DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M01364R000800330003-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 CIA-RDP90M01364R000800330003-1
To: .The President-elect
From: Brent Scowcroft and R. James Woolsey
Subject: Defense and Arms Control Policy
Early in a new Administration decisions about defense and arms control will have
to be made during a 'period dominated by two conditions. First, Gorbachev will con-
tinue to present bold challenges to the established order of East-West relations, in the
form of at least superficially attractive new foreign policy overtures and arms control
proposals. Maintaining both the public support for necessary defense programs and
cohesion in the alliance will be major challenges for the President in this environment.
Second, the mismatch between the limited resources available for defense and the
much higher spending profile required by earlier commitments to major weapons acqui-
sition programs, together with weaknesses in defense management, will put extreme
and early stress on the defense budget and defense management.
In this environment, decisions must be faced in the early days of the new Admini-
stration about the overall approach to both strategic and conventional arms control.
For the Administration to be able to do this successfully, certain decisions must first be
made about U.S. strategic and conventional force modernization and also about how
to establish a common position with our allies. Unless we follow this sequence there is
the severe risk that decisions about arms control negotiations will undercut both our
weapons modernization efforts and our relationsmith_our_allies.
Other major decisions about the defense budget, unrelated to arms control and
accompanying force modernization, must also be faced promptly?at least in broad
outline. There are two reasons for this. The long-run (say four-year) profile of the
defense budget will have much to do with overall federal fiscal planning for the entire
Administration. Also, it will be necessary to focus quickly on DoD management prob-
lems, both to improve the efficiency of defense acquisition and to establish and main-
tain public and Congressional confidence in the management of DoD?a confidence
that has been recently shaken.
Issue 1: Early Modernization and Force Structure Decisions and
Associated Arms Control Issues
A. Strategic Forces
1. Command and Combo,. The first, and in many ways most important, strategic
military issue for a President concerns the command and control of strategic forces.
The President must see to it that the forces over which he is Commander-hi-Chief not
only strive for but achieve a perfection that is unique in human endeavor. The trage-
dies of the Stark and the Vincennes illustrate that in military activity, as in most human
undertakings, two types of mistakes will occur, in spite of the best efforts to prevent
them: real threats will be ignored, and false alarms will provoke a response.
Strategic command and control is critical, difficult, and complex because it can
permit neither type of error. A potential aggressor must be certain that an attack, even
a cleverly masked one, could not succeed. And most certainly there must be no retalia-
tion in response to a false warning. Yet a command and control system designed to
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ensure that there are no mistakes of one type will tend to create a bias toward mistakes
of the other. Such possible command and control mistakes should be considered In
planning the forces themselves. For example, the increasing vulnerability of U.S. fixed
targets (such as ICBMs in silos) caused by the steadily improving accuracy of Soviet
strategic weapons puts pressure on the President to launch our silo-based ICBMs on
warning alone, without waiting for confirmation of nuclear attack by actual nuclear
detonations. Such a posture can increase the risk of accidental war. Moreover, other
vulnerabilities, such as those of our satellites involved in warning and surveillance, can
have serious implications for command and control?for example, such satellites might
well come under attack during an earlier, conventional, phase of a conflict.
These sorts of problems illustrate that, in addition to the importance of the Presi-
dent's understanding the details of the strategic war plan so that he is familiar with its
? options, he has another major reason to understand the strategic command and control
? system in some detail: namely, it may lead him to want some changes in the system
? itself and it may also lead him to prefer some types of strategic force modernization to
others as budget decisions are made.
The President, as an early priority, should assure himself that: his command and
control system is adequate to ensure that he will receive not only immediate warning of?
an attack but an accurate characterization of its size and nature; that he will be able to
communicate with his military forces under all circumstances throughout a conflict,
including his strategic reserve forces; that he can communicate in a crisis with the
AmericatroOplelind their political leaders, our allies, and our opponents; and that
provisions for his own and his successor's security preclude a decapitation attack.
