firepower
without regard for civilian casualties. Most
troops defend fixed targets. No effort to stem
infiltration or threaten foreign sanctuaries.
Little or no attention to developing militia or
civilian defense forces.
Dependence on multibattalion sweep operations,
use of heavy armor and artillery with
insufficient regard for damage to civilian
property/casualties. Little success in blocking
rebel movement in countryside.
MODERATE: Military objectives far more developed than
political. Only elite units employ small-unit
tactics and aggressive patrolling. Some effort
to limit civilian casualties. Effort to
strengthen militias and civilian defense forces.
Some success at interdicting infiltration.
SUBSTANTIAL: Clear objectives but with overly optimistic
timetable. Some attempt to emphasize political
as well as military steps. Heavy use of small-
unit tactics and patrolling, but limited to
daylight hours. Use firepower well, but
occasionally cause civilian casualties. Militia
restricted to defending fixed targets.
STRONG: Clear-cut objectives and appropriate timetable.
Emphasis on political as well as military
dimension of counterinsurgency. Heavy use of
small-unit tactics, patrolling during guerrilla
war stage. Large units and firepower to
confront main enemy units. Effective use of
militia and other local forces. Fire discipline
minimizes civilian casualties.
19
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/03: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000100120003-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/03: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000100120003-2
REGIME INDICATOR #3
Intelligence and Security
DESCRIPTION: Ability to obtain, evaluate, and act on information about
strength, disposition, and plans of enemy forces. Effectiveness
of counterintelligence and communications security.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Military forces penetrated by rebel agents
OF LEVELS: at many levels; unable to formulate plans
without leaks. Continuous use of unsecure
communications. Unable to determine size or
location of enemy forces and objectives.
Intelligence not considered in planning own
operations.
Some information on rebel forces available, but
rarely acted upon in timely manner. Some
penetrations by rebel forces of government
military/security services. Unsecure
communications used frequently.
MODERATE: Efforts made to identify and track rebel units,
and penetrate rebel ranks to learn plans and
objectives. Intelligence considered in making
own plans, even if not always adequate. Secure
communications available but occasional lapses
occur.
SUBSTANTIAL: Most major forces identified and tracked, but
many plans and objectives not recognized.
Voluminous collection of rebel communications
but exploitation and dissemination lags. Secure
communications but subject to codebreaking.
STRONG: All major rebel forces identified and located.
Prior knowledge of rebel plans and objectives.
Information disseminated in timely fashion and
acted upon. Enemy penetrations identified and
isolated; communications secure from enemy
exploitations.
25X1
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/03: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000100120003-2
Military Aggressiveness
Forces react aggressively to rebel sighting and seek contact.
Willingness to remain out of garrison for long periods.
DEFINITION
OF LEVELS:
DEFICIENT: Vast majority of clashes initiated
by rebels. Many government garrisons threatened
with being overrun. Unwillingness to risk elite
forces or sophisticated equipment like
helicopters.
MODERATE:
SUBSTANTIAL:
STRONG:
Government forces tied to defense of fixed
targets with only occasional multi-unit sweeps.
Troops generally unwilling to seek contact on
the ground, but call for artillery fire and air
support to engage rebels. Troops generally
unwilling to remain out of garrison for long, or
to threaten rebel sanctuaries.
Government forces initiate about half the
clashes. Dominate the countryside during
daylight. Forces willing to seek contact when
assured air/fire support.
Government forces initiate most clashes..
Willing to patrol and conduct night ambushes.
Elite units able to remain in field for extended
periods.
Vast majority of clashes initiated by government
troops. Some units remain in the field for
several weeks or months. Willing to engage
rebels in all weather and terrain, even when not
assured of fire support. Willing to cross
borders to attack rebel bases.
21
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 _ 11J _11 I
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DESCRIPTION: Sufficient mobility to challenge rebel control in the countryside.
Ability to confront rebels on several fronts simultaneously.
Government maintains presence in rural areas.
Mobility/Presence in Countryside
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Government presence reduced to large urban areas
OF LEVELS: and permanent garrisons. Rely almost
exclusively on air resupply and lack control
over roads.
Lack of helicopters, trucks, and good roads
limit government forces to operating on foot in
many remote areas. Unable to fight on more than
one front simultaneously. Effectively cede
control of some areas to rebels.
