HOUSE PASSAGE OF FISCAL YEAR 1989 INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION BILL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R001500040009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: June 6, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: (See Distribution)
FROM:
6 June 1988
OCA 1631-88
Deputy Director for Legislation
Office of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: House Passage of Fiscal Year 1989 Intelligence
Authorization Bill
On 26 May 1988, the House of Representatives passed and sent
to the Senate H.R. 4387, the Fiscal Year 1989 Intelligence
Authorization bill. Attached for your information is a copy of
the floor debate on the bill (Congressional Record, 26 May 1988,
pp. H3652-89). Also attached is a chart depicting the status of
the bill as a result of the floor action.
The following are some of the highlights of the House debate:
? Panetta Suspends Action On GAO Oversight Bill.
You will note the colloquy on pp. H3656-57 between
Representatives Stokes, Chairman of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)
and Representative Panetta, sponsor of H.R. 3603,
a till providing for access to Agency records by the
General Accounting Office (GAO). They agree, for the
record, that Panetta will not push his bill at this time,
given the work of HPSCI on H.R. 3822, (its version of the
new oversight bill) and the expected increase in the HPSCI
staff's auditing capabilities.
? Swindall Amendment Withdrawn. On pp. F3657-62 you will
note that Representative Swindall speaks on behalf of his
amendment which would have tightened restrictions on the
diplomatic personnel travel and mission sitings of Bloc,
terrorist and other hostile countries. Although he
withdrew the amendment "because of a conflict with the
Parlimentarian," LE promises to add it to next year's
Department of State authorization bill.
? "Drug-Free Workplace" Amendment Not Offered. The so-
called "Drug-Free Workplace" amendment of Representative
Walker, which it had appeared would be offered to the
bill during floor consideration, was not put forward.
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? EEO Report Provision & Former Spouses Technical
Amendments. Both were adopted - pp. H3663-65.
? Surprise Effort To Aid Contras Defeated. Otherwise
routine consideration of the bill was interrupted when
Representative Hyde offered a surprise floor amendment
to strike (effective 1 October 1988) the restrictions that
now exist on the use of the Reserve for Contingencies to
assist the Contras. The House, after a lengthy debate,
rejected the amendment by a surprisingly close vote of
214-190 (pp. H3665-86). You will note Representative
Cheney's vigorous denial of charges made by Representative
Frank that Agency employees were convicted of crimes in
the Iran/Contra affair (pp. H3673-74).
? Miscellaneous Amendments. The House then adopted several
miscellaneous amendments. These included an amendment to
conform the provision in the bill creating an Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to a similar
provision in the DoD FY-89 authorization bill (p. H3687),
and an amendment placing caps on the amount of allowances
paid to personnel eligible under the FBI's New York City
Field Office demonstration project (p. H3688).
? POW/VIA Live Sighting Reports. Also adopted was an
amendment previously cleared with the Defense Intelligence
Agency providing for the release of certain POW/MIA live
sighting reports (p. H3687).
The Senate is not expected to take up the house-passed bill
and its Senate counterpart, S. 2366, until mid-June. Please let
this office know if you have an uestions o
Attachments
as stated
STAT
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4
SUBJECT: House Passage/FY-89 Intelligence Authorization Bill
Distribution:
Original - OCA/Leg/Subject File
1 - EXDIR
1 - ER
1 - D/OCA
1 - DDO
1 - DDI
1 - DDS&T
1 - DDA
1 - General Counsel
1 - C/ALD/OGC
1 - C/OSD/OGC
1 - C/ICAD/OGC
1 - Inspector General
1 - Comptroller
1 - fl/OP
1 - D/OF
1 - D/OS
STAT
1 - C/EPS
1 - OCA Registry
1 - JR Signer
1 - PS Signer
1 - OCA RPArl
(27 May
1988)
STAT
OCA/LEG
Retyped b June 1988:pap
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01 June 1988
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?1ERaes its inclusion in the
Intelligence Community Legislative Program for the 100th Congress,
2nd Session.)
FY '89 INTELLIGENCE AUTUORIZATION BILL: ITEMS IN HPSCI & SSCI BILLS
HPSCI BILL - H. R. 4387
(introduced 4/14/88)
(ordered reported
Part 1
FINAL HOUSE
TIOOR ACTION
(5/26/88)
SSCI BILL - S. 2366
(reported out as original
bill 5/11/88)
Sen. Rpt. No. 100-334
FINAL SENATE
11OOR ACIION
( )
CONFERENCE REPORT
(Filed -
1. CONGRESSIONALLY-INITIATED ITEMS
DCI Advisory Ccomittees
Ccmpensation
FBI NYC Demonstration
Project (100/2-28)
CIA/NSA EEO Reports
DIA NonDisclosure Authority
Redesignaticn
No
Yes (?601)
Yes (?403)
Yes (703)
Assistant Secretary of Yes (?702)
Defense for Intelligence
NSA Foreign Cryptologic Yes (701)
Support Authority
Overt, "Earmarked" Budget Items Yes (?101)
No
Yes 1
(modified)
Yes
Yes
Yes 2
(modified)
Yes
Yes
1, - Modified by Ackerman Amendment
- Conformed to DoD FY'89 auth bill version by Mavroules Amendment
Yes (503)
Yes (601)
No
No
No
Yes (701)
Yes (101)
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Vol. 134
WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, MAY 26, 1988 No. 76
Congressional 'Record
United States
of America
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE /00th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION
United States
Government
Printing Office
SUPERINTENDENT
OF DOCUMENTS
Washington. DC 20402
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Penalty for private use, S300
SECOND CLASS NEWSPAPER
Postage and Fees Paid
US. Government Printing Office
(USPS 087-390)
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Declassified in
Thomas (CA)
Traticant
Upton
Vender Jagt
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Vento Wolf
Walker Young (AK) MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE
Weber
Wheat
Whittaker
NOT VOTING-80
Young (FL) A message from the Senate by Mr.
Hellen, one of its clerks, announced
that the Senate had passed without
amendment a bill of the House of the
following title:
H.R. 4556. An act to amend the provisions
of the Agricultural Act of 1949 relating to
certain cross compliance requirements
under the extra long staple cotton program.
The message also announced that
the Senate had passed with amend-
ments in which the concurrence of the
House is requested, a concurrent reso-
lution of the House of the following
title:
H. Con. Res. 306. Concurrent resolution
providing for a conditional adjournment of
the House until June 1 and a conditional ad-
journment or recess of the Senate until
June 6.
Asp I n Edwards (OK) Lunirren
Bartlett Flake Mack,
Barton PliiM0 MacKay
Berman Florio Mica
Biaggi Ford (TN) Michel
Bilbray Gallo Moody
Boulter Geidenson Moorhead
Broolu, Gray (IL) Pepper
Campbell Green Rangel
Chandler Guerin( Rose
Chappell Hansen Roukema
Clay Holloway Savage
Coyne Hunter Smith (NJ)
Craig Kemp Spence
Dellurns Kleczka Stangeland
Dicks Konnyu Torres
Dixon Leland Udall
Duncan Lipinski Vucanovich
Dyrnally Lowery (CA) Weiss
Dyson LuJan Wolpe
0 1026
Mr. BONK:ER changed his vote from
"nay" to "yea."
So the Journal was approved.
The result of the vote was an-
nounced as above recorded.
THE REVEREND LITTLETON
FOWLER
(Mr. WATKINS asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. WATKINS. Mr. Speaker, I take
great but humble pride in the honor
'which falls to me today to introduce to
the House of Representatives my long
time friend and constituent, the Rev-
erend Littleton Fowler, now of Hugo,
OK, who offered prayer opening
today's proceedings.
The Reverend Fowler and Nettie, his
charming bride of 52 years this coming
August, are participating this week as
senior interns under Close-Up Founda-
tion coordination. The Fowlers have a
son and daughter and three grandchil-
dren and he is a fishing buddy of my
son. Wade.
For 491/2 years, Reverend Littleton
Fowler ministered to various Method-
ist congregations throughout Oklaho-
ma. Included among those people who
were in his congregations is former
Speaker Carl Albert of McAlester, my
predecessor in the Congress, and now
one of my most cherished constitu-
ents. Reverend Fowler also ministered
to churches in Hugo, Seminole, Ant-
lers, Sulphur, all in the Third District,
along with Miami and Sapulpa. In ad-
dition to his direct pastoral duties at
assigned churches, he was for 10 years
director of the Oklahoma Methodist
camp system, which are operated for
both young people and adults.
Reverend Fowler was graduated
from the University of Oklahoma and
had further theological studies from
Southern Methodist University in
Dallas. He brings honor to his profes-
sion, his family, to me, to the Third
District, and to Oklahoma by his years
of dedicated service.
Thank you, Reverend Fowler.
PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE
ON APPROPRIATIONS TO FILE
PRIVILEGED REPORT ON DE-
PARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT APPRO-
PRIATIONS, 1989
Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that the Commit-
tee on Appropriations may have until
midnight tonight to file a privileged
report on a bill making appropriations
for the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, and for sundry
Independent agencies, boards, commis-
sions, corporations, and offices for the
fiscal year ending September 30, 1989,
and for other purposes.
Mrs. SMITH of Nebraska reserved
all points of order on the bill.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
Massachusetts?
There was no objection.
PERMISSION FOR COMMiYi
ON APPROPRIATIONS TO FILE
PRIVILEGED REPORT ON
RURAL DEVELOPMENT, AGRI-
CULTURE, AND RELAri.a.)
AGENCIES PROGRAMS APPRO-
PRIATIONS, 1989
Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unarimous consent that the Commit-
tee on Appropriations may have until
midnight tonight to file a privileged
report on a bill making appropriations
for Rural Development, Agriculture,
and related agencies programs for the
fiscal year ending September 30, 1989,
and for other purposes.
Mrs. SMITH of Nebraska reserved
all points of order on the bill.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
Massachusetts?
There was no objection.
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PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE
ON APPROPRIATIONS TO FILE
PRIVILEGED REPORT ON DE-
PARTMENTS OF COMMERCE.
JUSTICE, AND STATE, THE JU-
DICIARY, AND RELATED AGEN-
CIES APPROPRIATIONS, 1989
Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that the Commit-
tee on Appropriations may have until
midnight tonight to file a privileged
report on a bill making appropriations
for the Departments of Commerce,
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
related agencies for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 1989. and for
other purposes.
Mrs. SMITH of Nebraska reserved
all points of order on the bill.
The SPEAKER Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
Massachusetts?
?There was no objection.
0 1025
PERMISSION TO HAVE UNTIL
MIDNIGHT, TUESDAY, MAY 31,
1988, TO FILE CONFERENCE
REPORT ON H.R. 2470, MEDI-
CARE CATASTROPHIC PROTEC-
TION ACT OF 1987
MT. ROSTENKOWSKI. Mr. Speak-
er, I ask unanimous consent that the
managers may have until midnight,
Tuesday, May 31, 1988, to file a con-
ference report on the bill, H.R. 2470,
the Medicare Catastrophic Protection
Act of 1987.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
Illinois?
There was no objection.
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT, FISCAL YEAR 1989
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, by
direction of the Committee on Rules, I
call up House Resolution 456 and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as fol-
lows:
H. RES. 456
Resolved, That at any time after the ado;:-
tion of this resolution the Speaker may,
pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XMII. de-
clare the House resolved into the Commit-
tee of the Whole House on the State of the
Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R.
4387) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 1989 for intelligence and intelligence-
related activities of the United States Gov-
ernment, for the Intelligence Community
Staff, for the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for
other purposes, and the first reading of the
bill shall be dispensed with. All points of
order against the consideration of the bill
for failure to comply with the provisions of
section 401(b)(1) of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974, as amended (Public Law
93-344, as amended by Public Law 99-177),
and all points of order against the bill for
failure to comply with the provisions of
clause 5(a) of rule XXI are hereby waived.
After general debate, which shall be con-
fined to the bill and which shall not exceed
one hour, to be equally divided and con-
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May 26, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE H 3653
1 trolled by the chairman and ranking minori-
ty member of the Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, the bill shall be con-
sidered for amendment under the five-
minute rule by titles instead of by sections
and each title shall be considered as having
been read_ At the conclusion of the consid-
eration of the bill for amendment, the Com-
mittee shall rise and report the bill to the
House with such amendments as may have
been adopted, and the previous question
shall be considered as ordered on the bill
and amendments thereto to final passage
without intervening motion except one
motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER. The gentleman
from California [Mr. BenzavsoN1 is
recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, for
purposes of debate only, I yield the
customary 30 minutes to the gentle-
man from Ohio [Mr. LATTA] and pend-
ing that I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 456
Is the rule providing for consideration
of H.R. 4387, the Intelligence Authori-
zation Act for fiscal year 1989. It is an
open rule, providing for 1 hour of gen-
eral debate to be equally divided and
controlled by the chairman and rank-
ing minority member of the Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelli-
gence.
The rule provides for the bill to be
considered for amendment by titles,
rather than sections, with each title
considered as read. It allows one
motion to recommit.
The rule waives section 4011bX1) of
the Congressional Budget Act, which
prohibits consideration of new entitle-
ment authority which becomes effec-
tive prior to October 1 of the year in
which it is reported. The rule also
waives clause 5(a) of rule XXI, which
prohibits appropriations in a legisla-
tive bilL
Both of these waivers are necessary
to allow consideration of the provision
In H.R. 4387 establishing a new posi-
tion at the Department of Defense?
an Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence. The Intelligence Commit-
tee has found that responsibility for
Intelligence matters within DOD is
fragmented, and believes that there is
an urgent need to have one official su-
pervise all intelligence and intelli-
gence-related activities in that Depart-
ment. The two waivers contained in
this rule will allow us to make the
funds available to pay the salary for
that position?$74,500?immediately
upon enactment of this bill.
Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4387, the bill for
which the Rules Committee has rec-
ommended this rule, authorizes appro-
priations for the intelligence and intel-
ligence-related activities of the U.S.
Government for fiscal year 1989. The
bill requires the explicit authorization
and appropriation of any assistance
provided for the military or paramili-
tary activities of the Contras by any
department or agency of the United
States. It also directs the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Office
of Personnel Management to conduct
a demonstration project aimed at im-
proving the recruiting and retention of
FBI personnel in the New York metro-
politan area. And, as I mentioned ear-
lier, it creates a new position in the
Department of Defense for an assist-
ant secretary who will oversee the-de-
partment's intelligence activities.
Mr. Speaker., I urge adoption of
House Rescdution 456, so that we can
proceed to consideration of H.R. 4387.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of
my time.
Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield
myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. LATTA asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, the gen-
tleman from California (Mr. Bertlaq-
sool has described the provisions of
the rule. I will not repeat them.
However, there is one provision in
this rule which is becoming too rou-
tine. That is the Budget Act waiver. In
this case it is a waiver of the section
401(b)(1) of the Budget Act. This sec-
tion prohibits new entitlemeiat author-
ity effective prior to October 1 of the
year in which the bill is reported.
This intelligence authorization pro-
vides new entitlement authority by
creating a new assistant secretary posi-
tion in the Department of Defense. As
a result, the hill violates the Budget
Act.
Mr. Speaker, if we are going to have
a Budget Act, then we should comply
with it.
Mr. Speaker, the chairman of the
Budget Committee, in his letter to the
chairman of the Rules Committee con-
cluded that ". ? ? the Committee on
the Budget has no objection to a
waiver of the Budget Act to allow con-
sideration of the bill." However, in
order to clarify the RECORD, it should
be noted that all but one of the
Budget Committee Republicans re-
sponcling voted against recommending
the waiver. -And three of the Budget
Committee Democrats took this same
position. Maybe one of these days a
majority will decide to follow the
Budget Act requirements.
Mr. Speaker, because of the Budget
Act waiver, I will vote against this
rule.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from Connecticut [Mr.
ROWLAND].
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Row-
LAND of Connecticut was allowed to
speak out of order.)
THE WALL
Mr. ROWLAND of Connecticut. Mr.
Speaker. I am sure that all of us have
heard about the vandalism done to the
wall at the Vietnam Memorial. It was
a disgraceful action done by a few mis-
guided individuals.
Mr. Speaker. I do have some good
news. Students at Weston Middle
School in Weston, CT, got together
and raised over $800 in a bake sale to
help repair the damage done to the
wall. The students have come to
Washington, DC, this we to see the
wall for themselves. They presented
their check and Brian McGrath from
the eighth grade has written a poem
in honor of this occasion. Thk: type of
compassion, this type of concern, and
this type of action by these wonderful
young people certainly restores our
confidence in the future of our coun-
try. I say thank you to Weston Middle
School. ?
Tin WALL
(By Brian McGrath)
Mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers
Standing side by side,
Honoring their loved ones.
For this country they hare died.
Though we want to forget
The evilness of war.
We must remember the brave ones
Who have fought deep to the core
Perhaps this wall will teach us
To always keep in our thoughts
That war is not the answer for
The troubles we have brought
Although this wall may -bring
Tears ofdeepening sorrow.
If we change our ways of violence
There may be a peaceful tomorrow.
Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I have no
other requests for time, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
Mr. BETLENSON. Mr. Speaker, I
have no further requests for time, I
yield back the balance-of my time, and
I move the previous question on the
resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on
the table.
The SPEAKER. Pursuant to House
Resolution 456 and rule =II, the
Chair declares the House in the Com-
mittee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union for the consider-
ation of the bill, H.R. '4337.
0 1039
IN THE COIOLITTIKE Or THE WHOLE
Accordingly the House resolved
itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the
Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 4387) to authorize appropria-
tions for fiscal year 1989 for intelli-
gence and intelligence-related activi-
ties of the U.S. Government, for the
Intelligence Community Staff, for the
Central Intelligence Agency retire-
ment and disability system, and for
other purposes, with Mr. Prcnts in the
chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the
rule, the bill is considered as having
been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from
Ohio Mr. STOKES] Will be recognized
for 30 minutes and the gentleman
from Illinois (Mr. liras] will be recog-
nized for 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman
from Ohio (Mr. &roam].
0 1040
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I yield
myself such time as I may consume.
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may zI9, .1,700
a.. ilItIng
11.A.PINI?a1W..131UIN AL K104.A.PKII git,"..Jon
Mr. Chairman. I rise in support Of
H.R. 4387, the Intelligence Authoriza-
tion Act for fiscal year 1989. The Prin-
cipal purpose of this bill is to author-
ize appropriations for all of the intelli-
gence and intelligence-related activi-
ties of the U.S. Government during
fiscal year 1989. As in the past, the
actual amounts authorized are con-
tained in a classified schedule of au-
thorizations which is incorporated by
reference and which is available, along
with a classified annex to the commit-
tee's report, in the committee's offices.
Members who read both of the clas-
sified documents will recognize that,
although the committee's recommen-
dations are slightly below those
amounts requested by the administra-
tion, the committee has recognized the
high priority which intelligence
should enjoy within the larger nation-
al security budget. It has made appro-
priate recommendations so that all es-
sential intelligence programs and ac-
tivities can be funded. Most of the
amounts authorized are in the defense
budget.
Mr. Chairman, as it does every year,
the committee has worked closely with
the Committee on Armed Services to
produce recommendations for the au-
thorization of appropriations of intel-
ligence-related activities over which
the committees share jurisdiction. The
amounts authorized by H.R. 4387 are
therefore fully consistent with those
authorized by H.R. 4264, the fiscal
year 1989 defense authorization bill, as
it passed the House. Both committees
agreed on these amounts. I appreciate
the assistance of the members and
staff of the committee on Armed Serv-
ices in arriving at this outcome.
Mr. Chairman, in addition to the au-
thorization of appropriations, H.R.
438'7 contains a number of legislative
provisions.
Section 104 is a provision similar to
that enacted in the fiscal years 1987
and 1988 acts that would limit assist-
ance to the Contras to that specifical-
ly authorized by law.
Other provisions of title I prohibit
procurement of more than three
Guardrail RC-121K aircraft and sen-
sors until the submission of a report
by the Army on tactical airborne re-
connaissance; establish restrictions on;
provide specific authorization of ap-
propriations and transfer authority
for the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion with respect to its foreign coun-
terintelligence activities; authorize
transfer of $15.1 million from the De-
fense Intelligence Agency to the FBI;
and exempt the Defense Intelligence
Agency and Defense Mapping Agency
from certain statutorily required per-
sonnel reductions.
Title II would authorize $23,745,000
and 244 personnel for the Intelligence
Community Staff, which provides
staff assistance for the Director of
Central Intelligence. Title II also de-
fines how personnel are to be assigned
to the staff and how it is to be admin-
istered.
Title M would authorize
8144,500,000 /or final year 1989 for
the Central Intelligence Agency retire-
ment and disability tystem.
Title IV contains various general
WI:Midi:MB repeated from previous
years' -intelligence authorization acts.
In addition, the Committee adopted an
amendment requiring submission by
the Director of Central Intelligence
and the Secretary of Defense of equal
opportunity plans addressing any mi-
nority underrepresentation at the
Central Intelligence Agency and the
National Security Agency, respective-
ly.
Title V would permit the Director of
Central Intelligence to grant mone-
tary and other relief during fiscal year
1989 to former employees whose ca-
reers were unfairly affected as a result
of allegations concerning their loyalty
to the United States.
Title VI would provide for a demon-
stration project to test the effects of
lump sum and periodic payments on
recruitment and retention of FBI per-
sonnel and on FBI field operations in
the New York City area.
Title VII contains provisions affect-
ing the intelligence activities of the
Department of Defense. Section 701
would allow the Secretary of Defense
to pay for arrangements with foreign
countries for cryptologic support. Sec-
tion 702 would provide for an Assist-
ant Secretary of Defense for Intelli-
gence who would be responsible for
overall supervision of intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the
Department of Defense.
Mr. Chairman, H.R. 4387 enjoys
strong bipartisan support within the
committee and represents, I believe,
the product of an excellent working
relationship by both members and
staff to carefully -assess the needs of
intelligence and make recommenda-
tions that are consistent both with the
national security and the state of the
Nation's finances. I want to pay trib-
ute to the ranking minority member of
the committee, the gentleman from Il-
linois [Mr. HYDE], for his thoughtful
and cooperative approach. My thanks
also to the gentleman from Wyoming
[Mr. CinaNnyl, the ranking minority
member of the Subcommittee on Pro-
gram and Budget Authorization, who
has worked tirelessly and effectively in
the hearings and deliberations that
have produced this bill.
And, last, I want to pay tribute to
the hard work, dedication, and high
professionalism of the committee
staff.
H.R. 4387 provides what is needed
for intelligence, and I urge its adop-
tion.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield
myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. HYDE asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, as the
ranking Republican on the House Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, I wish to express my support
for ER. 4387. The authorization bill is
the committee's primary annual legis-
lation, and a large number of hearings
and a great deal of work have gone
Into it. The programs involved are
many and complicated. We have all
been immeasurably aided by our
highly skilled and hard-working
budget staff?Marty Full, Duane An-
drews, Bob Fitch, and Bob Surrette,
whose dedication we greatly appreci-
ate.
Most of these programs are highly
classified,-so the discussion today must
focus on some of the more mundane
aspects of intelligence administration
and oversight. The intelligence budget
Is largely included within the defense
budget. However, it has been spared
some of the deeper cuts taken by de-
fense. The committee slightly reduced
the administration's overall request in
the process of augmenting a few pro-
grams, while cutting back several
others.
One substantive issue which can be
discussed is our deferral of the pur-
chase of certain Guardrail aircraft
pending submission of a report on tac-
tical airborne reconnaissance. This
was done without prejudice and from
a belief that the program should be
better thought through and coordinat-
ed, but our action was certainly not
from a preconceived opposition to this
program.
Unfortunately, support for military
or paramilitary operations in Nicara-
gua continues to be banned unless spe-
cifically approved by Congress.
A number of Members have asked
about the Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee's request for a budget supplement
to improve collection on Soviet strate-
gic weapons and on verification of
arms control agreements. We have not
yet acted upon this issue, and it is
something which the two intelligence
committees will have to seriously ad-
dress and in some detail.
A few actions relating to administra-
tive measures are worth mentioning.
The committee specifically excepted
some Defense Intelligence Agency and
Defense Mapping Agency employees
from personnel cuts imposed on DOD
as a whole, because they are already
understaffed in some areas due to as-
signment of new responsibilities. The
bill establishes a pilot project to allow
supplemental pay for FBI personnel
stationed in New York City, an active
area for Soviet espionage.
We want to see whether such meas-
ures will help our counterintelligence
capabilities by improving recruitment
and retention rates. Most counterintel-
ligence agents do not come from the
New York area, and they find the
costs of establishing a home and rais-
ing families there to be prohibitively
high, and some are even forced to
commute from Philadelphia. Also, in
the counterintelligence area, we have
been concerned about FBI fund-alloca-
tion practices and whether all the
money authorized to augment coun-
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may 40, 1000 WINC3K.C.S.MUIN AL Kt.t...UKL) ? HUUbt, n 450DO
terintelligence activities actually is
spent for that purpose.
There will be further discussions
with both the Senate Intelligence
Committee and the administration
over the committee's recommendation
that a new Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for Intelligence position be cre-
ated. I am happy to join with the gen-
tleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MAV-
Rotnza who proposed similar legisla-
tion within the Committee on Armed
Services in this effort to improve the
Department of Defense's handling of
intelligence matters. In particular,
members of the Intelligence Commit-
tee have been very concerned about
the adequacy of the Department of
Defense's counterintelligence efforts
and their effective use of collected in-
telligence when designing U.S. weap-
ons systems.
0 1050
Although Nicaragua remains a con-
tentious issue, most of the bill is ac-
cepted by both Republicans and
Democrats on the committee. I, there-
fore, endorse it and recommend it to
all Members of the House.
If I may, Mr. Chairman, one final
note. This is the last time the gentle-
man from Ohio [Mr. STOKES] will
manage our annual authorization bill,
and I want everyone in this House to
know what an outstanding job Lou
STOKES has done as our chairman. He
has been fair, of exemplary integrity
and above all a perfect gentleman. It
has been an honor and a pleasure
working with him as together we have
tackled some of the most important
and complicated security issues facing
the Nation.
There is a line in Camelot where
King Arthur says all of us are tiny
drops in a vast ocean, but some of
them sparkle. Even though we have
struggled and fought over issues and
will again shortly. I just want to say
Lou Sr?itss is one of the sparklers.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance
of my time.
Mr. STOKRS. Mr. Chairman, I yield
such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from California [Mr. BEIL-
ENSON].
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I
commend the distinguished gentleman
from Ohio [Mr. STOKES], the chairman
of our committee, and the distin-
guished gentleman from Illinois [Mr.
HYDE], our ranking minority Member,
for their very good work under. very
difficult fiscal constraints. I think
they have done an excellent job.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong sup-
port of H.R. 4387, the Intelligence Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989. I
believe the Intelligence Committee
has made a series of balanced and
careful recommendations concerning
the fiscal year 1989 funding levels for
intelligence and intelligence related
activities. I urge my colleagues in the
House who have not already done so
to review the classified schedule of au-
thorization incorporated by the bill
and also the classified annex to the
committee's report. I believe that a
reading of these documents will bear
out my confidence in the committee's
recommendations.
Mr. Chairman. I would also like to
draw attention to several provisions of?
the bill which I believe have a particu-
lar importance for a subject to which.
as chairman of the Intelligence Com-
mittee's Subcommittee on Oversight
and Evaluation, I have devoted some
considerable attention; that is, coun-
terintelligence and security.
First, the committee makes a
number of recommendations concern-
ing the foreign counterintelligence ac-
tivities of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation. Specifically, we require that
funds authorized to be appropriated
for the foreign counterintelligence ac-
tivities of the FBI actually be spent
for this purpose. This has not been
the case for a number of years. The
committee has been placed in the posi-
tion of agreeing to the FBI's budget
request based on strong representa-
tions that every penny is needed to
counter Soviet and other espionage ac-
tivities in this country, only to learn
that the FBI has consistently under-
spent the amounts authorized and ap-
propriated because it has devoted its
attention to other areas. The commit-
tee believes strongly that if, as we
have been consistently told, foreign
counterintelligence is such a high pri-
ority, the FBI should make every
effort to devote the resources it says it
needs to this problem.
The second action of the committee
has been to provide additional re-
sources within the budget request of
the Bureau for the acquisition of tech-
nical surveillance equipment. I am
constrained in further describing the
need for this equipment but I believe
the committee's classified report goes
Into that in compelling detail. The
intent of the committee, in this case, is
to help ensure the availability as soon
as possible of both the quantities and
the quality of equipment very clearly
needed by the Bureau.
Mr. Chairman, beyond the allocation
of these resources, the committee is in
the process of reviewing executive
branch progress in addressing the rec-
ommendations made by this commit-
tee in its 1987 report entitled "U.S.
Counterintelligence and Security Con-
cerns, 1986."
That report made numerous findings
and recommendations concerning the
U.S. Government's personnel, industri-
al security, and counterintelligence
programs?recommendations that
were shared or augmented by similar
reports by the Senate Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence and a number of
blue ribbon panels appointed by the
executive branch, including one
chaired by Gen. Richard Stilwell, then
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy.
The 63 recommendations of the Stil-
well Commission have been accepted
and implemented by the Department
of Defense. DOD security regulations
have been revised, and the number of
security clearances in the department
were ordered reduced by 10 percent,
with possible further reductions to
follow. As with most efforts of this
magnitude, however, the problem is
ensuring that broad policy directives
are taken seriously, and iniplementecl.
by the military services and appropri-
ate agencies.
While some measures, such as the
actual reduction in clearances, appear
to have been implemented with some
degree of success, others, such as ex-
panding the scope of background in-
vestigations into financial informa-
tion, appear to be languishing?either
because of bureaucratic inertia or be-
cause of a serious lack of funding.
The questions the committee has
been asking itself have been broad and
basic:
Have the reductions in security
clearances been real,- and have they
had any impact on enhancing the na-
tional security?
Have all of these improvements and
task forces resulted in a more secure
method of hiring people, or the selec-
tion out of those who pose security
risks?
All the recommendations aside, is
there a commitment within the U.S.
Intelligence and national security com-
munity to fund the necessary improve-
ments in security programs.
Some of the witnesses before the
subcommittee have questioned one of
the most basic elements of our securi-
ty policy, the viability of the back-
ground investigations process. Statis-
tics show that, of the many thousands
of investigations conducted each year
of newly hired and currently employed
personnel, less than 1 percent are
denied a clearance. Expert witnesses in
the security field have suggested that
this process may need to be revamped,
If not eliminated, for certain large cat-
egories of personnel because it simply
doesn't have a significant impact on
the security picture.
The more difficult issues, of course,
are those which can't be fixed. with
new regulations or even with money:
How do you instill in agencies, where
virtually everybody has a security
clearance, a rigid application of the
need-to-kow principle?
How do you ensure that the creation
of new special access programs pro-
tects sensitive information and is not
designed to eliminate oversight, either
Internal or external?
Mr. Chairman, the subcommittee is
only at the beginning stages of exam-
ining the answers to these questions.
At present, we are not in a position to
recommend major new allocations of
funding or drastic changes in security
procedures. But is is clear to me that
unless the committee and other inter-
ested committees of the Congress con-
tinue their probing and their examina-
tion of this issue. It will?like so many
other difficult and large-scale prob-
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AA tIOJU uuriuithsSIONAL RECORD HOUSE May 26, 1988
lems?slip away from us and return to
the status quo. The status quo is what
led us to the so-called year of the spy.
and to major compromises in our na-
tional security programs. We simply
cannot afford the cost and the danger
Inherent in repeating the security
lapses of the very recent past.
Mr. Chairman, your committee will
continue to review counterintelligence
and security programs and, to the
greatest extent possible, make its rec-
ommendations and findings Public- It
Is only on the basis of such examina-
tion and public dismission that we will
move closer to the hard decisions that
will be necessary to solve these very
large and very complex problems.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the House
for allowing me to take the time to dis-
cuss this issue at some length but I be-
lieve it is one which cannot be ignored,
and one which I want Members of the
House to understand that the Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence
is addressing with care and persist-
ence.
Mr. STORRS Mr. Chairman, I just
want to take a moment to commend
the gentleman from California [Mr..
BEILENS0N1 for the remarks he has
just made regarding the area in which
he has expressed this interest. As a
Member of this committee he has
done an outstanding job, and I look
forward to his continuing to pursue
this specific area of interest to which
he has so eloquently addressed his
concerns.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield
such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Wyoming [Mr.
CHENEY].
Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, I
thank the gentleman for yielding time
to me.
Mr. Chairman, I rise at this time to
be very brief and simply to express my
appreciation for having had the oppor-
tunity to serve this past 2 years under
the chairmanship of the gentleman
from Ohio [Mr. Sroiirs]. It would be
difficult to find two Members of the
House whose voting records are far-
ther apart than the gentleman from
Ohio and myself. On many of the
issues of the day we have fundamen-
tally different approaches, and I am
not one who often sings the praises of
the leadership of my colleagues on the
other side of the aisle. But I have en-
joyed immensely my service on the
committee with the gentleman from
Ohio [Mr. Sroicssi. As the . ranking
member, the gentleman from Illinois
[Mr. HYDE], so ably stated earlier in
his remarks, he has been an outstand-
ing chairman.
This is one of the most difficult as-
signments because we are not able to
talk publicly about what we do. The
committee consumes a great deal of
time that is not available for other
purposes, but it is important work, and
the issues that we have to address are
extremely complex and sensitive ones.
Consistently throughout his tenure.
the gentleman from Ohio [Mr.
&roams] has proven to be extremely
fair. There has been a high degree of
comity on the committee and I have
always been treated with respect and
dignity regardless of party or regard-
less of my views and, frankly, Mr.
Chairman, I have often felt that if we
could extend the good feelings and the
cooperation that exists on the Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence
to the House at large this would be a
much more productive body.
I urge my colleagues to approve the
legislation that is before us today.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I have no
more requests for time, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
Mr. STORRS. Mr. Chairman, I just
want to thank both the gentleman
from Wyoming [Mr. CtuarEY] and the
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyorl
for their very gracious remarks and to
say in turn, although I have already
made reference to both of them and
the service that they have rendered to
this committee, it has indeed been a
real pleasure for me to work with both
of them in a leadership role, and it is
an experience that I shall treasure as
having served in this capacity in the
House.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to
the distinguished gentleman from
California [Mr. PANETTA].
(Mr. PANETTA asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. PANEITA. Mr. Chairman, I
thank the gentleman for yielding time
to me.
