INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BILL AND 48-HOUR NOTICE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M01264R000100080029-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: August 1, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/03: CIA-RDP90M01264R000100080029-9
August I, 1988
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks
- INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BILL
AND 48-HOUR NOTICE
EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS
HON. HENRY J. HYDE
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, August 1, 1988
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, today I am submit-
ting the second and final installment of publi-
cations relating to the upcoming vote on the
Intelligence Oversight Act of 1988. These arti-
cles, by myself and by legal scholar Bruce
Fein, appeared in the Washington Times. on
June 21.
Major objections to imposing an absolute
48-hour deadline for notification even in ex-
treme circumstances revolve around the
wisdom of keeping a very few operations ab-
solutely secret until they are completed, usual-
ly so a "leak" will not endanger lives. Some
argue that the greater the number of persons
informed, the more likely there will be an un-
authorized disclosure. Others claim the Con-
gress has a good record in this regard and
should be trusted. I have been very vocal in
rejecting the view that Congress is an excep-
tion and that it is only the executive branch
which leaks classified information, although I
acknowledge that the executive branch also
has severe problems in this regard.
Only last week, we were treated to a front-
page Washington Post article alleging that a
covert action to topple the Government of
Panama had been approved less than 2
weeks previously. At this point, it makes little
difference whether the newspaper -accounts
are factually correct?regardless, United
States foreign policy interests and the Pana-
manian opposition have been damaged irrevo-
cably. And I would note that the Post is citing
both congressional and executive branch
sources.
This is by no means the first time that Con-
gress apparently has talked out of turn. The
articles I am submitting today discuss this
problem and the ramifications for mandatory
48-hour notice of covert action.
(From the Washington Times, June 21,
1988]
MORE THAN COVERT CAN ENDURE?
(By Bruce Fein)
Giddy with summit euphoria, blind to re-
alpolitik, and emboldened by a weakened
presidency, Congress is hell-bent on destroy-
ing the covert-action capability of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency. That destruction
would foreclose the president's use of the
CIA to dethrone Gen. Manuel Antionio Nor-
iega in Panama, Col. Muammar Qadafi in
Libya, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in
Iran or Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski in Poland.
Nor would covert action be available to
bolster fledgling democracies in the Philip-
pines, El Salvador, South Korea or Hondu-
ras.
Without covert action, national security
will be irnpared so long as Soviet General
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev trumpets the
teaching of Soviet icon Vladimir Lenin: "Ev-
erything is moral that is necessary for the
annihilation of the old exploiting social
order and for uniting the proletariat."
On March 15, 19E8, the Senate voted 71-
19 to compel presidential notification to
specified members of Congress of all clan-
destine CIA activities. If the activities are
other than intelligence collection, the presi-
dent must make a written finding that they
"are necessary to support the foreign policy
objectives of the United States and are im-
portant to the national security of the
United States." The finding must describe
any foreign-government or foreign-agent in-
volvement.
Ordinarily, the finding must be shared
with the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees prior to any covert action.
When time is of the essence, disclosure to
the committees may be delayed -for 48 hours
after the Presidential finding. Further, in
the most extraordinary circumstances af-
fecting the most vital security interests of
the United States, and when the risk of dis-
closure constitutes a grave risk to such vital
interests, the president may report findings
only to the speaker and minority leader of
the House, and the majority and minority
leaders of the Senate.
The House Intelligence Committee has fa-
vorably reported a bill that echoes the
Senate-passed bill. The full House is expect-
ed to pass the anti-covert-action legislation
within weeks, despite the threat of a presi-
dential veto.
If enacted over the veto, the legislation
would be the epitaph of covert action.
Experience and human nature guarantee
cascades of congressional leaks ?to scuttle
covert actions and cooperation from foreign
Intelligence agencies or foreign agents.
Former CIA Director William Colby re-
counted in his "Memoirs" that every covert
action reported to congressional committees
in 1975 leaked. Mr. Colby's successor, Stans-
field Turner, testified that foreign intelli-
gence agencies and potential CIA assets
have refused cooperation because of fears of
public disclosures. Former Deputy Director
of the CIA Frank Carlucci confirmed that:
"If our intelligence assets around the world,
particularly cooperating organizations, per-
ceive that the CIA is obliged to disgorge
whatever the [Intelligence Committees]
may want, then it is very clear, based on my
experience, that our intelligence assets
would dry up."
