THE AMERICAN MEDIA VIS-A-VIS EL SALVADOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M01243R001000300023-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: December 7, 1989
• Content Type: CABLE

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2013/09/25: CIA-RDP90M01243R001000300023-3
Directorate of Intelligence
Office of African and Latin American Analysis
STAT
11 December 1989
NOLE FOR: Deputy Director of Centra ntelli ence
j
If you haven't seen them already, the
attached two cables from San Salvador are
probably worth your reading.
Attachment
en, Jr.
Director
African and Latin American Analysis
STAT
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) UNULASSIFIED
CDS
C 94656sAm SA 15833 072333z5oll 89-4979559
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FRP: ,2,
STATE
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89 4979559
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TOR: 072333Z DEC 89
NC 4979559
SAN SA 15833
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00 RUEAIIB
ZNR UUUUU ZOC STATE ZZH
TOU8921
00 RUEHC
DE RUEHSN 15833/0113412316
ZNR UUUUU ZZH ?
0 072310Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3848
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4182
BT
CONTROLS
UNCLAS SAN SALVADOR 15833
USIA FOR AR, PIG
STATE FOR ARA/CEN, ARA/P, PA
E.O. 12356 N/A
BODY
TAGS: OPRC, SCOM, PGOV, PREL, US, ES
SUBJECT: THE AMERICAN MEDIA VIS-A-VIS EL SALVADOR
REF: A. HOWARD/DANCE, JACOBS/HOWARD TELCOMS OF 12/7/89,
B. SAN SALVADOR 15596 (c)
BACKGROUND
1. EVEN BEFORE THE CURRENT FMLN OFFENSIVE BEGAN ON
NOVEMBER 11, EL SALVADOR AS A POLICY ISSUE OCCUPIED A
UNIQUE POSITION IN THE AMERICAN PSYCHE. THOSE WHO
SUPPORT U.S POLICY AND THE EFFORTS OF THE GOES TO BUILD
A WORKING AND VIABLE DEMOCRACY, WHILE NUMEROUS ENOUGH TO
SUSTAIN A BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL CONSENSUS, ARE
RESTRAINED AND CAUTIOUS. THE PROBLEMS THAT STILL PLAGUE
EL SALVADOR, AND THE MEMORY OF THE HORRORS THAT
UNCLASSIFIED
STAT
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AFFLICTED THIS SMALL COUNTRY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE
DECADE, SERVE TO LIMIT ENTHUSIASM. ON THE OTHER SIDE,
THOSE WHO OPPOSE THIS POLICY HAVE THE VEHEMENCE AND THE
INTELLECTUAL CERTITUDE OF THE "TRUE BELIEVER." FOR
THESE PEOPLE, SALVADOR IS NOT A POLITICAL PROBLEM, OR
EVEN A SPECIFIC PARCEL OF POOR AND OVER-CROWDED REAL
ESTATE; IT IS A MORALITY PLAY. ITS VILLAINS -- TOTAL
AND UNREDEEMABLE -- ARE THE OLIGARCHY, THE MILITARY, AND
THE CALLOUS AMERICAN BUREAUCRATS WHO SUPPORT THEM.
ITS HEROES -- PURE AND UNBURDENED BY POLITICAL
SELF-INTEREST -- ARE THE POOR AND NOBLE CAMPESINOS,
IDEALISTIC CHURCH ACTIVISTS, OPPRESSED LABOR LEADERS,
AND BRAVE FOREIGNERS WHO LABOR ON BEHALF OF THE
DOWNTRODDEN. IT IS ONLY IN THE PAST YEAR THAT A SERIES
OF BRUTAL ASSASSINATIONS -- OF MAYORS, POLITICANS, AND
CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUALS -- HAS FINALLY STRIPPED THE
FMLN OF ITS MYTHIC ROBIN HOOD IMAGE.
(A) COVERAIE
2. THE COVERAGE OF THE WAR, PARTICULARLY BY THE
INTERNATIONAL ELECTRONIC MEDIA WITH ITS DEMAND FOR GOOD
"VISUALS," HAS INTENSIFIED THIS DISTORTION. THE WRITTEN
MEDIA, PARTICULARLY THOSE WITH PERMANENT SAN
SALVADOR-BASED SPANISH SPEAKING REPRESENTATIVES, I.E,
THE WASHINGTON POST, NEW YORK TIMES, MIAMI HERALD,
NEWSWEEK, ETC., HAVE GENERALLY REPORTED THE WAR
ACCURATELY, AND HAVE AT LEAST MADE AN HONEST ATTEMPT AT
OBJECTIVITY.
3. THE MOST DISTORTED IMAGES HAVE COME FROM THE
TELEVISION NETWORKS, WITH CNN THE MOST CONSPICUOUS (AND
THE ONLY ONE WE ARE ABLE TO REGULARLY MONITOR)
OFFENDER. THEIR COVERAGE, AS TYPICAL OF THE MEDIUM,
TENDS TO REDUCE THE REALITY TO BLACK OR WHITE
SIMPLICITY, WHILE LEAVING ALL THE GRAY AREAS ASIDE. THE
VISUAL IMPACT OF COMBAT FOOTAGE AND IMPOVERISHED
CAMPESINOS ALSO FOSTERS A LEBANON-LIKE IMAGE, WITHOUT
COUNTERBALANCING IMAGES OF A THRIVING MIDDLE CLASS AND
THE RAPID URBAN DEVELOPMENT THAT ILLUSTRATES THE OTHER
SIDE OF THE SALVADORAN STORY.
OUR REALITY
4. WHAT WE SEE HERE IN EL SALVADOR IS A LEGITIMATE
GOVERNMENT, ELECTED WITH OVER 53 OF THE VOTE IN AN
ELECTION JUDGED "FAIR AND FREE," THAT HAD JOINED WITH
THE FMLN IN A PROCESS OF DIALOG (AND IN WHICH EACH SIDE
HAD ASSURED THAT IT WOULD NOT UNILATERALLY WITHDRAW) TO
ARRIVE AT A PEACEFUL -- BUT CONSTITUTIONALLY LEGITIMATE
-- SOLUTION TO A BLOODY TEN-YEAR OLD INSURGENCY,
UNCLASSIFIED
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STRUGGLING TO CONTAIN AN ARMED INCURSION INTO ITS
CAPITAL CITY, AS WELL AS INTO SMALLER INTERIOR
POPULATION CENTERS.
