EASTERN EUROPE: EXPORTS OF MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT TO THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 78
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 21, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
DAth
DOG NO SO V 71/ 83-2C250
OIR 3
P PD
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
21 July 1988
EASTERN EUROPE: EXPORTS OF MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT TO THE USSR
Summary
The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive
and detailed description of Soviet machinery and equipment
imports from the six CEMA countries of Eastern Europe--
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and
Romania. This base of data, which represents the record of
Eastern Europe's past contributions to Soviet investment,
provides a framework from which to judge Eastern Europe's
future role in supporting the USSR's modernization program.
Eastern Europe has been the Soviet Union's main supplier
of machinery, and the region's contribution to Soviet economic
development is likely to grow. Moscow has indicated it wants
to increase both the quality and quantity of machinery imports
from Eastern Europe in order to supplement the output of the
USSR's own machine-building industry for Gorbachev's
modernization program. Soviet demands are likely to cause
some shift in the composition of East European equipment
deliveries from heavy equipment toward advanced machinery
embodying high technology.
Such a shift in the mix of East European machinery
deliveries will probably increase the transfer of Western
technology to the USSR through Eastern Europe. Although many
of the East European products which Moscow is seeking embody
Western technology obtained though legal Western imports and
licenses, Eastern Europe is likely to increase its efforts to
acquire technology clandestinely.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
This typescript was prepared by Office of 25X1
Soviet Analysis, and Office of 25X1
European Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
should be directed to the Chief, Economic Performance
Division, SOVA, 25X1
1
SOV M-88-20054X
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
EASTERN EUROPE: EXPORTS OF MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT TO THE USSR
Machinery Deliveries in Perspective
At the beginning of the 1970s, Soviet economic planners
decided to accelerate imports of capital equipment to
supplement domestic production in the machine-building
industry. The growth of domestic output had slowed, a result
that was partly planned. Feeling the pinch of rising resource
costs, the Soviets wanted to use existing plant and equipment
more effectively and limit new investment rather than make
indiscriminate additions of costly equipment. Moreover, the
machine-building sector was plagued by problems such as raw
material scarcities, transportation bottlenecks, and labor
shortages that also hindered production.
Rising imports of machinery and equipment from Eastern
Europe and the West made an important contribution to Soviet
economic performance between 1970 and 1986.1 Equipment
deliveries increased at an average annual rate of almost 14
percent and were consistently the USSR's leading import
25X1
1 This study is based on data reported in the Soviet foreign
trade handbook. The goods covered are those reported by the
USSR in CTN (CEMA Trade Nomenclature) Category 1, Machines,
Equipment, and Transportation Facilities which are imports
largely destined for investment purposes. Machinery and
equipment imported for consumption--consumer durables such as
televisions and household appliances--are not included in this
study. Although some East European countries publish more
detailed figures on equipment trade, the Soviet data were
chosen to provide a consistent database for comparing the
equipment deliveries from Eastern Europe. In some cases, East
European data are cited to supplement the Soviet figures.
25X1
2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
"Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
4
category, accounting for around one-third of total imports.
Machinery and equipment imports from all sources accounted for
roughly one-third of total machinery investment in the early
1980s (see inset). Without these imports we estimate that
the average annual growth of Soviet investment would have been
at least one-half percentage point lower in the 19705 and 0.7
percentage point lower in the early 19805.
Eastern Europe's Leading Role
Moscow has traditionally relied on its six East European
allies for the bulk of equipment imports.2 In 1986, five East
European countries--East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria,
Poland, Hungary--were the most important sources of Soviet
equipment imports, accounting for two-thirds of all such
Soviet imports in that year. Romania was in ninth place,
following Finland, Yugoslavia, and West Germany (see figure
1). Equipment imports from Eastern Europe equalled roughly
one quarter of total Soviet investment of domestically-
produced machinery and equipment.3
The East Europeans supply the Soviets with a wide range
of equipment. Trade has been weighted largely toward heavy
equipment, with transportation equipment the leading category
(see figure 2). Of the CEMA 6, East Germany has been the
2 These six countries as a group are referred to
interchangeably in this paper as the CEMA 6 or Eastern Europe.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
3 Total new fixed investment of machinery and equipment in
1982 prices, including military investment.
3
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
2eX1
Box Inset
Domestic and Foreign Trade Prices in CEMA
Problems arise when trying to make comparisons between
imported equipment and Soviet domestic output. The first
problem stems from the mechanics of the CEMA pricing
mechanism. Although theoretically determined by a five-year
moving average, in practice East European machinery prices
have been set largely according to current, higher prices of
comparable machinery on world markets. However, not only has
a large share of East European equipment in. general been
inferior to most Western equipment, but the East European CEMA
countries have made a practice of exporting their best
equipment to the West and leaving poorer quality equipment for
export to the Soviet Union. Thus, the ruble value of Soviet
imports of East European machinery overstates the true worth
to some extent. 25X1
A second problem arises when placing a domestic valuation
on these imports. While foreign trade prices are tied loosely
to world market prices, most CEMA countries value their
?domestic economic activities in prices generally set by
central planners, presumably on the basis of average
production costs or other economic criteria. Because domestic
and foreign trade prices are set differently, it is almost
impossible to make meaningful comparisons between these
countries of either domestic or foreign economic activities.
Indeed, thousands of "coefficients" are often used in an
attempt to equate foreign and domestic prices. The extent of
this problem has been explored by several recent studies.
Treml and Kostinsky, estimating the domestic value of Soviet
foreign trade from data given in the 1972 Soviet input-output
table, conclude that 1970 Soviet imports in general have been
worth 100 to 150 percent more in domestic rubles than their
reported value in foreign trade rubles. However, they found
that, on average, Soviet machinery imports during the 1972-79
period were worth about the same in the two categories of
rubles, although the relationship varied substantially for
different types of machinery. Thus comparisons in this study
between Soviet imports of machinery and equipment and domestic
production or investment may be roughly valid, even given the
above problems. 25X1
4 Vladimir G. Treml and Barry L. Kostinsky, Domestic Value of
Soviet Foreign Trade: Exports and Imports in the 1972 Input-
Output Table, US Bureau of the Census, Foreign Economic Report
No. 20, October 1982. 25X1
End of Box Inset
4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0 ?
FIGURE 1
SOURCES OF SOVIET MACHINERY IMPORTS, 1.986
EAST GERMANY
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
BULGARIA
POLAND
HUNGARY
FINLAND
YUGOSLAVIA
WEST GERMANY
ROMANIA
JAPAN
ITALY
AUSTRIA
FRANCE
SWITZERLAND
INDIA
UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED STATES
SWEDEN
OTHER WEST
OTHER SOCIALIST
/////./A
Z_Z_Z_Z_ZA
/A
A
? CEMA 6
OTHER
0 1
Source: Soviet trade statistics
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
2 3
BILLION RUBLES
4 5
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
FIGURE 2
CEMA 6 MACHINERY EXPORTS TO THE USSR, 1986
Metal Processing
Energy engineering
Resource processing
Material handling
Light industry
Food industry
Unspecified residual
Chemical
Other industry
Precision
Source: Soviet trade statistics
Business
Agricultural
Transportation
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
'Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
dominant supplier of most categories.of machinery (see table
1). East European machinery is generally competitive with or
superior to the equipment produced by the Soviets and provides
Moscow with the best way of receiving payment for the
resources--mainly fuels--it exports to its allies. An
examination of the basic trade trends in individual commodity
categories and more detailed data on East European machinery
exports to the USSR are contained in Appendices 1 and 2.
At the beginning of the 1970s the CEMA 6 accounted for
over 70 percent of the value of Soviet imports of machinery
and equipment. By 1976, however, the CEMA 6 saw their share
of machinery and equipment imports drop to just 55 percent as
several developments led Moscow to look more to the West (see
figure 3).
o Moscow decided to use imports from the West to
acquire more modern technology in order to increase
Soviet productivity more rapidly than could be
achieved by continuing reliance on domestic and East
European equipment.
o The thaw in East-West relations also encouraged
Moscow to buy more from the West and, in turn,
spurred Western sellers to seek access to the large
Soviet market.
o Increases in the price and volume of Soviet energy
exports in the mid-1970s and greater Western
5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
PERCENT
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
FIGURE 3
CEMA 6 SHARE OF
SOVIET EQUIPMENT IMPORTS
Source: Soviet trade statistics
YEAR
CEMA 6
OTHER SOURCES
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
willingness to lend to the USSR gave Moscow the hard
currency needed to expand purchases from the West.
Large increases in Soviet imports from the West occurred in
most categories of equipment during the early and mid-1970s.
In particular, imports of Western chemical and metal
processing equipment exceeded imports of comparable equipment
from the CEMA 6. Purchases of transportation equipment from
the West were also substantial.
The CEMA 6 share of the Soviet equipment market began to
recover in the late 1970s. Rising CEMA energy prices rapidly
increased the value of Soviet exports to Eastern Europe, ?and
the CEMA 6 had to boost their equipment exports in an attempt
to keep trade balanced (see figure 4). The CEMA 6 initially
tried to meet the higher cost of fuel imports through
increased sales of consumer goods to Moscow, but the region's
widening trade deficit soon led to stepped up sales of
machinery and equipment. Between 1981 and 1985, CEMA-6
equipment sales grew by 72 percent, fast enough to match the
increasing value of Soviet energy exports and help hold down
the growth of East European deficits.
Import Surge Halts
In 1986 the double-digit growth in Soviet equipment
purchases from Eastern Europe abruptly ended as the nominal
value of imports fell by 2 percent and real imports dropped by
an estimated 5 percent. The decline stood at odds with Soviet
6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
FIGURE 4
TRADING EAST EUROPEAN MACHINERY FOR SOVIET ENERGY
Billion Rubles
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
do.
do.
do.
dm. '
mow..
off.
41.1,
I 1 1.1111W III
1 I I I I I I I I I I 1
tr) c7.) to
N co m
a) a) a)
..-1 ,-,
YEAR
Total Soviet Exports
to East Europe
Total East European
Exports to the USSR
Soviet Energy Exports
East European
Machinery Exports
4111=11 MOS 411?41 diMe
Source: Soviet trade statistics
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
"Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
pronouncements that Eastern Europe contribute more machinery
and equipment to the Soviet modernization campaign. Moreover,
at least two of the three countries that reported a drop in
equipment exports--East Germany and Czechoslovakia--are those
best positioned to meet Soviet demands. We believe a number
of factors probably accounted for the 1986 downturn:
o The Soviets finally put teeth into longstanding
complaints about the quality of East European goods
by rejecting some planned deliveries. Moscow's
tougher attitude toward quality, in general, was
shown in 1986 by large-scale rejections of
domestically produced goods through gospriyemka--the
State Acceptance program. Reporting suggests Soviet
rejections of poor quality goods from some countries
was higher in 1986 than in previous years.
o Moscow may have allowed several countries to delay
deliveries so that the type and quality of some
goods could be improved. For example, East Germany
reportedly retained a larger portion of its annual
machine tool output for the modernization of its own
machine tool industry, with the understanding that
deliveries to the USSR will increase sharply later.
o Soviet concern over the prospect of rising trade
deficits with Eastern Europe over the next few years
may have prompted a cutback in imports from the
region. Moscow has publicly reported that it must
7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
address the problem of worsening terms of trade with
CEMA as a result of declining oil prices.5
Data for 1987 indicate that East European deliveries
25X1
of 25X1
machinery to the Soviet Union were up slightly--an increase of
some 5 percent in nominal terms, and probably half this amount
in real terms.
