CHINA: TENSIONS IN TIBET CONTINUE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00100R000201090001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 15, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE 5 ZO ~S~
WC No 'm -aM5
OIR 3
P E PD _I
- Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
15 April 1988
China: Tensions in Tibet Continue
Summary
The upsurge of nationalism, especially among younger Tibetans,
suggests that sporadic violence against Chinese in Tibet will continue.
Tibetan exiles have sought to capitalize on recent unrest to win
international sympathy and support for their cause, and may even be
encouraging the violence. Beijing is likely to respond with a two-track
approach. On the one hand, the authorities will crack down on dissidents
and impose restrictions on the activities of monasteries. But Chinese
leaders probably will also continue their liberal religious and minority
policies toward Tibet to deflect international criticism and ultimately pacify
the population. In our view, any prospect of defusing these tensions over
the short term lies in a negotiated agreement between the Dalai Lama and
Beijing, but such a settlement seems no nearer now than when unofficial
talks between the two sides began in the late 1970s.
China Division, OEA,
This memorandum was prepared byl (Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 15 April 1988 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Political Assessments Branch,
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The Depths of Tibetan Discontent
The recurring unrest in Tibet since last fall graphically illustrates that Tibetans
remain fervently nationalistic and hostile toward the Chinese. The hostility is reinforced
by continued Chinese dominance of the bureaucracy, the modern sectors of the
economy, and higher education despite the fact that the Chinese make up only 5
percent of the population.
Although Tibetan representation in the government and the party has steadily
increased since 1980, many Tibetans view those in official positions as coopted by
Beijing. This includes the Panchen Lama--second only to the Dalai Lama in the Tibetan
Buddhist hierarchy but considered by many Tibetans to be a Chinese puppet. We
believe many Tibetans saw his trip to Tibet in January--which coincided with other
moves by Beijing to pacify the population--as a thinly disguised attempt to legitimize
Chinese actions in the province. As a consequence, his call during the visit for greater
autonomy in Tibet and his admission that police had fired on rioters in October only
increased Tibetan resentment.
Tibetans continue to resent the restrictions placed on monks and the destruction
of temples and monasteries during the Cultural Revolution. In a meeting with US State
Department officials in December, Chinese officials acknowledged that Beijing has
established a limit of roughly 10,000 monks for Tibet. Beijing claims limitations are
necessary to ensure enough manpower to develop the region economically, and to keep
the population from declining. To circumvent these quotas, many young Tibetans have
little choice but to become "unofficial" monks, financially supported by their own
families rather than the monasteries, further fueling resentment. In addition, although
Beijing provides 80 percent of the funds for the restoration of temples and monasteries
destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, only 234 out of some 2700 reportedly have
been reopened.
Tibetan Opposition Activity
According to a contact- of the
US Embassy in Beijing, the Dalai Lama's security office had sent a few monks from India
to. each of the major monasteries in Lhasa last fall to encourage anti-Chinese activities.
We do not know whether the Dalai Lama was aware of this. His security office has
acted in the past without his knowledge--in January 1987, it sent four or five Tibetans
to Lhasa to try to assassinate Tibet party leader Wu Jinghua, according to a State
Department contact.
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A Profile of the March Violence
Rioting broke out in Lhasa on the morning of 5 March during the closing
ceremony of the Great Prayer Festival, a holiday in which Tibetan monks
traditionally reaffirm their authority over the secular government. The day
before, Beijing admitted that a Tibetan dissident had died in prison last fall, and
agitators may have suspected it would take little to spark mob violence in the
large crowd. According to Western press and State reporting, several monks
began shouting slogans in support of the Dalai Lama and calling for
independence. They were joined by about 2,000 pilgrims from a crowd
reportedly as large as 25,000. Monks pelted police with rocks from the rooftops
of the Jokhang Temple, and, according to Chinese press reports, destroyed
vehicles and attacked a police station and office of the state-run Buddhist
Association. Police used tear gas to disperse the crowd and stormed the
temple, arresting over 200 monks. Sporadic violence continued throughout that
day and into the next. Although the Chinese press acknowledges only five
deaths, unconfirmed press reports suggest as many as 16 monks may have
died.
