ADDITIONAL ITEM FOR YOUR BREAKFAST WITH THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R001500010008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 6, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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OCA 88-2273
.f) July 1988
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
FROM: John L. Helgerson
Director of Congressional Affairs
. A
ILLEGIB
SUBJECT: Additional Item for your breakfast with the
House Foreign Affairs Committee
At the insistence Of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee staff, this ?afternoon we picked up a draft copy_of
the Committee's report-on H.R. 3822, the Stokes. Bill on
Oversight Legislation. We'have attached a copy of the draft
report which might be worth -a few minutes of your time to -
review-before-your breakfast tomorrow withthe Foreign-Affairs,.
Committee,
2. Predictably the report takes the opportunity to
address the often heard complaint that even though the Foreign'
Affairs Committee has jurisdiction over the consideration of
foreign policy matters, the Committee is not adequately
informed on covert action activities in support of U.S.
foreign policy. The report-contends that both House-rules,-and-
Hughes-Ryan specifically include the Foreign Affairs Committee
as.one,of the committees which should be informed in a. timely
fashion as to a description.and scope of the covert activity.
3. On the pace of the report identified as 19A .(see. .
clip) the Committee-says that it expects. and .understands that.i
the HPSCI will consult ith embers. of the-Foreign-Affairs
Committee about the policy objectives and national security of
the United States in accordance with the rules of the House.
In 'order to enhance communication and information sharinc
between the two Committees, "the Committee will, in
cooperation with the ? Select Committee, propose the establish-
ment of a formal intercommittee group which would be tasked to
ensure that all appropriate information relevant to the
conduct of U.S. foreicn policy in the posession of the Select
Committee be made available to the Committee on Foreign
Affairs."
4. In your testimony before the Foreign Affairs
Committee on the Stokes Bill, you said that. the Foreign
Affairs Committee has a legitimate need for intelligence
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information. You can agree that the Committee should have
access to information to ensure that no covert action is
undertaken which would be inconsistent with foreign policy
objectives, but the mechanism established to ensure that this
exchange between two committees of Congress takes place is the
responsibility of the House leadership, not the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
Attachment:
As stated
n Heloerson
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JUDGE:
5 July 1988
RE: Your proposed remarks at breakfast with the
House Committtee on Foreign Affairs
7 July 1988 8:30 a.m.
2200 Rayburn House Office Building
You are scheduled to have breakfast with the members and staff of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC). At the request of the Office of
Congressional Affairs, we have prepared unclassified talking points and
backgroundinformation for you. The talking points are unclassified because
staffers holding no clearances may be present at the breakfast. Dick Kerr's
staff has provided unclassified updates on key world hotspots that are also
attached.
The breakfast will be held in the Committee's hearing room, 2200 Rayburn
House Office Building. Because the breakfast follows the Fourth of July -
holiday, attendance is hard to estimate. It is possible that as many as 50
STAT congressmen and staff may attend. John Helgerson and of OCA will
accompany you. The House Foreign Affairs Committee regularly has breakfast
meetings with Cabinet members, visiting heads of state, and other high-level
officials to informally discuss matters of mutual interest.
STAT
This will be your second dealing with HFAC. On 14 June you testified .
before the full committee on H.R. 3822, the Intelligence Oversight Act of
1988. Your testimony covered the general merits of such legislation and
.specifically addressed the bill's proposal thatthe President notify Congress
within 48 hours of authorizing a covert action. Because this was your first
appearance before HFAC, you also addressed the committee's access to
intelligence information and the role of covert action in U.S. foreign
policy-. Following your testimony, you entertained-questionson the. - -
congressional oversight process, including the-conttitUtionality and
practicality of 48-hour notification, the risk of unauthorized disclosures due
to congressional notification, and the bill's definition of covert action.
You may be asked to make some brief remarks at the upcoming breakfast.
Two items are of key interest to the committee: their access to intelligence
information on world events and covert actions, and the authority and
activities of the Security Evaluation Office (SEO). Your proposed talking
points on the first issue focus on the support the Agency provides. Your
proposed talking points on SEO are based on the OGC opinion rendered o20
June, as well as pertinent correspondence between you, the Secretary of State,
the White House, and the Hill. A chronology of these communications is
attached.
Attachments:
. .
Bill Baker
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TALKING POINTS
HFAC7INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RELATIONS
IN MID-JUNE I TESTIFIED BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON THE
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT ACT, AND I BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE WAYS IN WHICH CIA AND
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CAN SUPPORT THE COMMITTEE'S ACTIVITIES. THIS
BREAKFAST GIVES ME ANOTHER WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE WAYS
IN WHICH WE WORK TOGETHER.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSES ON SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS ARE ESSENTIAL TO U.S
FOREIGN POLICY DELIBERATIONS. I CAN UNDERSTAND THAT SUCH ANALYSES WOULD BE
IMPORTANT TO THIS COMMITTEE, AND I BELIEVE THAT CIA HAS BEEN RESPONSIVE.
