THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS OF SOUTH AFRICA: ORGANIZATION, COMMUNIST TIES, AND SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90R00961R000600050009-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2013
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: July 1, 1986
• Content Type: SNIE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
Director of
Central
Intelligence
MASTER FILE COPY
DOO~?i AsK OUT
The African National Congress of
South Africa: Organization, Communist
Ties, and Short-Term Prospects
Special National Intelligence Estimate
fret
SNIE 73-86
July 1986
Copy 5 0 9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/ Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL ...- This Information Has Been Authorized for
Release to ...
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90R00961 R000600050009-1
S N I E 73-86
THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS OF
SOUTH AFRICA: ORGANIZATION, COMMUNIST
TIES, AND SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS
Information available as of 31 July 1986 was used in the
preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board on 31 July 1986.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90R00961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 11
Introduction ....................................................................................... 11
The Evolution of the ANC ............................................................... 11
The Current Setting .......................................................................... 12
The AN(; ........................................................................................... 13
Organization .................................................................................. 13
Objectives ...................................................................................... 13
ANC External Activities ................................................................... 15
ANC Internal Activities .................................................................... 15
Military /Paramilitary Activities .................................................. 15
Political Activities ......................................................................... 16
Relations With Internal Organizations ............................................ 1 i
Labor ............................................................................................. 1 i
The United Democratic Front ..................................................... 1 i
Black Consciousness Groups ......................................................... 18
The Township Militants ............................................................... 18
Rural and Homeland Blacks ........................................................ 18
White Groups ................................................................................ 18
Communist Influence in the ANC; .................................................. 19
SACP Organization and Objectives ............................................. 19
Soviet Objectives ........................................................................... 21
Soviet Bloc Support ....................................................................... 22
Constraints on Communist Influence in the AN( : ......................... 22
The Black Nationalist Faction ..................................................... 22
Non-Communist Foreign Support ............................................... 24
ANC Prospects for the Next Two Years ......................................... 24
External Activities ........................................................................ 24
Internal Activities ......................................................................... 25
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90R00961 R000600050009-1
Page
The South African Response ........................................................ 25
Prospects for Negotiation ............................................................. 26
Key Variables .................................................................................... 26
Conciliation Versus Repression .................................................... 26
Release of Nelson Mandela .......................................................... 26
Implications for the Soviet Union .................................................... 26
Implications for the United States ................................................... 27
Annex A. ANC Organization .............................................................. 29
Annex B. Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), ANC
Military ................................................................................ 31
Annex C. A Chronology of Relations Between the ANC
and the SACP ...................................................................... 35
Annex D. Key Personalities ................................................................. 39
iv
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90R00961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90R00961 R000600050009-1
SCOPE NOTE
In the past two years, the African National Congress (ANC) of
South Africa has emerged both within South Africa and on the
international scene as a major actor on the South African scene. Its
growing international acceptance seems predicated on the belief that
the ANC is a dominant shaper of events inside South Africa. This
Estimate seeks to examine the ANC, assess its policies and role in
contemporary South Africa, and estimate its growth and influence over
the next two years. It will also examine the nature of the ANC's
"revolutionary alliance" with the South African Communist Party
(SACP) and measure SA(;P influence and control over the ANC and its
policies and activities.
I
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90R00961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
KEY JUDGMENTS '
The international recognition accorded to the African National
Congress (ANC) as a spokesman for South African black political
aspirations is likely to grow during the next two years, as is its popularity
with South African blacks. The ANC's ability to garner widespread
support, however, is unlikely to be matched by a commensurate
increase in its ability to direct and control events inside South Africa.
We believe that the ANC recognizes that its chances for overthrowing
the South African Government in the near term are poor and that its
greatest short-run strengths lie in its ability to broaden its base of
international support and to gain domestic support as South African
blacks become more politicized and radicalized
In our judgment, the ANC's advocacy of the revolutionary and
violent overthrow of the South African Government will continue and
likely intensify. The ANC will maintain a pro-Soviet posture and the
longstanding alliance between the ANC and the South African Commu-
nist Party (SACP) will continue, as will the SACP's considerable
influence over and extensive and widespread presence in the ANC's
organizational and decisionmaking structures. This influence, however,
will remain constrained by non-Communist ANC leaders and fall short
of complete domination or control.
The Soviets calculate that the ANC will be the principal vehicle for
change in South Africa and they view the SACP, as well as ANC
dependence on Soviet military assistance, as their means of influence
within the ANC. The SACP is a protege of the Soviet Communist Party,
which funds and guides it. Moscow has treated the ANC as its "natural
ally" in the region deserving of financial, political, and military support.
The Soviets, however, are somewhat suspicious of the ANC's ideological
reliability and are concerned that nationalist elements could be co-
opted by Pretoria into some kind of reform program.
The Soviets are opposed to current Western efforts to promote
negotiations because they believe the South African Government is still
too strong, Western countries remain influential, and the ANC; is not yet
' The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, concurs in this Estimate,
but notes that it has not examined how potential changes in L'S policy or a significant expansion of L'S
relations with black South African organizations might alter the conduct or policies of the ANC.
3
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90R00961 R000600050009-1
recognized as the only spokesman for South African blacks. Moscow
appears convinced that the best way to advance Soviet interests in South
Africa is to support the ANC and its campaign of armed struggle.
Carefully directed violence, as Moscow sees it, will provoke counter-
action and repression by the South African Government, which in turn
will contribute to the polarization and politicization of the masses.
Violence will disrupt the economy, lead to disinvestment by Western
governments, and ultimately promote the collapse of the South African
regime. Moscow, however, appears concerned about growing internally
generated violence that is not under the control of the ANC and from
which rival groups may benefit.
The ANC is a small (about 10,000), externally based and bureau-
cratically complex organization. Transformed by banning and suppres-
sion in the 1960s from a legal, internal mass party to an externally
based, "vanguard" style liberation movement, the ANC's main compo-
nents are:
- A military wing (about 5,000 strong), mostly based in Angola.
- A collection of governing bodies located, along with most of the
ANC leaders, in London and Lusaka.
- An extensive external network (in about 40 countries, including
most major capitals) of ANC offices, which raises funds and
garners support, disseminates propaganda, and provides general
foreign representation.
- A rather disorganized and small clandestine political and mili-
tary support infrastructure within South Africa and in neighbor-
ing states.
We see little near-term prospect that the ANC and the South
African Government will find common ground to negotiate. Both sides
appear ill-disposed to compromise and determined to gird themselves
for the long struggle. There remains, however, an outside chance that
both sides could agree to talks. Should such talks occur, we believe both
sides would enter into them largely for tactical reasons, such as sowing
division in the other's camp or fostering the appearance of reasonable-
ness in Western eyes, rather than with the intention of negotiating
seriously.
The ANC is unlikely to fundamentally alter its articulated goals
and objectives. The ANC's short-term military goals will continue to be
designed to rally black resistance to the government, to intimidate
whites and erode their resolve, and to undermine government control of
nonwhite areas, while seeking over the longer term to develop an
insurgency capable of overthrowing the white government. On the
4
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90R00961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90R00961 R000600050009-1
political front, the ANC is likely to continue to encourage intensified
antigovernment activities by black South Africans and try to increase
Pretoria's international isolation by supporting demands for harsh
economic sanctions. In an effort to appeal to as broad an audience as
possible, the ANC also is likely to maintain its allegiance to its official
political manifesto-the 1955 Freedom Charter-that lists moderate
socialist and democratic aims. ANC leaders are unlikely to see any
political advantage to formulating a more specific vision of a future
black majority government.
Notwithstanding the fact that the ANC is now the most popular
black organization inside South Africa, there is little prospect that the
ANC will be able to mount a regime-threatening military campaign
during the period of this Estimate. In particular, Pretoria's willingness
to strike whenever and wherever it believes necessary against the ANC
will hamper its efforts to build the infrastructure needed inside South
Africa to sustain an insurgency.
ANC military activities during the next two years will probably
result in more civilian-especially white-casualties than in the past.
Although the older generation leaders may question the political
wisdom of risking Western support by such a campaign, we believe
pressure from young militants for such actions-including possible
attacks on Western business interests-will grow.
ANC internal political operations will have very mixed results.
Efforts to create a coherent underground political organization have
been beset with difficulties and will face continuing constraints. We
expect the ANC to participate in and even take control of some of the
shadow government organizations springing up in townships where
government control has collapsed. Although in competition with other
groups, ANC popularity and access to weapons will give it a decided
edge.
The ANC will continue to try to broaden its appeal to supporters of
groups such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of
South African Trade Unions (COSATU). While these groups are not
now under-or likely to come under-ANC control or direction, a
growing number of internal groups are likely to at least publicly pay
homage to the figurehead role of the ANC. In most cases, however, ties
between the exiled ANC and internal opposition groups are unlikely to
go much beyond rhetorical alliances with their leaderships, and we
expect that the ANC will be forced to be content with trying to bypass
leaders and appeal to the rank and file. Internal leaders, in our
judgment, recognize that closer ties probably are a short-term liability
rather than an asset as long as the ANC remains a banned organization.
5
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90R00961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
Resistance to the ANC from "black consciousness" groups,
regionally/ tribally based groups like Chief Buthelezi's Zulu organization
Inkatha, and rural-based groups such as the Pretoria-created homeland
"governments," will continue but slowly erode as the ANC makes
inroads into their memberships and areas of influence.
The ANC is likely to have considerably more success mobilizing
international opinion in its favor and gaining increased financial, and
perhaps military, support. Although we expect that many supporters,
and potential supporters, in the West will be troubled by the ANC's
close ties to the Soviet Bloc and the group's increasing use of indiscrimi-
nate attacks, current political trends in South Africa as well as the
worldwide focus on Pretoria's intransigence will work to the ANC's
advantage.
Increases in support from the wider international community,
however, are likely to be offset somewhat by ANC reverses in the
region. South Africa almost certainly will increase the cost of supporting
the ANC to neighboring countries by repeatedly demonstrating its
military and economic dominance. The black ruled nations have few
resources for fending off Pretoria, and when pressed will have no choice
but to attempt to please Pretoria, if only by temporarily limiting or
restricting ANC activities within their borders.
The SACP, by dint of its long history of support for the ANC and
presence therein and its dedicated and ideologically committed leader-
ship, has exercised, and is likely to continue to exercise, considerable in-
fluence in the ANC. We see little likelihood that ANC officials-
Communist and non-Communist alike-will see any political advantage
to fundamentally altering their longstanding and extensive relationship.
These ties date to the 1920s, extend through the period of civil
disobedience in the 1950s, and were formalized in an alliance in 1969 of
the three revolutionary "pillars of the liberation struggle": the ANC, the
SACP, and the SACP-controlled South African Congress of Trade
Unions (SACTU). We estimate that perhaps as much as 25 percent of
the ANC's total membership now belongs to the SACP.
SACP representation on the ANC's ruling National Executive
Committee (NEC) and other ANC bodies, as well as the ANC's
dependence on the Soviet Bloc, will continue to give SACP members
considerable influence over ANC policies. In our judgment, probably
more than half the seats on the NEC-11 known and 8 probable SACP
members-currently are held by Communists. Known or suspected
SACP members, for example, hold such important ANC positions as
secretary general, deputy secretary general, intelligence and security
director, director of information and publicity, and top slots in the
military wing.
6
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90R00961 R000600050009-1
The SACP and the Soviet Bloc also are likely to continue to have
leverage because:
- Thousands of ANC political and military cadres have been
trained in the Soviet Bloc or exposed to Marxist-Leninist
political education by Communist instructors in ANC camps.
- The SACP has gained entry into black labor through the South
African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), which is'a member
of the major international Soviet labor front. This influence is
marginal, however, given that SACTU has little influence-and
only marginal prospects for gaining influence-in South Africa's
burgeoning black labor movement.
- Most ANC literature is printed in East Germany and the two
mainline ANC publications as well as the ANC radio program
have Soviet Bloc advisers and receive Bloc assistance.
- The Soviet Bloc continues to provide virtually all military
assistance received by the ANC. Hundreds of Cuban and East
German instructors train ANC military wing recruits in Angola.
- The Soviets also provide limited nonmilitary assistance-such as
scholarships to study in Bloc countries-and provide or encour-
age a wide spectrum of material support through non-Bloc
surrogates or fronts.
Non-Communist leaders of the ANC-most notably ANC Presi-
dent Oliver Tambo-are well aware that SACP members have the
potential to gain control of the ANC, and are likely to continue to work
successfully to thwart Communist attempts to completely control the
ANC. Past reporting indicates that Tambo and other non-Communists,
although recognizing the need to maintain good relations with their
major benefactor, sometimes resent heavyhanded Soviet and SACP
attempts to dictate to the group.
Among the factors that we believe will continue to limit SACP
leverage are:
- A decisionmaking process that operates by way of consensus
rather than voting. This has a tendency, in our judgment, to
discount the SACP's numerical strength and enhance "old
guard" influence.
- The presence of two identifiable black nationalist factions in the
ANC-the "old guard" non-Communists and the young mili-
tants. The interests of these groups will continue at times to run
counter to those of the SACP.
7
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90R00961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
- Tactical and organizational moves by non-Communist leaders to
limit SACP influence. In the past, these have included rules that
prohibit all nonofficial contacts between ANC and Soviet
officials, and the reported creation of a core Working Commit-
tee-composed of non-Communists-to run the ANC on a day-
to-day basis. Tambo's position as ANC president also gives him
significant input in the SACP appointments of some SACP
officials.
- The presence of young black militants-many of whom are in
the military wing, and appear increasingly contemptuous of
nonblacks, Communists, and the cautious military tactics of the
"old guard" leadership.
- The ANC will continue to receive the bulk of its nonmilitary aid
from non-Bloc donors.
- Recognition by all parties that the SACP lacks popular support
inside South Africa, and that a split would leave the SACP
isolated and with little influence insid h Africa.
There are two sets of key variables that could alter our estimation
of ANC prospects. The first would see the release of Nelson Mandela.
The South African Government would like to release Nelson Mandela
primarily to avoid the repercussions of his dying in jail. However, given
the immense domestic and international popularity of Mandela, he
poses a real threat to the government and it is unlikely, in our judgment,
that he will be released over the next two years.
A second key variable, somewhat outside the scope of this Esti-
mate, is the pace and scope of South African Government reform.
