ALEXANDER "ANTISTONEWALLING" AMENDMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R000900130012-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: September 14, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Otte fti, OCA 3078-88
cF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
a Office of Congressional Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20505
TO: Mr. L. Britt Snider
Minority Counsel
Senate Select Ccxrrnittee on Intelligence
14 Sept 1988
Enclosed are materials on the Alexander
"Anti-Stonewalling" Amendment. We understand it
may came up today or ten=-r W on the House floor.
FORM 1533 PREVIOUS
2-86 EDITIONS
OCAS l5 Sep 88
Distribution:
Orig - addressee
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1 - PS Orono (w/o enc.)
1 - OCR, Records (w/enc. )
1 - OCA/Lfl Subj. File (w/o enc.)
Legislation Division
Office of Congressional Affairs
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H 6848
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE August 11, 1988
least we have broken the logjam to
give Members an opportunity here to
have their say.
We are seeing the results of the hard
work and dedication of the task force
members. led by the gentleman from
California. Mr. JERRY Liwzs. the gen-
tleman from Oklahoma, Mr. MIcsEY
EDWARDS, on our side, the gentleman
from Florida. Mr. Bzu. McCOttUw, two
of the three are down on our conven-
tion on the platform currently.
Countless hours of dedicated work
by Members and staff created this op-
portunity to pass quality legislation.
While I cannot list the names of all
these people, I think they know I
mean them, when I express the grati-
tude of this side of the aisle for their
hard work.
As I said, Mr. Speaker, I would have
preferred an open rule, but I must add
that the bipartisan spirit that has per-
meated this process is very much evi-
dent in the rule today. As a result of
the cooperative spirit evidenced by our
Speaker and majority leader and the
Rules Committee, the content of the
bill is not only comprehensive, but it is
of high quality.
Surely we do not agree on every-
thing in the bill, nor do we agree on all
of the amend.-rents, but we have en-
abled Members to address and debate
these key issues when we resume in
September.
So, Mr. Speaker. I want to again
thank the Speaker and the majority
leader and the distinguished chairman
of the committee for his cooperation
here, that when we do come back from
our recess there will be probably three
or more days involved in amending
this comprehensive drug bill.
I urge the adoption of the rule, and
thank the gentleman for yielding this
time.
Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, for pur-
poses of debate only. I yield 3 minutes
to the distinguished gentleman from
Arkansas [Mr. ALEXANDER).
BANDER asked and was
his remarks. and to include extraneous
material.)
Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, I
rise in support of the rule and to ex-
plain my amendment made in order
under the rule.
Mr. Speaker. I first conducted a
forum on drug abuse 16 years ago in
order to attack a dilemma that was
just beginning to invade some areas of
my home State of Arkansas. Today,
with Arkansas as well as the rest of
the country seemingly no closer to
solving the problem of drug abuse
than in 1972, the question arises as to
why America has been unable to deal
with the scourge of drug abuse.
As we debate the rule on the omni-
bus antidrug bill today, we should rec-
ognize that there is no one simple
answer to this question, but a major
obstacle in attacking drug use is the
absence of a clearly defined, unmistak-
able policy. In the void left by the lack
of a clear policy, confusion reigns
among the agencies that are charged
with drug enforcement.
As a remedy to this situation. in Sep-
tember I plan to offer an anti-
stonewalling amendment to the anti-
drug bill, which would require the
sharing of information among certain
Federal agencies about Illegal foreign
drug activities. My amendment would
require that any executive branch offi-
cial having information about such ac-
tivities would transmit it to the heads
of agencies involved in formulating
U.S. foreign policy or enforcing Feder-
al drug laws. The antistonewalling
amendment would also require that
such information be shared, when re-
quested, with committees of Congress
and the General Accounting Office.
A classic example of the difficulties
that arise from the national policy
vacuum in drug abuse occurred on
July 12 when John lawn. the head of
the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion, testified to a congressional sub-
committee that he had written letters
praising the alleged drug interdiction
efforts of Gen. Manuel Noriega and
the Panama Defense Forces. The DEA
Administrator testified that at the
time the letters were written he had
not known about the criminal investi-
gation into General Noriega's Involve-
ment with illegal importation of for-
eign drugs into the United States, be-
cause he was "left out of the loop" by
U.S. intelligence agencies and never
given hard evidence tying Noriega to
narcotics traffickers.
That criminal investigation eventu-
ally led to Noriega's indictment, and
was conducted by the Miami U.S. at-
torney general's office, which Is a part
of the Department of Justice. We
must prevent this kind of confusion
among agencies charged with drug
laws enforcement in which the left
hand of the Justice Department. clear-
ly didn't know what the right hand
was doing.
A second example concerns an ongo-
ing investigation by the General Ac-
counting office, undertaken at my re-
quest, which would examine how in-
formation about drug trafficking by
high-level Government officials of
other countries affects U.S. foreign
policy decisions, using as a case study
information concerning the drug traf-
ficking activities of General Noriega of
Panama
GAO indicated in an August 9 letter
to me that "since May 11, 1988 we
have been formally trying to gain
access to personnel and records at the
Departments of State, Justice, and De-
fense." In late May. GAO was in-
formed that the National Security
Council would handle this assignment
for the administration, and the Depart-
ments of State, Justice. and Defense
were instructed by the NSC to cease
cooperation in the investigation until
NSC issued guidelines for GAO access
to information. Repeated GAO re-
quests for information were refused by
State. Justice, and Defense, with each
refusal being accompanied by a refer-
ence to the NSC stonewalling policy.
While It is perfectly justifiable to
withhold certain types of information
that would jeopardize law enforce-
ment or intelligence activities, the
GAO told me that "most of the infor-
mation we need to examine should be
considered to be releasable." GAO of-
ficials met with NSC officials and told
them of "our previous experience on
other successful assignments involving
similarly sensitive information." There
is no reason why the executive should
not provide information on the basic
objective of the GAO investigation.
which is the organization and decision
process for foreign policymaking when
information is available on foreign of-
ficials' drug trafficking.
A series of questions remain unan-
swered about illegal drug trafficking
in Central America. For example, in
Arkansas serious questions continue to
surface about allegations concerning
Adler Berriman (Barry) Seal's gun
running and drug smuggling. Seal, a
DEA informant who wa/,ibin in Lou-
isiana in 2986, was allegedly involved
in an operation in which a plane
loaded with guns to aid the Nicara-
guan Contras flew from Mena, AR,
down to Central America and then re-
turned loaded with drugs. One of
Seal's planes, a C-123K that had been
serviced and parked at the Mena air-
port during much of 1984 and 1985,
was shot down over Nicaragua in Octo-
ber 1986, while carrying supplies to
the Contras, and an Arkansan, Wal-
lace (Buzz) Sawyer, was killed in the
crash. There have been local, State,
and Federal investigations into the
Mena operation, but many questions
persist. A vital goal of the anti-
stonewalling amendment is to ensure
that all agencies are cooperating in
giving and receiving the information
they need to do their job.
One question that arises is whether
Federal agencies were working at cross
purposes during the period of Seal's
activities as an informant. There is evi-
dence that the CIA and the NSC both
wanted to divulge Seal's involvement
in a massive undercover drug investi-
gation because of those agencies' in-
terest in influencing the Contra aid
debate that was taking place in Con-
gress shortly before Seal's murder in
February 1986; simultaneously, the
DEA's primary interest was apparent-
ly the undercover effort to break up
the Colombian drug cartel. A news
leak by an unknown U.S. Government
official resulted in articles alleging
that the Sandinista government was
involved in drug trafficking, and it
blew the investigation. According to
our distinguished colleague, Chairman
Bztt HUGHES of the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Crime, the political-
ly motivated leak cost Seal his life.
While everyone respects the need to
avoid disclosing information about the
criminal investigation of Noriega,
there are many other questions the
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August 11, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 6849
executive should be able to give the even pursue contradictory objectives. access questions on a case-bycase basis, fol
? GAO. Including: We must replace the current vacuum lowing discussions with agency officials and
First. what procedures are there for with a clearly defined, unmistakable examination of otherwise available records.
law enforcement agencies to communi- policy in which all agencies cooperate NSC's actions to prohibit such preliminary
sate their intelligence needs to the in- fully with each other in sharing infor- discussions until after guidelines concerning
telligence community? mation about Wegal drug trafficking. access are established has foreclosed that
Second, how are law- enforcement I further submit various copies of approach.
and/or foreign policvmaking officials various letters from the GAO. the De- agorae On to July our 13. r June ne 23. the NSC I988. . letter wrote i that t our
ur
further up the chain of command pro- partment of State, the Department of request ,seeks access to sensitive law en-
vided intelligence information-what Justice, the Department of Defense, forcement and Intelligence files covering a
procedures are involved. what kind of and the National Security Council substantial period of time" and "raises im-
information is provided? which further explains the need for portant statutory and constitutional Issues."
