RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS POSED BY SENATOR HELMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R000300080001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 203
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 5, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
March 5, 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
COL. WILLIAM M. MATZ
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency
RADM JOSEPH C. STRASSER
Executive to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
MR. WILLIAM B. STAPLES
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
,ExecutivePegistry
88-0358X/1
SUBJECT: Responses to Questions Posed by Senator Helms
Following a request from SFRC Chairman Pell for Administration
reaction to questions posed by Senator Helms Memorandum on the
INF Treaty, we have prepared responses drawing either from
previously cleared guidance or, in the case of questions not
previously addressed, from further interagency clearance. This
response takes into account interagency reactions to previous
drafts and is submitted to the NSC staff for coordination and
final approval. Since we have had repeated requests for a
response to Senator Helms, the Department hopes that this
material can be provided to Senator Pell by Tuesday, 8 Marnh.
Ai471
Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
As stated
STAT
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Article II, Para. 1
"GLBM" is a new phrase and concept. Why has it been created by
this Treaty?
The term "ground-launched ballietic missile (GLBM)" is used in
the INF Treaty to make clear that the only missiles covered by
the Treaty are ground-launched. This usage is consistent with
the long standing U.S. and Allied position that the INF Treaty
should not restrict missiles of any basing mode other than
ground-launched missiles.
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Article II, Para. 5 & 6
The Treaty classifies missiles by maximum range. Should
missiles be classified in this manner, or by minimum range?
The Treaty classifies missiles by both maximum and minimum
range. The Treaty stipulates that an intermediate-range
missile has a range in excess of 1,000 kms but not in excess of
5500 kms and that a shorter-range missile has a range equal to
or in excess of 500 kms but not in excess of 1,000 kms.
V
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Answers to Helms Questions
Article II, Para. 5 & 6
Are there Soviet ground-launched missiles which are capable of
use in these ranges (1000-5500 km and 500-1000 km) but which
are not covered in this treaty?
Essentially, all strategic systems of both the Soviet Union and
the United States can perform INF missions. Indeed, the United
States has, for a number of years, dedicated a portion of its
ballistic missile submarine force to direct support of NATO.
Soviet strategic systems could do the same. The INF Treaty is
not the solution to all of NATO's military problems, but the
agreement is a positive step in the right direction. The
Soviet Union peployed its theater forces for political as well
as military purposes, i.e. for political intimidation and
coercion during a crisis or conflict. The SS-20, because of
its range, accuracy, mobility and triple warhead capability,
was particularly threatening to NATO. The Soviet Union will be
required to destroy these missiles under the INF Treaty,
resulting in fewer nuclear weapons arrayed against NATO than
there were in 1979, and fewer than there would be in the
absence of an INF Treaty.
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Article II, para 7
Could missiles conceivably be located outside these
"designated" sites?
?
Under the Treaty provisions, intermediate-range missiles shall
be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities
or shall be in transit. Shorter-range missiles shall be
located at missile operating bases, at missile support
facilities or shall be in transit. An INF missile not at one
of these locations would be in violation of the Treaty. While
100 percent certainty is not attainable, the INF verification
regime provides confidende that a militarily significant covert
force could not be deployed.
e?
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Orr
Article II, para 7
Would "suspect" sites be covered by this definition?
No. We have long argued that the INF verification regime
should be tailored to the detailed limitations of the Treaty.
In the context of an INF agreement that would have permitted
the United States and Soviet Union to retain missiles and
launchers capable of carrying 100 warheads, the United Sttes
proposed inspection of any site in either country where such
missiles and launchers could be located -- suspect sites.
After the Soviets agreed to the long-standing United States
preference for double global zero, in July 1987, the United
States re-examined its proposals for inspections of suspect
sites. In light of the great practical difficulties from the
point of view of our laws protecting private property and the
need to protect sensitive installations and facilities, we
determined that in the context of double global zero, overall
U.S. interests were best served by a more restrictive approach
to suspect site inspections than on the basis of "anywhere,
anytime." Furthermore, the Soviets strongly resisted
"anywhere, anytime" inspections on their territory in the
context of an INF agreement. In the ensuing negotiations, the
sides eventually agreed to short notice inspections of formerly
declared facilities.