Consequently, we suggest that the President should at the outset require a detailed
review of strategic command and control from his personal perspective.
2. Strategic Offensive Force Modernization: Survivability. A continued effort will
be required throughout the new Administration and for many years into the future in
order to maintain survivable and effective strategic offensive forces. Regardless of
improved U.S.-Soviet relations and arms control agreements, the Soviet capability to
initiate strategic war against the U.S. will persist and a crisis ora political change in the
Soviet Union could occur far faster than the U.S. could rebuild neglected strategic
forces. Moreover, even with a START agreement, the Soviet ability to threaten all
three parts of U.S. strategic forces, as well as their command and control, could con-
tinue to improve and U.S. forces will grow relatively more vulnerable over time unless
force improvements are made. Soviet attack submarines and other anti-submarine
warfare forces will be unconstrained by arms control and the Soviets will be free to
continue to improve their capability (happily still a very limited one) against U.S. bal-
listic missile submarines. Soviet ballistic-missile and cruise-missile submarines and the
weapons they carry will continue to be improved in their ability to threaten U.S.
bombers on their bases and the U.S. command-and-control system. While the number
of MIRVed accurate Soviet ICBM warheads that threaten U.S. silo-based ICBMs are
likely to be constrained by a START treaty, those constraints Will not be sufficient to
ensure that U.S. silo-based ICBMs could survive a Soviet first strike.
A new problem for U.S. strategic force survivability will be created by the improv-
ing accuracy of MIRVed Soviet SLBMs; these as well as ICBMs may soon be capable
of being used against hardened targets such as U.S. silos. Moreover,
Defense and Anna Control Pettey
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recent public statement by U.S. naval intelligence, the Soviets have tested short-range/
short time-of-flight SLBM trajectories in support of pursuing a capability, announced
as an objective this year by Admiral Gorshkov, of "covert launches from short ranges."
Such launches could significantly reduce U.S. warning and response time. As the
Scowcroft Commission pointed out over five years ago, once attack from Soviet sub-
marines becomes feasible against both U.S. ICBM silos and bomber bases ?exectited
in such a way that there could be a near-simultaneous launch and near-simultaneous
detonation of close-in Soviet submarine-launched weapons on all urgent U.S. strategic
targets?then the only highly survivable U.S. strategic forces will be ballistic missile
submarines at sea. Under current planning and the restrictions of a START Treaty,
there will only be about twelve or so of these at sea once the Trident submarine force
fully replaces the older boats. They will carry, to be sure, some 2,300 warheads. But
this is many eggs in very few baskets.
A central question thus becomes, is a dozen large Trident submarines at sea suffl.
dent as a strategic force that could survive a uprise Soviet attack, or is some other
force needed, such as similarly-survivable ICBMs? The previous Administration
answered that question by choosing a system of ICBM mobility?rail-garrison MX?but
one that would require several hours of strategic warning, and a quick reaction to that
warning, to make that mobility effective. But if the U.S. could count firmly both on
obtaining strategic warning some hours In advance of a Soviet attack and on being able
to act upon such warning, then a large portion of our existing strategic forces would be
survivable and available to the Commander-in-Chief?whether or not any steps are
taken to augment Trident with a more survivable ICBM force. For example, with such
hours of strategic warning many bombers could be flushed from their bases, and addi-
tional submarines put to sea. But if the President decides that, to augment Trident, an
ICBM force is needed that could clearly ride out a surprise attack, then rail-garrison
MX will be inadequate?he will need to consider either an ICBM basing mode ade-
quate to that challenge or strategic defenses. For example, to ensure that some of the
ICBM force could survive surprise attack any of several ICBMs might be placed in a
new type of multiple-shelter, i.e., a shell game, deployment?one using much less land
than the MX multiple-shelter basing scheme of a decade ago. (The system is called
"carry-bard" because it transports the missile in a hardened cannister between simple
vertical shelters.) Alternatively, a small mobile ICBM in hard mobile launchers, i.e.
without shelters, might be deployed on a large military base in the Southwest (with
single warheads), at existing Minuteman bases (possibly with two warheads), or at both
locations. Or more than one of these options might be kept alive by pursuing them at a
gradual. pace. lb keep any such option alive, the current U.S. position in the START
Alb, that mobile ICBMs should be banned, would have to be reversed.
