NORTH KOREA-SOUTH KOREA: THE STATE OF PLAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00100R000201720001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 6, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE
DOC NO 64r 4(1 Kff-20)3t4
OIR
p PD
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
06 October 1988
North Korea-South Korea: The State of Play
Summary
South Korean President Roh Tae Woo--facing a lively popular
interest in reunification as well as an increasingly activist opposition--is
likely to push initiatives for personal, cultural, and economic exchanges
this fall when the two Koreas revive their dialogue. Still, Seoul and
P'VongVang remain far apart on key issues, and prospects for substantive
progress are dim. P'yongyang, for its part, confronts important domestic
concerns--top among them being economic stagnation that could threaten
the transfer of power from Kim II-song to his son, Kim Chong-il. To stem
Seoul's recent international successes, the North will continue seeking
support from its allies in the Third World and trying to ortra itself as the
more forthcoming party in the North-South dialogue.
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 06 October 1988 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Korea Branch, Northeast Asia
Division, OEA,
EA M 88-20134
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The North-South Dialogue
Since the mid-1980s, North and South Korea have conducted an on-again,
off-again dialogue. North Korea cut off the working-level parliamentary, economic, and
Red Cross talks in January 1986 to protest the annual US-South Korea Team Spirit
military exercise, but dialogue resumed in August after a series of proposals and
counterproposals. Early this year, North Korea called for a joint conference of politicians
and other nongovernment leaders but by summer was pushing for North-South student
talks. After counterproposing a meeting between education ministers in July, President
Roh announced South Korea would adopt a new, conciliatory approach toward the North.
He promised efforts to promote bilateral exchanges, family visits, and trade, and pledged
to help the North improve relations with the United States and Japan. The National
Assembly followed up in mid-July with a letter to its North Korean counterpart, the
Supreme Peoples' Assembly, urging P'yongyang to participate in the Olympic Games.
The North responded by proposing interparliamentary talks on a nonaggression
declaration and the Olympics.
With Seoul's acceptance of the offer, meetings between legislators from each
side tried to prepare for a joint parliamentary session, but talks broke off over format
and agenda. Both agreed to resume discussions in mid-October. President Roh has
attempted to keep the appearance of dialogue alive, probably in part to assuage Olympic
visitors' fears that North-South tensions would threaten the Games. In August, he
resurrected a proposal for summit talks with Kim ll-song, triggering a counteroffer from
Kim to meet if US forces left South Korea. This month, Roh responded by saying
withdrawal of US troops would be feasible if the North abandoned its threat to reunify
the peninsula by military force.
The South Korean Perspective
In our view, Roh's willingness to appear flexible on the previously taboo subject
of a withdrawal of US forces suggests South Korea is increasingly confident that it is
dealing with the North from a position of strength. Seoul's hosting of the Olympics has
symbolized the South's growing international stature and its economic, political, and
diplomatic lead over the North, and Seoul is likely to capitalize on that success by
continuing to push reunification proposals.
Roh believes the reunification issue wil make an effective theme to replace the
Olympics.
We expect the Roh government will have widespread support for its approach to
the North--a policy that is targeted at least as much at domestic audiences as at
rYbrigyang. There is broadbased, lively pressure for government action on reunification
issues, and recent opinion polls indicate Roh's flexibility vis-a-vis P'yongyang has gone
a long way toward satisfying public expectations. Most South Koreans apparently
support the government's conciliatory yet basically conservative approach:
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? A July 1988 USIA poll indicates most South Koreans reject the North's claim that
the United States is the biggest obstacle to reunification. Instead, the public
views ideological differences between North and South as the main
stumbling block.
? A September poll by a South Korean newspaper showed most Koreans support
government policy on personnel exchanges with the North. Most believe
exchanges should start with divided families--not students, as P'yongyang has
pushed. There is also backing for government management of student
exchanges--an attitude that offers little fertile ground for the North, which has
tried to sell the idea of exchanges between individuals and nongovernmental
groups.
The President may find he has more views to contend with in formulating
reunification policy in the post-Olympic period than he did in the past few months,
when an Olympic-induced "political truce" led the opposition to lie low on policy issues.
With the ruling Democratic Justice Party no longer holding a majority in the National
Assembly, opposition leaders probably will demand more say in North-South policy. A
National Unification Board official recently told US Embassy officers he doubts the
opposition will keep in step with the government at future North-South parliamentary
talks.
Perhaps anticipating more activism, Roh has asked his advisers to examine
initiatives that will allow him to hold the lead on North-South issues. Seoul's reported
about-face on its longstanding opposition to discussion of military topics with
P'vonqyanq may be a result of this effort.
Until now, Seoul had opposed
the North's effort to include a nonaggression declaration on the agenda; Foreign Minister
Choe Kwang Su recently suggested publicly that a nonaggression agreement be included
in summit talks.
Roh also will need to consider conservative views carefully. Since radical
students championed the reunification theme in late spring, security and military officers
have worried that the two Koreas' peace overtures are creating a false sense of security.
they are concerned that rapid movement will play into
North Korea's hands.
Perceptions of an immediate threat from North Korea are down sharply from late 1986,
but a recent USIA poll shows about half of those questioned think there is a fair chance
North Korea will launch a guerrilla or terrorist attack in the "next year or so," and about
a third fear a full-scale attack in the "next three years or so."