FROM 1986 TO THE PRESENT, CIA HAS PROVIDED 68 BRIEFINGS TO COMMITTEE
MEMBERS AND 48 BRIEFINGS TO COMMITTEE STAFF. DURING THIS PERIOD, CIA
OFFICIALS HAVE MADE 14 APPEARANCES BEFORE THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TO
GIVE FORMAL TESTIMONY.
-- THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY CIA HAS VARIED FROM PRE-TRIP BRIEFINGS ON
PARTICULAR COUNTRIES AND REGIONS, TO FORMAL TESTIMONY ON PROPOSED
LEGISLATION, TO BRIEFINGS FOR INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS ON SPECIFIC TOPICS.
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-- WE ALSO MAKE A VARIETY OF INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE TO THE
COMMITTEE, INCLUDING THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY AND OUR NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES. DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1988, CIA PROVIDED
A TOTAL OF 324 INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS TO COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND STAFF.
FRANKLY, WE SEE A LOT OF SOME OF YOU, AND TOO LITTLE OF OTHERS. WE IN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAVE A-WEALTH OF INFORMATION THAT WE ARE EAGER AND
PROUD TO SHARE. GIVE ME A CALL IF WE CAN BE HELPFUL.
SECURITY EVALUATION OFFICE (SEO)
I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT SOME COMMITTEE MEMBERS_ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SECURITY EVALUATION OFFICE., THEY BELIEVE IT MAY INFRINGE
UPON THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S AUTHORITY TO MANAGE U.S. EMBASSIES AND MISSIONS
ABROAD, AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE OMNIBUS DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AND ANTITERRORISM
ACT OF 1982.
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-- THE PROGRAMS AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED TO DO THIS
CAN ASSIST THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN HIS EFFORTS TO PROMOTE EMBASSY
SECURITY.
MY GENERAL COUNSEL AND I BELIEVE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SECURITY EVALUATION
OFFICE FITS WITHIN EXISTING LEGISLATION, AND THERE IS NO NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE
CHANGES.
CURRENT EVENTS
YOUR_COMMITTELIS WELL INFORMED_ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN THEVARIOUS TROUBLE
SPOTS AROUND THE WORLD, SO'I WILL NOT GET INTO ANY OF THOSE IN DETAIL? IN THE
BRIEF TIME AVAILABLE FOR THESE REMARKS THIS MORNING. 'I WANT TO ASSURE YOU,
HOWEVER, THAT WE ARE PROVIDING OUR BEST INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS TO U.S.
POLICYMAKERS -- INCLUDING THE CONGRESS -- AS WE GRAPPLE WITH THESE ISSUES.
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OUR PRIORITIES IN THE RECENT PAST AND AT THE PRESENT, HAVE INCLUDED SUCH
SUBJECTS AS:
?.ARMS CONTROL MONITORING .
-- GENERAL NORIEGA IN PANAMA
-- THE _WAR AND ASSOCIATED TENSIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF
-- THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN
-- THE PROBLEM OF NICARAGUA, AND
-- LAST WEEK'S SOVIET PARTY CONFERENCE
WITH CHALLENGES SUCH AS THESE, WE BOTH HAVE OUR PLATES FULL. I KNOW THE
AGENCY WILL CONTINUE TO BE HELPFUL TO THE COMMITTEE, AND I APPRECIATE YOUR
INVITING ME TO JOIN YOU THIS MORNING.
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Security Evaluation Office (SEO): A Chronology
3 Aug 87 Letter from the Secretary of State and DCI to the President.
Recommended actions to increase security at Embassy Moscow and at all U.S.
missions abroad. One recommendation was to establish a unit responsible to
the DCI to set standards for protecting embassies from penetration by foreign
intelligence activities and to monitor conformity with those standards.
22 Oct 87 Letter from the President's Deputy Assistant for National
Security Affairs to the Secretary of State and DCI.
Stated that the President agreed with their recommendation to establish a unit
to set security standards for U.S. embassies and to monitor conformity with
those standards. The?Presidert directed that the unit be responsible to the
DCI, who would report problems and recommendations to the Secretary of State
for his action.
10 Jun 88
Letter from the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Intelligence Operations to the
Secretary of State.
Stated that the formation of SEO may be in conflict with the Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986.
13 Jun 88 Briefing by the Director of SEO and the Assistant Secretary for
Diplomatic Security to HFAC staff.
'Discussed the aims and activities of SEO.
16 Jun 88 Question by Congressman Chester G. Atkins to DCI during HFAC
hearing on H.R. 3822, the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1988.
Question concerned the statutory and budget authority for SEO.