Mr. Chairman, I rise to express my
concern over the accountability of ap-
propriated funds expended by the
CIA. As the gentleman from Ohio, the
distinguished chairman of the commit-
tee, knows. I am most concerned about
recent abuses of taxpayer funds as il-
lustrated by the Iran-Contra Affair.
For these reasons, I introduced the
CIA Accountability Act, H.R. 3603 on
November 3, 1987. As the House spon-
sor of that legislation, I want to take a
moment to commend the distin-
guished gentleman and chairman of
the House Select Committee on Intel-
ligence for his work on this authoriza-
tion act and H.R. 3822, the Intelli-
gence Oversight Act of 1988. I am
pleased that the committee has acted
to improve its oversight of CIA oper-
ations and firm-I-trial activities. I under-
stand the Intelligence Oversight Act
will address prior notification of covert
action activities, regulate the use of
nonappropriated funds, and require
Improved reporting of the covert
transfer of military equipment.
I am pleased to learn that the com-
mittee is planning to begin the process
of developing an improved audit capa-
bility that can work with the recently
created audit staff of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence.
However, I believe that additional ac-
countability steps must be implernent-
ed.
I believe that my legislation is in
keeping with the need to improve the
accountability of our Nation's intelli-
gence oversight. The purpose of my
legislation is to clarify and restate the
General Accounting Office's (GAO]
Comptroller General's authority to
audit the financial transactions and
evaluate the programs and activities of
the CIA.
As the chairman knows, the CIA is
the only Federal Agency whose files
are not open to examination by the
GAO. Yet, the National Security
Agency as well as the Department of
Defense's highly sensitive activities
are regularly reviewed and examined
by the GAO.
Currently, the only method used to
ensure CIA accountability is the use of
Internal reviews by the CIA's inspector
general, who is appointed by the CIA
Director. The Iran-Contra scandal
offers evidence that an aggressive di-
rector, like William Casey, without
proper oversight, can circumvent any
accountability system. The inspector
general was unable to respond to the
inquires of the Iran-Contra commit-
tees because he had no access to the
information as to how the intelligence
agency's funds had been expended in
this regard.
Currently, there is no comprehen-
sive manner for Congress and the
American taxpayer to ensure that the
CIA is carrying out its activities legal-
ly or effectively. GAO performs this
auditing and evaluating function for
Congress throughout the executive
branch. It is a highly competent and
strictly nonpartisan agency. It is the
logical organization for the committee
to consider to carry out this work.
The National Security Agency and
numerous military services regularly
permit GAO auditors with top secret
clearances to review many of their
highly sensitive activities, including
special access programs such as highly
secret weapons projects and sensitive
intelligence operations. Also, the Iran
committees borrowed GAO personnel
to establish the money trail of the
Iran-Contra affair. My measure would
allow the GAO to apply to the CIA
the same strict standards of financial
accountability and performance that it
applies to other agencies. It provides
that CIA programs and activities can
be subject to possible audit or evalua-
tion. At the same time, my proposal
carefully limits the GAO personnel
who could be involved in CIA audits,
the methods by which the GAO could
obtain access to CIA personnel and
records, and the dissemination of the
audit results.
My measure is carefully drafted to
ensure that secret activities and classi-
fied documents are not compromised.
It would allow the President to shield
specific employees from investigation,
but no written records could be kept
from GAO review. My approach insists
on accountability while recognizing
the unique role of the CIA.
At this point, I would ask the gentle-
man from Ohio, Mr. STOKES, the chair-
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May 26, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOUSE
man of the Intelligence Committee, if
he would engage in a colloquy with me
concerning H.R. 3603. It is my under-
standing, based on my conversations
and correspondence with the gentle-
man, that the Intelligence Committee
is not willing to adopt the approach of
H.R. 3603 at this time. Would the gen-
tleman from Ohio explain to the
House his reasons for this position and
his position on the legislation?
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, if the
gentleman will yield, I would say that
I am very familiar with H.R. 3603 and
I commend him for taking such a
strong interest in the accountability of
U.S. taxpayer funds in the intelligence
field. I share the gentleman's interest
In assuring that the funds appropri-
ated for intelligence activities are nei-
ther mismanaged nor unaccountable
to outside review. But, as I have indi-
cated to you in our conversations and
correspondence, I am inclined to defer
to Director of Central Intelligence
strongly urged concerns about the se-
curity of CIA activities and am cur-
rently of the opinion that the intelli-
gence committees should seek to im-
prove their own audit capability and
oversight before considering the ap-
proach contained in H.R. 3603. I be-
lieve the committees have done a cred-
ible job in those audits that they have
Performed and I am thinking in par-
ticular of the House Intelligence Com-
mittee's audit and review of the ex-
penditure of Contra aid funds during
fiscal years 1987 and 1988.
Further, as I have indicated to the
gentleman, I have not closed the door
to additional financial audits. I remain
open to other alternatives, such as
that presented by MR. 3603. As the
gentleman has mentioned, the com-
mittee has taken steps in its adoption
of H.R. 3822 and its increased audit ac-
tivities to see if improved congression-
al oversight will do the job. If it does
not, and at present I don't know
whether it will or will not?then the
committee will be in a position to
review additional options.
Mr. PANETTA, Mr. Chairman. I
thank the gentleman for his review of
this important issue and look forward
to consulting with him in the future
on the implementation of increased in-
telligence oversight. I continue to
stand ready to press my legislative
ProposaLs should the approach adopt-
ed by the Intelligence Committee
prove inadequate.
0 1105
Mr. Chairman. I thank the gentle-
man for his colloquy and for all of his
work.
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I
thank the gentleman for his com-
ments in this very important area, and
we will certainly keep his concerns in
mind.
Mr. SWINDALL Mr. Chairman, in consider-
ing my amendment to H.R. 4387, the Intelli-
gence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1989,
the issue before us is curtailing espionage by
foreign diplomats in the United States. Protect-
ing our military secrets and advanced technol-
ogy from our enemies is of vital interest to
U.S. national security. However, I unfortunate-
ly was forced to withdraw my amendment be-
cause of a conflict with the Parliamentarian.
While this temporary setback leaves the issue
of hostile diplomatic travel unresolved, my col-
leagues can be sure that I will raise it again
during next year's State Department authori-
zation bill.
I had planned today to offer the Anti-Espio-
nage Act of 1988 as an amendment to grant
the Secretary of Defense and the FBI Director
authority over individual travel requests to the
State Department's Office of Foreign Missions
by diplomats from Communist and terrorist
countries in the United States. My amendment
affects all Communist countries listed in sec-
tion 620(f) of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act
and all countries determined by the Secretary
of State as terrorist for purposes of the 1979
Export Administration Act. Specifically, it
states that individual travel requests in the
United States by personnel of hostile foreign
countries and entities shall not be pentitted if
the Secretary of Defense or the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation judges
that such travel might enhance the capability
of those countries or entities to intercept U.S.
military, intelligence or diplomatic communica-
tions or engage in forms of human intelligence
collection. In either case, the Secretary of
State and the Director of Central Intelligence
must be consulted.
Instead of one executive branch authority
having exclusive oversight of the travel re-
quests of hostile foreign diplomats (as in cur-
rent law), my amendment creates authority for
two Departments to review diplomatic travel,
both of which have responsibilities that are di-
rectly affected by such travel. My amendment
balances our national security interests with
our political and diplomatic concerns by creat-
ing a system of checks and balances within
the executive branch to oversee the travel re-
quests of hostile intelligence operatives on
American soil.
This amendment differs greatly from the
travel restriction compromise reached in sec-
tion 162 of last year's State Department au-
thorization bill. Instead of imposing specific re-
strictions on entire missions like section 162,
the Anti-Espionage Act of 1988 creates a
process for reviewing individual cases of hos-
tile diplomatic travel.
My amendment does not deprive the State
Department of any authority that it legitimately
should have. It rests on the principle that reg-
ulating the movement of spies in the United
States should property be the responsibility of
those agencies concerned with counterintelli-
gence and national security?namely, the FBI
and Defense Department Current law allows
too little input on questions of individual travel
from the agencies most affected by the trips
of hostile intelligence personnel in the United
States.
Soviet travel within the United States in-
creasingly will impinge directly upon Defense
Department and FBI concerns. With the INF
treaty, nuclear testing verification, and possi-
bly in the future with START, there will be a
great deal of on-site inspection travel and ac-
tivity at or near defense and national security
installations.
With the passage of the Foreign Missions
Act [FMA) in 1982, Congress gave the Office
of Foreign Missions [OFM] the responsibility
H 3657
to decide between intelligence and reciprocity
concerns in regulating diplomatic travel. Con-
press created OFM because of serious dissat-
isfaction with the State Department's disre-
gard for the intelligence and counterintelli-
gence interests of the United States. But in
the time since OFM was established, the
State Department has remained continuously
hostile to the goals which Congress intended
to achieve in passing the Foreign Missions
Act
The Department has not tufty implemented
the FMA and, in some cases, has even
chosen to ignore the taw completely. For ex-
ample, it failed to implement Section 162 of
1987's State Department Authorization bill
until 8 weeks after the deadline and five
months after the bill became law. In finally ap-
plying the restrictions, the Department still
chose to bypass such U.S. intelligence threats
as the Hungarian and Romanian missions to
the U.N. Similarly, the State Department has
also chosen for 3 years not to fully implement
the 1985 Roth-Hyde amendment by allowing
Soviet members of the U.N. Secretariat to
travel to sensitive closed areas. More recent-
ly, State has been willing to grant travel re-
quests and allow negotiations with a known
KGB agent appointed to head a new U.S.-
U.S.S.R. trade commission,-the obvious pur-
pose being to improve the Soviets' efforts to
acquire denied technology. In other words,
Smooth relations with the Soviets Wok 'prece-
dence over the damage and even the humilia-
tion to the West.
The precedent for my amendment rests in
section 161 of the 1987 State Department au-
thorization bill. That section, part of the bipar-
tisan Diplomatic Reciprocity and Security Act
of Representatives FASCELL, MICA. BROOM-
FIELD, and Seowe, plugged the loophole in
the law with respect to the acquisition of
American property by hostile foreign diplomats
by giving the Defense Department and FBI
over future property acquisitions. This was
aimed at avoiding another scandal like Soviet
occupation of Mount Alto. Section 161 is iden-
tical to the substance of my amendment The
only difference is that, instead of avoiding the
prospect of giving the Soviets and their allies
real property to spy on U.S. military, diplomat-
ic and intelligence matters, my amendment
gives the executive authority to avoid spies
having the run of the country.
My amendment is a recognition of the fact
that, in addition to the State Department's le-
gitimate political and diplomatic interests, dip-
lomatic travel affects the FBI and DOD's inter-
nal security responsibilities. These agencies'
concerns deserve to be recognized and acted
upon. Diplomatic travel involves many com-
peting interests in the executive branch.
Therefore, there should be a balance of
power within the executive to deal with the
Issue, not a single department with unilateral
and final authority over the subject Otherwise,
the State Department will continue to ignore
the Congressional intent and mandate of the
Foreign Missions Act.
My amendment should not be misinterpret-
ed as a DOD and FBI "veto" over travel re-
quests because both must consult with the
Secretary of State and the Director of Central
Intelligence before using their authority in the
amendment to deny an individual diplomat's
travel. Neither the FBI or DOD would use their
authority lightty. One can hardly claim that the
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- edeetexestreenneillekle itetAnui ritJUSE May15, 1988
FBI has a tistOry Of ignoring or overriding
State Department concerns. As for the CBI,
they are a tar mailer and less powerful
agency than State, and traditionaily have ac-
commodated and deferred to the State De-
partment except in extreme cases. Meanwhile,
The Defense Department has its own concerns
about reciprocity, such as ensuring that U.S.
defense attaches stationed abroad have a
maximum of free movement Besides, no ex-
ecutive branch agency is free to disregard to-
tally the points of view and desires of another
because the bead of the department always
has the IBCOurse to go to the President to
seek resotution of the interagency dispute. In
Vie case ot foreign policy or national security
related questions, a mechanism clearly rests
within the process at the National Security
Council. llie current arrangement, whereby
the FBI and DOD having no vested or institu-
tional arrangement to object to individual in-
stances at travel, does not serve U.S. national
security iritt.ezits.
In addition, by offering This amendment, I
am allowing the FBI and DOD to specifically
target those types of trove'. which directly
threaten US. national security, while at the
same time respecting the State Department's
interests in allowing the nontiyeatening types
of travel to proceed unimpeded. . That ability
does not exist now. The present taw only cre-
ates arrangements tor broad travel controls
rather than finely tuned restrictions. As Ii
stands now, travel controls must apply to in-
telligence personnel as well as rioninteeigence
personnel within a given missiort Such an
across-the-board, generic approach deprives
the FBI, the Defense Department and the
State Department the ability to respond to
hostile intelligence activities on an individual
basis. My amendment offers a more sophisti-
cated, 'Vile" approach to the problem, in-
stead of the present "shotgun" approach and
thereby protects both chplomatie and counter-
intelligence interests.
Pt Congress fails to enact legislation of this
kind in the future, It will be saying to the FBI
and DOD that they do not deserve an institu-
tional means of objecting to hostile intelli-
gence activity and also tell the State Depart-
ment that the congressional intent of the For-
eign Miss-Torts Act no longer matters.
To underline the significarce of this issue, I
am including in the RECORD a backgrounder
written by two brilliant Heritage Foundation
analysts, Tom Dewey and Ambassador
Charles eichenstein.
New Mr.ssmies Nbrzsa To FIGHT ANTI-U.S.
SPYING
INTRODDCZIO'S
Devastating security breathes at Ameri-
can diplomatic installatitirs abroad have
highlighted once again the unrelenting
threat cf Soviet eepinnsge_ Coupled with
the threat itself has been neer criminal ne-
glect by top United States diplomatic offi-
cials of even the most routine security pre-
cautions.
These events abroad, however, should not
divert attention from one taunt fact: the
major components of Soviet espionage tar-
geted -against the U.S. are located in the
U.S-Sciviet and Soriet bloc diplomatic and
United Nations Missions, within the United
Nations Secretariat, at commercial offices
and news bureaus, and among the thou-
sands of Soviet and Soviet bloc visitors who
come to the United States each year.
Among the most Important covers for
Soviet and Soviet bloc espionage Is U.N.
Headquarters In -Manhattan. Examples:
On May 20. 1978. two Soviet employees of
the U.N. Secretariat, Valdik Enger and Ru-
dolph Chernyayev, and one employee of the
Soviet Mission to the U.N., Vladimir Zinya-
kin, were expelled from the U.S. on charges
Of trybag to buy information about Ameri-
ean submarine defenses.
On April 21, 1983, two "diplomats.f' at the
13oviet U.N. Mission, Aleksandr Mikheyev
and Oleg Konstantincre along with a Wash-
ington-based Soviet "diplomat,- were ex-
pelled from the U.S. on charges of espio-
nage. All were trying to obtain secret infor-
mation about U.S. weapons technology.
On August 23, 1986. Gennadiy 7.serharov a
KGB operative molting as a science officer
In the U.N. Secretariat, was arrested for
purchasing classified documents on robotics.
computers, and artificial hatelligthce en=
an undeicover triformsuat.
A 1986 .Senate Intelligence Committee
Report Identified Vladimir Kolesnikon
Special Assistant to U.N. Secretary-General
Javier Perez de Cuellar. as a China expert
for the KGB, the Soviet Intelligence and se-
curity service.
Previous Senate reports* identified other
U.N. posts as "traditional- KGB jobs. These
Include the past of External Relations Di-
rector of the U.N. Department of Public In-
formation.
The abundant evidence reveals how much
Moscow uses the U.N. Secretariat for hard-
target espionage (buying or stealing classi-
fied government documents), for acquiring
sensitive scientific and technical informa-
tion, and for furthering Soviet disinforma-
tion and propaganda themes. These activi-
ties, however, are only part of the Problem.
Other documented cases of Soviet bloc espi-
onage in the U.S. include agents as diverse
as a California-based Polish trade official
engaged in procuring top-secret information
on U.S. nuclear weapons and a West
German auto mechanic arrested in Florida
for buying U.S. Army documents for sale to
East Germany.
It Is now clear, moreover, that the Soviets
have been just as active at such U.N. spe-
cialized agencies as the International
Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and the
United Nations .Environment Program in
Nairobi. This problem appeared so serious
that the CIA investigated it, and, in a still
classified report, details the use of such
agencies by the Soviets f or large-scale scien-
tific and teclmical espionage.
The Reagan Administration, working with
bipartisan majorities in Congress, has begun
the critical job of rebuilding U.S. defenses
against this multifaceted espionage threat.
Major initiatives taken sinm 1981 include
reductions in Soviet personnel at Soviet dip-
lomatic installations, the Imposition of
travel restrictions on Soviet and Eastern
bloc diplomats In the U.S., the creation of
an Office of Foreign Missions (OFM) within
the State Department to coordinate security
programs, and increased funding and train-
ing for FBI counterintelligence agents- This
combination of legislative and executive
action is paying dividends. Says a senior FBI
official: "We've hurt them."
"Meeting the RaPionage Challenge: A Review of
United States Counterintelligence and Security
Programs:" Report 59-252 of the Selert Committee
on intelligence of the Untied States Senate (Wash
higton. U.S. Government Printing Office.
1986). p. 21.
*See, for example. "Soviet Presence in the U.N.
Secretariat." Report of the Senate Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence, S. RPT. 99-52. United States
Senate (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1985).
'They 'have not, however, been hurt
enough. If the U.S. Is more effectively to
counter espionage Inside the U.S., stem are
needed. Among them:
el) Streamlining a number of OM Regu-
lations. such as the travel restrictions that
currently apply to most Soviet bloc nations,-
(2) Extending the reach of such OPM reg-
ulations as "closed area" restrictions:
(3) Increasing pressure for strict enforce-
ment by the U.N. of the Ulies own regula-
tions on Solite s.nd bloc personnel in the
U.N. Secretariat:
(4) 'Ilgttening surveillance of non-Soviet
bloc targets, especially the People's Repub-
bc of China, and non-diplomatic Soviet bloc
personnel. Stat:11 as trade and press repre-
sentailves; and
(5) Expanding the ant authority to co-
ordinate U.S. policy toward diplomatic in-
stallations.
Through these steps cannot fully insure
the U.S. against damage caused by U.S.-and
U.N.-based espionage. they will enhance the
odds in favor of U.S. counterintelligence.
TM sower VILOC
An October 1988 Report of the Senate In-
telligence Committee states. "Among for-
eign Intelligence services, those of the
Soviet Union represent by far the most sig-
nificant intelligence threat hi terms of size,
'thrills and intent to act against US. inter-
ests."
Soviet espionage In the U.S. (and Canada)
Is planned arid conducted by the First De-
partment of the First Chief Directorate of
the KGB, by other operational components
of the KGB. and by the GRIJ, the Soviet
military intelligence agency. Their respec-
tive responsibilities are described In a report
on foreign espionage in the U.S., recently
transmitted to Congress by Ronald Reagan.
It says: "Within the Soviet services, GRU
personnel are targeted primarily againe
strategic military Intelligence while KGB
personnel are essigned to one of four oper-
ational components or "lines' ?Polttical
(PR), Counterintelligence (KR), Scientific
and Technical IX), or Illegals Support
(N)." 4
While the tasks of the first three KGB
"lines" are clear, the fourth, Line N. com-
prises what the presidential report Identi-
fies as ea small group involved in the oper-
ations of illegals, that is, Intelligence offi-
cers and agents infiltrated into a foreign
country under false circumstances for intel-
ligence purposes." An example of a suc-
cessful "Illegal" operation is the case of
Karl Koecher, a US. citizen of Czech origin
who "emigrated" to the U.S. in the 1960s
and worked for the CIA as a tratislater in
the 1970s?before being uncovered as a
Czech "illegal" dispatched to the U.S. to
penetrate American intelligence agencies.
Dangerous East Germans and Cubans.
The Soviets are aided In their espionage ac-
tivities by the foreign intelligence sen-ices
of their Warsaw Pact allies and by the
Cuban intelligence service. the Direccion
General de Inteligencia (General Director-
ate of Intelligence), generally known as the
DCI. The capabilities of the services vary.
Particularly dangerous, explains the presi-
dent report, are the East German service
(MIS), which has run several successful op-
erations involving -illegals," and the Cuban
DOI. whose "usefulness to the KGB . . .
cannot be underrated."'
? 1986 Select Committee Report, op. cif_ p. it.
? Report on Foreign Espionage In the United
States Department of State (Washington. D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987). p. 4.
?Ibid. p.5.
? Harry Rositske, "The KGB" (Garden City, New
York: Doubleday and Company, 1981), p 225.
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May 26, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
Since the KGB plays a major role in oper-
ations of most of these services, the Soviets
have been able to develop particular areas
of specialization. Example: Romanian spies
in the U.S., explains the report,". . . tend
to concentrate on gathering political and
economic information." while the U.S.-based
East Germans' "central focus" is on "a
broad variety of &la' [scientific and techni-
cal] information." 7
Some Soviet bloc espionage services coop-
erate with Moscow more closely than
others. Observes Jeffrey Richelson, a pro-
fessor of government at American Universi-
ty: "The relationship between the Soviet in-
telligence and security services and those of
the Warsaw Pact nations and Cuba vary
with the particular service. the Bulgarians
and the Cubans being the most and the Ro-
manians the least tightly tied." Despite
this uneven cooperation and the inevitable
friction between the Soviets and these sub-
ordinate services, significant information
collected by Soviet bloc intelligence officers
almost certainly is shared with Moscow. The
Polish intelligence officers, for example,
who supervised James Harper, the Califor-
nia-based engineer who provided the Poles
with clasaiiied documents pertaining to UB.
strategic nuclear forces, received Personal
letters of commendation from Yuri Andro-
pov, who then was KGB boss.
SPIES AT U.N. HEADQUARTERS
American counterintelligence against U.S.-
based Soviet and Soviet bloc espionage is
made particularly tough by the fact that
these countries use for espionage tasks their
nationals in the U.S. who are not attached
to embassies or diplomatic missions.
By far the largest such permanent concen-
tration of Soviet and Soviet bloc intelligence
officers is at the U.N. Secretariat in Man-
hattan, where 265 Soviets and 33 Soviet bloc
nationals are currently employed. The
Senate Intelligence Committee confirms
that between 30 and 40 percent of these os-
tensible "international civil servants" are in
fact officers of the KGB. GRIT, or their
Soviet bloc equivalents; all are subject to
cooptation and "spot" use by bloc services.
As the current Director of Central Intelli-
gence, William Webster, stated In a speech
when he was FBI Director.:
" . . the U.N. is indeed a rat warren or intel-
ligence operatives and needs to be severely
constrained" ?
The value of U.N. Headouarters in New
York to the Soviet bloc goes far beyond
using its U.N. employees for intelligence col-
lection. Numerous studies indicate that,
through a series of bureaucratic maneuvers,
with the acquiescence of top U.N. officials,
Moscow virtually now controls entire seg-
ments of the U.N. bureaucracy." This
allows the Kremlin, for example, frequently
to include Soviet disinformation and propa-
ganda themes in U.N. publications and ac-
tivities, giving such themes legitimacy they
could never enjoy if datelined Moscow. It is
for this reason that the "non-militarization
of space" was a major theme of the II.N.'s
' 1987 State Department Report, op. ctL, pp. IQ,
11.
? Jeffrey Richelson. "Sword and Shield: Soviet In-
telligence and Security Apparatus` (Cambridge.
Massachusett& Ballinger Publishing CoMPanY.
1988), p. 212.
Remarks by William H. Wer. Director, Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, before the Society of
Former Special Agents Annual Convention, Boston,
Massachusetts. September 39, 1986. p.8.
"See, for exanuole, Juhasta Oscan Pilate. "Mos-
cow's U.N. Outpost." Heritage Foundation Back-
grounder Na 307, November 23, 1083. and Charism
M. Lichenatein. -13y Breaking the Rules. Manow
Keeps A Tight Grip on the U.K.," Heritage Founda-
tion Backgrosnder No. 32d, July 23, 1986.
1986 International Year of Peace program;
this theme is at the core of Moscow's world-
wide propaganda effort to derail the Reagan
Administration's Strategic Defense Initia-
tive. The U.N.'s International Year of Peace
program was run by a Pole."
Recruiting Third World Citizens. The
U.N. community itself is a prime intelli-
gence target for the Soviet bloc. With its
thousands of accredited diplomats repre-
senting virtually every country. the U.N.
offers an ideal setting to identify and re-
cruit Third World citizens, many of whom
will return home to assume high positions
in their national bureaucracies or govern-
ments. Many already have access to sensi-
tive information. Even Western diplomats
are targets. Example: Norweigian diplomat
Arne Treholt, who served as a high-ranking
official of the Norwegian U.N. Mission, was
arrested in 1984 and identified as a longtime
Soviet agent. U.S. officials confirm that a
significant number of non-Soviet bloc U.N.
employees are Soviet agents or agents of in-
fluence. A top Soviet official boasted to
Arkady Shevchenko, a former Soviet citizen
who was U.N. Under-Secretary General
when he defected to the U.S. in 1978, that
the U.N. "is our best watch-tower in the
West" 17
NON-DIPLOMATIC covias
The Soviets and their bloc allies make es-
pionage use of other permanent non-diplo-
matic establishments in the U.S. All the
Warsaw Pact countries, for example, have
trade or commercial offices in the U.S., not
only in major cities like New York and San
Francisco, but also in Charlotte, North
Carolina and Columbus. Ohio, and other. re-
gional centers. Most Soviet bloc nations also
have established so-called news bureaus in
the U.S.; these routinely are used for espio-
nage purposes, as the public explusions of
TASS News Agency personnel shows." As
the Soviet and Soviet bloc intelligence offi-
cers operating under U.N. cover, intelligence
officers nominally employed by TASS or
AMTORG (the Soviet trade agency) have
the advantage of creating less suspicion in
the minds of potential targets than Soviet
diplomats would.
Soviet Scientists as Spies. All Soviet bloc
intelligence services use visiting delegations
In the U.S. as cover for intelligence officers.
Soviet bloc security personnel accompany
every delegation visiting the U.S. to prevent
defection or "unauthorized contact" with
U.S. citizens. Members of and/ delegations
also are used for "offensive" Purposes- Re-
ports the Senate Intelligence Committee:
"In one case cited In KCH3 training maintain
an intelligence officer spatted a possible re-
croft while serving as interpreter for a
Soviet scientist visiting the laboratory of a
private U.S. company. The KGB account
states that the scientist was aware of his in-
terpreter's intelligence function and actively
assisted him in that role."'"
Effective U.S. counterintelligence is thus
extremely difficult, because every national
from the Soviet bloc in the U.S. for what-
ever apparent reason, as well as the thou-
sands of bloc visitors to the U.S.. must be
considered a potential agent. A cursory ex-
Por an excellent overview of Soviet disinforma-
tion techniques. see Richard H. Shulta and Roy
Godson, Desitiformairia Active Measures in Soviet
Strategy (Washington. D.C.: Pergamon-Brawel.
1984.
z*Antady Sherchento. Breaking with Moscow
(New York,: Alfred A. Knout Ma). p.257.
"Bee "Expulsions of Soviet Officials. 1986." For-
eign Affairs Note, United States Department of
State (Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing
Office, January 101171. pp. 4-IL
"1988 Senate Select Committee Revort, op. eft,
pp. 26-37.
H 3659
aminatlon of the numbers involved (see Ap-
pendix), as well as the range of possible in-
telligence activities. from traditional scien-
tific, military, political, and economic to dis-
information and "active measures," make
the job seem nearly impossible.
NON-SOVIET nirruicriscis SERVICES HOSTI1Z
TO THE U.S.
While the Soviet and Eastern bloc services
represent by far the most serious intelli-
gence threat to the U.S., the activities of
other hostile services in the US. cannot be
ignored. Two threats are of primary impor-
tance: the intelligence activities of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China (PRC) and the espi-
onage efforts of other hostile countries, in-
cluding non-Warsaw Pact Communist states
and states supporting terrorism.
Countering PRC espionage in the U.S. is
difficult. The reasons: 1) food relations and
expanding economic and military coopera-
tion between the U.S. and PRC have made
Washington reluctant to raise sensitive In-
telligence issues; 2) the US. seems to know
very little about FRC intelligence, not even,
It. appears, how many intelligence services
Beijing maintains; and Si the huge PRC
presence in the U.S. give PRC personnel ex-
cellent opportunities for espionage.
Chinese Espionage. Explains an FBI offi-
cial: "The PRC is working on the 50 year
plan." Meardng: The Chinese have built
their espionage apparatus in the U.S.
slowly. This apparatus focuses, according to
the Senate report, "prirnarily,on [obtaining]
advanced technology not approved for re-
lease so as to further PRC military and eco-
nomic modernization in the 1990's and
beyond." Though the PRC does not engage
in the systematic subversion and disinfor-
mation characteristic of the Soviets, contin-
ues the report, ". . . the PRC intelligence
threat continues to be significant . . . and
justifies alerting American citizens to the
current risks,""
Within the context of the valuable U.S.-
FEC . strategic relationship, therefore,
Washington must do more to monitor and
restrict PRC espionage.
Generally, the activities of the intelli-
gence services of such nations SS Vietnam,
Libya, and Afghanistan pose only a relative-
ly small long-term threat to U.S. national
security. For one thing, their known in-
volvement with terrorism makes the U.S. es-
pecially vigilant in monitoring their activi-
ties in America. For another. North Korea,
Iran, and several other hostile countries are
not allowed to have diplomatic relations
with the U.S. In addition, they have rela-
tively few diplomats at their U.N. Missions
and in the U.N. Secretariat. And most of
these countries lack sophisticated foreign
Intelligence services and do not conduct
large-scale traditional intelligence collection
operations.
Most of these countries, moreover, spend
a large part of their Intelligence resources
simply monitoring the activities of their
U.S.-based emigres.
RECIPROCITY CONSIDERATIONS
Washington's policy toward diplomatic in-
stallations in the U.S. is based generally on
the principle of reciprocity. This means that
the U.S. will extend to the U.S.-based diplo-
mats of a particular country the same treat-
ment and conditions that apply to U.S. dip-
lomats in that country. With respect to
most countries, full reciprocity is in force.
Example: because the USSR places strin-
gent travel restrictions on American diplo-
mats in Moscow, Washington Places similar
restrictions on Soviet diplomats in the U.S.
s? !bid, p.19.
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f?Axtr! I) IC CC TAM A Et rer?rats Ter. MS e??? 411^11f1
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UI sasumeneacusgenee calm- nationals in the U.N. Secretariat. The one official: "These guys will always find a
Amendment's intent Was to =tall the espi-
onage activities of UN . employees. Primari-
ly those from the Soviet bloc.
The most important OFM anti-espionage
regulations restrict the travel of foreign dip-
lomats and nationals in the U.S. These are
now imposed, on the basis of reciprocity, on
nationals of 15 countries." The tightest
cover all Soviet nationals in the U.S., with
the strange exception of certain trade offi-
cials. Restricted Soviets who now want to
travel beyond a 25-mile radius of their base
city must make their arrangements through
the OFM Travel Service Bureau. OFM re-
serves the right to deny travel permission
and insists that travel requests be filed 48
hours in advance, to permit checking with
the FBI on the backgrounds of those wish-
ing to travel. Since the Soviets "close" parts
of the USSR to Americans, the US. recipro-
cally "closes" certain American cities and
areas to Soviet travel.
Violating the Roth/Hyde Law. There are,
however, serious inconsistencies in the ap-
plication of these restrictions. These incon-
sistencies are particularly significant since
the State Department has acknowledged
publicly that most Soviet bloc intelligence
services use their travel privileges for intelli-
gence activities. In violation of the Roth/
Hyde Amendment, for example, Soviet U.N.
employees travel to "closed areas" in the
U.S. As for Moscow's Soviet bloc allies, the
US. regulations are less restrictive and co-
herent than those imposed on the Soviets.
Though all Polish, Balgarian, Czech, and
East German personnel in the U.S. (except
certain commercial and trade officials) must
book travel through OFM, they can travel
to "closed areas" and beyond the 25-mile
radius of their base. They can do so because
Washington insists on honoring what has
become an asymmetrical reciprocity.
What is worse, Hungarian and Romanian
officials, who cooperate extensively with
the KGB, are subject to no restrictions at
all. Although the Cubans at the U.N. are
under the 25-mile restriction, members of
their Interest Section in Washington can
travel anywhere they desire in the U.S.
These restrictions, distressingly, apply only
to travel by commercial carrier; any nation-
al of any of Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies in
New York or Washington, can get into their
cars and drive where they want?to the sub-
marine construction facility at Groton, Con-
necticut, or to the Navy base at Newport
News, Virginia, for example.
Lack of FBI Manpower. Not only does the
U.S. apply its restrictions inconsistently, but
Soviet bloc personnel probably violate the
restrictions. Even if all of the FBI's 9,220
agents were detailed to counterintelligence,
the Bureau would still not have the man-
power to ensure that the roughly 110,000
nationals of communist countries in the
U.S. at any given time do not violate the re-
strictions." This is despite completion of
the FBI's five-year agent expansion pro-
gram and increased training and expertise
In counterintelligence techniques. Even with
a one to one ratio, tight surveillance would
be impossible; a single FBI agent cannot
keep tabs on a potential spy.
Though they now have some means of
monitoring hostile intelligence officers.
some counterintelligence officials still are
skeptical of the efficacy of travel restric-
tions in curtailing espionage, particularly in
light of their inconsistent application. Says
Willies, the generally sound Polley of reel-
proety is flawed. Pita, It Is not feasible to
compare the privileges and immunities
granted American diplomats In Soviet bloc
countries, especially the USSR, with those
granted bloc personnel in the U.S. America
Is an open society committed to freedom of
Information and movement. The Soviet bloc
snakes good use of freedom of information
and movement. The Soviet bloc makes good
use of the inherent nature of U.S. society,
by collecting huge amounts of information
from "open" sources "and by playing on in-
stinctive U.S. resistance to the imposition of
restrictions on free movement. In the
USSR. by contrast, even if there were no re-
strictions on the movement of US. person-
nel, all such movement would be known i and
reported to the Kremlin, due to the con-
stant surveillance and harassment that all
foreigners suffer there. The situation, in
short, is inherently unequal and asymmetri-
cal.
Flawed Reciprocity. The second major
flaw in the policy of reciprocity is that U.N.
Headquarters is in New York City; there is
no equivalent facility anywhere in the
Soviet bloc. This gives the Soviets the abili-
ty to place some 450 "diplomats" in the U.S.
who otherwise would not be there. US. in-
telligence enjoys no reciprocal opportunity.