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Japanese and US Involvement
Seoul has long objected to direct North Korean dealings with Washington
and Tokyo, which makes Roh's proposal in July to facilitate North Korea's
relations with the United States and Japan noteworthy. After Roh's speech,
Foreign Minister Choe announced that Seoul would no longer oppose
nonmilitary trade, personnel exchanges, and diplomatic contact between
P'yongyang and the South's allies. Nonetheless, Seoul obviously does not want
others to get out front in improving relations with the North. Choe told the US
Embassy in Seoul that he will ask NATO member countries to forgo formal
relations with P'yongyang until their Warsaw Pact counterparts take reciprocal
steps toward Seoul. The South Koreans also have delivered to Washington and
Tokyo guidelines detailing "acceptable" contacts with the North. For example,
Seoul asked for limits on intergovernmental exchanges restricting them to
cultural, academic, and sports contacts.
The North's Perspective
We believe Seoul's new activism on North-South policy has put P'yongyang on
the defensive. The North faces other problems as well. Perhaps most important, we
believe Kim ll-song's 15-year-long effort to lay the groundwork for his son, Kim
Chong-il, to succeed him has been complicated by P'yongyang's stagnant economy, as
well as food and energy shortages. The North also appears to be smarting from the
South's recent successes--the boost to its international stature provided by the
Olympics, as well as the inroads into its traditional political "territory" represented by
Seoul's economic contacts with the Soviet Union, China, and other Communist countries.
The North is not without assets, however, including increased Soviet military aid, an
obvious Chinese desire to pay overt political attention to P'yongyang, and the North's
own strategy to portray itself as possessing the high ground vis-a-vis the South in
dealing with the the Third World.
Outlook
Both Koreas have reason to pursue at least the appearance of dialogue, which
probably accounts for their agreement to resume the stalled parliamentary talks. Even
so, differences on key issues make substantive progress unlikely:
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? The North's media still underscore P'yongyang's longstanding objective--direct
talks with the United States to negotiate withdrawal of US troops from the South.
The North continues to claim this step is necessary for any peace settlement,
while Seoul argues that reunification is a problem to be solved by the two Koreas
alone.
? The South is willing to accommodate the North's demands for personnel
exchanges, but Seoul's main goal remains government-to-government talks.
Although P'yongyang called for such talks last year, its proposals for dialogue in
1988 have avoided any hint of direct dealings with the Roh government.
In the long run, the North may hope that attention to reunification will pay dividends in
South Korea's more open political environment. For example, P'yongyang may calculate
that North-South policy will emerge as a contentious topic between the government and
its opponents, enabling the North to use a "divide and conquer strategy" in dealing with
Seoul on the issue.
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NORTH KOREA-SOUTH KOREA: THE STATE OF PLAY
DISTRIBUTION:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1 - WILLIAM CLARK, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND
PACIFIC AFFAIRS, RM 6205, DEPT. OF STATE
1 - HARRY DUNLOP, DIRECTOR, EAP/K, RM 5313, DEPT. OF STATE
1 - MATTHEW DAILEY, SPECIAL ASST. TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST
ASIAN AFFAIR, RM 6205, DEPT. OF STATE
1 - ROBERTA CHEW, EAP/K, RM 5313, DEPT. OF STATE
1 - ROBERT SUETTINGER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ANALYSIS FOR EAST ASIA AND
PACIFIC, RM 8840, DEPT. OF STATE
1 - WILLIAM PIEZ, DEPUTY ASSISTANT, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC
AFFAIRS, RM 6205, DEPT. OF STATE
1 - KENNETH C. QUINONES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, EAP/RA, RM 4310, DEPT. OF
STATE
1 - BILL NEWCOMB, INR/EC/CER, RM 8442, DEPT. OF STATE
1 - JOHN MERRILL, INR/EAP, RM 8840, DEPT. OF STATE
1 - MARK FITZPATRICK, EAP/K, RM 5313, DEPT. OF STATE
1 - JIM PRZYSTUP, POLICY PLANNING STAFF, RM 7330, DEPT. OF STATE
1 - DAVID JOHNSON, S/S/O, RM 7516, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1 - JAMES A. KELLY, SPECIAL ASST TO THE PRESIDENT & SR. DIR. FOR ASIAN
AFFAIRS, RM 493, OEOB
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1 - DR. KARL JACKSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIA AND
PACIFIC AFFAIRS, RM 4E817, PENTAGON
1 - RADM EDWARD BAKER, JR., DIRECTOR, EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION, INT'L
SECURITY AFFAIRS, RM 4C839, PENTAGON
1 - WALLACE KNOWLES, OASD/ISA/EAPR, RM 4C840, PENTAGON
1 - LTC WILLIAM M. WISE, ASSISTANT FOR REGIONAL POLICY AND
CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS, ISA, RM 4C839, PENTAGON
1 - LTC JOE FLANTZ, HQDA (DAMI/F11/NORTHEAST ASIA), RM 2A474,
PENTAGON
1 - CAPT. WALTER ANDERSON, DEPT. OF ARMY/CURRENT INTELLIGENCE/NE ASIA,
RM 2B515, PENTAGON
1 - JAY SLOAN, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, EA/P, RM 2A520, PENTAGON
1 - LTC. JERRY WILLIAMS, JSI-3C, RM 1C930, PENTAGON
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INTERNAL
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1 ? NIO, EAST ASIA, RM 7E62,
1 ? Nb, ECONOMICS, RM 7E47,
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1 ? CHIEF, EA, RM 5D26,
1 ? CHIEF, OGI/FSIC/PI, RM 3G04,
1 ? CHIEF, OEA/NEA/KOREA, RM 6P37,
1 ? CHIEF, OEA/NEA/JAPAN, RM 6P37,
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? 7 ?
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