25X1
Impact on East European Economies
Both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have benefited
from a trade relationship patterned on differences in
comparative advantage. While contributing to Soviet
investment and growth, East European machinery has paid for
imports of Soviet energy and raw materials vital to the
region's economies. Furthermore, during most of the 1970s,
Eastern Europe was able to trade machinery--of low quality by
world standards--for energy priced below world market levels. 25X1
This Soviet subsidy contributed to the generally good economic
performance recorded by Eastern Europe during this period.
The gains for Eastern Europe diminished substantially,
25X1
5 The fall in the value of Soviet energy exports to Eastern
Europe because of declining CEMA energy prices could result in
large Soviet deficits with the region without adjustments in
previously planned trade flows or prices. We believe Moscow's
decision to impose tougher quality standards on imports from
Eastern Europe in 1986 was influenced by the realization that
because of declining terms of trade the USSR could no longer
afford to purchase ever-growing quantities of East European
machinery as during the previous 15 years. 25X1
25X1
8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
'Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
however, after 1978. As Soviet energy prices gradually rose
to world market levels, Eastern Europe had to increase rapidly
the volume of its machinery exports to maintain imports from
the USSR (see figure 5). The combined impact of this
adjustment in CEMA trade along with a significant drop in East
European imports of Western machinery and equipment--due to
hard currency balance of payments problems-=reduced investment
and economic growth throughout Eastern Europe in the 1980s.
25X1
25X1
Reliance on the Soviet market also imposed a substantial
cost on Eastern Europe by weakening the competitiveness of its
machine-building industries. This dependence seems especially
significant in the higher technology industries, where, for
example, 80 percent of East German machine tool output is
exported to the USSR and 70 percent of output from the
Hungarian Videoton Computer Enterprise is sold to socialist
countries. Although this orientation has ensured stability
and employment in industries that often face highly cyclical
demand in the West, East European production for the less
demanding Soviet market has undermined incentives to improve
product quality to remain competitive on world markets and
thus has left the region increasingly vulnerable to shifts in
Soviet requirements. This cost has become more burdensome as
the East Europeans lose markets in the West and as Moscow
presses for better quality deliveries. To upgrade production,
the East Europeans need to make substantial investments in
9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
100
80
60
40
111?06
WEB
?????
20 ?
41=110
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
FIGURE 5
SOVIET SHARE OF TOTAL EAST EUROPEAN
MACHINERY EXPORTSa
Percent
BULGARIA CZECHOSLOVAKIA GDR
aComputed from trade data in current prices.
HUNGARY
POLAND
LEGEND
VA
1975
1985
ROMANIA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: 6IA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
their machine-building industries and import Western
technologies; yet they are less able to sell goods in the West
to help finance the purchase of Western equipment.
25X1
Eastern Europe's Role In Soviet Modernization
Moscow's Goals and Motivations
Gorbachev's modernization program call for a rapid
expansion and updating of Soviet manufacturing facilities, and
he clearly wants Eastern Europe to contribute more to meet
that agenda.6 The Soviets want both an increase in the total
amount of equipment deliveries from Eastern Europe and better
quality equipment. The weak performance of the Soviet
machine-building industry in 1987 could put even more of a
burden on imports. Particularly troubling for the
modernization program was the fact that over two-thirds of the
targets set for the production
efficient types of output
published plan results.
Other considerations
were
of advanced and highly
not met,
according to recently
also heighten
the importance of
Eastern Europe as a potential supplier of equipment to the
USSR. Since late 1985, the Soviets have been rocked by the
collapse of oil prices on the world market. This has not only
reduced hard currency revenues from direct oil sales to the
25X1
25X1
10
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
developed West, but also cut cash earnings from sales of arms
to the oil-rich countries that have been Moscow's best
customers. The decline in hard currency earnings coupled with
the depreciation of the dollar make it more difficult for the
Soviets to import high quality equipment from its traditional
suppliers in Western Europe and Japan.
remains troubled by Western efforts to
high technology equipment.
Moreover, Moscow
control exports of some
25X1
25X1
Moscow is looking to Eastern Europe to provide a broad
array of machinery and equipment. In an internal study
completed in 1984, Moscow indicated areas in which its CEMA
partners are expected to develop their capabilities to deliver
equipment for which Moscow now relies on the West. These
areas include chemical engineering, oil equipment, automation
of production in industry, agriculture, and transport,
electronic equipment components, metal processing equipment,
equipment for the automotive industry, large capacity trucks,
heavy excavators, bulldozers and pipelayers, mining equipment,
and equipment for the mechanization of materials-handling
operations. 25X1
National Efforts
The CEMA 6 countries appear to be making efforts to
improve capabilities in key high-tech areas both to meet
Moscow's demands and to modernize their ailing economies.
National plans have highlighted computers, other
11
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
-Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
microelectronics, computer controlled machine tools, and
flexible manufacturing systems as high priorities for
development during the coming years. Those countries with
capabilities in these areas are apt to draw the strongest
Soviet attention.
o Bulgaria probably will retain the niche it already
has carved out in the computer and'electronics
fields. It is a leader in the production of
selected computer peripherals, including magnetic
disk drives generally considered superior to Soviet
models, and a co-leader with the GDR in personal
computer technology.
o East Germany--which sends about 70 percent of its
integrated circuit output to the USSR--is the
leading East European producer of microelectronics
and computer equipment. Most of this equipment
reportedly is more reliable than Soviet
counterparts. At the end of last year, East Germany
began production of a CEMA-coordinated high-
performance personal computer with a storage
capacity and processing speed approximately four
times greater than previous products. More
importantly, however, East Germany is a major
producer of machine tool lines and optical
equipment, some of which are also of excellent
quality. The marriage of these capabilities will
12
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
almost certainly permit East Berlin to lead the CEMA
6 in the flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) field.
o Czechoslovakia is also an important producer of
conventional and advanced machine tools and has some
computer capabilities. Although certain to remain
behind East Germany as a supplier, Czechoslovakia
probably has the greatest potentfal to increase
substantially its exports of advanced machine tools
to the USSR. Under Soviet direction, Czechoslovakia
may develop a leading role in specialized areas of
machinery production, such as robots or nuclear
reactor-related equipment.
o Hungary is likely to continue its leadership in
software for machine tool systems, which will give
it entree to specialized areas of FMS hardware
development.
o Poland .supplies the Soviet Union with some computer
equipment, such as minicomputers, floppy disk drives
and printers that generally are on par with Soviet
and East German models. Because of its serious
financial problems, however, Poland is not likely to
acquire the capabilities needed to become a leader
in any of the high-tech fields. Despite the size of
its industrial base, its position among the CEMA 6
as a supplier of machinery to the Soviet Union has
been declining. In trying to regain its pre-1980
13
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
'Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
position as an exporter to the USSR, Warsaw will
? probably contribute some expertise to joint
development projects and may benefit in the long run
from the advances made by its CEMA allies.
o Romania is likely to continue specializing in energy
extraction and processing equipment, building on its
own considerable experience and caPacity in this
area. Bucharest, however, has not been a major
participant in CEMA S&T programs and may find itself
more of a beneficiary than a contributor to the
mainstream of CEMA machinery development and
production.
CEMA and Bilateral Efforts
These individual national efforts are being supplemented
by multilateral CEMA agreements and bilateral arrangements to
develop and produce technologically advanced equipment as
quickly as possible.
o In December 1985, CEMA adopted the Comprehensive
Long-term Science and Technology (S&T) Program to
guide research and development and new production
through the year 2000.
o The CEMA countries have also signed a series of
protocols to coordinate five-year development plans
to support rapid development of technology sectors
in each of their economies.
14
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
o A series of bilateral trade agreements call for
increased trade turnover in computers,
microelectronics, machine tools, and flexible
manufacturing systems during the current five year
planning period.
o Numerous production specialization and cooperation
agreements have also been adopted that are aimed at
avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort.
Moscow also has signed agreements with all East European
countries except Romania for the creation of joint
25X1
25X1
enterprises, international research, scientific and production
associations, and the establishment of direct ties among
existing enterprises within CEMA. The Soviets hope that these
measures will also increase specialization and division of
labor in order to conserve scarce technical expertise and
other resources, and boost the exchange of both ideas and
goods.
25X1
The Soviets have sought other institutional changes to
improve the quality of deliveries. At the first session of
the newly established CEMA Commission for Legal Affairs late
last year, delegates discussed amendments to the "General CEMA
Delivery Conditions"--a set of guidelines and standards for
deliveries of goods--that would establish better guarantees of
quality. In addition, the Soviets reportedly are increasing
their inspections of goods from Eastern Europe and are not
accepting those that do not meet the now-higher Soviet
15
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
'Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
2
25X1 5X1
standards.1
Obtaining Western Technology
Despite the CEMA objective of technological independence
from the West, the USSR also seeks to benefit from Eastern
Europe's better access to Western knowledge and technology.
For example, Hungary recently obtained COCOM approval for the
purchase of a West German large capacity computer to run its
new tax program, and Poland is currently seeking assistance
from the IMF in computerizing its financial system.
East European regimes also
technology by liberalizing
reducing customs duties on
products.
25X1
25X1
The
have promoted access to Western
joint venture legislation and
private imports of computer-related
Eastern Europe probably transfers technology to the USSR
most frequently through the export of indigenously
manufactured products embedded with legally obtained Western
1 A
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
products and licenses. However, the CEMA S&T program may give
the Soviets--in their leadership role--increased leverage in
pushing Eastern Europe to acquire Western technology
clandestinely, especially if these regimes believe they must
satisfy their S&T obligations to secure supplies of Soviet raw
materials or to share in the benefits from CEMA
specialization.
Soviet Needs Versus East European Realities
The steps that Moscow has taken indicate the seriousness
of its efforts to raise the technological levels of CEMA
economies and gain more advanced machinery and equipment from
Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, a number of significant barriers
will continue to impede progress over the next several years.7
Shifting Terms of Trade. The greatest barrier to the
USSR's push for an increase in the flow of East European
equipment may be the shift in terms of trade against the
Soviet Union. The fall in world oil prices will be reflected
even more in the next few years--through the CEMA price
formula--in lower Soviet ruble earnings from oil deliveries to
Eastern Europe. Unless changes are made to planned imports
and exports, the value of Soviet total ruble exports to
Eastern Europe could drop sharply, and Moscow may begin
17
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
'Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
running trade deficits with the region as early as this year.