MODERATE: Road movement possible to nearly all areas
during daylight when escorted. Some company-
size units can be airlifted. Government
maintains control of countryside during day..
Can carry out simultaneous'operations.on two
fronts.
SUBSTANTIAL: Government forces can move anywhere during
daylight and good weather. Able to maintain
permanent presence in all areas most of the
time.
STRONG: Government forces able to move anywhere in
country when rebels appear, and to fight
simultaneously on several fronts. Government
maintains permanent presence in all departments,
municipalities, and other administrative
jurisdictions.
L 22
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/03: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000100120003-2
r1
DESCRIPTION:
Majority of combatants poorly trained and
lacking basic military skills. Only a few elite
units can be trusted to perform well. High
casualties due to inexperience and frequency of
ambushes. Many wounded die before receiving
medical treatment.
MODERATE: Most soldiers perform well in combat but
frequently are victims of ambushes. Efforts are
made to recover all weapons and casualties.
Soldiers remain vigilant in protecting most
important targets. Majority trained in basic
military skills before being subject to combat.
SUBSTANTIAL: Most combatants experienced and well-trained.
Troops react well under fire, including enemy
ambushes.
STRONG: Vast majority of soldiers experienced with good
application of basic military skills. Evacuate
casualties for treatment. New recruits cross-
trained to perform multiple tasks. Troops
successfully defend important targets even
against superior numbers.
25X1
23
SECRET
Combat Effectiveness
Effectiveness of individual soldiers in combat. Knowledge of
basic military skills. Ability to defend symbolic military and
economic targets. Small-unit cohesion. Composure under fire.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Soldiers inadequately trained in basic military
OF LEVELS: skills, waste ammunition, allow weapons and
equipment to deteriorate. Unable to remain in
field long because of poor physical condition
and unsanitary habits. Frequently flee combat
and abandon weapons or surrender when rebels _
besiege them.
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 i li...I X111::... 11 1
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Recruitment and Retention
DESCRIPTION: Government's ability to enlist and retain sufficient military
manpower. Control desertion/dropout rates. Willingness of
soldiers to reenlist. Commitment to revolution. Willingness to
submit to the draft. Troop morale.
DEFINITION: DEFICIENT: Military strength continually falling due to
OF LEVELS: draft evasion, low retention and high
desertions. Troop morale very low, sabotage of
equipment. Vast majority of soldiers not
motivated to fight for Sandinista cause.
Serious morale problems due to high casualties,
poor pay, poor medical treatment, bad food.
Draft evasion and high desertion rate force
regime to expand the draft to maintain force
levels.
MODERATE: Force able to obtain enough recruits and
conscripts to offset casualties and desertions.
Some instances of insubordination and court
martial, but morale not detrimental to overall
effectiveness. Some soldiers highly motivated
to fight for the revolution.
SUBSTANTIAL: Sufficient recruits and conscripts available to
increase strength of government forces when
needed. Desertion rate low and troop morale
relatively good.
STRONG: Government able to recruit and retain sufficient
personnel to reduce reliance on forced
conscription. Few draft evaders. Soldiers
committed to Sandinista cause. High morale and
esprit in most units.
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 L. _. .I J.I Il I f
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Availability of Weapons/Ammunition & Equipment
DESCRIPTION: Reliability of foreign assistance. Appropriate mix of weapons for
type of threat. Ability to produce and modify own equipment.
Sufficient stores available in Nicaragua.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Government lacks sufficient external support.
OF LEVELS: Unable to produce or modify equipment on their
own. Inappropriate weapons for type of
conflict.
External benefactors provide equipment, but
demand payment and threaten to withhold spare
parts. Many weapons inappropriate, and some
needed to counter a specific threat are lacking.
MODERATE: External supporters fill most needs, but with
frequent delays. Weapons mix mostly right, but
some difficult to maintain and others of little
use. Stores on hand mostly adequate but some
spot shortages noted.
SUBSTANTIAL: External supporters provide equipment when
requested but long-term reliability in question.
All appropriate weapons types acquired but some
in insufficient quantities. Stocks on hand
adequate for most contingencies.
STRONG: External supporters provide all that is needed
and are reliable over long term. Weapons mix
appropriate for threat. Sufficient quantities
stored in Nicaragua. Multiple sources of
weapons.
25
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 L ..I .J.I.II: II
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DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Inadequate planning results in frequent
OF LEVELS: shortages at end of month. Troops unable to
stay in remote areas because of lack of bases,
poor road network, insufficient transport.