Lhasa authorities believe a majority of the populace supported the rioters
and responded in force. Chinese police set up roadblocks around the city and
carried out several sweeps of Lhasa's downtown and major monasteries,
arresting perhaps 100 more Tibetans. To prevent further outbreaks of violence
on the 10 March anniversary of the-1959 Tibetan uprising, authorities used Army
troops dressed in police uniforms as reinforcements.
US Consulate sources in Lhasa report that the situation after the rioting
was worse than even news reports indicated:
Although tensions
remain high, foreigners in Lhasa report normalcy is slowly returning and some
tourists have been allowed to visit temples and monasteries. Unconfirmed
reports from the Western press state many monks remain in hospitals and, as
they recover, are being sent to prison.
The Dalai Lama and Tibetan exile leaders have clearly sought to capitalize on the
unrest to attract international, including US Congressional attention, to the Tibetans'
plight. Tibetans staged demonstrations in Washington, India, and several European
capitals after the disturbances last October and again after the unrest in early March. In
addition, they have fed a mix of fact and fiction to sympathetic Western political figures
and journalists to turn public opinion against the Chinese and generate pressure on
Beijing to make concessions (see appendix A).
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. Meanwhile, the Dalai Lama and Beijing have resumed their on-again, off-again
dialogue, The Dalai Lama's elder brother, Gyalo Thondup,
has made at least two trips to China since the unrest last October. According to the US
Consulate in Hong Kong, another new unofficial channel may be opening though T.C.
Wu, a Chinese Communist in the colony.
We believe the
five-point peace plan the Dalai Lama publicly floated last fall is a ploy to garner
international support for the Tibetan cause and put Beijing on the defensive. It may also
be in response to Tibetan exiles' perceptions that Beijing has hardened its stance since
the first official negotiations in 1982. The plan seems deliberately ambiguous on the key
issue of Tibetan independence (see appendix B).
We cannot rule out that the exiles believe they can force Beijing to grant
independence. But we think it more likely that they are seeking to prod Beijing into
granting real autonomy in exchange for nominal Chinese sovereignty. Neither of the
two official negotiating teams sent by the Dalai Lama in 1982 and 1984 demanded
independence. They sought instead expansion of the Tibet Autonomous Region to
include Tibetan areas of Sichuan, Qinghai, and.Yunnan Provinces, and asked for an
autonomous status similar to what Beijing has offered Taiwan.
Tibetan exile leaders, however, may be at odds over how far to push the
independence issue. Some of the Dalai Lama's advisers apparently sympathize with
Tibetans who favor total independence and oppose any negotiated settlement with
Beijing. According to a contact of the US Embassy in Beijing, the Dalai Lama's cabinet is
increasingly dominated by "fanatics" who will settle for no less than complete
independence. In addition, the Tibetan Youth Congress, an exile group based in India,
has periodically called on India to recognize that its own foreign policy interests demand
an independent Tibet. One TYC member told a State officer last fall that "it might
become necessary" to resume an armed struggle against the Chinese.
Beijing's Quandary
Beijing has few, if any, satisfactory options for defusing tensions over the short
run. Beijing has repeatedly offered to recognize the Dalai Lama as a religious leader and
to appoint him as a vice chairman of China's National People's Congress--a government
position, it said, requiring residence in Beijing. Recently, the Panchen Lama suggested
the Dalai Lama could live in Tibet if he would return from exile. The Dalai Lama
predictably has rejected the offer, probably believing--quite rightly--he would be
discredited by his followers if he accepted--just as the Panchen Lama has compromised
his standing in Tibet by cooperating with the Chinese.
In any. case, the renewed unrest in March underscores the failure of Beijing to
mollify the populace by restoring temples, granting more religious freedom, and building
roads, schools, hospitals, and some industries. Chinese leaders probably see no
alternative to continuing these policies if for no other reason than to show the outside
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world they are making a reasonable effort to accommodate the interests of the Tibetans
and other ethnic minorities. They probably also hope these policies and the economic
improvements weaken the loyalty of the Tibetan population to the Dalai Lama.
In the meantime, we expect the Chinese to increase repression to deter further
violence. They have already arrested several hundred monks, according to press
reports, and will probably impose even tighter restrictions on the operations of Buddhist
monasteries.