In fact, while there are major U.N. offices in
Rome, Vienna, Geneva, Nairobi. Paris, and
other large cities, there are none in any
Soviet bloc nation.
A case can be made that reciprocity helps
to ensure acceptable status and working
conditions for US. diplomats in the Soviet
bloc countries and also offers the U.S. intel-
ligence collection opportunities abroad. But
concerns for US. diplomats overseas must
not deter 'Washington from imposing and
Implementing whatever restrictions on
Soviet bloc personnel are necessary to deter
espionage in the US. This is especially nec-
essary in light of the tremendous damage
done to US. national security by U.S.-based
Soviet spies, and in light of the inherently
unreciprocal situation as it affects intelli-
gence collection opportunities.
U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
PROGRAMS
The Congress in 1982 established the
Office of Foreign Missions within the State
Department. This was one of the most im-
portant recent US. anti-espionage initia-
tives. The OFM has statutory authority to
"assist agencies of Federal. State. and mu-
nicipal government with regard to ascertain-
ing and according benefits, privileges, and
Immunities to which a foreign mission may
be entitled."" By placing UN. Missions
under OFM authority, Congress and the
Reagan Administration openly admitted the
problems caused by U.N.-based espionage.
In 1985, the Roth/Hyde Amendment to
the Foreign Missions Act expanded OFM's
authority by making all restrictions that
apply to diplomatic missions of' particular
countries applicable also to that country's
Intelligence professionals and scholars estimate
that between 70 and 00 percent of all information
gathered by the Soviet intelligence services in the
U.S. comes from open, public som-ces. See, for ex-
ample. "Remarks by William Webster before the
Standing Committee on Law and National Security
of the ABA.- Federation Bureau of Investigation,
Washington. D.C.. December 1.1985. p.7.
Section 203(c). (I). Title Ti of the State Depart-
ment Basic Authorities Act (As Added by the For-
eign Missions Act), as cited in Compilation of Intel
ligence Laws and Related Las-s and Executive
Orders of Interest to the National Intelligence
Community," Permanent Select Committee on In-
telligence of the House of Representatives (0-45-
8820), U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-
ton. D.C., 1985.
"Afghanistan, Byelorussia. Bulgaria, Cambodia,
Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Repub-
lic, Iran, Libya. Mongolia, North Korea, Poland,
USSR, Ukraine, Vietnam.
"Figure cited in Remarks by William H. Web-
ster, footnote 9, above.
way to go about their business despite these
Inconveniences." Yet., combining tighter
travel retrictlons with strict limits on the
numbers of potential hostile agents may
deter Soviet bloc espionage more effectively.
No actions have done as much to wound the
Soviet intelligence apparatus in the US. as
Ronald Reagan's expulsion last September
of 25 Soviets from the Soviet U.N. Mission
and October's expulsion of 60 Soviets from
their Washington Embassy and San Fran-
cisco consulate.
In the U.N. expulsion, the entire KGB
and GRIT leadership was sent back to
Russia, along with the ablest professional
Intelligence officers. In the Washington
case, the Soviet technicians manning their
technical collection apparatus were expelled
along with the leadership cadre. Moscow's
office in New York City and Washington,
moreover, now will be subject to mandatory
ceilings on the number of Soviets allowed at
them-170 in New York (down from 275)
and 251 in Washington and San Francisco
(down from roughly 320).
Paying a Heavy Price for the U.N. No such
actions can be taken with respect to the
U.N. Secretariat, where 265 Soviets current-
ly are employed. Although the U.S. does
deny visas to known intelligence officers
from time to time, the Soviets are entitled
to send their citizens to serve at the Secre-
tariat. This is one of the heavy prices that
the U.S. pays for hosting the U.N. Moscow,
however, is not entitled to use these individ-
uals to control entire components of the
U.N,, nor does Moscow have any right to
house its international civil servants in a
compound protected by diplomatic immuni-
ty?as it currently does.
The US. can and should take steps to
eliminate the manifold Soviet abuses of the
U.N. The US. also can take measures better
to protect its own secrets, to ensure that in-
dividuals with access to classified informa-
tion are not security risks, and to alert all
such individuals to the dangers of espio-
nage. The most serious damage to U.S. na-
tional security has been from those already
willingly working with hostile services. At
last there are signs that Washington is
taking more seriously the existing compo-
nents of a "good defense." An encouraging
example of this Is the FBI's Development of
Defense Counterintelligence Awareness pro-
gram, or DECA, which alerts employees of
U.S. defense contractors to the dangers of
espionage.
Perhaps most important, Washington can
try' to turn the large hostile presence in the
to American advantage by operations
to penetrate the hostile services and known
arenas of Soviet activity. The secret defec-
tion "in-place" of Arkady Shevchenko three
years before it was made public, allowed
him to keep his top U.N. job for that period.
In that time, the U.S. learned much about
Moscow's systematic use of the U.N. as
cover for espionage. There is reason to be-
lieve that the U.S. has had similar success
with other Soviet bloc intelligence officers,
particularly during the early 1960s, when
there was widespread disaffection in parts
of Eastern Europe.
RECOMMENDATI ON S
The U.S. probably will never be able to
protect itself completely from hostile intelli-
gence services. Washington, however, can
take steps to reduce the dangers from U.N.-
based espionage and other activities of hos-
tile intelligence services. These steps in-
clude:
Increased funding for FBI manpower,
training, and technical support. FBI agents
In the New York Field Office should receive
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? May 26, 1988 CdNRESi&4A1 REC?D ? HOUSE
"hardship post" adjustments, particularly
housing allowances to offset New York
City's towering rents.
Authority for the FBI and other intelli-
gence agencies to pursue offensive counter-
intelligence opportunities within the con-
straints of U.S. foreign policy concerns. The
huge foreign presence in the U.S. presents
obvious opportunities for penetrating hos-
tile services. So do the headquarters in the
U.S. of international organizations.
Placing all Warsaw Pact and Cuban diplo-
mats in the U.S. or at the U.N. under the
tight restrictions now applied to Soviet dip-
lomats and officials. This could trigger re-
ciprocal restrictions on U.S. diplomats in
Soviet bloc countries. Nonetheless, the
burden of proof must be on those officials
who would justify the absence of meaning-
ful restrictions by citing the value of intelli-
gence collected in those countries_ Given
the huge amounts of intelligence collected
by bloc spies in the U.S.. this Is a heavy
burden.
Limiting the number of hostile country
nationals allowed in the U.S., and requiring
the Office of Foreign Miasicms to report to
Congress every six months on the numbers
of those officials.
Granting the OFM primary responsibility
for enforcing all travel restrictions applied
to foreign nationals. Currently, the State
Department's Bureau of European and Ca-
nadian Affairs shares with OFM responsibil-
ity for the travel of Soviets.
Requiring U.S.-based officials of mainland
China to use the OFM Travel Service
Bureau to book all travel in the U.S. This
would allow the FIR to track their move-
ment.
Coordinating more closely the work of the
numerous federal agencies involved in issu-
ing entry vises for the U.S. Often, the FBI
is advised that visiting delegations from
Soviet bloc and other hostile nations are
coming to the U.S. only days before the
visit. This makes monitoring nearly impossi-
ble.
Insisting that the U.N. end its abuse of
"secondment," whereby the Soviets have
gained control of key units of the U.N. Se-
cretriat. The U.N. should adopt a rule limit-
ing to 50 percent the number of nationals at
the U.N. which a country can have "second-
ed," with a waiver for small states who use
"secondment" legitimately. This would crip-
ple Moscow's ability to rotate inelligence of-
ficers In and out of the U.N. Secretariat.
Requiring that the top 3.000 professionals
Posts at the U.N. Secretariat be subject to
five-year rotation. This would prevent na-
tionals of the same country or groups of
countries as the current occupant of a given
post from replacing the incumbent in that
job. This would loosen the Soviets' hold on
key positions in the Secretariat. If the U.N.
fails to adapt these meas-..res, the U.S.
should consider denying entry visas to "re-
placement" nationals of countries with
more than 50 percent of their U.N. person-
nel on secondment.
Prohibiting be law the housing of foreign
nationals lacking full diplomatic privileges
and immunities in compounds protected by
such immunity Most Soviet bloc countries
and China house their nationals from the
U.N. Secretariat in their diplomatic com-
pounds. Though this actually makes surveil-
lance of them a bit easier, it makes a mock-
ery of the separation of diplomats and
'International civil servants."
In light of recent, repeated breaches of
U.S. security, the Reagan Administration
and Congress must cooperate to crack down
on U.S.-based hostile intelligence activities.
For too long, the Soviet and other hostile
intelligence services have been allowed to
use the facilities of the U.N. in New York
and other diplomatic and commercial instal-
lations in the US. as cover for large-scale
espionage activities. Although the U.S. has
at long last recognized the scope of the
problem, and taken some important steps to
deal with it, more needs to be done to
reduce the danger and enhance the effec-
tiveness of U.S. counterintelligence.
Taomes E.L. DEWEY,
Policy Analyst
CHARLES M. laceari
Senior Fellow.
APPENDIX
Coautnes
Permanent
official Visitors s
presence
USSR 5,000
Bulgaria 1.000
N/A
Ent Germany._?___-__.... 90 851
Hungary 110 6,000
Kand 300 N/A
Rumania 72 N/A
lanistan_____-..-- 11 N/A
127 N/A
Iran 16 N/A
lira 9 N/A
Nicaragua 48 N/A
Nofth laea 16 N/A
P.O Reputit of Ors_...______ ...... ....... 1,500 25.000
Wenn 29 N/A
1,344
84
144
-Permanent- Oriel pr.serce releactS the total =bet of offs:ins?
diplomats, OXISUI31 Awn, oxnrnerceal aril press personnel of a given country
in the U.S. as of Camber 1986. Ni 561re azen,, Cuba, fee example, the
=ter also incluies morning wines Ni the case of USSR, the minter may
also reflect drical personnel art senora, who hay bum roR1 lor esliamee
tasks.
s "%Isaias' includes full this sluderts, East-Wmt.Exchange Participants and
twists, a wee as members al official visiting &ergotism
Source& Deparbirirt at State, Proem& Diplomatic and Consular Lists, 1907.
use at Employees of Diplomatic Missions. Senate Retort -A Renew of Unded
States Counter.InteEgence and Security Proven" 1986. Ihrlassified Regret
Foreign Espionage a the USA.
Prepared by Lee Avrashov.
Excerpts from October 1986 Senate Intelli-
gence Report, "Meeting the Espionage Chal-
lenge":
The hostile intelligence threat to the
United States is severe, and it confronts the
government and the American people with
increasingly serious challenges. The threat
spans all types of intelligence operations
from traditional human espionage to the
most sophisticated electronic devices. Every
kind of sensitive information is vulnerable,
Including Oa-seined government informa-
tion, emerging technological breakthroughs,
and private financial transactions. Foreign
intelligence services also sometimes target
the political process, seeking both informa-
tion and influence.
The research and development cost sav-
ings to the Soviet Union from illegal west-
ern technology acquisition are believed to
be enormous. Taken together, the damage
to national security from espionage, tech-
nology theft and electronic surveillance
amounts to a staggering loss of sensitive in-
formation to the hostile intelligence serv-
ices. As an open society, the United States
already allows its adversaries unfettered
access to vast amounts of information that
must be shared widely so that our political
system can function democratically and the
process of free scientific inquiry can be most
productive. Our openness gives hostile intel-
ligence services the ability to focus their ef-
forts on those few areas of our government
and society where confidentiality is re-
quired.
Excerpt from 1987 unclassified State De-
partment document
The primary Soviet intelligence goal
worldwide continues to be the recruitment
of agents targeted against Americans, par-
ticularly those with access to classified and
sensitive national security information. One
of the gravest threats to U.S. national secu-
II 3661
rity is the KGB's efforts to recruit Ameri-
can citizens holding sensitive positions in
government, the military, and the U.S. intel-
ligence community. Soviet intelligence ex-
pends considerable manpower, time and re-
sourm to spot, cultivate, and recruit Ameri-
cans with access to classified sensitive infor-
mation.
Mr. Chairman, I insert a copy of my amend-
ment
AMENDII.ENT TO H.R. 4387 Orraiten BY MR.
SvvurnaLt.
At the end of the bill, add the following
new title:
TITLE vm?ANTIESP/ONAGE ACI' OF
1988
SHORT =Li
Sec. BM. This title may be cited as the
"Anti-Espionage Act of 1988r.
AUTHORITY OVER INDIVIDUAL TRAVEL REQUESTS
OF PERSONNEL Or CERTAIN COUNTRIES AND
ENTITIES
Sm. 802. (a) SECRETARY or DEFENSE.?
Travel in the United States by the person-
nel of a foreign mission of a foreign country
or foreign entity described in subsection
(c)(1) shall not be permitted if, in the judg-
ment of the Secretary of Defense (after con-
sultation with the Secretary of State and
the Director of Central Intelligence), such
travel might contribute to the capability of
that country or entity to intercept commu-
nications involving United States Govern-
ment diplomatic, military, or intelligence
matters unless the Secretary of Defense de-
termines that national security Interests of
the United States require such traveL
(b) laTELWTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU Or
lervesrmartow.?Travel in the United States
by the personnel of a foreign miesion of a
foreign country or foreign entity described
In subsection (c)(1) shall not be permitted if,
in the judgment of the Director of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (after consulta-
tion with the Secretary of State and the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence), such travel
might contribute to the capability of that
country or entity to engage in intelligence
activities directed against the United States
Government, other than the intelligence ac-
tivities described in subsection (a) unless the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion determines that national security inter-
ests of the United States require such
travel.
(c) DETERTITONS.?For the purpose of this
section?
(1) the term "foreign country or foreign
entity" means?
(A) any country listed as a Communist
country in section 620(f) of the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961:
(B) any country determined by the Secre-
tary of State, for purposes of section 6(j) of
the Export Administration Act of 1979, to
be a country which has repeatedly provided
support for acts of International terrorism:
(C) any other country or entity which en-
gages in intelligence activites in the United
States which are adverse to the national se-
curity interests of the United States and
(D) any country or entity with respect to
which the United States withholds funds
from the United Nations for International
Organieations, Conferences, or Programa
under section 114 of the Department of
State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984
and 1985 (22 U.S.C. 287e, note) or section
527 of the Foreign Operations, Export Fi-
nancing, and Related Programs Appropria-
tions Art, 1988 (Public Law 11)0-202): and
(2) the term "personnel of a foreign mis-
sion of a foreign country or foreign entity"
includes the faintly members and depend-
ents of such personnel, but such 'cm does
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not include persons who are nationals or
permanent resident aliens of the United
? States.
(d) REroirrs.?The Secretary of Defense
and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall transraft to the Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. and
to the Permanent Select Committee on In-
telligence and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives, not
'later than 6 months after the date of enact-
ment of this section, and not later than 6
months thereafter, a report on the actions
taken by the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion in carrying out this section within the
Previous 6 months.
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I have
no further requests for time and I
yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has ex-
pired.
Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall
be considered for amendment under
the 5-minute rule by titles instead of
by sections, and each title shall be con-
sidered as having been read.
The Clerk will designate title I.
The text of title I is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States .of
America in Congress assembled, That this
Act may be cited as the "Intelligence Au-
thorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989".
TITLE I?INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
SEC. 101. (a) Funds are hereby authorized
to be appropriated for fiscal year 1989 for
the conduct of the intelligence and intelli-
gence-related activities of the following ele-
ments of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the De-
partment of the Navy, and the Department
of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion.
(b) None of the funds authorized to be ap-
propriated by this Act may be used to pro-
cure more than three Guardrail RC-12K
aircraft and sensor suites until the Depart-
ment of the Army has submitted to the Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Committee on Armed Services of
the House of Representatives and to the
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate
a report detailing the long-range plans and
budgetary commitments to meet the future
requirements for tactical airborne recon-
naissance in support of the United States
Army. The report should include, but not be
limited to, the contribution of remotely pi-
loted vehicles and other reconnaissance
assets.
(e)(1) None of the funds authorized to be
appropriated by this Act for the foreign
counterintelligence activities for the Feder-
al Bureau of Investigation may be used for
any other purpose.
(2) Of the funds described in paragraph
(1) not less than the amount listed for the
"FBI Dedicated Technical Program" in the
Schedule of Authorization described in sec-
tion 102(a) shall be obligated for the devel-
opment and procurement of counterintelli-
gence technical equipment.
(1) 014e funds authorized to be appro-
priated in this Act for the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, the Secretary of De-lenge
shall tranfer not to exceed S15,100.000 to
_appropriations for the foreign counterintel-
ligence activities of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
(d) The expiration date provided for in
secUon 803(b) of the Intelligence Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 1986 (Public Law
99-169) shall be extended until one year
after the submission of the report required
by section 803(a) of such Act.
CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE or AUTHORIZATIONS
Sec. 102. (a) The amounts authorized to
he appropriated under section 101, and the
authorized personnel ceilings as of Septem-
ber 30, 1989, for the conduct of the intelli-
gence and intelligence-related activities of
the elements listed in such section. are
those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared by the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence to accom-
pany H.R. 4387 of the One Hundredth Con-
gress.
(b) The Schedule of Authorizations de-
scribed in subsection (a) shall be made avail-
able to the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate and House of Representatives
and to the President. The President shall
Provide for suitable distribution of the
schedule, or of appropriate portions of the
schedule, within the executive branch.
(c)(1) In computing the number of non-
headquarters personnel required to be re-
duced under subsection (b)(2)(A) of section
602 of Public Law 99-433 (100 Stat. 1065),
the Secretary of Defense shall exclude per-
sonnel of the Defense Intelligence Agency
and the Defense Mapping Agency, and in
carrying out that reduction, the Secretary
shall allocate such reduction (under the au-
thority of the Secretary under subsection
(d) of that section) so that none of such re-
duction is applied to personnel of the De-
fense Intelligence Agency or the Defense
Mapping Agency.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1). the
term "nonheadquarters personnel" means
members of the Armed Forces and civilian
employees assigned or detailed to perma-
nent duty in the Defense Agencies and De-
partment of Defense Field Activities, other
than members and employees assigned or
detailed to duty in management headquar-
ters activities or management headquarters
support activities.
PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS
SEC. 103. The Director of Central Intelli-
gence may authorize employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the numbers author-
ized for fiscal year 1989 under sections 102
and 202 of this Act when he determines that
such action is necessary to the performance
of important intelligence functions, except
that such number may not, for any element
of the Intelligence Community, exceed 2 per
centum of the number of civilian personnel
authorized under such sections for such ele-
ment. The Director of Central Intelligence
shall promptly notify the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he
exercises the authority granted by this sec-
tion.
RESTRICTION ON SUPPORT FOR MILITARY OR
PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS IN NICARAGUA
SEC. 104. Funds available to the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Department of De-
fense, or any other agency or entity of the
United States may be obligated and expend-
ed during fiscal year 1989 to provide funds,
materiel, or other assistance to the Nicara-
guan democratic resistance to support mili-
tary or paramilitary operations in Nicara-
gua only as authorized in section 101 and as
specified in the classified Schedule of Au-
thorizations referred to in section 102. or
pursuant to section 502 of the National Se-
curity Act of 1947, or pursuant to any provi-
sion of law specifically providing such
funds, materiel, or assistance.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any
amendments to title I?
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I ask
unanimous consent that the remain-
der of the bill be printed in the
REcORD and open to amendment at
any point.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
Ohio?
There was no objection.
The text of the remainder of H.R.
4387 is as follows:
TITLE II?INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
STAFF'
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
Sm. 201.-There is authorized to be appro-
priated for the Intelligence Community
Staff for fiscal year 1989 the sum of
$23,745,000.
AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL END STRENGTH
Sec. 202. (a) The Intelligence Community
Staff is authorized 244 full-time personnel
as of September 30, 1989. Such personnel of
the Intelligence Community Staff may be
permanent. employees of the Intelligence
Community Staff or personnel detailed
from other elements of the United States
Government.
(b) During fiscal year 1989, personnel of
the Intelligence Community Staff shall be
selected so as to provide appropriate repre-
sentation from elements of the United
States Government engaged in intelligence
and intelligence-related activities.
(c) During fiscal year 1989, any officer or
employee of the United States or a member
of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the
Intelligence Community Staff from another
element of the United States Government
shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis,
except that any such officer, employee or
member may be detailed on a nonreimbursa-
ble basis for a period of less than one year
for the performance of temporary functions
as required by the Director of Central Intel-
ligence.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF ADMINIS-
TERED IN SAME MANNER AS CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCY
SEC. 203. During fiscal year 1989, activities
and personnel of the Intelligence Communi-
ty Staff shall be subject to the provisions of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401 et seq.) and the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403E et seq.)
in the same manner as activities and person-
nel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
TITLE III?CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABIL-
ITY SYSTEM
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
Sm. 301. There is authorized to be appro-
priated for the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 1989 the sum of $144.500,000.
TITLE IV?GENERAL PROVISIONS
RESTRICTION OF CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES
SEC. 4.01. The authorization of appropria-
tions by this Act shall not be deemed to con-
stitute authority for the conduct of any in-
telligence activity which is not otherwise au-
thorized by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
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May 26, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 113663
INCREASES IN EMPLOYEE SENEFITS AUTHORIZED
BY LAW
SEC. 402. Appropriations authorized by
this Act for salarY. pay, retirement, and
other benefits for Federal employees may
be increased by such additional or supple-
mental amounts as may be necessary for in-
creases in such benefits authorized by law.
TITLE V?CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY ADMINISTRATIVE PROW-
SIONS ?
ONE-Tna PERSONNEL AUTHORITY
SEC. 501. (a) Whenever the Director of
Central Intelligence finds during fiscal year
1989 that a former employee of the Central
Intelligence Agency has unfairly had his
career with the Agency adversely affected
as a result of allegations concerning the loy-
alty to the United States of such former em-
ployee, the Director may grant such former
employee such monetary or other relief (in-
cluding reinstatement and promotion) as
the Director considers appropriate in the in-
terest of fairness.
(b) Any action of the Director under this
section is not reviewable in any other forum
or in any court.
(c) The authority of the Director to make
payments under subsection (a) is effective
only to the extent that appropriated funds
are available for that purpose.
(d) The Director shall report to the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
and the Permanent Select Committee on In-
telligence of the House of Representatives
any use of the authority granted by this sec-
tion in advance of such use.
TITLE VI?FBI ENHANCED COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES
DEMONSTRATION PROJECT ON MOBILITY AND
RETENTION FOR THE NEW YORE YIELD DIVISION
Sze. 601. (a) Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Director of
the Office of Personnel Management shall
conduct a demonstration project to ascer-
tain the effects on the recruitment and re-
tention of personnel, and on field operations
In the New York Field Division of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation of providing?
(1) lump-sum payments to personnel upon
directed assignment to the New York Field
Division from another geographical loca-
tion, and who enter into an agreement to
complete a specified minimum period of
service, not to exceed three years, in the
New York Field Division; and
(2) periodic payments to New York Field
Division employees who are subject by
policy and practice to directed geographical
transfer or reassigrunent.
(b) Such demonstration project shall com-
merce not later than ninety days after the
date of enactment of this Act and shall ter-
minate five years after such date, unless ex-
tended by law.
(c) The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Director of the Office
of Personnel Management shall jointly pro-
vide to the President and the Congress
annual interim reports and, at the conclu-
sion of the 5 year period, a final evaluation
concerning the results of the demonstration
project.
TITLE WI?DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE PROVISIONS
Sze. 701. (a) Section 421 of title 10, United
States Code, is amended to read as follows:
'1421. Funds for foreign cryptologic support
"(a) The Secretary of Defense may use ap-
propriated funds available to the Depart-
ment of Defense for intelligence and com-
munications purposes to pay for the ex-
penses of arrangements with foreign coun-
tries for cryptologic support.
"(b) The Secretary of Defense may use
funds other than appropriated funds to pay
for the expenses of arrangements with for-
eign countries for cryptologic support with-
out regard for the provisions of law relating
to the expenditure of United States Govern-
ment funds, except that?
"(1) no such funds may be expended, in
whole or in part, by or for the benefit of the
Department of the Defense for a purpose
for which Congress had previously denied
funds, and
"(2) the authority provided by this subsec-
tion may not be used to acquire items or
services of value for the United States that
Could otherwise be obtained by the use of
appropriated funds.
"(c) Any funds expended under the au-
thority of this section shall be reported to
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and the Permanent Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence of the House pursuant to
the provisions of title V of the National Se-
curity Act of 1847, as amended.".
(b) The reference to section 421 in the sec-
tions at the beginning of chapter 21 of such
title is amended to read "Funds for Foreign
Cryptologic Support".
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTELLIGENCE
Sac. 702. (a) Paragraph (3) of section
136(b) of title 10, United States Code, is
amended to read as follows:
"(3) One of the Assistant Secretaries shall
be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence. He shall have as his principal
responsibility the overall supervision of in-
telligence and intelligence-related activities
(including intelligence oversight, counterin-
telligence, covert action, preparation of
threat assessments, and intelligence support
for net assessments) of the Department of
Defense. Such responsibility includes au-
thority for coordination of all policy, plan-
ning, budgetary, and management matters
within the Department respecting such ac-
tivities. The Assistant Secretary shall report
directly, without intervening review or ap-
proval, to the Secretary and Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense.".
(bX1) Section 136(a) of title 10, United
States Code, is amended by striking out
"eleven" and inserting in lieu thereof
"twelve".
(2) Section 5315 of title 5, United States
Code, is amended by striking out "(11)"
after "Assistant Secretaries of Defense" and
Inserting in lieu thereof "(12)".
REQUIREMENTS To DISCLOSE DEFENSE INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCY ORGANIZATIONAL AND PERSON-
NEL INFORMATION
SEC. 703. (a) Section 1607 of title 10,
United States Code (as added by section 603
of Public Law 100-178), is transferred to the
end of chapter 21, redesignated as section
424, and amended to read as follows:
'1424. Disclosure of organizational and person-
nel information: exemption for Defense Intelli-
gence Agency
"(a) Except as required by the President
or as provided in subsection (b). the Secre-
tary of Defense may not be required to dis-
close information with respect to?
"(1) the organization or any function of
the Defense Intelligence Agency ; or
"(2) the number of persons employed by
or assigned or detailed to such Agency or
the name, official title, occupational series,
grade, or salary of any such person.
"(b) This section does not apply?
"(1) with respect to the provision Of infor-
mation to Congress; or
"(2) with respect to information required
to be disclosed by section 552 or 652a of title
5.".
(b) The table of sections at the beginning
of chapter 21 of such title is amended by
adding at the end the following new item:
"424. Disclosure of organizational and per-
sonnel information: exemption
for Defense Intelligence
Agency.".
COMMITTEE AMENDMENT
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will
report the committee amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Committee amendment: On page 8, after
line 18, insert the following:
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY PLAN
Sec. 403. Ninety days after enactment of
this Act, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence and the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representa-
tives and the Select Committee on Intelli-
gence of the Senate a report setting forth
an analysis of each equal employment op-
portunity group's representation in the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and the National
Security Agency respectively and proposing
a plan for rectifying any underrepresenta-
tion of any such equal employment opportu-
nity group by September 30. 1991.
(b) The Director of Central Intelligence
and the Secretary of Defense shall each
submit interim reports on February 1 of
1989, 1990, and 1991 concerning the Central
Intelligence Agency and the National Secu-
rity Agency respectively detailing the ef-
forts made, and the progress realized, by
such agency in achieving the objectives of
each such plan. including, but not limited
to, the number of applications from, and
the hiring, promotion, and training of,
members of equal employment opportunity
group."
(c) For purposes of this section, the term
"equal employment opportunity group"
means?
(A) white women,
(B) black men,
(C) black women,
(D) Hispanic men,
(E) Hispanic women,
(F) Asian American and Pacific Islander
men.
(G) Asian American and Pacific Islander
women.
(H) Native American and Alaskan Native
men, or
(I) Native American and Alaskan Native
women.
Mr. STOKES (during the reading).
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the committee amendment
be considered as read and printed in
the RECORD.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
Ohio?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there any
debate on the committee amendment?
If not, the question is on the com-
mittee amendment.
The committee amendment was
agreed to.
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. MC HUGH
Mr. McHLIGH. Mr. Chairman. I
offer an amendment. ?
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Mcliftroin
On page 8, after line 6, add the following
new section:
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former spouses, usually older women
without a job and without social secu-
rity benefits.
The technical amendments have
been cleared with the Post Office and
Civil Service Committee and with the
distinguished ranking Republican
member of the Intelligence Commit-
tee.
The amendments makes changes in
the following five areas:
I. MARRIAGE DURATION REQUIRESIENT FOR
SPOUSZS ACQUIRED ATTER RETIREMTN7
There is presently a 1-year marriage
duration requirement before a CIA
Retirement Act (CIARDS) participant
may provide a survivor annuity to a
spouse married after the participant
has retired. Consistent with the recent
Civil Service Retirement Act ICSRM
and Foreign Service Act [FSA] amend-
ments, this requirement is shortened
to 9 months. In addition, if a couple
has been married and then divorced,
and the couple remarries after retire-
ment, the marriage must endure at
arms virtu crvn. wines BEITRINENT AND 1113.C. 403 110iBI';;;IITIV3 LAI -41Unalla
"one years and inserting In lieu thereof
"nine months after the date of remarriage".
(2) Section 221 of title II of such Act is
amended by adding at the end thereof the
following new subsection:
"(p) The election of a survivor annuity
and the reduction of an annuity under sub-
section (1k2) or (n) of this section shall take
effect on the first day of the first month be-
ginning 9 months after the date of mar-
riage. For the purposes of this subsection,
the 9-month period shall be deemed to be
satisfied in any case in which?
"(1) the annuitant dies within such period;
"(2) the surviving spouse of the suanuitant
had been previously married to the annui-
tant and subsequently divorced; and
"(3) the aggregate time married is at least
9 months.".
(3) The amendments made -by this subsec-
tion shall apply to marriages which occur
on or after May 7, 1985.
(e) Any new spending authority (within
the meaning of section 401(c) of the Con-
gressional Budget Act of 1974) provided pur-
suant to the amendments made by this sec-
tion shall be effective for any fiscal year
only to such extent or in such amounts as
are provided in appropriations Acts.
DISABIL/TT SYSTEM
Bac. $02. Is) Part, C of title II of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of
1964 for Certain Employees (60 U.S.C. 403
note) is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following new section:
"SURVIVOR ANNUITIES FOR 'PREVIOUS SPOUSES
AND SECOND CHANCE TO ELECT SURVIVOR AN-
worry TOR CERTAITI SPOUSES
"Sm. 226. (a) The Director shall prescribe
regulations under which any previous
spouse (including former spouses who are
also previous spouses), divorced after the ef-
fective date of this section from a partici-
pant, former participant, or annuitant
whose retirement or disability or FECA
(chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code
annuity commences after the effective date
of this section, shall be eligible for a survi-
vor annuity to the same extent, and, to the
greatest extent practicable, under the game
conditions (including reductions to be made
in the annuity of the participant) applicable
to spouses of participants in the Civil Serv-
ice Retirement and Disability System
(CSRS) married for at least 9 months with
service creditable under section 8332 of title
5, United States Code.
'(b) The Director shall prescribe regula-
tions under which participants, retired par-
ticipants, and former participants who have
separated from service with a deferred an-
nuity may make an election within two
years after the effective date of this section
(or, if later, at the time of retirement) to re-
ceive a reduced annuity, pay a deposit. and
Provide a survivor annuity for any spouse
for whom survivor benefits were not elected
at the time of retirement, or Of the mar-
riage occurred after retirement) were not
elected in a timely manner, and for any pre-
vious spouse (including former spouses who
are also previous spouses) who is not eligible
for a survivor annuity under subsection (a)
of this section, under, to the greatest extent
practicable, the same terms and conditions
as those prescribed for participants in the
Civil Service Retirement and Disability
System (CSRS) by the Civil Service Retire-
ment Spouse Equity Act of 1984.
"(c) As used in this section. the term 'pre-
vious spouse' means a former wife and hus-
band who was married for at least nine
months to a participant or former partici-
pant who had at least 18 months of service
which are creditable under section 251. 252,
and 253 of this Act.
"(d) This section shall take effect on the
date of enactment of the Intelligence Au-
thorization Act Fiscal Year 1989.".
(b)(1) Section 224 of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for
Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is
amended?
(A) in subsection (a)(2), by inserting "an
amount equal to any survivor annuity pay-
ments made to the former spouse under sec-
tion 223 and also by" after "shall be reduced
by"; and
(B) in subsection (b), by striking out para-
graph (1) and redesignating paragraphs (2)
and (3) as paragraphs (1) and (2). respec-
tively.
(2) The amendments made by paragraph
(1) shall take effect as of October 1. 1986.
(cal) Section 225(a) of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for
Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) is
amended by inserting "and any former
spouse divorced after November 15, 1982,
from a participant or former _participant
who retired before November 15, 1982,"
after "1982.".
(2) The amendment made by paragraph
(1) shall take effect as of December 2, 1987.
(d)(1) The third sentence of section 221(n)
of the Central Intelligence Agency Retire-
Mr. McHUGH (during the reading).
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the amendment be consid-
ered as read and printed in the
RsCoRD.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
New York?
There was no objection.
(Mr. McHUGH asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Chairman, I
would first like to join my colleagues
on the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence in commending our
chairman, the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. SroKiss). As everyone knows, the
rules of the House require him to step
down as chairman at the end of this
year and he has served all of us with
great distinction. We will miss him
very much not only for his contribu-
tions substantively, but for the way in
which he has conducted the commit-
tee and made his contributions. He is
one of the real gentlemen of the
House, not only in his service on our
committee but in all of the things he
does as a Member of this body:I would
like to say that it has been a personal
pleasure for me and an example for
me to serve with him as chairman of
our committee.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment con-
sists of several technical corrections to
those provisions of the CIA Retire-
ment Act of 1964 which provide retire-
ment and survivor benefits to former
spouses. 'These provisions, first en-
acted in 1982, were expanded in 1986
and 1987. Corresponding provisions af-
fecting civil service and Foreign Serv-
ice former spouses were enacted in
1980, 1984, 1985, and 1987.
Today's technical amendment makes
changes necessary to eliminate unin-
tended inconsistencies among CIA,
civil service, and Foreign Service in
this area, and to correct previous
drafting errors which, in some cases,
least 1 year after the remarriage or
the widow or widower technically is
not eligible for a survivor annuity even
if the participant elects to provide one.
