THE INF MONITORING AND VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R000800140022-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: April 21, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP90M00005R000800140022-0
100TH CONGRESS
2d Session
OCA 88-0894/1
SENATE
REPORT
100-318
THE INF TREATY MONITORING AND VERTIFICATION
CAPABILITIES
APRIL 21 (legislative day, APRIL 11), 1988.?Ordered to be printed
Mr. BOREN, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
REPORT
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC, March 21, 1988.
Hon. CLAIBORNE FELL,
Chairman,
Hon. JESSE HELMS,
Ranking Minority Member,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC
DEAR SENATOR PELL AND SENATOR HELMS: The Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has been charged with the re-
sponsibility of providing to the United States Senate a report on
the ability, of the United States to monitor and verify compliance
by the Soviet Union with the Treaty on the Elimination of Inter-
mediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the INF Treaty). In
meeting this responsibility, the SSCI has explored in depth not
only the immediate intelligence issues raised by the Treaty, but
also the longer-term implications of the Treaty, including its rela-
tionship to future requirements that may be levied against our in-
telligence considered the requirements that attend any prospective
START agreement. Of course, the Committee wishes to make clear
that this report is not an assessment or prejudgment of START or
its monitoring requirements, but rather an indication of the impact
that START may have on the INF Treaty.
? The Committee's efforts in preparing this study have been long
and comprehensive. We have followed both negotiations and arms
control monitoring on a continuing basis. In our annual budget au-
thorization process, we have focused on U.S. technical intelligence
capabilities, both for now and the future. Indeed, for several years,
19-010
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP90M00005R000800140022-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP90M00005R600800140022-0
2
this Committee has worked with the Executive branch to obtain
needed funding for improvements in our technical collection capa-
bilities, while encouraging the Intelligence Community to use those
funds as efficiently as possible.
Over the last six months, when the INF talks gained momentum
and finally concentrated on verification issues, the Committee's
study of U.S. monitoring capabilities has been intensive. From last
September until today, the Committee has had 15 closed hearings
and 17 on-the-record staff briefings on INF monitoring, in addition
to many informal staff briefings. Our witnesses have included
ranking officials and substantive experts from the CIA, DIA, NSA,
intelligence arms of the military services, the Intelligence Commu-
nity Staff, the State Department, the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
former defense officials who are leading authorities on arms con-
trol, and (on counter-intelligence implications of on-site inspection)
the FBI.
In addition to these proceedings, and the thousands of pages of
documents that the Committee has studied, both we and our staff
have traveled to many of the most important installations where
monitoring systems are produced or operated, as well as to the site
at Magna, Utah, where Soviet portal monitors will be able to ob-
serve items entering and leaving a U.S. missile production facility.
In short, we have endeavored to ensure that every issue was fully
addressed during the course of our work.
The purpose of this unclassified report is to address generally the
issues involved in the monitoring and verification process and to
describe the role which monitoring and verification plays in the
overall assessment of the INF Treaty. Each of these issues is ad-
dressed in detail in the classified report available to each member
of the U.S. Senate, and to whom the work of the SSCI is ultimately
directed.
Thank you for the opportunity to present these important mat-
ters to the Foreign Relations Committee.
Sincerely,
DAVID L. BOREN,
Chairman.
WILLIAM S. COHEN,
Vice Chairman.
THE INF TREATY: MONITORING AND VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES
(Adopted by Unanimous Vote March 21, 1988)
For Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
[SSCI], and consistent with the Committee's responsibility to the
Senate as a whole, the appropriate starting point for analysis of
the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-
Range Missiles (the INF Treaty) is to assess its verifiability. Sever-
al preliminary points should be made regarding this assessment.
First, the Committee notes that the answer to the question of
verifiability is not a simple one. It is a matter of degree and suffi-
ciency. Since no verification and monitoring regime can be abso-
lutely perfect, a central focus for the Committee has been to deter-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP90M00005R000800140022-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP90M00005R000800140022-0
3
mine whether any possible infractions would be of sufficient mili-
tary significance to constitute a threat to our national security in-
terests. This calculus is one which the Senate should bear in mind
in its consideration of the Treaty.
