THE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT AMENDMENTS OF 1987

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M01264R000100020033-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: February 4, 1987
• Content Type: MISC

II 566
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/09: CIA-RDP90M01264R000100020033-0
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE February 4, 1987
contract is shipped offshore. Taxes are
not only lost, but the whole amount
moves out of the country as a debt
that we owe to other nations in the
balance of payments.
Cheaper to go offshore? For whom?
I would like to know what bookkeepers
in our Congress and administration
add so poorly.
I welcome the concern of my fello
Congressmen over the loss of busines
to our military contractors. When this
whole cycle began, it seemed that this
country was bowing under the pres-
sure of foreign governments, saying
that if we did not buy more weaponry
.from them, they would stop purchas-
ing from us.
Well, we have brought more weapon-
ry from them and they are now buying
less from us. So much for bending to
intimidation; and their sales position
has been strengthened by the infusion
of state-of-the-art U.S. technology
which is being passed along in some of
these contract awards.
Mr. Speaker, I hope I do not sound
like some naive person when I express
utter shock and amazement that we
seem, to have bought the London
Bridge and the Eiffel Tower, and
every pea under the shell that these
hungry foreign nations are hawking.
They need manufacturing and man-
ufacturing jobs-well, so do we. Nei-
ther I, nor anyone in this body, was
elected to protect the interests of
Europe and European lawmakers, or
European or any workers abroad. We
are elected to protect the interests of
America and Americans.
Every dollar of taxpayers' money
should be plowed back into this coun-
try. With a shrinking industrial base,
the guarantee of defense money to the
remaining manufacturing companies
will at least keep a remnant of indus-
try in this country which maintains
skills and technology needed for any
meaningful defense.
I believe, to remain a leading nation
in the world, it will take more than a
remnant of industry. It will take an
expanding industrial base, but that
will take great effort and will on the
part of everyone to turn the tides that
are tearing at our strength. I hope
with all my heart that we can achieve
this turnaround. However, in the in-
terim, to throw away the lead we have
in weapons sales and technology is
more than folly, it is madness.
I am glad so many Congressmen are
now angry over these sales. I hope
they are angry enough to do some-
thing about it. I have been fighting
many bureaucrats over provisions of
law, of existing law which-they are
flaunting in regard to shipping on
American-flag ships. I am always dis-
mayed at the attitude they display
toward American law; and, in in-
stances of which I have been aware,
the law has been -clear, and all too
often disobeyed,
Let us make it clear, ladies and gen-
tlemen, where we stand. Once and for
all, and I hope that stand is for Amer-
ica. For American products and com-
panies and jobs. For America's revital-
ization. I believe it is worth the strug-
gle and the effort; and it should be
seen as the job of every American
today.
THE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT
AMENDMENTS OF 1987
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
GRAY of Illinois). Under a previous
order of the House; the gentleman
from Ohio [Mr. STOKES] is recognized
for 15 minutes.
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Speaker, the
Iran-Contra controversy has raised
some very serious questions concern-
ing the ability of the Intelligence
Committee to effectively perform its
important oversight function. I say
this not to criticize the committee, of
which I have been a member for 4
years, and will chair during the 100th
Congress, but to emphasize the obvi-
ous: No matter how vigorously it pur-
sues its mission, a congressional com-
mittee's oversight efforts are largely
dependent on the willingness of the
executive branch to provide informa-
tion.
When the executive branch treats
the oversight process as a legitimate
and important function of representa-
tive government, and cooperates ac-
cordingly, both the oversight process
and the programs overseen usually
function at their best.
When the executive branch treats
congressional oversight as an irritant
to be avoided or overcome, the result
is quite often a policy or program fail-
ure. Occasionally, such failures are of
such magnitude as to directly affect
the national interest.
Clearly, this has been the case with
regard to the so-called Iran initiative.