But speed in implementing a decision about ICBM modernization Is much less
Important than realizing that the decision about whether a portion of the ICBM force
needs to be able to survive a surprise attack is logically a precondition for many other
decisions that will need to be made about strategic forces, both offensive and defen-
sive, and about arms control. Moreover, such a decision needs to be politically sup-
portable by the Congress and the public to be effective.
The choice about whether topursue, or to preserve the option for, such ICBM
sinvivability is In may ways the most important decision that the President will make
WON and Arms Control Policy
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about strategic forces, since so much ebe derives from It. We would suggest that a
decision about thk issue should not be delayed beyond the first few months of the new
Administration, In order to avoid many other decisions necessarily being made in an
eiscoorsithated manner.
For example, if the President decides that no substantial part of the ICBM force
need be survivable against a surprise attack of the sort that the Soviets might be able to
? launch against ICBMs and bomber bases in the 1990s, then reliance on the survivability
of the U.S. ballistic missile submarine force would be very heavy indeed, and the pace
of modernizing the submarine force could be significantly affected. An earlier decision
would need to be made about whether more submarines would be needed sooner, and
whether new submarine and possibly new missile designs should be accelerated.
With respect to arms control, the limitation of nuclear sea-launched cruise mis-
siles (SLCMs) could also be affected by the ICBM decision. In the absence of an ICBM
force that is capable of surviving a surprise attack, the President might feel that it is
necessary?to retain a number of nuclear SLCMs in order to add to the number of sub-
marines and other ship that the Soviets would need to plan to attack in any first strike.
The difficulty of verifying SLCM limitations, the foreign policy problems with allies
(e.g., Japan) if the locations of nuclear SLCMs are publicly identified, the importance
of conventional-warhead cruise missiles (which could be affected by some types of
proposed limits on nuclear ones), and possible NATO reliance on nuclear SLCMs for
- - ?theatre nuclear forces in the aftermath-of the INF Treaty are all complicating factors in
? arriving at a decision on nuclear-armed SLCMs. To some, these factors suggest that
there should be no, or very limited, SLCM restrictions in any case. To others, espe-
cially if the U.S. deploys a survivable ICBM, and given the geographic asymmetries
favoring the U.S.S.R., these factors indicate the wisdom of a ban or limits on nuclear
armed SLCMs. Since this SLCM question affects not only strategic and NATO force
modernization but arms control as well, an early decision is imperative. Whatever
is decided, it is obvious that the U.S. negotiating position on SLCMs (where the U.S.
?now resists limits) should be coordinated with that on mobile ICBMs (where the
U.S. now supports a ban).
Finally, the issue of the political acceptability of START to the Senate will be
influenced by the above questions. If the U.S. has a survivable ICBM (e.g., a "carry-
hard" or a small mobile), the throw-weight reductions in START further enhance such
a system's survivability. But if the U.S. maintains silo-based ICBMs, the launcher reduc-
? tk)ns in START make it harder to maintain the survivability of our ICBM force because
they limit the number of U.S. silos without effectively limiting the threat to them from
MIRVed Soviet ICBMs and, increasingly, from Soviet SLBMs. Verification of precise
numbers also !mom= militarily more important in the latter case. Ultimately, the
question is whether two-thirds of the Senate could be expected to approve a START
agreement if a responsible case can be made that it, together with U.S. force planning
:decisions, would leave the U.S. with only a dozen at-sea submarines as highly-survivable
In the case of a surprise attack.
In view of the above, we recommend that the President require an immediate and
thorough reViCIIV 61 the strategic force and arms control implications of the decision
whether or not to maintain an ICBM force of which a substantial portion could survive
attack.
,
Neese sad Anne Casual Polky 4
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