Third, were any specific instructions the antistonewalling amendment. The letter advised that the administration
or directives prepared requesting in- GrmEnAt. Aocovr ILic Orncit. NA- is analyzing those Issues and would reply
formation on illegal drug-related ac- rroNAL 8ecvatrr AND 1xrrmNA- when its deliberations were completed. We
have on several occasions. most recently yes-
tivities in Panama or on Noriega's in- aoudArrAlxs Dlvtsion. terday. asked the NSC about the status of
volvement in Illegal activities? Washington, DC August 9, 198& the operating guidelines. We continue to be
Fourth. who received the raw infor- Hon. BILL Autnxa=. told the issues are being analyzed and guide-
mation, what did they do with it, what Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, lines will be issued when the review Is com-
studies, reports, or analyses were pre- the Judiciary and Related Agencies, pleted. NSC officials say they cannot pro-
pared on illegal activities in Panama Committee on Appropriations, House of vide a specific date when guidelines will be
Representatives.
or on Norlega? DL:AAa Ma. ALEKANDm: In May 1988 you We are not into the fifth month of our
Fifth, who were these reports sent asked us to review how information about effort to address the issue you asked us to
to-especially, were any recipients in drug trafficking by high-level government effort and it is difficult to predict hoe
the law enforcement community or in officials of nations friendly to the United review, much further delay is likely. Although we
foreign polieymaking positions? States affects U.S. foreign policy decisions. have assembled some information available
Sixth, how did the law enforcement Because the information required to sue- from public records we have made essential,
cessfully undertake this assignment would
use the reports-did they do potentially involve information related to ly no progress on the audit Itself. We believe
recipients further analysis, did they use the 1D- intelligence gathering and on-going law en- it should be possible to reach agreement
telligence as input to build or develop forcement investigations which is difficult with the agencies involved, as we pursue our
any criminal cases? to obtain. we suggested., and you agreed. audit questions. that much of the Informa-
Seventh, how did the foreign policy- that we would explore the issue using as a Lion we need to examine should be consid-
making recipients use the reports-did case study the information concerning the ered to be releasable. and to discuss special
they discuss them, did they do further drug trafficking activities of General Nor- arrangements for security of the Informa-
iega of Panama. The following is a summary Lion if such arrangements are warranted. In
analyses, did they summarize for of the experience we have had so far in sat- fact we were successful in such an approach
higher level recipients? isfying your request. with the Department of Defense prior to
Mr. Speaker, there is no reason why Since May 11, 1988, we have been formally July 12.
the executive l?ranch should. Withhold trying to gain access to personnel and We will continue to keep you informed of
information jM the primary fns of records at the Departments of State, Jus- the status of our efforts. and will discuss
the GAO inquiry, which is the organi- tice, and Defense. We were successful in further steps which we believe may be ap-
zation and decision process for foreign gaining access to the Department of De- propriate, if any, after we have reviewed
policymaking when information is fense and in fact performed a limited any guidelines issued by NSC.
available on foreign officials' drug amount of audit work at that agency. In N~ucCt R. >iuLCSavxY,
trafficking. The antistonewaliing late May. we were advised that the National
Security Council (NSC) would serve as the Associate Director.
amendment would focus only on infor- administration's focal point on this assign-
mation such as that involved in the ment. Concurrently, we were advised that GExnw. Aecouwrnrc Orricz. NA-
GAO's investigation of Noriega and the Departments of Justice and State had rroNAL SzcvarTy AND INrsaNA-
other officials, which legitimately can been instructed not to meet with the GAO rlONAL ArrAlas DIVISION.
be provided: It would not require dis- staff or provide any information to GAO on Washington, DC, August .1, 1988.
closure under three conditions: this assignment until NSC issued guidelines Hon. BILL ALEXANDER.
First, when it would jeopardize a concerning GAO access to information. The House of Representatives.
U.S. foreigintelligence or counterin- Department of Defense notified us on July Data Mr ALrxANDEP: In May 1988. you
telligence activity-. 12. 1988, that It also was instructed by the asked us to review bow information about
3 NSC to cease cooperation with GAO until drug trafficking by high-level government
Second, when It would endanger a such guidelines are available. We have by officials of nations friendly to the United
law enforcement investigation; and letter and telephone discussions continued States affects U.S. foreign policy decisions.
Finally, when it may adversely to try to obtain information and schedule Because the Information required to suc-
affect U.S. defense or national securi- meetings with the Departments of State. cessfully undertake this assignment would
ty. Defense, and Justice but these efforts have potentially involve Information related to
A decision not to share information been refused, with each agency citing the intelligence gathering and on-going law en-
A be made n only the head of an NSC's direction as the reason for refusal. forcement investigations which is difficult
could If the only by head t o We have been working with the NSC to for the General Accounting Office to obtain
facilitate access to agency personnel and under our access-to-records authorities, we
withhold the information from a com- records. We met with them on June 6, 1988 suggested. and you agreed, that we would
mlttee of Congress, he would have to and June 22, 1988. and discussed at some explore the issue using as a case study the
provide the committee the reasons for length our approach to the work, our views information concerning the drug trafficking
such action. In the event that the in- about our access to information, and our activities of General Noriega of Panama. As
formation involved U.S. foreign intelli- previous experience on other successful as- you requested at our meeting on August 2,
genre or counterInintelligence, the signments invoking similarly sensitive in- 1988, we are providing a detailed summary
President would required to formation. On June 23. 1988, at NSC's re- on the experience we have had so far in at-
at-
promptly inform the chairman and quest, we delivered a detailed letter to them tempting to obtain Information on this as-
giting further detail on the kinds of Infor- signment.
ranking minority members of the mation we would be seeking. Although that In summary, although we were able to
House and Senate committees on Intel- letter identified some information which ul- perform a limited amount of audit work at
ligence. timately may not be made available, the in. the Department of Defense in June, the Na-
Mr. Speaker, drug abuse is the most formation related to the primary focus of tional Security Council (NSC) has directed
devastating plague confronting Amer- our work. that is. the organization and deci- the other Executive Branch agencies in-
ica today. In battling g this evil, we sion process for foreign policymaking when volved not to meet with GAO staff or pro,
cannot any longer tolerate the policy information Is available on foreign officials' vide any Information to GAO on this assign-
drug trafficking. would not uniformly be ex- ment until NSC issues guidelines concerning
Void in which agencies operate in Igno- pected to raise similar concerns. Our normal GAO access to information on the assign-
rance of each other and occasionally procedures In such situations are to consider went. The NSC has informed us that it con.
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H 6850
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE August 11, 1988
eiders our request for Information concern-
ing General Noriega's drug trafficking and
other activities as raising "important statu-
tory and constitutional issues."
As of August 1. 1988. the representative of
NSC who has been our contact said that he
could not tell us when the guidelines would
be forthcoming, but he said that he expect-
ed them to be issued within, perhaps, a
couple of weeks (that Is. not within days,
and not after months). We have made sever-
al attempts. by letter and through tele-
phone discussions, to obtain information
and schedule meetings with the Depart-
ments of State. Justice, and Defense, but
these efforts have been refused, with each
agency citing the NSC'6 direction as the
reason for their refusal. We have also con-
tracted the Central Intelligence Agency,
where our request for information was also
declined.
A detailed chronology of our efforts to
meet with NSC and agency officials, and to
obtain information, is provided in Enclosure
1. Copies of the letters we sent to NSC and
to the agencies are provided in Enclosure 11.
The NSC has provided one written interim
response to our letters (Enclosure III ): of
the agencies, only the Central Intelligence
Agency has responded in writing (Enclosure
IV).
We are currently awaiting the NSC guide-
lines. We will continue to keep you In-
formed of the status of our efforts, and will
discuss further steps which we believe may
be appropriate, if any, after we have re-
viewed any guidelines issued by NSC.
Sincerely yours,
NANcz R. KINGSat)RY,
Associate Director.
ENCLOSURE I
CHRONOLOGICAL Suans aY OF GAO CONTACTS
WITH EBECOTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES AND
OPFICIAL5
May 11-16, 1988: We sent routine notifica-
tion letters to the Departments of.State,
Justice, and Defense, and the National Se-
curity Council advising them of our review
and identifying the subject and scope of our
work. Letters were sent specifically within
the Department of Justice to the Drug En-
I rcement Agency (DEA), the Executive
Office for U.S. Attorneys, and Justice's
Criminal Division.
May 23, 1988: We received our first re-
sponse from the NSC. Mr. Nicolas Rostow,
Special Assistant to the President and Legal
Advisor, told us by telephone that he
wanted to "think about It" before schedul-
ing a meeting with us.
May 24. 1988: We sent a notification letter
to the Central Intelligence agency asking
for a meeting to discuss the issues.,
May 30-June 1. 1988: We began contacting
personnel at State and Justice to arrange
for initial meetings to discuss the scope and
depth of our audit. Mr. Manuel Rodriquez.