Consistent with the CSRA and FSA
amendments, the amendment provides
that all periods of marriage (whether
or not they are interrupted by divorce)
will be considered in determining
whether the 9-month marriage dura-
tion requirement has been satisfied.
2. SURVIVOR ANNDITT FOR "PREVIOUS
SPOUSES-.
Consistent with the CSRA and FSA.
the amendment changes CIARDS to
permit a survivor annuity to be provid-
ed (by election at the time of retire-
ment, by court Order, or by spousal
agreement incident to a court order of
divorce, annulment or legal separa-
tion) to former husbands and wives
who were divorced from CIARDS par-
ticipants after at least 9 months of
marriage, provided that the CIARDS
participant had at least 18 months of
creditable service. The survivor annu-
ity will be funded by a reduction in
the retirement annuity of the
CIARDS participant.
At present, there is no satisfactory
way to insure that a survivor annuity
will be available to a "previous spouse"
like this if the "previotis spouse" does
not meet the 10-year marriage dura-
tion requirement and 5-year overseas
residence requirement of section
204(b)(4) of the CIA Retirement Act
and thus Is not a "qualified former
spouse."
3. arrorr Or ISECTI(7N 223 k. iJIY r BENEFITS
AGAINST SECTION 224 ANNUITY ENTITLE-
MENTS INSTEAD OT DISQUALITICATION
Section 223 was included in the CIA
Retirement Act in 1982 to permit
CURDS participants to elect to pro-
vide a survivor annuity for former
spouses who would have been qualified
for a survivor annuity under section
222(b) except for the effective date pro-
vision, which excluded former spouses
divorced before November 15, 1982.
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May 28, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
The election results in a reduction in
the retirement annuity of the partici-
pant. Section 224 of the CIA Retire-
ment Act, added in 1987, provides a
generous survivor annuity to individ-
uals who were qualified former spouses
on November 15. 1982, but disqualifies
any former spouse who is provided a
survivor annuity (no matter how small)
under section 223. The ironic result
from these two provisions, read togeth-
er, is that if a participant cared for his
former spouse enough to take a reduc-
tion in his retirement annuity to pro-
vide a survivor annuity for her under
section 223 of the CIA Retirement Act,
then the former spouse is entirely dis-
qualified from receiving the more gen-
erous benefit which would otherwise
have been provided to her by section
224 at no cost to the retired participant.
The amendment resolves this inequi-
ty in the same manner it has been re-
solved in the FSA. Instead of being
disqualified to receive benefits under
section 224, the benefits received
under section 224 would be reduced by
the amount of the benefits received
under section 223.
4. SECOND CHANCE TO PROVIDE SURVIVOR ANNU-
ITY FOR SPOUSE DESPITE FAILURE TO MAKE A
TIMELY ELECTION AT RETIREMENT, OR TO
MAKE A TIMELY DECISION FOR A SPOUSE AC-
QUIRED AFTER RETIREMENT
The 1984 amendments to the CSRA
and last year's FSA amendments pro-
vided a second chance to provide a
spousal survivor annuity to retirees
who had elected not to produce such a
survivor annuity at the time of retire-
ment, or who had failed to make a
timely election to provide a survivor
annuity for a spouse married after re-
tirement. The amendment provides a
similar second chance to CIARDS re-
tirees.
5. EXTENSION OF FORMER SPOUSE LIFETIME
BENEFITS UNDER SECTION 225 TO QUALIFIED
FORMER SPOUSES DIVORCED AFTER NOVEMBER
15. 1582, FROM AGENCY EMPLOYEES WHO RE-
TIRED BEFORE NOVEMBER 11? 1822
The CIA Spouse Retirement Equity
Act of 1982 granted certain former
spouses of CIA employees a presump-
tive entitlement, subject to revision by
state courts in divorce proceedings or
by spousal agreement, to a pro rata
share of the employee's retirement an-
nuity. Former spouses qualified for
the presumptive entitlement were
those married to a CIA employee
during at least 10 years of the employ-
ee's credible service, at least 5 years of
which must have been spent together
overseas.
The provisions of the 1982 act were
made to operate prospectively, to
cover only those divorced and retired
after November 15, 1982. This was
done because the entitlement was
funded by a reduction in the employ-
ee's retirement annuity and it would
not have been fair to apply such a re-
duction retroactively.
In the fiscal year 1987 Intelligence
Authorization Act, some of the former
spouse benefits were extended to cover
pre-November 15, 1982, former
spouses, but the cost was borne by the
retirement fund, not the retiree.
Last year, in the fiscal year 1988 In-
telligence Authorization Act, the full
presumptive entitlement was applied
retroactively, again, with the retire-
ment fund bearing the cost. The
intent of the fiscal year 1988 provi-
sion, in the words of the House Inteli-
gence Committee's report; was to
afford retirement benefits to "former
spouses who were divorced prior to No-
vember 15, 1982, or whose spouse re-
tired from the CIA prior to November
15, 1982," that is, those not covered by
the 1982 act. However, the actual lan-
guage in last year's act covered "any
individual who was a former spouse
? ? ? on November 15, 1982." Since
"former spouse" is a defined term in
CIARDS, the language had the unin-
tended effect of excluding from cover-
age those individuals whose spouse re-
tired before November 15, 1982, but
whose divorce occurred after such
date. The amendment corrects this
error.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. McHITGH. I am happy to yield
to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. HYDE. I thank the gentleman
for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, the minority agrees
with the gentleman from New York.
This is a good amendment. We are
pleased to accept it.
Mr. McHUGH. I thank the gentle-
man for his support.
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, if the
gentleman will yield, the amendment
offered by the gentleman from New
York is indeed a technical amendment;
it is a helpful and needed change in
the generic CIA spouses law. The com-
mittee has no objection to the amend-
ment, and I urge its adoption.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentle-
man from New York [Mr. McHnou3.
The amendment was agreed to.
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. HYDE
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an
amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. HYDE Page 6,
strike out line 3 and all that follows
through the end of line 15.
(Mr. HYDE asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, on Feb-
ruary 29 of this year we cut off all
military aid to the democratic resist-
ance in Nicaragua. On March 23, a.n
agreement was signed between the
Sandino Communists and the Contras
at Sapoa and on March 30, this House
passed the House Joint Resolution 523
to send some humanitarian aid to the
Contras while the negotiations pursu-
ant to the Sapoa agreement were to be
advanced.
Now in the last 60 days what has
happened? Well, La Prensa, Nicara-
gua's opposition newspaper has been
censored, threatened, and has twice
been closed. Mobs of government-
sponsored hooligans. called Turbas Di-
vinas, have taunted, harassed. and
H 3665
beaten citizens including repeated as-
saults on the elderly and desperate
women whose sons are held captive in
Sandinista prisons. And by the way,
there are 9,000 political prisoners inac-
cessible to Amnesty International and
the Red Cross.
The Ministry of Justice has been
closed and its functions turned over to
the head of the state police; peaceful
demonstrations have been forcibly dis-
rupted by the Government; independ-
ent radio stations have been closed
down for opposition to the govern-
ment line; journalists have been
beaten and expelled; labor leaders and
leaders of the ,internal democratic op-
position have been arrested and tossed
Into jail.
So flagrant has been the so-called
democratization of the Sandino Com-
munists that on May 12 of this year 27
members of the democratic party sent
a letter to Daniel Ortega complaining
of what they were doing. This letter
says in part:
First, we are troubled by the apparent un-
willingness of your government to facilitate
delivery to the Resistance forces of food,
clothing, and medical supplies. Second. we
are deeply concerned by your reported
threats to launch a military offensive
against the Resistance if a permanent cease-
fire agreement Is not signed by May 30.
Now what the Sandinistas have done
Is set out some very inhospitable areas
and called them cease-fire zones. They
have told the Contras, "If you move in
there, you disarm, lay your arms down
and then we'll talk democracy."
Well, we have waited from thence
until now and nothing has happened.
The Soviet Union supports the San-
dinistas, nobody supports the Contras.
And the food and the bandages and
the medicine that we, in our benefi-
cence, legislated to give them, have
not been delivered. We cannot get it
Into Nicaragua because the Sandinis-
tas will not let us. It has to be flown in
and if they fly it in they will be shot
down.
Oh, some food has been delivered on
the Honduran border. So to keep from
starving, the Contras, the democratic
resistance, have to leave Nicaragua
and go into Honduras to eat and to
keep body and soul together.
Well, I suggest today we fire a shot,
a mild benign shot, but a shot none-
theless, across the bow of President
Ortega.
This amendment does the following:
Effective the 1st of October 1988?it
does not take effect now, it takes
effect when the next fiscal year
starts?it eliminates all the restrictions
In this bill on the executive branch's
ability to provide military or paramili-
tary assistance to the Nicaraguan
democratic resistance using funds
available in the CIA's reserve for con-
tingencies for fiscal 1989; not a lot of
money, I can assure you, minuscule. It
sends a clear and unmistakable signal
to the Sandinistas to negotiate serious-
ly, respect their commitments at Es-
quipulas and at Banos, institute real
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1,11. .11, WOMTAX?431kM1 Air atraaaneas KM-PLJaLS Amu U, agoo
democratic reforms, halt labor tepees-
' sion, cease harassment of the edl
and the internal political parties or
face the prospect?and it la only a
prospect?of US. paramilitary assist-
ance next October. But this sends a
signal to the freedom fighters they
have not been abandoned, there is still
support for their cause and they
should not make unreasonable conces-
sions amounting to unilateral disarma-
ment or surrender to the Sandinistas
in their efforts to reach a peaceful so-
lution to their differences.
Mr. Chairman, this is a mild reaction
to the oppression, to the arrogance, to
the failure of the Sandino Commu-
nists to live up to their obligations
under &quipulas and under Sapoa.
It is pathetic that the Soviets keep
pouring in military aid, economic sup-
port to the Sandal? Communists while
we look impotent at the border be-
cause we cannot get in food to starving
campesinos who are doing only what
we did back in 17'76, fight to free their
country from tyranny.
I hope you will vote "yes" on this
amendment.
Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, I
move to strike the last word and I rise
In support of the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, let me begin by
apologizing to my colleagues for the
fact that we have had to bring this
amendment up without the kind of
notice we would ordinarily hope to be
able to exchange. The difficulty we
have encountered on this side in being
able to offer amendments, the growth
In restrictive rules that allow no
amendments to bills, led us to believe
that if we did in fact surface in ad-
vance today our intention to have a
debate on Nicaragua and the situation
there, that we would not be allowed to
do so by the leadership of the majori-
ty party. That has been our experi-
ence for several months now.
And I certainly meant no disrespect
and I am sure Mr. HYDE would join
with me in that, either to the gentle-
man in the chair or to our colleagues
on the other side of the aisle on the
Committee on Intelligence by not
being able to give them advance notice
today. But unfortunately, the way the
House works these days we felt we had
no other choice.
Mr. Chairman, this is a fairly
straightforward proposition. The
amendment simply removes from the
Intelligence Authorization Act the lan-
guage which prohibits the President
from undertaking a covert action to
support military or paramilitary oper-
ations inside Nicaragua. It would not
be effective until the new fiscal year,
that is fiscal year 1989. because that is
all this authorization deals with. It
would not take effect until October 1.
This amendment that we are propos-
ing today does not specifically author-
ize the provision of military aid; it
simply would permit the President at
some future time if he were to under-
take the normal proceedings of
making a finding that he wanted to
Initiate is covert action in Nicaragua
that he would be able to do so. He
would have to notify Congress, the
oversight committees, and then he
would be able to use whatever re-
sources are available to him in the re-
serve for contingencies to finance mili-
tary support for the democratic resist-
ance inside Nicaragua. I want to em-
phasize for all my colleagues who are
listening that we are not talking about
sending military aid to the Contras to-
morrow, perhaps none would ever go.
But this would allow the President to
have restored to him the same author-
ity that he currently has with respect
to any other nation in the world. He
would in fact be able, once this provi-
sion took effect after the end of this
fiscal year, to again proside paramili-
tary support for the democratic resist-
ance.
I think it is appropriate, Mr. Chair-
man, that we undertake this action at
this time. When we cut off military
aid to the Contras earlier this year we
were told that this is a worthwhile and
well-conceived plan to test the good
faith of the Sandinistas.
0 1120
Some of us warned that the Sandi-
nistas had given ample notice that
they had no intention of democratiz-
ing or negotiating in good faith. I be-
lieve we have been proven right.
No sooner was the truce signed, then
those who dared to demonstrate in the
Managua streets for more freedom
were beaten and intimidated. Some
labor unions dared to strike for better
working conditions. Even the Commu-
nist union in Managua raised its voice
In dissent over Sandinista mismanage-
ment and suffering by the common
people. But the government's response
was to beat supporters, -block visitors
and deliveries to the strike, and to
refuse for the past 89 days even to talk
to the unions.
The Government continues to claim
there is freedom of the press in Nica-
ragua even as it cuts off periodically
supplies of newsprint to the only op-
position newspaper and shuts down
radio stations which broadcast news
the Government does not like. State-
ments by Sandinista officials right up
to this week reaffirmed that they have
no intention of negotiating opposition
political rights either with the 14 op-
position political parties of widely
varying ideologies over the Contras
themselves. The Sandinistas openly
state that talks with the resistance are
negotiations only in the sense that
they provide cover for Contra surren-
der.
A few days ago, even as he declared
a 30-day extension of the cease-fire,
Daniel Ortega reiterated his insistence
that the Contras surrender their arms
before political conditions will even be
discussed. We predicted the Sandinis-
tas would drag out the negotiations
and try to extend them indefinitely
while the Contras' options narrowed
and they withered on the vine. Those
Who voted for the proposal assured us
that Contra capabilities would not be
affected and that humanitarian aid
would be delivered promptly.
Again what we predicted has come
true. The Sandinistas' first action was
to dump Cardinal Obando y Bravo as
mediator, apparently both because he
pushed for Sandinista as well as resist-
ance concessions and because he
served as a witness to the goings on.
When agreement on the cease-fire
zones was near, the Sandinistas sud-
denly said that the Contras also were
required to surrender their arms.
When the Contras insisted on the
original Sapoa terms, this threw the
negotiations into stalemate.
On May 23 Ortega once more reiter-
ated his insistence that the Contras
surrender their arms. Stalemate over
cease-fire zones in turn was used by
the Sandinistas as an excuse to refuse
to allow delivery of food to resistance
forces. Not a single such delivery has
taken place inside Nicaragua. When
AID finally concluded it would have to
send couriers with money for food pur-
chases instead, the Sandinistas loudly
Insisted this was illegal, and they got
the House Democratic leadership to
agree with them.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Wyoming [Mr.
CHENEY] has expired.
(On request of Mr. HYDE and by
unanimous consent, Mr. CiumEY was
allowed to proceed for 5 adthtonal
minutes.)
Mr. CHENEY. Resistance fighters
have thus been forced to evacuate in
Increasing numbers. Again there were
protests, both from Nicaragua and the
Democratic leadership in the House.
The humanitarian aid deliveries to the
Honduran border were illegal. AID did
not commence such deliveries until
April 28, halfway throught the origi-
nal 60-day cease-fire.
Paced with no option worth the
name, the Contras felt the disputes
among themselves about the best
source of action. Now the Sandinistas
are proposing to extend the cease-fire
for another 30 days, but warning that,
If the Contras do not accede to their
terms, they will launch a major mili-
tary offensive, the likes of which has
never been seen during all the years of
the war.
Since Soviet and bloc weapons deliv-
eries have flooded in at high rates, as
Contra military supplies have been cut
off, the Sandinistas have respositioned
their forces to maximum advantage,
and the Contras are once again hud-
dled in a vulnerable position on the
Honduran border rather. than scat-
tered throughout the country.
In light of all this, what Member can
claim that the US. Congress has not
both misgauged Sandinista intentions
and forced the Contras to negotiate
from a position of extreme weakness
such that their only choice is to
accede to Sandinista demands or per-
petuate a stalemate? The Sandinistas
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May 24 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE H 3667
? have made it clear that they have no
intention of negotiating democratic re-
forms. only Contra surrender.
Mr. Chairman, what more proof do
we need? The 30-day extension is a
farce, and at the end the Contra posi-
tion will be weakened still further. It
Is time for Congress to admit that we
gave negotiations our best Loy, but so
far they foaled miserabiy, and it is
time to reconsider military aid.
This amendemont will restore the
President's ability to use his authority
to initiate covert action including sup-
porting military operations of the
democratic resistance in .Nicarligua- It
is prospective in that it would not take
effect until the beginning of the next
fiscal year. October I. By this vote
today we will end the policy of the
Democratic leadership of this House
of illIpOSitlif unilateral surrender on
the Contras. We will signal the Com-
munist regime in Managans that fail-
ure to negotiate in good faith, failure
to lite up to the requirements for the
restoration of democracy in Nicaragua,
failure to abide by the Esquipulas and
Sapoa agreements will lead to a renew-
al of military aid for the &inelastic
resistance in Nicaragua.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Cliairraan. will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. CHENCEY_ Mr. Chairman. I yield
to the gentleman from Ininnio
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman. I Just
want to compliment the gentleman
from Wyoming I.Mr. Coornot) on an
excellent statement and mention, of
nouz . that this amendment negates
anything to the contrary in the classi-
fied annex and men:what& e nothing
happens until October L This simply
provides flexil3ility to the President
and confines that flexibility to contin-
gency funds that the CIA has, a rela-
tively very small amount of money,
and it gives the flexibility of the Presi-
dent toward Nicaragua the same flexi-
bility that he has to all the rest of the
globe.
Why we should immunize and iso-
late Nicaragua ander the present situ-
ation I cannot understand., no 1 hope
that poeple will bear that in mind, and
support the amendment, and again I
thank the gentleman from Wyoming
for an excellent statement.
Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, I
thank the gentleman and I yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I rise
In opposition to the amendment be-
cause It would sweep away with one
brush a principal for which Congress
has fought long and hard over tl years
to establish?the principle that assist-
ant* to the Contras Is not a covert
program. It is not a covert action in
support of our foreign policy toward
Nicaragua; it is our foreign Policy
toward Nicaragua. And as such, it
ought to be atibjeot to full debate and
a requirement that any funds expend-
ed to assit the Connus be voted on
openly by the Congress.
Yet, the effect of this amendment
would be to sweep away a restriction
which prohibits the expenditure of in-
telligence contingency funds to assist
the military and paramilitary activi-
ties of the Contras. Without this pro-
vision. the President could once again
use secret intelligence funds to aid the
Contras without congressional debate.
I think such a course would be a
grave mistake, but, in any event. strik-
ing this language would leave it to the
President to decide, not the Congress.
I think we have come too far. Mr.
Chairman, to regress to the point at
which we stood in 1981 when the
President first launched this unfortu-
nate and ineffective policy.
The amendment is a terrible mistake
for another reason. However imper-
fect, there is a cease-fire in Nicaragua
between the Contras and the govern-
ment. _However =satisfactory to both
parties, there are continuing negotia-
Um& aimed at resolving their differ-
ences. However unwelcome, it is coin a
fact that only the two parties sitting
down in Managua today can resolve
the differences between Nicaraguans.
The -U.S. Congress cannot Most as-
suredly, CIA assistance cannot.
It would be a tragic misstep for the
United States to resume military aid
to the Contras at this juncture?at a
time when the regional peace accord
signed by all the Central American
countries has had its culmination in a
series of continuing discussiqns be-
tween the Contras and the Sandinista
government In Nicaragua.
I believe the House should continue
to support the process established at
Esquipoulas furthered at Sopoa and
continued in the negotiations in Mana-
gua today. This is in every sense of the
word the worst time for the United
States to once again reinsert its heavy
hand into Central American affairs.
Haven't we learned enough, Mr.
Chairman, about the unpopularity of
the Contra war, about the ineffective-
ness of Contra pressure, about the in-
evitability of a negotiated settlement.
Mr. Chatrinan, the tragedy of our
policy toward Nicaragua has been that
although we can all agree on major
substantive goals such as democracy.
freedom, and an end to war, we have
so frequently spilt gang the question
of how to bring about these goals. I
would have hoped that the House had
learned after 6 long bloody years that
the United States cannot itself alone
enforce a settlement in Nicaragua,
that the guns of the Contras cannot
alone obtain the democratic process
they say they seek.
For the first time in B Fears, Central
American governments have come to-
gether to seek a solution which is re-
gional and which is self-imposed. Now
Is not the time for the United States
to declare that -effort a failure. Now is
not the time for the Congress to reject
a peace process devised and Imple-
mented by Central Americans, not by
the CIA or the State Department. Mr.
Chairman, now Is the time for the
Mouse of Representatives to continue
to support the Esquiponlas agreement,
the San Jose declaration. the Sapoa
agreement, and the bipartisan compro-
mise legislation to provide humanitari-
an aannonnee to the Contras and to
the young victims of that long war in
Nicaragua.
Mr. Chairman, United States policy
toward Nicaragua has been a total fail-
ure. Let's give the Central American
governments a ehorioo to fail on their
own, but let it be their failure if that
is what it must be, not one generated
by a return to failed and fatal assist-
ance to the Contras.
I urge my colleagues to reject this
amendment and to cantina* patiently
to support the ongoing peace process
in Nicaragua.
0 1130
- Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr_ Chairman. I
move to strike the last word_
(Mr. LIVINGSTON asked and was
given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr_ Chairman, I
rise in support of this amendment be-
cause it provides an essential ingredi-
ent to the process which might ulti-
mately provide peace, stability, and de-
mocracy to Nicaragua.
On February 3, 1988, a day which
may well be recorded as a day of
infamy in foreign policy for the
United States of America. the U.S.
Congress, with a vote of this House of
219 to 211, voted to stop Contra aid.
"Give peace a chance.- we said. Give
peace a chance, so we annihilated
Contra aid and probably brought
about the annihilation of the Contras
themselves. That was the carrot. That
was the carrot to the Nicaraguan San-
dinistas to give peace a chance, to pro-
vide peace and stability, to provide
freedom and democracy, to fulfill the
promises that they made at Esquipu-
las and 10 years ago, when they seized
power in Nicaragua with our help.
That was the carrot.
The amendment today provides the
stick. If the Sandinistas fail to live up
to all those promises, If over the next
4 months they fail to abide by the
commitments that they have made
time and time again to provide peace
and dignity and democracy and oppor-
tunity to their people to live in free-
dom without totalitarianism, then
there must be a stick, and this amend-
ment provides it to us.
Mr. Chairman, I do not think the
Nicaraguan Sandinistas really want to
abide by their cnnonitoronon or their
promises of peace and democracy, be-
cause I have listened to their words. I
have read what they have said in
recent weeks and months and years,
and I have seen that they have ren-
eged openly on all the commitments
they have made to let the Contras and
Nicaraguan citizens survive and live in
peace and dignity and freedom.
On February 4. 1983. the very day
after this House pulled the rug out
from underneath the Contras. Daniel
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!nay ZO, .1056
Ortega said on national radio In Nitta- We are determined to defend our nation.
ragua, We have proposed a 30-day extension of the
peace talks. Logically, if is
The vote doesn't mean the war is over, no reply received.there would be no other alternative other
and the Nicaramans should complete the than to continue with a military confronta-
total defeat of the rebels. tion.
In early March 1988, Mr. Ortega
stalled the peace talks and moved
2,000 troops into Honduras. He tried
to surround the Contras, and he would
have succeeded and defeated them and
annihilated them at that time since
the Contras had no ammunition or
food., except for the fact that Presi-
dent Reagan acted and moved United
States troops into Honduras. Mr.
Ortega had second thoughts, and a
stalemate arose. But the Contras still
had no ammunition and no food, and
because of that, and as a result of this
House pulling the rug out from under to enforce the Sandinistas' commit-
them, they agreed to a ceasefire and to ment to peace and freedom in Nicara-
engage in desperate talks for peace. gua. If they do not live up to those
commitments 4 months from now,
then we shall go back to the drawing
board, and we shall allow the CIA to
pick up the pieces of this tragedy, so
as to restore the stick which will
compel the Sandinistas to live up to
their promises, and allow us to live up
to the promises that we made to the
freedom fighters in Nicaragua a few
years ago.
Mr. Chairman, I urge the adoption
of this amendment.
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. LIVINGSTON. I am happy to
yield to the gentleman from Califor-
nia.
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chair-
man, I thank the gentleman for yield-
ing.
The gentleman knows that Daniel
Ortega back I believe it was in Decem-
ber in a speech to government labor
unions made the comment,
In a hypothetical case, if we would lose
the election, we might turn over govern-
ment, but we would never turn over power.
Mr. LIVINGSTON. As the gentle-
man well knows, Mr. Chairman, the
Communist government has never vol-
untarily shared power.
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chair-
man, if the gentleman will yield fur-
ther, is it not true that this amend-
ment would only take place on Octo-
ber 1?
Mr. LIVINGSTON. And then only if
the Sandinistas do not live up to the
promises that they have made for 11
years and failed to keep.
'Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Well, I thank
the gentleman.
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Chairman, I move
to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose this
amendment with all the vigor I can
muster this morning. I could not think
of a more pernicious, ill-timed amend-
ment, than that which has been of-
fered to this body at this particular
time. At the very minute, the very
time that the Contras who have strug-
gled for 3 weeks to put their own act
together, and having done that, at the
May 16, he said again:
The Contras should be grateful that we
are not offering them the guillotine or the
firing squad, which is what they deserve.
Mr. Chairman, the Sandinistas are
not living up to their commitments
today. They will not in the future. We
have offered them a carrot. By pulling
the rug out from under the Contras,
we have denied them the aid and the
assistance that the Contras so desper-
ately need to fight for freedom in
Nicaragua. All we ask today is to give
the Contras the stick that they need
The talks are ongoing and will prob-
ably end by early June. Then the Con-
tras may go back to war, but they are
living on borrowed time.
The deck is stacked. Time is on the
side of the Sandinistas.
Mr. Chairman, I ask this House, do
you really think the Sandinistas have
moderated? Do you really think that
they are going to live up to all those
promises that they have made? Do you
really think so, when you consider
that between August 1987 and Janu-
ary 1988, the turbas divinas, the
"divine mobs," instigated by the San-
dinista government, constantly and
physically attacked the two human
rights groups of Nicaragua?
In February 1988, the turbas divinas,
the "divine mobs," inspired brutal
Communist attacks on 15,000 labor
protestors who were simply trying to
march in hopes of better wages and
better working conditions in their
country. Two days later, the riot
police, under the auspices of the San-
dinista government, beat and arrested
the leaders of the demonstrators.
On March 6, 1988, 100 women and
girls marched peacefully to protest the
draft, and they were dispersed by 150
club-wielding Sandinistas.
Then on May 5, more than 30 work-
ers were arrested by the government
simply for demonstrating their sup-
port for construction workers conduct-
ing a hunger strike to protest low
wages.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Louisiana has ex-
pired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Lrviiica
rroa was allowed to proceed for an ad-
ditional 2 minutes.)
Mr. LIVINGSTON. On the same
day, Radio Catolica, Radio Mundial,
and Radio Corporacion, despite the
Sandinistas claims of free and open
press, were closed down and barred
from broadcasting news programs for
1 to 8 days for reporting on the work-
ers' hunger strike. That was reported
In the Washington Post.
Then on May 11, Nicaraguan Presi-
dent Daniel Ortega said:
very hour that they have come togeth-
er to meet with the government of
Nicaragua, with 4 days remaining on a
temporary cease-fire, an amendment is
offered to put the CIA back into this
war.
After all we went through over the
last couple months to work together in
a bipartisan way to come up with a bill
that will move the peace process for-
ward, we want to mine another harbor
and blow it up.
Mr. Chairman, this is ill-timed. It
sends a bad signal.
For those on this side of the aisle
and on my side of the aisle who care
about the CIA as an agency, please
keep them out of this conflict. There
has been nothing that has harmed the
agency more in the last 7 years than
our involvement in this ill-fated adven-
ture.
Mr. Chairman, there was a disagree-
ment this week on where the Contra
forces and the Nicaraguan Govern-
ment were going to meet, one of many
bumps that we have had to hurdle and
overcome in the last 9 months since
the Arias peace plan was first put for-
ward last August, but it was overcome,
and for those who suggest on this side
of the aisle and some of my friends
here that the Sandinistas have not
done anything to move this process
forward, 1 say you are absolutely
wrong. They agreed to meet head to
head. They agreed to meet in Nicara-
gua. They agreed last week to allow
the Contra forces who were coming
Into Nicaragua to meet with church
leaders, to meet with the press, to
meet with political parties, and that is
why they are there today discussing
these issues.
This is bad timing It sends a bad
signal. It is bad for the agency and it
will repudiate the overwhelming bipar-
tisan effort that was put together by
each of us here a month ago.
Do not cut the process short. There
Is still a week left in the negotiating
process. Do not cut it short with a
signal that I can almost assure you
will blow this process up.
Do not corrupt, if I might say?per-
haps corrupt is too strong a word?do
not taint the reasonable work of the
AID with this amendment.
As much as I have had problems and
our leadership has had problems with
the way AID is implemented, I under-
stand how they are struggling and are
caught between a wedge on this issue
and within the State Department. Do
not put the CIA back into the oper-
ation of this process alongside the AID
and create problems for the AID in
every part of this world.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. BONIOR. I yield to the gentle-
man from Illinois.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I thank
the gentleman for yielding.
Is it not a fact that the Democratic
Members of this body held a caucus
and passed a resolution to remove the
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AID from any operational function in
this program In favor of some private
organization. and so far from support-
ing the AM and the program that
they are undergoing, it has rejected,
and did not this caucus further say
that delivering food to starving Con-
tras in Honduras is illegal?
Mr. BONIOR. Well, Mr. Chairman,
that is incorrect. What the caucus did
yesterday was say to the AID people
and to the State Department people
that since the Verification Commis-
sion, and Baena Soares, the Secretary
General of the EOAS has agreed, has
suggested that the Pan American De-
velopment Foundation deliver the
money and since the Nicaragua Gov-
eminent has agreed to let them do
that and since the Contras have sug-
gested that that would be an accepta-
ble alternative, that perhaps since ev-
eryone is in agreement, we might want
to participate in that regional effort to
feed the Contras through that Pan
American Development Foundation.
That is what the caucus said.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Michigan has expired.
(At the request of Mr. Clik-NEY, and
by unanimous consent, Mr. BONIOR
was allowed to proceed for 2 additional
minutes.)
Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. BONIOR. I yield to the gentle-
man from Wyoming.
Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, I have
the utmost respect for the gentleman
from Michigan, because I know he has
worked very hard on this matter, and
while we look at it from different per-
spectives, I have never doubted the
gentleman's commitment to his beliefs
or his view of the situation; but I have
a recollection a couple weeks ago of a
meeting that both of us participated
In where a request was made by the
Democratic leadership of the House to
Mr. Woods of the AID that no food be
delivered until the next round of nego-
tiations with the Contras.
Our problem is that on February 3
we voted against military aid. At the
end of February all resupply ship-
ments of all kinds were cut off. There
has been no resupply of food Inside
Nicaragua to the Contra forces what-
soever since then and no resupply of
medical equipment.
0 1145
Now the caucus has taken the posi-
tion that we are not to make cash pay-
ments to the Contras that they can
use to purchase food inside Nicaragua
and not to deliver food inside Hondu-
ras. It is very difficult for this Member
who participated in putting together
that bipartisan accord to believe that
there is anything bipartisan about it.
It is difficult for us to see this as any-
thing other than an exercise in which
we continue to dry up the flow of sup-
port to the Contras, to guarantee they
writ have no choice but to surrender to
the Sandinistas.
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Chairman, re-
claiming my time, the gentleman from
Wyoming (Mr. CHENEY] will recall
that in fact food has been delivered to
the Contra forces Inside Nicaragua
which may in fact have been a viola-
tion, and is a violation not only of the
Sapoa accords but Esquipulas. But
given the fact that that has happened
that is the reality. The suggestion that
food should not be delivered inside
Nicaragua has never been a position
held by the Democratic Members on
this side. We have always advocated
that it be delivered but through an or-
ganization that has been agreed upon
by both sides.
Mr. Chairman, I have suggested to
our friend the gentleman from Illinois
[Mr. HYDE] just a second ago that we
have presumably reached that solu-
tion to that impasse in the last week,
and we are ony calling upon AID to
live up to the accord and live up to
what the Nicaraguan Government and
the Contra forces have presumably
agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
Bonma.1 has expired.
(On request of Mr. BURTON of Indi-
ana and by unanimous consent, Mr.
Bottroa was allowed to proceed for
additional minute.)
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BONIOR. I am happy to yield to
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr.
Burow].
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I just have
one question, if the Contras and San-
dinistas do not agree on that mutual
third party to bring the food in, then
the food does not get in and the Sandi-
nistas I understand have been holding
out on agreeing to a third party.
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Chairman, re-
claiming my time, they have not. No
they have not.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. If the gen-
tleman will yield further, they have
asked-for the International Red Cross
as I understand.
Mr. BONIOR. They asked for the
International Red Cross, that was re-
jected by the Contra forces, and the
Nicaraguan Government was waiting
for a counter offer since the Interna-
tional Red Cross by the way which op-
erates in these situations all over the
world, but since the Contra forces re-
jected that, a counter offer was hope-
fully going to be forthcoming. It never
did come so it was suggested to the
Secretary General of the Organization
of American States that he put some-
thing forward. He put forward the
Pan-American Development Founda-
tion for this reason, and I think it is
Important for Members to know, that
It is the only organization that both
the Contra forces and Nicaraguan
Government agreed upon when they
submitted their list of approved orga-
nizations for the Children's Fund.
As far as I am aware. from conversa-
tions with both parties in the last
week, they both agree on the Pan-
American Development Foundation.
That process of delivery presumably
has been worked out and hopefully
will be sanctioned today, but this
amendment that we have before us I
can assure my colleagues will create
enormous problems in moving that
forward.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chair-
man, I thank the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Bornoal for yielding.
Mr.. SHUSTLR. Mr. Chairman. I
move to stiike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, one of the toughest
aspects of serving on the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence is
that it makes one see the world as it
really is rather than as one wish it
were. I would suggest respectfully that
we are smoking political opium in this
Chamber if we think the Sandinistas
are living up to that exalted peace
process we hear so much about. If
ever, and I repeat if ever anyone is in
the business of practicing Napoleon's
dictum, "talk peace and think war,"
the actions of the Sandinistas, the
Sandinista Communists in Nicaragua,
clearly demonstrate that is precisely
what Ortega and his band of Commu-
nists are doing down there.
We have been told here a few min-
utes ago by one of our colleagues that
we send the wrong signal if we pass
this modest amendment. How many
clear signals have the Sandinista Com-
munists sent to us over the past sever-
al weeks, and are we going to keep our
collective head in the sand or are we
going to face the harsh reality of what
is happening down there?