The former chairman of Senate Intelli-
gence Committee, Republican Sen. David
Durenberger of Minnesota, was recently
reprimanded by the Senate Ethics Commit-
tee for publicly disclosing a CIA asset in the
Israeli army.
Former vice chairman of that committee,
Democratic Sen. Pat Leahy of Vermont, re-
signed after leaking a confidential report on
the Iran-Contra affair that the committee
had voted to withhold. Mr. Leahy also blun-
dered in revealing to a national NBC televi-
sion audience that the United States had
intercepted and deciphered communications
of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.
Democratic Rep. George Brown of Cali-
fornia was shuffled off the House Intelli-
gence Committee because of irresponsible
handling of sensitive intelligence informa-
tion.
In 1985, cogent evidence pointed to Sens.
Durenberger and Leahy as culpable in leak-
ing a planned covert action to overthrow
E 2547
Libyan tyrant Muammar Qaddafi with the
assistance of two North African nations.
A year later, Democratic Sen. Joe Biden of
Delaware publicly boasted of derailing two
covert-action gambits by threatening disclo-
sure.
Numbers, inexpertness and the absence of
sanctions explains the propensity of Con-
gress to publicize covert actions.
At present, the members and staffs of the
House and Senate Intelligence Committees
and the Defense Appropriations subcommit-
tees with regular access to classified intelli-
gence information approximate 132, a
number both exceeding the entire member-
ship of the initial Congress and incompati-
ble with secrecy. As early as 1776, Benjamin
Franklin and Robert Morris, members of
the tiny committee of secret correspondence
during the Revolutionary War, refused to
disclose to the Second Continental Congress
covert financial assistance negotiated with
France. They explained: "We find, by fatal
experience, the Congress consists of too
many members to keep secrets."
Members of Congress are novitiates in the
field of intelligence. Their intellectual ener-
gies are splintered, and tenure on the intelli-
gence committees is limited to six years.
Speaker of the House Jim Wright, Demo-
crat of Texas, exemplified congressional in-
nocence in falsely maintaining before the
House Intelligence Committee that the CIA
had engineered the assassination of Guate-
malan leader Jacobo Arbenz in 1954.
Further, congressmen are unschooled in
habits of taciturnity. They may unwittingly
disclose secret information because of for-
getfulness about its origins and sensitivity.
Congressmen are not fearful of sanctions
for publicizing covert activities or other
classified national security information. The
"Speech or Debate" clause of the Constitu-
tion prohibits both the executive and judi-
cial branches from penalizing a member or
his staff for anything said on the floor of
the House or the Senate or in committee
hearings. Thus, Democratic Sen. Mike
Gravel of Alaska with impunity placed the
47-volune Pentagon Papers containing clas-
sified information in the public record after
convening a subcommittee meeting.
Congress is constitutionally authorized
but disinclined to sanction members for im-
proper disclosures of classified information.
The sleepy House and Senate Ethics Com-
mittee are notorious for inactivity and leni-
ency in disciplining members of Congress.
And the House Intelligence Committee re-
cently voted against criminal sanctions for
members or staff who leak national security
information.
A 48-hour congressional reporting require-
ment eviscerates covert action as a national-
security or foreign-policy instrument of the
president. History proves the grave harm it
would cause. Six Americans hid in the Cana-
dian Embassy in Tehran after the American
Embassy was seized by the Iranian radicials
in November 1979, Canada assisted the CIA
in their covert exfiltration, but only because
CIA Director Turner agreed to withhold no-
tification to Congress until the 90-day
escape mission was concluded.
Six months of covert activity preceded the
Ill-starred Desert I rescue attempt of the
hostages held in the American Embassy in
Tehran. Congress was not informed. Direc-
? This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor.
Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.
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E 2548 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks August 1, 1988
tor Turner testified that the cover, mission
would have been canceled if congressional
reporting was compelled.
A planned covert operation to assist Phil-
ippines President Cory Aquino fight domes-
tic insurrections was scuttled after it was re-
ported to Congress and later publicized.