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The INF verification regime provides an effective deterrent to
Soviet cheating. Under the INF Treaty after all INF missile
systems were eliminated, the possession of any 'IN? missile or
treaty-limited item would be a violation., The inspection
regime incorporated into the Treaty enhances our ability to
verify Soviet compliance. This means it would be more
difficult for the Soviets to elude detection and to cheat in a
militarily significant way. Specifically, former SS-20
facilities would be subject to inspection even if they were
converted for use as SS-25 bases; the production facility where
85-20's and SS-25's have been assembled will be monitored by
U.S. inspectors; and. the Soviets agreed on a-cooperative
measure which will enhance our ability to verify by NTM that
SS-20's are not located at 88-25 bases which are not otherwise
subject to inspection.
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Article II, Para. 8
Why are "missile operating bases" for intermediate-range
missiles covered only if located in deployment areas, while
"missile operating bases" for shorter-range missiles. are
covered regardless of where located?
Under the Treaty, intermediate-range missiles are permitted to
operate within the deployment areas defined by geographic
coordinates in the data MOU. The U.S. wished to maintain its
ability to deploy missiles throughout their deployment areas in
order to ensure the viability, effectiveness and survivability
of those missiles throughout the period of reductions. In
contrast, shorter-range missiles are not allowed to operate in
deployment areas, but must be located either at missile
operating bases or missile support facilities or be in transit
to an elimination facility. This more stringent restriction on
shorter-range missiles affects only Soviet forces since the US
does not deploy a shorter-range missile system.
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Article II, Para. 10
Why is the definition of "transit" for intermediate range
missiles different from the definition of "transit" for
shorter-range missiles?
Transit is more restrictive for shorter-range missiles. They
can be moved only from an operating base or support facility to
an elimination facility. All shorter-range missiles and
launchers must be located at elimination facilities within 12
months after the Treaty enters into force and must be destroyed
within 18 months.
?.'?
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Article II/ Para 11-14
Why is there a distinction between "deployment area" for
intermediate-range missiles and "operating base" for
shorter-range missiles?
No deployment areas are provided for shorter-range missiles,
which are subject to more stringent geographical constraints
than intermediate-range missiles. Shorter-range missiles may
be deployed only at missile operating bases. This is in U.S.
interests, since only the Soviet Union has any deployed
shorter-range missiles.
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Article III, para. 1
Does either party have ground-based missiles in Europe which
are capable of intermediate-range use, but which are not among
the missiles listed here and not covered by the treaty? Can
these excluded systems serve the same functions as the systems
eliminated by the treaty?
a
Regardless of whether they are based in the Soviet Union, the
United States or at sea, strategic systems are not included in
the INF Treaty but can cover targets in Europe. Such Soviet
systems, however, would not have the same political effect on
Europe as the SS-20 since Soviet strategic systems are
perceived as threatening both the United States and Europe
while the SS-20 is viewed by many Europeans as threatening only
Europe.
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?
Article IV
This Article provides for the elimination of U.S.
intermediate-range missile systems. Can this be done
constitutionally without appropriate enabling legislation being
passed by both Houses of Congress?
Our understanding is that DOD has always maintained that it has
the authority, without any need for new legislation, to
eliminate weapons systems it no longer wishes to retain. In
fact, the US has been eliminating missile and other defense
systems for many years without violating the Constitution,
either for arms control reasons (such as the dismantling of
excess strategic systems) or because we no longer want to have
the system around. Furthermore,' treaty provisions are the law
of the land under our Constitution, and the President would
have the right and the duty to enforce the provisions of the
INF Treaty once it is ratified, even if he would not otherwise
be legally able to do so.
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Article IV, para 1
This paragraph requires the parties to eliminate all
intermediate-range missile systems as defined by the treaty.
But does this requirement actually cover all ground launched
missiles with intermediate-range capabilities possessed by the
parties in Europe? Which such missiles are exempt?
The INF Treaty obligates both sides to destroy all
ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of
500 kms to 5500 kms. Bee also answers to question on Article
III, para 1 and Article XII, para 3.