Should political reform be accelerated by the government, ANC
relationships with internal organizations would be jeopardized. There
are few indications that Pretoria has such an acceleration in mind,
however, and recent government crackdowns suggest that the pace of
reforms will, if anything, slow.
During the period of this Estimate, Moscow is likely to continue its
present mix of low-cost and low-risk support for the ANC and SACP by
supplying arms, advisers, and limited funds, and lending propaganda
and diplomatic support. The Soviets probably are confident that in the
long run this effort will pay off with a pro-Soviet regime in South
Africa. To this end, they likely are encouraged by Pretoria's shift
toward greater repression of black dissidents, believing that it further
isolates Pretoria, increases the chances of a violent overthrow of the
government, and lessens the chances that the ANC will be tempted to
backslide and negotiate with the South African Government.
8
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90R00961 R000600050009-1
The ANC will continue to present a dilemma for the United States.
The ANC's tactics of revolutionary violence are not consonant with US
policies designed to promote nonviolent change. Most troubling is the
SACP's strong position in the ANC leadership and the ANC's pro-Soviet,
anti-US posture. These negative factors are not likely to change in the
next two years.
On the other hand, in the likely context of developments in South
Africa over the next two years and beyond-inadequate reforms,
increasing black resistance, government suppression-the ANC will
strengthen its monopoly on the symbols of liberation and hold a virtual
veto over blacks who may claim to speak for the majority. In the
absence of significant political reform and negotiations with credible
black leaders, and given the likelihood of increasing violence and
polarization, it is difficult to see: how the ANC can be divorced from a
growing number of internal black opposition groups; the ANC-SACP
alliance sundered; its support of revolutionary violence diminished; or
Soviet influence reduced.
While the release of Nelson Mandela, the unbanning of the ANC,
South African Government-ANC negotiations, or accelerated govern-
ment political reforms all seem unlikely' over this period, progress on
any of them could alter the estimated course of developments or change
the factors in a more favorable direction for US interests.
9
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90R00961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
African National Congress (ANC) in Southern Africa-Selected Facilities and Camps
"VJOBURA
,PRETORIA
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
` Orange } Natal
Free /
State 'MASE U t~~ Richard's Bay
LES HO
SOUT / Durban
AFRICA
Cape Traansker
Cisher
East London F
TANZANIA
L7 1
KEHYAI r'
DAR ES
SALAAM
Morogoro
Selected facility/camp
Country supporting ANC
Black homeland
(only three named)
South African province
boundary
500 Kilometers
- 1 _
10
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
DISCUSSION
1. The African National Congress (ANC) is at one
and the same time a small, largely external, semiclan-
destine organization of probably not more than 10,000
members and the most popular organization within
South Africa. The ANC's position has been bolstered
by its ability to gain increasing international recogni-
tion as the leading representative of South African
blacks, which must be allowed at least a share in any
future government. Its resurgence during the past two
years of domestic unrest in South Africa has brought to
the surface old and new controversies over the depth
and significance of the group's ties to the South
African Communist Party (SA(P), the ANC's political
and economic vision of a postapartheid South Africa,
and its ability to control and direct antigovernment
activities in the black townships
2. The seeming paradox between the mass appeal
of the ANC and its small size and external base is
explained by several factors:
- The ANC was forced by government banning
and other suppressive efforts to become a small,
serniclandestine, mainly external organization in
order to survive.
- None of its rivals for the mantle of the anti-
apartheid struggle has developed a broad nation-
al appeal.
- The ANC; has concentrated its appeal on its
broadest, most popular program contained in its
1955 "Freedom Charter," which calls for a
"united, democratic, and nonracial state."
- SAG policies of granting only limited reforms
and periodically heavily suppressing internal dis-
sent have raised both nonwhite political expecta-
tions and the level of frustration and dissent.
These policies, combined with economic, demo-
graphic, and sociological factors, have served to
politicize millions of nonwhite South Africans in
the last few years, creating a vast new audience
for ANC activity
ANC
NEC
ANC
SACP
AZAPO
AZACTU
COSATU
UDF
GLOSSARY
African National Congress
National Executive Committee of the
Azanian People's Organization (Azania is
"the black consciousness" term for South
Africa)
Azanian Congress of Trade Unions
Congress of South African Trade Unions
United Democratic Front
Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation),
the ANC military arm
3. Founded in 1912, the ANC, has undergone a
number of transformations that reflect the changing
goals and tactics of South African blacks as well as the
differing responses of successive white-dominated gov-
ernments to black political activity. The small group of
largely middle-class, educated, black professionals and
tribal chiefs who formed the core of the early ANC
made little headway in organizing opposition to the
government's racial policies. Dynamic younger activ-
ists-including Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, and
others who now form the ''old guard" of today's
ANC-gained control of the organization in the 1940s
and launched a campaign of more militant disobedi-
ence that included protest marches, strikes, and mass
demonstrations. By the mid-1950s the ANC claimed a
membership of over 100,000 but achieved little more
success than its predecessors in forcing changes on the
government
11
SECRET
225X1
, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
4. Banned-along with the rival Pan-Africanist
Congress (PAC)2-by the government following the
Sharpeville incident in 1960, the ANC went tinder-
ground and pursued a campaign of sabotage directed
by the group's newly formed military wing, Lmk-
honto we Sizwe (The Spear of the Nation). South
African police broke the campaign in 1962-63 with a
series of arrests of ANC leaders, including Mandela.
With its internal organization decimated, some 600
ANC cadres who had eluded arrest went into exile to
begin the long process of reforming and transforming
the ANC from an internally based mass political
organization to a small, externally based revolutionary
movement.
5. As the organization atrophied in exile, the ANC
in the early 1970s became less and less relevant to
events going on inside South Africa. The Soweto riots
in 1976-77, however, proved a boon to the ANC; some
4,000 young, black, student refugees fled South Africa
and joined the ANC. Strengthened by new recruits,
increased military and training assistance from the
Soviet Bloc, and the emergence of new staging and
training areas in newly independent Mozambique and
Angola, the ANC began to conduct a limited number
of sabotage bombings and haphazard attacks on police
stations in the late 1970s. In 1980, it began a more
active and organized paramilitary campaign that has
continued to this day.
6. Although the ANC had been closely associated
with the SACP since the 1920s-the ANC, for exam-
ple, was closely tied to several SACP-controlled mass
organizations during the period of civil disobedience
in the 1950s-these bonds were strengthened and
expanded when the ANC was forced into exile begin-
ning in the early 1960s. The SACP, far more experi-
enced than the ANC at operating in exile and with
wider international contacts, funneled economic aid to
the ANC and provided limited military assistance and
training. Most black SACP members joined the ANC
after the banning of the Communist Party in 1950.
Most of the remaining party members followed when
the ANC officially opened its membership to nonb-
lacks in 1969. In the wake of the Soweto riots,
Soviet assistance in the form of
increased provision of arms and training, both in the
region and in Bloc countries. Not surprisingly,
The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), which continues to this day
as a rival of the ANC, split from the ANC in the late 1950s over the
issue of white and Communist influence within the organization.
The PAC leaders argued that non-African-especially white Com-
munist-participation in the antiapartheid struggle was reinforcing
throughout this period the ANC's public ideological
pronouncements and programs assumed a more revo-
lutionary Marxist tone.
The Current Setting
7. The ANC's growing popularity comes against a
backdrop of dramatically escalating black frustration
and protest over the scope and pace of the political
reforms offered by Pretoria. The 1984 Constitution,
granting some political representation to Coloreds and
Indians but none to blacks, served as a catalyst for
black resistance to apartheid and the government.
Many blacks saw the constitutional changes as denying
them any hope of increased political rights and gave
up on Pretoria's intermittent and slow reform pro-
gram. Violent resistance to government authority
broke out in black townships, at first over economic
grievances, but, within a year, largely motivated by a
political agenda of total resistance to government
authority. Despite massive government efforts to con-
tain it, violence in black townships has resulted in
some 2,000 killed in unrest-related incidents since
September 1984. This violence increasingly has been
directed against symbols of political authority, most
notably blacks who either represent the government
by serving on local governing bodies or who economi-
cally benefit from "the system"; many government-
imposed local government authorities have been de-
stroyed. In their place have arisen new community
organizations, which range from local groups often
under the control of bullyboys to more organized-
and probably more representative-shadow communi-
ty governments. Although many of these organizations
have proved, or will prove to be, transitory, there is no
question that the multiplication of black political
organizations and the expansion of violent black resis-
tance to South African governmental authority signal a
new phase of black political protest.
8. Although these trends appear on the surface to
track well with longstanding ANC objectives, the ANC
has been responsible for only a small percentage of
recent violent incidents. In contrast to their public
statements, in which they claim that township violence
is a response to their call to "make South Africa
ungovernable," ANC leaders privately have admitted
that they trailed, rather than led, events. In August
1985, ANC President Oliver Tambo, in a rare public
admission, noted that the ANC must "catch up" with
township militants and "properly take control of
them.
9. Despite its lack of control over the internal
situation, the ANC has benefited from the unrest.
12
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
Popular support among South African blacks for the
ANC as a symbol of black resistance has skyrocketed
in this volatile political climate. Polls indicate that
roughly half of South Africa's 9 million urban blacks
now support the ANC, and that an even greater
number favor imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Man-
dela as their political leader. Nor is there any question
that the overwhelming majority of the nonwhite popu-
lation identifies with the ANC's broad objectives
enshrined in the 1955 Freedom Charter (see inset).
Coordinating Council. The Working Committee and
External Coordinating Council give day-to-day direc-
tion to the farflung external elements of the ANC; the
Politico-Military Council directs ANC activities target-
ed against South Africa. Members of all the senior
committees are based in Lusaka, London, or, in a few
cases, Dar es Salaam, and the senior leaders are
inveterate peripatetics; rarely are meetings fully at-
tended and often deputies or ad hoc attendees take
part in decisionmaking.
10. In our judgment, the ANC's position inside
South Africa has been enhanced in part by the group's
skillful use of its Freedom Charter, the powerful
symbolic appeal of Nelson Mandela and other long-
imprisoned ANC leaders, and the attention focused on
the ANC by the government. The ANC, for example,
has skillfully reechoed and pledged allegiance to the
purposely broad and vague goals of the ANC's 1955
Freedom Charter rather than attempting to spell out
in detail the specifics of a new government. Conse-
quently the group has been able to draw differing
political visions of the future under its umbrella.
Liberal white, Colored, and Indian supporters, for
example, identify with the Charter's call for a multira-
cial democratic state, while more militant blacks focus
more on demands for social and economic change.
The continued imprisonment of Nelson Mandela pro-
vides a powerful unifying and rallying symbol for
South African blacks while allowing Mandela to re-
main above the partisan fray. We also believe that the
South African Government's stated view that the ANC
is directing and controlling much of the unrest has
burnished the ANC's credentials as the most influen-
tial opposition group.
Organization
11. The ANC is a complex organization (see annex
A) consisting of numerous committees, 11 of which
meet with regularity and varying effectiveness. The
ANC has offices in about 40 countries, including most
major capitals, but the leadership is concentrated in
two countries-the United Kingdom and Zambia.
12. The principal decisionmaking body of the ANC
is the 30-member National Executive Committee
(NEC), although the NEC meets only a few times a
year to formulate broad policies. Its most important
organizational entities are the NEC Working Commit-
tee, the Politico-Military Council and the External
13. Primarily for security reasons, the ANC's mili-
tary wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation)
operates largely independently of the rest of the
organization. Of the roughly 5,000 ANC guerrillas
(virtually all of whom are black) some 4,000 are being
trained in camps in Angola by Cuban, East German,
Soviet, and Angolan instructors, while several hundred
are located in camps in Tanzania. Still others are
scattered in small clandestine facilities in Botswana,
Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zim-
babwe. The number of ANC military personnel inside
South Africa is difficult to ascertain, but we believe
the figure is less than 200 at any one time. Although
military personnel located semipermanently in South
Africa were given greater operational freedom last
year to select and strike targets, military command,
control, and support structures still remain in countries
adjoining South Africa.
Objectives
14. The ANC's short-term objectives are fairly
clear. The group's military strategy is designed in the
near term to rally black resistance against the govern-
ment, to intimidate whites and wear down their
resolve, and to undermine the government's control in
nonwhite areas. Short-term political goals center on
persuading the international community to isolate the
white government completely by imposing the harsh-
est sanctions possible, encouraging intensified antigov-
ernment activities by blacks in South Africa-particu-
larly those who support the ANC-and gaining greater
domestic and international recognition as the leading
representative of the nonwhite community in South
Africa.
15. In the longer term, the ANC seeks to develop an
insurgency capable of overthrowing the intransigent
white government. Most ANC leaders, recognizing the
might of South Africa's vast military resources, pri-
vately admit, however, that prospects for such an
insurgency are bleak without significant help from the
black populace-a "people's war"-and neighboring
states. Pinpointing the ANC's long-term political goals
13
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
THE FREEDOM CHARTER
We, the People of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know:
that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government ((in justly claim authorttt unless it is based on
the will of all the people;
that our people have been robbed of their birthright to land, liberty and peace he a funs of gowermnent founded on injustice and inequality
that our country will never be prosperous unfree until all out people use in brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and opportunities:
thal only a democratic state, based on the Brill of all the people, can secure to all their birthright without distinction of colour, rare, sec or belief
And therefore, we. the people of South Africa, black and white together - equals, countrymen and brothers - adopt this Freedom Charter.
And we pledge ourselves to strive together, sparing neither strength nor courage, until the democratic changes here set out have been ,sun.
THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN! THERE SHALL BE WORK AND SECURITY!
Every man and woman shall have the right to vote for and to All who work shall be free to form trade unions, to elect their
stand as a candidate for all bodies which make laws: officers and to make wage agreements with their employers;
All people shall be entitled to take part in the administration of The state shall recognise the right and duty of all to work, and
the country; to draw lull unemployment benefits;
The rights of the people shall be the same, regardless of race, Men and women of all races shall receive equal pay for equal
colour or sex; work;
All bxlies of minority rule, advisory hoards, councils and There shall be a folly-hour working week. a national minimum
:mthorilies shall be replaced by democratic organs of wage, paid annual leave, and sick leave for all workers, and
self-government. maternity leave on full pay for all working mothers;
ALL NATIONAL GROUPS Miners, domestic workers, farm workers and civil servants shall
SHALL HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS! have the same rights as all others who work;
There shall be equal status in the bodies of state, in the courts Child labour, compound labour, the tot system and contract
and in the schools for all national groups and races: labour shall be abolished.
