CODEL BYRD: MEETINGS WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R000700130049-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: February 12, 1988
• Content Type: CABLE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP90M00005R000700130049-3
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RUEHDD/NATO COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
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CONFIDENTIAL BONN 04808
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, NATO, GE
SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD: MEETINGS WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL
AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER
1. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY
OCA
INCOMING
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IN SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH THE CHANCELLOR AND THE FOREIGN
MINISTER, CODEL BYRD FEBRUARY 9 EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE INF
TREATY AND HEARD GERMAN CONCERNS REGARDING FOLLOW-ON
STEPS. SENATE MAJORITY LEADER BYRD, JOINED BY SENATORS
PELL, NUNN, BOREN, AND WARNER APPLAUDED ALLIANCE COHESION
WHICH HAD YIELDED "A VICTORY ON INF" AND URGED THE NATO
PARTNERS TO DEMONSTRATE THE SAME COLLECTIVE UNITY IN
FACING THE POST-INF DECISIONS. THE CODEL PREDICTED THE
INF TREATY WOULD BE RATIFIED. CHANCELLOR KOHL AND FOREIGN
MINISTER GENSCHER OUTLINED THE GERMAN CASE FOR
INCORPORATING SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES INTO NATO'S ARMS
CONTROL NEGOTIATING STRATEGY, NOT SEQUENTIALLY BUT IN
TANDEM WITH THE OTHER TALKS. THEY MADE CLEAR THAT THEY
OPPOSED A THIRD ZERO, SUPPORTING INSTEAD REDUCTIONS TO
LOWER EQUAL LEVELS. ON MODERNIZATION, KOHL AND GENSCHER
PUSHED THE GERMAN PREFERENCE FOR A GO-SLOW APPROACH,
URGING THAT THE ALLIANCE DEFER SPECIFIC DECISIONS ON
MONTEBELLO FOLLOW-UP, PENDING DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPRE-
HENSIVE NATO SECURITY CONCEPT WHICH FACTORED IN GOALS AND
REQUIREMENTS. THE CHANCELLOR ALSO SHARED HIS STRONGLY-
FELT VIEWS ON THE FRG'S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S.
AND HIS ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET LEADER GORBACHEV AND THE
VULNERABILITY OF SOME WARSAW PACT MEMBERS TO WESTERN
IDEAS AND VALUES. THE FOREIGN OFFICE HOSTED A LUNCHEON
FOR THE CODEL. OTHER PROGRAM EVENTS INCLUDED A PRESS
CONFERENCE AND A MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER WOERNER
(THESE WILL BE REPORTED SEPTEL). THE AMBASSADOR AND
EMBOFF VARGAS ACCOMPANIED THE CODEL TO THE MEETINGS WITH
KOHL AND GENSCHER AND THE LUNCHEON. END SUMMARY.
-rratitic?i-rtchirr I AI
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MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER
3. SENATE MAJORITY LEADER BYRD EXPLAINED TO GENSCHER
THAT HIS BIPARTISAN DELEGATION WANTED TO REASSURE OUR
EUROPEAN NATO ALLIES THAT THE SENATE VIEWED THE U.S.
COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE AS FIRM AS EVER. ALLIANCE
COHESION AND STEADFASTNESS HAD ENABLED THE NATO PARTNERS
TO WIN A VICTORY ON INF; THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT THE
TREATY WOULD BE APPROVED BY THE U.S. SENATE. THE KEY
QUESTION NOW EVOLVED AROUND WHAT NATO ALLIES COLLECTIVELY
WERE PREPARED TO DO IN THE WAY OF NEXT STEPS.
4. ON NEXT STEPS, GENSCHER SAID A CONTINUING PRIMARY
CONCERN WAS THE SOVIET CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY, WHICH
WOULD BE A PROBLEM SO LONG AS NEW CONVENTIONAL ARMS TALKS
REMAINED IN LIMBO. THE FRG BELIEVED THAT A BALANCED CSCE
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, ADDRESSING THE MAIN ISSUES IN THE
THREE BASKETS (HUMAN RIGHTS, SECURITY, COOPERATION,
INCREASED VISITOR EXCHANGES), SHOULD BE FINALIZED AS
QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE SO AS TO PERMIT THE COMMENCEMENT OF
NEW CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS. ANY FURTHER DELAY IN
STARTING THESE TALKS WOULD ONLY DELAY ACHIEVEMENT OF
REDUCTIONS IN THE SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCE. ON A
RELATED NOTE, GENSCHER SAID HE HAD REMINDED GORBACHEV IN
THE PAST THAT THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE REMAINED AN
OBSTACLE TO EAST/WEST DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION.