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Article IV, para I
Will the warheads associated with the missile systems covered
by the treaty also be destroyed? If not, what can the parties
do with these warheads?
No, the INF Treaty obligates both sides to destroy INF
missiles, launchers and their support equipment and structures,
not nuclear warhead devices. By destroying the means of
delivering INF missile nuclear warhead devices, the Treaty will
remove the military threat posed by them.
-- For a number of reasons, the US determined that it would
not be in our interest to eliminate the nuclear warhead devices
themselves.
Verifying the elimination of nuclear warhead devices (not
to mention the production of new ones) raises formidable
technical challenges and difficult security issues. Intrusive
verification measures could disclose sensitive nuclear weapons
information to the Soviet Union.
-- Finally, the nuclear warhead devices contain costly and
scarce resources which it would be imprudent to destroy.
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?????=o
It was agreed at the Washington Ministerial in September
1987 that nuclear warhead devices and guidance elements would
be removed from the front section of a missile and returned to
national authorities. The missile front section itself, minus
the nuclear warhead devices and guidance elements, would then
be destroyed.
.."
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Article IV, Para. 1
How many warheads (in numbers and explosive power) will the
parties remove from the missiles covered by the Treaty?
The sides will remove the warheads from all deployed missiles
as listed in the Memorandum of Understanding on Data prior to
initiating the elimination procedure. Megatonage was not one
of the issues negotiated by the Parties in INF.
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Article IV, Para 1
Is there anything in the treaty to prevent the Soviets from
placing these warheads on ICBMs targeted at the United States?
or on other missiles targeted at Western Europe?
?
There is nothing in the Treaty to prevent both the United
States and the Soviet Union from using these warheads for other
missiles.
?
Oa
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Article IV, Para. 1
Do the parties have any support structures and equipment which
are not in the MOU?
The MOU includes unique support structures and equipment which
are used to support and deploy intermediate-range or
shorter-range missiles or launchers. Other types of
non-essential structures and equipment, such as general purpose
buildings, are not included in the MOU.
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Article 1V4 Para 1
Are therePfaci1iti.s associated with the SS-20 which the
Soviets hav failed to declare?
The answer to this question if classified. We would be happy
to provide you with the information in the appropriate form.
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STAT
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Article /V, Para. 2(a)
How many launchers of deployed intermediate-range missiles is
"the amount capable of carrying out missiles considered to
carry 171 warheads?"
The number of launchers will depend on the mix of systems. For
example, the US GLCM launcher is capable of carrying four
missiles, each with a single warhead, and the U.S. Pershing II
launcher is capable of carrying one missile with a single
warhead. Thus, the number of launchers the U.S. will have at
the.end of the initial 29 month period of reductions is
dependent on the mix of PIIs and GLCMs we have at that time.
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Article IV, Fara. 2(a)
Now many deployed intermediate-range missiles is "the number
considered to carry 180 warheads?"
The number of missiles will depend upon the number of warheads
associated with the different types of missile systems. On the
US side, all INF missiles carry a single warhead. On the
Soviet side, SS-20 missiles are considered to carry three
warheads while the other Soviet INF missiles are considered to
carry a single warhead.
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Article IV, Para. 2(a)
Why is there a difference in number between deployed
intermediate-range launchers (171) and missiles (180)7
The numerical difference between deployed intermediate-range
launchers and missiles results from our requirement to maintain
operational missile spares to support our deployed INF missile
force.
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Article IV, Para. 2(a)
How many intermediate-range launchers is the amount capable of
carrying missiles considered to carry 200 warheads?"
As with deployed intermediate-range launchers, the aggregate
number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of
intermediate-range missiles considered to carry 200 warheads
depends upon the mix of missile systems in each Party's INF
force 29 months after the Treaty enters into force.
?
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Article IV, Para. 2(a)
How many missiles is "the number considered to carry 200
warheads?"
As with deployed intermediate-range missiles, the aggregate
number of deployed and non-deployed missiles considered to
carry 200 warheads depends upon the mix of missile systems in
each Party's INF force 29 months after the Treaty enters into
force.