5. WE SEE AN FMLN, BLATANTLY SUPPLIED WITH SOVIET
DESIGNED WEAPONS PROVIDED BY CUBA VIA NICARAGUA (AND IN
VIOLATION OF SEVERAL CENTRAL AMERICAN AGREEMENTS),
BRINGING BETWEEN TWO AND THREE THOUSAND HEAVILY ARMED
COMBATANTS INTO SAN SALVADOR. WE SEE A SELF-PROCLAIMED
MARXIST-LENINIST GROUP ATTACKING THE RESIDENCES OF
PRESIDENT CRISTIANI -- ATTEMPTING TO MURDER HIM, HIS
WIFE, AND CHILDREN, VIOLATING ITS OWN PROMISE BY
WITHDRAWING FROM THE DIALOG PROCESS, USING HIGH-POWERED
WEAPONS IN A DENSE URBAN ENVIRONMENT -- WITH ONE OF ITS
FIRST VICTIMS A 26 YEAR OLD AMERICAN SCHOOL TEACHER, AND
THEN PURPOSELY PLACING ITS COMBATANTS BEHIND A SHIELD OF
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 SAN SALVADOR 15833
USIA FOR AR, P/G
STATE FOR ARA/CEN, ARA/P, PA
E.O. 12356 N/A
TAGS: OPRC, SCOM, PGOV, PREL, US, ES
SUBJECT: THE AMERICAN MEDIA VIS-A-VIS EL SALVADOR
INNOCENT CIVILIANS, AND ALL THE WHILE BABBLING ABOUT
HUMAN RIGHTS.
6. MILITARILY, WE SEE A SALVADORAN MILITARY (ESAF) THAT
HAS FOUGHT WELL, BUT HAS FAILED UNTIL RECENTLY TO GO
STRONGLY ON THE OFFENSIVE. THE FMLN HAS NOT OVERRUN OR
BADLY DAMAGED A SINGLE, RPT SINGLE, ESAF INSTALLATION,
AND HAS SUFFERED CASUALTIES AT A RATIO OF 3:1. WE SEE A
SALVADORAN AIR FORCE (FAES) THAT HAS GENERALLY
RESTRAINED ITS USE OF AERIAL FIREPOWER AND THAT HAS NOT
-- SO FAR -- LOST A SINGLE AIRCRAFT TO THE SOVIET SA-7'S
INTRODUCED BY NICARAGUA (BUT HAS LOST THREE AIRCRAFT TO
CONVENTIONAL GROUNDFIRE).
7.WE NOW SEE VIA RECENT INFORMATION, AN FMLN THAT
PLANNED THIS AS ITS (SECOND) FINAL OFFENSIVE, AND BASED
THIS EXPECTATION ON ATOPULAR UPRISING THAT DID NOT
HAPPEN. WE SEE AN FMLN THAT HAS TAKEN SERIOUS
CASUALTIES, AND IS TRYING TO REPLACE TRHESE LOSSES BY
KIDNAPPING CHILDREN AND OTHER CIVILIANS, THAT HAS NOT
ONLY USED OR LOST AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF WEAPONS AND
MUNTIONS, BUT IN ITS PUSH FOR A FINAL VICTORY HAS
UNMASKED A CAREFULLY CONSTRUCTED NETWORK OF SO-CALLED
POPULAR AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, SAFEHOUSES, ETC.
THE DISTORTION
8. THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA, AND A CASUAL READING OF THE
INTERNATIONAL PRESS, PRESENTS AN IMAGE OF EL SALVADOR AS
UNCLASSIFIED
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LEBANON, THAT IS, OF A NATIONESO FRACTURED AND VIOLENT
THAT, AT BEST, THERE IS A MORAL EQUIVALENCY BETWEEN THE
FMLN AND THE GOVERNMENT. THE GOES IS NOT PORTRAYED AS
DEFENDING ITSELF AND ITS POPULATION FROM ATTACK; IT IS
PORTRAYED INSTEAD AS THE UNPROVOKED INITIATORS OF
REPRESSIVE, VICIOUS ASSAULTS ON ITS CITIZENS. IT IS NOT
RESPONDING TO (PERHAPS IMAGINED OR EXAGGERATED BUT
NEVERTHELESS FRIGHTENING) REPORTS OF
"INTERNACIONALISTAS" FIGHTING WITH AND SUPPORTING THE
FMLN, BUT RATHER LAUNCHING A DIABOLICAL ASSAULT ON
CHURCH AND HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS. AT TIMES, IT
WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO KNOW FROM THE MEDIA COVERAGE THAT
THE FMLN IS EVEN A PARTY TO THE CURRENT SITUATION.
IMAGES OF REFUGEES, DAMAGED BUILDINGS, DEAD SOLDIERS,
ETC. ARE OFFERED AS THOUGH THEY EXIST INDEPENDENT OF THE
GUERRILLA'S ATTACK ON POPULATION CENTERS.
9. IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT SOME OF THE BLAME FOR THESE
DISTORTIONS RESTS WITH THE GOES ITSELF. ITS OWN
INFORMATION EFFORTS WERE LATE IN STARTING, HEAVY HANDED,
AND FREQUENTLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. ITS OWN SUSPICIONS
AND DISTRUST OF THE INTERNATIONAL, AND EVEN ITS OWN,
PRESS HAVE MADE RELATIONS WITH THE MEDIA PRICKLY. ITS
REPRESENTATIVES ABROAD ARE FREQUENTLY OUTGUNNED AND
OUTMANNED BY THE OPPOSITION. PRESIDENT CRISTIANI SHOULD
HAVE INCLUDED, AND PERHAPS WILL INCLUDE, REPRESENTATIVES
OF OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES IN HIS DECISION MAKING
APPARATUS. THE DECISION TO FUNNEL ALL INFORMATION
THROUGH A "NATIONAL INFORMATION CENTER" WAS ILL-ADVISED
AT BEST, AND GAVE A FREE PLAY TO THE FMLN'S EFFECTIVE
"RADIO VENCEREMOS," AS WELL AS TO THE EXAGGERATION AND
DISTORTION OF RUMOR AND GOSSIP THAT HAACAUSED
CONSIDERABLE DISCOMFORT, AT TIMES APPROACHING PANIC,
AMONG THE GENERAL POPULACE.
