CODEL BYRD: MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER; PRESS CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R000700130041-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: February 17, 1988
• Content Type: CABLE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP90M00005R000700130041-1
CONFfDENL-
25X1
/13/
LuNr1utNi1AL
PRIORITY
FRP: 3
STATE
88 7878091 SCP
PAGE 001
TOR: 171710Z FEB 88
NC 7878091
BONN 05096
PP RUEAIIB
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
STU8732
PP RUEHC
DE RUFHOL #5096/01 0481610
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171609Z FEB 88
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1579
INFO RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4596
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 6011
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 4017
.RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1076
RUFHMU/AMCONSUL MUNICH 3447
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 1817
RUFHGV/USDEL NST GENEVA
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
BT
E-N-T-3--A-L--BONN 05096
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, NATO, GE
SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD: MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER;
_ , PRESS CONFERENCE
REF: BONN 04808
1. (C) SUMMARY
OC A
INCOMING
IN HIS FEB. 9 MEETING WITH CODEL BYRD, DEFENSE MINISTER
WOERNER DISCUSSED HIS VIEW ON ALLIANCE DEALINGS WITH THE
SOVIETS AND ARMS CONTROL THEMES. HE DEFENDED THE WEST'S
INSISTENCE THAT MOSCOW BE MORE FORTHCOMING IN CONVENTIONAL
ARMS ISSUES IN EXCHANGE FOR INCREASED WESTERN COOPERATION.
ON THE THORNY QUESTION OF MODERNIZATION, WOERNER SUPPORTED
MONTEBELLO FOLLOW-UP, BUT ARGUED THAT THE TIMING ON
SPECIFIC IMPLEMENTATION STEPS WAS NOT RIGHT. HE EXPRESSED
CONCERN THAT A MONTEBELLO DISCUSSION NOW WOULD FUEL A
DOMESTIC DEBATE AND CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT MODERNIZA-
TION REPRESENTED A DEVELOPMENT FLOWING FROM THE INF
TREATY. HE AGREED WITH SENATOR NUNN THAT CONVENTIONAL
STABILITY TALKS (CST) SHOULD CONSTITUTE NATO'S NEXT ARMS
CONTROL PRIORITY, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT EXPECT A CST
MANDATE UNTIL LATE IN THE FALL OF THIS YEAR. HE
PORTRAYED THE FRANCO-GERMAN BRIGADE AS A POSITIVE STEP
IN PULLING FRANCE BACK INTO THE NATO FOLD. THE CODEL
EARLIER GAVE A 30-MINUTE PRESS CONFERENCE, FIELDING
QUESTIONS ON NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION AND INF TREATY
RATIFICATION. EMBASSY OFFICER ACCOMPANIED CODEL. END
SUMMARY.
2. (C) AFTER AN EXCHANGE OF COURTESIES, SENATOR BYRD
BEGAN THE CONVERSATION BY UNDERSCORING THE U.S. SENATE'S
SUPPORT FOR NATO COHESION. IT WAS THIS COLLECTIVE SPIRIT,
HE SAID, WHICH BROUGHT THE SOVIETS BACK TO THE INF
-GGNFIDENTIAL--
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP90M00005R000700130041-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP90M00005R000700130041-1
, ?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/07 : CIA-RDP90M00005R000700130041-1
CONFIDENTIAL
88 7878091 SCP
PAGE.002 NC 7878091
TOR: 171710Z FEB 88 BONN 05096
NEGOTIATING TABLE AND EVENTUALLY PRODUCED THE INF TREATY.
THE ALLIANCE NEEDED TO COUNT ON THIS SAME SPIRIT IN
APPROACHING THE DIFFICULT POST-INF DECISIONS ON
WESTERN DEFENSE. THE SENATOR INVITED DEFENSE MINISTER
WOERNER'S VIEWS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR DEALING WITH IT.
DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS --
MAKE COOPERATION A TWO-WAY STREET
3. (C) WOERNER SECONDED SENATOR BYRD'S COMMENTS ON
ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY, SAYING THAT AS NATO'S NEXT
SECRETARY-GENERAL, HE WAS KEENLY AWARE OF THE ROLE THIS
COHESION WOULD PLAY IN THE CHALLENGING TIMES AHEAD. AS
DEFENSE MINISTER, HE COULD ALSO ADD THAT. THE FATE OF A
FREE GERMANY DEPENDED ON NATO SOLIDARITY.
4. (C) REGARDING SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV,
WOERNER SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT THE
SOVIET LEADER WAS SEEKING TO REFORM A FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC POLICY-MAKING SYSTEM. HE HAD HIS OWN INTERESTS
AND AGENDA, THEREFORE, IN PUSHING FOR THE REALIZATION
OF COMMON SECURITY GOALS WITH THE WEST. IN DEALING WITH
GORBACHEV, THE ALLIANCE NEEDED TO FIRMLY INSIST THAT
COOPERATION BE A TWO-WAY STREET, RESISTING THE TEMPTATION
TO MEET HIM MORE THAN HALF-WAY SIMPLY BECAUSE HE
ENDORSED SOME OF THE WEST'S ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES.
NATO HAD EVERY RIGHT TO DEMAND THAT THE SOVIETS DO MORE,
SUCH AS IN THE AREA OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS, IN RETURN
FOR GREATER WESTERN COOPERATION.
NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION
5. (C) RESPONDING TO SENATOR NUNN'S QUESTION ON THE
NEED FOR MODERNIZATION IN THE POST-INF ENVIRONMENT,
WOERNER SAID HIS POSITION WAS CLEAR. THE ALLIANCE HAD
TAKEN THE MONTEBELLO DECISION ANO NEEDED TO TAKE THE
ACTIONS THAT FLOWED FROM IT. HE HAD SO REITERATED TO
THE CHANCELLOR THE DAY BEFORE. MODERNIZATION OF NUCLEAR
ARTILLERY, WEEDING OUT OLDER MUNITIONS. WAS PARTICULARLY
IMPORTANT IN UPGRADING BATTLEFIELD SYSTEMS.
6. (C) THE PROBLEM WAS ONE OF TIMING. THIS WAS NOT
THE TIME FOR THE ALLIANCE TO DEFINE MONTEBELLO FOLLOW-UP
C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 05096
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, NATO. GE
SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD: MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER;
PRESS CONFERENCE
STEPS. TO DO SO WOULD TRIGGER AN UNDESIRABLE DEBATE
(IN THE FRG) AND CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT MODERNIZATION
OF SHORT-RANGE SYSTEMS IS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE INF
TREATY. THERE WAS NO NEED PRESENTLY TO AGREE ON A LANCE
FOLLOW-ON, A SYSTEM WHICH WOULD CONTINUE TO SERVE THE
ALLIANCE UNTIL 1993. SENATOR NUNN VOICED AGREEMENT WITH
WOERNER'S ASSESSMENT ON MODERNIZATION.
CONVENTIONAL STABILITY --
"THE NEXT ARMS CONTROL PRIORITY"
7. (C) THE DEFENSE MINISTER AGREED WITH SENATOR NUNN'S
STATEMENT THAT CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL SHOULD CONSTITUTE
NATO'S NEXT ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVE. ADDING THAT THE
PUBLIC'S ATTENTION HAD TO BE DIVERTED FROM DISCUSSIONS
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP90M00005R000700130041-1
CONFIDENTIAL
88 7878091 SCP
PAGE 003 NC 7878091
TOR: 171710Z FEB 88 BONN 05096
ON NUCLEAR ISSUES "IN A DELICATE WAY." NATO HAD TO
STEP UP ITS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS HERE; OTHERWISE
THE PUBLIC SPOTLIGHT WOULD REMAIN nN SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR
FORCES TALKS, WHERE A THIRD ZERO OPTION (WHICH HE
STRONGLY OPPOSED) WAS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY.