Little or no effort to build new bases, roads.
DESCRIPTION Adequate planning and management of supply distribution. Presence
of bases or depots in forward areas, and good road network.
Sufficient trucks, helicopters, and support personnel.
Logistic Support
25X1
Supply system breaks down frequently due to bad
weather, rebel interdiction of roads, and
shortages of helicopters or fuel contamination.
Troops in the field miss meals and sometimes are
forced to break off action due to lack of
supplies.
MODERATE: New support bases and roads under construction
in remote areas. Sufficient trucks and
helicopters acquired, but personnel shortages
and weather occasionally delay deliveries.
Planning and logistics management adequate for
most routine operations, but emergencies and
unexpected developments cause problems.
SUBSTANTIAL: Good road network and forward bases in most
areas. Supply system performs adequately with
few delays.
STRONG: Sufficient roads, forward bases, and landing
strips constructed to support operations
anywhere in country. Sufficient transportation
assets; drivers and other personnel always
available. Good planning and management allow
large-scale operations supported by
prepositioned supplies. .
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/03: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000100120003-2
Ability to Assimilate Equipment and Operate
without Foreign Advisers
DESCRIPTION: Sufficient technical skills and education to operate and maintain
complex weapons. Foreign personnel able to depart after
training. Lack of tensions and friction between Nicaraguans and
foreign advisers. Foreign managerial and tactical advice
appropriate for Nicaraguan situation.
DEFINITION: DEFICIENT: Foreign personnel perform some combat duties.
OF LEVELS: Foreign advisers offer inadequate and totally
inappropriate advice and training. Frequent
friction between Nicaraguans and foreign
personnel.
Government troops unable to assimilate some
complex equipment (radars, medical services,
etc.). Foreign advisers present at most field
commands, causing friction and bruised
relations.
MODERATE: Government troops operate and maintain most
equipment while receiving training on the rest.
Some reliance on foreign support personnel.
Advisers offer appropriate and relevant advice
most of the time. Some friction with
foreigners, but not enough to threaten
operational efficiency.
SUBSTANTIAL: Government troops well-trained by foreign
advisers and gradually able to operate and
maintain all equipment. Relations with foreign
advisers generally good despite a few instances
of friction. Foreign advisers limited to
national staffs and training facilities.
STRONG: Government troops able to operate and maintain
all equipment without significant foreign
assistance. Foreign trainers and advisers offer
appropriate assistance. Strong relations and
mutual trust between soldiers and foreign
advisers.
27
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 -l ---- -- I. -i _._.._L~. .'..-.I_ .~l_lli 11f
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DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Open and violent rifts among Directorate
OF LEVELS: members. Key individuals/units are openly
identified as supporters of a faction or
Directorate member.
Directorate Unity and Cohesion
DESCRIPTION: Ability of Sandinista National Directorate to maintain cohesion.
Significant differences are unresolved and open
feuding begins. Unilateral decisions are made
and factions appeal to the party, military, and
public for support.
MODERATE: Personal.rivalries and policy differences fairly
intense, but compromise is reached for the good
of the revolution. Public awareness of
factional differences grows. Power plays to
undercut some leaders occur.
SUBSTANTIAL: Tactical differences and minor personal
rivalries present, but problems resolved without
lasting rancor.
Broad consensus on all major strategic and
tactical issues for consolidating the revolution
and countering the insurgency.
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 ... I_JJ-t_ ll
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Civilian-Military Relations
DEFINITION:
OF LEVELS:
Extent of unity and agreement between the Directorate and the
military over objectives and counterinsurgency. Extent of
cooperation between Interior and Defense ministries.
DEFICIENT: Military considers itself the only true
defender of the revolution. Splits with
political leadership over objectives and
strategy. Coup plotting. Ministry of Interior
and regular troops openly and violently at odds.
Military undertakes some operations in defiance
of regime policy. Armed forces and Ministry of
Interior attempt to usurp each other's role,
occasionally with violent consequences.
Military begins to question overall strategy and
chafe at restrictions on some types of
operations. Growing lack of cooperation between
Ministry of Interior and armed forces.
Agreement on objectives and strategy but some
tactical differences. Military leaders clearly
under civilian authority. Some friction between
Ministry of Interior and Army personnel in the
field.