(B) THE POST, THE AGENCY, AND PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS
10. THE OBVIOUS ANTIDOTE TO THE ABOVE IS INFORMATION.
USIS HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE REST OF THE MISSION,
AND MOST IMPORTANTLY WITH AMBASSADOR WALKER, TO BRIEF
THE PRESS ALMOST DAILY. SOMETIMES THIS HAS BEEN IN OPEN
PRESS CONFERENCES, OTHER TIMES ON BACKGROUND, AND ALMOST
CONSTANT ONE-ON-ONES WITH JOURNALISTS IN PERSON OR ON
THE TELEPHONE. WE ARE USING THE MATERIAL PROVIDED BY
WASHINGTON, I.E., WIRELESS FILE, WORLDNET, STATE
DEPARTMET BRIEFINGS, AS WELL ASHBUR OWN SELF-GENERATED
PRODUCTS. WE ARE ALSO WORKING WITH OUR SALVADORAN
COUNTERPARTS; CLOSELY WITH THE MILITARY SPOKESMAN
(COPREFA), LESS SUCCESSFULLY WITH MAURICIO SANDOVAL, THE
CIVILIAN NATIONAL SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION. A
SALVADORAN OFFICER, CAPT. SALVADOR GIRALT, WHO RETURNED
LAST WEEK AFTER PARTICIPATING IN THE AGENCY'S IV MRP
"AMERICAN BROADCAST MEDIA," HAS JUST BEEN ASSIGNED (AT
UNCLASSIFIED
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EMBASSY SUGGESTION) TO COPREFA AND IS NOW ITS DEPUTY
SPOKESMAN. HE WILL FILL A VITAL NEED AS THE ONLY GOES
INFORMATION OFFICIAL, CIVILIAN OR MILITARY, ABLE TO
BRIEF THE PRESS IN ENGLISH.
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 SAN SALVADOR 15833
USIA FOR AR, P/G
STATE FOR ARA/CEN, ARA/P, PA
E.O. 12356 N/A
TAGS: OPRC, SCOM, PGOV, PREL, US, ES
SUBJECT: THE AMERICAN MEDIA VIS-A-VIS EL SALVADOR
11. THE AGENCY HAS PROVIDED GOOD SUPPORT. WE CAN USE
WE ARTICLES, OFFICIAL TEXTS, WORLDNETS, ETC. IT IS
IMPORTANT THAT THE SALVADORAN PUBLIC, THE ESAF, AND EVEN
THE FMLN, NOT DOUBT AMERICAN CONSTANCY AND OUR
COMMITMENT TO THE CAUSE OF DEMOCRACY.
12. IT WOULD BE OF ENORMOUS IMPORT IF THE DEPARTMENT
AND/OR USIA CAN INTEREST SUCH ORGANIZATIONS AS FREEDOM
HOUSE AND THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE IN PREPARING
REPORTS AND DISSEMINATING INFORMATION ON THE CURRENT
SITUATION.
13. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE GOES HAD
PROFESSIONAL HELP IN SETTING-UP A MORE COMPREHENSIVE AND
EFFICIENT PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM. ONE POSSIBILITY
WE SUGGEST, WITHOUT HAVING VETTED IT WITH THE GOES
ITSELF, WOULD BE FOR A FLUENT SPANISH SPEAKING RETIRED
AGENCY OFFICER TO COME TO SAN SALVADOR TO WORK WITH THE
GOVERNMENT AS AN ADVISOR. THIS IS A SUGGESTION; WE DO
NOT KNOW HOW THIS WOULD BE FUNDED, WE DO KNOW THAT THERE
WOULD HAVE TO BE A REAL DISTANCE BETWEEN THIS ADVISOR
AND THE EMBASSY ITSELF.
(C) THE BOOMERANG EFFECT
14. THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE WASHINGTON POST, THE MIAMI
HERALD, AND THE WALL STREET JOURNAL ARE FOR SALE IN EL
SALVADOR THE DAY AFTER PUBLICATION, AS ARE THE WEEKLY
NEWSMAGAZINES. CNN IS BROADCAST VIA TWO PRIVATE "CABLE"
(ACTUALLY UHF BROADCAST DISTRIBUTION) COMPANIES, AND
LOCAL TELEVISION CHANNEL 12 WAS, AND HAS RESUMED,
BROADCASTING A SPANISH SUBTITLED HALF-HOUR OF THE CBS
NIGHTLY NEWS WITH DAN RATHER.
15. THE EFFECT OF THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN, AS WE SEE
IT, TWOFOLD. FIRST, WHEN THE GOES CLUMSILY BLANKED OUT
CNN, AS WELL AS TEMPORARILY CENSORING THE LOCAL
NEWSCASTS ON TELEVISION AND RADIO, THE FEELING AMONG THE
LOCAL POPULATION, AND PARTICULARLY THE UPPER CLASSES,
WAS THAT "THE SITUATION MUST BE WORSE THAN WE ARE BEING
UNCLASSIFIED
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TOLD, OR WHY ELSE WOULD THE GOVERNMENT BE CUTTING OFF
THIS OUTSIDE NEWS?"
16. SECOND, FOR THOSE WHO HAVE ACCESS TO OUTSIDE MEDIA,
THERE IS A FEELING THAT THE "WHOLE WORLD IS AGAINST US",
AND PARTICULARLY THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS. THIS HAS
CONTRIBUTED TO THE SOMETIMES UNPRODUCTIVE RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE GOES AND THE PRESS, BOTH DOMESTIC AND
FOREIGN. WE, THAT IS THE MISSION AND PARTICULARLY USIS,
THE CONSULAR SECTION, AND AMBASSADOR WALKER, SPEND TIME
WE DO NOT HAVE GETTING JOURNALISTS RELEASED BY MILITARY
UNITS, INTERVENING WITH THE SECURITY FORCES, ETC.