In an interview appearing in the Soviet publication
Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, a high-level Hungarian official said
that because of the expected decline in the prices of Soviet
exports during the next few years, the USSR will have to
increase the volume of its deliveries in order to
planned imports of
Statements by
first move will be
Hungarian goods.
Soviet officials indicate that
to increase sharply exports of
pay for
Moscow's
machinery
and manufactured goods to Eastern Europe in order to counter
declining value of its exports in the face of low energy
prices. This will be a difficult task for Moscow given Soviet
domestic needs and the push to increase Soviet exports of
manufactured goods to the West. Failing to accomplish this,
the Soviets probably will cut back more than planned on
imports of lower quality East European machinery while
continuing to press for equipment most needed by the Soviet
economy. The distribution of equipment imports from Eastern
Europe is likely to shift further from heavy and
unsophisticated equipment toward advanced machinery embodying
high technology.
o Computers and other electronic equipment will grow
in importance as will metal processing, energy
engineering, and resource processing equipment.
Food processing and light industry equipment may
also become more important as Moscow tries to
18
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
increase the welfare of Soviet consumers.
o The share of transportation equipment will probably
decline; the same might be true for agricultural,
material handling, laboratory, and chemical
equipment.
East European Priorities. Although the East European
regimes want to acquire high-tech skills, tfieir own domestic
priorities have led them to respond slowly to Moscow's
initiatives, especially its drive for closer cooperation under
the S&T 2000 program. They are reluctant to surrender control
of domestic high-technology programs to the Soviets or commit
resources to projects that in the end will mainly benefit the
USSR. Efforts to coordinate development plans have met strong
opposition both from countries that expect relatively small
gains from participation--like the GDR--and from those that
feel themselves relegated to an inferior position in the
community--like Romania. Most are also afraid that active
participation would force a reorientation of trade relations
away from the West that would deprive them of needed imports
and hard-currency earnings. For their part, Soviet scientists
and engineers are reluctant, either for political, ethnic or
personal reasons, to keep their East European counterparts
informed of developments in the Soviet Union. 25X1
25X1
25X1
Reform Jitters. Soviet measures to grant increased
autonomy to Soviet enterprises may also affect the volume of
equipment imported from Eastern Europe. Enterprises--now
19
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
'Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
.required to generate profits and given more opportunities to
choose their own suppliers--may no longer be as willing to
accept poor quality East European machinery.
Soviet managers will no
longer be bound by trade protocols to accept East European
equipment, but will be free to look for alternatives,
especially better or cheaper domestic products.
Another problem
realistic prices and
hampering cooperation is the lack of
exchange rates. Proposals have been put
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
forward to reform CEMA's financial system and eventually
establish convertible currencies within the Bloc, but little
will be accomplished in the near term. For example, the USSR
and Czechoslovakia recently signed an agreement allowing
enterprises engaged in joint ties or direct cooperation to
make payments to each other in rubles or crowns--the first
step in establishing complete 25X1
currency convertibility within CEMA. The accord does nothing,
however, to overcome the major problem of establishing
realistic prices and exchange rates necessary for currency
convertibility to succeed.
Economic Woes. Serious economic problems faced by the
East European countries probably will limit their ability to
supply more and better quality machinery to the Soviets.
o They must continue to sell to the West to earn the
hard currency needed to keep servicing the debts
incurred in the 1970s as well as to buy capital
20
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
goods that will help update their technologies.
o They need to retain a significant share of the
capital goods they produce to sustain growth and to
provide their own populations with the consumer
goods that will help improve labor productivity.
o Soviet demands pinch the East European countries by
putting additional burdens on the*fledgling
technology industries--many already stretched to the
limit--which are key to meeting other economic
priorities.
The CEMA 6 countries are likely to have varying degrees
of success in coping with Soviet demands. East Germany,
Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia will quite likely fare the best.
They have the strongest economies and are the least troubled
by hard currency debt. Hungary has some useful industrial
capabilities, but its large hard currency debt and
difficulties in Implementing its reform program will probably
hamper its response to Soviet requirements.
Warsaw and Bucharest face the most serious situations.
Both economies have suffered significant deterioration in the
1980s, and neither leadership seems capable of bringing about
a sustained recovery.
o Poland is hampered by intractable debt problems with
the West and with the Kremlin as well as by the
failure of the Jaruzelski regime to fashion a reform
program that will win the population's support.
25X1
25X1
25X1
21
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
'Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
While Moscow is likely to be lenient with Warsaw,
the lack of progress in correcting fundamental
economic flaws will block the additional Western
capital needed to modernize Polish industry.
o Romania's prospects are even less bright because
President Ceausescu remains unwilling to ease the
crushing austerity imposed on the economy as he
presses to repay the country's hard currency debt.
22
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Appendix 1
Transportation Equirment
Transportation is the largest category of equipment
exported by the CEMA 6 to the Soviet Union (see figures A-1
and A-2). These exports include railroad rolling stock,
streetcars, buses, engines for commercial and passenger
vehicles, motorcycles, vessels, and assorted'other equipment
required for transportation. Soviet imports of CEMA-6
transportation equipment increased steadily during the 1970s
and early 1980s, accelerated during 1982-85 with an average
annual growth of 16 percent, but leveled off in 1986. Imports
in 1986 totaled nearly 4 billion rubles, accounting for more
than two-thirds of total transportation equipment imported by
the Soviets and over a fifth of equipment imports from the
CEMA 6.
By Subcategory. The main subcategories--vessels and
related equipment, commercial road equipment, and rail and
related equipment--each accounted for roughly one-third of
total transportation imports from the CEMA 6 in 1986. Soviet
reliance on CEMA was greatest in the rail and related
equipment subcategory with more than 90 percent of these
imports coming from Eastern Europe.
o Czechoslovakia and East Germany are the largest
suppliers, accounting for 30 percent and 29 percent
of total imports, respectively, in 1986. Deliveries
from both countries increased steadily during the
25X1
23
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
FIGURE A-1
SOVIET IMPORTS OF TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT
Billion rubles
7-
gel
Cu
?r-I
Source: Soviet trade statistics
CO CO 0 CU nT ID
N N CO CO CO CO
CT3 cn cn cn 0) CT)
YEAR
CEMA 6
izOther Sources
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
FIGURE
SOVIET TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT IMPORTS F.ROM
East Germany
Czechoslovakia
-Bulgaria
Hungary
Romania
Poland
By Country
Source: Soviet trade statisics
Trucks & buses
T I
I
? nr ?,\
- r I 6, 1986
Railroad stock
and equipment
Vessels
By Category
Cars, motorcycles
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
'Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
1970s and 1980s although those from East Germany
declined by 7 percent in 1986. East Germany mostly
provides passenger and refrigerator cars to the
USSR. Plans called for Czechoslovakia to deliver
three-fourths of its production of the new CME-5
electric locomotive--described as the most powerful
locomotive produced by the Czechs--to the USSR last
year. Prague also was to deliver 40 CS7 locomotives
designed for mainline passenger service to and from
Moscow.
o Romania and Poland provided 16 and 14 percent
respectively of rail equipment imports. Romanian
rail equipment exports have expanded rapidly since
starting up in 1981. Bucharest primarily provides
freight cars to Moscow, although part of its
production of new diesel-electric locomotives
probably has been tagged to the USSR. Polish
deliveries--consisting chiefly of freight cars--have
grown slowly since the mid-1970s.
Over three-fifths of all Soviet imports
road equipment subcategory in 1986 came from
in the commercial
the CEMA 6. Half
of these consisted of accessories, components, and spare
parts--including engines--while buses accounted for one-third.
The Soviets import only small quantities of specialized
trucks--such as refrigeration and isothermic trucks--from
their CEMA partners.
24
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
o Hungary supplied 43 percent of total Soviet imports
in this subcategory in 1986, including almost all
imports of buses and 44 percent of accessories,
spare parts, engines, and garage equipment. Long-
term CEMA specialization agreements have made
Hungary the most important supplier in the bloc of
commercial road equipment during the 1970-86 period.
o Czechoslovakia rapidly increased deliveries of
parts, accessories, and trucks during the 1980s to
become the second leading CEMA supplier. Plans call
for Czechoslovakia to export tram-cars, trolley-
buses, Tatra cross-country dump-trucks, Avia
and refrigerator vehicles to the USSR during the
current five-year planning period.
trucks,
25X1
25X1
Moscow depended on Eastern Europe for 62 percent of total
imports of vessels and related equipment in 1986. Soviet data
do not specify the exact nature of these ships, but East
European sources indicate that a wide variety of fishing,
military, cargo, and passenger ships are involved.
o East Germany is the largest supplier of vessels
related equipment to the
percent of total imports
Soviets, delivering 29
and
in this category in 1986.
Deliveries fell by 16 percent in that year, parallel
to the downward trend in imports from non-CEMA
suppliers Yugoslavia and Finland.
o Imports from Poland--accounting for nearly one-fifth
25
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
'Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
of total vessel-related purchases by the Soviets in
1986--expanded rapidly from 1984 to 1986 following
several years of stagnation.
Food and Light Industrial Equipment
Imports of food and light industrial equipment--including
equipment for food
the leather, shoe,
category of Soviet
and
processing, textile production, sewing, and
and fur industries--are the second largest
imports from the CEMA 6 (see figures A-3
Soviet purchases grew at an average annual rate of 16
percent between 1971 and 1985 but fell 8 percent in 1986.
Imports in 1986 were valued at 1.3 billion rubles and
accounted for almost three-fourths of total Soviet imports of
light industrial equipment and 7.3 percent of all 1986 Soviet
imports of equipment from the CEMA 6.
25X1
25X1
By Subcategory. Moscow's reliance on CEMA is greatest in
the textile equipment subcategory, where 84 percent of these
imports in 1986 came from Eastern Europe. This reliance,
however, has declined in recent years, as Western countries
such as Japan, Italy and France have made some inroads into
the Soviet market.
o Czechoslovakia--acknowledged as a world leader in
25X1
25X1
26
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Billion rubles
1.5
0.5
0
FIGURE A-3
SOVIET IMPORTS OF LIGHT INDUSTRIAL
EQUIPMENT
Source: Soviet trade statistics
YEAR
CEMA 6
Other Sources
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
FIGURE A-4
SOVIET LIGHT INDUSTRY EQUIPMENT IMPORTS FROM THE CEMA 6, 1986
East Germany
Czechoslovakia
Refrigeratioh
and air conditio
Bulgaria equipment
Tobacco industry
Romania
Poland
Hungary
By Country
Source: Soviet trade statistics
Food industry
Textile industry
By Category
Leather, shoe and
fur industry
Sewing industry
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
textile technology?supplied more than half of all
such imports in 1986. Rapid expansion of
Czechoslovak textile machinery deliveries--averaging
21 percent growth annually since 1970--ended in 1984
with large reductions in imports of auxiliary
textile machines and parts, and machinery for
processing textile yarns, skins, 'and hides.
o East Germany and Poland--accounting for 13 percent
and 7 percent of Soviet textile machinery imports
respectively--have also delivered less in recent
years while those from Bulgaria have increased to
account now for 9 percent of total imports.