George Carver, former chairman of the
U.S. Intelligence Coordinating Committee
in Germany, testified without contradiction:
"Should it ever come to be widely perceived
abroad that U.S. law required ... the identi-
fication in a written document, of which at
least two copies would be sent to Congress,
of all non-U.S. individuals and entities, in-
cluding governments, cooperatively partici-
pating in any U.S. (covert action), our pool
of essential foreign assistance and support
would swiftly evaporate."
We would act no differently. In the after-
math of World War II, the United States
stopped sharing sensitive intelligence infor-
mation with Australia because its govern-
ment was unable to keep secrets from the
Soviet Union.
Without foreign assistance, significant
_ covert-action opportunities will be lost. In
1981, for instance, a CIA asset?Col. Wladys-
law Kuklinski?was infiltrated into the
highest levels of Polish Intelligence. With a
guarantee of secrecy, Col. Kuklinski was an
attractive -candidate to undertake a covert
action in support of the Solidarity trade and
freedom movement. But Col. Kuklinski
would certainly have shunned participation
if his involvement were to be shared with
Congress in a written finding.
Covert action is important to the nation's
national security arsenal and foreign policy
goals. It was employed to preserve demo-
cratic governments in Western Europe and
the Philippines in the late 1940s and early
1950s. It prevented communist domination
of Iran in 1953, and Castro-style misrule in
Guatemala in 1954.
At present, covert action should be bran-
dished to reinfbrce democratic impulses
around the globe.
Attractive targets of covert action include
dictatorial or communist natiOns, such as
Chile, Libya, Nicaragua, Cuba, North Korea,
Panama and Ethiopia, and embryonic de-
mocracies, such as Brazil, Argentina, Boliv-
ia, El Salvador, Taiwan, South Korea,
Singapore and Guatemala.
Overt U.S. support might be counterpro-
ductive, because of national pride and anti-
American attitudes in many foreign coun-
tries.
The national security fecklessness of Con-
gress is boundless. On Dec. 21, 1987, Con-
gress manipulated the power of the purse to
prohibit the president from requiring execu-
tive branch, employees to keep national se-
curity secrets. ?
Section 630 of the Omnibus Continuing
Resolution for Fiscal Year 1988 endowed all
government employees with an absolute
right to disclose any classified information
to Congress, despite the objections of the
president, based on, his constitutional privi-
lege of confidentiality recognized by the Su-
preme Court in United States vs. Nixon
(1974). Federal District Judge Oliver Gasch
held section 630 unconstitutional because it
impaired the president's constitutional right
to protect national security information
(National Federation of Federal Employees
v. U.S. (May 27, 1988).
Why is Congress so incontinent in pursu-
ing national security information and
knowledge of covert actions?
It has turned a deaf ear to a bipartisan
galaxy of former national security advisers,
CIA directors, a secretary of state and a top
CIA assistant, who have assailed a 48-hour
reporting rule.
Members argue the reporting require-
ments enrich the president's decision-
making over national security matters. But
one searches in vain for a single instance
since the creation of the.CIA in 1947 when a
member possessed of classified information
made a productive contribution to the presi-
dent's national security deliberations.
The more plausible explanation is con-
gressional self-esteem that comes with en-
larged powers. Neither the president, the
Supreme Court nor the American people,
however, should permit legislative amour
propre to trump the national interest in a
bold and robust covert action capability.
[From the Washington Times, June 21,
1988]
MORE THAN COVERT CAN ENDURE?
(By Henry Hude)
The House of Representatives soon will
consider whether to follow the Senate's
questionable "lead" in decreeing that,-with-
out exception, Congress' intelligence com-
mittees or top leadership must be informed
of every covert action within 48 hours of
presidential approval.
As hearings have shown, many present
and former policy officials, persons of
widely varying political affiliations, strongly
reject such inflexibility and congressional
micromanagement of foreign policy. They
cite the need to protect at least temporarily
a very few of the most sensitive operations
from security leaks, as well as the dubious
constitutionality of the proposal.
So corrosive has the permissive culture of
"leaking" become that it materially contrib-
uted to the disastrous Iran escapade. Adm.
John Poindexter testified that in addition
to keeping even the congressional leader-
ship in the dark for more than a year, he
also deliberately minimized information
given to top Cabinet and White House offi-
cials, and kept few documents or records of
key meetings.