20 Jun 88 Office of General Counsel opinion on SEO.
Stated that SEO's mission was "entirely consistent" with the 1986 Omnibus
Security Act.
27 Jun 88 Letter from the Secretary of State to the DCI.
Maintained that SEO should advise State on setting security standards.
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TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI
Trends in the Iran-Iraq War
5 July _1988
The Ground War
? In the first half of this year, Iraq has regained the
initiative in its war with Iran. Baghdad has achieved a series
of battlefield victories and has recaptured a significant amount
of Iraqi territory once held by Iran.
The war of the cities that began-in-February marked a?
turning point in Baghdad's fortunes. Using an extended
range missile, Iraq was able to hit targets deep in
Iran for the first time in the war, firing some 200
missiles at several major cities. Iran could not
respond in kind and Iranian morale began to suffer.
-- Apparently severe problems with supplies and manpower _
forced Iran to postpone -a major offensive along the
southernfront this past year; Instead, Tehran
launched an attack in:northeastern Jraq.and captured 'a
large amount of relatively, unimportant territory. -The-
Iraqi leadership believed it had achieved .a victory by
deterring a major Iranianonslaught.in-the south.
-- In mid-April,' the Iraqi Army..launched.its-first_maior
offensive-since 1981 and retook the Al Faw Peninsula.'
The ease of that victory encouraged Baghdad to launch
an offensive in May to recapture land east of the city
of Al Basrah, and success at Al Basrah emboldened the
Iraqis to regain the Majnoon Islands late last month.
-- The ease with which Iraq has been able to recapture
occupied territory can be attributed to its more
aggressive strategy, dictating when and where combat
will occur; declining Iranian morale on the
battlefield; and Iraq's use of chemical weapons against
troops that have little chemical defense capabilities.
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Baghdad will undoubtedly attempt to regain even more
occupied territory in the weeks ahead. Further success will
likely encourage Baghdad to step up its air attacks against
Iranian economic targets and possibly evento try to provoke Iran
to resume the war of the cities as a way to increase the pressure
on Tehran to end the war.
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TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI
The Iran Air Shobtdown
5 July 1988
Iran is exploiting the US downing of the Iranian civilian
airliner to raise questions about the US presence in the Gulf and
rally support-for-the war with Iraq. Tehran probably will not
try to retaliate right away because doing so now would undermine
the propaganda windfall Iran hopes to realize, ,but the .risk of
clashes with US forces remains high under the expanded US
protection program.
-- Iranian officials in Tehran and elsewhere are holding
interviews?gnd press conferences to focus publicity on
the "savage ctinfe" comititted by the US and are
portraying the presence of US forces in the Gulf as the
source of instability there. Iran's Foreign Minister
has asked the UN Security Council to condemn the US
shootdown.
-- Iranian naval forces are likely to maintain normal
activity levels over the next few weeks, and more
unplanned-confrOntati-o-hs-hetween Iranian-naval-forces
and US.warships and aircraft could occur. The risks
will be particularly high when Iranian small ,boats, in
retaliation .for _Iraqi ship. attacks, strike at
unescorted shipping and that shipping requests US .
assistance. Iranian-small boat crews probably-will-
view any US unit operating'nearby as a threat and might
try and get the:first-shot...
-- The shootdown of the airliner probably will strengthen
hardliners in the Iranian leadership who favor a more
aggressive stance toward the US as a way of undermining
US resolve. If a more aggressive approach is decided
upon, Iran more than likely would favor a "hidden hand"
approach over direct military confrontation to minimize
the chances of massive US retaliation.
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5 July 1988
HAITI
Lieutenant General Namphy, having consolidated the military's hold on power
in Haiti, appears set to govern with little in the way of-a political agenda
beyond self-preservation and rewarding his supporters. He has ruled out
elections and has reinstated a.number of allegedly corrupt cronies and
Duvalierists to government jobs,, they had lost after President Manigat assumed
office in February. Nevertheless, the political opposition and public at large
have _reacted ambivalently or silently to the _coup, indicating widespread
resignation to the political predominance of the military.
The coup that toppled Manigat on 19 June appears to have been a largely
spontaneous response to his decision to shake up the military. The Army closed
ranks against the President-apparently because it perceived he was-trying to -
divide and weaken-theInstitution-the same way Francois-Duvalierhad done after
being elected president in 1957. Press reports suggest that Manigat's attempt to
reassign Colonel Prosper Avril from the Presidential Guard to an innocuous desk
job helped trigger the coup. Avril, a powerful behind-the-scenes adviser to
former President Jean-Claude Duvalier and to Namphy during the ruling council's
tenure, is thought to have engineered the coup and is widely regarded as the
guiding force in the new regime.