All people shall have equal right to use their own languages, and THE DOORS OF LEARNING
to develop their own folk culture and customs; AND OF CULTURE SHALL BE OPENED!
All national groups shall be protected by law against insults to
their race and national pride; The government shall discover, develop and encourage national
The preaching and practice of national, race or colour talent for the enhancement of our cultural life;
All the cultural treasures of mankind shall he open to all, by
All apartheid d laws and and pcontemptractices shall be shall a he set punishable aside. crime: free exchange of hooks, ideas and contact with other lands;
All aparth -'-
,I., onanc people and their culture, to honour human brotherhood, liberty
IN THE COUNTRY'S WEALTH! and peace;
The national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Education shall be free, compulsory, universal and equal for all
Africans. shall be restored to the people: children;
The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly Higher education and technical training shall he opened to all by
industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a means of state allowances and scholarships awarded on the basis
whole; of merit;
All other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the well- Adult illiteracy shall be ended by a mass state education plan;
being of the people; Teachers shall have all the rights of other citizens;
All people shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to The colour bar in cultural life. in sport and in education shall be
manufacture and to enter all trades, crafts and professions. abolished.
THE LAND SHALL BE SHARED THERE SHALL, BE HOUSES,
AMONG THOSE WHO WORK IT! SECURITY AND COMFORT!
and all then of land ownership a racial basis shall ended, All people shall have the right to live where they choose. he
and all the land re-divided d amongst (Mhoose. who work it t t to banish
fantine and land hunger; decently housed, and to bring up their families in comfort and
The state shall help the peasants with implements, seed, tractors security:
and dams to save the soil and assist the tillers: Unused housing space to he made available to the people:
Freedom of movement shall he guaranteed to all who work on Rent and prices shall he lowered. food plentiful and no-one shall
the land; go hungry;
All shall have the right to occupy land wherever they choose; A preventive health scheme shall he run by the state:
People shall not be robbed of their cattle, and forced labour and Free medical care and hospitalisation shall be provided for all,
farm prisons shall be abolished. with special care for mothers and young children;
ALL SHALT, BE EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW! Slums shall be demolished, and new suburbs built where all
have transport, roads, lighting, playing fields. creches and social
No-one shall be imprisoned, deported or restricted without a fair centres;
trial; The aged, the orphans, the disabled and the sick shall he cared
No-one shall be condemned by the order of any Government for by the state:
official; Rest, leisure and recreation shall he the right of all,
The courts shall be representative of all the people; Fenced locations and ghettoes shall he abolished, and laws which
Imprisonment shall be only for serious crimes against the pco- break up families shall be repealed.
ple, and shall aim at re-education, not vengeance;
The police force and army shall be open to all on an equal basis THERE SHALL BE PEACE
and shall be the helpers and protectors of the people; AND FRIENDSHIP!
All laws which discriminate on grounds of race, colour or belief South Africa shall be a fully independent state, which respects
shall be repealed. the rights and sovereignty of all nations;
ALL SHALL ENJOY EQUAL HUMAN RIGHTS! South Africa shall strive to maintain world peace and the settle-
The law shall guarantee to all their right to speak, to organise, ment of all international disputes by negotiation - not war;
to meet together, to publish, to preach, to worship and to Peace and friendship amongst all our people shall he secured by
educate their children; upholding the equal rights, opportunities and status of all.
The privacy of the house from police raids shall he protected by The people of the protectorates - Basutoland, Bechuanaland and
law; Swaziland - shall he free to decide for themselves their own
All shall be free to travel without restriction front countryside to future.
town,from province to province, and from South Africa abroad; The right of all the peoples of Africa to independence and self-
Pass Laws, permits and all other laws restricting these freedoms government shall be recognised, and shall he the basis of close
shall be abolished. co-operation.
Let all who love their people and their countrv now Bar, a.s we .say here:
'THESE FREEDOMS WE WILL FIGHT FOR, SIDE BY SIDE, THROUGHOUT OUR LIVES,
UNTIL WE HAVE WON OUR LIBERTY. '
Adopted at the Congress of the People. Klipiown. South Africa, on ?fish June, 19S5
14
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
is more difficult given the diversity of views represent-
ed in the ANC leadership. The group's official politi-
cal manifesto, the 1955 Freedom Charter (see inset),
lists moderate socialist aims but is deliberately vague
in order to appeal to and attract as broad a coalition of
antiapartheid forces as possible. While President
Tambo has privately expressed a preference for a
moderate, independent state with a democratic base,
the ANC leadership has avoided formulating a plat-
form for a black majority government-in part to
avoid internecine conflict.
16. The ANC, through its foreign offices and par-
ticipation in international organizations, seeks to mobi-
lize opinion in favor of the ANC and obtain material
support for the ANC. The ANC also promotes mea-
sures and activities that condemn, isolate, and damage
the South African Government such as boycotts and
sanctions. The ANC also seeks international recogni-
tion as the sole and only legitimate representative of
the South African peoples.
17. The ANC has had growing success in all these
external activities, and this success will very likely
continue to increase. Aided initially only by the Soviet
Bloc, Soviet front organizations (all of which the ANC
has joined), and radical African states, the ANC has
obtained a worldwide venue for its agitprop activities
against South Africa and to promote itself. Although
we have only sketchy intelligence on external support
to the ANC, non-Communist moral and material
support is on the increase. Non-Communist govern-
ments and organizations, such as the British Govern-
ment and the EEC, which have historically avoided
contact with the ANC because of its program of
seeking the overthrow of the South African Govern-
ment through revolutionary violence, have publicly
opened contact with the ANC leadership in the last
year.
South Africa, and handicapped also by the need to
have some form of support mechanism in states
bordering South Africa, and by difficult to nonexistent
communications with operational units, the MK has
done well to increase its sabotage activity in the last
year (see annex B).
20. Recent bombings suggest that the ANC is con-
tinuing its shift toward attacks on civilians despite the
potential hazards of South African retaliation and
Western condemnation. Against a backdrop of the
worst domestic unrest in South Africa's modern history
and challenges presented by the state of emergency,
the ANC leadership apparently has decided that at-
tacks on government targets alone are not sufficient.
Given the pattern and scope of recent indiscriminate
bombings, we consider it highly likely that virtually all
of these bombings were the work of ANC guerrillas.
21. Until last year the ANC generally tried to avoid
causing civilian casualties during attacks on govern-
ment targets. Exceptions usually were unintentional or
were justified as retaliation for South African raids
against ANC targets in neighboring states. ANC
spokesmen claimed, for example, that the car bombing
of the South African Air Force headquarters in May
1983, in which 19 people died and 219 were injured-
many of them civilian passersby-was in response to a
South African attack on ANC guerrillas in Lesotho six
months earlier. Following a major ANC conference in
Zambia in June 1985, President Tambo said the group
would continue to strike at government targets but
would be less concerned about civilian casualties. This
decision reflected the growing influence of militant,
rank-and-file black nationalist youths opposed to what
they saw as inaction by the ANC's relatively moderate
"old guard" leadership. Most ANC bombings since late
last year have been directed against civilian rather
than government targets. A recent ANC statement
specifically noted that white farmers and urban white
males were considered by the ANC as part of the
government's "security forces" and were valid targets
tary/paramilitary and political actions.
Military/ Paramilitary Activities
19. The capabilities of the ANC's military wing,
Umkhonto we Sizwe (commonly referred to as "MK"),
to conduct military operations are modest (see annex
B). Handicapped by the need to infiltrate MK cadres
over long distances, sometimes remote and difficult
terrain, and heavily patrolled borders into and out of
for ANC operations.
conducted about 260 attacks from 1976 to 1984; in
1985 alone, it carried out 136 attacks, or roughly three
times the number of attacks in 1984. The increase has
continued in 1986, with some 116 attacks during the
first half of the year. There has been a flurry of
bombings following the declaration of a state of
emergency in June. We believe this increase primarily
15
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90R00961 R000600050009-1
resulted from a decision made at the ANC conference
last year to grant greater operational freedom to
military personnel inside the country to plan and
execute attacks. In the past, ANC: military command-
ers located in neighboring states would meticulously
plot out operations based on detailed information on
potential targets inside South Africa provided by
reconnaissance teams. Guerrilla teams usually then
would infiltrate South Africa, retrieve weapons from
caches placed earlier by separate units, conduct the
attack against the predetermined target, and flee back
across the border. Very often, however, the slightest
problem would result in the entire operation being
postponed.
23. Under the new rules of engagement, more
guerrillas apparently are being deployed for longer
periods inside the urban townships, choosing their own
targets within parameters presumably set by the lead-
ership, and striking when ready. This has allowed
them to conduct relatively simple hit-and-run attacks
on black local authorities (widely despised as govern-
ment collaborators) as well as the increased numbers of
security personnel in the black townships, who have
proved often to be vulnerable to surprise attacks. The
recent increase in indiscriminate urban bombings and
the use of landmines-operations which also require
less planning and preparation than in the past-is
likely to help make 1986 another record year of
activit' for the group, especially as the ANC appears
determined to take advantage of the international
focus on South Africa.
24. In a third important development, the ANC
military wing decided last year to begin limited
recruitment and training of black youths inside the
townships to try to offset increasing restrictions on
INC :activities in neighboring states by nervous host
governments. Although further details are sketchy,
ANC officials clearly want the new recruits to be
disciplined and under the strict control of regular
military cadres. One event last year tends to confirm
that the ANC has at least experimented with passing
out weapons to young township militants and perhaps
has provided elementary on-the-spot training as well.
On 26 June 1985 seven young local blacks (lied and
seven were injured in a series of related incidents in
three townships near Johannesburg. Six of the dead
and several of the injured were missing their right
hands because of grenades that had been rigged to
explode prematurely, The grenades came from an
ANC arms cache that South African security personnel
had discovered and tampered ,vith earlier. A hiatus in
grenade attacks of several months followed the widely
publicized deaths of the youths and subsequent ANC
claims that police posing as guerrillas had given the
booby-trapped grenades to inexperienced activists.
25. The longstanding ANC attempts to build a
widespread coherent underground political organiza-
tion in South Africa have had limited success. While
numerous ANC cells are believed to exist in South
Africa, these cells are not in direct communication
with ANC headquarters in Lusaka. ANC command
structure runs from Zambia to offices and bureaus in
countries bordering South Africa. Within the republic,
intermediate command and control echelons do not
appear to exist. Furthermore, the ANC facilities in
neighboring states have been subject to periodic South
African countermeasures, including military attack,
making it more difficult to maintain links between
Lusaka and the internal cells.
26. Although some of these echelons in neighboring
states have been abandoned under pressure from
Pretoria and host governments, most will likely be
reconstituted in the next two years. The prospects for
effective underground organization in South Africa,
with coherent guidance and direction through a chain
of command, seem modest. South African raids on
ANC offices have compromised much of the group's
organization through captured documents and the
interrogation of captives. Any further underground
organization will remain vulnerable to such counter-
measures. In addition, the ANC's process of vetting
new members will continue to inhibit the growth of
the organization in South Africa. If the ban on the
ANC; were lifted, however, it would likely grow
rapidly using the existing cell network as an organiza-
tional frame.
27. We do anticipate that ANC, cadres will partici-
pate in, and in some cases, control the "shadow
governments," (for example "street committees," "ac-
tion councils," and "peoples' courts") that are spring-
ing up in some populous African townships, such as
Mamelodi, Guguletu, and Alexandra. The government
is unlikely to succeed in suppressing all of these groups
and their self-appointed leaderships. The ANC agents
will be in competition with other groups such as
"black consciousness" militants and local criminal
warlords, but we anticipate that the ANC influence
within these "liberated areas" will gradually increase
and represent a significant ANC gain.
28. The second line of ANC internal political strate-
gy, which has been more successful than the develop-
ment of an underground, focuses on legal internal
16
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90R00961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
opposition groups. The ANC seeks to will support
from, and in turn supports, existing major associations
of groups opposed to the government's policies. In
addition, the ANC calls for the creation of new united
fronts of other groups, such as women and youth. This
strategy enhances ANC claims to represent the major-
ity and advances the work of building unity. Two key
federations, with extensively overlapping member-
ships, have developed this line of strategy. The princi-
pal group is the UDF, which brings together over 600
organizations; second is the COSATU labor federation,
some of whose components are also linked to the UDF.
Leaders of both have traveled to Lusaka for meetings
with ANC leaders and issued statements of support.
Some ANC leaders intend to build these and other
federations into the broad popular fronts similar to
those called for in classic Marxist-Leninist strategy.
We anticipate that ANC connections with and influ-
ence over these groups will become stronger, although
dependent to a degree on Pretoria's actions. The ANC
will fall short of converting them to obedient surro-
gates in most cases, however.
Relations With Internal Organizations
29. The ANC has a wide range of supporters and
opponents within South Africa. While few groups are
under ANC control or direction, a growing number
support it. Some support derives simply from its
symbolic importance as the oldest black nationalist
movement. Numerous groups also share the funda-
mental ANC objectives of eliminating apartheid and
restructuring South African politics and society on
lines similar to, if not explicitly following, the ANC
Freedom Charter. This support, however, does not
equate with complete agreement with every aspect of
ANC programs and tactics. In particular many groups
do not endorse the "armed struggle." Some disagree-
ments lead to moderate or strong-even bitter-
opposition among sectors of society that otherwise
share the desire to protest and change apartheid.
30. The black labor movement in South Africa is
divided on support for the ANC. The leadership of the
largest black labor federation, the 660,000 member
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU),
has made statements openly supportive of the ANC.
COSATU leaders have conducted talks with ANC
officials in Lusaka. Officials of the ANC's SACP-
controlled labor affiliate, SACTU, were present at
these talks but played only a minor role. Nonetheless,
we expect the COSATU leadership to retain formal
independence from all political groups. While
COSATU may support the ANC in opposition to the
white government, it is unlikely to welcome any effort
by the ANC or SACTU to assert itself as the senior
spokesman for or representative of black labor.