The Soviets relied on the CEMA 6 for nearly three-fourths
of their 1986 imports of equipment for the food processing
subcategory. A 13-percent downturn in 1986 contrasts with the
rapid growth in imports from Eastern Europe during 1975-85.
Imports from non-CEMA suppliers, however, fell even further
than those from Eastern Europe in 1986.
o The East Germans and Czechoslovaks provided 30
percent and 19 percent, respectively, of total
Soviet imports of food processing equipment.
o Imports from lesser CEMA suppliers--Bulgaria,
Hungary and Poland--have also declined in recent
years.
25X1
25X1
27
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
?Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Material-Handling Equipment
Soviet imports of equipment from the CEMA 6 in the
material-handling category consist largely of electric cars
(fork lifts), automatic loaders, cable cars, and lifting
machines (see figures A-5 and A-6). Soviet leaders have long
acknowledged Soviet inadequacy in this area and have pledged
to upgrade supplies of such machinery to indUstry. Imports
from Eastern Europe increased at an average annual rate of 13
percent from 1970 to 1985 but leveled off in 1986. About 1.3
billion rubles worth of this equipment was imported from the
CEMA 6 in 1986, representing 86 percent of total Soviet
imports of material-handling equipment and 7 percent of total
equipment imports from the region. Bulgaria accounted for
half of all Soviet imports of material-handling equipment.
By Subcategory
o Fork lifts and automatic loaders accounted for 43
percent of all material-handling equipment imported
by the Soviets from Eastern Europe in 1986.
Bulgaria--which predominates in this area due to
CEMA specialization arrangements that have made it
the supplier for other CEMA countries--delivered 98
percent of total Soviet imports of this equipment,
although deliveries were down 9 percent from the
previous year. Bulgaria also supplied all of the
accessories and spare parts for fork lifts and
loaders, as well as all of the machine handling
equipment and electric cable cars purchased by the
25X1
28
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Billion rubles
1.5
0.5
FIGURE A-5
SOVIET IMPORTS OF MATERIAL-HANDLING
EQUIPMENT
cD
a-I
In
YEAR
ret
CEMA 6
Other Sources
Source: Soviet trade statistics
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
FIGURE A-6
SOVIET MATERIAL-HANDLING EQUIPMENT IMPORTS
FROM THE CEMA 6, 1986
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Romania
Poland
Hungary
East Germany
By Country
Source: Soviet trade statistics
Spare parts
Lifting machines
Unspecified
By Category
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0 .
Soviets in 1986.
o Only about one-third of Soviet imports of lifting
equipment in 1986 came from other CEMA countries--
and almost all of this was from Poland.
o Soviet data do not specify the types of material-
handling equipment imported from East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary; these'three accounted
for 28 percent of total Soviet imports of such
equipment in 1986.
Energy-Engineering Eauipment
Soviet imports of energy engineering equipment are used
to produce, transport, and supply power for various
industries. The ambiguous names given by the USSR to much of
the equipment in this category preclude precise identification
of many of the subcategories, which include power-engineering
equipment such as diesel engines and parts as well as a
variety of electrical equipment--motors, transformers,
starters, switchboards, electromagnets, accumulators,
electrodes, and cables. Soviet imports of this equipment from
Eastern Europe grew at an average annual rate of 12 percent
during 1970 to 1985 but declined 8 percent in 1986. The CEMA
6 supplied Moscow with 1.2 billion rubles in energy-
engineering equipment in 1986--two-thirds of all such imports
by the Soviet Union and 7 percent of all Soviet imports of
equipment from the CEMA 6 in that year (see figures A-7 and A-
29
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Billion rubles
1.5
i
0.5
FIGURE A-7
SOVIET IMPORTS OF ENERGY-ENGINEERING
EQUIPMENT
a
N
a)
4r1
Source: Soviet trade statistics
0
CD
a)
a-I
YEAR
m
CEMA 6
Other Sources
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
East
Germany
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
FIGURE A-8
SOVIET ENERGY-ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT IMPORTS
FROM THE CEMA 6, 1986
Czechoslovakia
Bulgaria
Romania
Hungary
By Country
Poland
Source: Soviet trade statistics
4e'
Power engineering
A
Electrical engineering4
By Category
Cables & wire
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25 : CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
'Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
8) .
By Subcategory. Equipment in the electrical, power, and
cable subcategories accounted for 55, 37, and 8 percent,
respectively, of all Soviet imports of energy engineering
equipment from the CEMA 6 in 1986. Moscow relied on CEMA for
two-thirds of its imports in the electrical subcategory in
that year. These imports declined by 6 percent overall in
1986, although they expanded by 20 percent from non-CEMA
sources.
o The main CEMA supplier, Poland, supplied more than a
quarter of all such Soviet imports, with large
deliveries of electric motors, transformer booths,
electromagnets, and other unspecified equipment.
o Deliveries from Bulgaria--accounting for 16 percent
of all Soviet imports of electrical equipment--have
held steady in recent years. Those from East
Germany and Czechoslovakia have fluctuated widely.
Moscow relied on the CEMA 6 for more than four-fifths of
its 1986 imports in the power-engineerinq subcategory. More
than a third of these are not defined, with only diesel
engines, electric power stations, and spare parts specified.
CEMA deliveries have declined by 11 percent since 1984.
o Czechoslovakia accounted for 30 percent of Soviet
imports of this equipment in 1986.
o East Germany was responsible for another 22 percent
30
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0 ?
of all Soviet imports of power-engineering
equipment.
25X1
25X1
Agricultural Equipment
Soviet imports of equipment from the CEMA 6 in the
agricultural category include tractors, combines, mowers,
sowers, grain cleaners, livestock raising equipment, and
motors for agricultural machinery. Imports from Eastern
Europe grew an average of 17 percent annually during the
1970s, slowed, and even declined in the 19805. In 1986 Moscow
purchased 1.2 billion rubles worth of agricultural equipment
from Eastern Europe, accounting for 95 percent of total Soviet
purchases. More than a third of these imports in 1986 was
unspecified by type in Soviet trade data and other sources of
information fail to shed light on the nature of this equipment
(see figures A-9 and A-10). 25X1
By Subcategory. The Soviets relied heavily on Eastern
Europe for imports of agricultural equipment in the
subcategories for which we have data.
o East Germany--the largest CEMA supplier to the
Soviets--was the sole source for grain cleaners, hay
and straw presses, and milking units and supplied 91
percent of all combines and 72 percent of mowers
imported by the Soviets in 1986.
o All of the sprinkling machines imported by the
Soviets in 1986 came from Czechoslovakia, and
31
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Billion rubles
1.5
0.5
FIGURE A-9
SOVIET IMPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL
EQUIPMENT
Source: Soviet trade statistics
co
cr)
YEAR
CEMA 6
ElOther Sources
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
FIGURE A-10
SOVIET AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTS FROM THE
CEMA 6, 1986
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
ulgaria
Romania
Poland
Hungary
By Country
Source: Soviet trade statistics
Livestock equipment Sprinklers
Mowers
Combines
Sowers
Unspecified residual
By Category
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Romania supplied nearly all, of the imports of
sowers.
o Motors for agricultural machinery--comprising more
than quarter of total agricultural equipment
imports--came entirely from Eastern Europe; East
Germany accounted for 61 percent, Czechoslovakia for
21 percent, and Bulgaria for 18 percent of
deliveries.
Business Equipment
Soviet trade data on imports of business equipment from
the CEMA 6 are incomplete and vague. The Soviets lump imports
of sophisticated computers together with simple adding
machines and fail to report imports of computers from several
CEMA countries. The subcategory also includes office
machinery such as typewriters,
bookkeeping machines.
Moscow's push for
billing equipment, and
computers and related equipment from
CEMA is apparent from the data as business equipment imports
expanded at an average annual rate of 29 percent from 1980 to
1986. CEMA-6 deliveries reached 1.1 billion rubles in 1986,
accounting for nearly two-thirds of total Soviet imports of
business equipment (see figures A-11 and A-12).
9 Although business equipment appears as a subcategory (noted
by a 3-digit number) in Soviet trade reporting, the value and
importance of this equipment merit a separate discussion.
32
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Billion rubles
1.5
0.5
FIGURE A-11
SOVIET IMPORTS OF BUSINESS
EQUIPMENT
IX)
Source: Soviet trade statistics
YEAR
CEMA 6
Other Sources
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
FIGURE A-12
SOVIET BUSINESS EQUIPMENT IMPORTS FROM THE CEMA 6, 1986
Poland
Units. subassemblies
East Germany
By Country
Source: Soviet trade statistics
By Category
Bookkeeping, billing
Computing machines
Accessories. parts
Typewriters
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0 ?
By Subcategory. Computers, addina machines and related
equipment comprised 97 percent of business equipment imports
reported by the Soviets in 1986.
o Bulgaria was the largest identified supplier,
delivering 84 percent of computer-related equipment
from CEMA. Bulgarian deliveries consisted entirely
of units and subassemblies for computers and
computer accessories and spare parts. Previously
large deliveries of complete machines from Bulgaria
apparently have been phased out.
o Poland supplied 15 percent of computer equipment,
mostly in the form of units and subassemblies for
computers. The Soviets report small imports of
computing machines from East Germany, but these have
declined in recent years. Information on East
German production and trade from other sources,
however, indicates that East Germany exports
substantial amounts of computer and electronic
equipment to Moscow.
o Moscow reports no business equipment imports from
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Statistics from those
countries, however, indicate that computers and
related equipment comprise 3 to 4 percent of their
total machinery and equipment deliveries to the
USSR. Deliveries of computer equipment from
Czechoslovakia grew by an average of more than 20
13
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
?Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
percent annually from 1983 to 1986, according to
Czechoslovak data.
East Germany is the sole supplier of bookkeeping and
billing machines and, since 1984, of typewriters to the
Soviets. However, East German deliveries declined by 63
percent between 1981 and 1986.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Metal-processing Equipment
Soviet imports of equipment from the CEMA 6 in the metal-
processing category include specific types of metal-cutting
and metal-forming equipment as well as equipment lines for
metal processing.10 This category includes machines tools for
cutting, grinding, boring, milling, grooving, honing,
polishing, sawing, threading, pressing, ,hammering, and forging
metal. In 1976, the Soviets stopped publishing data on
individual types of metal-processing equipment and a year
later combined statistics on metal-cutting, forging and press
equipment into one category. In the past, the Soviets looked
primarily to the West for help in tooling their machine-
building industries. Since the late 1970s, Eastern Europe has
supplanted the West as the USSR's major supplier of machine
tools. After a lag in 1973 and 1974, Soviet imports from
Eastern Europe grew rapidly through 1985 at an average annual
rate of 19 percent, but leveled off in 1986. The 1.1 billion
34
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
rubles worth of equipment imported from Eastern Europe in 1986
represented 56 percent of total Soviet imports of metal-
processing machinery (see figures A-13 and A-14).
