ANGOLA: SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR UNITA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90R00961R000500110005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Angola: Short-Term
Prospects for UNITA
Key Judgments
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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SNIE 71-86W
ANGOLA: SHORT-TERM
PROSPECTS FOR UNITA
KEY JUDGMENTS
The full text of this Estimate
is being published separately
with regular distribution.
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SCOPE NOTE
We have addressed the significant augmentation of Soviet and
Cuban support to Angola and prospects for the future Soviet and Cuban
roles in Angola in two recent publications.' Neither specifically ana-
lyzed the prospects for UNITA (National Union for the Total Indepen-
dence of Angola) in depth. Given the considerable Community and
customer interest in this subject, this Estimate looks at the remainder of
1986 from the perspective of UNITA's prospects. It updates the
judgments contained in these two previous publications, with which it is
essentially consistent.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The military campaign for the remainder of 1986 is unlikely to
alter the military picture profoundly in favor of either UNITA or the
MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola).
The Angolan armed forces (FAPLA) are preparing another major
offensive, expected to begin after the rainy season ends in April, which
will be the dominant factor in the military situation for most of 1986.
We expect FAPLA to advance along two axes with the UNITA-held
town of Mavinga as a major objective. Because of logistic, terrain, and
weather constraints, the offensive may well be slow in developing.
UNITA has been making extensive defensive preparations, bringing in
additional troops, and ambushing the government's supply convoys.
Although the full extent of the FAPLA attack has not yet been
discerned, it will be at least comparable to the 1985 effort (about 10,000
men).
Key Variables
We see four key variables setting the parameters of military action:
- UNITA tactics and strategy.
- FAPLA weaponry and performance.
- The South African role in combat.
- The level of Soviet/Cuban support to FAPLA
Most Likely Outcome
Although these factors are volatile and interrelated, it is our
judgment that the most likely outcome will be a relative standoff, with
tactical gains and losses on both sides throughout the year.
UNITA claims to be prepared for the forthcoming FAPLA offen-
sive, and Savimbi has declared that UNITA will utilize a mobile, fluid
defense to blunt it. UNITA is also undertaking harassment attacks
around the area of FAPLA buildup to try to delay the offensive from
forming and is planning new endeavors in northern Angola. We believe
that FAPLA's 1985 gains resulted from the fielding of improved
weaponry and improved performance because of Soviet training and
increased Soviet direction as well as from UNITA's underestimation of
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its opponents. FAPLA's close air support and greater use of armored ve-
hicles will continue to give UNITA problems in 1986 but will probably
not prove a decisive advantage in the overall campaign. It remains to be
seen whether UNITA, with better preparation and reversion to a more
mobile defense strategy to which UNITA is more accustomed, can
reestablish its overall superiority in terms of basic troop combat
capability and offset the improved FAPLA performance.
We expect the Soviet involvement in military support to FAPLA to
approximate 1985 levels, albeit with possible new surges in military
equipment deliveries once the major campaign begins.
The Cuban role also will probably remain similar to 1985, although
we envision more Cuban-piloted air sorties in support of the offensive,
and we anticipate that Cuban-piloted MIGs would attempt to react
more aggressively to any South African air intervention, raising the
potential for direct air combat.
We cannot judge how the tactical gains and losses will play out in
the major campaign in the southeast. Although Mavinga could fall, we
believe the major FAPLA offensive in the southeast will probably be
contained short of Jamba. UNITA will also continue, if not step up, its
activity in northern Angola. We believe, however, that there is a
heightened risk that the Cubans and South Africans could be drawn into
direct conflict
We see two tactical possibilities that would have some impact on
UNITA's overall prospects:
- Should FAPLA garner even limited battlefield successes, such as
the temporary capture of Mavinga or other towns in the
southeast, it will reinforce the MPLA policy of seeking a
military solution to the UNITA insurgency, much as the capture
of Cazombo by FAPLA did in 1985. Such successes would be
flaunted by the MPLA as "major victories," not only bolstering
FAPLA-MPLA morale but also damaging UNITA's prospects in
the eyes of many international observers. Moreover, it would be
tactically significant if FAPLA could not only take but hold
Mavinga, and to a lesser degree Lumbala N'guimbo or Can-
gamba, where there are airstrips. This could enable FAPLA to
interdict UNITA supply lines to the north and provide sites for
supporting air attacks deep into UNITA's heartland.
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- On the other hand, should UNITA stop the FAPLA offensive
short of Mavinga, avoid the loss of other major towns, and inflict
new losses on FAPLA elsewhere, this could revive doubts among
some MPLA leaders as to the efficacy of a military solution, as
happened in 1983-84. We do not believe that such doubts would
have a payoff this year in terms of changing MPLA policy
regarding talks with UNITA or the MPLA's making meaningful
concessions on Cuban troop withdrawal. We see the prospects
for UNITA-MPLA talks in 1986 as virtually nil and the
likelihood of meaningful MPLA concessions on Cuban troop
withdrawal, a requisite to advance the negotiations, as remote.
Should UNITA blunt the offensive without losing major towns
and make gains elsewhere, this would heighten UNITA morale
and raise the estimation of UNITA's prospects in the eyes of
many international observers. UNITA's prospects in 1986 for
gaining additional external support appear quite modest, how-
ever.
The volatility of the key variables leads us to envision two
alternative outcomes, which we consider less likely but possible:
- Greater FAPLA threat scenario. If FAPLA produces unex-
pected successes in its campaign and also provokes extensive
South African air or ground interventions in combat, Washing-
ton would share the effects of widespread condemnation of the
South African intervention, which the Soviets would quite likely
succeed in associating with the United States. Although we
envision any such South African intervention as immediately
successful in blocking a FAPLA advance, the intervention-
especially using air assets-would increase the risk of air combat
with Cuban-piloted MIGs. The intervention might also compel
the Soviets and Cubans to increase support to FAPLA, including
increasing equipment deliveries and taking more measures to
negate the effects of South African intervention. This scenario
would create the framework for heightened prospects of subse-
quent Cuban-South African military clashes-both within and
beyond the time frame of this Estimate. The Soviets might well
deliver nonspecific private or public warnings to Pretoria or
Washington should South African intervention seriously threat-
en FAPLA's prospects.
- Greater UNITA success scenario. Should UNITA do better
than expected in blunting the impending FAPLA offensive and
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gaining successes elsewhere, including recapturing ground lost
in 1985, the Soviets and Cubans would face tough choices as to
how to retrieve the fortunes of FAPLA. We believe in this
circumstance a new surge of Soviet military deliveries would
occur, and the Cubans might well be forced to utilize the
21,000-man Cuban ground force in Angola to bear at least
selectively some of the brunt of fighting UNITA~
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