STRONG: Broad agreement on objectives and tactics for
prosecuting the war. Role of Ministry of
Interior and armed forces well defined. Spirit
of teamwork and cooperation predominates.
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Internal Security
DESCRIPTION: Ability to control growth of opposition groups. Ability to
prevent formation of internal front supporting guerrillas.
Effectiveness of block committees and informant networks. Success
in preventing distribution of opposition propaganda, political
messages.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Security services unable to limit growth and
OF LEVELS: activities of opposition groups and rebel
internal support networks. Uncontrolled
dissemination of opposition propaganda.
Security service personnel flee or defect to
rebels.
Security services unable to prevent opposition
groups from uniting and planning joint
activities. Unable to prevent formation of
urban internal front supporting rebels.
Frequent appearance of leaflets and graffiti in
cities.
MODERATE: Security services unable to control some
opposition groups, especially in the
countryside. Must devote considerable resources
to ferret out rebel supporters in the cities.
Block committees and informant networks break
down in rural areas. Government unable to jam
radio broadcasts or prevent appearance of
leaflets, posters, and graffiti in some areas.
SUBSTANTIAL: Opposition groups largely divided and under
control. Formation of internal fronts in urban
areas prevented, but some function in rural
areas. Vast majority of population intimidated
and unwilling to associate with rebels. All
internal information flow controlled, but some
external broadcasts reach population.
STRONG: Able to penetrate, divide, and manipulate
opposition groups. Successfully detect and
neutralize insurgent supporters. Population
intimidated and afraid to oppose the regime
actively. Complete control over information
dissemination.
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REGIME INDICATOR #14
Political Institutions
DEFINITION
OF LEVELS:
Ability of the Sandinista leadership to create, maintain, and
strengthen legitimate political and government institutions, such
as the party, party-affiliated organizations, and-local and
national legislative and administrative bodies. Ability of party.
leaders to control cadre and government officials.
DEFICIENT: Party lacks coherent vertical structure.
No clear-cut lines of authority or policy and
ideological guidance. Party lacks control over
both national and local government institutions
and officials. State and government mechanisms
non-existent or perceived as lacking legitimacy.
MODERATE:
SUBSTANTIAL:
STRONG:
Party deeply divided into factions reflecting
national leadership rivalries and irreconcilable
policy differences. Party apparatus begins to
break down in both urban and rural area.
Increasingly vocal demands to reform or
reorganize government structures.
Party apparatus functioning effectively in urban
areas, but deficient in some rural areas. Some
manifestations of policy differences between the
party and government officials.
Party cells functioning at nearly all levels of
society. Leadership provides guidance which
sometimes is misunderstood or not followed by
lower-level party and government officials.
Party cells effectively operate at every level
of Nicaragua's political, military, social, and
economic life. Leadership provides clear
ideological and policy guidance, which is
adhered to by lower-level officials. Lines of
authority clear. Functioning state and
government mechanisms are widely recognized as
legitimate.
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REGIME INDICATOR #15
Ability to Mobilize Mass Support
DESCRIPTION Membership and participation in mass organizations such as labor
unions and women's groups. Willingness to participate in parades,
rallies, and voluntary work programs. Election turnouts.
Voluntary enlistments in military and security services.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Mass organizations cease to function.
OF LEVELS: Little or no participation in rallies and work
programs. Lack of volunteers for military
service forces, increased dependence on draft."
Extremely low voter turnout or defeat of
Sandinista candidates.
Membership and participation in mass
organizations decline. Considerable coercion
needed to assure attendance at rallies and work
programs. Voter turnout declines and massive
fraud necessary to assure victory of Sandinista
candidates.
MODERATE: Apathetic participation in mass organizations to
ensure access to goods and services. Only party
faithful regularly attend rallies and work
programs. Voluntary enlistments in military
require considerable inducements.
SUBSTANTIAL: Mass organizations remain strong in the cities
but some apathy evident in countryside. Most
people participate in rallies and work programs.
STRONG: Virtually complete participation in mass
organizations. Heavy turnout for rallies and
work programs. Massive election turnout and
overwhelming support for Sandinista candidates.
High enlistment reduces dependence on the draft.
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Control of Political Opposition
DESCRIPTION: Ability to divide opposition groups and entice them to cooperate
with the regime. Ability to limit effectiveness and political
space of opposition. Ability to defeat electoral challenges.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Opposition parties united and organize large,
(1 OF LEVELS: widespread demonstrations, strikes, and other
Ill overt antiregime action. Strong grassroots
organization enables them to challenge
~. Sandinistas in fair election and win some
positions.