By Subcateaorv. Metal-cutting and metal-forming machine
tools comprise nearly 90 percent of metal-processing equipment
imported by the Soviets from Eastern Europe. The high
priority placed by Moscow on machine tools Made this one of
the fastest growing categories of machinery trade in the 1970s
and early 1980s.
o East Germany is the largest supplier, accounting for
one fourth of total Soviet purchases. East German
deliveries doubled from 1980 to 1985 but declined by
15 percent in 1986.
o Czechoslovakia was the next largest supplier until
1986 when deliveries declined sharply and it was
supplanted by Bulgaria. In 1984, 37 percent of
Czechoslovak machine tool exports went to the USSR;
by 1986 this figure had fallen to 24 percent.
Czechoslovak statistics indicate that most of the
decline resulted from a 15 percent drop in
deliveries of metal-cutting machine tools which
comprise one half of the total. Metal-forming
machine tools--accounting for one quarter of
deliveries--fell by 4 percent, while parts and
accessories for machine tools increased by 5
percent.
35
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Billion rubles
1.5
1
0.5
FIGURE A-13
SOVIET IMPORTS OF METAL PROCESSING
EQUIPMENT
C)
ga-1
Source: Soviet trade statistics
YEAR
CEMA 6
Other Sources
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
FIGURE A-14
SOVIET METAL PROCESSING EQUIPMENT IMPORTS FROM THE CEMA 6, 1986
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Bulgaria
Romania
Poland
Hungary
By Country
Source: Soviet trade statistics
Cutting-forming
machine tools
By Category.
Processing equipment
lines
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
'Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
?
o Bulgaria expanded deliveries by an average of 36
percent a year from 1980 to 1986; its share of CEMA-
6 deliveries went from 7 percent in 1980 to 19
percent in 1986.
o Imports from Poland had increased rapidly from the
mid-1970s until 1986 when they declined by 7
percent.
Imports of metal-processing eauipment lines--accounting
for 12 percent of metal-processing equipment purchases from
Eastern Europe--also increased rapidly.
o East Germany tripled deliveries during the 1980s and
supplied three-fourths of CEMA-6 exports to the USSR
in 1986.
o Czechoslovakia began deliveries in 1985 and
accounted for 21 percent of CEMA-6 exports in 1986.
Resource-Processing Equipment
The Soviets import a variety of equipment in the
resource-processing category from their CEMA partners. This
category includes equipment for underground surveying and
extraction, drilling and pumping, crushing, grinding, and
dressing, metallurgy, and petroleum refining. Soviet imports
of this equipment from the CEMA 6 increased by an average of
20 percent annually from the early 1970s to 1985 but leveled
off in 1986. The share of resource-processing equipment
imported from the CEMA 6 has grown in recent years, but the
36
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
USSR still relies on other suppliers.for most of the equipment
in this category. The nearly 1 billion rubles worth of
equipment imported by the Soviets in 1986 from Eastern Europe
represented 43 percent of total Soviet purchases of resource
processing equipment (see figures A-15 and A-16).
25X1
25X1
By Subcategory. Soviet reliance on CEMA 6 for drilling
and pumping equipment has grown rapidly in recent years. In
1982 Moscow purchased one-third of such equipment from Eastern
Europe; the CEMA-6 share had increased to two-thirds in 1986
because of stepped up East European deliveries and a sharp
slump in imports from other sources.
o Romania provided half of Moscow's total purchases of
drilling and pumping equipment in 1986. Romanian
deliveries more than doubled in 1986 alone with
large increases in exports of super deep drilling
equipment, tricone bits, gusher sittings and
coreheads, rockers, and preventers. Romania was the
sole or major supplier of much of this equipment.
o Czechoslovakia began delivering drilling and pumping
equipment in 1982 and by 1986 accounted for 11
percent of total Soviet imports. 25X1
Moscow is depending increasingly on non-CEMA sources for
imports of metallurgical equipment; only one-third came from
CEMA partners in 1984, and the East European share dropped to
19 percent in 1986. Imports from the major suppliers--East
Germany and Czechoslovakia--declined sharply during the early
37
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Billion rubles
1.5
0.5
FIGURE A-15
SOVIET IMPORTS OF RESOURCE-PROCESSING
EQUIPMENT
qa-I
Source: Soviet trade statistics
co
cn
YEAR
En
CD
0)
CEMA 6
Other Sources
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
FIGURE A-16
SOVIET RESOURCE-PROCESSING EQUIPMENT IMPORTS
FROM THE CEMA 6, 1986
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
Czechoslovakia
By Country
Source: Soviet trade statistics
Bulgaria
Romania
Metallurgical
Petroleum refining
Crushng, grindng
and dressing
Mineral extracting
Equipment for geological
survey, oil/gas extraction
By Category
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
1980s with each delivering lower quantities of rolling and
drawing equipment.
The CEMA 6 supplied about half of all Soviet imports in
1986 of underground and surface mineral extraction equipment.
o Poland is the major supplier of such equipment to
the USSR, accounting for one-third of total Soviet
imports in 1986. Polish deliveries increased by an
average of 51 percent a year during 1980 to 1986.
Polish data shows that coal-mining equipment is
Warsaw's major contribution.
o East Germany contributed 12 percent of Soviet
imports of mineral extraction equipment in 1986.
Imports from East Germany grew an average of 29
percent a year. between 1980 and 1985 but fell 48
percent in 1986. The Soviets report that about one-
third of surface-mined and one-sixth of total coal
output in the USSR is extracted with East German
machines.
The Soviets rely on Eastern Europe for most imports of
equipment for the petroleum refining industry but deliveries
have been volatile during the 1980s. Soviet purchases
declined by two-thirds during 1981 and 1982 and were stagnant
until expanding sharply in 1985. Imports from Eastern Europe
fell slightly in 1986 but still comprised more than three-
fourths of Soviet purchases.
Soviet purchases of crushing. grinding. and dressing
38
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
equipment--from both Eastern Europe and the West--were also
erratic during the 1980s. After declining by 45 percent in
1981, CEMA deliveries grew steadily through 1984, and slumped
by almost 50 percent over the next two years. Imports from
Eastern Europe in 1986 accounted for three-fifths of Soviet
purchases.
Precision Equipment
Soviet imports of precision equipment include laboratory
equipment, medical instruments, bearings, various tools, and
abrasives. Soviet purchases of this equipment from Eastern
Europe grew at a rate of 14 percent a year on average from
1980 to 1986. Eastern Europe provided 74 percent of all
precision equipment imported by the USSR in 1986 (see figures
A-17 and A-18).
By Subcategory. More than four-fifths of instruments and
laboratory equipment imported by the Soviets in 1986 were
acquired from Eastern Europe. This subcategory includes
electric power and radio measuring devices, optical
instruments, and a broad array of laboratory measuring
devices. Imports of this equipment from the CEMA 6 grew
steadily during the first half of the 1980s.
o East Germany supplied one-fourth of Soviet imports
of instruments and laboratory equipment in 1986.
The quality of East German optical instruments is
considered on par with any in the world. Deliveries
39
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Billion rubles
1.5
1
0.5
FIGURE A-17
SOVIET IMPORTS OF PRECISION
EQUIPMENT%
LE)
gr-1
Source: Soviet trade statistics
'Excludes Business equipment
0)
YEAR
L0
CO
0)
CEMA 6
Other Sources
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
FIGURE A-18
SOVIET PRECISION EQUIPMENT IMPORTS
FROM THE CEMA 6, 1986
East Germany
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
BY COUNTRY
Source: Soviet trade statistics
Bulgaria
Romania
Poland
Instruments and
lab equipment
Medical
BY CATEGORY'
Abrasives
Tools
Bearings
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
'Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
of this equipment to the USSR declined by 6 percent
in 1986 after having registered rapid growth during
the previous 10 years.
o Poland increased exports to the USSR during the
1980s by more than 30 percent a year on average,
becoming the largest Soviet supplier of such
equipment.
The CEMA 6 accounted for almost three-fourths of Soviet
imports of medical equipment and instruments in 1986. Steady
growth in East European deliveries since 1974 ended in 1986
with a 5 percent downturn. Imports declined from Hungary and
East Germany--the largest suppliers--by 14 percent and 6
percent, respectively, and increased only slightly from
Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.
Chemical Equipment
Most of the imports in this subcategory are not broken
down in Soviet trade data. The Soviet Union imported 510
million rubles worth of chemical plant and equipment from the
CEMA 6 in 1986, representing 59 percent of all chemical
equipment imported by the Soviets. Imports from Eastern
Europe declined by 13 percent in 1986, following rapid growth
during 1982 to 1985. Moscow cut back on purchases from other
suppliers even more, however, thus leading to greater
dependence on CEMA. Imports fell by 4 percent and 17 percent
from East Germany and Czechoslovakia, respectively--Moscow's
40
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
major suppliers--and other East European partners also shipped
less (see figures A-19 and A-20).
Other Equipment Imports
In addition to the major areas of equipment imports
discussed above, the Soviets purchase a variety of other
equipment from the CEMA 6.
25X1
25X1
o Moscow imported 202 million rubles worth of road
building equipment from Eastern Europe in 1986.
This represented a 12 percent decline from the
previous year and followed three years of level
deliveries. Meanwhile, imports from other
suppliers--in particular Japan, the United States,
and Italy--more than doubled in 1986 to account for
70 percent of total Soviet imports.
o Soviet imports of construction materials from the
CEMA 6 declined by 11 percent in 1986 to 154 million
rubles. Imports from the West declined even more,
however, and as a result Eastern Europe's share of
deliveries to the USSR increased to 69 percent.
o Pump and compressor imports from Eastern Europe fell
14 percent in 1986 to 152 million rubles, because of
a 29-percent decline in imports from East Germany.
Plans for East European contributions to the
Progress gas pipeline, however, suggest imports of
this type of equipment will grow.
41
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Billion rubles
1.5
0.5
FIGURE A-19
SOVIET IMPORTS OF CHEMICAL
EQUIPMENT
Source: Soviet trade statistics
co
YEAR
CEMA 6
Other Sources
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
FIGURE A-20
SOVIET CHEMICAL EQUIPMENT IMPORTS
FROM THE CEMA 6, BY COUNTRY
East Germany
Source: Soviet trade statistics
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25 : CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
'Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
o Following rapid growth during the early 1980s,
imports of communal. trade, and firefiahtina
equipment declined by 20 percent in 1986, with cuts
in deliveries from all CEMA suppliers.
o Imports of printing equipment expanded by 7 percent
in 1986 following two years of level purchases.
