AKHROMEYEV VISIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00551R001901180014-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: July 25, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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CON i NTIAL
MEMORANDUM
TO: Distribution
FROM: S/ART - E. Rowny
SUBJECT: Akhromeyev Visit
July 2'3, 19G
The following are the main points I picked up from
Akhrom72yev and Chervov during their recent visit.
On Sunday, July 11, at the Soviet Embassy, I talked for
about 15 minutes with Akhromeyev.. He said his principal
impressions of visit were:
1) The patriotism of the U.S. military and citizens.
"Americans, like the Soviets, love and will fight for
their country4.")
2) The resourcefulness, competence and candor of the
American soldiers, sailors and airmen.
3) The sophistication ofAmerican equipment ("America has
high-tech weapons.").
4) A perception among Americans that the USSR is a real
threat. ("We admit we're a potential threat, but you
see us as a real threat.")
On Monday, July 12, at the Council on Foreign Relations,
Akhromeyey delivered a carefully worded speech, long on
generalization and short on specifics.
His main points, in my opinion, were:
The USSR wants to avoid a nuclear war.
Prior to 1985, the USSR underestimated the in .2nsity
and depth of U.S. concerns over human rights.
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Since 1.'35, the Soviet military has attempted to lower
the perception in the West that the Soviets are
expansionist and a direct threat.
"The is our potential enemy."
"j .s. naval bases have us surrounded.
"We admit an advantage n tanks and artillery, but NATO
has an advantage in ant armor and combat aircraft"
(sic).
"Warsaw Pact and NATO have roughly the same number of
troops, but NATO has the larger mobilization base."
"The Soviet military pays as much attention to
'accidental launch' as does the U.S. military."
"It is wrong to think in terms of U.S. vs. USSR, we
must think in terms of NATO vs. Warsaw -Pact."
Question: "What degree of compliance with ABM does the
USSR want from the U.S.?" Answer: "The December 10,
1987 statement; abide by the ABM Treaty as signed in
1972_." 4
Question: "What is the USSR military doing differently
in exercises?" Answer: "We strive, via counter.
offenses, to give the politicians 20 days to reach a
political solution." (Comment: From my subsequent
conversations. with Akhromeyev and Chervov, I understand
this to mean that the Soviets will augment their
defenses against our attack with counter offenses.
However, they want to do it in such a way as to not
provoke us into a nuclear response.)
Question: ""Will you confine your counterattacks to
conventional forces?" Answer-: "We will resort to
whatever force is necessary." (Comment: ominous.)
Question: "How does Soviet civilian leadership fit
into military decisions?" Akhromeyev talked around the
Subject. He said that top civilians pay attention to
military advice, but fundamental decisions are reached
by ccncensus in the Politburo.
Asked to elaborate on the 20 day pause, Akhromeyev said
that -- li;se in boxing -- they must not only put up a
defense, but administer counter blows.
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Akhromeyev said their first concern in a conventional
war is avoidance of nuclear war. The second is our six
million vs. their four million mobilization base.
Question: "How much Soviet GNP is allocated to
defense?" Answer: Akhromeyev talked aroundthe
subject. He did say, however, that Gorbachev gives him
what he needs.
Akhromeyev said we shouldn't look for cutbacks in
Soviet military in the short run. "Be patient," he
said, "it will happen in the longer run."
Akhromeyev returned several times to the theme: "Yo-u.
surround us carriers and with air naval bases."
Akhromeyev denied that the Soviets support insurgents
in Ethiopia and Nicaragua. "We have only five military
advisors in Nicaragua." (sic)
The Soviets will continue to support states which
advance "socialism." (sic)
"The central problem between the U.S. and the USSR is
to reduce the perception in the U.S. that the Soviets
are a real thteat."
Gorbachev's main problem, Akhromeyev said, is economic
reform. "He will do this along lines laid down by Karl
Marx."
Question: ""What is the main lesson the Soviets have
learned from the Afghanistan eXperience?" AkhromeyPv's
answer: "That we will be out by 1 February 1989."
All in all, it was a skilled presentation to which the
audience gave him a standing ovation.
After the speech, Akhromeyev told me he worked hard
preparing for his session with the Council on Foreign Relations
-which he considered the most important event of his visit. When
I asked him if he really believed NATO would attack first, he
said, "That is what we've been taught from little up. Your
conduct dUring our revolution and the German attack in World
War II reinforces our teaching." When I told him the Nazis were
a common enemy in World War II and asked him about the help we
gave the USSR during the war, he said we allowed the Soviets to
be bled white. "I'll ncver be able to forget," he said, "the
siege of Leningrad."
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Akhromeyev said it would probably take a new generation of
Soviet military leaders to bring about a change of attitude
toward the U.S. "It will take military leaders of Gorbachev's
generation."
Chervov asked me how I thought Akhromeyev's speech went
over. I said it was long on generalities and short on
specifics. I asked him, "Do you really believe- NATO has the
capability or intention to .attack the Warsaw Pact?" Chervov
answered, "You don't have the capability on the ground, but you
do in the air and on the sea." "As for intentions, while we in
the military deal in terms of capabilities, we are indoctrinated
to believe you have hostile intentions against Socialist (sic)
countries."
I probed Chervov about Akhromeyev's "20 day pause." "The
problem we face," he said, "is to play to a tie. We need to
employ counteroffensive attacks but want to avoid giving you an
excuse to use nuclear weapons. "The use of nuclear weapons by
the U.S. will automatically unleash a nuclear response. This,"
he said, "must be decisive."
Chervov confirmed that the Soviets will not get a smaller
share of the GNP as a result of their pull-out in Afghanistan.
"We have large technological gaps to fill," he said, "and these
will be expensive."
Chervov said the visit was not only useful to Akhromeyev but
"caused the scales to drop off the eyes of the top military
people he brought with him." His concluding note: "We in the
USSR have to work harder on our defensive doctrine. So far, we
have only vague ideas about it."
Distribution
General Powell
General Burns
Dr. Gates
Ambassador Lehman
Ambassador Cooper
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