SOVIET POLICY DURING THE NEXT PHASE OF ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00551R002101490002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2014
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 7, 1988
• Content Type: SNIE

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I Li I GL
-4A- Central
Intelligence
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07 DEC 1988
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r
Soviet Policy During
the Next Phase
of Arms Control in Europe ((A
Special National Intelligence Estimate
This Special National Intelligence Estimate represents
the views of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
JGp5ecret
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,S ! Central 25X1
Intelligence
SNIE 11-16-88
Soviet Policy During
the Next Phase
of Arms Control in Europe (U)
Information available as of 17 November 1988 was used
in the preparation of this Special National Intelligence Estimate.
The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
also participating:
The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,
Marine Corps
This Estimate was approved for publication by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board.
Top Secret
November 1988
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Figure 1
NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces Within the Atlantic-to-the-Urals Zone
North
Atlantic
Ocean
Greenland
(Den.)
Svalbard
(Norway)
Thtilnited States Government has not tecogntzed
1114ncorporation of Estonia. Lavoie. and Lithuanta
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary reeresentatton
Es not necessarily authoritative.
Iceland
Greenland
Sea
Norwegian
Sea
Barents
Sea
Leningrad
MD
Ural
MD
North
Sea
Baltic
Sea
Baltic
MD
Poland
CI)
Volga MD
Belorussian
MD
France
Carpathian
MD
Kiev
MD
North
Caucasus
MD
S ?go
Italy
Romania
Caspian
Sea
Yugoslavia
Black Sea
atic
Ci
Bulgaria
Turkey
Matta
tZzt.0
Mediterranean Sea
590 Kilometers
500 MileS
Persian
G,JI1
Indigenous Forces
Stationed Forces
Indigenous Forces
Stationed Forces
Belgium
Netherlands
Belgium
Bulgaria Hungary
Group of Soviet Forces,
Denmark
Norway
Canada
Czechoslovakia Poland
Germany
France
Portugal
France
East Germany Romania
Central Group of Forces
Greece
Spain
Netherlands
Soviet Military Districts
(Czechoslovakia)
Iceland
Turkey
United Kingdom
Baltic North Caucasus
Northern Group of Forces
Italy
United Kingdom
United States
Belorussian Odessa
(Poland)
Luxembourg
West Germany
West Germany
Carpathian Transcaucasus
Kiev Ural
Southern Group of Forces
Leningrad Volga
(Hungary)
Moscow
714958 (5455561 11.88
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Key Judgments
We judge that the Soviets and their allies have a number of interrelated
military, political, and economic reasons to engage the West in conven-
tional arms control:
? Military:
? To improve the correlation of forces and to reduce what they perceive
as NATO's capability to launch a surprise attack.
? To impede NATO's force modernization plans and to prevent or
impede NATO's deployment of advanced technology weapons.
? Political:
? To demonstrate the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign and domestic
policy.
? To appeal to foreign and domestic public opinion in a generalized
way, while adding to Moscow's overall arms control posture and
enhancing the USSR's image as a trustworthy, rational player in the
international arena.
? Economic:
To reduce the threat from NATO and thereby reduce the urgency on
the part of the Soviet Union to match or better NATO's high-
technology modernization programs.
To make it politically easier to allocate economic resources within
the Soviet Union from the defense sector to the civilian sector to
carry out perestroyka.
We believe the Soviets and their allies prefer to negotiate with NATO to
achieve mutual reductions of conventional forces. Militarily, it makes more
sense to trade force reductions, thereby retaining a balance in the
correlation of forces. However, the Warsaw Pact probably realizes that
negotiating an agreement with NATO that is acceptable to the Soviets
could take years?and might not even be possible.
In the short term (up to two years), we believe the Pact will pursue a strate-
gy aimed at reducing the West's perception of the Soviet threat in the
expectation that this course will make it difficult for NATO governments
to maintain or increase defense spending. The Pact will engage NATO in
the Conventional Stability Talks and probably will introduce sweeping
proposals for asymmetric reductions.
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We predict that, when formal negotiations concerning conventional forces
in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone begin, the Warsaw Pact will quickly
present a formal version of its public diplomacy position?and might even
table a draft treaty very early in the negotiations. It will probably insist on
an initial discussion of data regarding asymmetries between the two sides'
forces and will probably suggest establishing a working group on data.
The Warsaw Pact states will not accept the current NATO proposal, which
in effect calls on the Pact to take gigantic cuts in tanks and artillery for mi-
nor cuts on the NATO side so that there is parity between the Pact and
NATO. For example, this would mean the Pact would have to withdraw or
destroy about 25,000 tanks while NATO would withdraw or destroy about
900 tanks.
Outside of the negotiating process itself, for political effect, the Soviets
may also take unilateral initiatives:
? ? We judge the Soviets could garner significant political gains in Western
Europe at tolerable risks by unilaterally removing some of their fofces
from Eastern Europe, especially all from Hungary. The evidence on
Soviet timing and conditions is insufficient to predict with confidence
when and whether a withdrawal announcement might be made.
? Given the West German concern about short-range nuclear-capable
forces, it is possible that the Soviets might make a gesture by unilaterally
withdrawing some short-range ballistic missile launchers from Eastern
Europe; however, we judge the likelihood of such a move to be low for the
period of this Estimate.
? The Soviets may attempt to portray force restructuring as a unilateral
force reduction; however, we judge that the ongoing restructuring of the
Soviet ground forces is intended primarily to make units more effective
for prolonged conventional combat operations against NATO.
We judge that, among our NATO Allies, France will be the most resistant
to potential Soviet gambits, with the United Kingdom a strong second. Of
the major partners, the Federal Republic of Germany will be the most
responsive to such ploys, because of its strong desire to reduce defense
spending and to reduce the chance of the country becoming Europe's
nuclear battleground. The challenge for the United States and the rest of
NATO will be to continue the ongoing NATO modernization, while at the
same time negotiating on a possible agreement with a more sophisticated
adversary in an environment where the public perception of the Warsaw
Pact threat has been softened significantly.
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Contents
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Page
Key Judgments
Discussion
1
Introduction
1
Soviet Motives
1
Military Considerations
1
Economic Considerations
3
Political Considerations
5
Soviet Approaches
6
Warsaw Pact Options
9
Negotiations
10
Unilateral Soviet Withdrawal
11
Eastern Europe: The Risk of Instability
1 2
Western Europe: Implications for the NATO Alliance
1 3
A Soviet Short-Range Nuclear Force Withdrawal
1 3
Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Restructuring
1 5
Constraints on NATO Military Activities
1 8
West European Reactions
1 9
Implications for the United States
22
Annex: Soviet Perceptions of NATO's Military Strength
23
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Soviet-Warsaw Pact Conventional Arms Control
Proposals
April 1986: Gorbachev proposes at the East Ger-
man party congress that NATO and the Pact make
"substantial" reductions in all components of their
ground and "tactical" air forces. Units would be
disbanded and weapons either destroyed or stored
on national territories. Tactical nuclear weapons
would also be reduced. The area of reductions
would be all of Europe from the Atlantic to the
Urals. Dependable means of verification would be
used, including on-site inspections "if need be."
June 1986: The Warsaw Pact's Political Consulta-
tive Committee issues the Budapest Appeal that
formally "blesses" Gorbachev's proposal. The
Pact leaders call for mutual NATO and Pact
reductions of 100,000 to 150,000 military person-
nel soon and a further cut by the 1990s of another
350,000 to 400,000 personnel. Ground forces and
"tactical strike aviation" and tactical nuclear
weapons must be reduced. The qualification "if
need be" is dropped in discussing on-site inspec-
tions, but the Pact's "verification" proposals con-
cern only the reductions of forces.
April 1987: In Prague, Gorbachev acknowledges
there are, "of course," asymmetries in the armed
forces of the Pact and NATO and says the USSR
favors rectifying inequalities by reductions by the
side that has a numerical advantage.
May 1987: Polish leader Jaruzelski proposes a
plan calling for a gradual withdrawal/reduction of
nuclear delivery systems, especially those with a
range under 500 kilometers, a gradual withdraw-
al/reduction of conventional weapons, an "evolu-
tion in the nature of military doctrines" so they
would be "exclusively defensive," confidence-and-
security-building measures, and mechanisms for
strict verification. On the Eastern side, the
zone would be East Germany, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, and Hungary; and on the Western side,
West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, and Denmark.
May 1987: The Political Consultative Committee
repeats virtually verbatim the PCC declaration of
1986 and reiterates that the Pact's military doc-
trine is defensive and proposes a Pact-NATO
discussion of doctrines.
January 1988: Foreign Minister Shevardnadze de-
clares that the Soviets are willing to "compro-
mise" on the issue of dual-capable weapon sys-
tems. In Bonn, he says the USSR (and Pact) want
to discuss the delivery systems within the context
of the conventional forces talks, but would be
willing to negotiate on the nuclear warheads for
the systems separately.