The intent to evade ' congressional
oversight is clear; the disastrous result
is equally clear. It has come in the one
area of secret governmental activity-
covert action-where effective congres-
sional oversight is imperative, and
where congressional access to informa-
tion must be unfettered. If the Intelli-
gence Committees are not informed of
covert actions, then no one in Con-
gress is informed and no oversight is
performed. If the Intelligence Com-
mittees are not permitted to offer
sound advice and constructive criti-
cism before an action is initiated, then
rarely will any such advice or criticism
be heard from anyone who does not
have a direct operational or policy
connection to the particular covert
action contemplated.
In my opinion, this outsider's look is
one of the more important functions
of the Intelligence Oversight Commit-
tees. While we must endeavor to avoid
or discover Intelligence Agency abuses,
to control the monetary cost of intelli-
gence activities, and to influence
major policy decisions affecting the
long-term conduct of intelligence ac-
tivities, it is just as important, to both
the Congress and the intelligence com-
munity, to be able to sit back in a de-
tached manner, listen to an intelli-
gence briefing, and suggest that the
proposed action is a bad plan. It is
much easier to perceive the inherent
folly of a complicated plan if you did
not have a hand in its formulation or
execution and your job does not
depend on its success.
So, there are reasons other than the
curiosity for oversight committees to
seek to know as much 'information as
possible. The Iran-Contra affair is in-
structive. Surely, if the Intelligence
Committee had been provided prior
notice of the Iran arms sales when it
should have been, at least one among
us might have asked some pertinent
questions; some of us might even have
opposed it; and some of us who op-
posed it might even have -proferred
reasoned and persuasive arguments as
to why the proposal would not work.
Indeed, since the Intelligence Commit-
tee possesses no veto authority over
covert actions, members of the com-
mittee have, on occasion, written to
the President directly to voice opposi-
tion to a-proposed covert action. Had
we been afforded the opportunity to
do so this time, at the program's incep-
tion or later, the President would have
had a better understanding of the
risks involved and of the clear aversion
of the Congress and the American
people to what appears to be an arms-
for-hostages deal.,
At, one time, even quite recently, in
this relatively new intelligence over-
sight process, the intelligence commu-
nity, and the CIA in particular,
seemed to recognize the value of con-
gressional oversight. At one time, the
intelligence community, and the CIA
in particular, seemed to recognize the
need to codify the oversight process
and joined the members of the intelli-
gence committees to enact the Over-
sight Act of 1980. Also, at one time,
the intelligence community, and the
CIA in particular, considered that stat-
ute as a binding promise to keep the
intelligence committees fully. in-
formed. -
Apparently, and regrettably, this is
no longer true. That bond of mutual
respect and trust between the commit-
tees and the CIA, which EDDIE BOLAND,
Ken Robinson, Senator INOUYE, Sena-
tor Bayh, Senator Goldwater, and
others strove so hard and so success-
fully to establish, has been broken. It
has been replaced of late by a demon-
stration of arrogance that permits
high-ranking Government officials to
look for ways to avoid the law rather
than execute it, and to reason that a
statute designed to insure prior notice
authorized no notice at all for 10
months.
Where the Congress had agreed to
some minimal ambiguity so as to avoid
confrontation, this administration now
sees an acceptance by the Congress of
a constitutional right to withhold in-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/09: CIA-RDP90MO1264R000100020033-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/09: CIA-RDP90MO1264R000100020033-0
February
`" CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HCi PT' ' H 567
formation. Where. some in the Con-
gress had recognized the possibility of.
a rare circumstance in which Presiden-
tial action was demanded before notice
could be given, this administration
perceives , congressional recognition
that some executive branch actions
are too sensitive to -share ? with the in-.
telligence committees. Where once in-
telligence professionals were eager
both to perform their own oversight as
well as cooperate with the Congress,
this administration now permits the
Nation's most sensitive intelligence op-
erations to be carried out by individ-
uals who deem the Congress more of a
threat than hostile governments or
terrorists.
Mr. Speaker, it is my fervent hope
that we now have hit rock botton in
this 'matter and that the state of af-
fairs I have described will end as
quickly as it began. Then the intelli-
gence committees and the executive
branch can begin to reestablish an at-
mosphere in which the committees,
the Congress, and the American
people can once again feel confident
that certain agencies are indeed. to be
trusted.