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Article IV, Para. 2 09
What are the reasons why the ratio of GLBMs to total missiles
in the first phase should not exceed the initial ratio?
4
The Treaty provides for steep asymmetric reductions on the part
of the Soviet Union. After 29 months the sides will be at
equal warhead levels. The provision explicitly allows the U.S.
to retain Pershing II missiles and launchers throughout the
elimination period (the Soviets had sought to force the U.S. to
eliminate its PII force early in the reductions period). The
U.S. can maintain its PII force at the same percentage level of
the total U.S. INF missile force at the end of the first (29
month) stage of reductions as it had on 1 November 1987.
7
, ,
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Article V
This Article provides for the elimination of US shorter-range
missile systems. Can this be done constitutionally without
enabling legislation passed by both Houses of Congress? (see
Art. IV)
Our understanding is that DOD has always maintained that it has
the authority, without any need for new legislation, to
eliminate weapons systems it no longer wishes to retain. In
fact, the US has been eliminating missile and other defense
systems for many years without violating the Constitution,
either for arms control reasons (such as the dismantling of
excess strategic systems) or because we no longer want to have
the system around. Furthermore, treaty provisions are the law
of the land under our Constitution, and the President would ?
have the right and the duty to enforce the provisions of the
INF Treaty once it is ratified, even if he would not otherwise
be legally able to do so.
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Article V, Para. 1
Does this section cover all ground-launched missiles with
shorter-range capabilities possessed by the partieS in Europe?
If not, what missiles with such capabilities are exempt?
Both the U.S. and Soviet Union have ground-launched missles in
Europe with ranges shorter than those covered by the Treaty.
All ground-launched missiles with ranges below 500 km are
exempt.
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Article V. Para. 1
Does either party possess support equipment not listed in the
MOU?
The support equipment for shorter-range missiles listed in the
MOU is equipment unique to the shorter-range missile systems
covered by the INF Treaty. It does not include equipment which
is not unique to those missile systems.
/.?
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Article V, Para. 2
Why is there a difference in time for the removal of deployed
and non-deployed missiles (90 days v 12 mos.)?
4
In order to ensure that shorter-range missile systems are
removed from operational status as rapidly as possible after
entry into force, the Treaty requires that deployed
shorter-range missiles and all deployed and non-deployed
launchers of such missiles be moved to elimination facilities
within 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty.
To further degrade their operational capability, the Treaty
requires that there be separate elimination facilities for
shorter-range missiles and launchers, no less than 1000 kms
apart. Given these restrictions, the U.S. agreed to allow the
Soviets an additional 9.months to move their numerous
non-deployed missiles to elimination sites as without launchers
these missiles posed little threat to NATO's security.
t-
Ir -
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Article V, Para. 3
Why must elimination facilities be separated by 1000 km?
The separation of missile and launcher facilities was a U.S.
proposal designed to ensure that shorter-range systems lose
their operational capability and military effectiveness as soon
as they are moved into elimination facilities. Separation by
the substantial distance of 1000 kms would make the
reconstitution of an SRM force logistically difficult and
ensure high confidence of detection.
-A-
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Article V, Para. 3
Are the elimination facilities for intermediate-range missiles
also subject to this 1000 km requirement?
No. The US proposed, and the Soviets eventually accepted, more
rapid and stringent ilimination procedures for Shorter-range
missile systems than for intermediate-range missile systems.
/;-
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Article VI, Para. 1
Why are launches of intermediate-range missiles not prohibited,
as is the case with shorter-range missiles?
The US favored other methods of missile elimination over
launching, but agreed to allow launches of a limited number of
intermediate-range missiles (100) during a brief time span (the
first six months of the reductions period). The Soviets
maintained that a certain number of their much larger force of
intermediate-range missiles needed to be eliminated by launch
in order to eliminate that force within the 3-year period
proposed by the US.
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Article VI, Para. 1
O. Are the launches of intermediate-range missiles permitted
only for the purpose of elimination?
Yee?
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Article VI, Para. 1
. Row do "launches" which are permitted for intermediate-range
missiles differ from "flight-tests" which are prohibited, and
how can we verify this distinction?