Consider while we have cut off aid,
the Soviets are pouring in military
supplies.
Consider Radio Catolica closed for
several days this month, not several
months ago, this month.
Consider Dr. Julio Garcia, repre-
senting all 14 opposition parties, said
on May 14, not months ago but just a
week or so ago, that as of this date
President Ortega has not complied
with the agreement, and Mr_ Garcia
refers to several points including unre-
stricted freedom of the press., freedom
of expression, no full freedom of
thought, and no immediate implemen-
tation of the general amnesty.
Consider President Arias on May 2.1,
just a few days ago, indicated that the
Sandinistas really are not creating the
conciliatory atmosphere that should
exist prior th such a meeting, and
Arias went on to say, "Without democ-
racy peace will not be possible."
Mr. Chairman, I say to my col-
leagues unfortunately President Arias
Is not quite right when he says that
without democracy peace will not be
possible because in Nicaragua peace
will be possible without democracy,
the same kind of a peace that we have
In the gulag. the same kind of a peace
we have In Cuba, the same kind of a
peace that exists in many countries
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.around this world, peace without free-
dom.
So I suggest to my colleagues let us
pass this modest amendment. Let us
indicate that we are pulling our heads
out of the sand, and that we are will-
ing to face harsh reality rather than
hopeful unjustified optimism. Let us
Indicate that we are willing to support
freedom in Central America by sup-
porting the Hyde amendment.
"Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman from Pennsylvania yield?
Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, I am
happy to yield to the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Faluvra
Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, the
gentleman has invoked the name of
President Arias who a lot of us admire
for the work he has done.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gen-
tleman from Pennsylvnia [Mr. SHU-
STER] would he be thinking of Presi-
dent Arias and that President Arias
would be supportive of this amend-
ment?
Mr. SHUSITat. Certainly not. I
think President Arias would not be
supportive, and the reason I think he
would not be supportive is that while
he is a fine man, he fits the category
of having on those rose-colored glasses
of seeing the world as we all wish it
would be rather than seeing the reali-
ty of the Communist menace in Cen-
tral America and on our doorstep.
Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Chairman, I
move to strike the requisite number of
words.
(Mr. McHIJGH asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Chairman, I am
opposed to this amendment, but let
me first say a word about process. I
think it is clear that the Members of
the House, at least on the majority
side of the aisle, have had no notice of
this amendment which is clearly a sig-
nificant amendment.
I appreciate the explanation offered
by my friend, the gentleman from Wy-
oming [Mr. CHRtrzYl, to the effect
that if the majority had known about
this amendment the leadership would
have fashioned a rule to preclude its
being offered.
However, the chairman of the Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelli-
gence indicated last week to the mi-
nority members that he would be rec-
ommending an open rule. This week,
on Tuesday, the Committee on Rules
granted an open rule. Certainly as of
Tuesday, therefore, the minority was
-guaranteed the opportunity to offer
this amendment and could have noti-
fied the Members of the House that
the amendment would be offered.
I would also say that if the minority
fears that the leadership will craft re-
strictive rules in the future, they are
playing into the hands of the leader-
ship. Many of us on the majority side
believe that the minority should have
an opportunity to offer serious amend-
ments such as this, but we also believe
that notice is important in fairness to
-the Members of the House, and there-
fore f.f the minority withholds reason-
able notice on significant amendments
I will urge the leadership to craft re-
strictive rules. Accordingly, I would
hope as a matter of fair process that
the Members of the minority would
consider it carefully before proceeding
down this path any further.
Mr. Chairman, with respect to the
amendment itself, it seems clear that
this amendment if adopted would once
again give to the President a blank
check with regard to covert-operations
and to military assistance to the Con-
tras in particular.
Section 104, which this amendment
would strike, has been on the books
now for 3 fiscal years. The reason Con-
gress adopted section 104 was to assure
that Congress had an opportunity to
publicly debate and vote on the merits
of such covert operations.
Section 104 became necessary be-
cause of how the President acted when
he had the discretion to initiate covert
aid unilaterally, which this amend-
ment would give him again.
Let us not forget what happened
when the President had such discre-
tion. The President authorized the
mining of Nicaraguan harbors. There
was, with or without the President's
knowledge, the preparation of a
manual which, among other things,
promoted assassinations.
There was a variety of explanations
offered to the public as to why this
policy was being pursued. First it was
simply to interdict arms going into El
Salvador. Then it was to put a little
pressure on the Sandinista govern-
ment for a political settlement. At
other times it was to "excise the
cancer" of the Sandinista government
out of Central America.
This policy lost whatever public sup-
port it had because of the way this
policy was pursued from the very be-
ginning, and one result of the way in
which the policy was handled was that
Congress said, "Mr. President, we need
to review carefully this policy before
any money is spent on military or
other aid in Central America!'
Section 104 was put into the authori-
zation bill 3 or 4 years ago to assure a
fair opportunity for Congress to con-
sider, debate and vote on that policy.
Mr. Chairman, my friends on the mi-
nority side are disappointed because as
a result of that debate, as a result of
the consideration which Congress has
given to this issue over a period of
time, their position has not prevailed.
A majority of Congress has conscious-
ly decided to support the Arias peace
proposal and, despite my minority
friends' derision, to give peace a
chance.
Mr. Chairman, I understand the po-
sition of the minority and I respect
the thoughtful way in which many of
them have proceeded even though I
disagree with them, but the fact is
that the effect of the pending amend-
ment is to give the President total dis-
cretion on what will happen on aid to
the Contras and to take Congress out
of the game.
Mr. Chairman, given the long histo-
ry regarding the policy In Central
America, some 'of which I have men-
tioned and Including the diversion of
funds to the Contras when Congress
acted expressly to deny those funds, I
think Congress would be foolish to
give the President total discretion
with respect to this policy and to sur-
render the opportunity now guaran-
teed to us by section 104 now, the op-
portunity to publicly debate and vote
on aid to the Contras.
Mr. Chairman, I ask for defeat of
this amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from New York (Mr.
McHtma) has expired.
(On request of Mr. HYDE and by
unanimous consent, Mr. McHumi was
allowed to proceed for 2 additional
minutes.)
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman from New York yield?
Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Chairman, I
yield to the gentleman from Illinois
[Mr. HYDE].
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I agree
with the gentleman from New York
[Mr. McHumil. There is nothing more
painful in my congressional career
than not notifying the gentleman
from Ohio (Mr. SroxEs) of this
amendment, but until the rule was
adopted we did not have an open rule.
Had word of this leaked out, it is en-
tirely conceivable we would have been
back to the Committee on Rules and
we would have had a losing battle
where the Committee on Rules is
stacked 9 to 4, even if the Republicans
show up. So we had to keep it a secret
and we did. It is very painful to me to
do that.
Insofar as giving the President a free
hand, this only talks about contingen-
cy funds that the Central Intelligence
Agency has which as my colleagues
know are severely limited, and this is
not the only operation in the world.
Mr. Chairman, I hope the gentleman
from New York [Mr. McHUGH] accepts
my apology, but until that rule was
adopted we did not have an open rule.
Yesterday there was a rule on the for-
eign operations bill and there were 11
waivers of the section forbidding legis-
lation on an appropriation bill. I had
one, but I did not get a chance to offer
mine. The gentleman from Wisconsin
[Mr. OBEY] offered his, some of which
were eccentric in my humble opinion,
but that is OK because when you got
the power you rule.
0 1200
We have to do what we have to do,
and I hope the gentleman understands
and never has to serve in the minority.
Mr. McHUGH. I hope not as well.
Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr.
Chairman, I rise In opposition to the
amendment.
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(Mr. DOWNEY of New York asked
and was given permission to. revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr.
Chairman, a little history first. It is
quite clear that when this administra-
tion came to power, it had one goal
with respect to Nicaragua: the over-
throw of the Sandinistas by whatever
means possible. During the 7 years
that the administration has been in
office, they have lived up to their
stated goal. Indeed, Director Casey
early on in his tenure was quoted as
saying when asked about how he
would get rid of the Sandinistas, he
said, "Whatever it takes," and they
tried almost everything.
First, as the gentleman from New
York [Mr. McHum], my friend, men-
tioned, there was the illegal unauthor-
ized mining of harbors. There was the
publication of death manuals. There
was the money supposedly to interdict
arms to El Salvador. All of these were
justifications for one purpose or an-
other, but always the goal was the vio-
lent overthrow of the Sandinistas gov-
ernment.
The issue at hand here today says to
the American people, "We think the
CIA is better at determining the policy
than are our elected officials. We be-
lieve that it Is much more appropriate
to allow an agency that has erred time
and again to make the decision with
respect to how your money is spent."
That is what this amendment says:
"Trust the CIA. Do not trust the Con-
gress."
Second, it ignores, it seems to me, at
your own political peril, the enormous
dissatisfaction that the people of this
country have with the way the admin-
istration has prosecuted public policy
with respect to Latin America. The de-
bacle of Manual Noriega is a stain that
is going to be very hard for this ad-
ministration to whitewash in Novem-
ber, the stain and the mistakes in
Nicaragua are also abundantly clear to
the American people. They do not sup-
port the President. They do not sup-
port this policy, and if they had a
chance, they would not support restor-
ing discretion to the discredited Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency to make these
decisions.
The American people, my Republi-
can colleagues, are not on your side.
They want the war to end. They un-
derstand that the peace process is
maybe not as pristine or as precise as
you or I would like it, but they prefer
the Arias peace plan to the Hyde
amendment. They prefer the idea of
talk to the continuation of war. They
recognize that freedom is not guaran-
teed by continued warfare. This is
only guaranteeing continued death.
That is why every fall the majority
here and to a certain extent a limited
number there support the process of
allowing the process to go ahead. They
do not want to see unlimited discretion
In the hands of the administration or
In the hands of the CIA, because,
frankly, they have made too many
mistakes. We do not want to repeat
the mistakes of history by taking off
the wraps of restraint on what has
been, in my opinion, an ineffective
policy.
I will be happy to yield to the gen-
tleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman. I
would be astonished if I heard the
gentleman correctly suggest that it
was a bad idea to want to eliminate a
Soviet-backed Communist government
on the mainland of the Western Hemi-
sphere. Did I understand the gentle-
man correctly?
Mr. DOWNEY of New York. No. I do
not think that the gentleman either
understands the import of my com-
ments or?
Mr. SHUSTE.R. Is that not what you
said a few moments ago?
Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Or the
thrust of my comments. What I would
like to see happen is peace restored to
Central America. I would like. to see
the twin pathologies of injustice and
social depredation removed from the
landscape.
Mr. SHUSTER. That is not what the
gentleman said a few moments ago.
Mr. DOWNEY of New York. There-
fore, the seeds of communism would
never have an opportunity to start.
Mr. KEMP. Mr. Chairman, I rise in
support of the amendment.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman from New York, my friend,
yield to me for just a moment?
Mr. IM4:P. I am happy to yield to
the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I just
want to say to the gentleman from
New York (Mr. DowisEy), who lust
spoke, that he committed what logi-
cians call the fallacy of the false alter-
native. Supporting the Hyde amend-
ment buttresses support for the Arias
peace plan, because it kind of makes
the playing field a little more level by
showing that the Contras have some
support, not just the Soviets support-
ing the Sandinistas.
Mr. KEMP Mr. Chairman, let me
say that I think this has been a good
debate. One of my dissappointments
over the past couple of years has been
that since television started in the
House, the House which we all love
has turned into less of a debating
forum and more of a speech forum. I
want to contratulate the gentleman
from Ohio [Mr. Sroms] and those
who are carrying on the debate from
that side of the aisle as well as the
gentleman from Lllinois and the gen-
tleman from Wyoming.
The Hyde-Cheney amendment is
something I strongly support. It is
strongly opposed by the left side of
the aisle and very frankly it is a good
debate. No one is getting up and just
reading speeches, and that is what
should take place more often here in
the Chamber. In that regard, let me
just say that I am sorry the gentleman
from New York [Mr. DOWNEY] left,
but when he said. "Give peace a
chance, give the peace process a
113671
chance, let us talk not fight," I was
thinking about the statement that
Daniel Ortega made the other day
when he said the Contra or the free-
dom fighter or the resistance, which-
ever name one chooses, should be
grateful to the Communists. He said,
"Because we are not offering them the
guillotine or the firing squad. That is
what they deserve." That is kind of an
example of why some of us on both
sides of the aisle are profoundly con-
cerned about the so-called give peace a
chance movement, or let us talk not
fight.
What I think is happening is that
the Communists Sandinistas, particu-
larly Ortega, has learned the
Clausewitzian theory that the absence
of war is not peace, it is war by an-
other means. What is going on is not
peace. What is going on is not the ab-
sence of war. What is going on is the
prototypical Clausewitzian example of
war by another method, and they are
slowly starving to death the freedom
fighters, and they are using the peace
talks as a means by which they can de-
stroy the Contras.
There was an interesting article a
couple of days ago in the New York
Times international section by Robert
Pear in which he said, "The Sandinis-
tas are preparing to attack." That did
not come from the Reagan administra-
tion. It did not come from the CIA. It
came from photographs of storage fa-
cilities, artillery capability, and the
gathering of the Communist soldiers
in the parts of Nicaragua where they
can mount an attack on the Contras as
a way of wiping them out if the Con-
tras do not go into these areas to sur-
render. That is what is at stake here.
The gentleman from New York [Mr.
Dowxyzl, the gentleman from Michi-
gan (Mr. Horme), the gentleman from
New York [Mr. McHucx], and I am
only mentioning the names not to take
advantage of the fact that they may
not be here at the moment but simply
to remind people of their debate, kept
saying that this is a pernicious amend-
ment, and ill-timed.
I think it is exactly the right time.
Today in Managua the Sandinista gov-
ernment of Ortega is going to meet
with the resistance. They are talking
and they are negotiating, but we have,
on the one hand, the specter of a San-
dinista gathering of their forces to
wipe out the Contras. It is timely, not
pernicious, but exactly the right time
for the Congress to get involved in
helping the talks. I think it is exactly
the right thing to do to pass this
amendment.
I congratulate the gentleman from
Illinois [Mr. HYDE] and the gentleman
from Wyoming [Mr. CHENEY] for their
wisdom. It is not turning it over to the
CIA. It is bringing to the attention of
the Sandinistas during the talks that
the Congress is not going to stand by
and allow them to take advantage of
the peace process.
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0 1210
That is what is so desperately
needed.
The gentleman from New York kept
saying we need to learn the lesson of
history. I do not know if any one of
my colleagues last night was watching
cable news. There happened to be a
show on one of the cable networks.
about the 1930's. It talked about ex-
actly, 50 years ego in September.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from New York [Mr Kew.]
has expired.
(By unanimous consent Mr. BEAU
was allowed to proceed for 3 additional
minutes.)
Mr. KEMP. The show last night
chronicled the anniversary of the 50th
year of the Munich accords, in Sep-
tember 1938 when Neville Chamber-
lain got up on the floor of the House
of Commons right after getting back
from Munich, and he held up a piece
of paper and he said he had Adolph
Hitler's name on it. He said that Hitler
did not want the Sudetenland, he did
not want Czechoslovakia, he did not
want living space, he had enough terri-
tory.
Neville Chamberlain was cheered in
the House of Commons. A back bench-
er in the House of Commons with
white hair got up and spoke eloquent-
ly about the fact that wax was coming
because of Munich. He was booed. Cat-
calls rang out. The House of Commons
voted overwhelmingly to support the
peace process at Munich, and by early
1939 the Sudetenland fell. In another
3 months all of Czechoslovakia fell,
and within I guess a year from Sep-
tember 1938 Poland was invaded. The
story is so sad.
No parallel in history is perfect, and
perhaps this is not perfect. But it does
teach us something about the negotia-
tion process. To negotiate, we must ne-
gotiate from strength, and it is a sign of
weakness to tell the Contras that we
are going to sit here in our chairs,
here in the Congress of the United
States, and not be concerned about
the buildup of the Communists, not be
concerned about the violation of
Sapoa, not be concerned about a viola-
tion of the Guatemala accords, not be
concerned about violations by the San-
dinistas of the Arias peace proposal,
that we do not care that the Sandinis-
tas are In violation of the promises
they made to the OAS in June of 1979.
For us to sit here in May 1988 and
make the same mistake that was made
in the House of Commons in Septem-
ber 1938 is to make the same historical
mistake over and over again. And the
gentleman from New York has said
have we not learned anything from
history. I want to stand here and say I
think we must learn from history. We
cannot expect to deny the lemon from
that tragic period of the 1930's.
And I say give peace a chance by
strengthening the peace process, by
voting for the liyde-Cheney amend-
ment, and let us truly give peace a
chance by supporting the amendment
id the gentleman from Illinois and the
gentleman from Wyoming and suggest
that we remove this restriction and
send a signal to Managua that we are
not going to stand by and allow the
guillotine to be used by Ortega against
freedom-loving men and woman
Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. KEMP. I am glad to yield to the
gentleman from Pennsylvania.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from New York Mr. Kozel
has again expired.
(On request of MT. WALEER and by
unanimous consent, Mr. Kinn, was al-
lowed to proceed for 2 additional min-
utes.)
Mr. WALKER Mr. Chairman, I
thank the gentleman for yielding and
want to congratulate him for his state-
ment.
I just want to also say that his state-
ment is in direct contrast to the, I
think, oome rather shocking state-
ments that are coming from the other
aide. I mean the gentleman who spoke
previous to the gentleman in the well
seemed to me to revert to the "blame
America first" rhetoric that we have
heard all too often on this floor. It
seems that when we weigh the relative
questions that what we have is people
on the other side who say that they
believe that the actions of the CIA are
far more of a threat than the actions
against freedom by the Sandinistas I
think that is the point the gentleman
Is making, and I really find that very,
very disturbing as a part of the debate.
We are literally sounding like the
Parliament of England in 1938 that
did not understand the disaster that
was about to occur.
Mr. KEMP. I thank the gentleman
for his comments and want to remind
all Members I bet if we go back in the
RECORD and look at this debate and
look at the mention of the words
"peace process," it will be redundant.
Everybody wants peace. I give that
motive to Members of both sides of
this debate.
But there has not been a single men-
tion of the word "freedom," and peace
without freedom is not peace. It is
simply the extension at least in Nica-
ragua of slavery.
There is peace, as the gentleman
from Pennsylvania said, there is peace
in Cuba, there is peace in Vietnam,
there is peace in the gulag, but there
Is no peace with freedom there.
Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. KEMP. I yield to my friend, the
gentleman from Massachusetts, who is
an eloquent spokesman for peace in
our time.
Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, I thank
the gentleman for yielding and appre-
ciate that. I would ask the gentleman
from New York for his help in under-
standing history.
If the general analogy was 1938. I
assume the Communists played the
role of the Nazis and the general ana-
logical theme of totalitariansim.
Mr. KEMP. Totalftariantatra
Mr. FRANK. The Communists have
the totalitarian role, which was Pre-
sumably the Nazis in Ins, and I pre-
sume that Gorbachev is somewhat an-
alogous to 'Hitler, but with a lot of
changes.
Mr. KEMP. The gentleman's point is
correct.
Mr. FRANK. So if I follow the anal-
ogy, my question is now as Ronald
Reagan is over there talking to Gorba-
chev, whom he has called his friend.
where does Ronald Reagan fit in this
analogy to 1938 as the Russians have
replaced the Germans and Gorbachev
has replaced Hitler, but where does
Ronald Reagan fit in?
Mr. KEMP I will take back my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from New York (Mr Kemal
has again expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr Emir
was allowed to proceed for 2 additional
minutes.)
Mr. KEMP. Mr. Chairman, it is a
valid point that the gentleman from
Massachusetts raises, and he is an elo-
quent spokesman for his point of view.
Let me just say the jury is out an
what is going to happen in Moscow.
My hope is that it turns out to be the
fact that we have developed a stronger
Nation, a stronger foreign policy, a re-
sistance to communism in Central
America and throughout the world
and those negotiations are different
than the negotiations that were held
In the 1930's.
But I did want to make the point to
the gentleman from Massachusetts,
before I yield to my friend from Cali-
fornia, there is no doubt about it, and
if the President does not say it I will.
In fact I would like to quote Hannah
Arendt, who wrote about the nature of
the 20th century and The drama that
is unfolding before the American
people, and she said there are two
evils on the Earth. One is nazism and
the other is communism and Hannah
Arendt said the central drama of the
20th century is the struggle between
totalitarian evil and freedom, and I
think those men and women who are
on the side of freedom in history are
going to be on the right side, not-
withstanding the eloquent point of the
gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr.
Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. KEMP I yield to the gentleman
from California.
Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr.
Chairman, first a correction. The gen-
tleman from Pennsylvania (Mr.
Wataaml stated the expression that
Jeane Kirkpatrick coined the "blame
America first crowd." To use those
words denotes there is someone else to
blame secondarily, I believe now we
have advanced in the last 2 or 3 years
since Ambassador Kirkpatrick used
that expression to a simple blame
America, there is no second point,
there is no blaming of the Soviet
Union, there is just blame America.
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May 26, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
Mr. KEMP. Or the CIA, or Reagan.
And I want to say on the eve of his
trip to Moscow that I am glad that it
Is going to be Ronald Reagan in
Moscow and not Neville Chamberlain.
I am glad that it will be Ronald
Reagan in Moscow and not Jimmy
Carter. I am glad it is Ronald Reagan
in Moscow and not Michael Dukakis.
Mr. DORNAN of California. Amen.
Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I
move to strike the requisite number of
words and I rise in opposition to the
amendment.
I just want to make three very quick
points. First, to take an action on May
26, an action that would take effect on
October 1 of this year in my judgment
would be very presumptuous, and I
quite frankly do not see why the
makers of the amendment find an
emergency here this morning so that
they have to come forth with this kind
of an amendment. We do not have an
emergency.
Second, in my judgment, I think the
policy of the administration has been
quite flawed for 7 years and the lives
of 40,000 innocent people have been
affected, whether through death, ma-
ligrunent, or injury.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, my opposi-
tion to this is that we do not have a
policy put forth to give this peace
process a chance. The question I want
to ask is how many innocent people
have been killed during this peace
process? I challenge anyone to get up
and state that innocent people are
being killed by the wayside while this
process is going on.
I think that is the bottom line, Mr.
Chairman,, and that is why we ought
to reject the amendment.
Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MAVROULES. I yield to my col-
league, the gentleman from Massachu-
setts.
Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, I thank
my friend, the gentleman from Massa-
chusetts. for yielding.
I was very surprised at the notion
that my colleagues would put forward
that what we should do to respond to
this is put the CIA back in with no re-
straints.
As to blame America first, no, I do
not do that. I am amused when I hear
that from some of my colleagues, not
amused, but we say that to be polite,
because one of the major subjects
facing America today is a problem of
the trade deficit. When it comes to
blaming America and letting others
off the hook when we deal with trade,
that comes from the other side. Those
of us who think that Americans ought
to be given a chance with trade to
defend themselves, and when we talk
about unfair practices, blaming Amer-
ica first comes from the other side.
But we ought to talk here about the
merits.
We have an acknowledged set of
facts from the CIA. and we are not
talking about the CIA as an entity, we
are talking about leadership under
this administration, which in my judg-
ment corrupted the CIA by having
members of that agency violate the
law. That has been admitted. Assistant
Secretary Abrams admitted that to
the Congress, and what we have now is
a proposal to reward people for an ex-
plicit policy of breaking the law and of
lying to Congress on what we before
we are told is on behalf of the Arias
peace plan. But we also heard the gen-
tleman from Pennsylvania, and I ap-
preciate his candor in this regard, say
that President Arias is opposed to this
effort to implement the Arias plan.
This is more Arias than Arias. It is not
an effort to implement that Arias
plan, it comes from people who were
frustrated and unhappy when the
Contras signed that accord, and we
know that as a fact. We know that As-
sistant Secretary Abrams and the
others in the administration, and some
of those here, thought the Contras
made a mistake and do not want the
Contras to go ahead with that process.
The notion that they are being
starved is simply false, as was pointed
out by the gentleman from Michigan.
The Nicaraguan Government has
agreed on the Pan American Develop-
ment Foundation. That is an offshoot
of the OAS. If the OAS is considered
somehow to be a tool of the Commu-
nists, I misread the last 20 years. The
OAS if anything would have been ac-
cused of being too close to us. We are
fortunate that it is there. There is the
OAS Pan American Development
Foundation today which is acceptable
I would think to everyone to give out
the food.
- This is not about food, and it is not
about negotiating tactics. It comes
from people who are frustrated that
there was a peace talk, and as the gen-
tleman from Massachusetts pointed
out, that peace talk has accomplished
one very important thing: The absence
of killing. I do not regard that as mere
artifice. I think that is a very impor-
tant goal. We are hoping that we will
continue to go forward with this.
But to say that the CIA should go
back into this with no restraint is not
only bad for the peace process, it is
bad for the CIA. I think my colleagues
on the other side made an error when
they take what should be our intelli-
gence agency, that we all want to have
as a respected and important agency,
and make it bear the burden of this
mistaken policy when they say to the
CIA we will impose a leadership on
you that will distort your mission, that
will take the great bulk of you and en-
tangle you in illegal efforts which we
will admit we have done as they had
admitted. That is a very grave error.
This would be bad for peace, bad for
the CIA, and it is not an effort to ad-
vance the peace process. This comes
from people who never wanted to see
It work in the first place.
Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. MAVROULES. I yield to the
gentleman from Wyoming.
ii 3673
Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, I
would ask the gentleman from Massa-
chusetts a question. He made a very
strong statement that CIA employees
have broken the law or committed a
crime. I wonder if the gentleman could
tell me who at the CIA has been ac-
cused of any crime?
Mr. FRANK. I am glad to tell the
gentleman that at the CIA they fired
some people. I cannot tell him exactly
who because they kept changing their
names, but there were some. I remem-
ber acknowledgments.
Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield again?
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr.
MAITROULES] has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. MAv-
ROULES was allowed to proceed for 2
additional minutes.)
Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MAVROULES. I yield to the
gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. FRANK. I thank the gentleman
for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, during the Iran-
Contra hearings there were several ac-
knowledgments of people who acted in
violation of the law, who misled and in
some cases lied to the Congress. r be-
lieve the mining of the harbors was an
illegal act, so there are several cases of
that being done. We have a number of
allegations against some people who
are no longer alive and cannot defend
themselves, but there were several al-
legations. In fact, people were dis-
missed from the CIA. and I really
cannot recall all of the names because
the names changed several times who
acted in violation of what the laws
were restricting certain actions that
were being taken. There was coopera-
tion by the CIA and a couple of people
In carrying out things they were told
they should not be doing by law, not
asked not to do, but told they should
not be doing.
Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. MAVROULES. I am delighted
to yield to the gentleman from Wyo-
ming.
Mr. CHENEY. I thank the gentle-
man for yielding. I think it is very im-
portant, I would say to my colleague
from Massachusetts, that we not
malign the reputation and integrity of
the men and women who oftentimes
put their lives on the line for the
United States by their services at the
Central Intelligence Agency.
No member of the CIA has been
charged with a crime in connection
with any of these activities. If I may,
no member of the CIA has been indict-
ed, and no member of the CIA has
been convicted of any crime.
0 1225
The gentleman is entitled to his
opinion, but he should get the facts
correct. The facts are that to say the
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CIA employees committed a crime Is
simply wrong.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr.
Mavaoutral has expired.
(On request of Mr. FRANK and by
unanimous consent; Mr. Maximums
was allowed to proceed for 2 additional
minutes.)
Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MAVROULES I yield to the
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr.
FRANK1.
Mr. FRANK. I thank the gentleman
for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I think I spoke pre-
cisely. I did not say anyone was con-
victed. There are crimes committed for
which there are no convictions. There
are people who admit breaking the
law. The fact that they are not con-
victed does not mean that crimes were
not committed.
When people violate the law and
there are people who violate the law
and who are not always convicted,
there are acknowledgments that the
law was violated by people at the CIA.
And I agree we should not malign the
great bulk of CIA agents. .
I think it is my friends on the other
side who are unfair to the CIA because
we have political leadership being im-
posed by this administration unfairly
Involving the CIA in things which
they should not be doing. I believe it is
that effort to use them to frustrate
the peace process that does a great dis-
service to the CIA.
But I would differ with the gentle-
man to say that because no one has
been convicted or even indicted, that
does not mean no one has committed a
crime.
I believe a few people have admitted
breaking the law.
Mr. McEWEN. Mr. Chairman, I
move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I have seen a great
deal of progress in the course of this
debate. I can remember during the
early part of this decade when we were
lectured to at length by certain Mem-
bers of this House that those involved
in the Sandinista Government were
not Communists. And then after re-
peated statements on behalf of the
Sandinista leadership that they were
Commimists, they began to backpedal
just a bit and say well, they were not
expansionists, that they were really
just good Communists and we should
not interfere in the operations of a
neighboring country.
Then as you are fully aware, Daniel
Ortega said, "We are like Che Gue-
vara, we are committed to taking our
struggle to other lands." Then in
about 1984 or so they began to say.
"Well, all right, they are expansionist
Communists but they are not subjects
of the Soviet Union.-
Little by little we began to see, as
millions of dollars of aid were flowing
into the country, even to the point
where they did not even bother to
paint over the floviet symbols Of the
Hind helicopters they were delivering
to attack their neighboring countries,
that it was obviously a Soviet expan-
sionist base Inside Central America.
So about 38 months ago, out of great
frustration, certain Members of this
House created a cocoon. They began
to say that every option that is avall-
able to the President, every option
that is available to our defense agen-
cies will not be available to this par-
ticular island, this one little country in
Central America that is involved in
Soviet Marxist expansionist revolu-
tion, that we will create a cocoon
around them whereby other assets
that are available to the President and
to our National Government will not
be allowed to be employed.
Now whenever we discuss matters of
this type, It happens, as has been said
In a court of law, when you have the
facts you argue the facts, when you
have the law you argue the law, and
when you have neither the facts nor
the law you argue.
So there has been a great deal of dis-
cussion about what this amendment
does. This amendment does not really
do anything. What it does is remove
the cocoon that was created around a
particular country. It strikes out some
words that give special privileges to
the Marxist Sandinista Government in
Nicaragua. It does not put the CIA
back in charge of any wars, it does not
allow mining of any harbors, it is not a
pernicious amendment, it is not a
blank check to anyone; it allows only
the United States government to
engage in activities in Central America
that it is allowed to engage in else-
where with the complete and manda-
tory oversight not only of this House
but particularly - of the intelligence
committees.
, The question was raised as to why
the emergency is now? The emergency
is now simply because this bill is on
the floor now. The emergency is now
because we have played this game now
for many, many months. We have
taken every step that has been lec-
tured to us by those who use the
phrase that we are supposed to give
peace a chance, we have reneged from
our commitments to help the demo-
cratic resistance.
We have given the extended arm of
support to those who want to negoti-
ate. We have done everything on our
side. What has happened in response?
This afternoon one of the members of
the original Sandinista directorate,
Violetta Chamorro, will be here_ One
of the people who was a part of the
revolutionary guard in 1978 that led to
the ultimate establishment of the new
government will be here to explain ex-
actly what is going on. They pledged
not more than a few weeks ago and we
were told and lectured in this very
Chamber and in the well of this House
that there were going to allow free-
dom of the press. This editor of La
Prensa will explain that they do not
allow freedom of the press because
they do not allow any newsprint to be
available to those involved In printing
the newspapers.
The fact of the matter is that the
time has come that we must no longer
be blind, deaf, and dumb. There comes
a time when intelligent people must
face facts. And when the facts come to
the floor that we have been played for
a fool time after time after time, no
longer can we give special privileges to
the Sandinista Government, no longer
should this cocoon be allowed to be es-
tablished around this one particular
government. But the United States of
America, its President and its Con-
gress should be allowed to engage in
the same sort of national security in-
terests in this area of the world as it
does elsewhere.
That is simply what the amendment
does. It makes no special privileges. It
gives nothing to the CIA. It does not
involve us in any sort of conflict. It
simply removes a special privilege
from those who are dedicated to sup-
porting that Marxist expansionist gov-
ernment in Nicaragua.
Mr. Pr...PPE:FL Mr. Chairman, I move
to strike the requisite number of
words and I rise in support of the
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, there are two cardi-
nal principles I think we must keep in
mind in dealing with the situation in
Nicaragua. One is we must assure the
Contras that we have not abandoned
them. Second, we must let the Sandi-
nista government know that we mean
business when we say we insist that
they negotiate to bring peace and de-
mocracy to Nicaragua. This amend-
ment in may opinion is in furtherance
of those two objectives.
I support the amendment.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. PEPPER. I yield to the gentle-
man from Michigan Mr. BROOM-
FIELD].
(Mr. BROOMFIELD asked and was
given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. BROOMFIELD I thank the
gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I merely rise to com-
pliment the gentleman from Florida
for his consistent support of the situa-
tion in Nicaragua to make sure that
the Contras are not eliminated from
meaningful negotiations for peace in
that country. I just want the gentle-
man to know that it is deeply appreci-
ated. He is very, very sincere and what
he has to say should mean a lot to all
the Members.
Mr. Chairman, I strongly support the amend-
ment offered by my distinguished oolleao,ie
on the Foreign Affairs Committee and ranking
Republican member of the Intelligence Com-
mittee, Mr. HYDE of Illonois.
Although the lime is We, we should renew
our efforts to support genuine negotiations by
keeping the Contras a viable force for, free-
dont and democracy in Nicaragua.
"This amendment would keep the pressure
on the Sandinista government to negotiate in
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May 26, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 113675
iood faith," knowing that the President could
resume assistance to the freedom fighters in
October.
The main advantage of this amendment, is
the Sandinistas could not lust "wait out" the
remaining days of this administration by stall-
ing the negotiations.
The Sandinistas could not simply starve the
Contras into submission.
This amendment would put the President
back into the driver's seat on foreign policy.
The Sandinistas would no longer be able to
negotiate directly with Congress and exclude
the Secretary of State.
With United States leverage taken away,
the Sandinistas have dragged their feet in the
negotiations, repressed domestic opposition,
censored the press and restricted labor
uniOns, and continued to accept huge Soviet
arms deliveries.
Mr. Chairman, it's time we removed the
straitiacket from our policy on Nicaragua
This amendment would not undermine the
Sapoa agreement, but instead would restore
the pressure that is needed to keep the San-
dinistas at the bargaining table.
I strongly urge adoption of the Hyde amend-
ment.
Mr. PEPPER. I thank the gentle-
man.
Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Chairman, I
move to strike the requisite number of
words and I rise in opposition to the
amendment. ?
Mr. Chairman, as I listened to this
debate, I am sort of surprised because
something is missing We have had on
this floor amendments coming for all
sorts, in all sorts of other situations
dealing with what I would call the
drug mania that is sweeping this body,
the other body and everywhere else.
Yet one of the areas where we
should be having the most concern
about drugs is in Central America,
with the Contras. There have been all
sorts of allegations that the Contras
involved themselves or some members
of the Contras in drug trafficking in
one way or another. And yet here
where we have one of the few provi-
sions that would be able to control the
things that the Contras are doing, we
do not get any amendment from the
other side, any mention that perhaps
we should not do anything until the
Contras are drug free. I mean, after
all, if we are going to hold every Amer-
ican contractor and every American
business to a very, very tough and rig-
orous standard, should we not hold
probably one of the greatest contrac-
tors of this Government, of this ad-
ministration: the Contras?they have
received I think over $1 billion over
the course of the years. far more than
many of those affected by the gentle-
man from Pennsylvania's amendment
would receive?should we not hold
them to the same standard?
So I would plead with my colleagues
from the other side of the aisle who
have been so tough on drugs in the
work place, in every appropriation
that has come up, before they rush to
this amendment which, after all,
brings some controls on the Contrab?
and I have always believed the prob-
lem that we have in Central America
is not that the Sandinistas are so won-
derful, but that the Contras are so
bad?I would ask my colleagues on the
other side of the aisle if they have any
Intention of bringing up some kind of
amendment here on this proposal that
would say, "Certify the Contras are
drug free." And before we take off the
little controls that we have on the
Contras as in section 104, could we get
some kind of provision that would
make the Contras or attempt to make
the Contras drug free? Because, after
all, we all know that the drugs that
start out in South and Central Amer-
ica end up in Ward and New York
and Chicago and Los Angeles. They
are every bit as damaging. It is every
bit as damaging to have Contra mem-
bers selling drugs here, who knows
with what funds, as it would be to
have some worker be smoking a mari-
juana cigarette and having a whole
factory of 10,000 people closed down.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. SCHUMER. I yield to the gen-
tleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDal.
Mr. HYDE. I thank .the gentleman
for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentle-
man and I want to compliment him.
He has added so much to this debate
that if he needs extra time I will be
happy to try to get it for him.
Mr. SCHLTMER. I thank the gentle-
man. I wonder if the gentleman is
going to propose that kind of amend-
ment today? And if not, why not?
Mr. HYDE. Only if it applies to the
Democratic Cloakroom.
Mr. SCHITME.R. Well, I would say
that that is not a response worthy, of
the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. HYDE. Then I ask it be stricken
from the record.
Mr. SCHUMER. I thank the gentle-
man.
We on this side are waiting for some
kind of amendment that would help
make the Contras as drug-free as we
seek to make the rest of the American
workplace.
Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Chairman, I
move to strike the requisite number of
words and I rise in support of the
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, as one of the previ-
ous spokesmen has said, serving on the
intelligence committee does give you
an opportunity for some real insights
that you might not get any other way.
However, this debate I think can be
dealt with on public statements made
by the participants to the Process In
Central America.
One of those I would like to refer to
is Mauricio Diaz Avila in his February
22 statement upon his ouster from a
National Assembly leadership position
because his party was one of the 14 op-
position parties engaged in the nation-
al dialog with the government. He said
that that action showed "the Sandi-
nista party tendency to force the as-
sembly's political parties to either
assume servile roles or be left
out. ? ? ? The PSLN is demonstrating
an enormous lack of tolerance for its
opponents. This shows that it is not
one bit democratic and that it intends
to stay in power forever. We have been
demanding these reforms since the
1984 elections. How many victims, how
many deaths could have been avoided
If they had complied with what they
signed in 1984? However, they are in-
transigent and inflexible; they prefer
monolog to dialog." Now that Is some-
one who is involved in the process who
asks us and the world how many
deaths could have been prevented if
the Sandinistas had lived up to the
promises they made in 1984?
Let us get back to the central debate
here, ladies and gentlemen. It is a
question of peace with honor, it is a
question of peace with freedom, it is a
question of essential democracy that is
to be given to the people of Central
America in our own hemisphere.
Dr. Julio Garcia, a member of the
Social Christian Party, on behalf of
those 14 opposition parties said just 10
days ago on Managua Radio, "As of
this date President Ortega has not
complied with the Esquipulas II agree-
ment, particularly the points referring
to, among other things, unrestricted
freedom of the press and fibedom of
expression, full freedom of thought
and the immediate implementation of
the general amnesty."
Dr. Garcia went on to say in that
Interview on radio, "We maintain that
the definitive cease-fire will not last
long unless there is a true democrati-
aation process In Nicaragua. There is
no democracy if there is no peace and
there can be no peace if there is no de-
mocrat7.
In the context of all of this, what
does Daniel Ortega say? Daniel Ortega
says if the Contras do not agree to
what he has presented to them, "We
will use all the human and material re-
sources necessary to combat and anni-
hilate them." Not pat them on the
head, but annihilate them! "We are
determined to employ every means we
have to annihilate and destroy those
who refuse to accept this peace proc-
ess and prolong the war."
He has set out the terms of the
debate. He has said, "When you are at
the bargaining table, accept our bar-
gain or we will annihilate you."
How can he say this? He can say this
because there is a continued flow of
Soviet support, of Communist country
support to his side and we have cut off
any support and any threat of our sup-
port from our side.
0 1240
If you want to look at bargaining po-
sitions, as an attorney you look and
see U the people who are at the table
have equal bargaining positions. In
the law we sometimes say that if some-
one has an unequal bargaining posi-
tion, the contract Is invalid. Why? Be-
cause the one party can take advan-
tage of the other party.
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What is the difference between that
and when you have people negotiating
their very lives in the peace process in
Central America? And what we have is
we have created an unequal bargain-
ing position. The Sandinistas on one
side have the steadfast support of the
Soviets, and they can back up their
threat. They can back up their threat
to annihilate the Contras if the Con-
tras do not genuflect and bow to them
at the bargaining table.
And what do the Contras have?
They look here to Washington, and
what do they see? They see us afraid
to even say the President of the
United States could consider, starting
next October, the possibility of assist-
ance to counterbalance in some way
what the Sandinistas are getting. We
are talking about several months
hence. But what have we done? We
have said we are going to pick one
group, one fighting force, one freedom
fighter group, the Contras, out of all
the rest of them in the world and say,
"No matter what happens, we are not
going to give you the possibility of
support that you need to bring an
equal bargaining position to the table
when you are negotiating today." That
is what we have now before us.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from California [Mr. Lme
ORM] has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. MTN-
CHEN WU allowed to proceed for 1 addi-
tional minute.)
Mr. L[TNGREN. So, Mr. Chairman, I
would just say this: We have had a lot
of debate. Some Members want to
make some strong debating points
about the drug issue. Some Members
want to say we are trying to further
the killing. Yet the people who are
down there negotiating on the part of
the opposition parties are telling us
the killing has been prolonged because
of the intransigence of the Sandinis-
tas.
They are asking for support from us.
The humane thing for us to do is to
support the Hyde amendment. It is
the humane thing because it gives
hope to the people who wish to have
an opportunity for democracy. We owe
them at least that much. I would
rather give them that much than tell
them that I am going to send my 14-
year-old son down to Central America
5 years from now when this policy
fails. And that is what you are doing:
You are putting those of us who have
children at risk of sending our sons
down there to Central America in 5
years because we do not have the guts
to give a reasonable threat on behalf
of the Contras at the bargaining table.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I move
to strike the requisite number of
words, and I rise in opposition to the
? amendment.
Mr. Chairman, when I came here
nearly a year ago, this was the first
vote I made on the floor, the vote for
the intelligence authorization. A lot
has happened in the peace process
since that time. President Arias was
TV 1 "PO
recognized as a Nobel Peace Prize
winner for its efforts for peace in Cen-
tral America. We have had the &peva
agreement, and indeed even today,
talks will be resumed in Managua. But
not much progress has been made on
the other side of the aisle in terms of
peace in Central America. This Hyde
amendment Is the same old thing. I
see no growth, no responding to
changing circumstances in Central
America, no response to the wishes of
the people of Central America, no re-
sponse to the wishes of the people of
the United States.
A few years ago I visited Central
America and I resolved?and this is
one of the reasons I worked hard to
come to Congress?to do whatever I
could in my power to stop the suffer-
ing there.
My colleague addressed the issue of
his 14-year-old son 5 years from now. I
would like to address the issue of the
14-year-old children fighting this ille-
gal war in Central America just be-
cause it happens to be a policy prefer-
ence of our colleagues in the House on
the other side of the aisle.
We have heard much talk about
peace today, but the fact is that if we
want peace, we should heed the words
of Pope Paul VI, who said, "If you
want peace, work for justice."
If we want peace, we should elimi-
nate the embargo in Central America
and give the Nicaraguan people their
own chance for peace. We should
reject the Hyde amendment for the
Nicaraguan people and their children.
Are these Sandinista children? They
are not Sandinista children; they are
Nicaraguan children, children of Con-
tras, children of Sandinistas, children
of Nicaragua. These are 15- and 16-
year-old boys who are losing their lives
and their limbs because of the mis-
guided policies of this. Reagan admin-
istration.
We should end the suffering of
young children and the babies born in
camps because there is no respect here
for self-determination in Nicaragua,
again because of the misguided poli-
cies of this administration.
We have heard the Hyde amend-
ment characterized by some of our col-
leagues on the other side of the aisle,
and I would say we should recognize it
for what it is. The Hyde amendment
would increase the militarization of
the area. It is not in support of peace
in Central America. It would remove
any restriction on the use of the CIA
In Nicaragua. It would dump the bi-
partisan support of the peace process.
It would put the House on record for
more war in Nicaragua, more suffer-
ing, more dying, and more killing of
children in Central America on the
same day, the very same day that the
Contras and the Sandinistas are talk-
ing about peace.
Mr. Chairman, the Hyde amendment
would say no to the Central American
peace process. it would reopen the
Contra war to the full establishment
of the CIA contingency fund, and it
Would end congressional participation
In making peace, not war, in Central
America.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. PELOSI. I yield to my colleague,
the gentlewoman from California.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I want
to compliment my colleague, the gen-
tlewoman from San Francisco, CA, on
her effort, and I would associate
myself with her remarks. I am proud
to serve with the gentlewoman in rep-
resenting that city.
I would like to say that the gentle-
woman is right, this amendment
brings us back to the same old thing.
We have seen those planes go down
with weapons and come back with
drugs. We do not want that same old
thing. We do not want to see the same
people who brought us General Nor-
iega. I would say to the Members who
support this Hyde amendment, "I
don't know where you people have
been." Noriega is looking at America
with a sword over his head, and we are
going to take the same old people who
brought us Noriega and put them in
charge of our Nicaraguan policy.
Mr. Chairman, I ask the Members to
vote "no" on that policy, vote "no" on
the Hyde amendment.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I would
like to say that I would like to see
some response by this Congress to the
efforts being made by the people of
Nicaragua for their own peace.
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr.
Chairman, I move to strike the requi-
site number of words.
(Mr. Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma
asked and was given permission to
revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr.
Chairman, this is almost surreal. I feel
as though we have been frozen in
time. I would say that while we have
disagreed, I cannot really find fault
with those Members who place their
hope in a peace process. We all have
times when we are guided by our
dreams and by our hopes, but this is
not the week of the unveiling of the
Arias peace plan, this is not the week
of the signing of the agreement at Es-
qipulas, and this is not the week of the
signing of the agreement at Sapoa.
This is the week the talks come to an
end with no agreement because the
Sandinistas have said to the President,
said to JIM WRIGHT, and said to you.
"You can take your plan and your list
of reforms and your democratic proc-
ess and shove it."
Then we hear this debate, and this
place becomes like a twilight zone. It is
as though none of the past 6 months
had even happened, as though none of
the articles had appeared as though
none of the trips to Central America
had been made, as though none of the
speeches by Ortega had been made. It
Is as though Major Miranda had not
defected and told us of the Sandinista
military plans. It is as though the San-
dinistas had not moved their troops
1
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'6-0601 NJ Nvi..7
into Honduras. It is as though the
Sandinistas were not threatening and
preparing a new military offensive. It
Is as though news print had not been
held from newspapers, as though labor
leaders had not been thrown into jail,
as though journalists had not been
beaten, as though peaceful demonstra-
tions had not been broken up. and as
though the ministry of justice had not
been closed and its functions turned
over to the police. You can ignore the
fact that you voted for food and it was
not delivered.
0 1250
My colleagues could ignore the fact
that Daniel Ortega and the Sandinis-
tas are laughing at them, but my col-
leagues cannot ignore the fact that
they are destroying the last hope of
freedom and democracy for millions of
Nicaraguans. Nicaraguans may have
dark skin, and they may speak a for-
eign language, but they have every bit
as much right to a free press, and free
elections and free speech as my col-
leagues have. To have not voted
against Contra aid months ago, with
what my colleagues knew then, is un-
derstandable, but to vote against this
amendment is absolutely indefensible.
Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. I
yield to the gentleman from Califor-
nia.
Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I am
wondering if the gentleman from
Oklahoma would present to us the evi-
dence that he apparently has that in-
dicates that talks are breaking off,
that there is somehow a conclusion
that we have not heard about. I think
most of us heard the Sandinistas were
willing to extend the cease-fire an-
other 30 days, and the talks continue
today in Managua. What evidence is
there that we have reached the end of
our rope? Is there some information
that the gentleman has that is not
publicly available?
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Oh, I
think it is very publicly available. I say
to the gentleman from California. if
he reads the papers, if he talks to the
Contras, if he lisens to what the San-
dinistas are saying, the Sandinistas are
willing, of course, to be able to contin-
ue the sham while the Contras run out
of food, while they have no ammuni-
tion and to keep the pressure on.
But these talks the gentleman from
California knows and I know, are not
going to go anywhere unless the San-
dinistas are willing to provide some of
the democracy that, not only the Con-
tras have been willing to fight and die
for, but that this Congress in the
Dreier and Chandler resolution said
we insisted upon.
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. I
Yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Chairman, with
all due respect to my friend from
Oklahoma, that is not what the Con-
tras told us. The directorate, who ap-
peared before the Democratic leader-
ship just 2 days ago, they have a plan.
They are in agreement on the Pan
American Development Foundation
for delivery of food, as is the Nicara-
guan Government. They are meeting
seriously now in Managua with the
rights to visit the church, the right to
visit La Prensa, the right to visit
friends, the rights to associate with
political parties while they are in Ma-
nagua.
Why would the gentleman want to
do this today when it took 3 weeks to
put together the whole Contra thing
when it fell apart? Now they have got
some semblance of order when it took
us 8 months to put together a biparti-
san package. Why in God's name
would the gentleman want to come to -
this floor today and propose this thing
that has the effect of blowing it all
up?
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Three
weeks to put it together? Is this the
same gentleman from Michigan with
whom I have been engaged in dialogue
over this for 2 years trying to get it
put together? Does the gentleman still
believe today, after everything that
has happened, that the Sandinistas
are going to bring democracy to Nica-
ragua? Does the gentleman believe
that?
Mr. BONIOR. Yes, I do.
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Then
it is absolutely amazing. The gentle-
man from Michigan (Mr. Bonioal
ought to subscribe to the newspapers.
Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I move
to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. AuCOIN asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I would
say to the gentleman from Oklahoma
[Mr. Eawaans] and his supporters
that I do not believe for a moment
that the Contras will restore democra-
cy or freedom to Nicaragua. And I
cannot understand anyone believing in
such a preposterous position.
Let me tell you something about the
Contras. I go back long enough to re-
member when Bill Casey told me and
other Members of the Congress that
the purpose of this whole Contra
covert exercise was to stop arms being
sent into El Salvador. Under our ques-
tions they could never point to a single
cache of a significant number of arms
sent from Nicaragua into El Salvador,
so we moved along to another rational-
ization. And what we have seen is one
rationalization after another, each one
shot down.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman. I will
not yield just yet. I will try to yield to
the gentleman from Illinois in a
moment. He never yields to me, but I
will try to yield to him in a moment.
Mr. Chairman, we have seen one jus-
tification after another shot down in
flames, and each time we finally get
closer to the truth. The truth is that
under the guise of the words_ "free-
dom" and "democracy," we are expect-
ed to believe the Contras have made as
their target of choice not regular San-
dinista troops but rather civilians, and
women and children in co-ops around
the countryside of Nicaragua who are
somehow the spiritual descendants of
Thomas Jefferson. That is absolutely
preposterous.
Benjamin Lender from Portland.
OR, is a constituent of mine, and he
was shot; and all the evidence suggests
that he was shot at point-blank range
In the temple, in all probability by
Contras, and we cannot find the an-
swers. We cannot get a full identifica-
tion or a full report from the CIA even
today after 2 years of trying. The
State Department would not cooper-
ate with us either.
These are the spiritual descendants
of Thomas Jefferson? Give me a
break.
Right now in Managua we have
peace talks, cease-fire talks, going on.
And your side, which says to the chair-
man that it is sorry it is necessary to
bring this amendment to the floor
without giving them notice, brings it
to the floor on a day when both sides
are talking, when there is a chance for
an agreement. The problem on that
side is that when the situation down in
Nicaragua is seen, it is felt that the
only way to solve the problem is to
give ammunition to not freedom fight-
ers but to mercenaries, mercenaries
who are indiscriminate in their choices
of targets.
Mr. Chairman. I have got a dead
constituent to prove that these merce-
naries do not stand for democracies.
They cannot even account for where
we have sent the funds. There are
hundreds of thousands of dollars in
Cayman Island bank accounts that are
unaccounted for today. These are the
spiritual descendants of Thomas Jef-
ferson?
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr.
Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I am
not going to yield at this point. I am
going to finish my remarks as the gen-
tleman did.
These are not the spiritual descend-
ants of Thomas Jefferson. These are
not freedom fighters. These are merce-
naries.
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr.
Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. AuCOIN. They are not going to
bring democracy to Nicaragua.
Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr.
Chairman, I would not yield, either.
Mr. AuCOIN. They are not going to
bring democracy to Nicaragua and, if
your litmus test on Nicaragua is free-
dom of the press, full participation in
society, why not fund the Contras in
South Africa where none of those
freedoms exist? The gentleman is
silent on those questions. We will have
sanctions on the question of that
country, and the gentleman is silent
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on that. The gentleman's dual stand-
ard is absolutely unbelievable to this
Member of Congress.
Mr. Chairman, I say we should
defeat the Hyde amendment. It is un-
timely. It is guerrilla warfare on the
House floor. It will introduce the
combat, the war, in Nicaragua, and I
think we have a chance to solve it by
peaceful means.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield now?
Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, this is
a preposterous amendment.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, now will
the gentleman yield?
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Oregon (Mr. AuCom)
has expired.
(On request of Mr. HYDE, and by
unanimous consent, Mr. AuCora was
allowed to proceed for 1 additional
minute.)
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, now will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield
to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I direct
my friend, the gentleman from
Oregon to a series of reports from the
Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence which recites how much arms
are being shipped into El Salvador
from Nicaragua when the gentleman
from Massachusetts [Mr. BOLAND] was
the chairman. I will even get them and
hand-carry them to the gentleman's
office.
Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I will
reclaim my time. I understand the
gentleman's point. I want to reclaim
my time.
I want to tell the gentleman that I
sat on the Defense Appropriations
Committee. I have had the secret
briefings as well. I understand what
the facts are as well as the gentleman
does. Drug interdiction was a sham,
and I think that the chutzpah award
ought to be given to the gentleman
from Illinois [Mr. HYDE).
Mr. Chairman, Arias got the Nobel
Peace Prize. The gentleman from Illi-
nois ought to get the chutzpah prize.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, now will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. AuCOIN. Here we have, as the
reward for people who went through
the back door, using illegal means,
shredding documents in the basement
of the White House, and is there a
reward? The gentleman from Illinois
says we ought to 'pass an amendment.
Mr. Chairman, it is ridiculous. Let us
defeat the Hyde amendment.
Mr. KASICH. I move to strike the
requisite number of words.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. KASICH. I yield to the gentle-
man from Illinois.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I would
just like to point out for the RECORD,
certainly not to instruct my friend
from Oregon, that the House Commit-
tee on Intelligence reports certify the
traffic in arms from Nicaragua to El
Salvador and, if he had ever read
those reports, which are public
records, not .classified, be would know
better.
Second. America does contribute
money for democracy in South Africa.
Millions of dollars go over there to
democratic institutions, so again the
gentleman is misinformed.
Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I ap-
preciate the gentleman's contribution.
and I really do not want to talk to the
people on this side who are already en-
trenched. What this debate comes
down to is whether we can get people
In who have been undecided about this
Issue for the last several years.
I want to tell my colleagues, first of
.all, I opposed the adminstration about
delivering military aid about a year
and half ago. I said that I thought it
was the wrong signal to send, and then
I supported the bipartisan policy, and
In fact I chastized people on both sides
who tried to politicize the debate
when we had the bipartisan policy
that passed through this House sever-
al months ago. But do my colleagues
know what? To those who were in the
middle, they have got to look at the
facts, and they have to look at the
truth, and they cannot ignore it any
more because the program is not work-
ing.
0 1300 -
Please look at the letter that the
gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr.
adrcxxv EDWARDS, wrote to President
Arias. Here is what Mr. EDWARDS re-
vealed: La Prensa, the great newspa-
per in Nicaragua censored, threatened,
twice closed; one of the most respected
television journalists in the country,
beaten on his doorstep as the result of
his reports; labor leaders and leaders
of the internal democratic opposition
arrested, thrown in jail; the Ministry
of Justice closed down, government
sponsored hooligans have disrupted
and abused those few people who dare
protest against the government.
Mr. Speaker, on the front page of
the New York Times yesterday was an
article about the Sandinistas prepar-
ing attacks, and we used aerial photog-
raphy and we discovered some inter-
esting things. The Sandinistas are
building up ammunition supplies, they
have got more than what they can
even put in their warehouses.
The photographs indicate move-
ments and buildups on the Honduran
borders, in fact even extending an air
field on the Honduran border.
I mean, this has all been happening,
Mr. Chairman, since we tried this bi-
partisan plan. I do not want to talk to
those who are entrenched. I want to
talk to those people in this House who
do not like the Sandinistas, who want
peace and who are trying to be objec-
tive; my friend from Delaware, MY
friend from Kansas, who have been on
the edge of these votes for vote after
vote.
What do we do here? What we say is
that the Sandinistas will not comply,
which clearly they have not been
doing.
To my good friends, in the middle, I
say that if the Sandinistas will not
comply next year, we ought to give our
Government the opportunity to sup-
port the opposition.
Let me tell you, I do not care who
you want to quote. If you want to talk
abut Luis Sancho, do you know what
he says? He is a leader of the Nicara-
guan Socialist Party. Listen to this:
The SandinLstas see the Contras falling
apart, and they see the United States not
disposed to help them. They feel they now
control the situation, which means there's
no reason to compromise on anything.
Mr. Chairman, we met the Contras a
couple days ago. Do you know what
they told us? They may not survive for
2 or 3 more months. If you want the
Contras to survive within Nicaragua, if
you want the peace talks to be success-
ful, if you want to be in a position
where you do not wipe out the opposi-
tion to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua,
you have got to support this amend-
ment, because this amendment sends a
signal that the Contras desperately
need.
I wish you all has a chance to see
these people. What -they will tell you
Is one basic thing, "our people are
staving. Our units are falling apart."
The Sandinistas know it and the time-
table is their ally.
If you will remember the debates
that we have had for the last couple of
years, we have asked you, we have
pleaded with you, not to let the calen-
dar be an ally of the Communists, and
that is exactly what they are doing.
Do not let the Contras starve to death.
For those in the middle who want to
keep the process going, give us an
option down the road. Let us not elimi-
nate any possibility we have to call the
Sandinistas on the carpet for all these
violations.
I plead with you and I beg you in
that bipartisan spirit that we had in
this House several months, ago, sup-
port the Hyde amendment, really give
peace a chance and do not put your
heads in the sand to wake up one day
and find out that the Contras exist no
more, that the Sandinistas have con-
solidated and there is no hope for the
future in Nicaragua.
Mr. CARPER. Mr. Chairman, I move
to strike the requisite number of
words.
(Mr. CARPER asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. CARPER. Mr. Chairman, I will
be brief. '
At the very best, the amendment
before us is premature. At the very
worst, this amendment is a step back,
not a step forward.
I would ask you to consider the fol-
lowing for just a moment. What has
been the policy of our country, at least
In the 6 years that I have been a
Member of this body? The policy of
our country has been to bring pressure
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May% 26, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE H 3679
to bear on the Sandinista regime to
compel them to live up to the original
promises of their revolution, a more
open society, and a mixed or a plural-
ist economy.
We have brought strong pressure
Indeed, economic pressure, military
pressure and diplomatic presssure. For
years the Sandinistas said to me and
to others in this body and to anyone
who would listen, "Uncle, Uncle."
They expressed repeatedly their desire
to negotiate with us toward a solution
Involving both peace and democracy.
Finally, at long last, somebody decid-
ed to call their bluff. Somebody decid-
ed to test the sincerity of the Sandinis-
tas. We test that sincerity, we put
them under the glare of the spotlight
with the agreement worked out at Es-
quipulas. Our pressure compelled the
Sandinistas to sign that agreement as
well.
We are not testing even today as we
speak that sincerity to further talks
between the Contras and the Sandinis-
tas. Those talks should go forward.
Let me return closer to home right
here. For 6 years I have witnessed par-
tisan bickering and sniping on this
issue, this foreign policy issue, which
almost alone we are able to reach any
kind of bipartisan accord on. until 1 or
2 months ago when finally we agreed
on a policy. What was that policy?
The policy says that we are going to
provide the sustenance to sustain the
Contras for 6 months, and beyond
that if necessary, in order to permit
them to try to reach a negotiated set-
tlement with the Sandinistas to bring
both peace and democratic reforms.
It has been pointed out that the
progress in those talks has been slow.
Let me just say that progress in the
talks to negotiate the withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Afghanistan has
been slow as well. It did not happen in
a day. It did not happen in a week. It
did not happen in 1 month.
Similarly, the negotiations for the
INF Treaty did not take place in a
day, in a week or in a month. These
things do not go by quickly.
Further, there is plenty of blame to
go around on both sides of this issue.
Neither side is without sin. -
Finally, let me just say, I wish all
the energy that we are consuming
today on this debate could somehow
be turned to the following subject: We
have enormous security concerns in
Central America. I want to see and I
think you want to see, we all want to
see the assurance that no foreign mili-
tary bases will be established in Nica-
ragua. We want to see the size of the
military there reduced, not increased.
We want to see the foreign military
advisors thrown out of that country.
Our President 1 year ago said,
"Let's enter into multilateral talks with
all the Central American countries on those
national security interests and let us do so
as soon as the Contras and as soon as the
Sandinistas begin to talk.
They are talking. The time has come
for us to follow through.
Mr. LOWRY of Washington. Mr.
Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CARPER. I yield to the gentle-
man from Washington.
(Mr. LOWRY of Washington asked
and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. LOWRY of Washington. Mr.
Chairman, I compliment the gentle-
man for his leadership in this speech.
The leadership of this House has given
a performance that is working. There
Is a real chance that we are going to
have something that everybody can be
for. We have bipartisan support for
what got us here.
Let us defeat the Hyde amendment
and give what the leadership of this
House has given, a chance for peace to
work.
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I ask
unanimous consent that all debate on
this amendment and all amendments
thereto conclude in 36 minutes, the
time to be accorded equally to each
side.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
Ohio?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. The time limita-
tion is now 36 minutes.
The gentleman from Ohio [Mr.
STOKES] will be recognized for 18 min-
utes and the gentleman from Illinois
[Mr. HYDE] will be recognized for 18
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman
from Ohio [Mr. SroK.Es].
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I yield
2 minutes to the distinguished gentle-
man from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY].
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I simply
want to make one practical point.
After many years of arguing and parti-
san bickering, we have been able in
the last 2 months to establish a very
tenuous bipartisan consensus in many
areas of foreign policy. We did that on
the Contra agreement which was
reached just a few weeks ago on the
floor of the House and we did that
again yesterday on the foreign aid bill,
after 7 years of very hard fighting.
I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that
nothing would be more damaging to
the national interests of the United
States than to, 1 day after that bipar-
tisan support was demonstrated on the
bill that we dealt with just yesterday,
without any notice whatsoever, in the
middle of negotiations taking place in
Nicaragua right now, to adopt the
amendment that is now before us.
Mr. Chairman, good public policy is
not served by surprise amendments
which only have the effect of sandbag-
ging the negotiations that are going
on. I have no idea whether those nego-
tiations will prove fruitful or not, and
as I have indicated many times before,
I would not trust either side in the
Contra-Sandinista debate as far as I
could throw either one of them. I have
been lied to so much by both sides
that I do not believe anybod5, on that
score anymore. But I would suggest
that this amendment deletes all re-
strictions on CIA activity in that part
of the world. It would allow a resurrec-
tion of the war. It would be the worst
possible thing we could do at the worst
possible time. U we are interested in
seeking peace, we should not be in the
business, right now, of each individual-
ly predicting what we think the out-
come of those negotiations is going to
be. We ought to be in the process of
trying to give those negotiations every
possible opportunity to succeed, and
we should not set up the United States
as an easy target for the Sandinistas
to blame if those negotiations fall
apart.
Passage of this amendment gives the
Sandinistas an easy excuse, an easy
out. It gives them an easy reason to
walk away from the negotiations or to
be even more obstreperous in the ne-
gotiations than they ususally are. I
cannot think of anything that would
be dumber for us to do at this
moment. If those negotiations do fi-
nally break down, let it be Nicaragua
that does it. Let it not be the U.S. Con-
gress.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr.
GRAY of Illinois). The Chair recognizes
the gentleman from Illinois [Mr.
HYDE].
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3
minutes to the gentlewoman from
Connecticut [Mrs. Jo}rNsoxl.
Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. Mr.
Chairman, I rise in support of the
Hyde amendment.
Whenever we discuss this issue on
the House floor, we tend to fall into
rhetoric that is divisive and polarizing.
The real issue here is how do we
achieve the goals of the Arias peace
plan, the twin goals of peace and de-
mocratization?
The negotiations that some of my
colleagues have referred to, the nego-
tiations about the cease-fire that have
not progressed very well and still have
a few weeks remaining, may succeed,
but they only address the issue of the
cease-fire. They do not address the
parallel issue of democratization, and
on the record of democratization, and
I will not repeat the record because
many of my colleagues here have
spelled it out in great detail and it is in
fact detailed in the State Department
publication, The Sandinista Actions
Since Esquipulas, August 7, 1987,
which I intend to submit for the
RECORD: but the record on the democ-
ratization actions is indeed very bad.
They have gone backward, not for-
ward.
So the issue is. how do we restore
the forward process. The Hyde amend-
ment is in the tradition of those ac-
tions taken that have in our experi-
ence promoted negotiations.
Now, Members will recall that the
Democrats of this House sent a delega-
tion down to the meeting of the Presi-
dents in January and only when House
Democrats said to Ortega, "Unless you
negotiate, you will face renewed mili-
tary aid," did negotiations proceed, did
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WAXa uew MAW arkd agree to The iiikenaguan govenaagag mama -to
the negotiations that led to the SOPOIL decree an ercneerLY for Sartaorsera. to Outran-
, agreeMent. tee "unrestricted lredom of stapression. ea
1315
Our point is now from this side to
again restore the kind of pressure that
the Democrats in this Rouse found
necessary to bring to bear In order to
Let the negotiations in place that
brought into being the 8apoa agree-
ment. That Sapoa agreement has not
worked to create forward progress on
the democratization issues which un-
derlie the peace issues. We are trying
to again restore comparable pressure,
the same kind of pressure the majori-
ty restored in January to get Sapoa.
We are trying now to -restore to the
current process so that in the next few
weeks there will be some progress on
the cease-fire, but also on the democ-
ratization issues that fundamentally
underlie and are essential to peace in
Central America.
What we are trying to do here is
limit it. It only restores aid as of Octo-
ber or allows that possibility with no
new money. We have plenty of time.
My colleagues are familiar with this
body, if we see that aid is going to run
and we want to condition it, we can do
It, but it sends a strong signal in any
event. It sends exactly the kind of
signal the majority found necessary to
send In Janaury to create forward
motion and new commitment. The
Sandinista S have an abominable
record on the democratization commit-
ments that they themselves made in
Sapoa, and only this amendment will
restore their interest.
MIT COICIITTICENTS
Esquipulas, August 7, 1987:
The Accord signed in Guatemala City by
the. five Central American presidents con-
tains a broad commitment to Popular Par-
ticipation by the regions' citizens in an au-
thentically democratic process. The five
presidents pledged themselves to "promote
an authentic democratic, pluralist and parti-
cipatory process that includes the promo-
tion of social justice, respect of human
rights.. . ."
The Accord specifically notes that politi-
cal parties would have the right to organize,
to participate in decision-making, and to
have access to the media to make their
views known. The signers, however, e0
beyond pledging themselves not to institute
restraints om freedom of expression, such as
prior-censorship, to making a positive com-
mitment. Political groups are guaranteed
"broad access to communication media, full
exercise of the rights of association and the
right to manifest publicly the exercise of
their right to free speech. be It oral, written
or televised, as well as freedom of movement
by members of political parties in order to
proselytize."
San Jose. January 16, 1988:
The five Central American presidents
meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica, reaffirmed
their commitment to fulfill unconditionally
their obligations under the EsquiPulas
Accord including "above all, democratiza-
tion, which shall include the lifting of the
state of emergency, total freedom of the
press, political pluralism, and the termina-
tion of the use of special courts."
Sopoa, March 23, 1988:
contemplated in the kaquipta= 11 Amapa"
to guarantee the right of ali political and
Other exiles to return to Nicaragua without
punishment, and to ensure free participa-
tion in municipal, national and Central
American parliament elections.
TEL ACTIONS
August 7: Esquipulas Accord signed.
August 8: Sixteen members of the Nicara-
guan Conferderation of Trade Union Unity
arrested and imprisoned.
August 15: Police, using electric cattle
prods, and "turbas" (mobs led by /anti ac-
tivists) break up two opposition attemps to
hold peaceful rallies.
The bead of the CPDH (Permanent Com-
mittee on Human Rights) and the leader of
the independent bar association are arrested
while observing a peaceful demonstration:
they begin a hunger strike to protest their
detention.