May 1988: Gorbachev proposes to President Rea-
gan in Moscow that reductions be taken in phases:
? Identify and eliminate asymmetries.
? Make further mutual reductions of up to
500,000 men with their equipment.
? Make still further reductions so that NATO and
the Pact will have only "defensive" forces.
July 1988: The Political Consultative Committee
issues another statement that endorses Gorba-
chev's proposal to the President.
August 1988: Soviet Defense Minister Yazov tells
the US Secretary of Defense that the Warsaw Pact
summit leaders approved a withdrawal of 70,000
Soviet personnel from Eastern Europe in return
for an unspecified NATO reduction from the
southern region.
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I up OUCTel.
Discussion
2
Introduction
The Warsaw Pact's public diplomacy on conventional
arms control has featured a number of public propos-
als by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, proposals
from the Warsaw Pact's summit-level Political Con-
sultative Committee, and hundreds of statements and
press articles by lower ranking officials, all of which
have stressed the Soviet Union's desire for a conven-
tional arms reduction agreement (see inset).
In public statements, in the negotiations in Vienna,
and in diplomatic contacts with the West, Soviet and
East European spokesmen have emphasized the War-
saw Pact's willingness to negotiate with NATO large
but mutual reductions of conventional ground force
units with their equipment and what the Pact terms
"tactical strike aviation." Since Gorbachev first
raised the possibility in Prague in 1987, Pact spokes-
men have also consistently advocated that the Pact
and NATO first eliminate the "asymmetries" in
forces, then negotiate further reductions. Other
themes of the Warsaw Pact regarding negotiated
reductions include:
? Reductions should be by units.
? Equipment affected should be destroyed or stored
on national territory.
? Reductions of forces must be subject to
"verification."
In addition to these proposals, of course, the Warsaw
Pact states have been negotiating in Vienna with
representatives of all 16 NATO states since February
1987 to arrange a mandate for new conventional arms
control talks?thus far called Conventional Stability
Talks?that will have as a zone of application
'The Soviets generally leave the definition of "tactical strike
aviation" purposefully vague in public statements, but we believe
they mean those light bombers, fighter-bombers, and other ground
attack aircraft in units assigned a primary mission of ground
attack. Some Soviet military spokesmen have implied that the term
"tactical strike aviation" is synonymous with dual-capable aircraft.
1
"Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals." See inset on
page 2 for an outline of the various forums at which
arms control has recently been discussed.
Soviet Motives
We judge that the Soviets and their allies have a
number of interrelated military, political, and eco-
nomic reasons to engage the West in conventional
arms control. Their primary military objectives are
probably: to improve the correlation of forces and to
reduce what they perceive as' NATO's capability to
launch a surprise attack; and to impede NATO's
force modernization plans and to prevent or impede
NATO's deployment of advanced technology weap-
ons. In the Soviet view, success in achieving these
objectives would significantly reduce the threat from
NATO and thereby reduce the urgency on the part of
the Soviet Union to match or better NATO's high-
technology modernization programs. This, in turn,
would make it politically easier to allocate economic
resources within the Soviet Union from the defense
sector to the civilian sector to carry out perestroyka.
Other related objectives are:
? To reduce NATO's capability for mobilization and
reinforcement with particular emphasis on reducing
the ability of the West German Bundeswehr to
mobilize forces.
? To attain, ultimately, a significant reduction of US
forces in Europe, and cast doubts on the US nuclear
umbrella.
? To reduce and, ultimately, to eliminate tactical
nuclear weapons in Europe
Military Considerations
The Warsaw Pact has a genuine concern about
NATO's military prowess, appraises the military bal-
ance differently from the West, and fears NATO's
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Other Arms Control Forums
The Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
(MBFR) Negotiations: The Warsaw Pact states
and most NATO states?but not France?have
been meeting in Vienna since 1973 to discuss
mutual reductions of ground and air forces in a
zone that encompasses East Germany, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia; and West Germany, the Nether-
lands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The talks have
been moribund for years and should end when (or
soon after) the Conventional Stability Talks begin.
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE): This conference, which includes
the United States, Canada, and all European
states except Albania (35 in all), originally met in
Helsinki and issued the Helsinki Final Act in
1975. The conference deals with a wide range of
European security, economic, scientific, and hu-
manitarian issues, but is not a disarmament forum
because reduction of forces is not a topic. There
have been several followup meetings since Helsin-
ki, including the one in Vienna that began in
September 1986 and is currently running (as of
November 1988). Agreements must be by consen-
sus and are politically but not legally binding.
The Conference on Confidence-and Security-
Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe
(CDE): The same 35 states met from January 1984
to September 1986 to negotiate the Stockholm
Document, a package of confidence-building mea-
sures, including mandatory advance not of
certain military exercises, mandatory invitation of
observers to certain exercises, and provisions for a
limited number of on-site challenge inspections.
The zone of application is "Europe from the
Atlantic to the Urals." CDE was held under the
auspices of the Conference on Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (CSCE). A second phase of
CDE?termed CDE I-B by the West?will begin
at the same time and in the same city as the
Conventional Stability Talks.
Conference on Disarmament (CD): This conference
is sponsored by the United Nations, and 40 UN
members participate in meetings that are held
alternately in New York and Geneva. It deals with
chemical and biological weapons, space issues, and
many other issues. The United States and USSR
hold bilateral talks on chemical weapons "on the
margin" and "under the auspices" of the CD.
Nuclear and Space Talks (NST): The "umbrella"
under which the United States and USSR negoti-
ated on Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF),
and continue to negotiate on strategic nuclear
forces (START), and defense and space-related
issues (D&S). This conference has met in Geneva
since 1985 and is noteworthy, of course, for the
successful conclusion of the INF Treaty.
Unclassified
ability to continue to produce advanced technology
nonnuclear weapons and to mobilize and reinforce
military forces. The Soviets are particularly con-
cerned about NATO's aircraft, which they consistent-
ly rate as superior to corresponding Soviet aircraft.
Soviet planners view the improvements NATO has
made in its air forces as threatening their goal of
achieving air supremacy?a critical objective?during
a conventional war in Europe. In addition, the Soviets
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have repeatedly expressed concern about NATO's
overall naval capability. There is a parallel trend in
Soviet assessments to attribute greater effectiveness
than NATO does itself to most NATO conventional
weapons, especially antitank guided missiles
(ATGMs) and attack helicopters.
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The Soviets have also frequently discussed the threat
posed by Western?especially US?advanced conven-
tional weapons and often claim that these weapons'
destructive power approaches that of low yield nuclear
weapons. For example, the Soviets refer in particular
to "vacuum bombs," and they often discuss the
dangers of precision location strike systems. (The US
term for a vacuum bomb is a fuel-air explosive
weapon.)
he Soviets associate US
advanced technology conventional weapon systems
with NATO's Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) doc-
trine. They recognize the threat such weapons pose to
the Pact's ability to reinforce.
The Soviets have grave concerns about how quickly
NATO, especially the West Germans, can mobilize
forces and how quickly the United States can send
reinforcements to Europe.
The Pact's perception, probably representing a worst-
case scenario, of how quickly NATO can mobilize
and its perceptions of improved defense capabilities
have led the Pact to change its estimate of the size of
forces required to ensure Pact success in a conventional
war. (The annex elaborates on Soviet perceptions of
3
NATO's military strength.) Thus, it now appears a
sustained Warsaw Pact theater offensive operation
against NATO in Central Europe would probably
involve four fronts instead of three fronts in the first
strategic echelon
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Economic Considerations
When Gorbachev came to power, he inherited a
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enced a decade of slowing growth characterized by
industrial bottlenecks, labor and energy shortages,
and declining efficiency of investment. Recognizing
the urgency of the situation, he initiated a bold
strategy of perestroyka and industrial modernization
designed to deal with many of the economy's funda-
mental problems. A major part of this strategy has
involved an effort to boost productivity through the
large-scale replacement of capital stock in civilian
industry?a strategy that so far has been unsuccess-
ful. Indeed, despite stepped-up investment in the
civilian sector of the economy, the Soviet economic
situation over the past three years has failed to
improve, as the hoped-for ains in productivity have
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From the beginning, Gorbachev's efforts to refurbish
the country's industrial base have held the potential
for heated competition with defense for many of the
resources involved in weapons production. Most of the
machinery needed for Gorbachev's modernization
program is manufactured by the machine-building
sector?the industrial sector also responsible for the
production of military hardware. Moreover, many of
the inputs used in the defense production, such as
microelectronics and high-quality machinery, are vital
to the modernization program. At least initially,
however, the defense sector was insulated from re-
source cutbacks, and the leadership apparently hoped
that it could achieve economic improvements without
affecting weapons development and production.
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As the economy has continued to stumble, however,
the Soviet leadership has stepped up its pressure on
the defense industries to provide additional resources
for its civilian program. In particular, it has tough-
ened its demands that the defense sector assume
greater responsibility for producing civilian goods. For
example, during an October 1987 Central Committee
conference, Premier Ryzhkov announced that the
defense industries must increase deliveries of equip-
ment to the food-processing sector by "four-fold to
nine-fold by 1995." A few months later, the Ministry
of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry and
Household Appliances was disbanded and most of its
260 plants resubordinated to the defense industries.