U.S. Attorneys Office liaison who was co-
ordinating the Justice Department compo-
nents, declined to set up a meeting stating
that NSC was coordinating the Administra-
tion's response to our notification and he
was going to wait until be heard from NSC
before proceeding. Mr. Bob Harris. from the
Department of State, advised us that State
would not deal with us on this assignment
until we had discussed our work with the
NSC.
June 1: We conducted our initial meeting
with the Department of Defense. We per-
formed work at the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) and the military departments
until July 12, 1988.
June 6, 1988: We had our first meeting
with Mr. Dan Levin, Deputy Legal Advisor.
NSC. Mr. Levin stated he understood the
purpose of our review, but wasn't sure we was not willing to commit to a specific time
could have access to sensitive intelligence or period.
law enforcement files. He promised to dis- June 23.1988: GAO hand delivered the ex.
cuss access with the agencies involved and planatory letter to the NSC. The document
would get back to us quickly. We were offs- explained that In order to accomplish our
ciaily notified that NSC would be our focal objectives, we planned to
point on this assignment. We advised Mr. (1) obtain agency briefings that describe
Levin that we preferred to deal with the the general organizational structure and the
agencies directly without having to clear ev- operational procedures related to the agen-
erything with the NSC-our normal prac- cy's data collection, analysis, and dissemina-
tice. Mr. Levin stated we are free to deal Lion systems:
with each agency directly and that NSC (2) interview relevant agency personnel
would not be a bottleneck. who are responsible for defining agency in
June 8-9. 1988: We again contacted the formation needs with regard to General
Departments of State and Justice to ar- Noriega and Panama, implementing the in-
range for initial meetings. Despite Mr. formation collection process. collecting= and
Levin's stitemerlt that we could deal direct- reporting raw data, and analyzing and dil-
ly with the agencies, both Mr. Harris at seeminating data on Panama and General
State and Mr. Rodriquez at Justice advised Noriega;
us the NSC instructed them not to deal with (3) review documents to include specific
us until NSC had developed operational directives, instructions, or taskings to collect
guidelines on what to do and what not to do data on General Noriega or alleged Illegal
on this assignment. activities involving General Noriega. cables
June 13, 1988: Mr. John L. Helgerson, Di- and reports from field offices regarding
rector of Congressional Affairs. CIA. re- General Noriega's involvement in or tolera-
sponded to our notification letter. He stated tion of illegal activities, analyses or summa-
that all agency activities in Central America ries of field reporting on General Noriega.
and information it gathers is under close and geographic/subject-area studies discuss-
and continuing se-utiny by the House and ing the role or suspected role of General
Senate Intelligence Committees. Further- Noriega in Illegal activities; and
more, the CIA advised all policy-related (4) examine the use of information about
que:'_ions should be directed to the appro- General Noriega in the foreign policy proc-
priate components of the Executive Branch. ess by identifying the agencies, organiza-
It stated that therefore it could not be of tions, and individuals who play a role in de-
help to us. ciding national security and foreign policy
June 15-16, 1988: We began efforts to con- issues with regard to Panama and interview
tact Mr. Levin, NSC, to determine when the each and review documents to determine
NSC guidance would be issued and we could whether information about General Noriega
continue our review. Mr. Levin requested reached them and how that information
another meeting to learn more about the was used in making decisions.
review. June 27. 1988: We contacted Mr. Levin at
June 16, 1988: We conducted an initial NSC on the status of its response to our
meeting with representatives of the Cus- June 23 letter. He said they were preparing
toms Service. Mr. Bill Rosenblatt. Assistant a response and it would be provided
Commissioner for Enforcement, did not pro- "promptly."
vide any information and said he wanted July 1, 1988: We called Mr. Levin again at
first for the U.S. Attorneys Office to estab- NSC. He said they hoped to have a response
lish ground rules as to how much of the in- soon. We inquired about who in the White
formation Customs has is covered by grand House or the NSC is making the decisions
jury secrecy provisions and what informs- and what the specific problems or objec-
tion they can provide to us. tions are, and Mr. Levin declined to provide
June 22, 1988: We held a second meeting any information.
with the NSC and White House staff per- July 5, 1988: We again called Mr. Levin at
sonnel. Attending for the Executive Branch NSC. He advised us that a letter was "in for
were Mr. Nicolas Rostow, Special Assistant signature," but he declined to predict when
to the President and Legal Advisor: Mr. Dan it would be signed. He also would not say
Levin, Deputy Legal Advisor. NSC; Mr. Jon- what position the response would take or
athan Scharfman. Assistant Legal Advisor, who it was with for signature. He said he
NSC: Mr. Dan McGrath, Legal Counsel, would not "sit on" a signed response and
White House Staff; Mr. Bob Harris, Depart- that he would call us when it is signed.
ment of State: and another official from the July 7, 1988: We called Mr. Bob Harris.
Department of Justice. State Department, in another attempt to
We reiterated our purpose. and our. re- gain cooperation and were told State would
quirements in terms of access to personnel not meet with us until It hears from NSC_
and documentation to the extent that we We advised Mr. Harris that we planned to
could. We explained that we needed to con- send a second letter to them specifically
duct initial meetings to more fully deter- asking for an initial meeting and access to
mine our documentation needs. We dis- documents.
cussed the availability of documents used in July 8. 1988: We called Mr. Paul Prise.
the deliberative process: grand jury- and DEA. asking to meet. He told us that NSC
other enforcement actions, foreign intelli- gave instructions not to meet with us until
gence. and other types of documentation. NSC gives the "go ahead." We advised a
Some were considered to fall under execu- second letter was eomutg.
tive privilege and not available to GAO, ac- July 12, 1988: We sent a second letter,
cording to the administration officials. We more detailed in what we requested in the
discussed in general terms our access experi- way of cooperation to the Departments of
ences in other kinds of highly sensitive as- State and Justice (DEA, Criminal Division
signments and pointed out that special secu- and the U.S. Attorneys Office), and the
rity arrangements could be agreed upon if NSC.
circumstances warrant. July 12, 1988: We attempted to continue
At the'request of Mr. Levin, we agreed to our work at the Department of Defense. Up
submit in writing a more detailed explana- to this point, we had conducted a series of
tion of the specific types of documents and interviews with personnel involved in Intelli-
information we Wanted access to so they gence gathering and analysis in Latin Amer-
could more fully consider our request. They ica. We had identified and requested about
promised a prompt response. We asked for a 100 documents, files. reports. cables. etc..
response within one or two weeks. Mr. Levin that we felt were relevant to our review. We
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August 11, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 6851
.bad some additional meetings scheduled Mr. Patton at 275-1698 or Mr. Benone at. please contact 2Mr. Patton at 275-1898 or
with agency personnel. We were advised by 275-7487? Mr. Renone at Sincerely yours.
Mr. Nacho Morales. Army Intelligence and Sincerely yours.ARxow P. JONES. JosErH E. KELLY.
Security Command, that NSC directed DOD
to postpone,Lny meetings with us on the as- Senior Associate Director. Associate Director.
signment. Mr. Craig Campbell, a GAO liai-
son official with the DOD/IO. confirmed OmetRAL AccOUnTING Omcc. NA- GENERAL AocouxnPG Omer. NA-
that DOD was told to withhold contacts nonAL SEC RITT AND INTZRNA- TIONAL SECURITY AND IxTERNA-
with us. Mr. Martin Sheina. DIA, told us he TioNAL ArrAIRs Drvuox. TIONAL AFFAIRS Dlvrsrox,
could not provide documents we had re- Washingon, DC May 12, 1988. Washington. DC, May 13, 1986.
quested until NSC provides guidance. Hon. PRAIM C. CARLUCCI. Hon. GEORGE P. SHIILTZ.
July 13. 1988: We sent a letter to the De- The Secretary Qf Wenac The Secretary of State.
partment of Defense. similar to those sent Attention: DOD Office of the Inspector (Attention: GAO Liaison. Office of the
to State and Justice on July 12. 1988. asking General. Deputy Assistant Inspector Comptroller.)
for a resumption of cooperation-i.e.. to pro- General for GAO Report Analysis. DEAR MR. SrcarraRr. The General Ac-
vide the requested documents and to contin- DEAR Ma.:SscsrrAar. The General Ac- counting Office, has been requested to un-
ue meeting with us. counting Office. has been requested to un- dertake a study of Panamanian leader Gen.