BEYOND THE ILL WILL GENERATED AND THE TIME LOST, THESE
IRRITATIONS AND HARASSMENTS TEND TO SHIFT MANY OF THE
JOURNALISTS' FOCUS FROM THE ACTIONS OF THE FMLN AND ITS
MILITARY OFFENSIVE, TOWARDS ISOLATED, CLUMSILY HANDLED
INCIDENTS OF HARASSMENTS THAT INEVITABLY EVOKE DARK
REMINDERS OF EARLY-80'S SALVADOR. THESE INCIDENTS OF
HARASSMENT OR WORSE SHOULD NOT GO UNREPORTED OR
UNREDRESSED, BUT IN MOST CASES THERE IS FAR MORE SMOKE
THAN FIRE. IT IS OUR CHALLENGE, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY
THE CHALLENGE OF THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT, TO KEEP THE
FOCUS ON THE MAIN STORY:
- I.E., AN ELECTED CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY FIGHTING
- TO BEAT OFF AN ASSAULT DESIGNED TO TOPPLE IT BY
- MARXIST GUERRILLAS. JACOBS
ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
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F I MIDB
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 SAN SALVADOR 15831
CITE: (U) 0361
SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 829 0361 90.
NC 4979846
RUEKJCS 5831
/*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/
BODY
COUNTRY: (U) EL SALVADOR (ES).
SUBJ: IIR 6 829 0361 90/LESSONS LEARNED FROM RECENT
UNCLASSIFIED
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STAT
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FMLN OFFENSIVE (PART 2) - WHAT REALLY HAPPENED, AND
WHAT DOES IT MEAN?/(111)(U).
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIE D.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DOI: (U) 891111-30.
REQS: (U) D-AH5 -1100-14; K-DC4 -00064.
SOURCES: (U) MEMBER USDA() SAN SALVADOR.
SUMMARY: (U) THIS REPORT IS THE SECOND IN A SERIES OF
"LESSONS LEARNED" FROM THE RECENT FARABUNDO MARTI
NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN) OFFENSIVE. *
TEXT: 1. (U) INTRODUCTORY RO COMMENT. THE FIRST
REPORT IN THIS SERIES (CITE IIR 6 829 0328) WAS AN EARLY
LOOK AT LESSONS LEARNED DURING THE RECENT FMLN
OFFENSIVE. THIS REPORT CONTAINS MORE OF THE SAME, WITH
MORE ANALYTICAL COMMENTARY NOT YET FULLY DEVELOPED WHEN
THE CITED IIR WAS WRITTEN. BECAUSE ALL THE INFORMATION
WAS GIVEN DIRECTLY TO RO, OR OBTAINED THROUGH
OBSERVATIONS OF RO, THE SOURCE IS GIVEN AS "MEMBER
DAO". WHERE IT IS USEFUL TO QUOTE OR IDENTIFY THE
DIRECT SOURCE OF INFORMATION, THIS IS DONE IN THE TEXT.
RO CONCLUSIONS OR OPINIONS, AS OPPOSED TO INFORMATION
COLLECTED BY RO, ARE SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED THROUGHOUT
THE REPORT. THE BASIC ISSUES THE REPORT ADDRESSES ARE--
--WHAT WERE THE FML'S GOALS?
--TO WHAT EXTENT WERE THE GOALS ACCOMPLISHED?
--WHAT ARE THE CAPABILITIES OF THE FMLN NOW?
--HOW CAN THE GOES/ESAF TEAM COUNTER THOSE CAPABILITIES?
--WHAT DID THE OFFENSIVE MEAN TO THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME OF
THE WAR?
PROBABLY FALL INTO 3 CATEGORIES - THE OBVIOUS ONES THAT
CAN BE DETERMINED FROM FMLN BATTLEFIELD MANEUVER; THE
"ADVERTISED" ONES THAT ARE TAKEN FROM FMLN PUBLIC
STATEMENTS, PRISONER AND DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION, AND
INFORMATION PASSED TO CIVILIANS IN CONFLICTIVE AREAS;
AND THE HIDDEN AGENDA KNOWN ONLY TO THE FMLN HIGH
COMMAND AND ITS SPONSORS. THE OBVIOUS GOALS, ACCORDING
UNCLASSIFIED
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TO RO'S SOURCES, INCLUDE--
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--INFLICT A SERIES OF MILITARY DEFEATS AGAINST PURE
MILITARY TARGETS, SUCH AS THE 1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE (1ST
BDE) HEADQUARTERS, THE SALVADORAN AIR FORCE (FAES) BASE
AT ILOPANGO, THE 3RD BDE HEADQUARTERS, ETC.
--SCORE PSYCHOLOGICAL OR "SYMBOLIC" VICTORIES, SUCH AS
WOULD BE ACHIEVED BY SEIZING ENTIRE NEIGHBORHOODS AND
HIGH VALUE ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL TARGETS.
--DEMONSTRATE THAT THE FMLN REMAINS A STRONG MILITARY
FORCE, A FORCE TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY.
THE ADVERTISED GOALS INCLUDED--
--SPARK A POPULAR INSURRECTION
--FORCE THE GOES TO RETURN TO THE DIALOGUE ON TERMS MORE
FAVORABLE TO THE FMLN, SINCE THE FMLN WOULD HAVE A
STRONGER POSITION
--DEMONSTRATE THAT THE FMLN IS STILL A VIABLE FIGHTING
FORCE
THE HIDDEN AGENDA IS NOT KNOWN. OTHER SOURCES AND
ANALYSIS OF FMLN CAPTURED DOCUMENTS MAY REVEAL OTHER
OBJECTIVES, BUT THESE BROAD STROKES, IN RO'S OPINION,
REPRESENT THE MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES.
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
3. (U) TO WHAT EXTENT WERE GOALS ACCOMPLISHED? THE
FMLN FAILED TO ACCOMPLISH ITS PURELY MILITARY OBJECTIVES
OF DEFEATING ESAF AND CUSEP FORCES. ALTHOUGH GUERRILLAS
TOOK GROUND AND INFLICTED CASUALTIES, THEY FAILED TO
INFLICT ANY MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT DEFEATS OR SEIZE ANY
KEY MILITARY TARGETS. MORALE IN MOST ESAF UNITS IN
COMBAT ROSE DESPITE HEAVY CASUALTIES, AND THE FMLN
SUSTAINED FRIGHTFUL LOSSES IN TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT. THE
FMLN ACHIEVED PARTIAL SUCCESS IN ITS GOALS TO SCORE
PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORIES. GUERRILLAS SEIZED AND HELD
SEVERAL AREAS OF TERRAIN WHICH GOT THEM MAJOR LEAGUE
ATTENTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA. AS GUERRILLAS
WERE DRIVEN FROM THE AREAS BY COORDINATED ESAF
COUNTERATTACKS, PART OF THAT PSYCHOLOGICAL GROUND WAS
LOST. MUCH OF IT WAS REGAINED, HOWEVER, BY 2 SMALL UNIT
ACTIONS WHICH RECEIVED WIDE-SPREAD PUBLICITY - THE
SEIZURE OF THE SHERATON HOTEL AND THE OCCUPATION OF
SEVERAL PRIVATE HOMES IN THE SAN SALVADOR SUBURB OF
ESCALON. EVIDENCE THAT THESE PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORIES
WERE SCORED CAN BE SUMMED UP THROUGH SEVERAL SOURCES--
--"THAT INCIDENT IN ESACLON JUST GOES TO SHOW YOU HOW A
UNCLASSIFIED
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HANDFUL OF GUERRILLAS CAN TERRORIZE AN ENTIRE AREA."