This is corroborated in the just-published
memoirs of Don Regan, then White House
chief of staff, who writes that unauthorized
disclosures "had achieved such epidemic
proportions that the inner circle was afraid
to take notes lest they read them the next
day in the newspapers". Mr. Regan con-
cludes that "in fact, the root of the scandal
may well lie in the fact that McFarlane and
Poindexter and their assistants were, in a
sense, driven mad by leaks".
The result was prolonged pursuit of an ill-
considered and politically dangerous policy
which suffered grievously from lack of full
consideration and thorough periodic review.
The paucity, of records also contributed to
later confusion and charges of a deliberate
cover-up.
Some airily dismiss these security con-
cerns as figments of Adm. Poindexter's par-
anoia. But every recent administration has
quickly become appalled by the pervasive-
ness of leaks harmful to U.S. foreign policy
and intelligence capabilities.
Moreover, despite the admiral's extreme
precautions, the Iran operation indeed was
soon exposed, originally in some Jack An-
derson columns. It finally unraveled because
of a leak which, for a change, occurred in a
foreign newspaper.
With increasing frequency, high-ranking
intelligence officials testify before the
House Intelligence Committee decrying the
human, intelligence and policy damage in-
flicted by injurious leaks. Lately, some have
even gone public in a campaign to point out
the harmfulness of an avalanche of unau-
thorized disclosures.
In this effort, they are hampered by an in-
ability to cite examples, for to do so would
confirm the authenticity of published mate-
rial and heighten the damage. A cursory
glance at the daily headlines, however,
should convince the average citizen that
sensitive, intelligence-related issues . have
become regular media fare. One begins to
suspect that the best way to publicize an
issue is to stamp it "Top Secret" and wait
for its predictable appearance in the media.
Nonetheless, members continue to press
the 48-hour legislation, a key assumption
being that Congress can indeed be trusted
in every instance, no matter what the risk.
Let us be clear about the facts here.
Whatever its reservations about congres-
sional reliability, each administration nor-
mally has swallowed its concerns and freely
provided the legislature a wealth of classi-
fied information. The intelligence commit-
tees have -controlled the oversight process
for more than a decade now.
As CIA Deputy Director Bob Gates re-
cently observed, the availability of classified
information to the intelligence committees
in particular, and to a lesser extent to Con-
gress in general, has increased exponentially
over these years, a factor which allows them
? considerably greater ability to probe and
question administration foreign policy than
Congress ever had before.
Prior to the Iran-Contra initiatives, there
had been only two cases in which House and
Senate leadership, rather than both full
committees, were initially informed of a
covert action. ,
There have been only four cases in which
notification of Congress was delayed. Three
occurred during the Carter administration.
All involved attempts to retrieve U.S. citi-
zens hiding in Iran or held hostage in Iran
or Lebanon. In each of these cases, the ad-
ministration feared deaths could result from
media leaks, and knowledge of the oper-
ations was also highly restricted within the
executive branch.
In three of those instances, although noti-
fication was delayed three to six months,
the Congress heartily supported the admin,
istration. ,
In all four cases, the administration in-
tended to notify the Congress eventually
and was legally required to do so, but it
could not be determined from the outset
how long notification might be delayed.
Thus, only one case?the Iran-Contra
affair?has raised serious concerns about no-
tification.
It is a precedent that is most unlikely to
be repeated. Given heightened congression,
al sensitivities and the personal and political
pain caused by the Iran-Contra investiga-
tion (exemplified by the attempted suicide
of one policy-maker, financial burdens for
them all, the destruction of reputations,
and, in effect, the crippling of the Reagan
administration during its final two years), it
Is beyond imagination that any future ad-
ministration again will temporarily with-
hold notification on an issue of similar po-
tential controversy.
Moreover, as the bipatisan Tower Com-
mission report noted, the Iran debacle oc-
curred largely because existing procedures
for handling covert action were ignored, not
because new procedures were needed. The
administration also has instituted additional
precautions, such as an automatic review
every 10 days if the president determines
that notification to Congress must be de-
layed.
Congress will suffer a Pyrrhic victory if it
wins on this issue. The Democratic majority
will find succeeding presidents hamstrung
in grappling with future hostage cases. Does
anyone predict an end to hostage taking?