5. ON SNF AND MODERNIZATION, GENSCHER REPEATED FAMILIAR
ARGUMENTS. THE JUNE 1987 REYKJAVIK NAC STATEMENT ALLOWED
FOR NEGOTIATED REDUCTIONS IN U.S. AND SOVIET SHORT-RANGE
NUCLEAR FORCES AND, GIVEN THE SPECIAL DANGER THESE
WEAPONS POSED FOR GERMANS, THE FRG SUPPORTED THE
INCORPORATION OF THESE LAND-BASED NUCLEAR MISSILES OF
SHORTER RANGE IN NATO'S ARMS CONTROL CONCEPT AND OVERALL
STRATEGY, HE SAID. GENSCHER REJECTED A SEQUENTIAL
APPROACH CONCERNING THE PRIORITIES FOR ARMS CONTROL
NEGOTIATIONS, SAYING THERE CAN BE NO SEQUENCE: THAT
DECISIONS ON NEGOTIATING TIMETABLES FLOW FROM A VARIETY
OF FACTORS. WHILE HE BELIEVED THAT SNF TALKS SHOULD
OCCUR IN TANDEM WITH OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS,
GENSCHER SAID HE WANTED TO BE CLEAR ON HIS AND THE FRG
STANCE ON SNF. HE DID NOT ADVOCATE NOR SUPPORT A THIRD
ZERO ON SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES. INSTEAD HE BACKED
C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 04 BONN 04808
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, NATO. GE
SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD: MEETINGS WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL
AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER
TALKS AIMED AT REDUCTIONS TO EQUAL LEVELS. COMING BACK
TO THIS POINT LATER IN THE DISCUSSIONS, GENSCHER FULLY
RECOGNIZED AND ACCEPTED THE POINT THAT "WE DO REQUIRE
THE ELEMENT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE" NOW AND IN THE FUTURE.
6. RESPONDING TO QUESTIONING ON MODERNIZATION BY
SENATOR NUNN, GENSCHER SAID NATO NEEDED TO DEVELOP A
POST-INF SECURITY CONCEPT, ADDRESSING GOALS OF ARMS
CONTROL AND DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS, BEFORE SPECIFIC
MODERNIZATION DECISIONS COULD BE IMPLEMENTED. THE
ALLIANCE COULD NOT SAY WHAT SHOULD BE DONE NOW WITH
RESPECT TO SYSTEMS SUCH AS LANCE WITHOUT HAVING FIRST
REACHED AGREEMENT ON WHAT SHAPE THE OVERALL SECURITY
FRAMEWORK WOULD TAKE. LANCE WAS ONLY A TINY SEGMENT OF
THE PICTURE AND COULD NOT BE DISCUSSED IN ISOLATION.
FURTHER, GIVEN ITS LIFE-SPAN. IT DID NOT REQUIRE A
CONFIDENTIAL
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MODERNIZATION DECISION NOW. THE FRG THINKING ON A
SECURITY CONCEPT FOR NATO DID NOT CLASH WITH MONTEBELLO,
BUT RATHER SOUGHT TO SETTLE THE REMAINING ISSUES (THE
RIB QUESTION HAVING BEEN RESOLVED BY THE INF TREATY) OF
MONTEBELLO. THE QUESTION OF ARTILLERY MODERNIZATION WAS
ALREADY COMPLETED (SIC), BUT OTHER MODERNIZATION ISSUES
WOULD COME UP, INCLUDING LANCE AND MUNITIONS. NATO WOULD
HAVE TO DEBATE THE NUMBERS AND TYPES. (COMMENT: GENSCHER
PROVIDED NO COMMENTARY TO BACK UP HIS ASSERTION ON
COMPLETION OF NUCLEAR ARTILLERY MODERNIZATION. END
COMMENT.)
7. ON START, GENSCHER SAID AN IDEAL TIMETABLE FOR
CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT, INCLUDING 50 PERCENT
REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WOULD BE DURING
THE FIRST HALF OF THIS YEAR. IF IT WERE NOT POSSIBLE TO
CONCLUDE A "GOOD AGREEMENT" DURING THIS TIMEFRAME,
HOWEVER, THE U.S. SHOULD OPT TO WAIT UNTIL A MORE
PROPITIOUS TIME.