July 13, 1988: Mr. Don Schramak. Justice dertake a study of Panamanian leader Gen. Manuel Noriega's alleged drug activities.
liaison. said that the Justice General Coun- Manuel Noreiga's alleged drug activities. The study, under code 472165. will examine
Eel staff had been working with NSC to de- The study, under code 472165, will examine (1) the broad parameters of US?-Paaamani-
velop a response. and Indicated that It (1) the broad parameters of US: Panamani- an relations over the past 20 years. (2) the
would be sent within a day or so. an relations over the past 20 years. (2) the type of Information about Noriega devel-
July 18. 1988: We received a letter from type of information about Noriega devel- oped by various Intelligence and law-en-
Mr. Nicolas Rostow. NSC, dated July 13, oped by various intelligence and law en- forcement agencies, (3) the extent to which
1988 which expressed his disappointment forcement agencies. (3) the extent to which this information reached foreign policy deci-
that we had not narrowed the scope of the this Information reached foreign policy de- sionmakers, and (4) the role that such infor-
information we wanted and stated that the cision-makers, and (4) the role that such in. oration played in decisions on U.S. foreign
administration is still considering our re- formation played in decisions on U.S. for. policy.
quest. eign policy. This work will be performed by Mr.
August 1. 1988: We telephoned Mr. Levin This work will be performed by Mr. Donald 1 Patton. Group Director. Mr.
at -NSC asking for the status of the re- Donald L. Patton. Group Director; Mr. James O. Benone. Evaluator-in-Charge; and
sponse. He said It was being reviewed at the James O. Benone, Evaluator-in-Charge: and Mr. Jon Chasson; of our Foreign Economic
Department of Justice and there was no Jon Chanson: of our Foreign Economic Assistance Group.
definite date it would be issued. He hoped it Assistance Group. The work will be conducted in Wsshing-
would be issued by the week of August 8, The work will be conducted in Washing- ton at the Department of State. the Depart-
1988. Lon at the Department of Defense, the De- ment of Defense, the Department of Jus-
August 2. 1988: We advised Mr. Levin. partment of State. the Department of Jus- tice, and other federal agencies. We will
NSC. that Senator Kerry's staff had in- tice. and other federal agencies. We will advise you of any need to visit State Depart-
formed us that Senator Kerry is prepared to advise you of any need to visit Department ment facilities outside the Washington area.
hold a press conference about the lack of co- facilities outside the Washington area. We appreciate your assistance in notifying
operation with GAO. I advised Mr. Levin We appreciate your assistance in notifying the appropriate officials of the assignment.
that the Senator's staff had stated that if the appropriate officials of the assignment. If you have any Questions, please contact
we did not have guidelines by 9 o'clock a.m.. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. Benone at
August 8, 1988, or at least a definite delivery Mr. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. Benone at 275-7487.
date. Senator Kerry would hold a press con- 275_7487 Sincerely yours,
JOSEPH E. KEL.IT,
Terence. Sincerely yours.
NANCY 11 KrNSBURY. Associate Director.
GENERAL Accotntirxc OrraCa.
GENERAL Gov=txKEwT Drvisiox,
Washington, DC, May 11. 1988.
Mr. PETER P. GRUszN,
Assistant Administrator, Planning and In-
spection Division, Drug Enforcement
Administration, Department ofJustice.
DEAR MR. GRUDEN: The General Account-
ing Office. has been requested to undertake
a study of Panamanian leader Gen. Manuel
Noriega's alleged drug activities. The study,
under code 472165. will examine (1) the
broad parameters of US.-Panamanian rela-
tions over the past 20 years. (2) the type of
information about Norlega developed by
various intelligence and law enforcement
agencies, (3) the extent to which this infor-
mation reached foreign policy decision-
makers, and (4) the role that such informa-
tion played in decisions on U.S. foreign
policy.
This work will be performed by Mr.
Donald L. Patton. Group Director: Mr.
James O. Benone, Evaluator-in-Charge; and
Mr. Jon Chasson: of our Foreign Economic
Assistance Group, National Security and
International Affairs Division.
The work will be conducted in Washing-
ton at the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion, the Department of State. the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Department of the
Treasury. and other federal agencies. We
will advise you of any need to visit facilities
outside the Washington area.
We appreciate your assistance in notifying
the appropriate officials of the assignment.
If you have any questions. please contact
GENERAL AccoUNTINC OFFicx, NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERINA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS DrvIStoN.
Washington, DC, May 13, 1986.
Mr. PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS,
Executive Secretary, National Security
Council, Old Executive Office Bldg.,
Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. STIVENs: The General Account-
ing Office, has been requested to undertake
a study of Panamanian leader Gen. Manuel
Noriega's alleged drug activities. The study,
under code 472165. will examine (1) the
broad parameters of US.-Panamanian rela-
tions over the past 20 years. (2) the type of
information about Noriega developed by
various intelligence and law-enforcement
agencies, (3) the extent to which this infor-
mation reached foreign policy decision-
makers, and (4) the role that such informa-
tion played in decisions on U.S. foreign
policy.
This work will be performed by Mr.
Donald L. Patton. Group Director; Mr.
James O. Benone. Evaluator-in-Charge; and
Mr. Jon Chasson; of our Foreign Economic
Assistance Group.
The work will be conducted at the Nation-
al Security Council. the Department of
State, the Department of Defense, the De-
partment of Justice, and other federal agen-
cies.
We appreciate any assistance you can pro-
vide to our staff. If you have any questions.
LIEJIFSAL. VUVAXP .Zl' 1 Y1 v.a.vn.
Washington, DC, May 16, 1988.
Mr. JOHN C. KsswrY,
Assistant Attorney General. Criminal Divi-
sion, Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC.
DEAR MR. KEENrv: The General Account-
ing Office. has been requested to undertake
a study of Panamanian leader Gen. Manuel
Noriega's alleged drug activities. The study.
under code 472165. will examine (1) the
broad parameters of US: Panamanian rela-
tions over the past 20 years, (2) the type of
information about Noriega developed by
various intelligence and law-enforcement
agencies, (3) the extent to which this infor-
mation reached foreign policy decision-
makers, and (4) the role that such informa.
tion played in decisions on U.S. foreign
policy.
This work will be performed by Mr.
Donald L. Patton. Group Director, Mr.
James O. Benone. Evaluator-in-Charge; and
Mr. Jon Chasson; of our Foreign Economic
Assistance Group, National Security and
International Affairs Division.
We would like to meet with knowledgeable
Criminal Division officials. We also plan to
conduct work at other Department of Jus-
tice offices, the Department of Defense, the
Department of State. and other federal
agencies.
We appreciate your assistance In notifying
the appropriate officials of the assignment.
If you have any questions, please contact
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116852 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE August 11
1988
Mr! Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. Benone at
our staff In this regard. If you have any
,
M
L
i
275-7487,
Si
questions, please contact Mr. Patton or Mr.
r.
ev
n indicated that you would
handle this request expeditiously
a
d
ncerely Yours,
Benone at 276-5790.
.
n
I
ARNo D P. JONES.
Sincerely yours,
Senior Associate Director.
PaANIc C. CONAHAN,
about our review, please contact Mr. Patton
at 275-1898 or Mr. Dentine at 275-7487.
Mr. MANUEL TIONAL BECQRITT A10 I1t NA Associate Director.
RODRIQVEZ, TIONAL AFFAIRS DmsioN,
legal Counsel, RXecutive Office for U.S. At.
torneya, Washington, DC, June 23, 1988. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. NA-
TIONAL Department Justice. SECURITY AND INTERNA?
DEAR MA. RODRIQUr2: The General Ac- Special Assistant to the President and Legal TIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
touting Office, has been requested to under-
take a study of Panamanian leader Advisor, National Security Council. Washington, DC, July 12, 1988.
Gen.
Manuel NOrlega's DEAR MR. RosTOw: As you are aware. Sen. Mr. LAWRENCE S. MCWNORTCR.
The study, , under code alleged 472165, drug will activities. ator John Kerry, Chairman of the Subcom- Director, Executive Office for U.S. Attor-
examine
(1) the broad parameters of i- mittee on Terrorism. Narcotics, and Interne- weys, Department of Justice, Washing-
an relations over the past 20 years, , (2) (2) the tional Operations and Representative Bill ton, DC.
he
type of information about Nonega bevel- Alexander, are concerned that information DEAR MR. MCWaoRTER: As we informed oiled by various Intelligence and law-en- about illegal activities by high-level officials Your staff in our letter of May 16. 1988, the
a
forcement of other nations may not be adequately con- General Accounting agencies, (3) the extent to which sidered in U.S. foreign policy decisions. At case study of how information about Gen undertaking
this information reached foreign policy deci- r- siorunakers, and (4) the role that such infor- their request, the General Accounting al Noriega was developed by various govern.
motion played In decisions on U.S. foreign Office Is undertaking an initial case study of went agencies, and what role such informa?
policy. how information about General Noriega was tion played in policy decisions regarding
This work will be performed by Mr. developed by various government agencies. Panama. As agreed with your staff, we ini-
Donald L. Patton, Group Director, Mr. and what role such information played in tially postpond audit work at the Justice
James O. Benone, Evaluator-in-Charge; and policy decisions regarding Panama. Department until we had met with National
Mr. Jon Beno Chasson, of our Foreign Economic To satisfy this request, we will: Security Council officials to more fully ex.