Subsequently, Premier Ryzhkov ordered the defense
industries to staff newly acquired civil plants with
their best people and to give the production of food-
processing equipment a higher priority, warning that
anyone who failed to get with the program "is making
a big mistake." Although these steps have not had any
discernible impact on major weapons programs so far,
if the leadership follows through on its demands, it
will almost certainly lead to stretching out or curtail-
ment of some future weapons programs.2
To buttress the justification for reallocating resources,
Gorbachev and other Soviet officials have called for
"new thinking" in the formulation of national security
policy. They have emphasized three themes:
? The economic dimension of national security. Sovi-
et leaders have linked an improved economy to the
expansion of the USSR's influence, and they have
contended that the challenge posed by the arms race
to the USSR's superpower status is as much eco-
nomic as it is military. They and the military
leadership agree that significant improvements in
the high-technology sector of the economy are es-
sential to compete with the West in the production
of advanced weaponry.
2 The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that the
demands Gorbachev is making on the defense sector do not
necessarily require reallocations from defense to the civil sector, or
that they would "lead to stretching out or curtailment" of weapons
programs, especially those that are key to Soviet force moderniza-
tion. The defense sector could meet these demands with minimal
cost in resources and without affecting current or future procure-
ment programs
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? The limits of military power. Gorbachev has tried
to promote a concept of "mutual security" that
stresses the inability of either side to achieve its
security purely through military means and attaches
greater weight to political factors.
? "Reasonable sufficiency."Some civilian reformers
have defined this concept as having the necessary
forces to deter aggression and indicated that the
Soviets already have sufficient power to do so. The
Party Congress in February 1986 endorsed Gorba-
chev's call to "restrict military power within the
bounds of reasonable sufficiency."'
The Soviets recognize that they cannot depend on
reaching major conventional arms control agreements
in the near future. However, we judge that Gorbachev
has raised the arms control process to the forefront of
the USSR's national security agenda in an effort to
reduce both external and internal pressures to spend
more on defense?at least until he can reap the
productivity gains he hopes to achieve from his indus-
trial modernization program. With the vast majority
of Soviet defense spending devoted to the continued
modernization of conventional forces, any accommo-
dation with NATO that would allow the Soviets to
reduce these expenditures could make additional re-
sources available for the civilian economy. By actively
engaging NATO in the arms control process, the
Soviet leadership clearly hopes to undercut support in
the West for NATO's conventional and tactical nucle-
ar weapons modernization programs. In reducing the
threat from NATO, and thereby reducing the urgen-
cy to match or better NATO's high-technology pro-
grams, the Soviets thereby create an environment that
would facilitate cuts in defense spending.
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that Soviet
calls for "new thinking" in national security policy are designed to
support a variety of political, military, and economic objectives
and, thus, do not stem from a need to buttress the justification for
reallocating resources. "New thinking" seeks to create a more
stable international environment and a more benign image of the
USSR, to sow discord among NATO Allies and slow Western force
modernization, and to acquire greater access to Western markets,
specifically to gain advanced technology.
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Political Considerations
In the broadest sense, the Soviet Union's "disarma-
ment campaign" concerning conventional forces is
part of Gorbachev's penchant for sweeping disarma-
ment proposals to demonstrate the "new thinking" in
Soviet foreign and domestic policy. The public propos-
als are intended to appeal to public opinion at home
and abroad in a generalized way, while adding credi-
bility to Moscow's overall arms control posture and
enhancing its image as a trustworthy and rational
player in the international arena
Initially, the Soviet and Pact proposals on convention-
al-forces were also reactions to criticisms of Gorba-
chev's sweeping proposal of January 1986 to rid the
world of nuclear weapons. Many West Europeans?
even spokesmen from leftist political parties?pointed
out critically that in a world without nuclear weapons
the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces would become
relatively more threatening and dangerous. Gorba-
chev then quickly introduced his proposal for mutual
and large cuts in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, a
proposal formally "blessed" by other Pact leaders in
Budapest in June 1986. Reporting from 1986, more-
over, suggested that the Soviet?Warsaw Pact propos-
als were?in part?a calculated appeal across the
political spectrum in NATO (and neutral countries) to
allay fears that a conventional war in Europe would
be more likely if the United States and USSR
conclude an agreement on strategic arms.
The Pact's willingness to discuss conventional forces
reductions is also characteristic of the more sophisti-
cated and flexible approach Moscow has adopted over
the past two years. Thus, in sharp contrast to his
predecessors, Gorbachev has tried to influence West
European governments and public opinion by using
carrots more than sticks. For example, while the
Soviets have not abandoned ties to leftist opposition
parties, they have built bridges to pro-NATO and
pro-nuclear conservatives such as British Prime Min-
ister Thatcher and West German Chancellor Kohl
and are now working on doing the same with French
President Mitterrand. The Soviets also appear to
recognize that creating doubts about the US commit-
ment to Western Europe's defense could lead to
efforts to strengthen both NATO's European pillar
and European ties to the United States. For example,
5
tone of Moscow's concerns following the October 1986
US-Soviet summit meeting at Reykjavik was that it
could trigger latent West European fears about a
Europe decoupled from the US nuclear deterrent?
which in turn could spur efforts by NATO to upgrade
its conventional and tactical nuclear forces.
This more active, nonconfrontational engagement of
Western Europe represents at one level a major
tactical shift to obtain long-term Soviet goals in the
region. At the same time, Moscow is strongly motivat-
ed to see the arms control process produce tangible
results. Thus, in the nuclear arms control field, the
present Soviet leadership sought and made substan-
tive compromises in its negotiations with the United
States to conclude arms agreements. For example,
Moscow's acceptance of on-site inspections in the INF
Treaty?a key to its acceptability to the United States
and NATO?signaled a major reversal of previous
Soviet policy on verification procedures that dates
back to the 1950s.
In the conventional arms control process, we expect
that for the short term (two years) the Pact states will
continue their efforts to take advantage of the differ-
ences among the Western Allies. The Warsaw Pact,
however, will desire that NATO not be so divided as
to preclude negotiating and perhaps completing a
mutually beneficial arms control agreement.
Over the longer term?if there is no progress toward
reaching agreement within two years?the Soviets
and their allies might adopt a more propagandistic
approach designed to cause dissension within NATO
and especially to create European suspicion of the
United States. Moscow would seek to play on existing
West European misgivings about Washington's pos-
ture on such issues as SDI, ABM, SALT II, and
short-range nuclear-capable forces (SNF) moderniza-
tion to create the impression among Europeans that
the United States is an unreliable, or perhaps even a
dangerous, partner.
The major Soviet political consideration behind Soviet
conventional arms control initiatives is the reduction
of European electoral and political support for
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increased defense spending to support NATO's force
modernization program. Moscow probably hopes that
its conventional arms control campaign, along with
other domestic pressures, will slow such moderniza-
tion, complicate Alliance decisionmaking, and con-
firm European suspicions that the United States does
not properly understand or take fully into account
European economic conditions and domestic political
interests. the European
publics' perception of a Soviet threat to Western
Europe has diminished considerably in recent years
At the same time, European NATO
governments have generally been unable to fund
substantial increases in defense spending encouraged
by the United States.
Finally, Moscow also sees the arms control process as
reinforcing its diplomatic efforts to engage the major
West European states in political dialogue both bilat-
erally and multilaterally?and in the process bypass-
ing the United States and thereby developing greater
leverage, through US Allies, on US policies toward
the Soviet Union. In this respect, the Soviets have
already achieved some successes?H
Soviet Approaches
Despite the Warsaw Pact's public relations campaign
and calls for conventional forces reductions talks to
begin as soon as possible, suggests
that the Pact was still thrashing out its positio
(see inset). We believe that internal
differences within the USSR and some differences
between the Soviets and their allies have limited the
Soviets' ability to develop a comprehensive conven-
tional arms control negotiating strategy.
The extensive debate going on within the USSR on
the question of "reasonable sufficiency" suggests that
there are divergent, strongly held views about the
future size and rate of modernization of the Soviet
armed forces. The lack of consensus may be responsi-
ble for the delay in the Soviet decisionmaking process
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regarding the details of a conventional arms control
position?particularly regarding what and how much
the USSR should offer to "trade" to obtain Western
reductions. The differing arguments being made by
Gorbachev's civilian advisers and the military suggest
that the subject is being negotiated in the context of
setting the parameters for the next five-year plan.'
We believe the Soviet military may have some differ-
ences with the political leadership over possible tactics
to be employed concerning conventional arms control,
but the military?especially the top leadership does
not oppose arms control per se. The military knows
that Gorbachev's overall policies are motivated pri-
marily by the desire to help preserve and advance the
USSR's power and to improve its position as a global
superpower. The military is a strong supporter and
potential primary beneficiary of these overall goals.