East Germany and Czechoslovakia provide 55 percent
and 23 percent, respectively, of total Soviet
imports.
o Eastern Europe supplied only 17 percent of timber
and paper equipment imported by the USSR in 1986.
Poland accounted for most of the CEMA deliveries.
25X1
25X1
In addition, the Soviets imported 3.7 billion rubles
worth of unspecified machinery and equipment from the CEMA 6
in 1986 which accounted for 21 percent of total machinery and
equipment imports from the CEMA 6. These residuals ranged
from 25 to 27 percent of equipment imports from Czechoslovakia
and Hungary, respectively, to 9 percent of those from Romania.
While these imports may include some military equipment, we
believe that the Soviets conceal most military imports from
Eastern Europe in a larger trade residual that is not
attributed to any category of trade. 25X1
42
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Appendix 2
CEMA Trade Nomenclature for Machinery and Equipment at
the Two and Three Digit Levels.
CTN Code Category/Subcategory
10 Metal processing equipment
100 Metal cutting machine tools
101 Presses
102 Hammers
103 Other forge and press equipment
104 Metal processing equipment lines
105 Equipment for metal processing industrial
enterprises
11 Power and electrical engineering equipment
110 Power engineering equipment
111 Electrical engineering equipment
112 Electrodes
113 Cables and wires
12 Mining. metallurgical, and petroleum eauipment
120 Equipment for underground survey and mineral
extraction
121 Crushing, grinding, and dressing equipment
122 Coking equipment and equipment for the gas industry
123 Metallurgical equipment
127 Petroleum refining industry equipment
128 Equipment for geological survey, the engineering of
petroleum, oil, and lubricants, and gas
extraction
129 Other mining, metallurgical, and petroleum equipment
13 Material handling equipment
130 Cranes
131 Charging and caving in machines
132 Winches
133 Lifting machines
134 Electric and motor cars
139 Other material handling equipment
14 Food and light industry equipment
140 Food industry-equipment
142 Refrigeration and air conditioning equipment
143 Tobacco industry equipment
144 Textile industry equipment
145 Sewing industry equipment
146 Leather, shoe, and fur industry equipment
149 Other light industry equipment
43
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
'Declassified in Part - Sanitized
15
150
151
152
153
154
Copy Approved
Chemical,
for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1
and other
timber, construction, Drintina,
Chemical
Timber,
Timber
Equipment
Roadbuilding
industrial equipment
equipment
industry
industry equipment
cellulose, and paper processing
processing machine tools
for the construction materials
equipment
155
Pump and compressor equipment
156
Communal, trade, and firefighting equipment
157
Printing industry equipment
158
Communication equipment .
159
Equipment for other industrial sectors
16
Buildings, enaineerina installations, and public
communications facilities
161
Industrial
buildings and installations
162
Agricultural and forestry installations
163
House buildings and complexes
164
Scientific, medical, trading, and other
installations
165
Communications installations
166
Hydroengineering and hydroindustrial installations
167
Pipelines
169
Other
17
Instruments, laboratory and medical equipment,
bearings, abrasives, business machines
170
Electrical
power and radio measuring instruments
171
Instruments for physics research and optical
engineering
172
Medical equipment and instruments except those for
the chemical or pharmaceutical industries
173
Bearings
174
Tools
175
Industrial diamonds, rubies, and other precious
stones
176
Hard alloys and abrasives
177
Business machines
178
Equipment to control technical processes and
laboratory equipment
179
Instruments for measuring mechanical quantities
18
Tractors and agricultural machinery and eauipment
180
Tractors and tractor garage equipment
181
Agricultural machines
182
Minor agricultural instruments
19
Transportation facilities and auxiliary equipment
191
Trucks and garage equipment
192
Vessels, vessel lifting, diving port equipment
193
Aerial communication facilities
195
Passenger cars, motorcycles, and motor scooters
199
Other transportation facilities
44
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
SOVIET
Hppendl J
IMPORTS OF EAST EUROPEAN MACHINERY
(Millions
1970-86
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
Total
2657
2798
3395
3810
4004
5182
5718
6573
9161
9331
9816
10769
12466
14940
16724
18526
18082
Bulgrla
280
341
410
533
604
779
909
1101
1569
1639
1730
190/
2106
2600
2860
3152
3304
601
520
681
710
760
986
1196
1209
1871
1786
1909
2261
2506
3162
3533
3907
3815
Gera.any
912
980
1217
1.305
1335
1669
1768
1991
2589
2708
2794
9300
3799
4405
4962
5177
4725
litincor.1
942
939
434
502
514
669
012
896
1379
1207
1234
1426
1612
1921
2220
2522
2409
Pulat.d
417
414
513
606
645
899
911
1071
1515
1701
1714
1604
1E67
2203
2415
2770
2968
koo.nia
25
96
132
154
146
100
177
225
237
209
311
363
511
643
794
918
967
Metal cutting machine tools, forge
and press equipment (100-03)m
74
94
122
109
101
138
181
326
346
413
439
523
652
777
919
1031
990
Fiut.-1.4r .1a
2
2
1
1
1
1
5
11
10
24
31
18
35
61
75
140
193
I 'al la
71
27
30
21
18
al
48
83
77
102
92
109
137
164
205
201
175
Giqmanq
15
45
62
65
62
83
90
171
193
211
227
289
346
216
454
459
32U
j
--,
3
2
2
2
9
9
7
0
/
8
,
11
L 29
42
41
15,,land
11
15
22
17
16
16
22
37
45
52
56
65
79
109
115
194
124
Pom.:11.1.
3
4
3
3
6
19
16
13
16
26
39
4::
516
46
55
11
Metal processing equipment
lines (104>
Cl
0
1
5
9
20
26
22
16
27
43
48
60
87
95
114
140
Bu I lj.:11- 1,1
I I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
11
15
0
8
9
Czechov,k61,
II
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
LI
U
0
0
20
29
La?A. Gi,r01,3fly
I!
0
1
3
9
20
26
22
16
27
99
37
59
72
95
26
III7:
fitir.:;,,ry
LI
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
it
1.3
0
0
0
Poil,1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
II
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
CI
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
LI
I 1
0
CI
LI
0
Equipment for motor vehicle
manufacturing plants (105)
o
1
2
15
18
19
16
11
13
2
2
2
4
3
4
4
2
Buluori,
LI
0
1
2
3
2
,
2
7
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
13
15
17
14
9
6
1
2
2
4
3
4
4
2
E?ast I1&r .nany
13
0
0
0
0
LI
CI
CI
0
0
Cl.
Cl
0
0
0
0
1_1
Hunyat
11
0
o
0
u
LI
CI
0
0
0
LI
0
LI
0
0
U
CI
Pol,rd
0
1
el
o
0
LI
LI
CI
CI
0
0
, 0
0
0
0
0
0
1.1
LI
0
CI
CI
0
LI
13
0
13
LI
'' 0
I.,
CI
CI
0
0
Power engineering equipment (110)
62
74
71
70
61
69
107
124
181
220
270
301
3:81
435
498
485
444
81,19,rt,
0
0
27
4173
29
liii
74
30
24
24
24
24
40
42
80
100
109
99
1711
170
1134
Ea..,1: Ger .Itany
Flur.q,ry
21
14
23
0
21
24
0
22
24
0
21
20
0
17
21
0
18
34
92
35
97
42
13
37
47
22
48
59
31
47
!!
39
59
129
75
69
122
84
110
Si
67
9
1
2
1
1
4
0
3
3
111
9
11
20
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
1910
1971
1912
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
Electrical engineering
equipment (111)
98
116
144
157
163
220
271
331
381
405
434
423
473
535
530
696
656
Hu 1 ga,
37
:1'3
43
46
45
6.3
00
9,-1
112
123
140
116
120
146
155
1513
154
1
265
S 7
0
10
12
16
11
25
42
54
50
OS
65
t 6er man 9
18
21
35
38
37
45
59
62
76
82
ns
93
103
109
95
116
87
Hungary
Cl
u
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1 J
0
9
11
Poland
24
34
46
53
58
77
12
118
127
137
130
195
156
174
173
274
2:6
Poman a
8
10
14
16
18
28
33
42
54
49
52
54
52
52
49
54
69
Cables and wire (113)
49
52
58
54
54
65
64
72
83
87
90
105
89
102
110
114
97
Bulgaria
0
13
13
0
0
Cl
0
0
4
3
Cl
0
0
Cl
0
0
0
6:2..?cho,31uval.la
7
0
Cl
8
8
9
11
13
15
19
19
18
19
18
23
26
20
East Get man9
34
313
413
37
36
41
43
45
49
52
52
60
49
66
60
63
57
Hungary
5
5
q
7
8
11
10
14
14
14
19
21
16
15
25
77
10
Poland
2
1
2
2
2
a
0
Cl
0
o
o
0
0
o
o
o
Li
P...1,101,i
0
0
0
0
Cl
0
0
0
Cl
Cl
0
6
5
3
2
3
Equipment for underground and surface
mineral extraction (120)
14
5
3
5
5
5
6
15
44
35
40
48
69
157
194
241
224
Bulgaria
0
0
0
0
CI
0
Cl
Cl
LI
o
Cl
0
0
0
Cl
0
LI
;
6
I
1
3
1
1
1
0
Cl
LI
Cl
0
H
0
0
0
Cl
0e. .1rty
8
3
2
3
3
4
6
1
33
25
26
29
21
60
82
94
SU
0
0
0
Cl
0
0
0
o
LI
0
Cl
0
I I
0
Cl
0
LI
Poland
0
0
0
0
Cl
0
0
6
11
11
14
19
4U
9?
112
147
166
Pothania
0
0
0
0
0
0
Cl
0
LI
0
(TI
0
CI
CI
CI
Cl
LI
Crushing, grinding, and
dressing equipment (121)
2
2
2
3
3
5
8
22
25
19
20
11
36
58
74
69
36
But gal i.
CI
CI
0
Cl
0
U
Cl
0
CI
I.i
CI
CI
al
11
8
5.
:.1
LI
0
Cl
LI
0
Ii
0
1.3
10
12
4
113
13
9
9
I t Gralanq
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
6
1
9
2
7
t
40
36
19
14un.j.,-A
0
0
0
0
8
U
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1J
Cl
Cl
13
Poland
1
I
1
1
1
2
7
7
7
5
7
8
15
17
17
15
Pomania
0
LI
Cl
0
Cl
U
0
11
Cl
0
0
0
n
LI
0
Cl
Li
Metallurgical equipment (123)
101
104
77
62
75
98
116
124
156
135
212
246
228
185
261
? 217
161
Bulgaria
Cl
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Cl
0
0
Cl
0
0
LI
LI
I. I
Czechoslaval.ia
73
79
44
38
92
52
50
46
61
63
125
119
140,
95
09
105
59
East CArmany
25
22
30
22
38
39
54
62
70
5.3
69
109
69
69
145
28
132
7.