The Future: More Negotiations, More Violence
In our view, any success at defusing tensions in Tibet in the short term lies with
a negotiated agreement between the Dalai Lama and Beijing. Without the support of the
Dalai Lama, Beijing's rule over Tibet will not appear legitimate to the Tibetans. Such a
settlement, however, is unlikely to be soon. The Dalai Lama has refused Beijing's offer
to live in Tibet and has insisted that his five-point plan must form a basis for
negotiations. Meanwhile, Beijing fears the Dalai Lama's visit to Europe this spring will
generate greater popular support and is preparing a propaganda campaign to counter
negative publicity.
We expect Beijing to continue overtures to the Dalai Lama, again partly to show
the international community that it is willing to reach an accommodation. But because
the gap between their positions is so wide, the two are unlikely to reach a compromise.
Beijing is not prepared to grant anything approaching real autonomy to Tibet because:
? The Chinese military, which still regards the area as strategically vital and
probably fears undue Soviet or Indian influence, would firmly oppose the move.
? Chinese leaders fear such an agreement would encourage not only the Tibetans
to seek full independence but other minorities located in equally sensitive
strategic areas along China's border with the Soviet Union to make similiar
demands.
? Reform leaders, the architects of the liberal minorities policy, feel vulnerable
enough on economic issues and are not about to give their critics an opening by
making concessions on Tibet.
Therefore, given the upsurge of Tibetan nationalism, especially among young
monks, further sporadic outbreaks of violence seem inevitable. Although the heavy
police presence and increased surveillance over the monasteries have restored an
uneasy calm, several Tibetans have vowed to resume protests once the tourist season
picks up later this month, according to state reporting. Chinese officials, meanwhile,
fear monks have shifted their tactics to sabotage and assassination. Authorities were
seaching for two men believed to be on suicide missions in mid-March.
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Tibetan Ethnic Group in China
Lake
Balkhash
Xizang
(Tibet)
0 200 400 Kilometers
0 200 400 Miles
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
Soviet Union
Bay of
Bengal
Lake
Baikal
Mongolia
Nei
Mongol
Guizhou
Shanxi
4/1"e,
Guangxi
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Appendix A
Both Beijing and the Tibetan exiles have published historical accounts and
statistics supporting their claims. Given the lack of independent observers in Tibet, and
the remoteness of the region, the gathering of objective data is nearly impossible. The
problem is further complicated because the two sides often use different boundaries for
Tibet and different time frames without providing any definitions.
For example, the Tibetan exiles claim there are 6 million Tibetans worldwide.
However, China's 1982 census--performed under UN auspices--shows that China had
3.82 million ethnic Tibetans. In 1986, Chinese figures claim 4 million Tibetans, which we
believe is fairly accurate. Tibetan exiles are estimated to be only 100,000 worldwide,
making the claim of 6 million appear grossly inflated.
Tibetan exiles also demand an end to Han Chinese migration into Tibet, and
allege that 1 million Chinese now live in the province. According to State reporting,
there are only about 70,000 to 80,000 Chinese civilians in Tibet, and we estimate
perhaps another 60,000 troops, most stationed near the Sino-Indian border. According
to officials from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing sent between 150,000
and 200,000 Han to Tibet during the 1960s and 1970s. Partly out of the realization that
a large Chinese presence in Tibetan cities contributes to Sino-Tibetan tension and partly
because Chinese are unwilling to endure the hardships of life in Tibet, Beijing allowed at
least 80,000 of these settlers to leave by 1981, which has caused a shortage of doctors,
engineers, and other professionals.
We are unable to substantiate Tibetan exiles' accusations that over 1 million
Tibetans have died under Chinese rule. According to Chinese statistics, the number of
ethnic Tibetans in China decreased from 2,775,622 in 1953 to 2,501,174 in 1964, but in
1960-61 there was a serious famine in most of China, and the national population fell by
1.3 million. Given the fighting and emigration relating to the Dalai Lama's flight to India
in 1959, the border war of 1962, and the famine, a decrease in Tibetan population of
some 275,000 seems quite possible. But the claim that 1 million Tibetans died because
of "political instability, imprisonment, and widescale famine," seems improbable.