We believe the military has outlined at least its
"bottom line" on arms control?to diminish the
standing and reserve capabilities of both US and West
German forces, particularly tactical strike aircraft,
and to slow NATO modernization. Negotiated agree-
ments that include reciprocal Western obligations are
far preferable to unilateral reductions. We believe the
political leadership will accede to most of the mili-
tary's suggestions about the details of arms control,
but ultimately the outcome of any debates will be
determined by the policy agenda and political power
of the party leadership.
? The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes the Soviets
have made it clear that "reasonable sufficiency" is a concept that
can only be implemented on a mutual basis and over an extended
period. He believes that, rather than reflecting strongly held,
divergent views on force modernization levels in the next five-year
plan (1991-95), discussions of this concept demonstrate Soviet
uncertainty over how far it might be taken in the arms control
arena. Since the outcome of "reasonable sufficiency" is so uncer-
tain for the Soviets, it is unlikely that it is a factor in the five-year
plan currently under development or that it is a reason for delays
in developing the Soviet position for the first round of the
Conventional Stability Talks.
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The Warsaw Pact Negotiating Position
There is other circumstantial evidence that the
Pact was still working on its position as of Novem-
ber 1988:
? The Pact's negotiating record at the "mandate
talks" in Vienna showing the Pact unwilling,
until recently, to make any concessions on im-
portant issues and reluctant to "give" on minor
ones. This record reflects in part "hard-nosed"
diplomacy; it could also reflect a Pact desire not
to expedite formal negotiations. One reason for
the Pact's approach is that the mandate talks
are connected to the CSCE follow-on meeting,
which deals in part with human rights, and the
Soviets have only reluctantly made concessions
on human rights issues.
? The Pact's call for a data exchange and verifica-
tion before formal negotiations begin, perhaps, in
part, a delaying tactic. Given the record of
MBFR, the complexity of exchanging data on
forces from the Atlantic to the Urals, and the
time required to verify the data, the Pact has
called for a process that is almost guaranteed to
take a long time and perhaps preempt substan-
tive discussion of reductions proposals.
? The Pact's most recent public "call" for conven-
tional arms control. The Warsaw meeting in
July 1988 of the Political Consultative Commit-
tee rehashed earlier Warsaw Pact proposals
without elaboration.
? Hungarian statements, including one by Premier
and party leader Grosz in late July 1988, noting
that conventional arms control is an "extremely
complex issue" that has "not been clearly de-
fined so far. . ."
? A plethora of Warsaw Pact meetings in late
October, including another meeting of the Spe-
cial Disarmament Commission. (s
There was evidence, however, of academic input to
the formulation of an arms control proposal in
August 1988, when the USSR Academy of Sci-
ences, Institute of World Economy and Interna-
tional Relations, published a detailed 'Proposal"
in its 1987 yearbook, Disarmament and Security.
While this source does not represent a formal
Vienna negotiating position, it builds consistently
on the Budapest Appeal with very specific descrip-
tions of cutbacks of "comparable divisions" and
tanks, artillery pieces, and aircraft within three
distinct zones and in three phases. It includes, in
the third, or outer zone, "a certain part" of the
territory of the United States, and the naval forces
in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.
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Gorbachev, moreover, appears to have a strong con-
sensus in the leadership to maneuver on foreign policy
issues and arms control. Although there appear to be
some reservations about his policies, he has repeatedly
demonstrated his ability to build a consensus to
support major foreign policy initiatives, such as the
INF agreement and the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan. Over the course of his three years as
party leader, support for his foreign policy appears to
have increased in the leadership as it has begun to
produce results. Gorbachev's ability to set the foreign
policy agenda has been strengthened by recent leader-
ship changes that put his allies Shevarnadze and
Politburo and Secretariat member Yakovlev in charge
of these issues. Most members of the leadership would
appear to use their political capital to fight battles on
domestic issues?with which most of them are more
directly concerned. If Gorbachev is willing to push
hard, he could probably win approval for a bold, but
well conceived, arms control policy.
The East Europeans present a different set of prob-
lems for the Soviet leadership. Although our evidence
is very scanty, it seems to suggest that the East
Europeans would like to "benefit" from conventional
arms control in the sense that they too would either
like to reduce their forces or at least not compensate
for any Soviet reductions. Regarding Soviet forces,
the East Europeans do not have a common position on
conventional arms control, and the Soviets therefore
must respond to different sets of interests. To provide
further aggravation, Romanian leader Ceausescu con-
tinues to play his highly idiosyncratic role and threat-
ened to block all progress in Vienna unless his views
are accepted. The Soviets and other East Europeans,
as a result, occasionally refer to the "Warsaw Pact
Six plus one." And finally, the Special Commission on
Disarmament established by the Pact apparently has
been unable to formulate even a basic policy on which
to formulate proposals
We believe, moreover, that, while the Soviets and
their allies appear to have resolved some of the
fundamental issues regarding the negotiations, they
have yet to agree on many important details of how
any reductions on the Pact side should be apportioned.
For example, if the Soviets withdraw forces from
Eastern Europe, from which countries should the
9
Soviets withdraw and how much of the Groups of
Forces should be withdrawn? Again, the evidence is
scanty, but we surmise that Hungarian leaders advo-
cate and Polish leaders would support at least partial
withdrawals. Czechoslovak leaders are likely divided
on the question of a Soviet withdrawal. East German
leaders probably would support a partial withdrawal
of Soviet forces from East Germany (which now
comprise 19 tank and motorized rifle divisions), but
would oppose a major withdrawal.
There is no doubt that control over the substance of
Pact policy in international negotiations will remain
firmly in Soviet hands. The Soviets, however, may
find it hard to ignore demands from some of the East
Europeans that they participate in a possible reduc-
tions scheme. The USSR probably will also pay
attention to possible warnings from other East Euro-
peans that stability in their countries could be affect-
ed by major Soviet withdrawals. The bottom line,
then, is that Moscow may find it more difficult than
in the past to manage its alliance, and intra?Warsaw
Pact differences may complicate the formulation of
Pact positions.
Warsaw Pact Options
Over the long term, we believe the Soviets and their
allies prefer to negotiate with NATO to achieve
mutual reductions of conventional forces. Militarily,
it makes more sense to trade reductions of forces,
thereby retaining a balance in the correlation of
forces. However, the Pact probably realizes that
negotiating an agreement with NATO that is accept-
able to them could take years?and might not even be
possible. In the meantime, the Soviets fear that
NATO could continue to modernize its forces, which
would compel the Soviets either to match that mod-
ernization or risk a serious shift in the correlation of
forces. Such an arms race would, of course, almost
certainly derail Gorbachev's attempts to restore the
Soviet economy through a high-investment strategy.
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In the short term (two years), we believe the Warsaw
Pact will pursue a strategy aimed at reducing the
West's perception of the Soviet threat in the expecta-
tion that this course will make it difficult for NATO
governments to maintain or increase defense spend-
ing. The Pact will engage NATO in the Conventional
Stability Talks and probably will introduce sweeping
proposals for asymmetric reductions, and perhaps
take unilateral initiatives designed for political effect,
but having limited impact on overall Warsaw Pact
military capabilities. By emphasizing the arms control
process they will attempt to capture the public rela-
tions high ground while not allowing NATO to im-
prove those advantages that the Soviets and most Pact
allies currently perceive.
Negotiations
We predict that, when formal negotiations concerning
conventional forces in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone
begin, the Warsaw Pact will quickly present a formal
version of its public diplomacy position?and might
even table a draft treaty very early in the negotiations.
(The Pact did just that in the negotiations on Mutual
and Balanced Force Reductions.) It will probably
insist on a discussion of data regarding "asymme-
tries" between the two sides' forces and probably
suggest establishing a "working group on data"-
The Warsaw Pact states will not accept the current
NATO "proposal," which in effect calls on the Pact to
take gigantic cuts in tanks and artillery in return for
minor cuts on the NATO side so that there is parity in
these weap6n systems. (This would mean the Pact
would have to withdraw or destroy about 25,000 tanks
while NATO would withdraw or destroy about 900
tanks.) They will admit they have a numerical advan-
tage in certain items of equipment, but will not accept
at face value the NATO view of the "asymmetries."
They will continue to insist that there is an overall
"parity" between NATO and Pact forces and that
NATO has numerical superiority over the Pact in
certain items of equipment.
The Pact realizes that NATO would reject any
proposal calling for nearly equal reductions?and that
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Western publics would most likely support the West-
ern governments' rejection of such a maneuver. The
Pact, therefore, may fairly quickly suggest an "asym-
metrical" reduction?asymmetrical in that the Pact
might propose taking greater reductions than NATO
in similar units of account (say, divisions) and/or
propose trading greater reductions in one item of
equipment for NATO's reducing another item, such
as tanks for aircraft. Gorbachev himself has strongly
implied in a number of statements, beginning with his
April 1987 address in Czechoslovakia, that this would
be the Pact's position.