(SOURCE IS U.S. FIELD GRADE OFFICER)
--A MAJOR ARTICLE IN THE NOVEMBER 27, 1989 "US NEWS AND
WORLD REPORT" CALLED THE OFFENSIVE A "MISFIRE", IN WHICH
THE FMLN "GAMBLED BIG...AND SEEMINGLY LOST." THE
ARTICLE ALSO STATED THAT THE GUERRILLAS "MISCALCULATED"
IF THEY THOUGHT THE OFFENSIVE WOULD "UNDERMINE THE
GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT ALFREDO CRISTIANI AND EXPLODE IN
PRESIDENT BUSH'S FACE." THE ARTICLE CONCLUDED THAT "IF,
AS THE REBELS SAID, THEIR AIM WAS TO STRENGTHEN THEIR
NEGOTIATING POSITION, THEN THE STRATEGY BACKFIRED." ONE
WEEK LATER (DECEMBER It, 1989 ISSUE), THE SAME MAGAZINE
FEATURED AN ARTICLE WHICH CALLED EL SALVADOR "BUSH'S
CENTRAL AMERICAN ALBATROSS", STATED THAT THE CURRENT
ROUND OF FIGHTING "LEFT CRISTIANI WEAKER," AND FURTHER
STATED THAT THE U.S. "MAY BE FORCED...TO PRESSURE ARENA
TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE GUERRILLAS." THE ARTICLE RAISED
AN UGLY SPECTER THAT IT WAS PRACTICALLY FORBIDDEN TO
DISCUSS IN MANY WASHINGTON CIRCLES A YEAR AGO BY
SPECULATING, "THE BEST THE U.S. MAY BE ABLE TO HOPE FOR
IS A MILITARY STALEMATE."
--ON 891130, MOST FAMILY MEMBERS OF U.S. MISSION
PERSONNEL IN EL SALVADOR WERE REMOVED FROM THE COUNTRY
IN WHAT WAS TERMED "VOLUNTARY EVACUATION".
TWO INCIDE S WHICH HAD I NCE
WHATEVER I 'iD''i'f ULTIMAT -: A
SMA$HINF]UU4QAL VICTORY.ZEEK AFTER THE "BATTLE _OF
SAN SALVADOR"_WASWON BY HE ESAF-. THE POPULAR
INS011REUTION?MILE1) TO MATERIALIZE: WHAT FEW CIVILIAN
NONCOMBATANTS HELPED GUERRILLAS DID SO, IN MOST CASES,
AT GUNPOINT. POPULAR SUPPORT, IN FACT, PROBABLY
DECREASED, ACCORDING TO MANY WORKING CLASS SOURCES.
SOME OF RO'S SOURCES STATE (AND RO CONCURS) THAT THE TOP
FMLN LEADERSHIP COULD NOT POSSIBLY HAVE BELIEVED THE
SUPPORT BASE EXISTED TO SPARK AN INSURRECTION. THE
EVIDENCE OF FAILURE, AT ANY RATE, IS ABSOLUTELY
CONCLUSIVE. THE FMLN REMAINS A VIABLE FIGHTING FORCE.
THAT FORCE IS NOT, HOWEVER, CAPABLE OF DEFEATING THE
ESAF, EXPANDING THROUGH A MASS OF "ENLISTMENTS" VIA THE
POPULAR INSURRECTION, OR SUSTAINING ITSELF IN HEAVY
COMBAT FOR MORE THAN A FEW DAYS. THE FORCE REMAINS
VIABLE AFTER THIS OFFENSIVE, IN RO'S OPINION, ONLY
BECAUSE THE ESAF (FOR WHATEVER REASON) PASSED UP THE
CHANCE TO CRUSH IT ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THE JURY IS
STILL OUT AS TO WHETHER THE FMLN HAS A STRONGER
BARGAINING POSITION IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. PART OF
THAT QUESTION WILL BE ANSWERED BY OBSERVING GOES
RESOLVE. PART OF IT WILL BE ANSWERED BY OBSERVING U.S.
(THAT IS, EL SALVADOR'S MAJOR ALLY'S) RESOLVE. IF THE
U.S. APPLIES PRESSURE TO FORCE THE GOES TO RETURN TO THE
UNCLASSIFIED
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DIALOGUE PROCESS OFFERING ANY CONCESSIONS TO THE FMLN
NOT PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED (OR AGAINST THE GOES' DESIRE),
RO WOULD JUDGE THE FMLN PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY OVER THE
U.S. A 100 PERCENT SUCCESS.
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/
4. (U) WHAT ARE THE CAPABILITIES OF THE FMLN NOW?
SOURCES' OPINIONS VARY, BUT SOME CREDIBLE, EXPERIENCED
"EL SALVADOR WATCHERS" BELIEVE THE FMLN HAS TAKEN SUCH A
MILITARY BEATING, AND SUSTAINED SO MANY CASUALTIES AND
MATERIAL LOSSES, THAT IT WILL BE OUT OF MAJOR ACTION FOR
THE NEAR TERM. SOME OF THESE SOURCES DO NOT BELIEVE THE
FMLN HAS MAJOR "RESERVES" TO COMMIT TO ANOTHER LARGE
SCALE OFFENSIVE. RO CONCURS THAT THE FMLN HAS (AGAIN)
BEEN THRASHED, BUT WARNS AGAINST COUNTING THEM OUT
MILITARILY FOR 2 REASONS. FIRST, THE HIGH COMMAND AND
SOME TOUGH FIELD COMMANDERS ARE STILL ALIVE.