We are unable to confirm or deny the charge that Beijing has used Tibet as a
dumping ground for nuclear waste. We have no information on nuclear facilities in Tibet
other than planned development of small and medium-scale electric reactors to increase
Tibet's power production.
In our view, exile accusations that the Chinese are destroying Tibetan culture
have some truth. China has built roads, schools, hospitals, power plants, office
buildings, and hotels; improved transportation, agriculture, and education; and brought in
some industry. But this modernization has been superimposed upon traditional Tibet,
which was pastoral, agricultural, and intensely religious. Furthermore, China's university
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system is slanted toward the Chinese; learning Chinese and adapting to Han culture is
necessary for Tibetans to move up within the system. The challenge that faces
Tibetans, both within and outside China, is how to preserve their unique culture and
traditions in the face of an ever-changing and modernizing world.
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Appendix B
Negotiations Between Beijing and the Dalai Lama
Communications between Beijing and the Dalai Lama opened in 1978 after a
20-year hiatus, when China agreed to allow a delegation of Tibetan exiles in India to
visit Tibet. The move followed the Dalai Lama's announcement that he would give up
demands for an independent Tibet if he were convinced Tibetans were happy under
Chinese rule. During 1979 and 1980 the Dalai Lama sent four "fact finding" missions to
Tibet and nearby provinces. Three of the missions contained members of the Dalai
Lama's family, and the fourth, representatives of Tibetan exile communities outside India.
In May 1982 the Dalai Lama sent the first of two official negotiating teams to
Beijing. They met with the Panchen Lama and the Director of the United Front Work
Department, as well as with other Chinese officials concerned with minority policies.
According to Embassy reporting, the Tibetans laid out three conditions for the Dalai
Lama's return to China:
? The Tibetan Autonomous Region must be enlarged to include the Tibetan
minority groups in Sichuan, Qinghai, and Yunnan.
? Tibetans should be offered something similar to the nine-point proposal
previously made to Taiwan.
? Tibet would accept Chinese sovereignty, but the area should be demilitarized and
made into a zone of peace.
The Chinese indicated they would be willing to discuss the first condition, but
predictably objected to the others. The United Front director asked the Tibetans to
scale down their demands, but only offered in return to give the Dalai Lama an
ambiguous position commensurate with his status. Beijing later publicized the visit,
rejecting the first condition and not even mentioning the third.
In October 1984 a second Tibetan negotiating team visited Beijing. The Tibetans
again tabled their three demands and raised new concerns, including the alleged arrest
of 1,000 Tibetans during the anticrime campaign in 1983 and the Han migration into
Tibet. This time, according to State reporting, the Chinese outlined a five-point policy
pubicly, which the Tibetans regarded as a hardening of their position. The Chinese
insisted that:
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? The Dalai Lama must have confidence in China's political stability and its
minorities policies.
? The Dalai Lama should forget about the events of 1959 and be "frank and sincere"
in discussing Tibet's future.
? China would welcome the Dalai Lama's return to contribute to national unification
and modernization. -
? If the Dalai Lama returned to China, the Communist Party would recommend that
he be elected a vice-chairman of the National Peoples Congress, and "it is
suggested that he not go and live in Tibet"'
? When the Dalai Lama returned, he would issue a statement to the press.
The.Chinese also hinted that a visit to Tibet by the Dalai Lama would be inappropriate.
Beijing refused to allow.another Tibetan fact-finding mission to visit Tibet in
1985. Although unofficial contacts between the two have continued, primarily through
the Dalai Lama's elder brother Gyalo Thondup, we believe the Dalai Lama probably hopes
to force Bejing back to the negotiating table officially. A representative of the Dalai
Lama told State officers in 1985 that the Dalai Lama refused to let the issue of his own
return eclipse the more important matter of the future of Tibet, and rejected Beijing's
five conditions for his return. To pressure Beijing, the Dalai Lama tabled his own five
point peace plan during his visit to Washington last September. It calls for:
? Abandonment of China's population transfer policy, which threatens the existence
of the Tibetans as a people.
? Respect for the Tibetan people's fundamental human rights and democratic
freedoms.