Assistance Group, National Security and (1) Obtain an agency overview. At each plain our review objectives and give them an
International Affairs Division. agency that develops relevant information opportunity to coordinate agency participa-
We would like to meet with the U.S. At. on General Noriega or his possible involve- tion in our review. However, because the Na-
torneys In both Miami and Tampa, Florida, ment in Illegal activities, we will receive a tional Security Council has not acted. and
who have brought indictments against Gen. briefing that outlines the general organiza- because of the high level of congressional
Noriega to discuss the genesis of the indict- tional structure and the operational proce- Interest in this assignment, we must now im.
menus, Identify other people that we should dures related to the agency's data collection, element our review independently at each
talk with, and obtain information about the analysis, and dissemination systems. agency.
uses. We also plan to conduct work at other (2) Interview relevant personnel. Once we We are therefore requesting that you pro-
Department of Justice offices, the Depart- understand the basic organizational struc- vide us with the following:
ment of Defense, the Department of State, ture, we will then interview key personnel I. Documents outlining the organizational
and other federal agencies, responsible for (1) defining agency informs- components involved in, and the operational
TIONAL AFFAIRS Division,
Washington, DC, May 24, 1988.
Hon. WILLIAM H. WEBSTER.
Director, Central Intelligence Agency.
Attention: Director, Office of Legislative Li-
aison.
Mr. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. Benone at uiti raw aaia, ana it) analyzing ana dissemi-
275-7487, hating data on Panama and Norlega.
Sincerely yours, (3) Review documents. As we learn more
JOHN ANDERSON, about each agency's collection and reporting
ARNOLD P. JONES. processes, we will request relevant docu-
SeniorAssociate Director. ments. We anticipate that these will in-
clude: specific directives, instructions, or
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NA- taskings_ to collect data on Noriega or al-
gence data.
2. Documents relating to the investiga.
tions of alleged drug trafficking by General
Noriega conducted by the U.S. Attorneys in
Miami and Tampa.
3. Any memos, reports, analyses, studies,
briefing papers, meeting records, or other
documents generated by the office of the
U.S. Attorneys which discuss allegations of
Illegal activities by General Noriega
and
,
cables and reports from field offices regard- Interagency communications on these mat-
ing Noriega's involvement in or toleration of ters.
illegal activities, analyses or summaries of We anticipate that as our review pro-
field reporting on Noriega, and geographic/ greases, we will make additional requests for
subject-area studies discussing the role or documentation.
suspected role of Noriega in illegal activi- To facilitate our review, we request that
ties
. appropriate officials meet with us at an
DEAR MR. WEBSTER: The General Accout- (4) Examine the use of information about opening conference no later than July -20.
ing Office, has been requested to undertake Noriega in the foreign policy process. After At that time, we will establish a schedule
a study of Panamanian leader Gen. Manuel completing a systematic review at each for obtaining the needed documents.
Noriega's alleged drug activities. The study, agency, we will attempt to determine how With the input and cooperation of U.S.
under code 472165, will examine (1) selected agency reporting on Noriega may have in. Attorney officials, I am confident that we
aspects of U.S.-Panamanian relations over fluenced foreign policy decisions on can successfully complete our review in a
the past 20 years, (2) the type of informs- Panama. We will first identify the agencies, timely manner.
tion about Noriega developed by various in- organizations, and individuals who play a If you have any additional questions
telligence and law-enforcement agencies, (3) role in deciding national security and for- about our review, please contact Mr. Donald
the extent to which this information eign policy issues with regard to Panama. L. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. James O.
reached foreign policy decisionmakers, and Through interviews and a review of relevant Benone at 275-7487.
(4) the role that such information played in documents, we will determine whether in- ' Sincerely yours,
decisions on U.S. foreign policy. formation about Noriega reached them, and NANCY R. KINGSBURY,
This work will be performed under the di- how that information was used in making Associate Director.
rection of Nancy R. Kingsbury, Associate decisions. _
Director by Mr. Donald L. Patton, Group As part of our review, we willcontact ap- GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. NA-
Director, Mr. James O. Benone, Evaluator- propriate officials of the National Security TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
in-Charge; and Mr. Jon Chasson; of our For- Council who are now or were in the past in- TIONAL AFFAIRS Drvisrox,
eign Economic Assistance Group. volved in policy decisions regarding Washington, DC, July 12, 1988.
The work will be conducted in Washing- Panama. We intend to discuss their knowl- Mr. EDwsan S. DENNIS,
ton at the Department of State, the Depart- edge and utilization of information concern- Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Divi-
ment of Defense, the Department of Jus- Ing General Noriega's Illegal activities. Sion, Department of Justice, Washing-
tice, and other federal agencies. We understand that this review will in- ton, DC,
We would like to meet with Agency repre- volve potentially sensitive material that DEAa MR. Dnnns: As we informed your
sentatives to discuss these issues and obtain may require special controls and safeguards. staff in our letter of May 16, 1988, the Gen-
the Agency's perspective on them. We ap- We are willing to discuss this issue with you eral Accounting Office is undertaking a case
preciate any assistance you can provide to and take appropriate precautions. study of how information about General
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August 11, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
Noric'gs was developed by various govern-
ment agencies. and what role such informa-
tion played in polity decisions regarding
Panama. We initially postponed audit work
at the Justice Department and several other
government agencies until we had met with
National Security Council officials to more
fully explain our review objectives and had
given them an opportunity to coordinate
agency participation in our review. However,
because the National Security Council has
not acted, and because of the high level con-
gressional interest in this assignment, we
must now implement our review independ-
ently at each agency.
We are therefore requesting that you pro-
vide us with the following.
1. Documents outlining the organizational
components involved in, and the operational
procedures related to, the Criminal Divi-
sion's development of law enforcement in-
formation and its requests for and analysis
of foreign intelligence data provided by the
various collection agencies.
2. Any memos, reports. analyses, studies.
briefing papers, meeting records. or other
documents generated by the Division which
discuss allegations of illegal activities by
General Noriega or the possible impact of
such activities on U.S. relations with
Panama.
We anticipate that as our review pro-
gresses. we will make additional requests for
documentation.
To facilitate our review, we request that
appropriate officials meet with us at an
opening conference no later than July 20.
At that time, we will establish a schedule
for obtaining the needed documents.
With the input and cooperation of Crimi-
nal Division officials, I am confident that we
can successfully complete our review in a
timely manner.
If you have any additional questions
about our review, please contact Mr. Donald
L. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. James O.
Benone at 275-7487.
Sincerely yours.
NANCY R. KINGSBURY.
Associate Director.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS Drvssiox,
Washington. DC, July 12, 1988.
Mr. JOHN C. LAWN,
Drug Enforcement Administration,
Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. LAWN: As we informed your
staff in our letter of May 11, 1988, the Gen-
eral Accounting Office is undertaking a case
study, under code 472165, of how Informa-
tion about General Noriega was developed
by various government agencies, and what
role such information played in policy deci-
sions regarding Panama. At the request of
your staff, we initially postponed audit work
at the Drug Enforcement Administration
until we had explained our review objectives
to the National Security Council and had
given them an opportunity to coordinate
the executive agency participation in our
review. However, because the National Secu-
rity Council has not acted. and because of
the high level of congressional interest in
this assignment, we must now implement
our review independently at each agency.
We are therefore requesting that DEA
provide us with:
1. Documents outlining the organizational
structure and the operational procedures re-
lated to DEA's development of law enforce.
ment information and Its foreign intelli-
gence data collection analysis, and dissemi-
nation systems.
2. Documents which establish DEA's pro-
cedures for (a) defining foreign intelligence
information needs with regard to General
Noriega and Panama. (b) implementing the
information collection, process. (c) collect.
ing and reporting raw data. and (d) analyz-
ing and disseminating data on Panama and
General Noriega.
3. Specific directives. Instructions, or task-
ings to collect data on General Noriega or
his alleged illegal activities. cables and re-
ports from field offices regarding his in-
volvement in or toleration of illegal activi-
ties. analyses or summaries of field report-
ing on him. and geographic/subject-area
studies discussing his role or suspected role
in illegal activities.
To facilitate our review, we are requesting
an opening conference with appropriate of-
ficials no ter than July 20. At that time.
we will more fully discuss the specific pa-
rameters of our audit work and establish a
schedule for obtaining the needed docu-
ments.
With the input and cooperation of DEA
officials. I am confident that we can success-
fully complete our review In a timely
manner.
If you have any additional questions
about our review, please contact Mr. Donald
L. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. James O.
Benone at 275-7487.
Sinceerly yours.
NANCY R. KINGSBURY,
Associate Director.
GENERAL ACCouNTING OrrIca, NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION.