The Elimination Protocol contains detailed provisions for the
conduct of launches for purpose of elimination. These
provisions include, for example, a prohibition against
transmission or recovery of data except for unencrypted data
for range safety purposes. In any case, given the limited
number of permitted launchers for elimination (100 IRMO, the
tightly constrained time period (only the first 6 months after
EIF) and the ban on telemetry broadcast for flight-testing
purposes, launches for elimination would have little utility as
substitutes for flight-tests. Our monitoring capabilities and
rights to on-site inspection will allow us to determine whether
a launch for elimination has been used as a prohibited flight
test.
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Article VI, pare 2
This paragraph provides the exception to para 1 "provided that
the party does not produce any such similar stage". Why is
there this restriction?
The Soviets advised us that the first stage of the 65-25 (which
has a range capability greater than 5500 kilometers and is thus
not covered by the INF Treaty) is outwardly similar to the
SS-20 first stage. As a result, there is a provision in the
Treaty that permits the production of one stage (the SS-25
first stage) that is outwardly similar to, but not
interchangeable with, a first stage of a banned missile (the
SS-20 first stage). At the same time, a Party may not produce
any other stage which is outwardly similar to, but not
interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of
intermediate-range GLBM." This provision prevents the Soviets
from producing SS-20's under the guise of two "outwardly
similar" stages.
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Article VI, Para. 2
What "type of GLBM" uses a stage outwardly similar. to, but not
interchangeable with, a stage of a GLBM covered under this
treaty? (for each party)?
The Soviet SS-25 missile.
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Article VI, Para. 2
Why are the parties permitted to produce these nearly identical
stages?
The INF Treaty does not limit missiles with ranges below 500
kms. or above 5500 kms., thus it does not limit Soviet ICBMs.
The references in Article VI to a stage "outwardly similar to,
but not interchangeable with" a stage of an intermediate-range
missile take into account the outward similarity between the
first stage of the 88-20 and the first stage of the SS-25. This
similarity resulted in the stringent verification provisions
including portal monitoring in the Treaty to help ensure that
88-20's are not produced under the guise of 88-25's. All 58-25
missiles exiting the Votkinsk facility will be subjected to
stringent examination.
C
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Article VI, Para. 2
Can these nearly identical stages be used for the same purposes
as the stages eliminated by the treaty?
No. They cannot be used as stages on missiles eliminated under
the terms of the Treaty.
gl
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Article VI, Para 2
How do we verify that the stages permitted to be produced by
this paragraph are indeed not interchangeable" with stages
prohibited from production by this treaty?
1.
Our principle aim under the paragraph is to ensure that while
the Soviets continue to produce the SS-25 ICBM, they are not
secretly producing SS-20s under the guise of SS-25s. The
monitoring procedures established by the Treaty at the 55-25
final assembly facility at Votkinsk, the on-site inspection
regime at all former SS-20 bases converted to SS-25 bases,
enhanced NTM at other SS-25 bases, our basic NTM capabilities,
and the zero level environment all combine to help ensure that
55-20 production has indeed ceased. The Soviets volunteered
adding the phrase not interchangeable" after we called them on
the "outwardly similar" problem. We accepted the addition of
the phrase as a further limiting factor on Soviet, activity but
our major emphasis for insuring the non existence of SS-20s is
the above listed elements of our verification regime.
z
, ? ".?
? ' .
?d.
Declassified
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Article VI, Para. 2
Could warheads be removed from missiles to be eliminated under
this treaty be reloaded onto this other "type of GLBM?"
Both the U.S. and Soviet Union can remove nuclear warhead
devices from missies to be eliminated under this Treaty and use
them for other purposes. They cannot, however, be simply
"reloaded" onto another GLBM.
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Article WI, Para. 1
How do we know what's been "flight-tested or deployed?"
?
NTM are used to determine whether a ballistic or cruise missile
has been flight-tested or deployed.
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001-5
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Article VII, Para. 1
Which missiles are effectively covered under this paragraph,
and which are not?