? Restoration and protection of Tibet's natural environment and the abandonment
of China's use- of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and the dumping of
nuclear waste. -
Chinese press has been tougher on this point, implicitly stating the the Dalai Lama
would not return to live in Tibet, and Chinese officials recently explained to a State
Department officer that the Dalai Lama's residence in Beijing is indeed implied in this
point. Speaking at a 4 April press conference, however, the Panchen Lama stated that
the Dalai Lama-could in fact reside in Tibet.
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? Commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and of
relations between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples.
Although the plan does not call for Tibetan independence, and the Dalai Lama has
avoided such an appeal in his public statements, Chinese officials have told State
officers that it is clearly implied in his demands for the withdrawal of Chinese troops
and the status of Tibet as a nonnuclear area.
During his visit to Beijing last October, Gyalo Thondup received a letter from
Deng Xiaoping to deliver to the Dalai Lama, according to a contact of the US Embassy in
Beijing. The letter was remarkably conciliatory, and in it Deng reaffirmed a 1979 pledge
that all issues were negotiable except Tibetan independence. Deng also apologized for
the lack of progress in negotiations.
Thondup returned to Beijing in late December with the Dalai Lama's response, but
apparently no agreement was reached. An official of the United Front Work department
told a State officer that no progress had been made on any outstanding -issue and that
there were no future formal or informal contacts.
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Appendix C
Chronology of Selected Events Relating to Tibet
1950s
7 Oct 50
19 Dec 50
23 May 51
The Chinese Army enters eastern Tibet (Kham).
The Dalai Lama flees to the Indian Border.
17-point agreement between representatives of
the Dalai Lama and the Chinese signed in Beijing.
Tibetan. exiles contend the agreement was not
legal.
17 Aug 51 The Dalai Lama returns to Lhasa.
9 Sep 51 The Chinese Army peacefully enters Lhasa.
53 Tibetans in Kham begin guerrilla warfare campaign
-against the Chinese.
9 Mar 55 Establishment of Preparatory Committee for the
Tibet Autonomous Region.
55-56 Khampa tribesmen rebel against Chinese forces in
eastern Tibet (Kham).
10 Mar 59 Mass anti-Chinese uprising breaks out in Lhasa.
17 Mar 59 Dalai Lama flees after Chinese shell Norbulingha.
23 Mar 59 Chinese declare martial law in Tibet.
1960s-70s
62 Sino-Indian border war.
Mar 64 Panchen Lama arrested.
66-76 Cultural Revolution; temples, monasteries burned;
Buddhists persecuted.
late 79 Dalai Lama sends first fact-finding delegation, led
by an older brother, to Tibet.
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22 May-1 Jun 80 CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang and Vice
Premier Wan Li visit Lhasa; admit mistakes made
during Cultural Revolution.
Jul-Aug 80
Visit of a five-member fact-finding delegation
sent by Dalai Lama cut short when large crowds
gather in Lhasa; third fact-finding delegation, led
by Dalai Lama's sister, visits Qinghai Province and
Tibet. Another brother of the Dalai Lama visits
Tibet with his family.
Apr 82 Agricultural communes in Tibet disbanded.
May 82 Dalai Lama sends first official negotiating team to
Beijing.
19-31 Aug 84 Secretariat member Hu Qili and Vice Premier Tian
Jiyun visit Tibet; announce new economic
policies.
Oct 84
Jun-Aug 85
Jan 86
1987
Dalai Lama sends second negotiating team to
Beijing.
Delegation from the Dalai Lama refused entry to
Tibet.
Traditional Tibetan Great Prayer Festival revived;
had been banned since the Cultural Revolution.
Jun Beijing refuses Dalai Lama's brother Thublen
Norbu to. visit China.
18 Jun US House of Representatives approves
amendment on human rights violations in Tibet.
1 Sep Chinese Embassy in Washington protests Dalai
Lama's upcoming US visit.
19-29 Sep The Dalai Lama visits United States.
21 Sep Dalai Lama proposes a "Five-Point Peace Plan" on
the question of the status of Tibet at the House
of Representatives Human Rights Subcommittee.
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The Chinese Embassy in Washington criticizes
some members of the US Congress for
interfering in China's internal affairs and for
permitting the Dalai Lama to preach
"independence for Tibet before the House group.
Eight US Congressmen send a letter to Premier
Zhao Ziyang in support of the Dalai Lama's plan.
Two or three Tibetans executed in Lhasa,
according to press reports.