Opposition coalition gaining strength and
becoming more vocal. Grassroots organizations
increasingly competitive with Sandinista party
in attracting new supporters. Expanding
political space strongly defended by
international community and invulnerable to all
but massive crackdown.
MODERATE: Opposition groups cooperate within a formal
coalition. Individual groups internally
cohesive. Grassroots organizations spread with
aid of internal newsletters. Small but stable
political space assured by high degree of
international attention.
SUBSTANTIAL: Opposition weak and divided and individual
parties and groups carry out independent
antiregime agendas. Weak grassroots
organization with little ability to disseminate
message outside urban areas. Political space
exists only at the whim of the regime. Little
international recognition.
Opposition parties, unions, and other groups
completely coopted throughout the country.
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Ability to Defuse Religious and Ethnic Discontent
DESCRIPTION: Inability of opposition religious and ethnic leaders to rally
their supporters to actively resist regime policies. Extent of
.acceptance by religious and ethnic groups of Sandinista
ideological indoctrination.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Religious and ethnic leaders declare the
OF LEVELS: regime illegitimate and rally their supporters
to oppose the Sandinistas with violence.
~1. Actively link with political and armed
resistance.
Church hierarchy counsels civil disobedience and
justifies armed resistance. Church leaders take
an active role in opposition political activity.
Church plays clandestine role in forging
internal front support for the insurgents.
Ethnic groups openly oppose the regime and many
join the insurgents.
MODERATE: Church hierarchy is united in its determination
to resist certain regime policies such as the
draft and Marxist textbooks. Ethnic leaders
demand autonomy and an end to government
interference in their affairs.
SUBSTANTIAL: Some high-level clergy and ethnic leaders
criticize Sandinista policies, but most ethnic
and religious groups remain apolitical.
Sandinistas coopt religious and ethnic groups to
support the regime. Sandinistas are able to
carry out their programs without resistance from
these groups.
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Ability to Deflect Public Dissatisfaction
with Regime's Economic Performance
DESCRIPTION: Extent of public dissatisfaction with regime's ability to deliver
food, health, education, employment, and other services. Ability
to avoid public blame for economic deterioration.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Extreme dissatisfaction results in
OF LEVELS: frequent, widespread, organized violence against
regime authority, which the rebels are able to
exploit.
Intense dissatisfaction results in frequent,
widespread, organized violence against regime
authority which the rebels are able to exploit.
MODERATE: Considerable public disgruntlement leads to
occasional, organized, non-violent
demonstrations in urban areas. A few
spontaneous acts of violence occur.
SUBSTANTIAL: Population expresses frequent verbal
dissatisfaction, with a few isolated small
demonstrations.
Little or no public dissatisfaction with regime
performance. Public does not blame Sandinistas
for economic shortcomings.
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Foreign Political/Diplomatic Support
DESCRIPTION Extent of foreign diplomatic support. Ability to attract foreign
economic aid. Willingness of foreign leaders to meet with
Sandinista officials. Increasing tolerance within the region and
ability to avoid blame for Contadora stalemate.
DEFINITION DEFICIENT: Western and Latin American. economic aid
OF LEVELS: cut off. Soviet Bloc and Cuba cut back aid and
pressure regime to negotiate with opposition.
Some Western and Latin countries openly support
the rebels.
Major Third World governments pressure
Sandinistas to negotiate with opposition. Most
non-Soviet Bloc aid cut off. Contadora
countries end mediation efforts and blame
Nicaragua for failure.
MODERATE: Moderate Third World governments distance
themselves from Sandinistas, but remain opposed
to the insurgency. West Europeans become more
critical and continue to reduce aid. Nicaraguan
influence in international organizations
declines. Nicaragua perceived as an obstacle in
regional negotiations.
SUBSTANTIAL: Sandinistas continue to enjoy strong support
from Third World and Soviet Bloc. Some Western
leaders critical and cut contacts. Some
government aid reduced but internationalists
remain highly supportive. Sandinistas generally
able to deflect criticism in regional
negotiations.
STRONG: Sandinistas enjoy widespread international
support. Obtain sufficient foreign economic
support from West and Soviet Bloc. Successfully
portray themselves as aggrieved party and shift
blame to United States.
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