And if, in one of those instances, word of
covert initiatives leaks out prematurely, pos-
sibly triggering the death of a hostage or
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August 1, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL, RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks
agent, it is Congress that will fall under a
dark cloud of suspicion. At that point, the
diminishing mutual trust essential of effec-
tive oversight will suffer yet another griev-
ous blow.
A TRIBUTE TO SCOUTMASTER
JERRY SALMON
HON. NORMAN F. LENT
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, August 1, 1988
Mr. LENT. Mr. Speaker, On Sunday, August
7, Boy Scouts of America Troop 332 of East
Rockaway, NY, will honor an individual who
exemplifies the finest qualities of Scouting.
That person is Scoutmaster Jerry Salmon,
who will be retiring after 11 years of service to
the youth of East Rockaway and Lynbrook..
. With the help of his wife, Catherine, Jerry
Salmon strived to teach these young men to
achieve their highest personal goals and to
improve their community. Under his guidance
and encouragement, 44 young men have at-
tained the rank of Eagle. Scout, the highest
rank in Scouting. Also, Troop 332 has been
named Bishop's Troop three times, a very dis-
tinguished honor.
Jerry Salmon has served as an important
role model for these young people. Through-
out his dedicated career in Scouting, he gave
generously of his time and energy. This com-
mitment is borne of a genuine caring for the
young Scouts in his charge and a concern
that they mature into active members of the
community. Indeed, we all benefit from Jerry
Salmon's work. For the young men he has
worked with become infected with this need to
serve. They take what they have learned fromr
him and reach out to many others.
Volunteers like Jerry Salmon, dedicated to
the welfare of their fellow man, are the es-
sence of the American spirit. They have
helped make our country great, and we are
very fortunate to have him. On this- occasion,
I'd like to offer my sincere appreciation to
Scoutmaster Jerry Salmon for his many years
of dedicated service to the young people of
our communities and wish him many years of
happiness in the years ahead. .
SUPER BOWL QUARTERBACK
DOESN'T FIND RICHES
HON. LOUIS STOKES
OF OHIO
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, August 1, 1988
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Speaker, I read with great
interest an article which recently appeared in
the Detroit Free Press entitled, "Fame Fine:
Bucks Better." The article discusses the lack
of endorsement opportunities for Doug Wil-
liams, quarterback of the Super Bowl champi-
ons Washington Redskins. Doug Williams' case
is in stark contrast to the cases of other Super
Bowl heroes such as Joe Theismann, Roger
Staubach, and Jim McMahon. These quarter-
backs have achieved more than Super Bowl
victories?they have achieved the fame, glory,
and, more importantly, the financial rewards
that accompany such success. Is Doug Wil-
liams not worthy of the same?
Mr. Speaker, I read the article with great in-
terest and I urge my colleagues to do the
same.
[From the Detroit Free Press, July 7, 1988)
FAME FINE; BUCKS BETTER?QB DOESN'T
FIND RICHES
(Bk Ray Didinger)
PHILADELPHIA.?Joe Namath won a Super
Bowl and got a movie contract. Phil Simms
won a Super Bowl and wrote a book.
Jim McMahon won a Super Bowl and
wound up selling tacos on TV. Joe Montana
beat Dan Marino in Super Bowl XIX, then
they co-starred in a hokey diet soda com-
mercial.
For most NFL quarterbacks, the Super
Bowl is like magic carpet. It whisks them
away to a land where their names are in
bright lights and strangers smile and hold
open limousine doors 24 hours a day.
Mostly, it is a land where a quarterback
can get rich in a hurry. It happened to Joe
Theismann and Roger Staubach. It even
happened to Bob Griese, who is duller than
Muzak.
But it has not happened to Doug Wil-
liams, not yet anyway, and he had perhaps
the best Super Bowl of any quarterback
ever. Williams threw for four touchdowns
and 340 yards (a Super Bowl record) as
Washington buried Denver, 42-10, in Super
Bowl XXII last January.
In the five months since his MVP per-
formance, Williams has done just one na-
tional TV commercial and that was the
Disney World spot that was arranged with
both quarterbacks, Williams and Denver's
John Elway, before the game. -The winner
got to do the line ("I'm going to Disney
World") as he left the field in San Diego.
Since then, the advertisers and marketing
types have beaten a path away from Wil-
liams' door.