31. One small black federation, AZACTU, which
claims 60,000 members, rejects the ANC's multiracial
character and Communist ties. Many other labor
leaders, such as the CUSA and TUCSA federation
leaders, prefer to remain neutral even if they have
personal inclinations toward the ANC in order not to
divide their memberships on a political issue.
32. COSATU's expression of support for the ANC,
was the key factor in the creation in May 1986 of a
new labor grouping based on Chief Buthelezi's Zulu-
based Inkatha movement. This grouping, called the
United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA), is
explicitly anti-ANC and opposed also to COSATU,
which it accuses-incorrectly in our view-of being an
ANC front. Although UWUSA is being built from the
top down as the labor arm of Inkatha, it is likely to
organize substantial portions of the work force in
Natal and KwaZulu and thus dilute both ANC and
COSATU influence in these areas.
The United Democratic Front (UDF)
33. The UDF is a loose federation of over 600
separate and widely disparate organizations with both
national and regional leaderships and a claimed mem-
bership of some 2 million. The UDF's political agenda
closely resembles the democratic and multiracial as-
pects of the ANC's Freedom Charter and many UDF
leaders have had strong ANC connections. The ANC
probably has substantial influence in the national UDF
leadership, in some of the regional leaderships such as
the Natal and West Cape UDF organizations, and
reportedly directs a small number of the component
organizations. Nonetheless, we do not credit either
South African Government or ANC claims that the
UDF is an ANC surrogate. The UDF is a loose
organization and the large majority of its component
organizations are autonomous actors and not con-
trolled by the ANC. Many of these groups are issue
oriented and are willing to act contrary to ANC wishes
in negotiating with the South African Government or
"establishment" entities to obtain real reforms or
benefits for their members.
34. The UDF's future is cloudy. Newly formed
community and youth groups, some dominated by
violence-oriented radicals that claim allegiance to the
17
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
UDF, have overshadowed more conservative, reform-
oriented groups and leaders, including religious
groups. The UDF has been a specific target of govern-
ment suppression and, given the disparate nature of its
constituency, it is questionable whether the UDF can
survive as a national organization given concerted
government suppression.
Black Consciousness Groups
35. Black consciousness groups reflect a longstand-
ing minority black opposition to the ANC's multira-
cialism and its alleged SACP domination. They believe
blacks should win their own liberation and reject white
domination or participation in the struggle. The first
group formed to promote these views was the 1958
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), still feebly opposing
the ANC from exile. A second group, the now-banned
Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), provided the
dynamics for the 1976 Soweto riots. Successor Black
Consciousness (BC) groups set up the National Forum
in 1983 as a much smaller rival to the UDF. Most
National Forum groups are dominated by intellectu-
als, internally divided, and are increasingly in violent
conflict with the UDF and ANC supporters. The
leading component, the 20,000 member Azanian Peo-
ples' Organization (AZAPO), is hostile to the ANC and
UDF on a number of counts. It accuses the ANC of
being controlled by white and Indian Communists,
and criticizes ANC/UDF support of consumer and
school boycotts. In turn, the ANC has publicly dispar-
aged AZAPO as immature. Although the views of
many young radicals are closer to the views of the BC
National Forum, we expect continuing defections
from this group to the ANC and UDF.
The Township Militants
36. The most visibly active group within South
Africa is the mostly unemployed and young township
militants who are responsible for much of the violence.
The township militants appear to lack coherent orga-
nization or serious affiliation with other groups. In
general, they favor violence against "collaborators,"
and the "establishment," and feel that only by open
violence can they bring down the system of white rule.
Various groups claim allegiance to the ANC, UDF, or
AZAPO, but evidence of serious organization or incor-
poration is lacking. Violence often seems random and
nihilistic. The ANC, UDF, and AZAPO are making
efforts to recruit and control these groups, but with
only limited success to date. The very amorphousness
of these groups prevents comprehensive government
suppression of them.
37. As economic conditions in the townships worsen
and recruitment efforts on the part of the ANC, UDF,
and AZAPO intensify, we envision some more struc-
tured organization of these elements developing, par-
ticularly in townships where the government adminis-
tration has collapsed. The ANC has a marked
advantage in recruiting these groups by means of its
supply of arms and will likely make the most head-
way, but we envision much of the township violence
continuing to come from ill-organized and largely
transitory groups. We also see interfactional violence
among these township militants on the rise, at times
encouraged by the South African Government.
38. The often-made charge that the ANC is domi-
nated by Xhosa-speaking leaders such as Mandela and
Tambo has had some impact on ANC appeal among
other ethnic groups, particularly among the Zulu,
traditionally hostile to the Xhosa. ANC rivalry with
the KwaZulu leader, Chief Buthelezi, and his Zulu-
based political movement (which claims a membership
of over 1 million) has been quite bitter and shows no
signs of diminishing. While Buthelezi embraces the
political aims of the ANC and has acknowledged the
leadership of Nelson Mandela, he rejects the armed
struggle and ANC demands for disinvestment and
other sanctions. Buthelezi has probably significantly
undermined ANC efforts to expand among the 7
million Zulus, who represent about one-quarter of
South Africa's black population. Many young urban
Zulus, however, have rebuffed Buthelezi's leadership,
and his continued failure to win any significant con-
cessions from Pretoria has diminished his general
prestige. Meanwhile the ANC has moved to increase
its support in rural areas and the homelands. ANC and
UDF activities have expanded to several "homeland"
areas and are likely to increase. The tribally oriented
homeland "governments" created by Pretoria are not
uniformly hostile to the ANC. For example, the
Kangwane leader Enos Mabuza in early 1986 met with
ANC leaders in Lusaka and has made statements
generally supportive of the ANC.
White Groups
39. Numerous white groups-businessmen, stu-
dents, religious leaders, opposition political figures-
have opened contact with the ANC in the last year.
The ANC has made expansion of contacts with white
groups such as the End Conscription Campaign and
the National Union of South African Students a top
18
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90R00961 R000600050009-1
priority for 1986. The garnering of white support for
the ANC will be handicapped by the increasing ANC
support for sabotage and terrorist actions that kill
white civilians.
Communist Influence in the ANC
40. The nature of the relationship between the
ANC and the South African Communist Party has
provoked sharp debate within the ANC and drawn
close scrutiny of outside observers. Historically, the
SACP has preferred to conceal the Communist alle-
giance of some senior ANC officials for fear of
alienating moderate sympathizers. Nevertheless, in
public the two groups define their relationship as an
"alliance" that, along with the South African Congress
of Trade Unions (SACTU), forms the three "pillars of
the liberation struggle."
41. The ANC, however, is not a monolith nor do we
believe it is under the firm control of any one cohesive
group. In our judgment, the SACP (in part because of
its long history of support for the ANC and its
dedicated and ideologically committed leadership) has
a considerable degree of influence in the ANC-
particularly in the ANC's military wing. At the same
time, however, we believe that generational, racial,
and ideological differences within the ANC act as a
Communists (see chart). Known or probable SACP
members currently fill the key ANC positions such as
secretary general, deputy secretary general, deputy
treasurer general, intelligence and security director,
director of information and publicity, secretary of the
political committee, editor of the party magazine
Sechaba, and the top positions in MK, just to name the
most prominent.
43. SACP influence also extends throughout other
ANC organizations. SACP members, for example, play
a leading role in the ANC's military wing created in
1961. Since then, SACP cadres have held top com-
mand positions in both the military and intelligence
sections of the ANC. In addition, thousands of ANC
political and military cadres have been trained in the
Soviet Bloc or exposed to Marxist-Leninist political
education given the Communist instructors in ANC
camps.
44. The SACP also has gained limited entry into the
black labor movement through the South African
Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), founded in 1954
and currently operating in self-imposed exile in Lusa-
ka, Zambia. SACTU is a member of the Soviet-front
World Federation of Trade Unions and has served as a
conduit for Soviet funding to the ANC. Almost all the
top executives of the SACTU are SACP members
brake against any SACP attempt to gain domination
over or total control of the ANC.
42. The ties between the ANC and the South
African Communist Party (known as the Communist
Party of South Africa before it was outlawed and re-
formed in the early 1950s) date from the founding of
the party in 1921. Although relations between the two
groups have ebbed and flowed, the SACP historically
has been well represented in ANC councils (see annex
Q. Given that almost all SACP members seek to
conceal their party affiliation, it is not possible to
identify with full confidence all Communist members
of the ANC or assert with certainty the percentage of
ANC members who also belong to the SACP. We
estimate, however, that perhaps as much as 25 percent
of the ANC's total membership may belong to the
SACP, although we cannot provide firm or incontro-
vertible intelligence to support this judgment. We are
confident, however, in judging that the SACP exerts
considerable influence on ANC policies through its
disproportionately heavy representation on the Na-
tional Executive Committee (NEC) and other decision-
making bodies. In our judgment, probably somewhat
more than half of the 30 seats on the NEC-11 known
and 8 probable SACP members-are currently held by
while SACTU's head sits on the NEC.
45. SACP influence is particularly strong in the
ANC's information and propaganda spheres. Most
ANC literature is printed in East Germany and the
two mainline ANC publications as well as the ANC
radio program, Radio Truth, have Soviet Bloc advisers
and receive Bloc assistance.
SACP Organization and Objectives
46. SACP Organization. Details on the inner
workings of the SACP or the means by which Moscow
directs the SACP are scarce. We do know, however,
that the SACP is a pro-Soviet, semisecret party head-
quartered in London. To help "monitor" the ANC, the
SACP has established a watchdog District Committee
based in Lusaka. The SACP appears to see itself as a
vanguard and the key force directing the ANC, the
broader "national democratic" liberation movement.
As such, limited intelligence indicates that the SACP is
not interested in mass recruitment in its ranks, and
follows a careful and lengthy screening process-often
as long as three years-of potential SACP membersE
19
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90R00961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
Membership of the African National Congress's
National Executive Committee
Race/
Ethnic
Group e
Joe Slovo
Alfred Nzo
W
B/Yhosa
Chief of staff, military wing
Secretary general
61
S. R. "Mac" Maharai
I
Member, with military and intelligence responsibilities
51
NIzwai Piliso
B/Xhosa
Head, intelligence and security department
62
Dart Tloome
B/unknossn
Deputy secretary general
65
John Nkadimeng
B/unknowtn
General secretary, SACTU
60,
Reginald September
C
Member
62
James Stuart
Member
49
Aziz Pahad
I
Member
44
Francis Meli
B1/unknown
Editor, Sechaba, ANC Magazine
49
Stephen Dlarnini
B/Swazi
President, South African Congress of Trade Unions
73
(
SACTU)
73
Probable Communists
Thabo Mheki
B/Xhosa
Director Department of Information and Publicity
44
Joe Modise
B/Sotho
Commander, military wing
53,
Martin "Chris" Haiti
B/unknown
Deputy Commander and political commissar, military
42
wing
Director of research, Department of Information and
44
Anthony Mongalo
B/Sotho
Publicity
Representative to East Germany
49
Josiah Jele
13/Zulu
SACTU staff
54
Gertrude Shope
B/unknown
Head, women's section
60
John Gaetswe
B/unknown
Member
65,
Probable Non-Communists
Cassius Make
B/Sotho
Political commissar, military wing
45,
Heim Makgothi
B/ Tswana
Secretary of education
57
Joe Nhlanhla
13/unknown
Member
53,
Sizakele Sigxashe
B/Xhosa
Member
48
Non-Communists
Oliver Tambo
B/Xhosa
President
68
Thomas Nkobi
B/rnknotvn
Treasurer General
63
Johnny Makatini
B/Zulu
Director, Department of International Affairs
56
Simon Makana
B/Xhosa
Head of security in Lusaka
51
Jacob Zuma
B/Zulu
Representative in Mozambique
44
Robert (Manci) Conco
B/Zulu
Representative in Mozambique
43,
Ruth Mompati
B/unknown
Member
60
Key: (B) - Black
(C) - Colored
Approximately.
(I) - Indian
(W) - White
20
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
47. The SACP is not without some internal division
and has suffered in the past from racial tensions.
Although blacks reportedly make tip 90 percent of the
SACP members, the Party continues to be dominated
by English-speaking whites and Asians.' Racial antago-
nism has on at least a few occasions resulted in black
SACP members' intriguing against white members
within the leadership. Nonetheless, the SACP leader-
ship has shown the capability to tolerate and overcome
personality clashes, as well as racial hostilities, within
its ranks. Individual members who stray too far are
purged, and SACP members of all races have a record
of pulling together to protect SACP equities within the
ANC. Despite an expected increase in black-white
tensions within the SACP, we do not envision them
splitting or seriously shaking SACP cohesiveness over
the next two years
48. SACP Objectives. SACP literature makes clear
that it envisions and is planning for a scenario in which
there is a broad national democratic revolution after
which the "working class" under SACP control will
'take over the state apparatus" to engineer an eco-
nomic and social revolution. In 1983, the late Chair-
man of the SACP, an Indian, listed the Party's more
immediate tactical goals as:
- Guiding and directing the revolutionary struggle.
- Educating the masses to the "universal truths" of
Marxism-Leninism.
- Strengthening the ANC-SACP alliance.
- Resisting backsliding to a "bourgeois-reformist"
way of development.
- Concentrating on organizing, uniting, and giving
clear guidance to the black working class.
- Defeating South African Government attempts
number of South African black organizations such as
the "black consciousness" groups, probably has a broad
antipathy for US policy toward South Africa. A major-
ity of ANC, members are suspicious of capitalism, from
which they have derived little benefit, and fond of
Marxist terminology. ANC publications on foreign
policy, for example, closely follow Soviet themes and
ANC President Tambo and other senior ANC officials
regularly issue statements that parallel Soviet positions.
Soviet Objectives
50. The Soviet Union seeks important long-term
strategic objectives through the overthrow of the South
African Government and its replacement by a regime
"well-disposed" toward Moscow. Moscow believes the
economic weight of South Africa, its educated and
well-trained work force, and its developed economy
and infrastructure will enable a black South African
government to assume a leading role on the continent,
even overshadowing Nigeria and Ethiopia. Moreover,
the Soviets are aware of the value of South African
resources, especially of minerals strategic to the West.
In the short- to medium-term, Moscow seeks to under-
mine the influence of the West in South Africa while
extracting maximum propaganda benefit for Soviet
international diplomacy and to remove South Africa
from being what it terms a "strategic pillar" of the
Western alliance.