Washington. DC. July 12, 1988.
Mr. PAUL Scxorr STEvzNs.
Executive Secretary, National Security
Council. Old Executive Office Building,
Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. STEvsNs: As we informed you in
our letter of May 13, 1988. and Mr. Rostow
In our letter of June 23. the General Ac-
counting Office is undertaking a case study
of how information about General Noriega
was developed by various government agen-
cies, and what role such information played
in policy decisions regarding Panama. At
the request of the National Security Council
staff. we initially postponed audit work at
the Council and several other government
agencies until we had met with them to
more fully explain our review objectives and
had given them an opportunity to coordi-
nate agency participation in our review.
However, because we have not received a re-
sponse to our letter of June 23. and because
of the high level of congressional interest in
this assignment, we must now implement
our review independently at each agency.
We have sent requests to each agency.
asking that appropriate officials meet with
us to establish a timetable for collecting and
reviewing relevant documents. We ask that
the National Security Council provide us
with:
1. Documents outlining the organizational
structure and the operational procedures re-
lated to the National Security Council's re-
quests for and analysis of foreign intelli-
gence data provided by the various collec-
tion agencies.
2. Any memos. reports. analyses, studies,
briefing papers. meeting records, or other
documents generated by the National Secu-
rity Council staff which discuss allegations
of illegal activities by General Noriega and
the possible impact of such activities on
U.S. relations with Panama.
We anticipate that as our review pro-
gresses, we will make additional requests for
documentation.
To facilitate our review, we request that
appropriate officials meet with us at an
opening conference no later than July 20.
At that time, we will establish a schedule
for obtaining the needed documents.
H 6x33
With the input and cooperation of Nation-
al Security Council officials. I am confident
that we can successfully complete our
review in a timely manner.
If you have any additional questions
about our review. please contact Mr. Donald
L. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. James U.
Benone at 275-7487.
Sincerely yours.
NANCY R. KINGSBURY.
Associate Director.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS Dzvsiox.
Washington. DC. July 12. 1986.
HOn. GEORGE P. SHULTZ.
77w Secretary of State.
(Attention: GAO Liaison. Office of the
Comptroller.)
DLAa Ma. SECRETARY: As we informed you
In our letter of May 13, 1988. the General
Accounting Office is undertaking a case
study, under code 472165. of how informa-
tion about General Noriega was developed
by various government agencies, and what
role such information played in policy deci-
sions regarding Panama. At the request of
your staff, we initially postponed audit work
at the State Department until we had ex-
plained our review objectives to the Nation-
al Security Council and had given them an
opportunity to coordinate the executive
agency participation in our review. However.
because the National Security Council has
not acted, and because of the high level of
congressional interest in this assignment. we
must now implement our review Independ-
ently at each agency.
We are therefore requesting that the
State Department provide us with:
1. Documents outlining the organizational
structure and the operational procedures re-
lated to the State Department's foreign in-
telligence data collection. analysis, and dis-
semination systems.
2. Documents which establish the State
Department's procedures for (a) defining
foreign intelligence information needs with
regard to General Noriega and Panama. (b)
implemening the information collection
process. (c) collecting and reporting raw
data, and (d) analyzing and disseminating
data on Panama and General Noriega.
3. Specific directives, instructions, or task-
ings to collect data on General Noriega or
his alleged illegal activities. cables and re-
ports from embassies regarding his involve-
ment in or toleration of illegal activities.
analyses or summaries of field reporting on
him. and geographic/subject-area studies
discussing his role or suspected role in ille-
gal activities.
We anticipate that many of these docu-
ments are available within the Offices of
the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, the Assistant Secretary
for Intelligence and Research. and the As-
sistant Secretary for Narcotics Matters.
To facilitate our review, we are requesting
an opening conference with appropriate of-
ficials no later than July 20. At that time.
we will more fully discuss the specific pa-
rameters of our audit work and establish a
schedule for obtaining the needed docu-
ments.
With the input and cooperation of State
Department officials. I am confident that
we can successfully complete our review in a
timely manner.
If you have any additional questions
about our review, please contact Mr. Donald
L. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. James O.
Benone at 275-7487.
Sincerely yours.
NANCY R. KINGSBURY.
Associate Director.
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H 6854
GENERAL AccouxTLrc OrrICE, NA.
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE August 11, 1988
Washington, DC, July 13, 1988.
Hon. PRANK C. CARLOCCI.
The Secretary of Defense.
iAttention. DOD Office of the Inspector
General. Deputy Assistant Inspector
General for GAO Report Analysis).
DEAN Ma. SECRETARY: As we informed you
In our letter of May 12. 1988. the General
Accounting Office Is undertaking a case
stud.. under code 472165. of how Informa-
tion about General Noriega was developed
by various government agencies, and what
role such information played In policy deci-
sions regarding Panama. With the Coopera-
tion of Department of Defense officials, in-
eluding those from the military services and
other Defense agencies, we have already
made substantial progress toward achieving
our review objectives. However, we were ad-
vised on July 12, 1988. that these officials
have been directed to postpone meeting
with us and providing us with documents
until the National Security Council provides
guidance on the extent that the Depart-
ment should participate in our review.
Since initiating this review, we have fully
briefed the National Security Council staff
on our review objectives and methodology
and allowed them time to provide guidance
to executive branch agencies. However, be-
cause the Council has not issued such guid-
ance and because of the high level of con-
gressional interest in this assignment, we
have advised the Council that we must now
Implement our review independently at
each agency.
We are therefore requesting that the De-
partment resume cooperating with us on
this assignment and provide us with docu-
ments we need to accomplish our review ob-
jectives. In addition to the documents that
we already have requested, we need to
obtain:
1. Cables and intelligence reports generat-
ed by, or in the possession of, the Depart-
ment of Defense and its various components
which discuss General Noriega and his al-
leged Illegal activities.
2. Any other memos, reports, analyses,
studies, briefing papers, meeting records,
other documents, or recorded information
generated by, or in the possession of, the
Department or. its components which dis-
cuss allegations of illegal activities by Gen-
eral Noriega and the possible impact of such
activities on U.S. relations with Panama
To facilitate our review, we would appreci-
ate being advised in writing no later than
July 20. 1988, of your Intended action on
this matter.
With the Department's renewed coopera-
tion. I am confident that we can successful-
ly complete our review in a timely manner.
11 you have any additional questions
about our review, please contact Mr. Donald
L. Patton at 275-1898 or Mr. James O.
Benone at 275-7487.
Sincerely yours,
NANCY R. Kzwasnv'ay.
Associate Director.
EncLOSvRx 111
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL,
Washington, DC, July 13 1988.
Ms. NANCY R. KINGSBURY,
Associate Director, National Security and
International Affairs Division. General
Accounting Office, Washington, DC.
Ds*a Ms. KrxosawRY: I am writing In re-
sponse to your request concerning a study
of the alleged drug activities of Manuel Nor-
lega, and the role information about such
activities played in decisions about U.S. for-
eign policy (Study *472165).
As described to Mr. Kelly's May 13. 1988. Mr. QUILLEN. Mr. Speaker. I yield
letter to Paul Stevens and Your June 23, 3 minutes to the gentleman from Cali-
I988, letter to me, your request seeks access fornia [Mr. DORNAN).
to sensitive law enforcement and Intelli-
gence files covering a substantial period of Mr. DORNAN. of California. Mr.
time. In our meeting. your staff confirmed Speaker. I passed an amendment in
that your three areas of Interest were Intel- the Crime Subcommittee and In the
licence files. law enforcement files, and the full Judiciary Committee that was bi-
deliberative process of the Executive partisan. and noncontroversial, about
branch. including Internal communications these clandestine drug labs, which are
and deliberations leading to Executive a particular problem in my beautiful)
branch actions taken pursuant to the Presi? State of California. Due to California's
dent's constitutional authority. I was disap-
pointed that your letter did not contain any
narrowing of the request. The request raises thing, the domestic growing of illegal
Important statutory and constitutional crops has become a real problem. More
issues. The Administration Is anlayzing ominous though are the hidden drug
them now, and when Its deliberation is coin- labs that sometimes are defended with
plete. I shall reply further to your letter of booby traps, Including high explosives.
June 23, 1988. It is a tragic situation, recognized by
Sincerely,
Nlcaot.As RosTow,
Special Assistant to the President
and Legal Adviser.
EncLosuaz IV
CENTRAL Ir TLUGExCE AGENCY,
Washington, DC, June 13, 1988.
Mr. FRAM C. CONARAR.
Assistant Comptroller General, National Se-
curity and International Affairs Divi-
sions, General Accounting Office, Wash-
ington, DC.
DEAN MR. CoxAaAx: The Director has
asked me to respond to your letter of 24
May 198$ that described the General Ac-
counting Office's investigation of allega-
tions made against General Noriega of
Panama.