This time, however; the Congress
must be perfectly clear in setting out
the ground rules and must exercise its
full constitutional powers. Events have
demonstrated that to rely, as we all
did, on the assurance that Govern-
ment officials would always act in a
spirit of good will when interpreting
statutes worded vaguely at the insist-
ence of other Government officials, is
not in the best interest of the over-
sight process. The actions 'of the Presi-
dent, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, and the latter's general counsel
in interpreting the prior notice provi-
sion of the Oversight Act of 1980 re-.
quire. us; for their benefit as well as
ours, to bring clarity to the provision.
Therefore, Mr. Speaker, today, Mn
BOLAND, Mr. BEILENSON, Mr. MCCURDY,
Mr. DANIEL, Mr. BROWN of'California,
Mr. DWYER, Mrs. KENNELLY,.Mr. KAS-
TENMEIER, Mr. MCHUGH, and I have
joined to. introduce the Intelligence
Oversight Amendments of 1987.
The bill amends the National Securi-
ty Act of 1947 and section 662 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961-the
Hughes-Ryan amendment-in order to
implement the intent of those ' who
drafted the Oversight Act of 1980 and
to insure that the President, whoever
he or she may be, receives sound,
advice from within both the Congress
and =the executive branch before un-
dertaking covert. actions.
The bill would require that all Presi-
dential. findings be in writing, and that
the written finding be provided to the
intelligence committees, the statutory
members of the National Security
Council, and the Director of Central
Intelligence prior to the initiation of a
covert-action.
The bill would also make clear that
prior notice to Congress of all covert
actions must be given, except. in ex-
traordinary circumstances affecting
the vital interests of the United States
where time is of the essence. In such
cases, and only in such cases, notice
could be deferred for not more than 48
hours.
With these amendments, the scheme
for covert action reporting will be
quite clear: First, in almost all cases,
prior notice must be given to the intel-
ligence committees; second, in rare
cases, where the President believes
there is an unusual degree of sensitivi-
ty, prior notice must be given, but it
may be given to the leadership group
set out in section 501; and third, in
even rarer cases, where the President
must react with speed because of an
immediate threat to our national secu-
,-,,..=d BEILENSON, in the introduction of
the Intelligence Oversight Amend-
ments of 1987.
I can well recall that when the
House Intelligence Committee was cre-
ated nearly 10 years ago there were no
illusions about the fact that to effec-
tively do its job of oversight it would
have to depend to a great extent on
the candor of. the intelligence agen-
cies.
To those who might consider that a
contradiction in terms, I would re-
spond, that the hard work of Intelli-
gence Committee members on both
sides of the, aisle, and in both Houses
of the Congress, won for us a recogni-
n
, in the executive branch, that in-
rity, notice may be deferred for a max- Lio
imum of 48 hours. telligence oversight was something to
Never again, Mr. Speaker, must we
hear that an activity. of the U.S. Gov-
ernment is so sensitive that knowledge
of it must be withheld from the U.S.
Congress.
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased now to
yield to the distinguished former
chairman of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, the gentle-
man from Massachusetts [Mr.
BOLAND] under whose chairmanship
the House Intelligence Committee at-
tained prominence.
(Mr. BOLAND asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks. )
Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, I. appre-
ciate very deeply the remarks of the
distinguished chairman of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence with respect to my chairman-
ship during the 7 years that I was with
the select committee.
Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, by the
time the last investigative` report is
issued on the Iran-Contra affair, I
expect that the national list of lessons
to be learned from this episode will be
quite extensive indeed.
I also expect that Congress may
deem it necessary to address, through
legislation, certain aspects of this
matter, in an attempt to ensure that
whatever mistakes were made are not
repeated in the future.
We are obviously some months away
from the kind of final accounting
which can form the basis for such leg-
islation.
However, in one particularly sensi-
tive area-the form and timing of con-
gressional notification of covert intelli-
gence actions-it is already quite clear
that there exists a serious and funda-
mental disagreement between the ex-
ecutive branch and the Congress over
the requirements of existing law.
The potential for additional damage
to our foreign policy interests, and the
reputation of our intelligence agencies,
through the perpetuation of this dis-
agreement is so great, that I believe
that it must be legislatively resolved as
quickly as possible.