51. Soviet strategy toward South Africa closely
meshes with Soviet policy toward other southern
African states whose governments are generally sym-
pathetic to the ANC. For example, a portion of the
Soviet military assistance to several of those states is
channeled toward the arming and training of the
ANC. Southern African states often suffer South Afri-
can retaliation for support to the ANC, creating a
to create a black middle class.
49. Taking its cues from Moscow, the SACP's agen-
da not surprisingly takes on a manifestly anti-US tone
claiming that US efforts to foster political change
without destroying South Africa's economic system are
unwelcome "reformism." Although the ANC; has fol-
lowed a less consistent track in public and private, it is
equally not surprising that factions of the ANC often
strongly echo positions taken by the SACP. We esti-
mate that the majority of the AN(:, like a growing
A recent SACP publication gave the following ethnic breakdown
for the attendees at the late 1984 Sixth Congress of the SACP: 64
percent African, 18 percent Indian, 6 percent Colored, and 12
perceived need for improved self defense and military
assistance, openings the Soviets can exploit.
52. The Soviets calculate that the ANC will be the
principal vehicle for change in South Africa and view
the SACP, as well as AN(, dependence on Soviet
military assistance, as their means of influence within
the ANC. The SACP is a protege of the Soviet
Communist Party, which funds and guides it. Moscow
has treated the ANC as its "natural ally" in the region
deserving of financial, political, and military support.
The Soviets, however, are somewhat suspicious of the
ANC's ideological reliability and are concerned that
nationalist elements could be co-opted by Pretoria into
some kind of reform program.
21
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
53. The Soviets are opposed to current Western
efforts to promote negotiations because they believe
the South African Government is still too strong,
Western countries remain influential, and the ANC is
not yet recognized as the only spokesman for South
African blacks. Moscow appears convinced that the
best way to advance Soviet interests in South Africa is
to support the ANC and its campaign of armed
struggle. Carefully directed violence, as Moscow sees
it, will provoke counteraction and repression by the
South African Government, which in turn will contrib-
ute to the polarization and politicization of the masses.
Violence will disrupt the economy, lead to disinvest-
ment by Western governments, and ultimately pro-
mote the collapse of the South African regime. Mos-
cow, however, appears concerned about growing
internally generated violence that is not under the
control of the ANC and from which rival groups may
benefit.
Soviet Bloc Support
54. Soviet support to the ANC is across the board
and through multiple channels and seems designed to
both enhance the influence of the SACP within the
ANC as well as maintain Soviet influence over the
broader ANC leadership. We believe the Soviet Bloc
provides virtually all the military assistance received
by the ANC but is much less generous regarding
nonmilitary aid. In both cases, we cannot estimate
specific dollar amounts of this assistance
55. The ANC's heavy dependence on the Soviet
Bloc for military aid is an important source of leverage
for the SACP and the Soviet Union. In 1983, Oliver
Tambo stated that the ANC obtained 90 percent of its
military support from the Soviet Union. The Soviet
Bloc supplies virtually all the military equipment to
the MK, and the 500 Cuban and East German instruc-
tors present in Angolan training camps provide train-
ing to MK recruits, among others. The Soviet Bloc
donates all advanced military and sabotage training by
means of "scholarships" to the USSR and East Germa-
ny; attendance at such courses seems to be a sine qua
non for advancement in the MK hierarchy.
56. Soviet Bloc nonmilitary assistance takes many
forms. According to a 1982 report, 180 ANC nonmili-
tary cadres are given scholarships to study in the
Soviet Bloc each year. The Soviets also give or encour-
age a wide spectrum of material support through non-
Bloc surrogates and fronts. The British Communist
Party provides a wide variety of support to the ANC
in the United Kingdom. Funds have been provided by
the Soviets to individual ANC members, both SACP
and non-SACP, within the ANC hierarchy.
indicates that Soviet embassies have supp ie
57. The history of the ANC since the 1940s has
included periodic unsuccessful attempts by "black
nationalists" to protest SACP and nonblack influence
within the ANC. In each case, SACP leaders and
veteran non-Communist leaders were able to control
the organization and oust the protesters. There have
been several grassroots mutinies within MK also pro-
testing SACP and nonblack control, and all these were
ruthlessly suppressed (see annex Q. (s NF)
58. At least two identifiable black nationalist fac-
tions within the ANC have interests that at times run
counter to those of the group's SACP clique. The first
includes "old guard" nationalists who long ago opted
to work alongside the Communists against a common
enemy rather than break away in opposition to the
ANC-SACP alliance. Although members of this group
such as ANC President Tambo and Treasurer General
Nkobi on occasion have expressed resentment at Com-
munist attempts to undercut their authority, they see
themselves as political realists who must recognize that
the ANC presently has no choice but to continue to
depend on Communist assistance. The second faction
is comprised mainly of young rank-and-file militants
who joined the ANC during the Soweto riots and who
exhibit anti-Communist and antiwhite views. The
"Class of 76" already has begun to challenge SACP
and ANC officials and is likely to make its presence in
the ANC even more strongly felt during the period of
this Estimate
59. The Non-Communist "Old Guard." As "prac-
tical politicians" and "pragmatists," non-Communist
ANC veterans such as ANC President Oliver Tambo
and ANC Treasurer Thomas Nkobi have sought to
maintain close relations with the Soviet Union and
Communist members of the ANC leadership. In the
past, for example, Tambo has not always sided with
the "old guard" in disputes with the Communists over
contentious issues. In one incident Tambo allowed Joe
22
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1 25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
Slovo, SACP Chairman and NEC member, to go to
Moscow in July 1985 even though several non-Com-
munist NEC members objected because they believe
he would brief Moscow on the recently completed
ANC conference that Soviet observers were not al-
lossed to attend.
60. Nevertheless, the ANC non-Communist leaders
are well aware that SACP members have the potential
to gain control of the ANC, and have worked hard-
and with success in our estimation-to prevent the
Communists from completely controlling the ANC.
Non-Communists in the ANC on occasion have ex-
pressed anger at the lack of tact displayed by Soviet
officials who have a tendency at times to act as though
they have a right to dictate to the group. The ANC's
non-Communist leaders also resent the constant and
often heavyhanded efforts by Soviet intelligence offi-
cers to recruit junior and mid-level ANC members.
Tambo and most NEC members also appear resigned
to the fact that SACP members on the NEC pass
information to Moscow.
61. Acting on this distrust of Moscow, Tambo and
other non-Communists have taken a number of steps
designed to curb Soviet and SACP influence. The
group, for example, now has established rules that
prohibit all nonofficial contacts between ANC and
Soviet officials, and that require all official contacts to
he reported. ANC efforts to halt Soviet recruitment
activity, however, have had little success. Tambo also
occasionally has assigned special projects to non-Com-
munists and had them report back only to him.
Soviet penetration of the
ANC also has been hampered somewhat by the cre-
ation of a core Working Committee of the NEC,
comprised of non-Communist NEC members and
charged with handling the day-to-day activities of the
group. There is almost no evidence as to the success of
these two measures. Despite the ANC military wing's
longstanding need for a secure communications sys-
tem refused a Soviet
offer last year to provide such a system because the
ANC was convinced the Soviets would monitor its
communications. ANC efforts over the years to gain
greater support from China and the West offers
further evidence that the SACP faction in the ANC
does not have absolute control over ANC policy.
62. There is little evidence available on specifics of
the policy debate within the top ANC structures such
as the NEC. Despite having an apparent majority in
the NEC, the SACP is not able to prevent occasional
initiatives and policies which displease the Soviet
Lnion-such as overtures to China and the West. We
attribute this in large part to the "old guard," which
wields influence beyond its mere numbers, and to
decisionmaking by consensus, which allows for the
play of personal influence of "old guard" leaders like
Oliver Tambo. The SACP played an important part in
the formation of the most fundamental ANC policies,
such as the Freedom Charter and the inception of
paramilitary activity. We believe this reflects a broad
consensus between the SACP and "old guard'' leaders
on fundamental strategy, and considerably reduces the
areas of potential friction between them.
63. We also believe that the SACP's lack of popular
support inside South Africa gives non-Communist
leaders considerable counterleverage against SACP
efforts to dominate the group. While we view a
collapse of the ANC-SACP alliance as unlikely, such a
split would leave the SACP isolated and with little
influence in South Africa. We believe both the SACP
and Moscow realize this and would be reluctant to
pursue opposition to an ANC policy line to the point of
risking an irreparable split in the ANC-SACP alliance.
64. Under the present ANC-SACP relationship,
Tambo's position as ANC: president also gives him
significant input into the SACP's selection of its chair-
man and secretary-general. The SACP, for example,
reportedly must negotiate with Tambo over the role
proposed SACP candidates would play in the ANC if
they were selected. Tambo also apparently has a voice
in the affairs of the Communist-dominated and self-
exiled SACTU, a labor federation and the ANC's third
"ally." He and most NEC members reportedly are
thoroughly dissatisfied with SACTU and see it as being
completely out of touch with the rapidly developing
black labor situation in South Africa. Tambo appears
to believe that SACTL will never be able to gain direct
influence with COSATU's leadership and that the
most SACTU is likely to be able to do is serve as a
labor propaganda arm for the ANC. Last November
he instructed SACTU leaders to comprehensively reex-
amine their labor strategy and urged them to give up
their "impossible" efforts to actively control labor
activity in South Africa.
65. The Young Militants. Younger black mili-
tants-many of wwhorn are in the military wing-
appear increasingly contemptuous of the "cautious"
ald guard" as well as nonblacks and Communists, and
favor expanding military activities against white civil-
ians. We cannot identify a leadership element of this
23
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
inchoate group. Several recent grassroots mutinies
have protested the role of Communists in the ANC's
leadership and the sluggish pace of the guerrilla
campaign. We believe these restless "young lions"
were a major factor in the decision made at the ANC's
1985 conference to revise military tactics
noting the influence of many young deleg so
far as to speculate that it would be the last conference
dominated by the older generation leadership of the
NEC.
66. We believe that some black SACP members,
particularly in Umkhonto we Sizwe, have opportunis-
tically moved to support the military policies advocat-
ed by these militants, probably sensing that this group,
which almost certainly represents a majority of the
rank and file in Umkhonto we Sizwe and the ANC,
poses the most significant potential challenge to the
established leadership of the ANC. We see continuing
tension between the leadership and this broad group;
and the views of this group will increasingly impact on
and circumscribe ANC tactical flexibility. For exam-
ple, we believe that the ANC leadership is cautious
and divided over the questions of negotiation with the
South African Government or compromise over the
armed struggle, in part because of leadership percep-
tion that such a move would not be tolerated by the
young, militant rank and file. Nonetheless, we see both
ANC and SACP leaders retaining overall control of the
organization and capable of resisting any challenge to
their leadership positions from this group. Over a
longer time frame than this Estimate, this group will
have the potential for moving into the ANC leadership
as some veterans die off and other leaders seek to
mollify this faction further by promoting representa-
tives into leadership positions.
Non-Communist Foreign Support
67. Non-Communist support to the ANC is signifi-
cant, and it exceeds Soviet Bloc assistance in nonmili-
tary support. One of the two leading non-Communist
sources of support are the Nordic countries.
second ea ing source of nonmilitary support. Lesser
but regular contributions are made annually by the
World Council of Churches, various Western anti-
apartheid movements, and humanitarian aid groups
such as Oxfam. The OAU through its Liberation
Committee has been a longstanding, albeit minor,
source of military aid, and currently budgets $300,000
for the ANC. Non-Communist assistance is not de-
signed to enhance the credentials of non-Communist
ANC leaders or reduce SACP influence.
ANC Prospects for the Next Two Years
68. A recent Estimate" described the most likely
scenario of developments within South Africa over the
next several years as one of continuing white rule, an
ongoing government-directed reform program that
will receive at best mixed results, at best sluggish
economic growth, and continuing outbreaks of black
violence. We believe this scenario still is the most
likely, and project the following for the ANC for the
next two years against this scenario.
69. The international recognition accorded to the
ANC is likely to grow during the next two years. The
ANC's ability to garner widespread support as the
major-and in some circles the only-recognized
spokesman for the broad mass of black South Africans,
however, is not likely to be matched by a commensu-
rate increase in the ability of the ANC to direct and
control events inside South Africa. The ANC probably
recognizes that chances for the overthrow of the South
African Government in the near term are poor and
that the group's greatest short-run strength lies in its
ability to burnish its image and broaden the base of its
international support.
the ANC leadership in the past year.
70. We anticipate that the ANC's greatest successes
will come in mobilizing international opinion in its
favor and gaining increased financial, and perhaps
military, support. Although we expect that many
supporters, and potential supporters, in the West will
be troubled by the ANC's close ties to the Soviet Bloc
and the group's use at times of indiscriminate attacks,
current political trends in South Africa, as well as the
worldwide focus on Pretoria's intransigence, will work
to the ANC's advantage. The United Kingdom and
other EEC members, for example, already have par-
tially reversed past policies and opened contact with
71. To achieve this broadened external support, the
ANC is likely to lobby hard for the imposition of strict
sanctions and boycotts against Pretoria while remain-
ing vague about characteristics of a future ANC-
oriented government. The ANC can expect continued
24
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90R00961 R000600050009-1
front organizations, and most African nations.
72. Increases in support from the wider internation-
al community, however, are likely to be offset some-
what by ANC reverses in the region. In particular,
South Africa almost certainly will increase the cost of
supporting the ANC to the neighboring countries.
There is little that militarily weaker and economically
dependent black-ruled nations can do to fend off
Pretoria. As such, we expect that nations such as
Zimbabwe and Mozambique will try to walk a fine
line between bowing to South Africa's military and
economic might and allowing a limited ANC presence
in their countries. When pressed, however, the black-
ruled nations will have no choice but to attempt to
please Pretoria, if only by temporarily limiting or
restricting ANC activities within their borders.
73. In part because of its inability to establish
secure bases in neighboring countries, the ANC will be
incapable of mounting a regime-threatening military
campaign (luring the period of this Estimate. ANC
operations, however, are likely to be keyed to ANC
perceptions of the state of unrest inside South Africa.
