LETTER FROM JOHN L. HELGERSON TO JAMES MURR, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE, OMB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R001500100018-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: August 24, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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STAT
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DIA
25 August 1988
OCA 2863-88
r:r. Jarr,es r:urr
Assistant Director, LegislativE Reference
Office of N~nagetnent anD Budget
hGshington, D.C. 20503
I write to advisE you of the opposition of the Central
Intelligence Agency to the "Anti-Stonewalling Act of 1988"
(house Report No. 100-861, pp. 54-55), an amen~ment to be
offered by Representative Alexander to the omnibus, anti-drug
legislatior. that will probably be considerec by the House of
Representatives when it returns to session in September.
The amendment would require any Executive Branch employee
obtaining information about "illegal foreign drug activities"
to forward such information promptly to his agency head. ~'hE
agency head, in turn, would be required to furnish it to
Presidentially-Designated law enforcement agencies and, upon
request, to any committee of Congress and/or the General
Accounting Gffiee (GAG). Information could be with.helD from.
the Fresidentially-designated agencies under certain limiteD
circum;stGnces but only by the agency head on a non-Delegable
bads and only after notification to the President. The
information would have to be disclosed, upon request, to any
committee of the Congress and to the GAO. The President could
withhold the information but would have to report to the
Congress on his reasons thezefor. GAG could sue to obtain the
infcrrr,ation in accordancE with the provisions of 31 U.S.C. F71E~
et sec.
Our reasons for opposing this amendment are as follows:
Congressional Reporting Requirements
Our primary concern is with those portions of the amendment
dEeling with the Congress. t~:~ost important,' the key phrase
"information about illegal foreign drug activities" could be
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interpreted as requiring intelligence agencies to provide
routinely to Congressional requesters raw, unevaluated
intelligence reports. Currently, it is not our practice tc
forward such unevaluated reports on any subject to the
Congress, even to the intelligence oversight com~r.ittees. Zhe
proposed amendment would constitute a radical change in this
area and would raise serious questions regarding the protection
of sensitive intelligence sources and methods.
MoreovEr, by pertritting any com,r:.ittee of the Congress to
obtain such information on demand, the provision, in effect,
giv e every committee oversight of intelligencE rr:atters in this
area. Zhis, too, wou16 be a radical departure from: present
practicE, breaching the understanding bEtween the Executive-and
Legislative branches that oversight of intelligence activities
bE confines to the ta-o intelligencE com:m,ittee~.
Under present law (Title V of the National Security Act),
the Lirectcr of Central Intelligence and the heads of the
various agencies in the Intelligence Community are required to
keep the comr,-ittee~ "fully snd currently informed" of
intelligence matters. Pursuant to this provision, the Agency
anc the Comr:~unity routinely provide the committees with a large
body of narcotics intelligence information otherwise falling
within the scope of the amendment. Z~he amendment is thus, to
some extent, duplicative of existing law.
The provision creates brow new rights of access for the
General Accounting Office (GAC) to Executive branch
information, most especially intelligencE information. A~
subsection (c) of the provision indicates, that right is, in
fact, superior to tt,e right of a Congres~ior,~l com:m.ittee to
obtain the information. F:oreover, GAC would be given the right
to sue .the agency involved to obtain. the information ir.
accordance with the provisions of 31 U.S.C. F716. This raise
the prospect of a la~,suit betheen two branches of government
over some of what could be the most sensitive information in
tYie possession of the United State. Involver:,ent
of GAO in the process is particularly objectionable to the
Agency since, we have historically taken the position vis-a-vis
GAO that Congressional oversight of intelligence activities
should be limited to the intelligence committees.
The amendment Goes make provision for withholding
information; fror:. the Congress but it is not satisfactory.
Although not c1eGr on the face of the provision, it appears
that if an agency ~,ishes to withcld information, it must o0
through the cumbersome process of obtaining Presidential
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approval. In the event the President chooses to withold
information requested, he must notify the chairman .and ranking
minority member of the committee involved (the intelligence
committees if it involves intelligence matters). ke also see
this scheme as sowing the seeds of future problems similar to
those currently facing the Executive Branch with respect to
Congressional notification of intelligence activities. Zhese
range from technical questions of the content and four, of the
notification to broader questions of what the Congress can do
upon receipt of notification snd the President's countervailing
constitutional authorities in the area. In short, rather than
helping to dampen any future conflicts, it will serve to
institutionalizE and sYiarpen them,.
Intra-Executive Branch Repoztina Requirerr,Ent~
KE are 2ISG concErned.with the intra-f;xecutivE Branch
reportinc recuirer~Ents Mhict, the amendment would create.