HISTORICALLY, CAPABLE INSURGENT LEADERS WIN OR DIE.
UNTIL THE TOP LEADERSHIP IS KILLED, THE TOP LEADERS WILL
KEEP TRYING TO WIN. SECOND, THE FMLN HAS REPEATEDLY
SHOWED ITS WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT WITH CHILD WARRIORS. AS
LONG AS THE TOP LEADERSHIP LIVES, IT CAN FIND AN ALMOST
INEXHAUSTABLE SUPPLY OF YOUNG KIDNAP VICTIMS TO FILL ITS
DEPLETED RANKS. RO FIRMLY (MORE FIRMLY THAN EVER, AFTER
THIS OFFENSIVE) BELIEVES THAT ESAF TACTICAL UNITS ARE
CAPABLE OF OUTFIGHTING THE FMLN TACTICAL UNITS. THIS
DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE FMLN MILITARY CAPABILITIES CAN BE
WRITTEN OFF. FMLN CURRENT POLITICAL CAPABILITIES ARE
NOT QUANTIFIABLE, AT THIS STAGE OF THE POST-OFFENSIVE
PERIOD, IN RO'S OPINION. IT IS SIMPLY TOO SOON TO TELL
HOW MUCH POLITICAL CLOUT THE PARTIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
VICTORY HAS GIVEN THE FMLN LEADERSHIP, AS OPPOSED TO HOW
MUCH THE FMLN MAY HAVE BEEN WEAKENED POLITICALLY BY THE
MILITARY BEATING IT TOOK.
5. (U) WHAT ARE THE CURRENT FMLN CAPABILITIES? IN
BROAD TERMS, RO BELIEVES THE FMLN HAS THE CAPABILITY TO
GO BACK ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE, PERSUADE THE GOES TO
RETURN TO THE DIALOGUE TABLE, THEN USE THE DIALOGUE
PROCESS (ONCE AGAIN) TO REARM, RECRUIT, RETRAIN, AND
REST. THE FMLN CAN CONTINUE GUERRILLA ACTIONS AS IT HAS
DONE IN THE PAST. BY MASSING ITS SURVIVING FIGHTERS
(ASSUMING SUFFICIENT ARMS AND AMMUNITION REMAINING) THE
FMLN COULD LAUNCH A SECOND ROUND OF ATTACKS, EITHER IN
THE CAPITAL OR THE FIELD. RO DOES NOT BELIEVE THE FMLN
CAN DUPLICATE ITS PREVIOUS ALL-OUT EFFORT WITHOUT
REINFORCEMENTS NOT YET SEEN IN ITS ORDER OF BATTLE.
6. (U) HOW CAN THE GOES/ESAF COUNTER THESE
CAPABILITIES? A NUMBER OF SOURCES BELIEVE THE ESAF MUST
"GO ON THE OFFENSIVE" NOW TO EXPLOIT THE SUCCESS IT HAD
IN PREVENTING FMLN MILITARY VICTORIES. AT LEAST ONE
MILITARY LEADER ADVOCATED "GOING AFTER THE LEADERSHIP",
UNCLASSIFIED
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WHICH WAS INTERPRETED AS "ATTACKING COMMAND AND CONTROL
ELEMENTS". RO HAS HAD A STEADY STREAM OF ESAF SOURCES
STATING FOR A YEAR AND A HALF THAT THE WAY TO WIN THE
MILITARY SIDE OF THE WAR IS TO DESTROY THE FMLN
LEADERSHIP. JUNIOR OFFICERS ARE MORE SPECIFIC. THEY
SIMPLY SAY THAT THE TOP LEADERS MUST BE KILLED. ESAF
SOURCES (FIELD SOLDIERS) ARE INEVITABLY EXCITED AND
ENCOURAGED BY THE DEATHS OF FMLN PLATOON-LEVEL LEADERS.
THOSE ARE IMPORTANT LOSSES, BUT RANDOMLY KILLING PLATOON
COMMANDERS WILL NOT REDUCE THE FMLN'S LEADERSHIP
CAPABILITY. TO CRIPPLE THE FMLN, IT'S NECESSARY TO KILL
ENOUGH OF THE TOP LEADERS (JOAQUIN ((VILLALOBOS)) HAS TO
GO, FOR INSTANCE), TO DERAIL THE VERY AGILE, VERSATILE
LEADERSHIP ORGANIZATION THAT HAS ADAPTED SO WELL TO
CHANGING FORTUNES AND CIRCUMSTANCES THROUGHOUT THE WAR.