Given the South African Government's extensive secu-
rity network, there is little prospect during the next
two years that the ANC will be able in any significant
way to move intermediate command and communica-
tions echelons now located in neighboring countries
into South Africa. Pretoria's willingness to strike when-
ever necessary at neighboring countries also will ham-
per ANC efforts to build an infrastructure inside South
Africa
74. We believe it is difficult to assess at this junc-
ture whether the ANC will expand its recent cam-
paign of attacks against civilian targets, or back away
from sustaining such a campaign to avoid alienating
the West and potential white supporters in South
Africa. On balance, however, the records of other
liberation groups around the world strongly suggest to
us that the ANC is unlikely to "take a step backward"
during its slowly evolving but increasingly harsh mili-
tary campaign. We expect ANC attacks during the
next two years to result in more civilian-especially
white civilian-casualties than in the past, although
traditional government targets also will be attacked.
Young militants in the ANC also are pressing for
attacks against Western firms in South Africa to spur
even greater disinvestment. The ANC leadership re-
portedly is waiting to see how the sanctions issue is
resolved, but the scope of any new sanctions almost
certainl' will fall short of ANC demands. As a result,
although ANC leaders will be reluctant to risk newly
improved ANC international legitimacy and increas-
ing Western support, we cannot rule out the possibility
of some future ANC; attacks on Western business
interests inside South Africa.
75. On the political front inside South Africa, the
ANC is likely to attempt to broaden its appeal to
the rank and file of groups such as the UDF and
COSATU, but in most cases is unlikely to succeed in
establishing much beyond rhetorical alliances with
their leaderships. Instead, we expect that the ANC; will
have to be content with trying to bypass leaders in an
attempt to appeal to the rank and file, and place ANC
supporters in key positions. In our judgment, although
internal leaders will continue to pay some homage
(such as by traveling to Lusaka to meet with ANC
leaders) to the principles espoused by the ANC, they
recognize that closer ties probably are a greater short-
term liability rather than an asset. In particular, as
long as the ANC remains a banned organization, closer
association with the ANC runs the risk of providing
Pretoria with "justification" for cracking down harder
on groups such as the UDF and COSATU.
The South African Response
76. All signs point to the government continuing its
campaign to discredit the ANC: by claiming that it is a
Communist-controlled organization dedicated to ter-
rorism, and that it enjoys little support among black
South Africans. Although unlikely in our judgment to
have much success, we also expect that the govern-
ment will continue with efforts to build an alternative
"moderate" black leadership willing to accept Pretor-
ia's reforms and challenge the ANC on its own ground
77. At the same time, we expect that South African
security authorities are increasingly likely to move
toward a strategy designed to break the back of the
organization in exile. Past limited military and para-
military raids in neighboring countries, which have
netted internal ANC documents, compromised ANC;
networks, and intimidated neighboring states into at
least temporarily- disrupting activities, are likely to be
supplanted by more destructive cross-border attacks.
Pretoria also may authorize selective assassinations of
ANC: officials. Inside South Africa, we expect that
security services will continue to have some success
rounding up ANC military units that infiltrate the
country. At the same time, we expect the security
services to become more aggressive in targeting groups
such as the UDF.
25
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90R00961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
78, On balance, we believe South African security
forces are capable of keeping ANC-sponsored violence
within, from Pretoria's perspective, tolerable limits.
We do not believe, however, that Pretoria is capable
within the next two years of meeting its stated objec-
tive of "restoring order" to black townships, or of
creating a black leadership strong enough to overcome
opposition from the ANC and other groups opposed to
negotiating with the government.
by white establishment entities to community action
groups and trade unions, there would likely be a
positive response on the part of some opposition
groups. Such new conciliatory dialogues would inhibit
ANC prospects to influence, penetrate, and control
these groups, as well as work against the ANC's broad
interests by dampening antigovernment fervor. The
current trends of government suppression and conse-
quent radicalization of the legal opposition groups
makes such a development unlikely over the next two
Prospects for Negotiation
79. We believe the ANC and the government will
not agree to negotiate during the period of this
Estimate. Both sides appear determined to gird them-
selves for the long struggle rather than compromise
now. The Eminent Persons Group of the Common-
wealth unsuccessfully attempted to promote talks ear-
lier this year. Although the ANC was not put to the
test of formally responding to the proposal, there
appeared to be some interest in the concept on the
part of the ANC "old guard."
80. There is an outside chance, however, that both
sides might agree to talks for tactical reasons, for
example, to sow division in the other's camp or to
foster an appearance of reasonableness in Western
eyes. Delegates at the ANC conference last year
agreed that the group should not enter negotiations as
long as the apartheid system "remains intact." A
consensus also was reached that another conference
should be called if the government's position on
apartheid changed radically. In addition, the NEC was
given authority to begin talks with the government in
the meantime but not to make any concessions without
specific approval. In the case of the government, we
believe it probably will eschew genuine negotiations
until after it has exhausted most of its security options
and resources, regardless of mounting white casualties
and international pressure-a point beyond the time
frame of this Estimate.
Key Variables
81. There are two key variables that would affect
and possibly alter these projected outcomes, both
related to South African Government actions.
Conciliation Versus Repression
82. Should the South African Government funda-
mentally change its policy toward internal nonwhite
opposition groups and seek to conciliate these groups
by undertaking new reforms and allowing concessions
years.
83. Pretoria would like to release Nelson Mandela'
primarily to avoid the repercussions of his dying in
jail. However, given the immense domestic and inter-
national popularity of Mandela, he poses a real threat
to Pretoria and it is unlikely, in our judgment, that he
will be released over the next two years. Should he be
released, the most likely scenario would have Mandela
moving immediately and smoothly into the top leader-
ship. He would likely accept and support extant ANC
policies and the prominent SACP presence as he did in
the 1950s, and he would serve as an important new
ambassador for the ANC internationally
Implications for the Soviet Union
84. Given the anticipated improvement in ANC
fortunes over the next two years, Moscow is likely to
continue without major change its present mix of low-
cost and low-risk support to the ANC: supplying arms,
advisers, and limited funds; lending propaganda and
diplomatic support; and other efforts designed to
sustain SACP influence within the ANC and advance
ANC fortunes.
85. The Soviets are probably confident that this
long-term effort of support to the ANC and SACP will
ultimately result in an outcome favorable to the
USSR-a pro-Soviet regime in South Africa. One of
Moscow's major concerns has been that a peaceful
reform and gradual elimination of apartheid would
reduce the ANC and SACP chances of seizing power.
The Soviets likely are encouraged by Pretoria's shift
toward greater repression of black dissidents, which
isolates it internationally and, in their view, increases
the long-term chances of a violent overthrow of the
Mandela no longer holds an official ANC position, but he is
widely regarded both internationally and in South Africa as the
ANC's "leader." His perceived ANC standing is the result of his
having become the most visible symbol of black opposition to
26
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
white government. Statements by Soviet officials sug-
gest that they do not expect this to happen soon but
are content with the progress their program is show-
ing, although exhibiting a continuing nervousness
about social democracy and backsliding tendencies
within the ANC.
88. The leading role of the ANC makes it essential
in any foreseeable peaceful negotiated outcome. Yet
the ANC's tactics of revolutionary violence are not
consonant with the US preference for evolutionary
change. Most troubling are the Communists' strong
position in the ANC's exiled leadership and the Con-
Implications for the United States
86. The ANC presents a dilemma for the United
States-and ANC is the most popular organization in
South Africa, but it is an organization with consider-
able Communist influence and has extensive and
longstanding ties to the Soviet Union, a pro-Soviet
posture, and it promotes revolutionary violence. This is
not likely to change over the next two years.
87. The ANC's membership is small, its vision of a
future South Africa vague, and its leadership is in exile
or imprisoned. But the ANC's broad popularity tends
to support its claim to be the leading representative of
blacks. The likely future South African develop-
ments-inadequate reforms, black resistance, govern-
ment suppression-will reinforce the ANC's hold on
the symbols of "liberation" and its near veto on blacks
who may claim to speak for the majority (even if it
cannot do so itself). Without significant action on black
political rights from the government, it is difficult to
see how the ANC can be divorced from the growing
number of internal black opposition groups.
gress' pro-Soviet, anti-US posture.
89. Efforts by third parties to deal with the ANC by
first seeking to separate it from internal black opposi-
tion, sunder the ANC-SACP alliance, or reduce Soviet
influence, would likely fail. ANC resistance to such
efforts could jeopardize efforts to improve contacts
with the ANC and increase ANC suspicion of Western
complicity with the Botha government.
90. Over the longer term the ANC character would
change were it to expand its role in domestic politics.
Even if operating from exile, ANC attempts to spread
its influence are likely to include stronger links to
internal organizations that are relatively democratic
and mostly anti-Communist. If allowed to operate
legally inside South Africa, the ANC could become a
mass-based party, a transformation that would greatly
reduce the role of the SACP. These two factors-the
existence of legal internal democratic opposition and
the legalization of the ANC-will remain dependent
on South African Government policy.
27
SECRET
, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
ANNEX A
ANC Organization
The ANC, then a mass organization, was banned in
1960 and its organizational structure virtually elimi-
nated in a series of arrests and detentions in 1962-63. A
handful of ANC National Executive Committee lead-
ers who were out of the country, joined by other ANC
officials who had fled before arrest, jumped bail, or
been released from detention, slowly re-formed the
ANC as an exile organization from bases in London
and Dar es Salaam. The ANC was organizationally
reconstituted as a semiclandestine movement in 1969.
All ANC leadership positions were assumed by these
exiles, some of whom had held senior ANC positions.
Subsequent appointments were made by this self-
proclaimed leadership, which ultimately gained ac-
ceptance and legitimacy both internationally and
within South Africa. The ANC constitution, designed
for a legal democratic mass organization, is in fact
moribund.
The highest titular authority of the ANC is its
National Consultative Conference, of which there
have been two (1969 and 1985). All delegates were
handpicked by the leadership.
The most senior policy organization of the ANC is
the National Executive Council (NEC), currently com-
posed of 30 members. The 1969 and 1985 National
Consultative Congresses not surprisingly elected the
incumbent NECs, but appointments to and dismissals
from the NEC regularly occur and appear on the basis
of a consensus among the majority of NEC members.
The NEC reportedly only meets two or three times a
year and rarely with full membership
The three top positions in the ANC are, in theory,
the president, secretary general, and treasurer general.
President Tambo sits ex officio on all substantive
committees of the ANC where decisions are made.
The three substantive committees of the ANC are:
the Politico-Military Council (and its subordinate Po-
litical and Military Committees), which plans and
directs all ANC activity inside South Africa; the
External Coordinating Committee, which directs all
ANC external activity; and the Working Committee,
which provides day-to-day, largely housekeeping,
management for external ANC activities.
A fourth locus of substantive authority is the Mili-
tary High Command, which in theory reports to the
Military Committee but apparently runs Umkhonto
we Sizwe.
There is a plethora of ANC departments that
manage functional areas of ANC external activity:
Information and Propaganda, Education, Health, In-
ternational Affairs, Youth League, Women's League,
Arts and Culture, and Intelligence and Security. Al-
though information is skimpy, it would seem that the
department heads have considerable freedom to man-
age their departments
The most important group not on the formal organi-
zational chart of the ANC is the South African Com-
munist Party. The SACP has a Central Executive
Committee based in London, and wields its collective
influence on the ANC through its London and Lusaka
Committees. Senior SACP members in the ANC pre-
sumably report to either the London or Lusaka Com-
mittees, and major ANC
policy and decisionmaking take place first in these
committees and then are transmitted to the ANC
structure through SACP cadres.
which is believed to be reasonably accurate
The ANC periodically changes the names of its
committees. See the organizational chart of the ANC,
29
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
Organization of the ANC
Politico-Military Council (PMC)
Regional Political
Committee
National Working Committee (NWC) '*_
The Military
High Command
Regional Military
Committee
~ Area
Political Committees
External Coordinating Council (ECC)
Department of International
Affairs
Treasury Department
Regional Missions, Foreign Liaison
Finance, Logistics, Transport
internal/
Research
Press releases
,
,
external propaganda
radio freedom
,
Department of Arts
Department of Manpower
and Culture
and Development
Arts Culture
Committee Committee
Art exhibitions Amandla Group,
Choir
30
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
ANNEX B
Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), The ANC Military
The military wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe
(Spear of the Nation or MK) was formed in 1961 to
organize a guerrilla war against the South African
Government. Its initial campaign of bombings col-
lapsed when its entire high command was captured in
a police raid in 1963 and subsequently convicted at
the famous Rivonia trial.
Senior ANC and SACP leaders had gone abroad in
1962 to seek training sites for MK cadres. A handful
were subsequently trained in Tanzania and Algeria,
but the most significant training was provided by the
Soviet Union (arranged by SACP leaders J. B. Marks
and Joe Slovo). In 1963-64, over 300 MK trainees
received training there. Following an attempt by MK
to ally with Zimbabwe African People's Union
(ZAPU), one of the Rhodesian insurgent groups, which
led to the loss of 100 MK fighters in an abortive
incursion into Rhodesia in 1967, MK became mori-
bund until 1977.
In 1977, about 4,000 militant, young blacks left
South Africa following the Soweto uprising and joined
the ANC and MK, reinvigorating the organization.
ANC President Tambo reportedly received pledges
from Soviet President Podgorniy and Cuban President
Castro that year for more support to MK. Later in
1977, MK training camps were established in Angola,
and Cuban and East German advisers and Soviet arms
were provided.
The "Class of 1976" revitalized an ineffective and
dormant organization but also sowed the seeds of the
current tension in the ANC. The young militants are
eager to dismantle apartheid, even if they have to
destroy South Africa's economic base and alienate the
white population in the process. The "old guard," by
contrast, wants to safeguard the economy to ensure a
powerful state after they take over. Senior ANC
members resist broad antiwhite tactics.
attacks against South African targets within the past 18
months. It is also attempting to broaden the conflict
into a "people's war" by taking advantage of the
current unrest in South Africa's black townships. At a
conference at Kabwe, Zambia, last year, the ANC
decided to broaden the target of its attacks, to carry
the fight outside the cities, and to recognize that death
of civilians of all races is unavoidable. Ultimately, the
"people's war" is meant to establish control over the
unrest and to deny the townships to the authorities.
The townships could then provide secure bases from
which the ANC would be able to fight government
forces from inside South Africa and spread the strug-
gle to the country at large.