Insofar as the amendmFnt creates such requirements for
intelligencE information, it unnecessarily du?.licates
long-standing, carefully-crafted a6rr.inistrative mechanisms for
rEportinc such information within the Executive branch. ThESe
include the requirement in Executive Order 12333 for
Intelligence Cor?,munity agencies to report to the Attorney
General information which comes to their attention concerninc
federal crimes. They also include other such mechanisrr:s which
allow for the sharing of narcotics intelligence information
with lay- enforcement agencies while, at the sane time,
protecting intelligence sources and methods from, disclosure.
In fact, the Agency and the Community already share
intelligence information of this sort on a routine basis anc
will undoubtecly share more in the uFcorr:inc years. In this
regard, I note that the conferees on the Fiscal Year 1989
IntEllieence Authorization bill in their conferEnce report havF
'requested the Director of Central IntElligence, the Secretary
of Defense an6 the various lah enforcement agenciES to develoF
by 1 r:arch 1989 a plan to expand cooperation even further.
(~:ouse Report too. 100-879, F. 22.)
the statutory scheme kith hhich the amendment kou16 reFlacE
thesE adn.inistrative n:ecY.ani~ms is, by nature, inflexible.
D.andatory involvement of the President and various agency heads
and_ to its inflexibility. Pore important, hohever, the scr,er;,e
is an attempt to resolve by fiat that which has been an
historical conflict betkeen t~,e constitutional areas of
Presidential authority: his pokers and duties to enforce the
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laws of the Unite6 States, and his powers and duties to conduct
the foreign relations and national defense of the United States.
By mandating the reporting of such information to law
enforcement agencies, the provision subordinates the
President's national security powers and duties to his law
enforcement powers and duties. Ke believe the conflict in this
area is best handled on a case-by-case basis under existing
mechanisms with ultimate resort to the Pzesident, if
necessary. A statutory reporting scheme favorinc lah~
enforcement over national security would be an ill-advised
constraint on Presidential flexibility.
he are also concerned with the term chosen to describe the
inforrr,ation tt:at "trips" the reportino requirerr:Ent: "illegal
foreign druo activities." Zhis terra is vague and subject to
en}' nurber of interpretations. Zhese will undoubtedly lead to
uncErreporting or overreporting, which, in turn, will lead to
further conflict within the Executive branch and with the
Congress.
I also note that therE arE sore units of the IntelligencE
Comr.unity that are specifically tasked to collect narcotics
intelligence information. Zhis provision, could undoubtedly be
interpretec b}? some as requiring the entire product of thesE
units to bE usec for lah? enfcrcerrent purposes. Again, we
bElieve the uses of intelligence information vis-a-vis lah~
enforcement activities should be establishes on a case-by-case
basis, rather than by an inflexiblE rule.
ReFresentative P.lexandEr' ~ ir.troauctory reriark~
(Congressional Record, 11 August 1985, pp. h 6545-54) indicatE
hE introduces the ar;.Enorr~ent ir, reaction to positions taken by
the ExecutivE Branch in response to Congressional and GAC
efforts to obtain information or, various topics, including the
druc trGfficking in Central America and the relationship of the
Uniteb StatES GovernmEnt to Panar,anian General r:anuEl t~orieoa.
Zhe Aeency has cooperates and continues to cooperate with
the intellieence cor;rr:ittees in response to their inquiries in
thesE areas. Because of this, ans our historical position
vis-~-vis GFO, hie indicated to GAC that we herE not able to
cooperatE in their investigation.
F;e hoFe that RepresentativE Alexanser's concerns can be
addressed other than through legislation. In an}- event,
hCKeVEr, Me trust that the Aorilnistration will take every
appropriatE action to oppose this provision. 'I1'ie Director of
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Central Intelligence is prepared personalty to contact
appropriate Congressional leaders as a part of coordinated
Administration action to oppose this amendment.
??hank you for the opportunity to comment on this irr.portant
piece of legislation.
Sincerely,
~' -~~"~~
I ~~
Joh . L. hElger on
Director o Congressio al Affair
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SUBJECT: Anti-Stonewalling Act of 1988
L/OCA/JLH
24 Aug
88
STAT
Distribution:
Grig -
addressee
1 -
DCI
1 -
D DC I
1 -
EXDI h
1 -
ER
1 -
DDO
1 -
General Counsel
1 -
D/OCA
1 -
1 -
DDL/OCA
OCA Records
1 - 0 Chrono STAT
1 - OCA/LEG Subj. File
1 - OCAFeao
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SUEJECT: Anti-Stonewalling Act of 1988
D/OCA/JLH~
Distribution (External):
24 Aug 88
David S. Addington (The White House)
Nicholas Rostov (NSC)
Barr Kell (NSC)
(NSA)
(DIA)
(IC Staff)
J. Edward Fox (State Department)
STAT
STAT
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