26 people, including 21 monks from the Drepung
Monastery, demonstrate in Lhasa for less than an
hour and are arrested by police.
29 Sep 200 Tibetan exiles protest in New Delhi.
30 Sep
Two representatives of US Congress call a press
conference to protest the execution and
imprisonment of Tibetans in China, and release
the text of the letter to Zhao.
Late Sep-Early Oct NBC broadcasts from China; televises prior
interview with Dalai Lama.
Monks from the Sera and Drepung Monasteries
demonstrate around the Johkang Temple in
downtown Lhasa; call for the release of the 21
arrested monks; crowd swells to more than 1,000.
There are also unconfirmed press reports of
demonstrations in other cities.
Chinese Embassy in Washington delivers
demarche to State Department, warning that the
United States is becoming the center for Tibetan
independence activities.
2 Oct Lhasa placed under curfew.
3 Oct 300 Tibetans demonstrate in New Delhi; several
hundred protest in Bern, Switzerland.
The Dalai Lama appeals from India to human
rights groups to persuade the Chinese
Government to stop executions and imprisonment
of Tibetans. %_
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4 Oct The Dalai Lama's brother, Gyalo Thondup, arrives
in Beijing.
Spokesman of China's International Liaison
Department holds news briefing on China's
position on Tibet, charging that the support of
some foreigners for Tibetan independence is a
serious interference in China's internal affairs.
US State Department spokesman reiterates United
States Government position that Tibet is a part of
China.
Protests reported in Xigaze.
The Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies based
in India writes a letter to Zhao Ziyang protesting
the arrests of Tibetans in Lhasa.
Dalai Lama's spokesman says hundreds of
Tibetans have been arrested following the 1
October riot; says rally staged on 1 Oct to disrupt
celebrations marking China's 38th National Day
and because of recent executions and anger at
the official propaganda campaign launched
against the Dalai Lama.
US Senate passes amendment 98-0 on human
rights violations in Tibet. Chinese Embassy in
Washington expresses extreme indignation over
the amendment.
About 90 monks arrested and later released.
Dalai Lama holds a press conference from his
home in India. Calls for continued peaceful
demonstrations, and affirms he will continue to
send delegations to China for consultations.
In New Delhi, police remove eight Tibetans from
Chinese Embassy on hunger strike.
50 protest in Ottawa.
8 Oct China calls on India to prevent Dalai Lama from
making political statements.
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A Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials
delivers a strongly worded demarch to the US
Ambassador to China.
10 Oct 150 people protest outside the Chinese Embassy
in Paris calling for Tibetan independence.
350 Tibetans demonstrate in New Delhi; want to
deliver a letter to the Chinese Embassy calling for
an internationally supervised plebiscite to settle
Tibet's future.
The Dalai Lama gives interview in India; denies
protests planned but says his US trip may have
played a factor in the unrest.
European Parliament adopts resolution on Tibet.
NPC Vice Chairman Huang Hua cancelled plans to
visit the Parliament in response.
Individual travel by foreigners to Tibet banned.
US Congressional hearing on human rights
violations in Tibet.
15 Oct 1,200 Tibetans protest in New Delhi.
13 Tibetan protesters--including nine of the 21
monks arrested after the 27 September
demonstrations--released from jail.
80 monks arrested after demonstrating against
Chinese security presence at Ganden Monastery
in Lhasa.
16 Nov 500 Tibetans demonstrate in New Delhi.
US House-Senate conference committe adopts
nonbinding amendment on Chinese human rights
violations in Tibet.
Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Zhu Qichen
demarches US Ambassador to China on US
Congressional amendment.
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Several Tibetan nuns demonstrate near Jokhang
Temple in Lhasa; they call for Tibetan
independence and are arrested.
11 Jan The Panchen Lama arrives on month-long
inspection tour of Tibet.
21 Jan Bejing releases 59 Tibetans detained since last
fall.
Chinese press carries statement by Panchen Lama
admitting Chinese police fired on demonstrators
during October riots.
25 Feb Traditional Tibetan prayer festival begins;
continues through 6 March.
1 Mar China's official news service acknowledges 12
political prisoners are being held in Tibet.
4 Mar Beijing confirms that a Tibetan dissident died in
prison last fall.