8. AS THE MEETING CONCLUDED, SENATOR BYRD STRESSED THE
IMPORTANCE OF A UNITED STANCE BY THE ALLIANCE IN
ADVANCING COMMON SECURITY GOALS. HE AFFIRMED THAT THE
U.S. COMMITMENT TO NATO WAS UNWAVERING.
CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL
9. IN A RELAXED, 90-MINUTE MEETING, THE CHANCELLOR
RESPONDED TO CODEL BYRD QUESTIONS ON FRG PERCEPTIONS OF
THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. KOHL
ALSO ASSESSED DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND SHARED
PERSONAL VIEWS ON THE FRG'S RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.
10. KOHL BEGAN BY NOTING HIS STANDING INVITATION TO A
SMALL GROUP OF U.S. SENATORS TO VISIT THE FRG AROUND THE
MAY-TIMEFRAME. THE OBJECTIVE IS TO AFFORD BOTH THE
SENATORS AND HIGH-LEVEL FRG GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AN
OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE IN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS ON A WIDE-
RANGE OF ISSUES AFFECTING U.S. AND GERMAN RELATIONS.
THERE WOULD BE A CULTURAL PURPOSE AS WELL, WITH THE
AMERICANS HAVING THE CHANCE TO MEET AND CHAT WITH THE MAN
ON THE STREET, DOING SOME SIGHTSEEING AND TAKING IN SOME
CULTURAL EVENTS. A SIMILAR INVITATION WOULD BE ISSUED
TO A GROUP OF U.S. CONGRESSMEN TO VISIT ON ANOTHER
OCCASION.
11. SENATOR BYRD SAID THAT THE SENATORS WERE AWARE OF
THE CHANCELLOR'S INVITATION. THERE WAS A NATURAL
AFFINITY BETWEEN GERMANS AND AMERICANS, WHICH GAVE RISE
TO THESE TRANSATLANTIC EXCHANGES. HE DESCRIBED THE
BIPARTISAN NATURE OF HIS DELEGATION AND BEGAN THE
SUBSTANTIVE PORTION OF THE PROGRAM BY ASKING THE
CHANCELLOR TO COMMENT ON GERMAN PERCEPTIONS OF U.S./FRG
RELATIONS AND THE "DYNAMIC" SOVIET LEADERSHIP.
12. KOHL REPLIED THAT FRG RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.
CONSTITUTED THE ESSENTIAL ISSUE FOR US." PEACE AND
PROSPERITY HAD REIGNED IN EUROPE SINCE 1945 PRINCIPALLY
BECAUSE OF THE U.S. PROTECTIVE UMBRELLA. NOT SINCE THE
SIMILAR (IN LENGTH) PERIOD 1870-1914 HAD EUROPE KNOWN
SUSTAINED TRANQUILITY. GERMANS, ESPECIALLY THE 30-35
PERCENT OF THE POPULATION WHO RETAINED MEMORIES OF THE
WAR, REMEMBERED WELL THE EXTENDED-HAND OF THE MARSHALL
PLAN WHICH IGNITED THIS NEW ERA OF PEACE AND GROWTH.
KOHL KNEW PERSONALLY THE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN AID TO
A SHATTERED, DEFEATED GERMANY. AT THE CLOSE OF THE WAR,
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 04 BONN o4soe
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, NATO, GE
SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD: MEETINGS WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL
AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER
HE WAS A 15-YEAR OLD SOLDIER, MEMBER OF AN ANTI-AIRCRAFT
UNIT. HIS UNIT WAS WITHOUT SUPPLIES AND STARVING. THE
AMERICANS WERE KIND AND PROVIDED FOOD. GERMANS OF HIS
GENERATION WHO ARE LIVING COULD AFFIRM THAT AMERICANS
DID NOT LOOT NOR DISMANTLE WHAT REMAINED OF GERMAN
INDUSTRY. KOHL SAID THAT AS CHANCELLOR HE HAS BASED HIS
POLICIES ON THE "IRREVERSIBLE LINKS" BETWEEN THE FRG AND
THE WEST, FORGED IN LARGE MEASURE BY THE U.S./FRG
RELATIONSHIP.