Organization
Joe Modise, commander of the ANC's military
wing, serves as chairman of the military subcommittee
that oversees MK's activities and operations in South
Africa. The MK high command oversees infiltration
and operations. There are probably several regional
commands, most likely located in Lusaka, Maputo,
and Luanda. The Luanda command may oversee
military training, while Lusaka and Maputo most
likely have operational elements assigned, although
the Maputo regional command became ineffective for
all practical purposes after Pretoria and Maputo
signed the Nkomati Accord in March 1984.
Although little is known of the MK's subordinate
structure beyond the regional commands, we believe it
can be broken down into a number of discrete entities:
- Two or three battalion-size units (200 to 400
each) of conventionally trained troops in Angola.
- Transit and support facilities in Mozambique,
Zimbabwe, Angola, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswa-
na, Zambia, and Tanzania.
With only approximately 5,000 trained insurgents
located mostly outside South Africa, MK does not
aspire to a short-term military victory against the
South African security establishment. Despite the re-
fusal of South Africa's neighbors to allow the MK to
operate from within their borders, the MK has suc-
ceeded in markedly increasing the number of its
31
SECRET
. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
Faced with an extremely difficult operational envi-
ronment, a probable high attrition rate on assignments
within South Africa, and limited successes over the
~ ears, MK morale in locations outside South Africa
probably has never been more than mediocre and
most often is low. This is reflected by occasional
isolated mutinies. The young militants are frustrated
with the slog pace of operations and voice dissatisfac-
tion with harsh military camp living conditions. Some
MK members recognize and fear South African intelli-
gence and counterterrorist capabilities and avoid as-
signments within South Africa. From time to time
issues such as claims of tribal favoritism, UNITA
depredations, and complaints about leadership's luxu-
rious lifestyle have created internal frictions. Morale
problems occasionally manifest themselves in deser-
tions, drug abuse, theft, weakened dedication, and
general discouragement. Given the small numbers
needed for the current and anticipated level of MK
operations inside South Africa, the morale problems
7 surface-to-air missile.
The MK's arsenal includes: explosives (plastic and
other), homemade bombs, limpet mines, antitank and
antipersonnel mines, automatic rifles (including AK-
47, AKM, and SVD sniper rifles), machineguns (in-
cluding RP 46, RPK, and PKM), pistols (9 mm and
7.62 mm), and antiaircraft machineguns, mortars (60
mm and 82 mm), RPG-7 antitank missile launchers, B-
11 recoilless rifles, and single tube 122-mm rocket
launchers. ANC members are also said to have been
trained on the 75-mm recoilless rifle and on the SAM-
township unrest.
the ANC; is now
being supplied with highly technical terrorist equip-
ment. For example, of particular concern to the South
African Government is the more frequent MK use of
remotely controlled detonators, such as that used for
the car bombing of South African Air Force headquar-
ters in 1983. A large number of arms caches have been
discovered throughout South Africa, most in northern
Natal and the Transvaal. The movement of grenades
through Botswana had priority last year over rifles
probably because grenades are a useful weapon in the
Logistics
Large shipments of arms are usually delivered to the
MK in Tanzania and in Angola. Its logistic element
transports the weapons to infiltration points. The
shipment of 200 AK-47 rifles and 57 handgrenades in
August and September 1985 serves to illustrate the
process and its inherent problems. The arms arrived in
northeastern Botswana in late August. After several
intermediate stops in Botswana, they were then infil-
trated into South Africa by a number of couriers. A
delay in the delivery of the grenades caused the ANC'
leadership in Botswana to question the reliability of
the courier. A previous shipment of grenades had been
intercepted by the South African authorities and their
fuses tampered with, killing most of those who at-
tempted to throw them.
Capabilities
Basing and Infiltration Routes
The MK's military camps appear to be colocated
with, albeit in areas separate from, other ANC facili-
ties in Tanzania, Angola, and Zambia. In Botswana,
Swaziland, Lesotho, and Mozambique, facilities are
limited to safehouses and arms caches. An estimated
32
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
4,000 MK personnel may be present in Angola and
several hundred in both Tanzania and Zambia. Others
may be abroad for training or in transit to or inside
South Africa. We estimate that the number of trained
MK guerrillas inside South Africa at any one time is
less than 200.
The ANC's presence in all the countries adjacent to
South Africa has been periodically curtailed in the past
four years:
Swaziland agreed to restrict the movement and
activities of South African insurgents within its
borders in a secret pact with South Africa in
1982. Clashes between ANC members and the
Swazi police in 1984 hampered the use of this
route for a time, but
large, reconstituted ANC presence in Swaziland.
- The insurgent presence in Mozambique was
drastically reduced in 1984, following the signing
of the Nkomati Accord. Despite South African
accusations to the contrary, Mozambique has
generally upheld its side of the agreement, re-
moving most ANC members from its territory.
The ANC has continued to use Mozambique on a
limited basis as a staging area for the infiltration
of men and equipment into South Africa without
the knowledge or consent of the Government of
Mozambique.
- Botswana has been under increasing pressure
from the South African Government to expel
ANC and other insurgents. Raids against ANC
facilities in Gaborone in June 1985 and May 1986
demonstrated Pretoria's determination to take
whatever measures it deems necessary to destroy
insurgent bases in neighboring countries. Al-
though Botswana has ordered the removal of all
ANC personnel from its territory, the small size
of the country's security forces and the difficulty
they experience in controlling their vast territory
make it very likely that Botswana will continue
to be used as an infiltration route by the ANC.
- South African security force raids in December
1982 and December 1985, along with various
embargoes and other economic impediments,
served to remind Lesotho of its vulnerability and
dependence on South Africa. Such actions were
in part responsible for the 20 January 1986 coup
deposing Prime Minister Jonathan, which was
followed by the ejection of most ANC members
from the country. The small size of the Lesotho
security forces and the difficult, mountainous
terrain in most of the country has allowed the
ANC and other insurgents to continue some
infiltration into South Africa despite the efforts
of the Government of Lesotho.
- There are small numbers of MK personnel in
Zimbabwe, but Prime Minister Mugabe has not
given the ANC the free hand it would like to
have in using Zimbabwean territory for bases
and staging operations. Mugabe fears South Afri-
can strikes and is suspicious of the relationship
between the ANC and the party of Joshua
Nkomo, Mugabe's chief rival.
Other potential sources of support for the ANC and
its campaign of guerrilla attacks on South Africa are
the so-called black homelands. Recent ANC attacks
reportedly have increased in the Transkei, and weap-
ons caches have been found in the neighboring Ciskei,
The Kangwane homeland leader has encouraged the
ANC to believe that the rural population there will
support the struggle. Attacks from homeland bases will
probably continue, but at a low level.
Training
A limited amount of military training has taken
place at locations in Tanzania and in Zambia. Almost
all of the MK's military training is now conducted at as
many as seven camps in Angola, notably Quibaxe,
Pango, Malanje, Viana, and Caxito. Most instructors
are members of the ANC, although Cuban, Soviet, and
East German instructors teach specialized courses.
Instruction is broken down into basic and specialized
training, and a trainee may have to travel to a number
of camps to complete his or her training. Training
includes the use of small arms, light mortar, and the
RPG-7, sabotage and explosives, and political instruc-
tion. Selected students are sent to Cuba, the Soviet
Union, and other Soviet Bloc countries for advanced
training. East Germany, for example, provides train-
ing in security, sabotage, countersabotage, counterin-
telligence, and political agitation.
In its latest effort to counter South Africa's policy of
denying the ANC bases in neighboring countries and
to attempt to take the war to the people, the MK
leadership has decided to send weapons instructors
into South Africa. Members of ANC cells in the cities
are to learn to use pistols and grenades, and in rural
areas they are to learn to lay mines. Qualified MK
members have been sent to training camps in Angola
to complete a three-month instructor course before
being sent to South Africa. Conventional military
training in Angolan camps for other MK members
33
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
continues in anticipation of a conventional level of
guerrilla war yet to come and to provide the core of a
future black South African army
Strategy and Tactics
Despite mounting difficulty in infiltrating from
countries adjacent to South Africa, the MK has in-
creased the tempo of its terrorist attacks against South
African targets and demonstrated the capability to
strike at targets of national significance. Its primary
tactic is sabotage. In 1985, the number of these attacks
reached 136, compared with 39 in 1982, 56 in 1983,
and 44 in 1984.
facilities on 1 June 1980, which caused millions of
dollars of damage. Recent incidents, such as the use of
landmines beginning in November 1985 and attacks
on a number of shopping centers and other civilian
facilities, demonstrate the changing nature of the MK's
strategy and tactics. Earlier attacks were planned
against government installations with little risk to the
civilian population. A number of recent attacks sug-
gest, however, that civilian casualties have become
increasingly acceptable to the ANC. On the other
hand, some incidents inside South Africa attributed to
ANC/MK may have been perpetrated by independent
groups not under the full control of MK in Lusaka but
The first MK spectacular consisted of limpet mine
explosions at South Africa's synthetic oil production
identifying with it.
34
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
ANNEX C
A Chronology of Ties Between the ANC and
the South African Communist Party
1912 South African Native National Congress is
established and later renamed (in 1923) the
African National Congress (ANC).
1915 Leftists split with South African Labor
Party and form International Socialist
League (ISL).
1921 ISL members, many of whom had a special
interest in the black labor movement, and
other leftists, form the Communist Party of
South Africa (CPSA). The CPSA joins the
Comintern and complies with Soviet orders
to concentrate on gaining control of white
trade unions.
1922 Mine owners, trying to offset declining
gold prices, precipitate a violent strike by
announcing plans to lay off more highly
paid white employees and replace them
with blacks. The CPSA initially supports
the miners' campaign, over which it has
little direct control, but becomes disaffect-
ed after white miners attack black workers
who remain on the job.
1924 Pact by the Labor and Nationalist Parties
gains them an electoral victory. New gov-
ernment enacts a series of discriminatory
laws, some of which entrench white labor
privilege, CPSA subsequently shifts its at-
tention to recruiting black members and
infiltrating black organizations. Main tar-
get is the Industrial and Commercial
Workers Union of Africa (ICU). Begun as a
trade union of black dockworkers in 1919,
the ICU grows in the 1920s and becomes a
mass political movement with well over
100,000 members, eclipsing the ANC dur-
ing this period.
1926 CPSA's four members on the ICU's Na-
tional Executive Committee lead the left
wing of the ICU in calls for a more
militant program. The remainder of the
ICU leadership responds to expelling all
CPSA members from the ICU. CPSA fo-
cuses on the ANC as a result.
35
SECRET
1927 ANC President Josiah Gumede attends the
Brussels Conference of the League Against
Imperialism and visits the USSR. When he
returns, he unsuccessfully lobbies for a new
ANC strategy of demonstrations, strikes,
tax boycotts, pass burnings, and close ties to
the Soviets.
1928 New directive from Comintern states that,
in response to the "united white front
arrayed against the nonwhites," the CPSA
must work toward establishing "an inde-
pendent native republic-with full guaran-
tees for minority groups-as a stage toward
a workers' and peasants' government."
Many in the CPSA (especially former ISL
members) object to the Soviet line because
they prefer to regard blacks as an "exploit-
ed class of workers" rather than as a
'persecuted race." A pro-Moscow group of
ultraleftists, however, eventually gains con-
trol and purges the CPSA of black mem-
bers and whites with ties to trade unions.
The purge is sparked by a Comintern
directive that accuses all socialists of not
being "true revolutionaries."
1930s CPSA is virtually moribund despite aban-
donment of its ultraleft line; ANC contin-
ues to follow a slow-moving reformist cam-
paign after Gumede loses reelection bid in
1930. A number of nonwhite Communists,
including black trade unionists, receive
training in the USSR, including future
party leaders Moses Kotane, J. B. Marks, P.
J. Mkhize, and David Bopepe.
1941 CPSA membership increases after Hitler
invades the Soviet Union. Black Commu-
nists gain new foothold in the ANC.
1943 A new ANC constitution is drafted, in part
by lawyer Abram Fischer, and promulgat-
ed. The new constitution eliminated ex
officio representation of native chiefs, con-
tained numerous antidiscrimination and
political-social reform objectives. Fischer is
later revealed as a longtime CPSA leader.
, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
1944 A group of young black nationalists-dis-
gusted with the lack of progress resulting
from the ANC's moderate tactics-form
the ANC Youth League. Most Youth Lea-
guers are initially anti-Communist and be-
lieve that there is no role for whites in the
struggle for black rights. ANC Youth
League leaders Nelson Mandela and Oliver
Tambo unsuccessfully attempt to force
CPSA members from the ANC in 1945-46.
The ANC and the Communist-led SAIL;
join in a Defiance Campaign of passive
resistance, planned by Communists J. B.
Marks, Yusuf Dadoo, and M. P. Naiker, as
well as Nelson Mandela, which reflects the
growing influence of Communists and
Youth Leaguers in the ANC. Defiance
Campaign is aimed at changing six "un-
just" laws, including the Suppression of
Communism Act.
1946 J. B. Marks, a Colored Communist in the
ANC, leads a major strike by the African
Mineworkers' Union.
1946 The Xuma-Dadoo-Naiker agreement
formed between the ANC's President
Xuma and the Communist-led South Afri-
can Indian Council (SAIC), and its leaders
Dadoo and Naiker, in which the ANC and
SAIC agreed to closely cooperate. SAIC
leaders gain influence with ANC leaders.
1948 Afrikaner-based National Party comes to
power.
1949 Youth Leaguers dominate ANC National
Conference and push through a new "Pro-
gram of Action" that calls for civil disobe-
dience, strikes, and boycotts.
1950 Suppression of Communism Act bans the
CPSA and also gives the government wide
powers to counter extraparliamentary op-
position groups. CPSA announces its disso-
lution one month before passage of the act.
Portions of the organization continue to
operate underground; three years later the
South African Communist Party (SACP) is
formed. Many nonwhite CPSA members
quickly join the ANC and assume signifi-
cant positions in the organization-Moses
Kotane, Govan Mbeki, Phillip Vundla, Al-
fred Nzo, and Alex La Guma being the
best known.
1950-52 The veteran Communist J. B. Marks as-
sumes the presidency of the Transvaal
Province ANC and staffs the province
leadership with several Communists.
1951 Veteran ANC leader R. V. Selope-Thema
resigns from the ANC in protest against
Communist influence in the ANC and
unsuccessfully attempts to form a rival
organization.