Hungary
'3
3
7
7
4
8
12
16
17
18
III
, 111
19
21
.E0
. CD
Poland
Pothani
1
0
1
0
1
Cl
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
Cl
0
0
0
0
Cl
Cl
n
CI
0
LI
0
0
Cl
0
o
Cl
0
0
0
1.1
Petroleum refining industry
equipment (127)
Oulgaria
C.Afechluvakia
at. 8cer;hany
Hungaru
Poland
leo;uania
16
0
7
7
0
0
2
12
(Ti
3
8
0
0
0
7
0
3 .
4
0
Cl
Cl
15
0
4
11
0
0
0
30
Cl
5
25
0
0
0
53
Cl
15
38
0
0
o
29
0
12
17
Cl
o
0
40
0
0
32
0
0
0
94
0
8
78
0
o
7
152
U
15
117
11
ti
20
154
1_1
22
111
LI
0
21
115
1J
JJ
70
LI
LI
12
47
Cl
21
20
Cl
0
5
53
0
12
24
16
0
1
52
0
6
30
15
o
1
104
Cl
10
37
44
Cl
5
99
0
-A6
71.
I]
10
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Equipment for geological survey,
petroleum engineering, and gas
extraction (128)
1970
13
1971
17
Ekilgat
0
LI
Czechn-slovakia
0
0
East Germany
0
LI
Hungary
0
0
Poland
0
0
Pomania
13
17
Material handling equipment (13)
197
225
Bulgeria
91
119
Czecho5lovkis
15
16
East Germany
66
68
Hungary
10
12
Po I awl
6
10
Romani,
0
0
Food industry equipment (140)
104
71
Uuluaria
5
4
17
9
Ea:it 6.i.1m00..4
3?
36
211
11
17
10
Po.hania
LI
0
Refrigeration and air conditioning
equipment (142)
23
41
Bulgaria
0
0
Czecho,11,wal..la
.:.
'3
La,:-Al CirAl.,,ny
10
27
Hungary
9
b
p, .ind
a
11
Pomania
11
1972
21
LI
CI
0
0
0
21
247
133
17
71
14
12
0
84
4
9
41
20
12
0
55
U
8
1
0
0-
Tobacco Industry Equipment (143)
2
3
4
Buly.-.ria
0
1
1
Czechoslovakia
0
0
0
East Germany
1
3
3
tkingry
U
0
0
Poland
LI
0
0
Pi:48Jan 1 a
li
0
0
Textile industry equipment (144)
56
52
73
Bulgaria
3
1
4
Czechoslovakia
29
29
40
East Germany
18
13
19
Hungary
0
0
0
Poland
0
9
10
0
0
0
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1906
25
26
25
31
39
52
70
78
87
210
253
222 ?
321
427
0
0
0
LI
0
0
CI
0
I.J
i:
Li 0
CI
LI
0
LI
U
0
0
0
0
U
1
58
55
60
79
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
CI
0
LI
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
CI
LI
LI
I1
CI
CI
0
LI
CI
0
CI
0
0
0
11
CI
0
Ll
0
CI
0
II
25
26
25
31
39
52
?I-1
?I:1
06
152
198
155
:253
250
270
358
394
475
495
684
727
760
847
1000
1180
1287
1253
134
153
182
203
269
290
400
407
416
480
575
714
7E12
74
19
17
20
22
35
40
44
55
59
82
'39
103
116
75
77
113
127
130
123
195
160
188
174
195
210
224
211
16
22
40
37
41
41
41
41
46
51
65
72
80
131
6
2
3
4
0
0
bb
64
51
5.1
83
85
98
111
0
o
o
o
o
0
o
o
ti
?u
0
u
o
u
120
125
142
131
166
199
254
288
328
359
470'
564
577
501
4
4
4
4
C.
5
10
11
832
:
98
40
-3I
28
36
41
34
99
57
51
59
65
129 .
167
174
136
47
45
61
59
00
07
9?
100
tafs
140
104
200
211
211
27
25
22
12
21
25
42
59
47
5./
94
103
14
15
14
22
19
25
55
SI
71
1-,0
48
57
49
46
0
o
0
0
0
0
0
CI
LI
LI
0
0
U
0
52
43
37
42
38
47
48
4973
101
106
111
121
123
0
0
U
0
0
0
CI
LI
0
7
11
14
15
18
5
7
7
9
0
0
10
7
11
1G
15
16
19
11
39
7
CI
CI
31
6
0
0
23
7
27
6
CI
0
6
0
0
3147
0
0
u
:1111.:;i:j
":.3
CI
15
0
0
63
1
Ci
64
16
0
0
67
14
0
Cl
70
17
0
0
b9
15
0
0
4
3
3
3
5
2
2
5
3
5
6
6
10
7
1
1
0
2
4
0
--,
5
3
5
5
5
10
7
0
0
o
0
0
o
0
o
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
2
3
2
1
2
0
1
O
:1
0
0
0
I::
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
o
0
0
Ii
0
0
0
0
0
0
o
o
IJ
CI
0
0
0
0
IA
0
0
0
LI
0
CI
0
0
CI
0
CI
0
(I
90
98
140
165
222
276
316
343
383
487
635
650
639
603
6
a
11
17
17
16
16
17
19
24
37
40
44
52
51
56
81
91
133
173
192
213
248
310
426
427
416
20
20
20
31
37
43
62
SB
bb
82
94
96
102
90
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
10
9
10
14
13
12
13
14
20
27
35
45
46
47
40
45
59
64
53
41:
0
0
0
0
0
U
U
U
0
9
9
9
11
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
- --_
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
?
1980
1901
1982
1983
1984
1905
1986
=,,,-2
Sewing Industry Equipment (145)
Bulgaria
AzechosInvakia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
14
Li
5
0
13
0
,
b
0
15
0
5
4
6
LI
16
0
5
4
7
0
12
0
4
2
6
0
17
LI
5
4
8
0
21
CI
0
4
9
0
22
0
9
5
9
0
26
0
11
6
9
0
27
0
13
6
.9
CI
29
0
19
e
e
0
36
0
16
9
12
0
44
0
19
10
15
U
53
0
21
12
19
0
53
ii
10
16
19
0
56
0
113
16
23
0
57
CI
19
14
24
CI
Romania
CI
CI
0
o
0
o
o
o
o
0
o
o
o
0
LI
0
0
Equipment for leather, shoe and
Fur industry (146)
5
7
9
9
e
s
e
8
11
13
20
23
28
27
31
39
34
Bulgaria
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
U
CI
0
U
1.,zchoslovakia
5
7
9
9
a
5
0
a
11
13
20
29
28
27
31
39
34
Fast Germany
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Hungary
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Poland
0
0
0
0
0
CI
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Romania
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I I
0
0
0
LI
0
0
0
0
Chemical industry equipment (150)
133
104
149
187
213
269
312
353
414
426
428
374
404
546
562
585
510
Bulgaria
0
0
Ci
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
H
18
' 17
14
12
Czechos laJV.A 1,3
38
29
35
SO
52
88
99
109
121
197
157
139
127
167
176
193
161
Last Germany
53
43
60
89
94
105
116
134
141
124
127
117
153
201
189
199
191
Hungary
15
0
11
9
14
17
26
26
27
49
311
28
':-.3H
SO
67
57
94
Poland
20
13
27
37
44
40
60
79
114
110
UB
65
57
69
01
86
87
Romania
7
7
8
9
10
10
11
11
111
12
18
25
29
93
92
34
.-,.?
2,
Timber, cellulose, paper processing
industry equipment (151)
18
13
12
17
15
25
18
22
29
33
40
40
37
33
37
39
48
Bulgaria
0
0
0
0
0
Cl
0
0
ti
0
0
5
C:
3
2
0
'
CzechoslovsIta
13
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
11
U
0
0
0
Li
CI
CI
CI
Fast bet-many
0
11
CI
CI
0
0
1
2
0
0
LI
0
0
1
0
0
5
Hungaiy
U
CI
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Poland
18
13
12
16
15
25
17
20
29
33
40
"
29
29
95
39
41
Romania
Ci
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
i i
0
0
0
is
II
0
U
0
Equipment for construction materials
industry (153)
20
15
17
25
30
38
37
48
57
62
73
60
89
116
153
169
151
Bulyaria
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(1
0
0
.C1
q
29
39
29
14
Czechosloval...1a
6
1
1
1
1
2
1
7
15
18
12
9
6
7
15
94
29
East Germany
11
12
12
14
16
15
1620
24
24
25
27
45
49
SR
46
56
Hungary
3
7
4
4
6
5
4
7
5
7
22 .
1?4
16
lb
18
18
18
Poland
LI
0
CI
6
0
16
15
15
19
12
14
11
13
IS
28
42
514
Rumania
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.1
Ii
0
U
LI
U
ii
0
0
0
Road and roadbuilding
machinery and equipment (154)
44
44
70
38
30
20
17
BO
85
96
125
137
181
227
225
229
202
Bulgaria
0
0
U
0
Cl
0
0
0
H
0
0
CI
0
0
U
0
0
Czechoslovakia
4
3
11
6
7
7
6
7
IA
14
21
19
25
91
32
42
43
East Germany
17
'3
9
5
4
6
7
4
4
5
19
99
62
87
bj
90
70
Hungary
0
0
0
U
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
U
0
0
0
0
0
Poland
24
92
SO
27
19
0
4
69
71
78
05
79
.'3.4
1c19
105
107
09
Womani-i
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
U
0
0
U
0
A
0
Ci
0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
19/0
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1901
1982
1989
Pump-compressor equipment (155)
21
21
31
41
42
53
64
80
82
90
98
107
122
133
Elu I gat la
LI
8
11
17
2U
2.?
28
34
35
94
37
41
45
45
Czechoslovakia
4
2
5
k::
7
8
9
19
15
15
14
15
25
East Germany
7
8
11
11
10
13
19
22.
25
32
40
44
55
55
Hungary
0
0
0
0
a
0
0
0
0
0
0
LI
LI
11
Poland
2
2
3
5
5
6
8
10
8
? 7
7
7
5
8
Romania
Ti
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
IJ
Communal, Trade, Firefighting
equipment (156)
10
12
11
13
11
17
18
22
29
50
58
72
83
115
Bulgaria
0
Ti
0
LI
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Czechoslovakia
4
4
3
4
3
7
6
7
9
13
20
14
13
29
East Germany
5
6
5
a
3
6
8
8
10
14
15
24
33
37
Hungary
1
-,:.