All Agency activities in central America,
as well as information we receive concerning
other U.S. Government activities In the
region, are subject to close and continuing
scrutiny by the House and Senate Intelli-
gence Committees. Furthermore, any assess-
ment of policy-related questions should be
directed to the appropriate components of
the Executive Branch. such as the Depart-
ments of State and Defense.
I am sorrry that we cannot be more help-
ful in this case.
Sincerely,
JOHN L. Hszoetson.
Director of Congressional Affairs.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, DC, August 2. 1988.
NANCY KIWGSIVRY,
Associate Director, General Accourting
Office, National Security and Interna-
tional Affairs Division.
DEAR Ms. KmosBURY: I am pleased to re-
spond to your July 12 letter on the proposed
care study your office is undertaking about
how U.S. government agencies used infor-
mation about General Noriega In Its policy
decisions regarding Panama.
As you are aware, the National Security
Council staff and the Office of White House
counsel have been working closely with your
office on this investigation. All executive
branch agencies have been instructed by the
White House not to take any action on your
request until various legal issues have been
analyzed by the Administration According.
ly. at the present time it will not be possible
for the Department to meet with your staff
or produce Information until this examina-
tion Is completed. For the time being. Nich-
olas Rostov. Legal Adviser to the National
Security Council, is acting as the adminis-
tration's point of contact on this matter.
Sincerely.
ROGER B. FELDYAn,
Comptroller.
all to the extent that everybody on
the subcommittee and on the major
committee said that my legislation on
clandestine labs was fine and despara-
tely needed.
Because of a jurisdictional dispute,
and only because of that, my language
was taken out of the final bill pro-
duced by the Rules Committee.
Last night, however, In the Rules
Committee they agreed to allow me to
offer my language again as an amen-
dent, when we take this bill up again
In September. I am still put at a disad-
vantage by these actions, however, as
it will appear that I am trying to alter
the original language of the bIIL This
is always an uphill battle.
I would just like to read a statement
that I put out to the Rules Committee
yesterday explaining my point of view.
01115
This was hand delivered last night to
Hon. CLAUDE PEPr sa:
DEAN Ma. CnAnuur: Only moments ago. I
became aware that the Rules Committee
will drop my language regarding Clandes-
tine Drug Laboratories, In Subtitle B of title
VI. This language was accepted by the ma-
jority staff of the Crime Subcommittee even
before subcommittee markup occurred. This
language then survived markup before the
full Judiciary Committee without amend-
ment. In short, Mr. Chairman, this provi-
sion to establish a Task Force on Clandes-
tine Drug Laboratories has always evJoyed a
significant bipartisan support in Congress
and within the Drug Enforcement Agency.
Let me add that the DEA is anxious,
very anxious to get this language in
the legislation, since they are the
major repository of the chemicals used
in these drug labs:
I am disappointed, to say the least, that
the Rules Committee would circumvent the
committee process which I have followed so
diligently.
I am grateful to the Rules Commit-
tee that this was corrected:
It Is my understanding that the language
will be allowed as an amendment to the
drug bill during floor debate. I would cer-
tainly hope that I would at least be granted
this opportunity.
Mr. Chairman, I certainly hope that you
can see your way clear to either reinstating
my language. ? ? ?
And he did that. I would like to
thank him for it. I look forward to of-
fering it on the floor in September.
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100m CONOR:SS I RIFT. 100-861
Sd Session HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES l Part 2
PROVIDING FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A BILL
RELATING TO THE OMNIBUS, DRUG INITIATIVE
SsPraxsss 6, 1988.-Ordered to be printed
Mr. PEPPER, from the Committee on Rules,
submitted the following
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT
[To accompany H. Res. 521 and to supersede H. Rept. 100-861]
The Committee on Rules, having had under consideration House
Resolution 521, by nonrecord vote, report the same to the House
with the recommendation that the resolution do pass.
The following are the amendments made in order under House
Resolution 521.
An amendment to be offered by Representative Wortley of New
York or his designee to be debatable for not to exceed 10 minutes,
equally divided and controlled by the proponent of the amendment
and a member opposed thereto.
Page 11, after line 15, insert the following new section:
SEC. 1010. GOVERNMENT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION.
Section 1112 of the Right to Financial Privacy Act of
1978 (12 U.S.C. 3412) is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following new subsection:
"(f) Nothing in this title shall apply when financial
records obtained by an agency or department of the
United States are disclosed or transferred to the Attorney
General upon the certification by a supervisory level offi-
cial of the transferring agency or department that there is
reason to believe that the records maybe relevant to a vio-
lation of Federal criminal law. Records so transferred shall
be used only for criminal investigative or prosecutive pur-
poses by the Department of Justice and shall, upon com-
pletion of the investigation or prosecution (including any
de-
appeal), be returned only to the transferring agency
partment.".
58-522
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Page 841, strike line 14 and all that follows through page 356,
line 5, and insert the following:
SEC. 10006. DRUG TESTING CERTIFICATION PROGRAM REQUIRE.
MENTS.
(al IN GsNERAL.-Not later than 6 months after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services shall establish a procedure to be used to
(1) certify certain clinical laboratories that analyze and de-
termine the results of drug tests conducted by other enti-
ties or individuals, and (2) ensure that such laboratories
maintain high quality and appropriate security concerning
the results of such tests.
(b) REQuIREMENas.-Under the procedures established
under subsection (a), a laboratory that conducts drug test-
ing shall, as determined under guidelines prescribed by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services-
(1) meet the mandatory guidelines, or be determined
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
have met the mandatory guidelines, established by the
Secretary under subclauses (I) and (III) of section
503(aX1XAXii) of the Supplemental Appropriations
Act, 1987, or
(2) have been inspected and accredited by a national
accrediting body approved for such purpose by the Sec-
retary.
(C) SPENDING RESTRICrION.-
(1) The Secretary of Health and Human Services
may not expend any Federal funds for any part of the
certification of laboratories to conduct drug testing,of
Federal employees. Costs associated with such certifi-
cations shall be the responsibility of the laboratories
seeking the certification.
(2) Paragraph (1) does not limit the authority of the
Secretary to expend Federal funds to administer and
provide oversight of the clinical laboratory certifica-
tion process.
An amendment to be offered by Representative Alexander of Ar-
kansas or his designee to be debatable for not to exceed 20 minutes,
equally divided and controlled by the proponent of the amendment
and a member opposed thereto. .
Page 375, after line 21, insert the following new title:
TITLE XI-INTERAGENCY COOPERA-
TION RELATING TO INFORMATION
ON ILLEGAL FOREIGN DRUG AC-
TIVITIES
SEC. 11001. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the "Anti-Stonewalling Act of
1988".
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follows through page 356,
months after the date
tart' of Health and
ure to be used to
that analyze and de-
ducted by other enti-
t such laboratories
security concerning
rocedures established
it conducts drug test-
deliaes prescribed by
rvices-
es, or be determined
Human Services to
es, established by the
and (III) of section
ental Appropriations
credited by a national
~h purpose by the Sec-
land Human Services
ds for any part of the
nduct drug testing of
ted with such certifi-
of the laboratories
t the authority of the
ds to administer and
laboratory certifica-
ntative Alexander of Ar-
not to exceed 20 minutes,
nent of the amendment
ding new title:
IY 000PERA-
ORMATION
N DRUG AC-
I;iStonewalling Act of
SEC. 11002. INTERAGENCY COOPERATION RELATING TO INFOR-
MATION ON ILLEGAL FOREIGN DRUG ACTIVITIES.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Any officer or employee in the execu-
tive branch of the Government, who, in the course of the
official duties of such officer or employee, obtains informa-
tion about illegal foreign drug activities shall promptly
furnish, such information through the head of the agency
in which the officer or employee serves or is employed-
() to the head of any other agency designated under
subsection (b); and
(2) upon request of a committee of the Congress or of
the Comptroller General, as the case may be, to such
committee or to the Comptroller General.
(b) D861GNATIONS.-Not later than 60 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the President shall-
(1) designate agencies involved in the formulation of
United States foreign policy or the enforcement of
Federal drug laws to receive information under sub-
section (aXi); and
(2) notify the Speaker and the minority leader of the
House of Representatives, the President pro tempore
and the minority leader of the Senate, and the Comp-
troller General of such designations.
The President shall review such designations once each
year and may, on the basis of the review, change any des-
ignation, with notification as provided in paragraph (2).
(c) NONDISCLOSURE.-Except with respect to the disclo-
sure of information to the General Accounting Office, not-
withstanding subsection (a), the head of an agency may
withhold the disclosure of information that, as determined
by the head of the agency-
(1) may jeopardize a United States foreign intelli-
gence or counterintelligence activity or source;
(2) may jeopardize a law enforcement investigation;
or
(3) may adversely affect the national defense or se-
curity of the United States.