THE MOST EXPERIENCED, DEDICATED FIELD LEADERS WHO KEEP
THE FIGHTERS GOING (AND KEEP THE RECRUITING AND TRAINING
PROJECTS ALIVE) HAVE TO DIE, AS WELL. AT THE ESAF
BATTALION LEVEL DOWN, RO SEES THE WILL TO GO INTO THE
MOST CONFLICTIVE ZONES, HUNT THE FMLN DOWN, AND CLOSE
WITH THE ENEMY REPEATEDLY. AT THE HIGHER LEVELS OF
DECISIONMAKING, RO HAS HEARD A LOT OF CONVERSATION ABOUT
"GOING AFTER THE LEADERS", BUT HAS NOT YET SEEN A
DEDICATED EFFORT TO REALLY GET THEM. ON THE CONTRARY,
THE ONLY TIME RO HAS EVER SEEN A TOP FMLN LEADER, SUCH
AS VILLALOBOS, THE LEADER HAS BEEN TALKING PUBLICLY WITH
A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOES. IF THE RECENT OFFENSIVE
HAS TAUGHT ANYTHING, IT HAS REINFORCED THE LESSON THAT
THE KEY TO PUTTING DOWN AN INSURGENCY IS TO PUT DOWN THE
LEADERSHIP. THE FMLN HAS, RO BELIEVES, 2 OTHER KEY
VULNERABILITIES, BOTH OF WHICH RELATE TO SUPPLIES. A
FULL-COURT PRESS TO CUT THE LOGISTICS FLOW TO FMLN
FIGHTERS COULD RESULT IN A MAJOR BODY BLOW TO THE
ORGANIZATION. RO HAS SEEN DOZENS OF ATTEMPTS AND HEARD
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 ******/
HOURS OF CONVERSATION ABOUT STOPPING THE LOGISTICS. RO
CAN COUNT THE SUCCESSFUL INTERDICTIONS OF THE PAST 18
MONTHS, HOWEVER, ON THE FINGERS OF 1 HAND--
--THE MAJOR SEIZURE OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION IN SAN
SALVADOR (GOOD POLICE WORK)
--THE SEIZURE OF A TRUCK LOAD OF WEAPONS IN HONDURAS
(GOOD WORK IN HONDURAS)
--THE SEIZURE OF ANTI-AIR WEAPONS FROM A PLANE WHICH
CRASHED IN USULUTAN (LUCKY ACCIDENT)
--THE SEIZURE OF 750 POUNDS OF HIGH EXPLOSIVES IN THE
SOUTHERN ANGELA MONTANO 891031 (GOOD PATROL ACTION, BUT
LUCKY BREAK HITTING THAT TARGET)
THESE FEW SUCCESSES, WHILE SPECTACULAR IN TERMS OF
UNCLASSIFIED
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VOLUME OR POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT POLITICALLY, WILL NOT
SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE FMLN'S ABILITY TO SUSTAIN
ITSELF OVER THE LONG HAUL. THE OTHER VULNERABILITY IS
THE RECRUITING PIPELINE OF DEDICATED FIGHTERS. THE FMLN
CAN KIDNAP AN ENDLESS SUPPLY OF 10-YEAR-OLDS, SOME OF
WHOM WILL FIGHT AND SOME OF WHOM WILL FLEE. ONLY A
SMALL PERCENTAGE WILL SURVIVE TO BECOME TOP-LINE
GUERRILLAS. A HARD CAMPAIGN TO ENCOURAGE MORE
DESERTIONS MIGHT WEAKEN THE OVERALL FIGHTING STRENGTH OF
THE FMLN. THE BEST WEAPON IN THE ARSENAL FOR THE FIGHT,
HOWEVER, IS TO CRUSH THE TOP/FIELD LEADERSHIP, THEREBY
WEAKENING OVERALL GUERRILLA MORALE, THUS AFFECTING
RECRUITING AND RETENTION. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE OF THE
EQUATION, THE GOES MUST IDENTIFY THE PERCEIVED NEEDS AND
DESIRES OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AND DEMONSTRATE
OBVIOUS DEDICATION TO AND PROGRESS TOWARD FULFILLING
THOSE NEEDS. THE USG PERCEIVES THOSE DESIRES TO BE
DEMOCRACY AND BASIC "HUMAN RIGHTS". THE DESIRES MAY BE
MUCH MORE BASIC THAN THAT AT THIS POINT IN THE WAR,
SINCE THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IS FAIRLY WELL ALONG
(WHETHER IT IS A REAL DESIRE OF THE POPULATION AT LARGE,
RO FRANKLY DOES NOT KNOW); AND MOST "HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS" ARE COMMITTED BY THE FMLN. MOST WORKING
CLASS PEOPLE WHO TALK TO RO WANT TO SEE THE FMLN
GUERRILLAS KILLED TO THE LAST RIFLEMAN AND TO HAVE THE
FREEDOM TO WORK IN PEACE. WHATEVER THE NEEDS, DESIRES,
OR PROJECTS THE GOES NEEDS TO ADDRESS, IT CAN NOT MAKE
MUCH MORE PROGRESS UNLESS THE FMLN CAN BE MADE TO STOP
FIGHTING. "COUNTERING THE GUERRILLA CAPABILITIES",
THEN, EXAMINED FROM ANY ANGLE, APPEARS TO START AT THE
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? ' CEASES TO BE A FACTOR IN THE COUNTRY'S PROGRESS. IN THE
MILITARY ARENA, THIS BOILS DOWN TO 1 THING ? GET OUT OF
THE DEFENSIVE MIND?SET AND ATTACK THE FMLN MILITARY
TARGETS UNTIL THE WILL TO FIGHT IS DEFEATED.
7. (U) WHAT DID THE OFFENSIVE MEAN TO THE EVENTUAL
OUTCOME OF THE WAR? AS OF 891204, NOBODY KNOWS. RO
BELIEVES 2 SCENARIOS ARE POSSIBLE--
SA 4 'SQUARE 1"--CRUSH THE FMLN TO THE POINT AT JUCII IT
CEASES ! A FACTOR IN THE COUNTRY'S PROGRESS IN THE
MILITARY ARENA, 111 LS DOWN TO THING ? GET OUT OF
THE DEFENSIVE MIND?SET AND low , THE FMLN MILITARY
TARGETS UNTIL THE WIL 0 FIGHT IS D.
7. (U) DID THE OFFENSIVE MEAN TO THE EVENTU
OUT 0 0F THE WAR? AS OF 891204, NOBODY KNOWS. RO
B IEVES 2 SCENARIOS ARE POSSIBLE--
--SCENARIO 1
--THE GOES/ESAF/POPULATION AT LARGE REALIZES THE
OFFENSIVE ENDED IN AN FMLN DEFEAT.
--THE GOES/ESAF TEAM DECIDES TO GO ON THE ATTACK AFTER
THE HARD FMLN TARGETS AND DESTROY THEM.
--THE USG CONTINUES TO PROVIDE MATERIAL AND MORAL
SUPPORT (ESPECIALLY THE LATTER), AND TO PRESSURE OTHER
INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS TO CURTAIL SUPPORT TO THE FMLN.
--FACED WITH DEMORALIZING LEADERSHIP LOSSES, IMPLACABLE
UNCLASSIFIED
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SUPPORT FROM A POWERFUL GOES ALLY, AND SHRINKING SUPPORT
FROM ABROAD, THE FMLN RETURNS TO THE DIALOGUE PROCESS
WEAKENED, WILLING TO "GIVE" ON KEY ISSUES.
--THE GOOD GUYS WIN, AND THE USG HAS A FOREIGN POLICY
SUCCESS IN CENTRAL AMERICA.
--SCENARIO 2
--THE GOES/ESAF DECLARE A VICTORY IN THE FMLN OFFENSIVE
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 005 ******/
AND HUNKER DOWN IN THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE.