Could it be they haven't been able to find
Williams' offseason home in rural Zachary,
LA.? Or could it be they just aren't trying.
Is it because they don't think white Amer-
ica is so eager to buy cameras and razor
blades when they are being pushed by a
black Super Bowl hero?
"I don't know the answer. That's just the
? way it is," Williams said recently as he ac-
cepted the NFL Filmstar Award for the out-
standing individual achievement of last
season.
"I've made it this far without all that
(commercial) stuff, I'm not going to start
worrying about it now. I don't even like to
talk about it because it's not going to
change anything. That's just the way things
are."
"But it doesn't seem fair," someone said.
Williams smiled. "Whoever said life was
fair?" he asked.
By all rights, Williams should have been a
hot property after Super Bowl XXII. Here
was a quarterback who had kicked around
pro football for a decade, a man haunted by
personal tragedy, who came off the bench
to lead his team to the NFL championship.
It was can't-miss, storybook stuff.
This script had everything, including a
scene where the here twisted his knee early
in the big game and limped off the field
only to come back and win. It was all there.
Blood and guts, tears and cheers, gritty un-
derdog (Williams) outshining the golden
boy (Elway).
Williams' performance was memorable on
several levels; but in particular for the grace
be displayed under pressure. He fielded
every newsman's question during the week,
no matter how clumsy. ("Doug, you've been
a black quarterback all your. . .") He was
virtually flawless when the curtain went up
Sunday.
E 2549
If Williams has been slighted by the ad-
vertisers and corporate spenders since then,
well, it's something he can live with.
He has the new car he won as the game's
Most Valuable Player. He has a gold Super
Bowl watch. His championship ring is on
order. He has piled up a lot of frequent flier
miles traveling the banquet circuit and col-
lecting awards.
His left knee, surgically repaired in Febru-
ary, is healing nicely. His family?wife, Lisa,
and daughter, Ashley?is settled in the new
house. He is listed first on the Washington
depth chart, ahead of Jay Schroeder, going
into training camp.
All in all, Williams, 32, figures he is much
better off than he was this time a year ago.
"I'm not mad," Williams said. "Who
should I be mad at. I've done a lot of things
this off-season, met a lot of nice people.
"The best thing that's come out of this is
the Doug Williams Foundation we set up in
Washington. We rise money for scholar-
ships and drug abuse programs for needy
kids. We ran our first benefit three weeks
ago and it was a big success.
"That is a direct result of what happened
in the Super Bowl. It's a way I can give
something back to the community. I'd
rather spend my time working on that than
banging on doors, asking why I'm not doing
more TV' commercials."
The people who said Williams' life would
change after Super Bowl XXII didn't know
much about the man or his life. Williams
never cared for the spotlight, and, after his
first wife died of a brain tumor in 1983, he
pulled back even more.
Williams never bought into the argument
that he played Super Bowl XXII for all
black quarterbacks?past, present and
future. Williams didn't want the label going
into the game. He didn't want the credit
after. If others wanted to cast him as a role
model, that was up to them.
"I had three or four offers to write a book
after the Super _Bowl," Williams said. "I
wasn't interested. Not yet anyway.
"I'll write a book, but after I'm done play-
ing. And it won't be just a football book. It
will talk about my growing up, my life off
the field. It will talk about everything I've
gone through.
"I'm looking forward writing it. I feel like
I've got a.lot to say."
FIVE MARYLAND ELEMENTARY
SCHOOLS RATED OUTSTANDING
HON. CONSTANCE A. MORELLA
OF MARYLAND
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, August 1, 1988
Mrs. 'MORELLA. Mr. Speaker, I take great
pleasure in commending five elementary
schools in Maryland's Eighth Congressional
District that were recently rated "outstanding"
by the U.S. Department of Education: Bells
Mill Elementary School in Potomac, Whet-
stone Elementary School in Gaithersburg, the
Hebrew Academy of Greater Washington in
Silver Spring, the St. Jane de Chantal Catholic
School in Bethesda, and the Center School in
Chevy Chase.
From almost 100 applications, 10 public and
private elementary schools were selected by
the State of Maryland to be considered by the
Department of Education for its biannual Ele-
mentary School Recognition Awards. Each
school then underwent a 2-day, onsight and
indepth inspection. As part of this inspection,
DOE interviewers spoke with students, par-
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