More recently, in what is probably a preview of this
type of proposal, senior Soviet officials have claimed
the USSR would withdraw a substant/ial force from
Eastern Europe under an agreement with NATO in
which NATO also withdrew some forces. Soviet
General Chervov recently asserted that Pact leaders
have approved plans for a partial Soviet withdrawal
from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany as
part of an agreement with NATO. Chervov, in effect,
was repeating a comment Defense Minister Yazov
made to Secretary of Defense Carlucci. Yazov said
the Pact had approved a Soviet withdrawal of 70,000
personnel from Central Europe in return for a recipro-
cal NATO response in southern Europe.
The military impact on the Warsaw Pact if an
asymmetrical proposal were accepted and implement-
ed would vary depending on how the Pact implement-
ed it. Variables would include:
? Whether the Soviets took all the reductions or
whether one or more East European states also
reduced forces.
? Whether the Soviets withdrew forces from Eastern
Europe, reduced forces in the USSR, or did some of
both.
? Whether withdrawn Soviet forces were simply
moved or disbanded.
? Whether equipment were destroyed or stored.
The greatest military impact would occur if the
Soviets took all the reductions by withdrawing forces
from Central Europe, disbandin the units, and de-
stroying the equipment.
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In general, withdrawals/reductions of Soviet forces
from the entire Atlantic-to-Urals region on a modest
scale?involving fewer than, say, 10 divisions?would
not seriously affect long-term Pact military capabili-
ties unless the Pact took the unlikely step of destroy-
ing modern equipment. Modest withdrawals, more-
over, mean that it would take only a few days longer
than now is the case for the Warsaw Pact to mobilize,
retrain, and reintroduce forces to the forward area.
The Soviets would view the military impact on NATO
of such a negotiated agreement as being dependent
on:
? Whether the United States withdrew forces from
Europe, and whether the United States withdrew
equipment as well, and especially if this withdrawal
included tactical nuclear weapons and dual-capable
systems.
? The extent to which the Bundeswehr participated in
reductions and how the Bundeswehr took cuts?that
is, by "thinning out" or by cutting units. (We believe
the Soviets are well aware West Germany wants to
participate in any NATO reductions for demo-
graphic and political reasons and would not permit
any deal in which the Bundeswehr "gets off cheap.")
We judge the Soviets and their allies would be willing
to make an asymmetrical offer and, upon agreement
with NATO, implement it. They presumably assume
that the impact on Western force modernization
would outweigh what the Pact might view as a short-
term military disadvantage in some categories. Were
the Pact states to offer to trade "tanks for aircraft,"
we assume they would defend their proposal by
reversing Western arguments about the difficulty of
monitoring aircraft reductions and about how aircraft
can be moved but quickly reintroduced. They would
point out:
? Aircraft have played an integral role in surprise
attacks.
? It would be the Pact states that would have to worry
about monitoring reductions and about the reintro-
duction of the aircraft.
? Thus, Western arguments should lead the West to
accept such a proposal, which NATO itself once
offered
Unilateral Soviet Withdrawal
Previous Soviet unilateral withdrawals have mostly
been for public diplomacy, as in the 1,000 tank-
20,000 troop withdrawal by Brezhnev in 1979-80, in
which concurrent unit expansions actually resulted in
overall increases in Soviet forces. But since the
Warsaw Pact issued the Budapest Appeal in June
1986, there have been numerous reports and rumors
that the Soviets would unilaterally withdraw forces
from Eastern Europe. These reports and rumors sur-
faced during every trip by Gorbachev to an East
European capital and several times when there was a
US-Soviet summit.
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ered withdrawing some or all of their Southern Group
of Forces (SGF) from Hungary. In response to recent
articles in the Western media about a possible unilat-
eral Soviet drawdown in Hungary, the Soviets public-
ly ruled out such a move. Some Soviet officials?
especially top military officers?have consistently de-
clared that a unilateral gesture is unacceptable.
Moreover, the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative
Committee session ended on 16 July without mention
of unilateral Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe
or any other unilateral Warsaw Pact moves.
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issue was contemplated and much groundwork was
laid, possibly including an agreement in principle
between Moscow and Budapest. Moreover, Hungar-
ian officials have indicated publicly that they are
continuing to discuss with Moscow the timing of a
reduction of Soviet forces. The evidence is mixed as to
whether the Soviets would opt to make the reduction
unilaterally, but any step contingent on a Western
response would differ little from previous Soviet offers
and would be difficult for Moscow to portray as a bold
new initiative.
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If the Soviets decide to reduce their forces in Eastern
Europe unilaterally, we judge they would choose a
move that would secure maximum political impact in
the West without unduly disrupting Soviet military
capabilities. They would adopt a withdrawal time-
table sufficiently long?perhaps up to two years?to
retain some flexibility in the event of changing cir-
cumstances and would expect to spread their propa-
ganda gains over the entire period. Unilateral with-
drawal of all or a large part of the Southern Group of
Forces from Hungary would best satisfy these re-
quirements. Alternative unilateral gestures,frequently
mentioned by the East since the Warsaw Pact's June
1986 Budapest Appeal?a token withdrawal or a
thinning of Soviet forces throughout Eastern
Europe?would lack the dramatic appeal of removing
all or a large part of the Southern Group of Forces.
Senior Soviet military officers would be likely initially
to resist any withdrawal on the grounds that it would
reduce their ability to conduct operations against
NATO, and to oppose a unilateral step. If,
however, the withdrawn units were to be
relocated to the USSR and downgraded, the military
leadership would be hard pressed to argue against the
move because there would be no overall reduction in
forces.
The military's principal objection?and one for which
they would probably find some support within the
political leadership?would be to the unilateral char-
acter of the withdrawal. Defense Minister Yazov,
Chief of the General Staff Akhromeyev, and other
senior officers have consistently opposed unilateral
reductions. Akhromeyev publicly denied their utility
during his recent visit to Washington. These military
leaders would probably be joined in their arguments
by those Politburo members who in the past have
expressed reservations about Gorbachev's approach.
They would cite the risk that any unilateral move sets
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a dangerous military and political precedent. But
Gorbachev's two most powerful Politburo critics, Vik-
tor Chebrikov and Yegor Ligachev, apparently suf-
fered a serious setback at the party plenum in October
1988 when their responsibilities were shifted away
from the KGB and ideology, respectively, and they
were moved to new commissions on legal reform and
agriculture. In the near term, therefore, Gorbachev
remains in a powerful position to carry through with
arms reductions he believes would be prudent. Gorba-
chev and his supporters would make counterargu-
ments to critics that unilateral reductions have the
advantage of not requiring a negotiated timetable or
being subject to verification. Some military leaders
might also be swayed by the prospect that a unilateral
withdrawal could place enough pressure on Western
governments to bring about some reductions in
NATO forces or to forestall planned NATO modern-
ization.
Eastern Europe: The Risk of Instability. The Soviets
would probably anticipate that the most negative
potential consequence of a unilateral withdrawal from
any East European state would be the possibility for
unrest. Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe are
not configured or employed as occupation forces and
are trained, equipped, and organized to conduct mili-
tary operations against NATO. However, they help
keep popular pressures for change in check by symbol-
izing Moscow's willingness to use force to maintain
Communist regimes in power. A unilateral withdraw-
al from Hungary, where the Soviet military presence
is associated historically with violent repression,
might be interpreted by opposition elements and
leaders alike as a sign that Moscow intended to
delegate more of the responsibility for maintaining
order to the local Communist regimes. While encour-
aging reformers within party leaderships to imple-
ment change, the Soviets may be concerned that a
withdrawal could encourage demands for changes
that go beyond permissible bounds.
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Moscow's evaluation of these risks might affect the
Soviets' timing for announcing and implementing a
withdrawal, but the Soviets probably would calculate
that Eastern Europe could be insulated from them if
the withdrawal were carefully designed:
? A lengthy withdrawal timetable would give the
Soviets an opportunity to limit instability in Eastern
Europe. Moscow would gain immediate internation-
al credit for withdrawing the SGF, but the actual
removal of forces would be gradual arid could be
adapted to changing events in the region.
? Soviet and East European leaders could agree in
advance on measures to blunt the impact of a
withdrawal announcement on East European pub-
lics and coordinate their responses to possible popu-
lar unrest. Their confidence in local security forces
should have been enhanced by the 1981 Polish
implementation of martial law.
? Reformers and dissidents elsewhere in the Bloc
might temper their demands if Grosz successfully
contained "inappropriate enthusiasm" in Hungary.
? In the end, the Soviets probably would view the
continued presence of their forces elsewhere in
Eastern Europe as an effective deterrent to any
ferment possibly sparked by a withdrawal from
Hungary.
Western Europe: Implications for the NATO
Alliance. From the Soviet perspective, the major
benefit of unilaterally removing the SGF, for exam-
ple, would be the positive reaction from West Europe-
an leaders and publics. At the very least, Moscow
would dramatically reinforce its other efforts to por-
tray the Soviet Union as a peaceful superpower. West
European leaders would view a unilateral withdrawal
of Soviet forces from Hungary as a victory for the
Alliance's strategy of holding out for asymmetrical
force reductions, but they would differ on how best to
respond publicly and in future conventional arms
control negotiations. They would also recognize that
Gorbachev had seized the public relations initiative.