--THE FMLN, FACED WITH ONLY THE TYPE OF STEADY PRESSURE
WHICH THE FIELD FIGHTERS HAVE LEARNED TO LIVE WITH,
RESTS, REARMS, RECRUITS, AND RETRAINS.
--THE USG, UNABLE TO POINT TO A STRATEGIC VICTORY IN THE
OFFENSIVE AND UNABLE TO SUSTAIN FULL SUPPORT FOR A
GOES/ESAF WHICH HAS BEEN "SHAKEN" BY THE UNEXPECTED
STRENGTH OF THE FMLN, REDUCES AID, ESPECIALLY MORAL
SUPPORT.
--VIEWING "WEAKENING U.S. RESOLVE", THE FMLN AND
EXTERNAL SUPPORTERS PROLONG THE STEADY MILITARY BATTLE,
THUS GAINING MORE POLITICAL STRENGTH.
--THE FMLN LEADERSHIP, AT SOME FUTURE DATE, APPLIES
ANOTHER HEAVY DOSE OF PUBLICITY - GAINING COMBAT ACTION.
--THE USG, TIRED OF DRAGGING OUT THE PROCESS FOR NO
APPARENT GAIN, PRESSURES THE GOES TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE
FMLN ON THE REBELS' TERMS.
--THE BAD GUYS WIN, AND THE USG SUFFERS A MAJOR (AND
EXPENSIVE) FOREIGN POLICY DEFEAT IN CENTRAL AMERICA.
BETWEEN THE EXTREMES OF THESE 2 SCENARIOS, THERE MAY BE
AN ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF POSSIBLE OUTCOMES, BUT THIS
OFFENSIVE IS PROBABLY THE TURNING POINT IN THE WAR. THE
GOES/ESAF HAS AN OPPORTUNITY THAT MAY NOT COME AROUND
AGAIN. THE FMLN HAS, IN FACT, BEEN BEATEN MILITARILY IN
THIS OFFENSIVE, BUT THAT MAY BE IRRELEVANT. AS ONE
MODERATELY HIGH-RANKING CIVILIAN OFFICER TOLD RO 891202,
"YOU CAN'T SEPARATE THE MILITARY ASPECT FROM THE
POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT." THOSE ARE THE KEY
WORDS IN THIS REPORT. THE ESAF MILITARY VICTORY MEANS
NOTHING IF THE FMLN PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY GIVES THEM THE
UPPER HAND. WHAT DOES THE OFFENSIVE MEAN TO THE OUTCOME
OF THE WAR? IT'S THE TURNING POINT, AND IT COULD GO
EITHER WAY.
UNCLASSIFIED
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COMMENTS: (FIELD COMMENTS) -- 1. (U) THE FINAL
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE RO'S ALONE, ALTHOUGH THE
SOURCES QUOTED HAVE OBVIOUSLY EXPRESSED POSSIBILITIES
AND CONCLUSIONS ON WHICH RO HAS REFLECTED AND FROM WHICH
RO HAS DRAWN. REAL ANALYSTS MAY DEVELOP OTHER EQUALLY
VALID CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGEST OTHER CREDIBLE
EVENTUALITIES, EVEN IF THEY HAVE ACCESS TO EXACTLY THE
SAME EVIDENCE AND INFORMATION AS RO.
2. (U) THE ESAF "DEFENSIVE MIND-SET" REFERRED TO IN
THIS REPORT REFERS TO THE ESAF INSTITUTION AS A WHOLE
AND SOME OF THE TOP OFFICERS. AT THE BATTALION LEVEL
DOWN, RO NORMALLY SEES AN AGGRESSIVE ATTITUDE IN
OFFICERS AND TROOPS ALIKE WHICH IS NOT REFLECTED ALL THE
WAY UP THE CHAIN OF COMMAND. OF THE 2 MOST AGGRESSIVE
HIGH-RANKING FIELD COMMANDERS RO KNOWS, 3RD BDEIS
COLONEL MAURICIO ERNESTO ((VARGAS)) AND DM-7'S COLONEL
ROBERTO MAURICIO ((STABEN)), THE FORMER HAS MAINTAINED
AN AGGRESSIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN PLAN SINCE
TAKING COMMAND, AND INCLUDED AN AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT PLAN
IN THE RECENT BATTLE OF SAN MIGUEL. THE LATTER IS
EXILED TO A NON-CONFLICTIVE AREA OF THE COUNTRY WHERE
HIS SUPERIOR TALENTS AS A BATTLEFIELD LEADER ARE DOING
HIS COUNTRY NO GOOD. SOME SOURCES, INCLUDING A
HIGH-RANKING U.S. MILITARY OFFICER WHO HAS PARTICIPATED
IN AND FOLLOWED THE EL SALVADOR WAR FOR SEVERAL YEARS,
BLAMES THE "DEFENSIVE MIND-SET" PARTIALLY ON THE U.S.
THE ENTIRE U.S. AID AND ADVISORY EFFORT, IN THIS
OFFICER'S OPINION, HAS STRESSED AVOIDING RISK-TAKING AT
THE EXPENSE OF GOING AFTER THE ENEMY. EVERY TREND THAT
RO HAS SEEN IN 18 MONTHS OF WORKING WITH THE ISSUES IN
EL SALVADOR SUPPORT THAT OFFICER'S POINT.
3. (U) FOR ANALYTICAL PURPOSES, RO CONCLUDES THAT THE
BATTLE OF SAN SALVADOR, THE KEY FIGHT IN THE OFFENSIVE,
BEGAN 891111 (WITH THE MULTIPLE FMLN ATTACKS AGAINST
GOES/ESAF/CUSEP TARGETS) AND ENDED AT 1730 LOCAL,
891130, WITH THE FORCED DEPARTURE OF U.S. MISSION
DEPENDENTS FROM COMALAPA AIRPORT.
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 006 ******/
//IPSP: (U) PG1100//.
//COMSOBJ
ADMIN
PROJ:
COLL:
INSTR:
PREP:
ACQ:
DISSEM:
WARNING:
: (U) 111//.
(U)
(U)
(U)
(U)
(U)
(U)
AB; ZZ.
US NO.
6-00302.
EL SALVADOR (891111-891130).
FIELD: AMEMBASSY EL SALVADOR.
REPORT CLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED
RELEASABLE TO THE COUNTRIES OF UK, AS, CA.
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE:0041
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