13. REGARDING THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, KOHL SAID GERMANS
VIEWED GORBACHEV AS AN IMAGINATIVE LEADER SEEKING TO
REVERSE INEFFECTUAL MANAGEMENT PRACTICES OF THE PAST,
HOPING TO BRING ABOUT AN INCREASED LEVEL OF EFFICIENCY,
PARTICULARLY IN THE ECONOMY. IN KOHL'S VIEW, IT WAS TOO
EARLY TO DECLARE GORBACHEV A MAN OF PEACE. THE WEST
SHOULD RESERVE JUDGMENT FOR THE NEXT 3-5 YEARS, AWAITING
SOVIET ACTIONS ON AFGHANISTAN. EMIGRATION, AND POST-INF
ARMS CONTROL. THE NATO ALLIANCE SHOULD MAKE GOOD USE OF
THIS TIME, DEVELOPING ANO IMPLEMENTING SECURITY POLICIES
WHICH ENABLED IT TO TALK TO THE SOVIETS ON THE BASIS
OF STRENGTH.
14. KOHL TERMED SOME WARSAW PACT MEMBERS AS UNRELIABLE
PARTNERS FOR THE SOVIET UNION. THE "GIFTED AND TALENTED"
CZECHS WERE UNHAPPY WITH THEIR REGIME AND YEARNED FOR A
GREATER MEASURE OF FREEDOM. SO DID THE POLES, WHO WILL
SURVIVE" COMMUNISM ("THEY HAVE SURVIVED EVERYTHING
ELSE"). WHILE HE COULD NOT KNOCK DOWN THE BERLIN WALL,
KOHL SAID HE WOULD SEEK TO EXPAND INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS
IN AN EFFORT TO "OPEN THE WINDOW INTO THE GDR." OVER
1.5 MILLION YOUNG EAST GERMANS HAVE VISITED THE WEST
AND HE WILL SEEK TO INCREASE THAT NUMBER, ENABLING THEM
TO COMPARE THEIR LIFE STYLES WITH THOSE OF FREE
SOCIETIES.
IS. TURNING TO ARMS CONTROL THEMES, KOHL URGED THAT THE
SENATE RATIFY THE INF TREATY. REFRAINING FROM ATTACHING
AMENDMENTS THAT WOULD CHANGE THE CHARACTER OF THE TREATY.
FAILURE TO RATIFY WOULD SPELL DISASTER FOR EUROPE. KOHL
RECOUNTED THE BITTER CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING DEPLOYMENT
OF P-II'S AND GLCM'S IN THE FRG IN 1983. OVER 300,000
GERMANS HAD CONVERGED AROUND THE CHANCELLERY TO PROTEST
HIS DECISION TO IMPLEMENT THE PAINFUL HALF OF THE DUAL-
TRACK DECISION. GERMANS ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM
STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE U.S.-SOVIET TREATY WHICH WOULD
TAKE THESE SYSTEMS OUT. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION BY
SENATOR WARNER, KOHL SAID THAT THE U.S. CONSULTATIONS
WITH THE FRG THROUGHOUT THE INF NEGOTIATIONS WERE
EXCELLENT, THANKS IN GREAT PART TO THE EFFORTS OF THE
U.S. AMBASSADORS HERE (FIRST ARTHUR BURNS; NOW, RICHARD
BURT) AND THE U.S. NEGOTIATORS, WHO SAW TO IT THAT THE
FRG GOVERNMENT WAS CONSULTED CONTINUOUSLY. THE SCG
MECHANISM HAD EQUALLY SERVED AN IMPORTANT FUNCTION IN THE
CONSULTATIVE PROCESS. (LATER IN THE DISCUSSION,
RESPONDING TO A POINT ON THE DANGERS OF A THIRD ZERO, THE
CHANCELLOR REFERRED TO THE HEATED DOMESTIC DEBATE ON THE
SECOND INF ZERO, WHICH RAGED IN THE FRG DURING THE PERIOD
APRIL-JUNE 1987. KOHL, ASKING THAT THIS REMARK NOT BE
DISCLOSED, SAID THAT HE HAD NOT SUPPORTED THE SECOND
ZERO, ON SRINF; THAT ZERO LRINF AND REDUCED EQUAL CEILINGS
ON SRINF HAD CONSTITUTED HIS PREFERRED FORMULA. THE
PROBLEM WAS THAT THE U.S. HAD SIGNALLED ITS PREFERENCE
CONFIDFNTI
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FOR DOUBLE ZERO AND HE WAS OBLIGED TO REVERSE HIS
GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IN FAVOR OF DOUBLE ZERO. HIS
DECISION HAD DISMAYED HIS FELLOW CONERVATIvFS, CAUSING
HIM SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITHIN HIS OWN PARTY.)