Second, the Committee would note that U.S. intelligence require-
ments should not be dictated solely by arms control Treaty moni-
toring needs. The Committee believes that monitoring Soviet activi-
ties is necessary not only to verify arms control agreements, but
also to provide timely warning of possible threatstithat are not pro-
hibited by the Treaty. Accordingly, the Committee- paid close atten-
tion to whether our current and proposed capabilities?human,
technical and otherwise?are sufficient to meet current demands,
as well as emerging future requirements. When certain systems
are limited or eliminated by agreement, other military develop-
ments which are perfectly legal under treaties take on a new sig-
nificance and could affect the strategic balance between the United
States and potential adversaries. We must have the capability of
monitoring such developments not addressed under the INF
Treaty.
One of the most challenging tasks the Intelligence Community
could face in the near future is the monitoring of a prospective
START agreement. An agreed cut in Soviet and U.S. strategic nu-
clear forces would change the requirements for U.S. intelligence for
several reasons:
Under current proposals, envisioning a system of limits and
sublimits on strategic arms, as opposed to the bans employed
by the INF Treaty, significant violations would be more diffi-
cult to detect;
Soviet violations of START could have a greater impact on
U.S. national security than any plausible violation of the INF
Treaty;
Unanticipated improvements in Soviet strategic offensive
and defensive capabilities could make the lower levels of U.S.
strategic forces set by START more vulnerable;
Even in the absence of START, the balance of strategic
forces could be undermined or upset by possible Soviet techno-
logical breakthroughs, offensive forces improvements, or possi-
ble breakouts from ABM Treaty limits.
The Committee believes that without continuous attention to im-
proving our intelligence capabilities, the Intelligence Community
may not be able to monitor a START Treaty well enough to ensure
U.S. security. Indeed, the burdens of monitoring Soviet military ac-
tivities that are not constrained, as well as those that are con-
strained by the INF and any prospective START Treaty, could put
strains on the future capabilities of the Intelligence Community,
especially in an environment of limited funding for intelligence
activities.
The Committee feels that this potential gap between intelligence
capabilities and intelligence requirements must be appreciated by
Members of the Senate. Thus, this report and its classified annex
raises the issue in connection with consideration of the INF Treaty.
Third, the Committee would observe that in negotiating an arms
control agreement, verification is only one of many objectives that
must be served. Indeed, there are inevitable tensions between the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP90M00005R000800140022-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP90M00005R0-00800140022-0
4
need for effective verification and the desire for strategic stability.
The current U.S. position in Geneva is to seek a ban on mobile mis-
siles, largely because of the verification problems they may pose.
On the other hand, mobility enhances strategic stability by reduc-
ing the opportunity for preemptive strikes. In any arms control
proposal we advance, we must always keep open the possibility of
allowing ourselves the flexibility to adopt systems needed for our
own national security even if it makes verification less certain. In
other words, verification cannot be viewed in a vacuum. It is but
one factor that must be balanced with other competing interests
for our own security.
In the INF agreement, the United States has sacrificed the right
to deploy a conventional long-range ground-launched cruise missile
[GLCM] against the Warsaw Pact, principally because monitoring
the distinction between nuclear and conventional cruise missiles is
difficult. Some Members of the Committee believe that other na-
tional security interests may have been subordinated to verification
considerations on the GLCM issue. This has raised serious concerns
among Members of the Committee that similar considerations of
verifiability in START could lead to unduly restrictive limitations
on future U.S. options for conventionally armed air-launched and
sea-launched cruise missiles.
Another example of the tension between monitoring require-
ments and overall strategic needs is the fact that there are no on-
site inspection rights provided for undeclared or suspect sites.
These problems are most pronounced with respect to the possibility
of covertly stored missiles at undeclared facilities in the Soviet
Union. In this case, legitimate U.S. security interests argued
against allowing the Soviets greater presence and access in the
United States than granted by the Treaty. Our own counterintelli-
gence concerns about potential Soviet exploitation of on-site inspec-
tion rights may again outweigh the need for more intrusive and
direct verification in future negotiations.
Finally, the Committee would emphasize that the conclusions
with respect to monitoring and verification do not necessarily con-
trol the final decision each Senator must make with respect to
whether the INF Treaty should be ratified. Rather, the verifiability
of the Treaty is only a part of the analysis that each Senator must
make, and the weight given to verifiability in making his or her
final decision regarding ratification properly resides with each indi-
vidual Member.
VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AND MONITORING CAPABILITIES
Effective verification?knowing whether or not the Soviets are
cheating?is essential to enforcing strict compliance. And good in-
telligence?monitoring all aspects of Soviet strategic behavior?is
the key to effective verification. Between the extremes of blindly
trusting the Soviets and trying to follow their every move, what
level of monitoring is needed to verify and enforce the INF treaty?
Are U.S. monitoring capabilities good enough to make the INF
treaty effectively verifiable? To answer these questions, it is helpful
to distinguish among the functions and officials involved in dealing
with suspected violations.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP90M00005R000800140022-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/29 : CIA-RDP90M00005R000800140022-0
?
5
Monitoring
Monitoring is the responsibility of the Intelligence Community,
which reports on what the Soviets do, using all the information
available from U.S. on-site inspectors, our National Technical
Means, and other sources of information on Soviet missiles and re-
lated activities.
Verification
Verification is the responsibility of the Executive branch, which
decides whether the Soviet behavior reported by the Intelligence
Community is permitted by the treaty, based on the text of the
treaty, relevant records, diplomatic exchanges, and applicable law.
Enforcement
Enforcement is the responsibility of the President, acting in con-
cert with the Congress, in proposing and pursuing a course of
action if a violation is found. Options for enforcement include seek-
ing Soviet compliance by diplomatic means, denouncing the viola-
tion publicly, threatening to withdraw from the treaty, or ultimate-
ly countering the violation with new military programs of our own.
Each option depends on the United States having the will to act
in the face of a confirmed violation. To be effective, monitors, ver-
ifiers, and enforcers will need good information on Soviet inten-
tions, as well as capabilities, in order to make critical decisions. To
do nothing is advisable only if confronting the Soviets with the vio-
lation would jeopardize the sensitive intelligence sources and meth-
ods on which we rely for detecting more serious threats.
Moreover, to deter the Soviets from cheating in the first place,
the U.S. must reinforce Soviet expectations that Treaty violations
would be discovered and countered if they did so.
In the case of the INF treaty, detecting any possible violations
involves three sets of monitoring requirements:
Assessing the accuracy of the numbers and locations of INF
systems declared by the Soviets in the Treaty's Memorandum
of Understanding.
Observing the drawdown and elimination of INF systems in
accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on
Elimination.
Detecting any production, testing, or deployment of INF
systems.
ASSESSING SOVIET DECLARATIONS
With respect to assessing the accuracy of the numbers and loca-
tions of forces and systems declared by the Soviets in the Treaty's
Memorandum of Understanding, the Intelligence Community has
not resolved significant differences of view over the possibility that
the Soviets may not have disclosed their entire inventory of nonde-
ployed SS-20 missiles. These differences represent valid analytical
judgments based on the limited and inconclusive information that
has been available to the Intelligence Community.
Whether or not these differences can be resolved in the future,
on the basis of new information or analysis, their potential mili-
tary significance would be short-lived. This is because the oper-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP90M00005R000800140022-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP90M00005Ro00800140022-0
6
ational reliability and military utility of any covertly maintained
missiles would begin to deteriorate immediately; would seriously
degrade during the first three years, when all declared missiles are
being eliminated; and would vanish entirely within a decade,
unless the Soviets can resume flight testing them. This would be
both illegal and readily detectable.
OBSERVING DRAWDOWN AND ELIMINATION
With respect to declared INF systems, we can expect Soviet coop-
eration in permitting U.S. inspectors to observe their elimination,
because they will have a strong interest in showing us that they
are fulfilling their treaty commitments. If the Soviets fail to coop-
erate, we will know it well before we have eliminated our own INF
systems and could retain them until they cooperated. So, by fully
implementing the Inspection Protocols of the INF Treaty, the U.S.
will not need to rely on National Technical Means to verify the
complete elimination of the Soviets' declared INF systems.