8. (C) WOERNER TOLD THE CODEL THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT
TO SEE A MANDATE ON CONVENTIONAL STABILITY UNTIL THE
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER TIMEFRAME. HE EXPRESSED HIS VIEW
THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD NEVERTHELESS ACCELERATE EFFORTS
TO DEFINE AN OPENING NATO PROPOSAL, "THE SOONER THE
BETTER." HE SAID THE U.S. AND THE FRG HELD SIMILAR
VIEWS ON CONVENTIONAL CRITERIA, ESSENTIAL IN FASHIONING
AN APPROACH WHICH WOULD HIT AT THE SOVIET OFFENSIVE
CAPABILITY.
FRANCO-GERMAN BRIGADE
9. (C) WDERNER REPEATED FAMILIAR FRG VIEWS ON THE
FRANCO-GERMAN BRIGADE. THE FRG CONSIDERED ITS CREATION
A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, HE SAID, IN DRAWING
FRANCE INTO A NATO STRATEGY OF FORWARD DEFENSE. THE
FRG WOULD TAP UNITS DRAWN FROM ITS SOUTHERN TERRITORIAL
COMMAND FOR THE BRIGADE, LEAVING ITS NATO FORCES
UNTOUCHED. AS ENVISIONED, THE NATIONAL UNITS COMPRISING
THE BRIGADE WOULD REPORT TO THEIR NATIONAL COMMAND IN
PEACETIME. IN WARTIME, THEY WOULD REPORT UNDER ONE OF
TWO SCENARIOS: TO THE GERMAN SOUTHERN TERRITORIAL
COMMAND, IN THE REAR AREA; AND, TO THE FRENCH CORPS IN
THE FORWARD AREA. UNDER BOTH SCENARIOS, THE BRIGADE
WOULD OPERATE IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH NATO.
PRESS CONFERENCE
10. (U) FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL
(REPORTED SEPTEL) AND BEFORE THE CALL OF WERNER, THE
CODEL GAVE A 30-MINUTE PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE FEDERAL
PRESS CENTER. PRESENT WERE MEMBERS OF THE GERMAN AND
THE U.S. PRINT MEDIA. h GERMAN TELEVISION CREW
FILMED-TAPED PORTIONS FOR THE EVENING NEWS PROGRAM.
11. (U) IN AN OPENING STATEMENT, SENATOR BYRD
EXPLAINED THAT THE FIVE U.S. SENATORS WERE VISITING
FIVE EUROPEAN CAPITALS TO HEAR FIRST-HAND EUROPEAN
LEADERS' REACTIONS TO THE INF TREATY, THINKING ON
POST-INF, AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP.
HAVING JUST VISITED WITH THE CHANCELLOR, SENATOR BYRD
SAID, HE COULD ENTHUSIASTICALLY SAY THAT THE U.S.-GERMAN
RELATIONSHIP IS UNSHAKABLE. AMERICANS AND GERMANS
SHARED THE VIEW THAT NATO UNITY AND COHESION HAD BROUGHT
US THE INF TREATY, WHICH "IS A GOOD TREATY." THE U.S.
AND THE FRG ALSO BELIEVED THAT POST-INF STRATEGIES
MUST RESULT FROM COLLECTIVE PLANNING BASED ON PERCEIVED
MUTUAL SECURITY INTERESTS, NOT ON PERCEIVED GOODWILL OR
INTENTIONS ON THE PART OF ADVERSARIES. WHILE WE SHOULD
GO ON THE OFFENSIVE IN SEEKING NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR
WORLD PEACE, WE MUST BE EVER CAUTIOUS. THIS IS
PARTICULARLY THE CASE WITH A START TREATY. THE SENATOR
SAID THAT THE U.S. WOULD NEED TO PROCEED CAREFULLY AND
PATIENTLY, REMEMBERING THAT ONLY A GOOD TREATY CAN SERVE
THE INTERESTS OF ALL. THERE SHOULD BE NO TIMETABLE FOR
A START TREATY; THE TIME FOR SUCH A TREATY IS WHEN "WE
C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 05096
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, NATO, GE
SUBJECT: CODEL BYRD: MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER;
PRESS CONFERENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP90M00005R000700130041-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP90M00005R000700130041-1
CONFIDENTIAL
88 7878091 SCP
PAGE 004 NC 7878091
TOR: 171710Z FEB 88 BONN 05096
CAN GET THE RIGHT TREATY." (SENATOR WARNER SUPPORTED
SENATOR BYRD'S COMMENTS ON START, SAYING HE AGREED THAT
THE TIME FOR AN AGREEMENT IS WHEN THE U.S., IN
CONSULTATIONS WITH ITS ALLIES, AGREE THAT THE RIGHT
AGREEMENT IS AT HAND AND THAT IT SERVES THE SECURITY
INTERESTS NOT ONLY OF THE U.S., BUT OF OUR ALLIES AS
WELL.)