36
SECRET
Five prominent "Africanist" (antiwhite,
anti-Indian, and anti-Communist) officials
of the Transvaal ANC are expelled as
"divisionists" by the ANC's National Exec-
utive Committee.
Congress Alliance is formed between the
ANC and the following Communist-con-
trolled organizations: the South African
Colored Peoples Organization, the SAIC,
the Congress of Democrats, and the South
African Congress of Trade Unions. A Con-
gress of the People is held in 1955 and a
Freedom Charter, reportedly drafted by
SACP leaders Joe Slovo and Moses Kotane,
is adopted by the ANC in 1956 that lists
the basic aims of the movement. Later that
year, the government arrests 156 Congress
Alliance leaders on treason charges. The
defendants eventually gain acquittals, but
the six-year trial consumes the energy of
the Congress Alliance, which loses its
momentum.
A 15-man National Consultative Commit-
tee (NCC) formed to coordinate policy
between the ANC and the five other orga-
nizations of the Congress Alliance. Twelve
members of the NCC are SACP members.
The NCC, led by SACP member Joe Slovo
(head of the Congress of Democrats),
strongly influences all major ANC policies.
1958-59 Black nationalists, angered by the influ-
ence of white Communists on the ANC,
split with the ANC and form the Pan-
Africanist Congress (PAC).
1960 The government bans both the ANC and
the PAC in a security crackdown following
the Sharpeville shooting incident.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 I I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
1961 Following a recommendation of the Cen-
tral Executive Committee of the SACP, the
ANC forms a military wing-Spear of the
Nation-and launches a campaign of sabo-
tage bombings. SACP leaders, led by Joe
Slovo, form the majority of the "National
High Command" of Spear of the Nation
(Umkhonto we Sizwe).
1962 The SACP draws up a new Party Program
and adopts as short-term objectives the
goals listed in the Congress Alliance's Free-
dom Charter.
1963-65 A series of mass arrests cripples the ANC
and weakens the SACP. Among those cap-
tured and sentenced to life imprisonment
are ANC President Nelson Mandela and
SACP Chairman Bram Fischer. ANC and
SACP leaders who escape the dragnet go
into exile to rebuild their organizations.
1967 ANC National Executive member James
Hadebe resigns in protest against Commu-
nist domination of the ANC, unsuccessfully
attempts to form a rival organization.
1969 The ANC holds its First Consultative Con-
gress at Morogoro, Tanzania. Nonblacks
become authorized to hold positions within
the ANC except on the NEC. The revolu-
tionary alliance of the ANC, SACP, and
SACTU (South African Congress of Trade
Unions, an SACP front) is proclaimed. The
ANC redefines its strategic objective as the
military overthrow of the apartheid re-
gime. Several white, Colored, and Indian
SACP members, newly accepted within
the ANC, form and dominate for 14 years
the ANC Revolutionary Council, which
controls all ANC activity within South
Africa.
1976-77 ANC recruits thousands of young blacks
fleeing South Africa in the wake of the
Soweto riots and trains them for service in
the military wing.
Several senior ANC leaders, known as the
"group of eight," rebel against Communist,
white, and Indian domination of the ANC
leadership. Despite quiet encouragement
from ANC President Tambo, they are
purged from the ANC in 1975.
Soviet President Podgorniy and Cuban
President Castro pledged increased Soviet
and Cuban military support to the ANC.
Umkhonto we Sizwe's training camps are
quickly established in Angola with Cuban
and East German trainers and Soviet arms
provided.
The reinvigorated military wing of the
ANC renews its "armed propaganda" cam-
paign by attacking government buildings
and security personnel and facilities, and
by sabotaging power and transportation
equipment and facilities.
The ANC's second Consultative Confer-
ence is held in Kabwe, Zambia, in June.
Nonblacks are authorized to join the Na-
tional Executive Committee, and five
nonblacks, all SACP members, join the
NEC. The congress proclaims a "people's
war" strategy. Subsequently, the ANC
leadership apparently broadens the man-
date for Umkhonto we Sizwe to allow for
attacks on "soft targets."
37
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
ANNEX D
KEY PERSONALITIES
Nelson Mandela
ANC leader Nelson Mandela, imprisoned since 1962, advocates the violent
overthrow of the South African Government and its replacement with a socialist state
under majority rule, but he has repeatedly stressed in press interviews his willingness
to negotiate with Pretoria. We do not believe that 24 years in prison or advancing age
(68) have mellowed Mandela or lessened his commitment to the ANC and to the po-
litical goals sketched out in the 1955 Freedom Charter. He has repeatedly spurned
government offers to release him if he would renounce violence, declaring that he
would accept only an unconditional release.
No one enjoys more popular support among South African blacks than Mandela,
whose popularity crosses all ethnic and geographic lines. Over the course of his
imprisonment he has become an almost mythical figure to blacks, embodying their
aspirations and goals and becoming for them a symbol of black strength and black re-
sistance to the white regime. He has kept in touch with his supporters and other ANC
leaders by using family members and press interviews to publicize his views and by
having letters smuggled out of prison. Despite his long imprisonment, Mandela, a
voracious reader, is well informed about domestic and international events.
We believe Mandela is a socialist rather than a Communist, although he worked
closely with many members of the South African Communist Party before his
imprisonment. He had ample opportunity to join the SACP before 1962, but we
believe that he never made the jump because of his deep attachment to nationalism
and to the socialist, quasi-democratic ideals that characterize traditional African
culture. Mandela appreciates, rather than supports, Communism. His published
writings reveal an admiration for the theoretical nonracialism and social and
economic equality of Marxism but say little about its political system.
Mandela joined the ANC in 1944 and soon became a prominent figure in the orga-
nization. His political activities led to charges of treason in 1956, but he was
acquitted five years later. After a series of incidents in the early 1960s, including the
Sharpeville massacre, the banning of the ANC, and the whites-only referendum that
created the Republic of South Africa, Mandela concluded that equal rights could be
obtained only through violence. He subsequently helped found the ANC's military
wing; left South Africa; and made his way to Algeria, where he received military
training. He returned to South Africa to lead the guerrilla campaign, but in 1962 he
was arrested, tried, and sentenced to five years in prison for inciting a strike and ille-
gally leaving the country. In 1964 he was tried again; after pleading guilty to many
of the government's charges, he was sentenced to life imprisonment for sabotage,
treason, and other crimes.
Mandela, the son of a prominent Xhosa chief, studied at the University of Fort
Hare in the late 1930s but was expelled in 1940 because of his political activities. He
subsequently worked as a policeman for a Transvaal mining company and studied
law at the University of South Africa and the University of Witwatersrand. During
the 1950s, he and Oliver Tambo, the current ANC president, ran a joint law practice
in Johannesburg.
Mandela is in generally good health,
39
SECRET
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
and high blood pressure.
Tambo helped found the ANC Youth League in 1944. A committed political
activist, he quit teaching in 1947 to study law. Five years later he opened a joint law
practice in Johannesburg with his close friend, Nelson Mandela. Tambo was
politically active throughout the 1950s and gradually assumed greater responsibility
in the ANC, serving as its deputy president from 1958 to 1960. He fled to the United
Kingdom shortly after the 1960 Sharpeville massacre. He spent most of the 1960s as a
roving ANC representative. Tambo became "acting president" of the ANC in 1967
and "president" in 1985. Tambo. 68, is in poor health and suffers from heart disease
with Western governments, including the United States.
Oliver Tambo
Longtime President Oliver Tambo, in many respects, is the glue that has held the
ANC together since it went into exile in 1960. We believe that he exercises profound
influence, but not control, over ANC policy. Generally speaking, Tambo acts by
consensus and his decisions often merely reflect the majority view of the organiza-
tion's policymaking body, the National Executive Committee (NEC). Tambo
publicly acknowledges the presence of Communists on the NEC, but he asserts that
they owe their primary allegiance to his organization. In fact, however, Tambo, the
leading member of the NEC's non-Communist faction, is wary of Communist
influence in the ANC and and has consistently tried to limit it. Regardless of his per-
sonal views, we believe Tambo is unlikely to make a major move against the
Communists because Soviet aid is vital to the ANC. Tambo regularly briefs Soviet of-
ficials on most ANC activities, but he is also anxious to establish or improve relations
Johnny Makatini
Johnny Makatini, the socialist director of the department of international affairs,
belongs to the non-Communist, "old guard" faction on the NEC. He (like his
colleagues) fully supports the ANC's relationship with Moscow because he considers
Soviet aid essential for ANC operations. Over and above this, he has a long history of
good working relations with Communist or Soviet organizations and was associated
with the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the Afro-Asian People's
Solidarity Organization during the 1960s. In the early 1970s Makatini re ortedl had
close ties to the KGB, which paid his personal and operational expenses
several members of that group in senior ANC posts.
Makatini, who studied law at the University of Natal, joined the ANC in the early
1950s. He fled South Africa in 1963 and subsequently served as the ANC
representative in Algiers (1964-77) and headed its observer mission at the United
Nations (1977-86). Makatini, 56, belongs to the Zulu ethnic group and is one of
Alfred Nzo
Alfred Nzo, a black who joined the Communist Party in 1950, is the ANC's
primary contact point with the Soviet Union. Secretary general since 1969 and a
longtime member of the NEC, he frequently visits the Soviet Union and strongly
supports close relations between the ANC and Moscow. Nzo occupies a key post in
the ANC, but we do not believe that he has a large personal following in the
organization. In our view, he occupies his current post because of his close ties to oth-
er veteran leaders and because he is a competent middleman between the ANC and
the Kremlin.
61 years old.
Nzo worked as a health inspector before joining the ANC in 1957. His subsequent
political activism led to his banning in 1959 and detention in 1963. After fleeing
South Africa in 1964, he served first as the ANC representative in Cairo (1964-67)
and, later, in New Delhi (1967-69). He is a vice president of the World Peace Council
and last year received a Soviet award, the "Order of Friendship of Peoples." Nzo is
40
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
Thabo Mbeki
Thabo Mbeki (44), the ANC's publicity and information czar, is one of the most
visible and impressive officials in the organization. Mbeki, the son of imprisoned
ANC and South African Communist Party leader Govan Mbeki, is probably a
Communist, but he often seems to subordinate his suspected ideology to his strong
black nationalist sentiments. He is hostile, for example, to SACP nonblack members
such as Joe Slovo reportedly because he resents their inordinate influence in the ANC
and their slavish ties to the Soviet Union. Mbeki habitually criticizes the United
States in public forums, but he privately comes across as
moderate, favoring dialogue with the West, me u ing t e United States.
prominent ANC members.
Mbeki left home in 1962 for the United Kingdom, where he attended Sussex
University and later became an officer of the ANC's Youth Section. During the
1960s, he was associated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth (a
Communist-front organization) and may have received training in the Soviet Union
and East Germany. He held several posts in the ANC during the 1970s, including as-
signments as a political officer in the military wing and political secretary in the
president's office. He holds a seat on the NEC. Mbeki has two brothers who are also
Africa
levels o violence against the South rican regime, probably, in our view, because he
sees it as an ideal way to solidify support for the ANC among South Africa's restless
youth. In a recent speech, for example, he expressed a hope that violence would con-
tinue to escalate in South Africa and would expand into white areas. Mbeki is
convinced that the ANC is extremely popular in South Africa, but he also believes
that blacks are not fully behind the ANC's political goals. He has, in fact, told other
ANC officials that the organization must imnrove its political operations in South
Joe Modise
Joe Modise has been nominal commander of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the ANC's
military wing, since the late 1960s, but he has actually served throughout the
intervening years as a regional military commander. We believe that Modise, a
probable Communist, has held on to his post, despite many complaints about his
incompetence, because of his ideological orientation and close- ng ties to
senior ANC leaders.
Modise, who is about 53, has a seat on the NEC.
Modise has belonged to the ANC since at least the late 1950s. Before leaving South
Africa in 1964, he was involved in political activities in the Johannesburg area. He
may have received military training in the Soviet Union during the mid-1960s.
Joe Slovo
Joe Slovo is a longtime member of the South African Communist Party (reportedly
its new chairman) and the only white on the NEC. A dedicated Marxist, Slovo
advocates the violent overthrow of the South African Government and has publicly
acknowledged his involvement in numerous terrorist actions directed against the
white regime.. Slovo renuently visits the ' t Union and strongly supports it on all
issues. Slovo often consults Soviet officials on
ANCA military an political matters.
elected to the NEC last year.
Slovo, a Lithuanian Jew, immigrated with his parents to South Africa in 1935
when he was nine years old. He was already a Communist when he joined the South
African Army in 1944. After serving in Italy and Egypt during the war, he returned
home, where he subsequently earned a law degree from the University of
Witwatersrand. Slovo, associated with the ANC since the late 1940s, helped draft the
ANC's Freedom Charter in 1955 and was defense counsel at numerous treason trials
during the 1950s. Slovo himself was tried on treason charges in 1960, but he was ac-
quitted. He fled South Africa in 1963. Slovo's wife, Ruth First, a prominent historian
and Communist propagandist, was killed by a parcel bomb in 1982. Slovo was
41
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
S. R. "Mac" Maharaj
"Mac" Maharaj, an Indian and longtime member of the South African Communist
Party, plays a major role in ANC military and intelligence activities, particularly
covert operations
a KGB agent
At least one ANC official believes that he is
We believe that
Maharaj also has a hand in the formulation of the ANC's current and long-term polit-
ical strategy; he has been a leading participant in the ANC's recent meetings with
delegations of white South African businessmen, students, and opposition parliamen-
tarians.
activities. He was elected to the NEC in 1985. Maharaj is 51 years old.
Maharaj, who studied law at the University of Natal, has been associated with the
ANC and the SACP since at least the mid-1950s. He left South Africa in 1957 for the
United Kingdom, where he taught for several years. he
joined the Communist Party of Great Britain in 1959 and subsequently became a
member of its executive committe was in the Soviet
Union from May 1961 until early 1962, when he returned to South Africa and was in
charge of receiving and distributing Communist literature for the SACP. In 1964 he
was convicted of sabotage and of furthering the aims of Communism and was
sentenced to 12 years imprisonment. Immediately after his release in 1976 he was
banned for five years. He fled the country in 1977 and resumed his political
42
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/20: CIA-RDP90ROO961 R000600050009-1