DETECTING ILLEGAL SYSTEMS AND ACTIVITIES
At the same time, U.S. intelligence must also seek to ensure that
there are no illegal INF systems that should have been declared or
that have been covertly stored, diverted, tested, or produced in vio-
lation of the INF treaty. In contrast with Soviet interests in show-
ing our inspectors their declared inventories of INF systems and
their elimination, we muSt expect the Soviets will try to conceal
any illegal systems or activities.
That is why the United States must be able to monitor Soviet
missile-related activities, no matter how well concealed. In particu-
lar, verifying the INF treaty's ban on all Soviet ground-based mis-
siles for weapons-delivery with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers
will require that we monitor Soviet missile testing, production, and
deployments with the best National Technical Means available.
Yet, as noted previously, even with the best technical means in
the world, the United States cannot expect to discover every pro-
hibited activity that the Soviets have plausible incentives to con-
duct clandestinely. Concealing a few, small illegal activities or
assets is just too easy in a closed society like the Soviet Union.
However, there is little apparent advantage to Soviet military com-
manders, and there are certainly significant risks, in developing
any covert forces that cannot be exercised realistically or tested
fully because they must remain strictly concealed all the time to
minimize any chance of detection.
Moreover, the INF treaty's ban on the testing of any ballistic
missiles for weapons delivery with ranges between 500 and 5,500
kilometer can be monitored with high confidence. This makes it ex-
ceedingly difficult, costly, and risky for the Soviets to develop or
maintain a militarily useful, covert force of ballistic missiles, espe-
cially longer-range missiles, which violates the INF treaty. At
worst, a Soviet short-range ballistic missile might be tested to a
range of slightly over 500 kilometers without U.S. monitoring capa-
bilities being able to verify that it is a treaty violation, but the So-
viets would have little to gain and much to lose from conducting
such a test.
neclassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP90M00005R000800140022-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/29 : CIA-RDP90M00005R000800140022-0
? ???? ? .7 ? t??? ?
7
U.S. National Technical Means of verification are not as highly
effective against ground-launched cruise missiles [GLCMs] with
these ranges, testing within which are likewise banned by the INF
treaty. In aprticualr, an illegal force of GLCMs could probably not
be detected nearly s promptly nor with the same high degee of con-
fidence. This is due to their much smaller size and to the fact that
they are in almost all respects identical with and virtually indistin-
guishable from sea-launched versions of the same missile, which
are not banned by the INF treaty.
Still, any militarily significant training or deployment of a covert
force of ground-launched cruise missiles would be subject to detec-
tion by the United States. This is because it would necessarily in-
volve a sizable number of troops and technicians, as well as special
security arrangements associated with highly sensitive activities,
especially the illegal training or deployment of a nuclear-capable
missile force. Moreover, in contrast with the SS-20, the Soviets
have never developed the infrastructure for such a force of GLCMs.
So, the Soviets could not have much confidence that they could
maintain or deploy a ready ground-launched cruise missile force
banned by the INF treaty without being caught.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The key unclassified findings and conclusions of the Committee
are as follows:
The Committee believes that by a combination of National Tech-
nical Means and on-site inspection, the intelligence community will
be able to monitor the drawdown and elimination of declared
Soviet missiles launchers and associated equipment with great cer-
tainty.
The Committee notes that the on-site inspections established by
the Treaty are applicable only to facilities declared by the Soviets
in the Memorandum of Understanding. Therefore, the burden of
detecting banned activities at undeclared sites, where they are
most likely to occur, will fall on National Technical Means of veri-
fication.
The specific requirements imposed by the Treaty, including the
bans on production, flight testing and storage, will limit the ability
of the Soviets to maintain non-deployed missiles in a high state of
readiness. These provisions increase both the probability of detect-
ing cheating and the cost of cheating for the Soviets. At the same
time, however, Soviet compliance with some of the Treaty's provi-
sions will be difficult to monitor.
This problem is exemplified by the unresolved controversy be-
tween DIA and other intelligence agencies over the number of SS-
20's in the Soviet inventory. In any event, the Treaty's ban on
flight testing, will over time limit the military utility of any SS-
20's that the Soviet Union might covertly maintain.