Some would be likely to fear that such a dramatic
Soviet gesture could strengthen calls in the US Con-
gress for a withdrawal of at least some US forces from
Europe.
13
On balance, then, we judge the Soviets could garner
significant political gains in Western Europe at toler-
able risks by unilaterally removing some of their
forces from Eastern Europe, especially all from
Hungary. The evidence on Soviet timing and condi-
tions is insufficient to predict with confidence when
and whether a withdrawal announcement might be
made. Gorbachev might now delay until formal talks
begin on reductions of conventional forces or until the
new US administration is in place. On the other hand,
considerable groundwork apparently has been laid,
and Gorbachev, whose timing in making foreign
policy gestures has sometimes been startlin mi ht be
prepared to unveil the plan sooner.
A Soviet Short-Range Nuclear Force Withdrawal
Given the West Germans' concern about short-range
nuclear-capable forces (SNF), it is possible that the
Soviets and their allies might make a gesture by
unilaterally withdrawing some short-range ballistic
missile (SRBM) launchers from Eastern Europe. The
actual number probably would be small and might
consist, for example, of the withdrawal of one of the
two 27-launcher, front-level Scud missile brigades
located in East Germany. The offer could involve only
a withdrawal of SRBMs, or it might be linked to a
more general conventional arms proposal:
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? In the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region, the Pact has
fielded over 600 Scud SRBM launchers and 'about
150 SS-21 SRBM launchers, while NATO has less
than 200 total SRBM launchers located in the
region. In Eastern Europe alone, the Pact maintains
over 300 Scud and over 100 SS-21 launchers.'
The Pact's primary objectives in offering a gesture of
this type would include:
? To improve Soviet?West German relations.
In addition to the Scud and the SS-2 l , the Pact maintains over
200 FROG rocket launchers in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region.
Refire missiles/rockets are available for all Pact SRBM and
FROG launchers.
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? To convince West Germany to resist?or at least
delay?any commitment to accept fielding of new
SNF weapons, as advocated by the United States
and the United Kingdom, tentatively scheduled for
the mid-1990s.
? To support the East German and Czechoslovak
desire for a nuclear-free zone along the inner Ger-
man border.
? To create major dissension within NATO, especially
to sow discord between the United States and West
Germany and to drive a political wedge between the
West Germans and the French.
We judge it unlikely that the Soviets would actually
destroy any SRBMs unilaterally; rather, we believe
that they probably would restation them in the USSR.
From there the weapons would be unable to reach
NATO targets in Central Europe. During a crisis, the
SRBM launchers could be returned to Eastern
Europe. Thus, there would be minimal change in the
balance of forces, but the Soviets could argue that
they were responding to a NATO?and especially a
West German?demand.'
The West Germans would welcome any Soviet unilat-
eral reduction of Pact SNF missile systems, particu-
larly if the reductions were substantial (more than 50
percent) and the weapons were destroyed rather than
simply withdrawn. Although we judge both substan-
tial reductions and destruction of weapons as unlikely,
if they did occur, Bonn probably would oppose deploy-
ment of a follow-on to the Lance SRBM. The United
Kingdom would be more reserved, with London insist-
ing that the West carefully analyze the East's actions
before responding. The United Kingdom would also
insist that, in any case, the West must preserve the
right to modernize its SNF forces. France would be
the most cautious of the larger European Allies,
The ease of redeployment forward would depend in part on
whether the Soviets withdrew only SRBM launch units or also
included their refire missiles and logistic support units.
Top Secret
although Paris would take into account the action's
impact on the West German domestic scene as it
formulated its response. The smaller Allies would, for
the most part, react favorably to a unilateral Soviet
action on SNF. Most would refrain from commenting,
however, until they had an opportunity to discuss the
technical aspects of the proposal with the larger
Allies.
We believe, however, that a Soviet unilateral SRBM
withdrawal would not mean that the Pact was aban-
doning its position that dual-capable SNF delivery
systems (as opposed to warheads or "charges") should
be discussed and negotiated within the context of
conventional force negotiations. In addition, the Sovi-
ets will remain unwilling to negotiate on the basis of
the Western definition of SNF?which includes only
artillery, FROGs, and SRBMs?at the expense of
their definitions of "tactical" and "operational-tacti-
cal" nuclear systems that also include aircraft. We
judge, moreover, that, even in the event of an SRBM
unilateral gesture, the Soviets would remain unwilling
to limit any subsequent SNF negotiations solely to a
discussion of SRBMs.
Although, from the Soviets' perspective, there un-
doubtedly are incentives to withdraw unilaterally a
portion of their SRBM force from Eastern Europe, we
judge the likelihood of such a move to be low for the
period of this Estimate. An excellent opportunity for
the Soviets to stage such a move appeared with the
withdrawal of SS-23 SRBMs from East Germany.
The SS-23, which was to replace the Scud until it was
banned by the INF Treaty, had been fielded with one
Soviet army in East Germany. The October visit to
Moscow by Kohl provided an ideal opportunity for
Gorbachev to announce that no replacement for the
SS-23s would be fielded. The Soviets, however, have
notified the United States that ground-based missile
systems not covered by INF provisions will occupy the
former SS-23 facilities in East Germany beginning in
November, and the
unit there is converting back to the Scud. Thus, the
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Soviets apparently have decided to restore the Scud
force to the level that existed before the introduction
of the SS-23:
? The SRBM's role in conventional strike operations
has grown considerably, and it is now regarded by
the Soviets as a key ingredient in the success of their
conventional fire-support planning against NATO.
Because of this, from a Soviet operational perspec-
tive, the number of SRBM weapons now stationed
in Eastern Europe is insufficient to carry out all
assigned tasks in a timely and effective fashion.
? A family of improved conventional munition war-
heads has been developed, and more are under
development, for Soviet SRBM systems to improve
their performance in conventional strikes. Coupled
with ongoing programs to increase the accuracy of
SRBMs, such as the Scud, the Soviets are making a
considerable investment in these systems to improve
their capabilities in carrying out conventional attack
operations.
? Many targets assigned to the SRBM force must be
attacked at the outset of hostilities in order to
achieve a high probability of success in destroying
them. These include highly mobile targets and
others that would field-deploy early in any conflict.
Thus, the Soviets could not be certain that any
SRBM systems withdrawn to the USSR could be
brought forward quickly enough to ensure their
availability for use at the start of combat.
? SRBMs are viewed by the Soviets as important
weapons in offsetting NATO's tactical strike air-
craft advantage. They would be employed against
NATO airfields and air defense systems, and thus
would be crucial in the battle for air supremacy.
The air supremacy campaign would be conducted
early in a Pact-NATO war, and SRBMs would have
to be available immediately to participate in opera-
tions. Thus, the Soviets might link any SNF drawn-
down to a reciprocal NATO reduction in its tactical
strike aviation.
Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Restructuring
We believe the Soviets have been considering for
several years an alternative organization for their
15
ground forces that, if adopted on a large-scale basis,
would change its complexion beyond any reorganiza-
tions attempted since World War II. Although no
Eastern source has linked a possible force restructur-
ing to an arms control move, such an association could
be made as the negotiations proceed. There is not
enough information currently available to determine
whether the Soviets have made the decision to alter
fundamentally the structure of their ground forces.
We also have no information on the ultimate design
and scope of any intended alterations, or the timing of
their implementation. The Soviets may, as they have
indicated, continue to experiment with alternative
organizational concepts before deciding on a preferred
structure. Under any circumstances, we believe that
any sizable restructuring plan, once decided on, would
proceed gradually and require several years to com-
plete in the forward area. Nevertheless, because there
have been increasing indications since the early 1980s
that the Soviets are experimenting with new ground
force unit organizations, we judge the future restruc-
turing of Soviet ground forces to be a distinct possibil-
ity. (For a historical perspective of restructuring, see
inset.)
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Over the past two years, the Soviets have created
combined-arms battalions in motorized rifle regi-
ments by adding one tank company to the existing
three motorized rifle companies. This configuration
has been detected thus far in two motorized rifle
divisions and two tank divisions in the Group of Soviet
Forces, Germany (GSFG) and appears to be becoming
the standard for Soviet forces in East Germany and
perhaps the forward area. The creation of these
battalions represents another step in the Soviets'
utilization of combined-arms concepts to structure
their forces more effectively for conventional combat
operations against NATO. We cannot yet confidently
assess whether battalion restructuring is carrying the
Soviet ground forces toward an expanded division-
regiment structure, a division-brigade organization, or
is a first step toward the eventual emergence of a
corps-brigade formation. In any case, expanded bat-
talions would create substantially larger maneuver 25X1
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Reorganization and Reductions: A Historical
Perspective
Although Soviet force structure is constantly being
modified in order to assimilate new weapons and
respond to the ever-changing demands of the mod-
ern battlefield since 1945, these changes have
tended to be incremental. The vast size of the
Soviet Army also precludes the concurrent imple-
mentation of structural changes on a forcewide
basis. On two occasions since World War II,
however, the Soviets have launched forcewide re-
organizations of their ground forces units because
of a reassessment of their warfighting doctrine and
their corresponding military requirements. Both
involved major force reductions.