September 27: Police arrest 18 Social
Christian Party (PSC) members prior to a
rally in Managua.
PSC members outside of Managua are pre-
vented from obtaining transportation to
participate in the commemoration of the
PSC's thirtieth anniversary.
October 19: Radio Catcaica's first newcast
since reopening is cancelled by government
officials who claim the radio lacks the
proper permits.
October 22: Turbas disrupt a peaceful
human rights vigil and attack members of
the "January 22 Movement of Mothers of
Politica] Prisoners" in El Calvario church in
Managua.
October 25: .An estimated 5,000 potential
emigrants walking to the Costa Rican
border are turned back by Sandinista securi-
ty forces.
October 26: aTurbas" numbering approxi-
mately two thousand surround the head-
quarters of the Permanent Committee on
Human Rights (CPDE) where the "January
22 Movement of Mothers of Political Prison-
ers" has gathered
October 31: Nearly 300 Nicaraguans flee
to Honduras following a meeting with fami-
lies at the border.
November 1: Julio Bustamante of the
Office Workers 'Union of El Viejo is taken
from his home at 10:00 P.M. and beaten by
three men wearing army uniforms.
November 18: President Ortega says he
will not approve the request of private busi-
nessmen to open an independent television
station.
Case comes to light of a Resistance
member who on April 30 surrendered under
the Sandinista amnesty on April 30 and,-the
amnesty notwithstanding, 'MIS arrested nine
days later and sentenced Sc 15 years in
prison.
November 19: Miguel Salas, machinists
union member, is seriously wounded by San-
dinista official Wilfred Dominguez who shot
him four times.
'November 27: Nicaraguan police arrest
and beat two youths for distributing anti-
government leaflets for the Liberal Inde-
pendent Party,
December 3: Police detain persons in Jino-
tega for publicly voicing support for thir-
teen individuals falsely arrested by the San-
ddnistas.
December 13: Security forces detain a
Social Democratic party leader for three
days following his organization of a Decem-
ber 13 march in opposition to the govern-
ment.
December 13: President Ortega tells a
labor group that while the Sandinistas
gagait give up the formal trimming: es goy-
aroment., they would tient' Veld power.
December 15: Three Supreme Court
judges resign to protest. Sandinista noncom-
Pliance with judicial orders.
December 17: Government imposes a re-
Miirement for a 72-hour notice prior to
holding poottical events and makes sponsors
responsible for all damage, Including that
caused by partictpants In government-
backed tiounter-Oomonstrations.
December 18: President Oscar Arias de-
rectinces Nicaragua's plans for a military
buildup as a violation of the Esquipulas
Accord.
-January 14: interior Ministry threatens
Nicaraguans who met with Resistance rep-
resentatives In Guatemala with a "thorough
investigation."
January 15: President Daniel Ortega
threatens to reimpose a state of emergency
and censorship of La Prensa if new funding
for the Resistance is approved.
January 16: Joint communique issued by
the five Central American Presidents.
Twelve opposition leaders arrested and in-
terrogated for meeting with the Resistance
outside of Nicaragua.
January 19: Strongly worded Sandinista
editorial warns opposition that restoration
of civil rights should not be taken as a
"blank check."
January 22: A Sandinista "turba" yelling
"People Power!" hurls rocks into the head-
quarters of the Democratic Coordinadora,
smashing windows and injuring several.
Comandante Bayardo Arce warns the op
position parties to "return to their hales or
we will crush them."
January 31: Sandinista authorities threat-
en to hang, take away land, and seize ration
cards from participants in a Liberal Consti-
tutionalist Party rally in San Dionisio, liasa-
tagalpa.
Transport Ministry refuses to allow oppo-
sition parties to rent buses to transport sup-
porters.
February 6: Sandinista military recruiters
round up 300 youths in Matagalpa and herd
them into vehicles. 'Boys as young as thir-
teen and men as old as fifty are press-
ganged into military service. More than two
hundred youths later reportedly escape.
One youth is seriously injured.
February 8: 200 Sandinista police confront
demonstrators in Masaya protesting mili-
tary recruitment. Demonstrators are beaten
and arrested.
February 0: Sandinista police briefly
detain and confiscate television crews' film
of police brutality in Masaya.
February 10: Government newspapers
charge independent newspaper La Prensa
with supporting the Resistance and threat-
en to use physical force to close it down.
-February 18: Violeta Chamorro, widow of
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, assassinated
owner of La Prensa, writes to President
Oscar Arias that "the Sandinista
regime. . has entered into a phase of
total indifference to the points stipulated in
the Esquipulas II Accord."
February 20: Police raid Managua's East-
ern Market. Thousands of cordobas worth
of merchandise seized from small entrepre-
neurs.
-February 23: President Ortega accuses
democratic opposition political parties of
having a **perfidious. blackmailing attitude
. which Is treason to the fatherland."
February 25: During a strike by 2000
res-
taurant workers in Managua four union
leaders are detained and pro-Sandinista
mobs threaten strikers.
The International Committee of the Red
Cross. while conducting a census of politica]
Prisoners, is denied access to security police
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May 26, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 113681
nrisons under the control of Tomas Borge's
Interior Ministry.
February 26: Two U.S. Embassy officers
are assaulted and harassed by PSLN sup-
porters during a pro-government rally in
Managua.
February 27: After being held for 15 days
after their February 12 acquitaL five opposi-
tion members acquitted of alleged involve-
ment in anti-government bombings in Jim-
tega are released from jail. They were re-
leased only after intervention by an interna-
tional human rights organization.
February 28: Cardinal Obando y Bravo
calls Daniel Ortega's insistence that the
Sandinista agenda serve as the basis for the
next round of cease-fire talks "a backward
movement to zero."
February 29: Sandinista television begins
broadcasting spots accusing La Prensa
owner Violeta Chamorro of war crimes.
March 1: President Ortega closes Ministry
of Justice. Tomas Borge's Interior Ministry
now oversees control over organizations, as-
sociations and other "legal personalities"
such as political parties.
Security officials threaten to jail leaders
of the Democratic Coordinadora if they pro-
ceed with plans for a March 6 rally in
Masaya.
March 2: Miguel Cardinal ?hand? y Bravo
Is dismissed as cease-fire mediator by Presi-
dent Ortega.
March 3: Several hundred "turbas" break
up a meeting of 15 leaders of the Permanent
Congress of Workers (CPT). Police watch
from a distance as the "turbas" storm the
hall where the union leaders are meeting.
A Sandinista-organized, rock-throwing
mob officially estimated at 3.000 gathers
outside La Prensa offices, shouting anti-La
Prensa slogans and burning Mrs. Chamorro
in effigy.
Transported to the scene in government
trucks, a pro-Sandinista mob storms an op-
position labor meeting in Managua.
The secret police (the DOSE) warn three
opposition reporters that they are being
watched and monitored because of their
connection to "counter-revolutionary
organs." Two weeks earlier, a reporter Is
briefly detained while covering an anti-gov-
ernment demonstration by women in Mana-
gua's Eastern Market.
March 5: Two labor activists leading a
peaceful march of 60 peasants en route to a
rally sponsored by the Labor Unity and
Action Central (CAIJS) are killed by troops
near the village of El Turns in Matagalpa
department
March 6: 150 Sandinista counter-demon-
strators wound seven opposition demonstra-
tors in Masaya protesting military recruit-
ment policies.
Sandinistas employ "turbas" to violently
disrupt a peaceful Women's Day march of
the "January 22 Movement of Mothers of
Political Prisoners." Five hundred peaceful
marchers are attacked and beaten by a got-
errunent mob armed with rocks, chains and
iron bars. Over 150 government vehicles re-
portedly were used to transport city workers
and DOSE employees to Masaya for the
government-organized countermarch. DOSE
agents repeatedly threaten march organiz-
ers and their families.
March 9: Police refuse to grant a march
permit to the CPT.
March 13: President Ortega warns opposi-
tion parties "not to overstep their right to
criticize the government." "Everything has
Its limits," Ortega warns. and "he who sows
the wind reaps a storm."
An extraordinary session of the F8LN As-
sembly warns the opposition against provok-
ing the "ire" of the people.
March 15: Sandinista-organized mobs
backed by Nicaraguan police sweep through
three Managua markets seizing merchan-
dise from private vendors to enforce new
price restrictions.
Seven labor organizers arrested in
Masan.
Labor leaders protest the arrest of Justo
Pastor Espinoza in Granada. Pastor, a labor
organizer for CAUS (Labor Action and
Unity Central), was arrested and later
turned over to a mob which beat him in
front of police headquarters and stole his ?
megaphones.
March 16: All radio stations required to
join a government network three times a
day, thus preventing local radio stations
from reporting on the Nicaraguan incursion
into Honduras.
March 17: President Ortega tells opposi-
tion leaders the political opening permitted
to date would be terminated if they contin-
ue to pressure the regime to abandon its
revolutionary principles.
March 18: Vice-President Sergio Ramirez
again declares that the Sandinistas will not
grant a license for a non-government televi-
sion station.
March 19: Labor march planned for
Masaya is cancelled because police refuse to
indicate whether permission to march wil be
granted. Marchers also fear government-or-
ganized violence.
March 23: Sapoa Agreement between the
Government of Nicaragua and the Nicara-
guan Resistance signed.
March 28: La Prensa suspends publication
because of a shortage of newsprint Sandi-
nistas refuse to permit La Prensa to pur-
chase foreign newsprint.
April 12: Sandinistas officials deny permis-
sion for AmeriCares (a private US humani-
tarian aid organization) to deliver newsprint
to La Prensa and medicine and clothing for
use by the Catholic church.
April 17: Sandinista authorities deny per-
mission for an opposition rally in San
Ramon, Matagalpa province.
April 25: Permanent Congress of Workers
(CPT) launch a hunger strike at the Inde-
Pendent General Confederation of Labor
(CGT-I) headquarters to protest Sandinista
non-compliance with labor promises.
April 26: Fourteen political parties walk
out of national dialogue talks with the gov-
ernment in sympathy with striking unions.
April 27: A special police unit, the "Black
Berets," attempts to occupy CTG-I union
hall and prevent cars driving along road in
front of building from stopping to make do-
nations to strike fund collectors.
Approximately 100 Sandinista police beat
and arrest four workers from the Labor
Action and tlnity Central (CAUS) carrying
signs supporting the hunger strike. Police
attempt to enter the building, but are
blocked by a crowd of trade unionists in
front of building.
April 29: Interior Minister Tomas Borge
orders Radio Corporacion Director Jose
CastWo brought in to his office and assaults
him there because of the station's coverage
of police actions against CPT hunger strik-
ers.
The "Black Berets" forcibly clear protest-
ing workers from the COT-I parking lot
Several people are arrested, including union
leader Antonio Jarquin and Horaxio San-
chez, leader of the construction trades
union.
Police disperse group of youths from the
social democratic and conservative parties
who arrive at CGT-I headquarters to sup-
port hunger strikers. Some reported arrest-
ed.
May 1: 5,000 march in CPT-sponsored
May Day rally. The Nicaraguan Workers
Central (CTN) May Day rally with 1,500
marchers Is disrupted by what appears to be
"turba" harassment.
May 3: Antonio Jarquin and Roberto
Moreno arrested along with a dozen other
people for attempting to hold a press con-
ference at the COT-I hunger strike head-
quarters. -
All entry and exits from the COT-I build-
ing are blocked by police. Water, electricity
and telephones shut off.
Interior Ministry informs Radio Mundial
Its morning and noon news broadcasts are
' suspended for one week because of its re-
porting of the hunger strike.
Unknown persons break into Radio Mun-
dial destroying control console and FM
transmitter, breaking tubes and ripping
wires. There are no signs of forced entry
and nothing is stolen.
The government suspends the following
newscasts for eight dam Radio Catolica's
"Iglesia," Radio Noticia's "El Pueblo,"
Radio Mundial% "Ed Nicaraguense."
Radio Corporacion shut down completely
for 24 hours.
May 4: Police detain between 25-30 oppo-
sition political leaders as they attempt to
visit the trade union hunger strikers. Sandi-
nista police head Doris Tllerino declares
there will be no concessions to workers as
long as the hunger strike continues.
May 8: Government refuses permission to
the Democratic Coordinadora to hold a
march in Jinotepe. Secret police threaten
local Coordinadora organizer with imprison-
ment.
On the morning of a planned demonstra-
tion. Sandinista authorities refuse permis-
sion for the Liberal Constitutionalist Party
(PLC) to hold a peaceful rally in El Corozo,
Matagalpa province.
A PLC member reports his supervisor at a
state-owned factory seized his PLC member-
ship card and threatened to fire him for
joining the party.
May 14: The Interior Ministry orders di-
rectors of independent radio news Programs
not to broadcast reports on forced military
recruitment or the economic crisis, and not
to or show "lack of respect" for Sandinista
officials. They are warned that violators
face permanent closure. Tomas Borge's In-
terior Ministry will enforce the censorship
lirws.
Mr. STO/Cr-S Mr. Chairman. I yield
2 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. STENAOLM].
(Mr. STENHOLM asked and was
given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I
rise in strong support of this amend-
ment. This amendment does not in my
judgment hinder the peace talks going
on at this very moment. It strengthens
the peace talks. This amendment does
nothing until October 1. This amend-
ment allows a strategy of peace
through strength to occur and that is
what all of us have wanted, peace.
Many of us are divided about the
proper way to accomplish it, and 27 of
us on my side of the aisle sent a letter
to President Ortega 2 weeks ago of
which he took as being a threat from
Members of Congress to him, but it
was not meant to be a threat. Mr.
Chairman, that letter was meant to be
a response to threats by President
Ortega where he publicly not once,
not twice, but thee times all of which
have been reported on by the media,
threatened to annihilate these Con-
tras the day after the peace talks
break down.
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_
I say to my colleagues this is a diffi-
cult time. None of us have the simple
answer to this and 1 quarrel Dot with
most of the factual statements that
have been made on this floor today.
Whet we are talking about is a proper
strategy for America to help the peace
process work. I suggest we forget the
partisan rhetoric we have heard today
and concentrate strictly on the peace
process and see if there Is not some
little question in the back of our
minds that providing doubt in the
Sandinistas of what might happen on
October 111 they do not live up to the
peace accords, because we have al-
ready told the Contras what this Con-
gress will do to them. Let us be fair to
both sides and let us give peace a
chance. Support this amendment very
strongly.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3
minutes to the gentleman from Penn-
sylvania [Mr. Goonereel.
(Mr. GOODLING asked and was
given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mx. GOODLING. Mr. Chairman,
before I get to the crux of this amend-
ment I want to refer to a couple of
things that were mentioned thus far
in the debate.
First of all, it seemed that some were
trying to draw a parallel between the
1930's and the 1980's. I suppose that
was to be drawn between Chamberlain
and Reagan, but I would like to say
that Mr. Chamberlain was not an ap-
peaser. He had no choice. France, Eng-
land, and the United States collective-
ly could not have fought their way out
of a paper bag at that particular time.
That situation does not happen at
this particular time.
Second, I hear time and time again
that we were told in the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence over
and over again that the whole purpose
was to interdict arms.
Mr. Chairman, that is nonsense.
That was No. 2 on the list.
First on the list every time when the
former CIA director came before us
was that he wanted to cause the San-
dinistas to turn inwardly, to look in-
wardly, but -we seem to have forgotten
that. He did it all the time.
I left the committee for two reasons,
because as my colleagues know I was
not a supporter of the effort. I left the
committee because I thought the ad-
ministration had enough opposition on
that committee without having some-
body on their side.
However, the Ortega brothers have
convinced me that I should tate them
for what they are and what they be-
lieve. They are making a believer out
of me. I supported the $75 million that
Carter wanted. I supported the -$100
million that went in as a matter of
fact because I wanted to do something
differently than we did with Cuba. It
did not work.
Mr. Chairman, I am here to say
today that unless we have a stick,
unless we have a stick I am thorough-
ly convinced at this point that it is not
going to work. There will not be a
peaceful settlement and whether this
* the right stick or not I do not know
but the beauty of this stick is that It
does not get used until October, so as a
matter of fact Inert are many months
yet to bring about this entire peace
process. The stick is there. Every time
we have taken the stick away they
have made a fool out of the previous
Speaker, they have made a fool out of
this Speaker, they have made a fool
out of this person who is standing in
the well. So I think if we cannot get a
bipartisan stick quickly, it is going to
be too late. My hope is that as a
matter of fact this will be the stick
that will bring about what all of us
want and that is a peaceful resolution.
Without a stick I am no longer going
to be naive enough to believe that ft
can happen.
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I yield
3 minutes to the gentleman from
Washington [Mr. Lowell.
(Mr. LOWRY of Washington asked
and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. LOWRY of Washington. Mr.
Chairman, my congratulations to the
chairman of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence for bring-
ing this bill to the floor. I just do not
understand why today we want to take
a chance in interfering with the tre-
mendous opportunity that is going on
In Nicaragua and Managua right now.
On March 30 this House to its credit
by a broad bipartisan effort, as a
matter of fact 166-5 on the Republi-
can side, passed a tremendous effort to
support the Nicaraguan people's
chance for them to accomplish peace.
Now the parts of that package are
moving forward.
Two days ago the Contra leadership
here in a press conference, as most of
us know, said that they will accept and
look forward to the delivery of food,
clothing, and medical supplies by the
Pan-American Development Founda-
tion, and the previous week the 'Nica-
raguan Government had said the same
thing. So that element called for
within that bipartisan package that
passed here on March 30 was being
met.
Last week at long last, but it has
now been done, the Independent Veri-
fication Commission established by
the Organization of American States,
that bipartisan movement that was so
successful on this floor, was funded
and we now have the Organization of
American States with the Independent
Verification Commission as called for
by the package that passed the House,
to support the chances of peace in
Nicaragua going forward.
There has been about $12 or $13 mil-
lion of the children's health aid pack-
age that has been sent forward to the
private organizations to work on the
health problems of the victims of that
terrible war that we are all for stop-
ping down there. That has been sent
forward. It is moving forward. It is a
tremendous success.
Let us not today take a chance an
interfering with the Nicaraguan
people to obtain the negotiated peace
that we all support.! think the last
months' action in this House by a bi-
partisan means to really move forward
has been a tremendous success for this
House. I compliment the House on
that. Let ns not god that all aside
today and lose that, let us 'defeat the
Hyde amendment.
Mr. HYDE. Mr_ Chairman, I yield 3
minutes to the gentleman from Cali-
fornia (Mr. Doesaal.
Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr.
Chairman, I do not think a more elo-
quent statement has been spoken in
this well than that by the gentleman
from Pennsylvania Mr. G00DLING3.
He alluded to the fact that Ortega is
the head of the Communist Govern-
ment of Nicarauga, amid it is ruled
under the threat of guns and terror,
with nighttime arrests and private
executions. lie also said that, "Mr.
Speaker, you have been made a fool
of. Mr. Speaker, when you received
one of those Communist thugs in your
office, an office supplied by the tax-
payers, on Veterans' Day Of last year,
you were duped." In that meeting, to
which the gentleman from Wyoming
[11r. CHENEY] referred and in written
comments after a meeting with the
press the other day, I heard the
Speaker refer to the Contras as "our
people down there."
That was said right to the face of
our Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz.
Not everybody in this Chamber be-
lieves that the Contras are our people.
Certainly not a couple of gentleman
from New York, nor the gentleman
from Oregon (Mr. AoConir). They
think they truly are mercenaries and
thugs.
Some of us believe, most -of us I
hope, that the Cubans, the East Ger-
mans, and the Bulgarians, are the
mercenaries.
The Nicaraguan young men and
women from the fincas, the small
coffee and cotton farms and destroyed
cattle ranches, are Nicaraguans fight-
ing for freedom on Nicaraguan soil.
They are hardly anybody's definition
of a mercenary.
Let me clean -up some things before I
refer to these newly released pictures
of the prison camps in Nicaragua.
They are very clear in detail, the clear-
est ever released. Every Member is in-
vited to a top secret briefing by any of
our intelligence agencies, the DIA, or
the CIA particularly, to See tnese
three times closer.
Mr. Chairman, the International
Red Cross has been so compromised
after the Sandino Communists execut-
ed hundreds of young guardia soldiers
the Red Cross turned over to them in
1979 after a promise of sanctuary,
they are so compromised by that deed
and by their acceptance of Communist
figures that there are barely over
3.400 political prisoners, Inside Nicara-
gua. In fact, Louis Rouge Mont in New
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May 26, 1.988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE H 3683
Ybrk, told me to my face that the Red
Cross would bet me $50 that these
prison camps are military installa-
tions. They are obviously prisons, just
look at the three rows of concertina
barbed wire and gun towers. There are
over 8,000 political prisoners still in
prison, most for so-called political
crimes against the Communist govern-
ment. Just a little cleanup before I go
on.
The gentleman from Oregon [Mr.
AuCons] mentioned Benjamin Linder.
Benjamin Linder was in uniform, he
was carrying a Russian assault rifle,
and he was killed in a firefight. After
the incident, the Communists lied five
times in five major disinformation sto-
ries over a 5-day period. It was the
Sandino Communists who put the
coup de grace into his corpse. It was
those lying Communists who shot him
in the head after he had been dead 5
days. No one has been allowed to see
his body, not his parents, not Ameri-
can doctors. The Communists floated
a ludicrous story that niabody of good
sense could really believe.
Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from
New York [Mr. ScHUMER] talks about
drugs, I would ask him if we going to
make the workplace cirugfree for the
Sandinista Communists?
Mr. Chairman, we have film taken
from the tail of a C-47, with people
from the Mint, the Ministry of Interi-
or, Tomas Borge's gang, loading drugs
on an airplane. That is where the
drug-running took place, and that is
where it continues to take place.
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I yield
2 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Goma/tat-al.
Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Chairman, I
rise in strong opposition to this
amendment. I cannot think of a more
mischievous, counterproductive to the
national interest bit of legislation than
this proposed amendment Let us
make no mistake as to the net end
result of this amendment if it is en-
acted by the Congress. The so-called
exertion of pressure on the Sandinis-
tas will mean the further murdering
and raping on the part of those that
the President in an excess of verbiage
calls freedom fighters, perpetrated
against innocent men, women, chil-
dren, schoolteachers, and American
social workers.
0 1330
On top of that, our country has been
disgraced- in the tribunals of interna-
tional justice. We stand condemned
because of CIA activity in Nicaragua,
of acts of terrorism. We not only stand
In condemned judgment, but we have
been fined by the World Court of Jus-
tice, the international tribunal of jus-
tice, because of the thing that this
amendment would seek to bring about
restoration of. I say for the sake of our
own honor, the well-being of the
future interests of the Nation, we turn
this amendment down overwhelming-
ly.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3
minutes to the gentleman from Indi-
ana (Mr. BURTON].
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Me Chair-
man, I thank the gentleman for yield-
ing.
They are Communists. They are
committed to expanding their revolu-
tion throughout Central America, and
they are being heavily supported by
the Soviet Union. They received over
$200 million in aid. I think, since the
first of the year, while we have not
even been able to get $17 million in
humanitarian assistance in to help the
freedom fighters.
The point has been made earlier
today that an agreement has been
reached between the freedom fighters
and the Communists down there that
the Pan-American Development Corp.
will take the food in. That agreement
has been reached, but it will not be im-
plemented until certain other condi-
tions are met. For instance, the Sandi-
nistas are arguing about the seven
cease-fire zones and, more important-
ly, what is going to happen inside
those zones. Until this is resolved,
they will not let the food in. They are
going to drag this peace process out as
long as they can to starve the freedom
fighters, the Contras, into submission.
That is a fact. That is why they want
to extend this cease-fire another 30
days, and we are playing right into
their hands by not doing anything
about it.
Not one penny of the $17 million al-
located by the United States Congress
on April 1 for humanitarian assistance
has been given to the freedom fighters
Inside Nicaragua. They are starving to
death. Are we going to wait until they
are no longer a viable force before we
do something? I hope not.
That is why I think the Hyde amend-
ment should be passed and passed
rather rapidly today. When the U.S.
Agency for International Development
tried to send some bananas, some ba-
nanas, to the refugee camps in Nicara-
gua, the Congress forced the Price
Waterhouse accounting firm to count
each banana and run them through a
metal detector to make sure they con-
tained no weapons. That is the kind of
aid we are getting in. They are count-
ing bananas to keep weapons from get-
ting in. It is a terrible, terrible thing
we are doing to the Contras right now.
What is even more absurd is that
one of the Senators in the other body
from Hawaii ordered a GAO study to
see if the sending of the food to the
refugee camps in Honduras was illegal,
was illegaL At the same time, we are
sending rice and beans to refugee
camps, and the Soviets have already
shipped over 200 million dollars' worth
of military aid in the first quarter of
this year alone.
Right here in my hand I have seven
Pages of violations of the Sapoa agree-
ment. As the gentleman from New
York [Mr. Km") said earlier today,
they have not complied with the
agreements that they signed in 1979 at
Esquipulas, at Sapoa. They violated
everything, and yet we continued to
support them by going along with this
peace process. It is not a peace process.
It is a process for capitulation.
Daniel Ortega said just recently, and
I think it bears repeating here today,
he said, "The Contras are defeated
criminals who deserve the guillotine."
He went on to say that their demands
that the Sandinista front relinquish
control of the army and police would
never be accepted. He later said that
changes in Nicaragua's revolutionary
path are not on the table in the peace
negotiations.
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I yield
1 minute to the gentlewoman from
Connecticut ? [Mrs. KmiNELLY). a
member of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence.
Mrs. KENNELLY. Mr. Chairman, as
a new member of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, I
had not planned on speaking today.
This bill was marked up in delibera-
tion with quiet professionalism. The
staff, working with the members in a
bipartisan fashion, listened to the
advice of the counterintelligence
agency, the Defense Department and
State Department.
With the introduction of this
amendment, we have opened up the
whole Contra question again, a ques-
tion that has been debated time and
time on this floor, hundreds of hours
of Members' time involved. That is all
well and good if it makes people feel
better.
Right now the Contras and the San-
dinistas are trying to bring peace to
their own area, and since we have not
been very successful, we should allow
them to do that.
I would suggest that we just defeat
this amendment and return to the bill,
which is a good bill, the kind of bill we
should have with the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, and
vote for it, and this debate obviously
will come up again.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3
minutes to the gentleman from Arizo-
na [Mr. Kati.
(Mr. KYL asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. KYL. Mr. Chairman, this is the
right amendment, the right policy
statement at the right time. As our
Committee on Rules chairman, the
gentleman from Florida [Mr. PEPPER]
said, we need to do something now. We
need to show, first of all, that we have
not abandoned the Contras, and
second, we need to show that the
United States means business in pur-
suit of hopefully a solution to the
problem.
Military aid is obviously not an
option at this time. All this amend-
ment does is to bring policy toward
Nicaragua into conformance with our
policy everywhere else In the world as
of next October, but it will still send a
message, and that is the point.
The real question is: Why should
this amendment be opposed? First of
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36S4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE may iu, 41700
? all, it will not really go Into effect
until October, so it does not disrupt
negotiations, and it can very well pro-
vide an incentive to the Sandinistas to
negotiate and to comply with what
they have already promised.
Second, it does not provide new aid
to the Contras. No aid, additional aid,
could even be given until after next
October.
Third, it conforms United States
policy in Nicaragua with respect to in-
telligence activity to that policy which
exists everywhere else in the world,
the Soviets Union, Cuba, and every-
where else where we conduct a foreign
policy.
In short, for those who have op-
posed aid to the Contras but who be-
lieve that the Sandinistas have not yet
complied with the agreements to
which they have been committed, that
they have not yet made sufficient
progress toward democracy in Nicara-
gua, for those who believe those two
things, this amendment provides a
very good answer-and a very good vote.
It is the right vote for this point in
time.
Already alluded to has been the
State Department chronology of page
after page after page of Sandinista
violations of the agreements that they
have promised to comply with so far, a
really sorry state of affairs in Nicara-
gua today. If you believe that the San-
dinistas have not lived up to their
agreements as these documents and
the news stories in the New York
Times and the Washington Post have
confirmed, then we ought to do some-
thing to try to provide that incentive
to send a message, and as the gentle-
man from Florida (Mr. PKPPER) said,
this is the right thing to do, because
while it is not aid to the Contras
today, it is the establishment of a
policy as of next October that would
permit us to begin to do some things
that we do in other parts of the world.
Therefore, I say that to provide or to
promote democracy as well as peace,
this is the amendment to support, and
I would urge all of the Members, my
colleagues, those who have not sup-
ported aid to the Contras in the past,
to please consider this as the moderate
position, the amendment that can be
supported to bring that pressure to
bear in the appropriate way.
Mr. STOKES Mr. Chairman, I yield
1 minute to the gentleman from New
Mexico (Mr. RICHARDSON] a member
of the committee.
(Mr. RICHARDSON asked and was
given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. RICHAFtDSON. Mr. Chairman,
there are six reasons why we should
not support this amendment, which
perhaps may be opportune later if
there is generally a stalemate in the
negotiations.
Let me just review what this amend-
ment would do. It would remove any
restrictions on the use of the CIA in
Nicaragua. This amendment would
dump the bipartisan support for the
peace process that many on both sides
tried to achieve. This amendment
would put the House on record for
more war in Nicaragua on the same
day that the Contras and the Sandi-
nistas are talking about peace. This
amendment would say no to the Cen-
tral American peace process and re-
place an American solution for a Cen-
tral American solution in the region.
It basically would reopen the Contra
war, because negotiations would most
likely break down. It would open the
full extent of the CIA contingency
funds. Most importantly, though, this
amendment would end congressional
participation in Contra aid decisions.
This amendment is not opportune at
this time.
If there is a continuing stalemate, if
there are continuing problems on the
part of the Sandinistas that have
shown generally not to be supportive
of the peace process, then I say per-
haps this amendment is opportune
later, but now it would be a disaster.
0 1340
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1
minute to the gentleman from New
Hampshire (Mr. Swan).
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr.
Chairman, I thank the gentleman
from Illinois for yielding time to me.
Mr. Chairman, my colleague from
Oregon indicated in his remarks a
short time ago that we on this side
view the Contras as the "spiritual de-
scendants of Thomas Jeffeson." I
agree that it is doubtful that they are
the image of Thomas Jefferson, how-
ever, one thing is very certain: Orte-
ga's Communist thugs certainly do not
resemble Jefferson.
The continual stalling of this peace
plan starves the Contras, ignores hun-
dreds of millions of Soviet arms to
Nicaragua and slowly chokes to death
any hope of freedom in Nicaragua.
The opposition looks upon the Con-
tras as less than people. They speak of
the Nicaraguan people and the Con-
tras. Time and time again they say it.
Support the Hyde amendment and
send a message to Ortega that the
United States of America stands, yes,
for peace, but also for freedom and de-
mocracy.
Mr. STOKF'-S. Mr. Chairman. I yield
1 minute to the gentleman from Ar-
kansas [Mr. ALEXANDER].
Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Chairman, I
thank the gentleman for yielding.
Since I have never spoken on this sub-
ject before, I thought I would take the
opportunity to express my position.
Earlier this week I had the opportu-
nity to spend about 3 hours with a Nic-
araguan who no longer lives in that
country. He told me in confidence and
with other government agents that are
pursuing his testimony as evidence of
a meeting he had with former dictator
Somoza back in 1980 before the
Reagan administration came into
power, and of the fact that it was So-
moza's idea to establish the Contras.
As long as the United States contin-
ues to provide money, the ghost of
Tacho Somoza will continue to oppress
and plague and kill the people of Nica-
ragua. ?
I urge my colleagues to vote down
this amendment, and let us bury
Somoza once and for all.
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I yield
3 minutes to the distinguished gentle-
man from Washington (Mr. Foixv),
the majority leader.
(Mr. FOLEY asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I think
in deciding this quesiton Members
should be very clear on what the
amendment seeks to do. The issue is
not about sending signals to the nego-
tiations that are going on in Managua
even at this moment between the re-
sistance and the Nicaraguan Govern-
ment.
The question is whether we will au-
thorize, effective October 1, the send-
ing of military and paramilitary equip-
ment and funds to resume the war.
That is what it is about, and no
Member should be in any doubt about
It,
It is not about helping the peace
process but abandoning it, of rearming
the Contras to conduct by military
means an effort to overthrow the Gov-
ernment of Nicaragua.
This is not a new Issue but one we
have considered repeatedly since De-
cember 1, 1981; the provision that our
friend would like to strike, has been in
the law for the last 4 years.
What will occur if the gentleman is
successful in removing it ought to be
very clear. Not only will the contin-
gency funds available to the Central
Intelligence Agency be available for
military or paramilitary operations
without restriction as of October 1 but
any funds which might accrue, under
a finding, to the Department of De-
fense or any other agency will be
available for military operations in
Nicaragua. In addition as far as I know
there will be no legal restriction on
the Department of Defense's making
personnel or materiel available to the
Central Intelligence Agency, subse-
quent to a finding, to put an unlimited
number of American military trainers
into the field to transfer material vir-
tually with any legal limits to the
democratic resistance or to provide
any other implements of war.
If that isvhat Members want, this is
one opportunity to do it and obviously
they will find others.
It is, however, both incorrect and
unwise to say that all we are doing
here is balancing the negotiating
scales. What we are doing is sending a
clear signal that we have lost confi-
dence in the negotiations between the
2 parties and in the peace process
while they continue to demonstrate
their aspirations for them. It is saying
that we want the administration to be
able to send military and paramilitary
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May 26, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOUSE
aid to the democratic resistance in
quantities limited only by the size of
the contingency funds or its ability to
transfer or reprogram funds subject
only to the required notification of the
relevant committees without the
knowledge of the American people or
the rest of Congress. At a time when
the administration is clearly not com-
mitted to the peace process.
If we want to abandon the peace
process, this is the time, and as far as
our friends say certainly the way to do
it.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I am
pleased to yield our final 2 minutes to
the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr.
Binfrinto], who will discuss this
amendment, which does not take
effect until next October.
(Mr. BUNNING asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. BUNNING. Mr. Chairman, the
time is now. I have been in this Con-
gress for 15 months. This is the fifth
time we have had this issue before us.
I have voted 4 times on aid or military
assistance or withholding military as-
sistance from the Contras.
The Sandinistas, with the good help
of their PR firm in New York, have
played our Congress like a drum. They
make promises to bring peace and de-
mocracy to Nicaragua. Every time
they get close they say we need more
time, we need more time.
As soon as they get there, they
reject what has been proposed in the
negotiations. They stonewall peace,
they stonewall democracy.
It should not surprise us- They have
done it all along and they are doing it
to us presently.