. For that reason, I am pleased to join
Chairman Lou STOKES of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence, and Congressmen MCHUGH
be valued, and not feared.
Or at-least I thought it had.
The fact of the matter is, as Mr._,.
STOKES has so well stated, that con- ,
gressional oversight of intelligence ac-
tivities is the only independent assess-
ment of them, that is going to be
made.
It seems to be beyond question, that
intelligence initiatives, which are well-
conceived, and based on sound policy
objectives could only benefit from this
type of review.
The tendering of advice and sugges-
tions, or the noting of reservations, by
outside parties ought, it seems to me,
to be welcomed by decisionmakers in-
terested in truly measuring the risks
and the potential gains of sensitive ac-
tivities.
This is the role the Intelligence
Committees are supposed to play, but
it simply cannot be done if they are
not fully informed about intelligence
activities, in time, to provide meaning-
ful oversight.
In 1980, during the consideration of
the Intelligence Oversight Act of that
year, the House and Senate Intelli-
gence Committees, in conjunction with
representatives of the administration
then in office, grappled with the most
difficult issue related to oversight-
the prior reporting of covert oper-
ations.
After a great deal of give and take,
during which time both the Congress
and the executive branch understand-
ably sought to preserve their constitu-
tional authorities, we established, in
statute, a procedure that recognized as
a matter of practice that significant
intelligence activities, including covert
opertions, had' to be reported to the
Intelligence Committees prior to initi-
ation..
While. prior notice was clearly to be
the norm, we also recognized that
there might be an extremely limited
number of occasions, in which the
President might ' determine, that
notice of a covert operation could not
be made until after it had begun.
We determined that those instances
would be accommodated without doing
violence to the -general principles of
congressional prenotification if the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/09: CIA-RDP90MO1264R000100020033-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/09: CIA-RDP90MO1264R000100020033-0
H 568
CC GRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE February 4, 1987
President understood that notice could
be deferred, not eliminated.
We did not define, what we consid-
ered to be a reasonable time, for in-
forming the committees in those in-
stances where prior notice could not
be given.
But that was a result of a clear un-
derstanding, that we were trying to es-
tablish procedures for situations, that
were going to be, by definition, so ex-
traordinary as to defy attempts to pre-
dict the type of response that would
be necessary.
We believed, that the consensus
which had been achieved during the
negotiations on the bill, about the
would guarantee, that after-the-fact
notifications, were made in the short-
est time possible.
As a result, we did not feel it wise or
necessary to delineate, in statute, the
outer limits on the acceptable time for
that type of notification.
Yes, there was. an element of comity
established in those negotiations, and
yes, we thought it would endure.
That hope, unfortunately was one of
the early victims of the Iran-Contra
affair.
As a result, and because the impor-
tance of fully informed Intelligence
Committees now should be even more
clear, Congress must act to inject addi-
tional statutory certitude into the no-
tification process.
The legislation we introduce today
restates the requirement for prior
written notice of covert activities to
the Intelligence Committees, or in cer-
tain instances to a statutorily defined
leadership group.
. And it establishes a 48-hour period,
as the maximum reasonable time,
during which rare circumstances and
the need for dispatch could combine to
allow notice to be deferred.
The enactment of this measure,
which I believe is fully consistent with
the intent of the drafters of the Over-
sight Act of 1980, will strengthen the
intelligence oversight process on both
ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.
It is a. bill that is in the best interest
of Congress, the President, and the
Nation, and I hope it will be brought
to the floor as expeditiously as possi-
ble.
0 1650
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Speaker, I thank
the gentleman from Massachusetts
[Mr. BOLAND] for his excellent state-
ment regarding this bill and am
pleased to have him as a cosponsor of
this legislation.
GENERAL LEAVE
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days in which to
revise and extend, their remarks on
this special order. .
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
GRAY of Illinois). Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from
Ohio?
There was no objection.
PERMISSION TO EXTEND
SPECIAL ORDER
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that I be allowed
to extend the special order which I
have reserved for this evening to 10
minutes, rather than 5.