Rioting breaks out during religious festival when
several monks begin shouting slogans in support
of the Dalai Lama. As many as 2,000 people may
have participated in the riot. Hundreds arrested.
Dalai Lama issues press statement stating that
Tibetans "cannot be deceived by cosmetic
changes." 500 Tibetan exiles demonstrate in New
Delhi.
8 Mar Chinese Foriegn Minister Wu Xueqian meets with
US Secretary of State. Tibet is discussed.
10 Mar
The Panchen Lama and Tibetan government leader
Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme denounce March unrest
and call for punishment of rioters.
Tibetan National Day--anniversary of 1959 Tibetan
uprising; 500 Tibetan exiles demonstrate in New
Delhi.
20 Mar Date set by Chinese authorities by which all
participants in 5 March riot must surrender.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP90TO0100R000201090001-1
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The Panchen Lama confirms that four people died
in the 5 March rioting, and later increases the toll
to five. Previously, Beijing acknowledged only
one death.
The Panchen Lama says the Dalai Lama would be
allowed to reside in Tibet; the Dalai Lama calls on
Beijing to consider his five-point peace proposal.
The Dalai Lama arrives in London for a 10-day
stay.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP90TO0100R000201090001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP90TO0100R000201090001-1
Subject: China: Tension in Tibet Continue
Distribution:
White House and National Security Council
1 - Don Gregg, Special Assistant to the Vice-President, NSC, Room 298,
White House
1 - James A. Kelly, Senior Director for Asian Affairs, Old Executive Office
Building, Room 302
1 - Doug Paal, Director of Asian Affairs, NSC, Room 302, OEOB
Department of State
1 - The Honorable Gaston Sigur, Assistant Secretary East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Room 6205
1 - Stapleton Roy, Deputy Assistant Secretary, East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Room 6205
1 - Richard Williams, Director, Office of Chinese Affairs (EAP/C),
Room 4318
1 - Richard Solomon, Director Policy Planning Staff, Room 7311
1 - Robert L. Suettinger, Director, INR/EAP, Room 8840
1 - Tom Fingar, Chief, INR/EAP/CH, Room 8840
1 - Chris Clarke, INR/EAP/CH, Room 8840
1 - Bart Flaherty, EAP/C, Room 4318
Department of Defense
1 The Honorable Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary for International
Security Affairs, Pentagon, Room 4E808
1 - Dr. Karl Jackson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia, ISA,
Room 4E817, Pentagon
1 John J. Sloan, Defense Intelligence Officer, East Asia and Pacific,
Pentagon, Room 2C238
1 - Ed Ross, OSDISA, 4C840, Pentagon
China Plans and Policy, FESA J-5, Room 2E973, Pentagon
Major Ron Tom, China Staff Officer, Hq Dept. of the Army, DAMO-SSA,
Room 3B516, Pentagon
1 - Major A. G. Yang, Office of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, DAMI-FII, Room 2A474, Pentagon
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP90TO0100R000201090001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP90TO0100R000201090001-1
Central Intelligence Agency
DDI, Room 7E44
Senior Review Panel, Room 5G00
PDB Staff, Room 7F30
NIC/Analytic Group, Room 7E47
NIO/EA, Room 7E62
NIO/Econ, Room 7E47
C/PES, Room 7F24
DC1/COMPT, Room 7C28,
CPAS/ISS, Room 7G50
CPAS/ILS, Room 7G50
CH/EA/CORR, Room 5D38
Room 5D54
Room 3D01
D/OLL, Room 7B24
D/LDA, Room 1H18
C/LDA/CH, Room 11-118
NESA/SO/S, Room 6G17
U(31/FbIL;/L;mp, Hoorn
Office of Congressional Affaris, Room 7B02
FARO/FF/NF Rnnm ft;'1
D/OEA, Room 4F18
OEA Production Staff, Room 4G48
C/OEA/CH, Room 4G32
C/OEA/NEA, Room 4G43
C/OEA/SEA, Room 4F42
C/OEA/CH
C/OEA/CH
C/OEA/CH
C/OEA/CH
Room 4G32
Room 4G32
Room 4G32
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP90TO0100R000201090001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP90TO0100R000201090001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP90TO0100R000201090001-1