The first forcewide reorganization occurred imme-
diately following the war when the mobile forma-
tions of the Soviet Army?the tank and mecha-
nized corps?were converted to divisions. In
making the transition from a wartime to.a peace-
time footing, the Soviets also demobilized several
million men and disbanded numerous units.
The second reorganization occurred in the late
1950s after Khrushchev came to power, and was a
result of his belief that the next war would
inevitably be nuclear. Khrushchev reorganized and
reduced the size of the Soviet ground forces by
over 2 million men in an attempt to make them
more survivable and capable of offensive exploita-
tion on the nuclear battlefield. The restructured
tank and motorized rifle divisions were heavier in
armor, but lighter in infantry and artillery, since
they were designed to operate on a nuclear battle-
field where mobility and radiation protection were
judged more important than conventional fire-
power. Khrushchev said he took the reduction
unilaterally because NATO would have tied him
"in knots" during negotiations
Many reliable sources indicate that in the early to
mid-1980s, the Soviets concluded that, in a
NATO-Pact war, a prolonged conventional phase
might precede escalation to general nuclear war
and that the use of nuclear weapons might be
deterred altogether. Soviet military writings also
suggest that units with a more balanced mix of
tanks, infantry, and artillery are now required to
overcome NATO's increasingly strong antitank
defenses.
During the past 20 years, Soviet maneuver divi-
sions have grown into balanced, combined-arms
organizations. Also, in 1982, two Soviet divisions
were reorganized into larger independent corps
with subordinate brigades rather than regiments.
This organization?similar in size and function to
the mechanized corps of World War Il?was
unique in having a very high proportion of infantry
and artillery to tanks, and for the first time mixed
tanks and infantry on a permanent basis at the
battalion level. One of these independent corps,
however, has now reverted to a division. We are
also beginning to observe changes within maneuver
divisions. Since 1986 tank companies have been
added to motorized rifle battalions to form similar
combined-arms battalions in several divisions.
The possibility that the Soviets may eventually adopt
a corps-brigade structure is supported by ongoing
restructuring in the Non?Soviet Warsaw Pact ground
forces. In 1987, the Hungarians converted their one
tank division and five motorized rifle divisions into
three corps. The Bulgarians reportedly will adopt a
corps-brigade structure for their ground forces in
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1989. Although the Hungarian and Bulgarian corps
are organizationally distinct, the changes apparently
are both intended to reduce officer personnel and
perhaps save other resources. Other than a reduction
in headquarters personnel, there does not appear to
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have been a decrease in peacetime active duty
strength. The wartime manpower authorized strength,
however, appears to have been reduced.' In any case,
neither the Hungarian nor Bulgarian corps would
likely serve as a Soviet model.
From an arms control perspective, increasing the
armor holdings of motorized rifle and tank divisions?
regardless of whether the new formations become
expanded divisions or evolve into a corps-brigade
structure?raises the possibility that the Soviets could
remove one or more tank divisions from the forward
area while offsetting any significant reductions in the
overall tank inventory.
It the expanded-battalion structure were
adopted on a widescale basis, such a reallocation
would be necessary unless the Soviets decided on a
significant overall net increase in armor holdings
opposite NATO. Of the few units that have adopted
the expanded battalions, the two motorized rifle divi-
sions appear to have eliminated their independent
tank battalions and reallocated their tanks to the
motorized rifle battalions
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would invariably entail. A smaller force structure
could also allow some reduction in equipment produc-
tion if the Soviets are satisfied with the current rate of
weapons modernization in key regions and can accept
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The possibility cannot be discounted, however, that
the Soviets are seriously interested in reducing both
the size and the perceived offensive character of their
ground forces for long-term economic, political, and
security reasons. Restructuring under these circum-
stances would probably be required to distribute cuts
evenly and to create a more efficient force out of
remaining manpower and equipment. A shift to a
corps-brigade structure with a higher proportion of
infantry and artillery but a lower proportion of tanks,
for example, could create a more balanced combined-
arms force and effectively minimize the resulting loss
of combat power that major manpower and tank cuts
' The Hungarians and Bulgarians also may be able to reduce future
"opportunity costs" they would have incurred had they attempted
to fully equip all units within their old force structures. By reducing
the wartime requirement for equipment through restructuring, they
may no longer have a need to modernize certain units with new
equipment
17
We judge that the ongoing restructuring of the Soviet
ground forces is intended primarily to make units
more effective fighting formations in prolonged con-
ventional combat operations against NATO. We fur-
ther believe that, while the restructuring could result
in some unilateral force reductions, depending on the
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doubt the Soviets intend to use these changes primari-
ly as part of a scheme involving a feigned arms
reduction move in Eastern Europe. The Soviets realize
that a large-scale redistribution of their armor assets
within East Germany would be detected and moni-
tored by NATO. Moreover, they almost certainly
believe that if the redistribution resulted in little or no
reduction in Soviet armor holdings, this would be
discovered and reported by NATO. Thus, a scheme
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in order to augment others, and the subsequent 25X1
withdrawal of the skeletal remains of the divisions to 25X1
the Soviet Union, would almost certainly be declared
a sham by NATO if the Soviets attempted to claim
that an arms reduction had occurred. On the other
hand, if the restructuring resulted in an actual de-
crease in armor holdings opposite NATO, then the
Soviets would attempt to extract the maximum propa-
ganda advantages possible from this "unilateral" ges-
ture. While we cannot yet determine how the ongoing
restructuring will affect armor holdings opposite
NATO, we are confident in our ability to detect
whether large-scale shifts in the Soviet armor inven-
tory in East Germany are the result of a reallocation
of existing weapons, a reduction in the current equip-
ment inventory, or the Introduction of new equipment.
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Constraints on NATO Military Activities
It is clear that the Warsaw Pact will continue its long-
term efforts to restrict Western freedom of navigation
in international waters and airspace and to impose
other constraints?such as limiting the size of exer-
cises and imposing restrictions on-where exercises
may take place?where the adverse effect on NATO
is greater than on the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets and
their allies will also again play "declaratory arms
control" by suggesting agreements on nuclear- and
chemical-weapons-free zones, "no first use" of
nuclear weapons, "freezes" on defense spending, and
other such measures that are designed particularly to
appeal to the NATO publics.
NATO has studied Soviet proposals over the past 10
years. In almost every instance, NATO has concluded
that these proposals would benefit the East more than
the West. To date, NATO's approach has been to
weigh each individual future constraint proposal on its
own merits, and we would expect most Allies to
respond in the same vein to any constraint that the
East might put forward. However, some Allies, nota-
bly the West Germans and the Dutch, are more open
to constraints as a concept than others. The West
Germans, in particular, tend to see greater political
advantages resulting from constraints than other
Allies. In the military sphere, they see constraints as
another potential means for deterring surprise attack.
serious threat to the Soviet Union in an area in which
they are particularly vulnerable. In particular, the
Soviets are concerned that: ,
? During a prolonged period of conventional combat,
NATO (primarily US) naval forces could seriously
degrade the Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) fleet.
? Western conventional naval forces, especially air-
craft carriers and units armed with land attack
cruise missiles, could attack Soviet territory, includ-
ing command-and-control facilities and land-based
nuclear forces as well as forces throughout the
theater of war.
Although not a substitute for building and moderniz-
ing their own naval forces, the Soviets recognize the
potential value of naval arms control agreements and
limitations on naval activities. Of particular interest
to them probably are:
? Improving the survivability of their SSBNs through
the establishment of zones in which antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) operations by the other side would
be prohibited.
[Thus while a
Soviet constraint proposal is likely to make little
headway with most Allies, Moscow can expect to
receive at least more than a polite hearing from the
West Germans.
Some of the proposals that are particularly attractive
to the Soviets are those aimed at restricting the
operations and deployment of NATO, and particular-
ly US, naval forces. The Soviets have become particu-
larly concerned in recent years by the growing US
naval capability, which they see as presenting a
Top Secret
Meeting the submarine-launched cruise missile
(SLCM) threat by prohibiting or limiting the num-
ber deployed and restricting the geographic areas in
which they would be deployed.
Complicating the execution of the US Maritime
Strategy through agreements that would prohibit
peacetime US naval deployments in areas close to
Soviet territory or, at the least, inhibit them through
restrictions or the creation of a political climate in
which such deployments would run counter to the
letter or spirit of such an agreement.
In addition to proposed limitations on naval deploy-
ments and cutbacks in naval strategic systems, the
Soviets also continue to call for actual reductions in
the size of the general purpose order of battle of the
US and Soviet navies, with particular interest in
mutual limitations on the numbers of aircraft carriers.