The SPEAKER ' pro tempore. Is
there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Wisconsin?
There was no objection.
RESPONSE TO CONGRESSMAN
McCOLLUM RE MILITARY AS-
SISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
a previous order of the House, the gen-
tleman from Wisconsin (Mr. OBEY] is
rcognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, earlier
today,. three Members of this House,
the gentleman -from Florida [Mr.
McCOLLUM], the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. ARMEY], and the gentle-
man from Indiana [Mr. BURTON) at-
tacked me for placing a hold on the
administration's request for additional
aircraft and other military assistance
funds for the Government of El Salva-
dor.
I would rise to a point a personal
privilege because of their attack upon
me except for the fact that I regard it
as a personal privilege to be attacked
by the three gentlemen in question.
Nonetheless, I would like to set the
matter straight on the issues which
they raised today.
Last year, at the end of November,
the administration sent my subcom-
mittee notifications that it intended to
provide El Salvador with' $8.6 .million
worth of fixed and rotary-wing air-
craft and $6.5. million in military as-
sistance funds for training and equip-
ment of security forces.
Since the Congress was then out of
session, and there was no way for the
committee to take a close look at those
requests, the committee put them on
hold until this session could resume.
Since that time, a number of things
have happened. First of all, a number
of the members of my subcommittee,
not just myself, asked that holds be
put on the aircraft reprogramming.
Also, since that time, the Hasenfus
affair and the contragate scandal have
raised a number of serious questions
about the use of United States person-
nel and facilities in El Salvador.
There have been a number of allega-
tions that American personnel in El
Salvador, during a time when funding
to the Contras was cut off, had facili-
tated the providing of supplies to the
Contras.
Substantial questions have been
raised, not only about United States
personnel, paid for, I should point out,
in the foreign assistance bill, facilitat-
ing the arms supply network to the
Contras, but also questions have been
raised about the involvement of El
Salvadoran officials in facilitating
those same shipments.
New reports have stated that the
former CIA operatives running the
arms supply operation from the Ilo-
pango Airfield in El Salvador carried
credentials issued from the El Salva-
doran Armed Forces which identified
those individuals as United States
military advisers.
01700
Gen. Juan Rafael Bustillo, the chief
of the. Salvadoran Air Force, also has
been implicated in those stories in con-
nection with the supply network going
on.
Because of the serious allegations
raised by the Iran-Contra scandal, the
subcommittee sent the State Depart-
ment on December 5 a list of 40 ques-
tions in order to determine whether or
not any foreign assistance funds were
used for any illegal purposes whatso-
ever in carrying out those activities.
One question was this: Did the State
Department or the Defense Security
Assistance Agency directly or indirect-
ly have any role in the planning, pur-
chasing, or delivery of arms provided
to Iran or the Nicaraguan Contras? To
date, the administration has only re-
sponded to 8 of those 40 questions.
That may pot bother the gentleman
from Florida [Mr. MCCOLLUM.) with
his longstanding love for the Contras,
or the other gentleman who spoke
today, but I have an obligation to
make sure that the intention of Con-
gress has not been circumvented by
the administration. I am not asserting
that it has been, but I do have an obli-
gation to determine whether it has
been or not.
When those Members addressed the
request for police training earlier this
afternoon, the impression was left
that the administration does not have
resources available to address its anti-
terrorist programs, including the prob-
lems of insurgency and terrorism.
I would like to point out that in
fiscal year 1986 and fiscal year 1987
the administration has had $238 mil-
lion in military aid and more than
$850 million in economic and military
aid in total for El Salvador.
The committee approved last year
the full administration request for an-
titerrorism of $9.8 million, a 39-per-
cent increase over the previous year's
level when foreign aid had to be cut
overall by 14 percent because of
Gramm-Rudman.
The committee ' earmarked for the
second year in a row $1 million specifi-
cally to assist the Government of El
Salvador and its special investigative
unit for the purpose of bringing to jus-
tice those responsible for the murders
of United States citizens in El Salva-
dor, including Corporal Kwiatkowski
from my own district.
During the next month I will be
talking with State Department offi-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/09: CIA-RDP90MO1264R000100020033-0