12. (U) MEDIA QUESTIONING LARGELY CENTERED ON THE
ISSUE OF MODERNIZATION, WITH SENATOR NUNN RESPONDING
ON BEHALF OF THE CODEL, FOR THE MOST PART. IN REPLY TO
A QUESTION CITING GERMAN APPREHENSION ON MONTEBELLO
FOLLOW-UP, NUNN STATED THAT, BASED ON DISCUSSIONS WITH
FRG OFFICIALS, HE DID NOT SENSE THAT THERE WAS ANY
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NATO ALLIES AND THE FRG REGARDING
THE CONCEPT OF MONTEBELLO. THERE WAS THE FEELING WITHIN
THE FRG GOVERNMENT, HE BELIEVED, THAT THE MONTEBELLO
DECISION IN CONCEPT SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT, ALTHOUGH IT
WAS EQUALLY TRUE THAT THE GERMANS WANTED TO TAKE ANOTHER
LOOK AT THE POST-INF ENVIRONMENT BEFORE DETERMINING
SPECIFICALLY HOW THE ALLIANCE WOULD PROCEED. THE SENATOR
EXPRESSED HIS VIEW THAT THE GERMAN POSITION WAS AN
UNDERSTANDABLE ONE. ADDING THAT THE U.S. SHOULD CONSULT
VERY CLOSELY WITH THE FRG AND OTHER NATO ALLIES IN
DECIDING WHERE THE ALLIANCE WANTED TO GO ON MODERNIZATION.
NUNN REMINDED THE MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE THAT THE 1983
MONTEBELLO DECISION AFFECTING NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION
HAD BEEN TAKEN BEFORE INF AND THE WEAPONS SYSTEMS
EARMARKED FOR MODERNIZATION WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE
INF TREATY. THE SENATOR VOICED HIS SUPPORT FOR
MODERNIZATION AS CALLED FOR UNDER MONTEBELLO, SAYING
THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE FLEXIBLE IN ITS APPROACH
13. (U) CODEL WAS ASKED IF IT EXPECTED EARLY RATIFICA-
TION OF THE INF TREATY. SENATOR BYRD PROVIDED A ONE-WORD
RESPONSE: YES. SENATOR PELL ADDED THAT THE SENATE
WAS PROCEEDING WITH ALL DISPATCH. IN ADDITION TO THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, THE TREATY WOULD BE
SCRUTINIZED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEES ON ARMED SERVICES
AND INTELLIGENCE. HE SAID HE EXPECTED TO GET THE TREATY
TO THE SENATE FLOOR SOMETIME IN MARCH. SENATOR BOREN
ADDED THAT THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE WAS
PROCEEDING WITH ITS HEARINGS ON THE VERIFICATION
PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY: THAT UP TO NOW, NO PROBLEMS
HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED. HE PREDICTED A FAVORABLE REPORT
BY HIS COMMITTEE.
14. (U) CODEL DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THIS
CABLE BEFORE DEPARTING BONN.
DOBBINS
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
noriaccifipn in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/07: CIA-RDP90M00005R000700130041-1