I thought the Secretary of State,
when I was elected to Congress, was
the policymaker as far as the U.S.
Government is concerned. I got a real
education when I came to this Con-
gress. There are 535 Secretaries of
State, and they seem to be sitting in
this House and on the other side of
the aisle and over on the other side of
the Capitol.
Instead of living up to the promises
of meaningful negotiations they are
counting on starving Contras, starving
those people that want to fight for
their own freedom.
I think it is time that the Congress
get back to their business and send a
message to those people that want to
fight for their own freedom that the
United States of America stands for
freedom, stands for democracy, and we
ought to support those people.
I just wish that the Hyde amend-
ment will be passed and I tisk for every
Member to consider that this is the
only means that we have right now to
send a message to those people.
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman. I yield
myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman. I am concerned about
this amendment in a respect that I do
not think has been properly addressed
here this afternoon.
If this amendment is adopted, flind-
ing for the Contras would then be con-
ducted through the reserve or the con-
tingency fund that belongs to the CIA.
I think the gentleman from Illinois
[Mr. H7'roz1 and the gentleman from
Wyoming [Mr. CHENEY], the authors
of the amendment, would agree with
me that this is an area in which our
committee has oversight function on
behalf of the Congress. It is an area
that has had some problems, but on a
bipartisan basis we have worked to-
gether trying to work out those prob-
lems. And to the credit of the CIA,
they have been responsive to our con-
cerns and to the initiation of restric-
tions regarding that fund.
I cannot refer to how much money is
In there because that is privileged. But
that fund is for the precise purpose of
giving the CIA the opportunity to
have funds for unforeseen emergen-
cies, not to conduct wars or other af-
fairs such as would be conducted here.
It is precisely to enable them to be
able to meet unforeseen emergencies
around the world.
I think that this amendment being
sponsored by Members of our commit-
tee who have responsibly worked with
me and other Members to try to bring
an area of responsibility to this fund
really in effect undoes the work that
we have engaged in up to now. I really
hope that Members understand we are
bypassing the authorization and ap-
propriation process totally by enacting
an amendment of this sort. I think it
allows for mischief to occur once again
in an area where there should not be
any mischief, in an area where we
have tried to exercise the oversight
function of Congress.
I would urge the Members not to
adopt this amendment and to defeat
this amendment.
Mr. HOUGHTON. Mr. Chairman, the Hyde
amendment springs from the debate on the
Intelligence Authorization Act of 1989.
I see no problem with it. The amendment
would not unleash military aid. That still is the
prerogative of the Congress. This amendment
merelIkreinstates the President's constitutional
freedom to exercise his rights under the gen-
eral umbrella of the Intelligence Act. Why
should Congress tie the President's hands
when it comes to foreign policy?
So, this issue today has nothing to do with
military aid to the Contras. But considering
recent events, I thought I might include a
letter, which I just wrote to Gen. Daniel
Ortega:
DEAF( GUrlatAL ORTEGA: In February. I
voted to prohibit the sale and supply of
military equipment to the Contras. My deci-
sion was based on the hope that you would
follow through on what you promised?
meaning to negotiate and grant amnesty to
the Contras, permit early elections, and
allow the press to be free.
I said then that although there was rea-
sonable evidence to the contrary. I wanted
to believe your words: I wanted a peaceful
solution to this conflict for the people?the
humanity of Nicaragua.
So, I was willing to hold back on arms
shipments hoping that you would honor
your pledge to the outside world. At the
same time, I made it cleat I would change
113685
my vote if the "actions- of peace did not
follow the "words" of peace.
I am troubled. I am troubled by your
treatment of the Miskito Indians who want
recognition and respect. I am troubled by
your words in a recent speech about the
Contras. "They should be grateful." you
said, "that we are not offering them the
guillotine or the firing squad, which is what
they deserve." Strange words of concilia-
?tion. And lastly, I'm troubled by reports
that two weeks ago your Interior Minister
General Borge called Mr. Jose Castillo
Osejo, one of your country's leading radio
newsmen, to his office, then started shout-
ing and punching him.
At some time or other, all of us in this life
are on trial. Without trying to sound pre-
sumptuous, may I suggest that you, sir, are
now on trial in the eyes not just of your
people, but also the American people, and
the people of the world.
May your actions suit your promises.
Very sincerely,
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentle-
man from Illinois [Mr. HYDE].
The question was taken; and the
Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I demand
a recorded vote, and pending that, I
make the point of order that a quorum
is not present.
The CHAIRMAN. Evidently a
quorum is not present.
Members will record their presence
by electronic device.
The call was taken by electronic
device, and the following Members re-
sponded to their names:
[Roll No. 156]
Ackerman Cardin .
Akaka Carper
Alexander Carr
Anderson Chandler
Annunzio Chapman
Anthony Chappell
Applegate Cheney
Armey Clarke
Atkins Clay
AuCoin Clement
Badham Clinger
Baker Coats
Ballenger Coble
Barnard Coelho
Bartlett Coleman (MO)
Barton Collins
Bateman Corn best
Bates Conte
Bellenson Conyers
Bennett Cooper
Bentley Coughlin
Bereuter Courter
Berman Coyne
Bevil' Crane
Bilbray Crockett
Bilirakis Darmemeyer
Bliley Darden
Boehlert Daub
Boggs Davis (IL)
Boland Davis (MI)
Bonior de is Garza
Honker ? DeFazio
Borsid DeLay
Bosco Dellums
Boucher Derrick
Boxer DeWine
Brennan Dickinson
Brooks Dingell
Broomfield DioGuardi
Brown (CO) Dixon
Bruce Donnelly
Buechner Dorgan (ND)
Bunning Dornan (CA)
Burton Dowdy
Bustamante Downey
Byron Dreier
Callahan Durbin
Campbell Dwyer
Dymally
Dyson
Early
Eckart
Edwards (CA)
Edwards (OK)
Emerson
English
Erdreich
Evans
Fascell
Powell
Fazio
Peighan
Fields
Fish
Flippo
Poglietta
Foley
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Frank
Frenzel
Gallegly
Garcia
Gaydos
Gejdenson
Gekia
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gllman
Gingrich
Glickman
Gonzalez
Goodling
Gordon
Gradison
G.-andy
Grant
Gray (IL)
Green
Gregg
Guarini
Gunderson
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Hartuneractunidt
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from Illinois (Mr. HMO for a reoord-
ed vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
(Roll No. 157)
The vote was taken by electronic
device, and there were?ayes 190, noes
214, not voting 28, as follows:
AYES-190
OrP_?
McDade Schroeder
Hastert McEwen Schuette
Hatcher McGrath Schulze
Hawkins McHugh Schumer
Hayes (ll.) McMillan (IIC) Sensenbrenner
Hayes (LA) McMillen (MD) Sharp
BefleY Meyers Shaw
Hefner Winne Shays
Henry Michel Shumway
Herter Miller (CA) Sikorski
Hertel Miller (OH) filsisky
liner Miller (WA) Skaggs
Hochbrueckner Mingle Skeen
Holloway Moakley Skelton
Hopkins Molinari Slattery
Borten Mollohan Slaughter (NY)
Houghton
Boyer
Hubbard
Huckaby
Hughes
Hunter
Hutto
Hyde
Inhofe
Ireland
Jacobs
Jeff ords
Jenkins
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (SD)
Jones (NC)
Jontz
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kastenmeier
Kemp
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kilder
Kleczka
Kolbe
Koller
Rost rnayer
Kyl
LaFalce
Lagornarsino
Lancaster
Lantos
Latta
Leach (IA)
Lehman (CA)
Lehman (FL)
Leland
Lent
Levin (MI)
Levine (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lewis (GA)
Lightfoot
Lipinski
L1ving:3ton
Lloyd
Lott
Lowery (CA)
Lowry (WA)
Luken. Thomas
Lukens. Donald
Lungren
Madigan
Manton
Markey
Marlenee
Martin (IL)
Martin (NY)
Martinez
Matsui
Mavroules
M.szzoli
McCandless
McCloskey
McCollum
McCrery
cCurd
Montgomery
Moody
Moorhead
Morella
Morrison (CT)
Morrison (WA)
Mrazek
Murphy
Murtha
Myers
Hatcher
Neal
Nelson
Nichols
Nielson
Nowak
Oakar
Oberstar
Obey
Olin
Ortiz
Ovens (NY)
Owens (UT)
Oxley
Packard
Panetta
Parris
Pashayan
Patterson
Pease
Pelosi
Penny
Pepper
Perkins
Petri
Pickett
Pickle ?
Porter
Price
Purse]
Rahall
Ravenel
Ray
Regula
Rhodes
Richardson
Ridge
Rinaldo
Ritter
Roberts
Robinson
Rodino
Roe
Rogers
Rose
Rostenkowski
Roth
Rowland (CT)
Rowland (GA)
Roybal
Russo
Sabo
Saiki
Savage
Sawyer
Saxton
Schaefer
Scheuer
Schneider
Slaughter (VA)
Smith (FL)
Smith (IA)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith, Denny
(OR)
Smith. Robert
(NH)
Smith, Robert
(OR)
Snowe
Solara
Solomon
Spratt
St Germain
Staggers
Stallings
Stangeland
Stenholm
Stokes
Stratton
Studds .
Stump
Sundquist
Sweeney
Sail t
Swindell
Synar
Teflon
Tauke
Tauzin
Taylor
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (GA)
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traficant
Traxler
Udall
Upton
Valentine
Vander Jagt
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Walgre-n
Walker
Waxman
Weber
Weldon
Wheat
Whittaker
Whitten
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Wolf
Wortley
Wright
Wyden
Wylie
Yates
Yatron
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
0 1411
The CHAIRMAN. Three hundred
ninety-six Members have answered to
their names, a quorum is present, and
the Committee will resume its busi-
ness.
RECORDED VOTE
The CHAIRMAN. The pending busi-
ness is the demand of the gentleman
Archer Harris
Arnie), Hastert
Dedham Hatcher
Baker Hayes (LA)
Ballenger Kelley
Bartlett Berger
Barton Eller
Bateman Holloway
Bentley Hopkins
Bereuter Boughton
Sevin Hubbard
Bilirakis Hucksby
Bliley Hunter
Broomfield Hutto
Brown (CO) Hyde
Buechner Inhofe
Bunning Ireland
Burton Johnson (CT)
Byron Kutch
Callahan Kemp
Chandler Kolbe
Chapman Kyl
Chappell Lagomarsino
Cheney Latta
Clinger Leath (TX)
Coats Lent
Coble Lewis (FL)
Coleman (MO) Lipinski
Cornbest Livingston
Coughlin Lloyd
Courter Lott
Crane Lowery (CA)
Dannemeyer Lukens. Donald
Darden Lungren
Daub Madigan
Davis (IL) Marlenee
Davis (MI) Martin (IL)
DeLay Martin (NY)
DeWine McCandless
Dickinson McCollum
DieGuardi McCrery
Dornan (CA) McDade
Dowdy McEwen
Dreier McGrath
Dyson McMillan (NC)
Edwards (OK) Meyers
Emerson Michel
Miller (OH)
Miller (WA)
Molinari
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moorhead
Murphy
Murtha
Myers
Nelson
Nichols
Nielson
Oxley
Packard
Parris
Erdreich
Fasten
Fawell
Fields
- Fish
Flinn?
Gallegly
Gekas
Gilman
Gingrich
Goodling
Gradison
Grandy
Grant
Gregg
Gunderson Pashayan
Hall (TX) Patterson
Hammerschmidt Pepper
NOES-214
Ackerman Borskl
Akaka Bosco
Alexander Boucher
Anderson Boxer
Andrews Brennan
Annunzio Brooks
Anthony Bruce
Applegate Bustamante
Atkins Campbell
AuCoin Cardin
Barnard Carper
Bates Can
Bellenson Clarke
Bennett Clay
Berman Clement
BilbraY Coelho
Boehlert Collins
Boggs Conte
Boland Conyers
Bonior Cooper
Honker Coyne
Petri
Pickett
Porter
Pursell
Ravenel
Ray -
Rhodes
Ridge
Rinaldo
Ritter
Roberts
Robinson
Rogers
Roth
Rowland (CT)
Saxton
Schaefer
Schuette
Schulze
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shutnway
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Slaughter (VA)
Smith (FL)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith. Denny
(OR)
Smith. Robert
(NH)
Smith. Robert
(OR)
Solomon
(Rangeland
Stenholm
Stratton
Stump
Sundquist
Sweeney
Swindell
Tenon
Tauzin
Taylor
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (GA)
Upton
Vander Jagt
Vucanovich
Walker
Weber
Weldon
Whittaker
Wilson
Wolf
Wortley
Wylie
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Crockett
de Is Garza
DePazio
Deli urns
Derrick
Dingell
Dixon
Donnelly
Dorgan (ND)
Downey
Durbin
Dwyer
Dymally
Early
Eckart
Edwards (CA)
English
Evans
Fazio
Feighan
Foglietta
Poley Levine (CA) Russo
Ford (MD Lewis (GA) Sabo
Ford (TN) Lightfoot Saki
Prank Marry (WA) Savage
Frenzel Luken. Thomas Sawyer
Frost Manton Scheuer
Garcia Markey Schneider
Oudot! Martinez Schroeder
Gephardt Matsui Schumer
Gibbons Mavroules Shari)
Glickman Mazzoll Shays
Gonzalez McCloskey Sikorski
Gordon McCurdy Skaggs
Gray (IL) McHugh Slattery
Gray (PA) McMillen (MD) Slaughter (NY)
Green Igfume Smith (lA)
Guartni Miller (CM Snowe
Hall (OH) Mineta Solarz
Hamilton Moakley Spratt
Hawkins Moody St Germain
Hayes (IL) Morella Staggers
Hefner Morrison (CT) Stallings
Henry Morrison (WA) Stark
Hertel llitrazek Stokes
Hochbrueckner Nagle Studds
Horton Hatcher Swift _
Boyer Neal Sy=
Hughes Nowak Tauke
Jacobs Dakar Torres
Jeffords Oberstar Torricelli
Jenkins Obey Towns ?
Johnson (SD) Olin Traficant
Jones (NC) Ortiz Traxler
Jontz Owens (NY) Udall
Kanjorski Owens (UT) Valentine
Kaptur Panetta Vento
Kastenmeier Pease Visclosky
Kennedy Pelosi Vollmer
Kennelly Penny Walgren
Kildee Perkins Watkins
Kleczka Pickle Waxman
/Colter ' Price Wheat
Kostmayer Rahall Whitten
LaPalce Regula Williams
Lancaster Richardson Wise
Lantos Rodino Wright
Leach (IA) Roe Wyden
Lehman (CA) Rose Yates
Lehman (FL) Rostenkowski Yatron
Leland Rowland (GA)
Levin (MI) Roybal
NOT VOTING-28
Aspin Flake MacKay
Biaggi Florio Mica
Boulter Gallo Quillen
Brown (CA) Geldenson Rangel
Bryant Hansen Roukemz
Coleman (TX) Jones (TN) Spence
Craig Konriyu Weiss
Dicks Lewis (CA) Wolre
Duncan Lujan
Espy Mack
0 1428
The Clerk announced the following
pairs:
On this vote:
Mr. Quillen for, with Mr. Coleman of
Texas against
Mr. Hansen for, with Mr. Wolpe against
Mr. Gallo for, with Mr. Brown of Califor-
nia against
Mr. Craig for, with Mr. MacKay against
Mr. Mack for, with Mr. Flake against
Mr. Boulter for, with Mr. Rangel against
Mr. Konnyu for, with Mr. Florio against.
Mr. DERRICK changed his vote
from "aye" to "no."
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was an-
nounced as above recorded.
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, I move
to strike the last word.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. MICHEL
was allowed to speak out of order.)
LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman. I take
this time to discuss with my distin-
guished friend, the majority leader, to
Inform the Members of how we will
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May 26, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
proceed for the balance of this after-
noon to expedite the business of the
House.
Mr. Chairman. I yield to the distin-
guished majority leader, the gentle-
man from Washington.
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank
the distinguished Republican leader
for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, it is my understand-
ing that we have about six more
amendments with respect to this bill.
Three of those amendments, it is my
understanding from the distinguished
chairman, will be accepted on this
side. One of them will be the subject
of a point of order, which will be the
privilege of the House, of course, to
decide.
The Smith-Solarz amendments with
respect to MIA-POW's I have been in-
formed have been concluded and can
be adopted without extensive debate.
It is our hope under these circum-
stances that we could proceed for a
vote on this bill shortly after 3 o'clock.
Following the conclusion of this bill,
the Intelligence Act authorization for
1989. we would proceed to take up the
conference report on the budget. It
would be my intention to request that
our side yield to the distinguished mi-
nority, and this has been discussed
with the minority, 15 minutes for
debate on the rule and utilize 15 min-
utes on this side to expedite the con-
sideration of the rule.
Following that, there is 1 hour of
debate on the conference report itself,
which we would not propose to limit,
but which we would hope would be ju-
diciously used by each side in the hope
of getting to a vote on the conference
report prior to 5 p.m.
That is the general schedule and in-
tention for the rest of the afternoon.
We are conscious that Members, par-
ticularly those who are some distance
from the Capitol, have departure
times that become very difficult after
5 p.m., so it is our hope to try to con-
clude the business of the House by 5
p.m.
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman. I
thank the gentleman.
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY KR. MAVROULES
Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I
offer an amendment
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. MAVROULES:
On page 13, line 13. strike Sec. 702 in its en-
tirety and insert in lieu thereof:
-SEC. 702. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTELLIGENCE.
"(a) Esrasusimairr or Posrrion.?Section
136(b) of title 10. United States Code, is
amended?
"(1) in paragraph (3)?
"(A) by striking out 'Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Command, Control. Commu-
nications, and Intelligence' and inserting in
lieu thereof 'Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Command. Control, and Communica-
tions'; and
"(8) by striking out 'communications, and
Intelligence' and inserting in lieu thereof
'and communications'; and
"(2) by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
'"(5) One of the Assistant Secretaries
shall be the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence. He shall have as his princi-
pal duty the overall supervision of-Intelli-
gence and intelligence-related activities of
the Department of Defense.'
"(b) NUMB= or ASSISTANT 8scarrAiurs.?
(1) Section 136(a) of title 10, United States
Code, is amended by striking out 'eleven'
and inserting in lieu thereof 'twelve'.
"(2) Section 5315 of title 5, United States
Code, is amended by striking out 'CM' after
'Assistant Secretaries of Defense' and in-
serting in lieu thereof '(12)'."
Mr. MAVROULES (during the read-
ing). Mr. Chairman. I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be con-
sidered as read and printed in the
RECORD.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
Massachusetts?
There was no objection.
Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman.
my amendment is a simple one. It
would conform the language of section
702 with the language creating an as-
sistant Secretary of Defense?adopted
as an amendment to H.R. 4264?the
National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1989.
The amendment to the Defense au-
thorization bill was a revision of my
earlier amendment creating an Assist-
ant Secretary of Defense for Intelli-
gence. It was worked out between
myself and the gentleman from Ala-
bama, the chairman of the Investiga-
tions Subcommittee of the Committee
on Armed Services. Our agreement
was?that I would offer identical modi-
fications to the intelligence bill to
ensure that the House position in both
bills was the same.
Mr. Chairman, as the Intelligence
Committee's report sets forth in some
detail, there is a very real need for a
single focal point within the Depart-
ment of Defense for intelligence mat-
ters. My own limited experience on
the Intelligence Committee has con-
vinced me of this, as has my previous
and continuing service on the Commit-
tee on Armed Services. This is an
amendment whose time has come and
one for which I will work very hard to
secure the understanding and final ap-
proval of the Congress.
Mr. Chairman. I urge the adoption
of my amendment.
Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. MAVROULES. I am happy to
yield to the gentleman from Califor-
nia.
Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Chairman, on
our side of the aisle, I would like to
say that we are in support of the
amendment. The gentleman from Illi-
nois (Mr. HYDE] has testified on
behalf of it and supports it, and we
accept the amendment.
Mr. MAVROULES Mr. Chairman, I
thank the gentleman.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentle-
man from Massachusetts [Mr. Mev-
aoutzsl.
The amendment was agreed to.
H 3687
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. SMITH OF NEW
HAMPSHIRE
Mr. smr-fH of New Hampshire. Mr.
Chairman, I offer an amendment
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Siam of New
Hampshire: At the end of title IV (page 9,
after line 25). add the following new section:
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING
AMERICAN PERSONNEL LISTED AS PRISONER.
MISSING, OR UNACCOUNTED MR IN SOUTH-
EAST ASIA
Sac. 404. (a) This section is enacted to
ensure that current disclosure policy is in-
corporated into law.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c),
the head of each department or agency?
(1) with respect to which funds are au-
thorized under this Act, and
(2) which holds or receives live sighting
reports of any United States citizen report-
ed missing in action, prisoner of war, or un-
accounted for from the Vietnam Conflict,
shall make available to the next-of-kin of
that United States citizen all reports, or
portions thereof, held by that department
or agency which have been correlated or
possibly correlated to that citizen.
(c) Subsection (b) does not apply with re-
spect to?
(1) information that would reveal or com-
promise sources and methods of intelligence
collection; or
(2) specific information that has previous-
ly been made available to the next-of-kin.
(d) The head of each department or
agency covered by subsection (a) shall make
information available under this section in a
timely manner
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire
(during the reading). Mr. Chairman. I
ask unanimous consent that the
amendment be considered as read and
printed in the RECORD.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
New Hampshire?
There was no objection.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr.
Chairman, this amendment really is
quite simple. It simply provides that
all agencies of the U.S. Government
that hold live-sighting reports of our
missing men in Southeast Asia make
available to the next of kin of that cit-
izen all records or portions thereof
held by that Department or Agency
which have been correlated or possibly
correlated, to that citizen.
Before yielding to my friend, the
gentleman from New York. I would
like to commend the gentleman for
the manner in which we have been
able to accommodate the language of
two different amendments here. I had
an original amendment and he had a
substitute and we were able to agree
on the language, and I think . accom-
plish the same purpose.
Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I am
happy to yield to the gentleman from
New York.
Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I
thank the gentleman for yielding.
I think this is an example of the leg-
islative process at its best. I want to
applaud the willingness of the gentle-
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man to reach a constructive compro-
mise with us on this issue.
I think the amendmentetielare us
goes a long way toward satisfytog the
concerns which be en:intently sod ef-
fectively represented, while at the
same time being compatible with what
some of us felt needed to be some
limits on access to this triformation.
I think it does represent a signifi-
cant step forward. It will codify an im-
portant right which tire family mem-
bers of the men missing in action or
who were POW's are entitled to have.
I believe it will be acceptable to the
administration and to the League of
Families and others who are intimate-
ly and deeply involved in this issue.
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield to me?
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I
yield to the gentleman from Califor-
nia.
Mr. LAGOMAFtSINO. Mr. Chair-
man, I thank the gentleman for yield-
ing.
I want to commend the gentleman
from New Hampshire [Mr. Sierrtn and
the gentleman from New York [Mr.
Solana as well as the gentleman from
New York [Mr. SOLOMON), for working
out this arrangement. I think it is in
the best interests of everyone,, and es-
pecially in the best interests of those
who are still missing in action in
Southeast Asia. It shows that we can
work together in a bipartisan way to
help solve this remaining problem
that we have.
I especially commend the gentleman
for doing so and I urge my colleagues
to accept the amendment.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I
yield to the gentleman from New
York.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I
thank the gentleman for yielding.
I want to take my hat off to the gen-
tleman from New Hampshire [Mr.
&Mal]. The gentleman is a Vietnam
veteran.
As the former chairman, of the POW
Task Force, I just want to say that no
one has worked harder or more dili-
gently than the gentleman from New
Hampshire in looking ont for this ter-
ribly important issue.
I also want to commend the gentle-
man from New York. Mfr. Swaim] and
the gentleman from California [Mr.
Lanomannisrol, the present task force
chairman, because they hare all done
a magnificent fob on this issue. It is so
good to have them all come ? to an
agreement an this. I thank them all
very much on behalf of all the fami-
lies.
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I
yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, the
language of this amendment was
worked out with the Intelligence Com-
mittee. It Is my understanding that it
represents currrent DIA disclosure
policy and it is acceptable to the alkaa-
matt*.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentle-
man from New Hampshire [Mr.
Swan].
The amendment was agreed to.
Alearrosum OREM) SYACIUMUMN
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I
offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
'Amendment offered by Mr. Actimidear
Strike paragraphs (1) and (2) of section
601(a) and insert the following:
(1) lump-sum payment to personnel upon
directed assignment to the New York Field
Division from another geographical loca-
tion, and who enter into an agreement to
complete a specified minimum period of
service, not to exceed three years, in the
New York Field Division, except that no
lump-sum payment under this paragraph
may exceed $20,000, and no employee shall
be eligible to receive more than one lump-
sum payment under this paragraph in con-
nection with each such assigrmient: and
(2) periodic segments to New York Field
Division emslcsees who are subject to
policy and practice to directed geographical
transfer or reassignment, except that the
amounts paid under this paragraph to an
employee for any period may not be less
than 20 percent nor greater than 25 percent
of the bask pay paid or payable to such em-
ployee for service performed during such
period.
Any lump-sum payment under paragraph
(1) and any periodic payment under pate-
graph (2) shall be in addition to basic pay.
Any authority to make payments under this
section shall be effective only to the extent
of available appropriations.
? Mr ACKERMAN (during the read-
ing). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be con-
sidered as read and printed in the
RECORD.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
New York?
There was no objection.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman,
the amendment I am offering today is
very straightforward. Section 601 of
H.R. 4387 establishes a personnel dem-
onstration project tor the New York
Field Division of the FBI. This project
will allow the FBI to pay certain em-
ployees a lump-sum allowance upon di-
rected assignment ta New York City
and to make periodic payment-' to
those employees throughout their
service in the New York Field Division.
Special legislation is required be-
cause the FBI is excluded from the
demonstiation project provisions of
title 5, United.States Code.
My amendment?which is supported
by the FBI?simply limas the initial
lump-sum ? payment to a maximum of
$20,000 and provides a range for the
periodic payments of between 20 and
25 percent of base pay. My amend-
ment also specifies that these pay-
ments shall not be part of basic pay
for retirement and other purposes.
I believe that the limitations con-
tained. in my amendment are reasona-
ble and are necessary to both enure
that the recruitment and retention
needs of the New York Field Envision
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
-are addressed, and the potential budg-
etary implications are confined within
appropriate pasamebers.
As the recent report of the FBI and
the Office of Personnel Management
attests, the FBI is experiencing serious
recruitment and retention problems as
a result of the unusually high cost of
living in the New York metropolitan
area.
As but one example, the head of the
New York Field Division recently re-
signed citing the high cost of hying as
a factor in his decision.
This demonstration project is in-
tended to provide FBI agents who are
subject to mandatory mobility require-
ments, with a reasonable lump-sum
payment to help them settle in the
New York City area and periodic re-
tention payments to help maintain a
reasonable standard of living.
The Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service recognizes the unique cir-
cumstances of FBI agents in New York
City. The committee also recognizes
that other Federal employees live and
work in the New York metropolitan
area, as well as in other high cost
areas around the Nation.
To address the problems of other
Federal employees, the committee is
pursuing comprehensive pay reform
legislation.
I want to thank the chairman of the
Intelligence Committee for his coop-
eration on this amendment and for
moving expeditiously to solve the spe-
cial recruitment and retention prob-
lems the FBI is having in New York.
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I move
to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, the amendment of
the gentleman from New York is ac-
ceptable to the committee. It is a help-
ful refinement of the committee's rec-
ommendation and it is a reflection of
the strong interest that the gentleman
from New York has exhibited from
the beginning of congressional consid-
eration of a cost-of-living relief for the
FBI New York field office.
The gentleman from New York
strongly endorsed the requirement for
a study on this matter and has helped
to engender support tor it within the
Committee on Post Office and Civil
Service.
Mr. Chairman, I urge adoption of
the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentle-
man from New York [Mr. &auntie/an.
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there other
amendments to the bin? If not, under
the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly the Committee rose;
and the Speaker pro tempore '(Mr.
Polars) having assumed the chair, Mr.
PICKLE, Chairman of the Committee
on the Whole House on the State of
the Union, reported that that Commit-
tee having had under consideration
the bill (Rit. 4387) to authorize aP-
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May 26, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE H 3689
propriations for fiscal year 1989 for in-
telligence and intelligence-related ac-
tivities of the U.S. Government, for
the intelligence community staff, for
the Central Intelligence Agency retire-
ment and disability system, and for
other purposes, pursuant to House
Resolution 456, he reported the bill
back to the House with sundry amend-
ments adopted by the Committee of
the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
the rule, the previous question is or-
dered.
Is a separate vote demanded on any
amendment? If not, the Chair will put
them en gros.
The amendments were agreed to.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed
and read a third time, was read the
third time, and passed, and a motion
to reconsider was laid on the table.
0 1445
MESSAGE FROM kir, SENATE
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
FOLEY) laid before the House the fol-
lowing message from the Senate:
Resolved, That the concurrent resolution
from the House of Representatives (H. Con.
Res. 306) entitled "Concurrent resolution
providing for a conditional adjournment of
the House until June 1 and a conditional ad-
journment or recess of the Senate until
June 6", do pass with the following amend-
ments:
Page 1, line 7 after "on" insert "Thursday.
May 26, 1988, or on".
Page 1, line 10, after "adjourned" insert
"or in recess".
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The
question is on the Senate amend-
ments.
The Senate amendments were con-
curred in.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The
question is on the concurrent resolu-
tion, as amended.
The concurrent resolution, as
amended, was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on
the table.
GENERAL LEAVE
Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days in which to
revise and extend their remarks and
Include extraneous matter on H.R.
4387, the bill just passed.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
FOLEY). Is there objection to the re-
quest of the gentleman from New
York?
There was no objection.
0 1500
CONFERENCE REPORT ON
HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLU-
TION 268, CONCUHRENT RESO-
LUTION ON i'HE BUDGET?
FISCAL YEAR 1989
Mr. DERRICK. Mr. Speaker, by di-
rection of the Committee on Rules, I
call up House Resolution 461 and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as fol-
lows:
H. Has, 461
Resolved, That upon the adoption of this
resolution it shalt be in order to consider
the conference report on the concurrent res-
olution (H. Con. Res. 268) setting forth the
congressional budget for the United States
Government for fiscal years 1989, 1990, and
1991, and all points of order against the con-
ference report and against its consideration
are hereby waived. The conference report
shall be considered as having been read
when called up for consideration. Debate on
the conference report shall be limited to not
more than one hour, to be equally divided
and controlled by the chairman and ranking
minority member of the Committee on the
Budget.
Soc. 2. The chairman of the Committee on
the Budget may file, not later than June 1,
1988, a report in the House containing the
allocations required to be made pursuant to
section 302(a) of the Congressional Budget
Act of 1974, as amended. The report shall be
printed as. and considered to be, a report of
the Committee on the Budget and such allo-
cations made in that report shall be consid-
ered to be the allocations required to be in
the joint explanatory statement accompany-
ing this conference report.
Sac. 3. Rule XLIX shall not apply with re-
spect to the adoption by the Congress of the
conference report on the concurrent resolu-
tion (H. Con. Res. 268).
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
FOLEY). The gentleman from South
Carolina [Mr. DERRICK] is recognized
for 1 hour.
Mr. DERRICK. Mr. Speaker, in ac-
cordance with an agreement between
the majority and minority leaders to
limit debate on this rule to 30 minutes
and with the concurrence of the gen-
tleman from Ohio [Mr. LArrA], I yield
back 30 minutes of debate time and,
for the purposes of debate only, I yield
15 minutes to the gentleman from
Ohio [Mr. LATTA] and, pending that, I
yield myself such time as I may con-
sume.
(Mr. DERRICK asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. DERRICK. Mr. Speaker, House
Resolution 461 is a rule providing for
the consideration of the conference
report on House Concurrent Resolu-
tion 268, the budget resolution for
fiscal year 1989. The rule waives all
points of order against consideration
of the conference report. This waiver
is necessary to allow the House to con-
sider the budget resolution expedi-
tiously since the conference report is
technically beyond the scope of the
conference and the conference report
has not laid over for 3 days. The rule
also provides that the conference
report shall be considered as having
been read. Debate on the conference
report is limited to 1 hour, with the
time equally divided between the
chairman and ranking minority
member of the Budget Committee.
The rule also provides that the
chairman of the Budget Committee
will have until June 1, 1988, to file the
allocations required by section 302(a)
of the Budget Act to be included in
the joint explanatory statement ac-
companying the budget resolution
conference report. This will provide
the time necessary for the allocations
to be accurately crosswalkecl, which is
important since points of order for vio-
lation of the budget targets are based
on these allocations.
Finally, the rule provides that House
rule XLIX does not apply with respect
to the adoption of this conference
report. That rule provides that when
Congress adopts a budget resolution,
the House is considered to have adopt-
ed a joint resolution increasing the
statutory limit on the public debt to
the level called for by the budget reso-
lution. The application of this rule is
waived because there is no need to in-
crease the debt limit at this time.
Mr. Speaker, I will not take much
time to describe the contents of the
budget resolution. since Chairman
GRAY and others will do that once we
have adopted this rule. I think it is
enough to say that the conference
report meets the Gramm-Rudman tar-
gets and is consistent with the budget
summit agreement reached last year. I
also would like to point out that this
conference agreement is a product of
the same bipartisan cooperation in the
House that has marked the entire
budget process this year. I would like
to congratulate Chairman GRAY and
the ranking minority member of the
Budget Committee, Mr. LATTA, for the
excellent work they have done on this
budget resolution.
Mr. Speaker, we need to adopt this
rule so that we can move ahead with
the adoption of the budget resolution
and take another step toward complet-
ing our budget business this year in a
timely and responsible manner.
Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield
myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. LATA asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks, and to include extraneous
matter.)
Mr. LA1TA. Mr. Speaker, when the
Committee on Rules considered this
rule yesterday, it was given 1 hour
notice of the meeting. At the time
there was no final agreement on the
budget resolution conference report,
so the Committee on Rules was asked
to provide what was labeled "an antici-
patory rule." In past years we used to
call this buying a pig in a poke, but
now the language has been updated.
In any case, the Committee on Rules
reported this rule before final agree-
ment on the conference report had
been reached.
Mr. Speaker, when we agree or dis-
agree with the substance of the con-
ference report, there is still a need for
an orderly process in this House. The
Members should know what is in a
piece of legislation before they have to
vote on it. Over the years I have come
to appreciate the need for an orderly
process. This rule, as it went through
the Committee on Rules yesterday,
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