At the same time, the Committee notes that the flight test ban is
uneven in its application against weapons systems eliminated by
the Treaty. It is effective in limiting the military reliability of a
covert SS-20 force, but far less relevant to ground-launched cruise
missiles and shorter-range ballistic missiles.
nprinqcifiRd and Approved For Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP90M00005R000800140022-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP90M00005R000800140022-0
?-? - ?7??? ,??? ? ift????jta ?
8
Ground-launched cruise missiles pose a particularly difficult
monitoring problem as they are interchangeable with long-range
Soviet sea launched cruise missiles [SLCM's]. So long as SLCMs are
not banned, their testing will allow a Soviet military planner to
fulfill all of the technical requirements for testing a covert GLCM.
The lack of a ground forces infrastructure for such weapons, how-
ever, would be extremely difficult for the Soviets to overcome cov-
ertly, and this greatly lessens the value and probability of such a
cheating effort.
We are concerned that the Soviets could covertly extend the
range capability of a cruise missile, or overtly develop a new
ground-launched missile with a prohibited long-range capability, if
the cruise missile were tested only to shorter ranges.
Yet the Committee believes that the risk of a Soviet attempt to
cheat with such an extended range capability is offset by Soviet
operational requirements. Soviet military planners woultkhave se-
rious problems with the reliability of systems not tested to their
maximum range.
In the case of short range ballistic missiles [SRBM's] the Commit-
tee does not foresee the need for the Soviets to cheat since they can
easily and legally develop a new or modernized SRBM with a dem-
onstrated range less than 500 kilometers.
Moreover, the Soviets could not test any short-range ballistic
missile much beyond the 500-kilometer limit without the United
States detecting the violation.
The Committee believes that in the absence of a START agree-
ment, the Soviets have little or no incentive to cheat. With 10,000
warheads in their strategic arsenal today, the the Soviets can cover
INF and global targets and still have several thousand warheads in
reserve.
In an INF/START environment, however, the monitoring, cheat-
ing and risk calculus changes substantially. The Soveit incentive to
cheat could increase because of a greater difficulty in meeting tar-
geting requirements. The military significance of any cheating will
increase because of lower U.S. force levels.
But the Soviets would have greater difficulty maintaining a
covert force of intermediate-range ballistic missiles in a START
regime with new limits on road-mobile strategic ballistic missiles
and new provisions for short-notice inspections of undeclared facili-
ties.
The monitoring of numerical limits, rather than a ban, and of
qualitiative restrictions will make the satisfaction of collection re-
quirements and, therefore, the detection of cheating far more diffi-
cult.
The U.S. intelligence community must be prepared to meet two
priorities under a Start environment?where the United States and
the Soviet Union have agreed to reduce their strategic offensive
? forces while also complying with the INF, ABM and other arms
control treaties. The first involves monitoring those weapons sys-
tems and activities limited or banned by arms control treaties. The
second involves military activities which are not limited by trea-
ties, but which take on an added importance as a result of their
constraints.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP90M00005R000800140022-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP90M00005R000800140022-0
9
By cutting strategic offensive forces on both sides by roughly 50
percent, a START agreement would raise the importance of intelli-
gence on Soviet developments in other areas that would threaten
the survivability and effectiveness on scaled back U.S. strategic
forces.
Indeed, it is potential combinations of simultaneous develop-
ments in Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces, particular-
ly its capabilities against U.S. satellites, ballistic missile launchers
and cruise missiles that raise the most urgent concerns about
threatening shifts in the strategic balance between the Soviet
Union and the United States. Moreover, it is in areas not limited
by a treaty where such Soviet efforts are likely to be most active.
The Committee accordingly recommends that the Congress au-
thorize and appropriate funds required to initiate a long-term pro-
gram to modernize and improve upon current plans for intelligence
collection. It specifically recommends investing more in programs
that would be most helpful in verifying a START Treaty, in pre-
venting technological surprise and in supporting U.S. policy and
operation in crises.
Many of the details regarding the precise nature of our inspec-
tion rights are still being negotiated with the Soviets. A construc-
tive process has been put in motion to secure U.S. objectives in
these negotiations, although this has not yet been achieved.
The extensive on-site inspection and portal monitoring that may
be required by a START agreement, including suspect site inspec-
tions, could have a far more significant impact on U.S. counterin-
telligence and security interests than those agreed to in the INF
Treaty.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP90M00005R000800140022-0