The authority to make such a determination may not be
delegated. Any such determination shall be communicated
in writing to the President, who may direct the head of
the agency to furnish the information under such proce-
dures and safeguards as the President may specify.
(d) Aprlac*rnu'ry of SECTION 716 of Tmz 31, UNntn
STATES CODE.-If information requested by the Comptroller
General under subsection (a) is not furnished within a rea-
sonable time, section 716 of title 31, United States Code,
shall apply to such request.
(e)DuTSr of THE PRESmvNT.-In the event the President
for any of the reasons set forth in subsection (c), the- resi-
dent shall transmit in writing to the chairman and rank-
ing minority party member of such committee a statement
of the reasons for the decision. If the information concerns
a United States foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
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activity or source, the President shall promptly inform the
chairman and ranking minority party member of the Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Wenate of the nature of the information withheld.
This section does not waive or otherwise alter any right or
procedure that the Congress or any committee of the Con-
gress may otherwise have to receive such information.
(fl DEFINITIONS -As used in this section-
(1) the term "officer or employee in the executive
branch of the Government" means an appointed offi-
cer in the executive branch of the Government, an em-
ployee in the executive branch of the Government,
and a member of a uniformed service; and
(2) the term "agency" means a department, agency,
or establishment in the executive branch of the Gov-
ernment.
O
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House Drug Bill - Talking Points
Alexander Amendment: Requires an officer or employee in the
Executive branch to sake disclosure of "illegal foreign drug
activities" information through the agency head. Agency head, in
turn, would disclose to law enforcement agency and, upon request,
to the Congress and the General Accounting Office. The President
must be notified of any determination of nondisclosure and must
notify Congress of this. GAO could sue Executive branch to
obtain information.
o The Administration opposes this amendment.
o The provision's disclosure requirements concerning illegal
foreign drug activities would constitute unconstitutional
interference with the President's exclusive authority to
control and supervise the Executive branch.
o Congressional reporting requirements could compel
disclosure of "raw intelligence reporting," allowing any
committee to request information. Turns all committees
into "intelligence oversight" committees for narcotics
information purposes. Puts GAO into intelligence
oversight business. Duplicates existing duty of
DCI/Community to keep intelligence committees "fully and
currently informed." Withholding mechanism is cumbersome
and institutionalizes Executive-Legislative branch
disputes. Term which "trips" obligation is vague, leading
to underreporting/overreporting with resulting problems.
o Executive branch reporting requirements duplicate
long-standing, carefully-crafted, flexible administrative
mechanisms `for reporting intelligence information to law
enforcement authorities, Executive Order 12333, and other
liaison mechanisms. Subordinates Presidential foreign
relations powers and duties to Presidential law
enforcement powers and duties, "tying the hands" of the
President. Could be interpreted as requiring certain
Intelligence Community units to turn over entire product
to law enforcement agencies.
o "Anti-Stonewalling Act" amendment is highly objectionable
and, should not be passed in any form.
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(Offer of t1 Annrnpp Ornpral.
J ai4ingtun, R. 01. 2053D
8 September 1988
The Honorable Jim Wright'_
Speaker
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515
Dear Mr. Speaker:
The Administration strongly supports and urges Congress to
act swiftly to adopt effective and responsible legislation to
combat drug abuse. United States law enforcement and
intelligence agencies have devoted and will continue to devote
substantial efforts toward achievement of the vital national
objective of halting the flow of illegal drugs.
The amendment proposed to be offered, by Congressman Bill
Alexander to the Omnibus Drug Initiative Act of 1988 (H.R. 5210)
will weaken the hand of the United States in the battle against
illegal drugs. The'Alexander Amendment is both unwise and
impermissibly encroaches on the President's constitutional
authority.
The amendment requires Executive Branch personnel obtaining
information about "illegal foreign drug activities' to forward
such information promptly to the head of their agencies. In
turn, the agency heads must furnish it to law enforcement
agencies specially designated by the President and, upon request,
to any committee of the Congress or the General Accounting Office
(GAO). If the agency head personally determines that disclosure
of the information risks specified damage to national security or
law enforcement interests, he need not disclose the demanded
information to a congressional committee, but he nevertheless
must furnish it to the GAO. The amendment also provides for
lawsuits by the GAO against Federal agencies to secure
information covered by its provisions.
The Alexander amendment would diminish the ability of the
United States to collect narcotics intelligence. Sources of
foreign narcotics intelligence, including cooperating foreign
government agencies, would be less likely to share sensitive
narcotics intelligence with U.S. agencies if it must be
disseminated on demand to the General Accounting Office and, in
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w.
many cases, to multiple congressional committees. The proper
executive-legislative arrangements for handling sensitive
narcotics intelligence in a responsible and secure fashion are
those specified by Title V of the National Security Act of 1947,
under which the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of
intelligence agencies keep the' congressional intelligence
committees fully and currently informed of intelligence
activities, including narcotics intelligence.
The prospect of lawsuits between the GAO and intelligence
agencies over some of the most sensitive national security
information in the possession of the United States presents a
substantial danger of unauthorized disclosure of sensitive
information. Congress recognized this danger when it enacted the
General Accounting Office Act of 1980 that provided for the
exemption of intelligence information from the GAO's current
authority to bring suits to obtain information.
The inter-agency reporting requirements established by the
amendment will disrupt effective, carefully crafted mechanisms
for secure dissemination of narcotics intelligence within the
U.S. Government. These mechanisms ensure that sensitive
narcotics intelligence is disseminated to law enforcement
agencies and that the information is properly protected from
unauthorized disclosure.
In addition to its practical flaws, the amendment
impermissibly encroaches on the powers of the President under the
Constitution to faithfully execute the laws, to supervise his
subordinates in the Executive Branch, to preserve the integrity
of executive deliberations, and to protect national security
information.
We urge the House not to adopt the Alexander Amendment.
Sincerely,
64A, 1Z Alxs~z
William H. Webster Dick Thor
Director of Central Intelligence Attorney
cc: The Honorable Bill Alexander
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on -P of Or Attomrp frn.erat
Vas4igtvn,1. (g. 20530
8 September 1988'
The Honorable Robert H. Michel
Minority Leader
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515
The Administration strongly supports and urges Congress to
act swiftly'to adopt effective and responsible legislation to
combat drug abuse. United States law enforcement and
intelligence agencies have devoted and will continue to devote
substantial efforts toward achievement of the vital national
objective of halting the flow of illegal drugs.
The amendment proposed to be offered by Congressman Bill
Alexander to the Omnibus Drug Initiative Act of 1988 (H.R. 5210)
will weaken the hand of the United States in the battle against
illegal drugs. The Alexander Amendment is both unwise and
impermissibly encroaches on the President's constitutional
authority.
The amendment requires Executive Branch personnel obtaining
information about "illegal foreign drug activities" to forward
such information promptly to the head of their agencies. In
turn, the agency heads must furnish it to law enforcement
agencies specially designated by the President and, upon request,
to any committee of the Congress or the General Accounting Office
(GAO). If the agency head personally determines that disclosure
of the information risks specified damage to national security or
law enforcement interests, he need not disclose the demanded
information to a congressional committee,. but he nevertheless
must furnish it to the GAO. The amendment also provides for
lawsuits by the GAO against Federal agencies to secure
information covered by its provisions.
The Alexander amendment would diminish the ability of the
United States to collect narcotics intelligence. Sources of
foreign narcotics intelligence, including cooperating foreign
government agencies, would be less likely to share sensitive
narcotics intelligence with U.S. agencies if it must be
disseminated on demand to the General Accounting Office and, in
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 IM -
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many cases, to multiple congressional committees. The proper
executive-legislative arrangements for handling sensitive
narcotics intelligence in a responsible and secure fashion are
those specified by Title V of the National Security Act of 1947,
under which the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of
intelligence agencies keep the congressional intelligence
committees fully and currently informed of intelligence
activities, including narcotics intelligence.
The prospect of lawsuits between the GAO and intelligence
agencies over some of the most sensitive national security
information in the possession of the United States presents a
substantial danger of unauthorized disclosure of sensitive
information. Congress recognized this danger when it enacted the
General Accounting Office Act of 1980 that provided for the
exemption of intelligence information from the GAO's current
authority to bring suits to obtain information.
The inter-agency reporting requirements established by the
amendment will disrupt effective, carefully crafted mechanisms
for secure dissemination of narcotics intelligence within the
U.S. Government. These mechanisms ensure that sensitive
narcotics intelligence is disseminated to law enforcement
agencies and that the information is properly protected from
unauthorized disclosure.
In addition to its practical flaws, the amendment
impermissibly encroaches on the powers of the President under the
Constitution to faithfully execute the laws, to supervise his
subordinates in the Executive Branch, to preserve the integrity
of executive deliberations, and to protect national security
information.
We urge the House not to adopt the Alexander Amendment.
Sincerely,
William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
cc: The Honorable Bill Alexander
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