16. LOOKING BEYOND INF, KOHL SAID NATO SHOULD FACTOR IN
GERMAN SENSITIVITIES ON SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES IN
OUTLINING AN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATING STRATEGY. THE
ALLIANCE WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO INCLUDE SNF TALKS
WITHIN ITS OVERALL CONCEPT, HE SAID. KOHL HASTENED TO
ADD THAT HE DID NOT FAVOR A THIRD ZERO AND THAT THE FRG
POSITION REMAINED ONE OF FAVORING NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT
REDUCTIONS TO EQUAL LOWER LEVELS. HE SAID HE PLANNED
TO RUN FOR RE-ELECTION IN 1990 AND HIS OPPOSITION TO A
THIRD ZERO AND DE-NUCLEARIZATION WOULD CONSTITUTE STRONG
CAMPAIGN THEMES.
17. ON NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION, KOHL REPEATED FAMILIAR
ARGUMENTS ON THE NEED FOR NATO TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE
SECURITY CONCEPT BEFORE DEFINING A TIMETABLE FOR SPECIFIC
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 04 OF 04 BONN 04808
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, NATO, GE
SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD: MEETINGS WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL
AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER
DECISIONS ON MODERNIZATION. THERE WAS NO RUSH TO DECIDE
ON A LANCE FOLLOW-ON, HE SAID, AS THE PRESENT SYSTEM WAS
GOOD THROUGH THE FIRST PART OF THE 1990'S.
18. OTHER POINTS ON ARMS CONTROL BY KOHL:
-- IN NEGOTIATIONS ON MISSILES IN THE 0-500 KM RANGE,
THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE PRESSED TO SCALE BACK THEIR SCUD
FORCE; EVEN IF THEY HALVED IT, THEY WOULD STILL HAVE
MORE THAN WHAT THE WEST HAS.
-- SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ENTERTAIN ASYMMETRICAL
REDUCTION PROPOSALS IN NEW CONVENTIONAL ARMS TALKS WILL
PROVE TO BE THE REAL TEST IN ASSESSING SERIOUS SOVIET
INTENT IN ARMS CONTROL.
-- A START AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY IF CONCLUDED THIS
SUMMER, WOULD PROVIDE AN IMPORTANT BOOST TO GORBACHEV
INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION.
19. REPLY/NG TO QUESTIONS BY SENATOR PELL ON THE FRANCO-
GERMAN BRIGADE, KOHL SAID ITS CREATION HAD BEEN HIS IDEA.
THERE WAS BOTH SYMBOLISM AND PRACTICALITY BEHIND IT. UP
TO NOW, NO ONE WOULD HAVE THOUGHT SUCH A NOTION WAS
POSSIBLE IN THIS CENTURY. BUT NOW IT WAS REALITY. THE
BRIGADE WOULD HAVE AN INTEGRATED LEADERSHIP AND, FOR NOW,
NATIONAL COMBAT AND SUPPORT UNITS. HE EXPECTED IT TO BE
OPERATIONAL IN A YEAR'S TIME AND WOULD SUCCEED IN BRINGING
FRANCE INTO THE FORWARD DEFENSE REGIONS AND
EAST OF THE RHINE. IT WAS A CONVENIENT WAY TO BRING
FRANCE CLOSER TO NATO, ALTHOUGH THIS TOPIC WAS NEVER
BROACHED IN FRENCH-GERMAN TALKS. KOHL SAID HE EXPECTED
INCREASED MOMENTUM AND PROGRESS IN BRIGADE ACTIVITIES
FOLLOWING THE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. '
20. SENATOR BYRD THANKED THE CHANCELLOR FOR HIS TIME,
SAYING HE LOOKED FORWARD TO SEEING HIM ON FEB. 18, AT
1100 HOURS, ALONG WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SENATE IN
WASHINGTON. ON A POSSIBLE START TREATY, THE SENATE
MAJORITY LEADER SAID HE WOULD BE CONCERNED IF ONE CAME
TO THE SENATE BY THE SUMMER. IT WOULD BE TOO SOON AND
GIVEN THE COMPLEX, CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES, THE SENATE WOULD
WANT TO CAREFULLY REVIEW IT BEFORE GIVING ITS ADVICE AND
CONF !DENT I AL
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CONSENT. THE SENATE WOULD RESIST BEING SWEPT ALONG BY
A PRO-ARMS CONTROL ATMOSPHERE.
21. CODEL BYRD DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THIS
REPORT BEFORE DEPARTING BONN.
BURT
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
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