- Regardless of whether Namphy emerges as an active leader or figurehead
President, or even is quickly toppled as a result of divisive jockeying in the.
high command,. the military is firmly entrenched politically-. The Army's.deep.
distrust of civilian political leaders,- moreover,- is likely to persist for some
time. The military's experience with Manigat--Who appears to have lacked any.
real support independent-Of the Army--has made theinilitary-waty of bestowing the
presidency on any civilian, no matter how malleable.
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5 July 1988
PANAMA
Despite the sustained economic and political pressures on the Panamanian
regime over the last year, Defense Chief Manuel Noriega has been able to
further consolidate his support base, and he remains firmly entrenched in
power. Noriega has kept the ruling coalition intact and, crucial to his
survival, has maintained the continued support of the Panamanian Defense
Forces. Following the March coup attempt, Noriega purged opponents and placed
his loyal cronies in key command positions. The recent creation of the
Strategic Military Council, tasked to advise Noriega and the General Staff on
national security issues and dominated by Noriega's loyalists, has further
tightened the Defense Chief's hold on the military. (U)
Noriega's position has been further bolstered by the failure of either
the domestic opposition or Latin American leaders to mount sustained pressure
on the regime. Government repression, internal disunity, and a continued
refusal to confront regime shows of force have rendered anti-Noriega forces
impotent to challenge the Defense Chief. Various efforts by Latin American
leaders.to Mediate a resolution to the crisis have stalled because.they.fear
that Noriega is.intoo strong a position?to. commit himself .to serious ?
negotiations. An increasing number of countries have opted to return to
"business as usual", recognizing the Solis Palma regime and thus bolstering
its international credibility. (U)
Noriega's future plans remain unclear but he is keeping all his
political options open. In order to divert attention from the issue of his
tenure, he is trying to focus domestic debate on the presidential elections
now scheduled for spring 1989. Although he has publicly?appealed to the
political parties to begin planning for the elections, he also is cOnsidering
holding a national plebiscite to seek a delay in the voting. Noriega probably ,
calculates that such a delay would give him more time to develop a sufficient
power base either to launch a run for the presidency or ensure his preselected
candidate wins. (U)
Nevertheless, Noriega is facing growing economic problems. Although
private banks' liquidity has improved and the public is-accepting government
checks as a de facto currency, the regime appears to be operating on a day-to-
day basis financially and is unsure how future payrolls will be met. The
government is considering harsh austerity measures--including massive layoffs
of public employees--to address its deepening budget crisis. Additionally, the
regime is increasing its efforts to circumvent US economic sanctions and
collect taxes from US-owned firms. US pressure has dissuaded most prospective
donors from providing much beyond humanitarian aid, although Taiwan is
considering investing in an all-Taiwanese export zone. (U)
In summary, Noriega's hold on power appears firm and he faces no near-
term threats, but Panama's deteriorating economy and the government's severe
financial problems will confront the regime with an increasingly serious
challenge to longer term stability. (U)
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Nicaragua: The Current Situation
War Winding Down
Over the past six months, the focus of the conflict in Nicaragua
has shifted from the battlefield to the negotiating table. If
hostilities resume, however, the regime will have significant military
advantages.
5 July 1988
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The rebel military position has weakened steadily since the US
lethal aid cutoff, and over 11,000 insurgent fighters--nearly
two-thirds of the rebel force--have sought sanctuary in Honduras.
Infighting among rebel leaders has undercut leadership unity and
caused confusion and morale problems in the field.
Redent efforts by some rebels to return to Nicaragua have been
hampered by ammunition shortages, logistical difficulties, and
uncertainty over future US and Honduran support.
Meanwhile, the Sandinistas have.used the cease-fire to rest and
refit their troops1 ttack, rebel movements, and lure a few _
insurgents to lay down their arms through a persistent amnesty
campaign.
Stringing Out the "Peace Process"
The Sandinistas, who consider the Sapoa Peace accord only a
timetable for rebel disarmament, have sought to prolong the cease-fire
talks. They appear confident that time is on their side.
-- The Sandinistas have consistently resisted making fundamental
political reforms, offering only, to discuss political issues in
an ongoing dialogue with internal opposition parties.
--The failure of the rebels to forge an alliance with the internal
opposition--weakened by infighting, ideological differences, and
selective Sandinista repression--has enhanced the- regime's
ability to deflect demands for change.
-- Eager to deny Washington any pretext for renewing lethal aid to
the rebels, the Sandinistas again have extended the fragile truce
and called for a new round of talks later this month.
Economic Troubles Intensifying
Despite the regime's strong position in cease-fire talks and on
the battlefield, the Sandinistas face serious economic challenges.
- Inflation--running at a 16,500 percent annual rate during the
quarter ending in May--and consumer shortages have fostered
widespread popular discontent.
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Sandinista moves to trim the huge budget deficit, including the
layoff of at least 8,000 government workers, have had little
impact so far.
Soviet Bloc and Cuban economic aid, currently running at more
than $500 million annually, has not been sufficient to meet
Sandinista needs.
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