2
4
4
4
4
6
7
a
7
l'3
13
16
Poland
0
0
1
1
1
1
i
1
4
14
15
21
24
33
Romania
0
Printing industry equipment (157)
19
21
24
20
23
25
28
28
35
40
43
74
102,
Bulgaria
0
0
0
. 0
0
0
0
0
0
Ci
.47
0
0
0
Czeilhoslovakia
24
6
5
5
6
7
8
10
10
10
15
1U
35
East Germany
16
17
18
15
18
18
20
20
24
29
32
21
52
Hungary
Ci
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
i,
1
1
1
1
2
P ,Iand
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
u
IJ
3
P,a,,nla
0
0
13
o
0
o
0
0
o
0
LI
0
Cl
0
Industrial fixtures--
Computers removed (159)
45
57
66
83
86
96
66
77
91
99
96
102
111
125
Bulgaria
0
0
3
7
7
9
16
23
32
37
30
29
34
33
Cz,c_hoslovakia
11
11
13
15
15
21
18
18
21
17
17
21
10
16
Fast Germany
.11
25
29
37
34
31
10
11
1:.;
14
14
17
19
23
Hungary
5
14
14
16
23
20
13
16
17
18
12
al
25
32
Poland
2
3
4
5
6
6
0
5
4
4
7
5
9
15
Poatania
2
a
a
2
1
1
1
5
4
10
9
9
6
5
Pipelines (167)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
61
55
91
24
Bulgaria
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Cl
Czechoslovakia
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Ea5t Germany
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
U
- U
0
0
Hungary
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
24
Poland
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Ti
0
61
55
^?
91
0
Romania
0
0
El
0
0
0
Cl
0
0
0
0
C1
0,
Instruments & laboratory
equipment (170, 171, 178, 179)
Bulgaria
Czec.holovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
komani..
75
2
21
11
0
93
-:.
13
42
23
13
0
102
4
13
43
27
15
0
97
4
12
38
31
13
0
93
4
10
36
30
13
0
112
u
16
40
37
14
0
147
a
15
56
47
19
0
173
10
22
66
53
22
0
185
13
25
66
"
29
0
212
IG
25
78
60
31
IJ
228
17
31
87
56
37
0
276
15
31
113
74
43
0
347
14
40
129
83
81
0
402
20
51
137
Bb
108
0
1984
149
SO
23
68
0
8
0
116
0
35
42
1E1
21
1983
1966
177
152
. 4-9
'1,0
91
91
b5
0
li
0
b
0
0
130
110
0
0
46
.:s 5
41
_LI
26
25
13
104
111
u
0
33
32
75
3
2
2
0
1_1
144
120
29
11;
23
22
21
20
36
Ai
19
15
14
12
35
22
Ci
8
Ci
0
0
0
0
0
35
22
0
u
500
531
26
35
49
50
165
155
90
10:1
170
1130
0
0
103
0
30
6:366
1
0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
132
31
19
24
29
17
11
44
0
0
0
0
44
0
451
24
50
148
93
138
0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
IWO
19/1
19/2
19/3
1974
1975
1976
1977
19?1;
1979
1980
1981 1902
1983
1904 1985
1380
Instruments & laboratory
equipment (170, 171, 178, 179)
75
93
102
. 97
93
112
147
173
185
212
228
276 347
402
451 500
531
Bulyaria
.:'
2
4
4
4
5
0
10
13
la
17
15 14
20
czechoslovakia
913
I-A
I.
10
16
19
2')
25
31
31 .40
SI
50 ? :'.1
1.0
East Germany
42
43
90
:It.
40
56
66
bb
78
87
113 129
137
146 ? 165
155
Hungary
23
31
311
37
. 47
53
tD2
60
56
74 03
Ht.+
93 90
109
Poland
11
13
15
13
13
14
10
23
29
al
37
43 01
100
138 170
100
Romania
0
0
0
0
Li
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0
0 0
0
Medical equipment and instruments
excl. chemical-pharmaceutical (172)
41
51
57
51
48
55
74
86
101
112
124
158 184
199
225 261
248
Bulgaria
4
6
5
5
5
b
7
10
13
13
15
17 15
16
22 24
Czechoslovakia
11
9
II
11
12
13
17
21
24
26
aa
95 40
50
46 SG
:313
East Germany
9
15
15
13
13
13
21
21
6
28
30
40 SO
58
61 65
61
Hungary
15
Id
20
17
15
18
25
28
29
9.3
32
47 56
49
61 77
br,
Poland
2
4
6
5
4
4
6
7
10
13
14
19 23
26
35 39
30
Womania
0
0
0
Cl
CI
0
0
Cl
0
0
0
0 0
LI
0 U
0
Bearings (173)
6
7
7
7
8
9
13
13
13
15
17
18 23
25
32 33
32
Bulgaria
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Cl
0
0
0
0 Cl
0
0 0
LI
Czechoslovakia
3
3
3
4
4
4
6
5
4
b
7
9 0
10
11 11
11
East Germany
LI
0
0
0
0
0
0
Cl
0
Cl
LI
0 LI
0
0 0
Li
Hungary
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
o
o
Cl 0
o
0 0
1_1
toland
1
1
2
1
1
1
4
3
4
4
4
4 9
10
16 17
14
Pomania
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
4.
5
5
b
S 6
6
6 6
7
Tools (174)
3
4
5
5
3
4
4
3
3
4
4
4 6
11
12 14
16
Bulgaria
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
L.I
0
0
CI
o il
0
0 0
CI
Czechoslovakia
0
0
0
CI
0
0
0
1J
CI
0
0
0 0
0
-U 0
0
East Germany
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0
LI 0
. El
Hungary
CI
0
0
0
LI
0
u
0
0
0
CI
CI Cl
CI
0 Cl
CI
Poland
3
4
5
5
3
4
4
3
3
4
4
4 6
11
12 14.
16
Pomania
0
0
0
0
0
0
LI
0
0
0
0
0 0
0
CI 0
ll
Hard alloy and abrasives (176)
6
5
5
5
4
5
6
6
6
7
8
9 9
11
11 12
14
Bulgaria
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
CI
0 0
0
0 CI
CI
Czechoslovakia
3
3
3
4
3
3
5
,
5
5
6
7 7
:3
0 0
0
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
Pomania
2
CI
0
0
2
0
0
13
1
13
0
CI
1
CI
0
0
1
CI
0
CI
1
0
0
13
2
0
0
LI
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
2 2
0 0
0 0
0 0
'
3
0
0
0
3
0 0
0 0
Cl (i
0
13
13
Business Machines (177)
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
Pomania
67
ID
0
SI
2
--,
:.
0
109
33
0
72
2
2
0
162
05
0
79
2
13
0
223
135
LI
77
1
10
0
261
166
Cl
79
1
22
0
341
224
0
99
0
24
0
133
26
0
104
P
2
0
151
29
u
117
LI
5
0
133
49
U
81
0
9
0
222
98
0
68
0
95
0
243
50
0
97
0
96
0
' 350 963
3.3 553
0 0
212 310
0 0
99 101
0 0
930
670
0
143
0
110
0
949 929
2413 745
0 0
90 61
0 U
117 122
0 0
1113
164
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Tractors and tractor garage
equipment (180)
Bulgaria
Czechoslov.:,kia
East Ger.fiany
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Agricultural machinery and
equipment (181)
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Railroad rolling stock and
auxiliary equipment (190)
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Trucks, Buses, and garage
(191)
1970
17
57
0
12
0
0
0
153
58
13
58
5
15
a
254
0
89
91
19
55
0
220
21
54
2
102
23
10
359
16
24
143
14
136
26
1971
26
0
12
0
b
0
195
65
15
01
5
23
242
0
78
92
14
58
0
281
21
79
21
111
29
27
237
13
24
99
11
14
1912
15
7
0
9
0
0
0
262
65
24
120
19
25
283
0
97
91
14
66
15
350
17
73
43
144
39
34
275
17
23
129
12
77
16
1973
13
12
LI
1
0
0
0
301
79
27
132
23
27
13.
301
0
79
109
11
77
31
371
16
74
40
174
24.
33
350
24
15
137
11
151
14
1974
13
13
0
0
0
0
0
289
76
28
121
19
29
14
350
0
104
107
10
91
38
324
17
22
16
177
20
13
413
21
28
171
6
172
14
1975
15
15
0
0
0
0
0
319
92
3?
131
20
28
12
458
0
120
139
14
133
SI
416
20
99
3
255
30
8
704
41
39
294
5
305
19
1976
23
22
0
i
0
0
0
447
192
35
48
26
441
0
137
145
20
130
9
519
20
113
12
390
42
1
486
57
II 38
11
1977
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
525
98
51
254
30
53
90
432
' 0
138
146
22
125
0
509
24
65
6
350
64
1
468
Si)
43
202
12
131
1978
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
583.
109
bU
.2;.;1:4;
26
517
0
135
199
26
156
0
570
10
77
b
389
07
0
547
71
JS
21
134
20
1979
2
0
0
2
. 0
0
0
631
119
56
63
28
539
0
140
224
16
152
I I
563
18
86
7
359
90
'0
753
55
43.
320
25
22
1900
4
0
0
4
o
0
0
723
142
73
311
78
1]9
30
549
0
160
225
19
145
0
649
13
05
7
499
106
0
797
ae_
54
320
26
916
29
1981
5
0
0
5
o
0
0
71
7132
73
71
20
607
0
216
251
20
120
0
752
3
136
9
52?
78
0
63
70
psia
24
234
26
1902
4
0
0
4
o
0
0
802
143
85
387
69
90
28
640
0
199
290
26
125
0
903
1
162
12
620
109
0
798
67
54
415
26
209
27
1983
8
0
0
a
a
0
0
998
451
80
98
90
949
0
266
321
92
157
173
1101
1
4,22
16
749
114
0
989
15C;:1
12
213
1984
0
0
0
o
0
0
1107
151
510
1011
94
94
1045
0
272
381
31
153
200
1231
4
251
17
897
122
0
1102
111
54
551
32'
0
51
1965
5
0
0
5
u
0
0
1221
544
117
90
99
1180
0
358
306
29
169
238
1360
4
255
15
927
145
' 0
1331
119
83
699
44
341
45
1986
6
0
0
5
o
0
0
1177
185
195
519
105
99
74
1146
U
973
360
30
177
206
1400
7
292
9
940
152
0
125
12560:
70
44
391
32
equipment
Bulgaria
Czechos1ov.shia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Vessels, vessel lifting, and
diving port equipment (192)
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
Roman a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1905 1986
'z,ssenger cars, motorcycles,
.Lor scooters (195) 39 53 64 67 71 79 96 117 121 123 137 132 155 165 169 184 146
Bulgaria 1 5 lii 13 15 15 22 25 26 24 28 32 34 37 38 41 41
Czechoslovakia 26 213 29 20 30 39 52 53 56 60 71 62 79 84 04 91 84
East Germany 0 U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 U 0 0 0
Hungary 11 21 25 26 26 25 22 23 23 23 24 28 28 29 32 j1 0
Poland 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 16 16 16 14 11 14 15 15 20 21
komania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 U 0 0 0
The numbers In parenLheses are the CEMA Trade Nomenclature (CTN) categories.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
R
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/25: CIA-RDP90T00100R000600430001-0
25X1