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Since the Soviets normally portray limitations on
naval activities as mutually binding, they are superfi-
cially attractive to the West European publics that are
not familiar enough with the fundamentals of naval
strategy to recognize that the effect of these proposals
is highly favorable to the Warsaw Pact.
Another option open to the Warsaw Pact is to present
a formal proposal to the NATO states to begin
negotiations on naval arms control. The Pact has
already laid the public diplomacy groundwork for
doing so in the communiques issued after several
foreign ministers' and summit meetings. We doubt
that the NATO Allies would agree to such a negotia-
tion, but such a proposal would cost the Pact nothing,
and the Soviets and their allies would gain some
public diplomacy advantages even if NATO replied in
the negative.
NATO took special pains to exclude naval forces from
both MBFR and CDE. The Allies have also agreed
that naval forces should not be a subject of negotia-
tion in the upcoming CST or CDE follow-on talks.
The NATO partners recognize that Moscow's goal in
attempting to constrain naval forces would be to
affect the West's ability to launch attacks on the
Soviet Union from the sea and to move reinforce-
ments from North America and the United Kingdom
to the Continent
West European Reactions
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I Ula JPIrrIRT
Despite more than two years of discussion, the NATO
Allies as of mid-November 1988 still had not resolved
many issues regarding the new negotiations. More
recently, in the aftermath of the successful INF
negotiations, European leaders have shown greater
interest in reducing conventional forces. A significant
Soviet gesture, such as a highly visible withdrawal of
some forces from Eastern Europe, probably would
raise expectations of progress in conventional arms
control and could reduce support for costly West
European weapon modernization programs
Implications for the United States
The United States will face a number of major
challenges in the conventional arms control arena, the
most important of which will be:
? To maintain the unity of the NATO Alliance at a
time when the French and West Germans are
generally approaching conventional arms control
from different angles. Furthermore, the West Ger-
mans are fixed on the notion of dealing in some
fashion with short-range nuclear forces, whereas
current US policy is not to negotiate on these forces.
? To convince Allied governments, parliaments, and
publics that NATO is correct in replying negatively
to what may appear superficially to be attractive
Warsaw Pact offers to reduce forces as part of a
negotiation, but which are in reality only beneficial
to the Warsaw Pact.
? Conversely, to convince these same bodies to be
flexible and react positively should the Pact offer a
mutually beneficial scheme for reductions. (s NF)
Given the large numerical superiority the Warsaw
Pact has over NATO in almost every major type of
military equipment, the Pact's heretofore effective
public diplomacy, and Gorbachev's penchants for
surprises, the Soviets and their allies are in a position
Toro Secret
to offer many "pawns." The Pact's ability to offer
unilateral reductions/withdrawals will present a pos-
sible fourth major challenge to the United States?to
offer convincing arguments to Allies to "pocket" the
benefits of such actions by the Pact without feeling
obligated to respond in kind.
We judge, however, that certain aspects of NATO's
approach to conventional arms negotiations serve to
protect long-term US interests. First, although
NATO governments are a disputatious lot, they tend
to pull together on key issues and are generally
committed to keeping US forces in Europe at a
politically significant level. Second, conventional arms
control is a very complex issue. Any proposal, no
matter how inviting, is nearly certain to involve
complicated data, interpretation, and verification is-
sues that would take many months of negotiations
even for the most eager treaty participants. Consider-
ing that the forces of 23 countries are at stake, long
debate is sure to ensue. There is a downside to this
aspect of a conventional arms treaty: should the
Soviets, forced by tough negotiations and economic
requisites, eventually table a proposal that ultimately
would serve US and NATO interests, it may be nearly
as difficult to obtain NATO consent for a good treaty
as for a bad one. (s NF)
The MBFR negotiations were in one sense successful
for the West, because the United States and its Allies
have been able to increase and modernize forces while
at the same time negotiating in good faith and
offering reductions. The challenge for NATO will be
to continue the ongoing modernization, while at the
same time negotiating on a possible agreement with a
more sophisticated adversary in an environment
where the public perception of the threat has been
softened significantly.
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Annex
Soviet Perceptions of NATO's
Military Strength
The Warsaw Pact has a genuine concern about
NATO's military prowess, and its appreciation of the
correlation of forces is much different from that of the
West.
the Soviets and their
allies see certain NATO force trends as cause for
pessimism. In particular, the Soviets are greatly con-
cerned about NATO's ability to continue to produce
advanced technology nonnuclear weapons and to mo-
bilize and reinforce military forces
The Soviets are particularly concerned about NATO's
aircraft. Evidence over the years shows that, in "scor-
ing" and comparing NATO and Pact aircraft, the
Soviets consistently rate NATO, particularly US,
aircraft as being much better than corresponding
Soviet aircraft. It is apparent in Soviet writings and
statements that Soviet planners view the improve-
ments NATO has made in its air forces as threatening
their goal of achieving air supremacy during conven-
tional conflict in Europe and thus the viability of their
theater operations
Thus, the Soviets have consistently called for reduc-
tions of what they have termed "tactical strike avia-
tion." Marshal Akhrome ev Soviet Chief of Sta
told
the strength of NATO's air forces
unsettles his side the most. He referred in particular
to the US F-15E and the West European Tornado
aircraft as "very dangerous."
The Soviets have also frequently discussed the threat
posed by Western?especially US?advanced conven-
tional weapons and often claimed that these weapons'
destructive power approaches that of low-yield nucle-
ar weapons. The Soviets refer in particular to the
"Assault Breaker," "vacuum bombs," and "cavity
munitions," and they often discuss the dangers of
precision location strike systems. (The US term for a
vacuum bomb is fuel air explosive weapon.)
23
Other US weapons mentioned as being particularly
dangerous include the 240-mm multiple launch rocket
system. The Soviets have also discussed electromag-
netic guns and low- and medium-power tactical laser
weapons. Classified evidence indicates Soviet con-
cerns are neither merely propagandistic nor entirely
futuristic:
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There is a parallel trend in Soviet assessments to
assume greater effectiveness for most conventional 25X1
weapons, including especially antitank guided misiles
(ATGMs) and attack helicopters. Thus, it is not
surprising that when the Soviets publicly comment on
NATO?Warsaw Pact force comparisons they fre-
quently claim that NATO has both a quantitative and
qualitative advantage over the Pact in ATGMs and
attack helicopters. Their views on these weapon sys-
tems also help explain why they insist that equipment
must be destroyed or withdrawn along with personnel
and that reductions must be by units?so as to
"capture" all the weapons assigned to an organic unit.
The Soviets also have a grave and exaggerated con-
cern about how quickly NATO, especially the West
Germans, can mobilize forces and how quickly the
United States can send reinforcements to Europe. In
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The Pact's changed (and overestimated) perception of
how quickly NATO can mobilize and its perceptions
of improved defense capabilities have led the Pact to
change its estimate of the size of forces required to
ensure Pact success in a conventional war. Thus, it
now appears a sustained Warsaw Pact theater strate-
gic operation against NATO in Central Europe would
probably involve four fronts instead of three fronts in
the first strategic echelon.
25
In the arms control context, this Pact perception of
NATO's ability to generate forces helps explain why
the Pact persistently calls for equipment to be de-
stroyed or stored on national territories and why the
Pact calls for reductions by units:
? If the United States (and other Allies) could not pre-
position equipment in unit sets (POMCUS) in the
Central Region, it would take the United States
much longer to provide reinforcements.
? The West Germans have consistently stated they
could not accept reductions by units because doing
so would seriously affect their mobilization plans.
This, along with verification procedures, has been a
consideration for the Soviets and their allies in
consistently calling for unit cuts.
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The Soviets and their allies also are concerned that
NATO would initiate hostilities and?because
NATO forces are still generally smaller in size than
those of the Pact?would launch a surprise attack: a
NATO blitzkrieg. The Soviets are probably ascribing 25X1
to NATO the same type of thinking they would adopt 25X1
were the Pact forces numerically inferior to those of
NATO. This helps explain why the Pact (as well as
NATO) emphasizes that one of the objectives of
conventional arms control should be to prevent a
surprise attack and is another reason the Pact empha-
sizes the need for reductions of "tactical strike avia-
tion." 25X1
25X1
both Gorbachev and
Shevardnadze have told Pact leaders that it is neces-
sary to adopt measures that would eliminate the
danger of a surprise attack
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25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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25X1
The statements by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze indi-
cate they have accepted the Soviet military view of
the possibility of a NATO surprise attack. In recent
years Pact writers have made much of an alleged
decision by NATO that the West would attempt to
achieve only limited objectives in a European war
not the complete annihilation of non?Soviet Warsaw
Pact countries and the USSR. By maximizing its
short-term correlation of forces through a rapid,
stealthy mobilization and launching a limited offen-
sive with limited objectives, NATO might, in the
Soviet view, hope to achieve significant political and
military objectives without risking its survival.
Top Secret
26
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16.1PG?..1
0
0
?Trip-Geeret-
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