For purposes of the INF Treaty, the missiles covered by this
paragraph are those listed in Article III. Exceptions are
provided for GLEMs Which are developed solely to intercept
objects not located on earth (para. 3, Art. VII), R&D booster
systems (para. 12, Art. VII) or IRMs or SRMs that have been
tested but not deployed (para. 6, Art. X).
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Article VII, Para. 2
Should this paragraph cover all GLBMs and GLCMs possessed by
the parties in Europe with intermediate- or shorter-range
"capability?"
The paragraph covers all GLBMs and GLCMs with a range between
500 and 5,500 km, that is, all INF- missiles. It does not cover
systems with a range greater than 5,500 km but which could be
fired to a distance below 5,500 km. Such systems are covered
in the START negotiations.
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Article VII, Para. 3
How can we tell which GLBM's have been developed and tested
solely for interception purposes?
These systems must have been developed and tested solely for
intercepting objects off the surface of the earth. NTM will
provide the means of detection.
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Article VII, Para. 3
As this paragraph exempts MBAs developed and tested solely for
interception purposes, is there anything to stop the Soviets
from modifying SS-4, 55-20, 55-12 or SS-23 missiles and
claiming them to be interceptors exempt from elimination?
The Treaty requires the Soviets to eliminate all existing INF
missiles and prohibits further production. These include the
55-4, SS-20, SS-12 and 55-23 missiles. There is no provision
in the Treaty to permit modification of these missiles. The
Soviet Union, as does the U.S., has systems designed and
developed solely as interceptors which are exempted by this
provision.
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Article VII, Para. 4
Does this method of determining the missiles to be.covered by
this Treaty exempt any ground based missile systems located in
Europe which have intermediate- or shorter-range capabilities?
No. This provision is designed to eliminate debate over
whether any future system which might be developed is an INF
system by establishing the criteria of maximum tested range.
Thus this article does not exempt any IRM or SRM.
c
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Article VII, Para. 5 is 6
Are the "maximum number of warheads as provided in. the MOU" the
actual maximum that can be carried by the respective GLBMs and
GLCMs?
4
It is the maximum number of warheads for which the missile has
been tested.
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'Article VII, Para. 6
Are SS-25 launchers capable of launching 88-20 missiles, and
would such a capability bring 88-25 launchers under this treaty?
Only if a launcher has, contained, launched or been tested with
an INF GLBM or GLOM is it limited by the INF Treaty. To our
knowledge, no SS-25 launchers has contained, launched or been
tested with an INF missile.
f?_;
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Article VII, Para. 10
This para provides for the counting of missiles covered by the
treaty. Will there be confusion with "similar but not
interchangeable" stages exempted under Art VI, para 2?
No, Soviet missiles are not normally stored or moved in
separate stages. We do not anticipate that Soviet missiles, in
particular the SS-25, will appear outside their final assembly
facility other than in canisters. Consequently the SS-25's
first stage which is "outwardly similar but not
interchangeable" with the SS-20 first stage likely will not be
observed as an individual missile stage.
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Article VII, Para. 10
How can we tell if a canister contains a GLIM and whether it is
a GLIM covered by the treaty?
If a missile is stored or moved in a canister, e.g. the Soviet
SS-20, the canister "counts" as a missile. If we see an SS-20
canister, it is equivalent to seeing the missile
0?14?11?
unless the
Soviets "prove to the satisfaction of the other Party" that it
does not contain an SS-20.
7,?
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Article VII, Para. 11
Which particular missile systems will be exempted by this
paragraph?
a
The U.S. wanted this provision in order to permit ground-based
testing of items not subject to the treaty, such as SLBMs and
SLCMs.
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Article VII, Para. 11
How can we determine which Soviet missiles are "intended" and
which are "not intended" to be ground-based for the purpose of
identifying exempted missile systems?
The Treaty article does not use the language "intended" or "not
intended." The provision was sought by the U.S. to permit
continued testing of U.S. missiles, e.g., SLCM, in accordance
with our existing programs. NTM will be used to confirm that
such launchers are used only at test sites for legitimate test
purposes.
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Article VII, Para. 11
What functionally related features will distinguish
test-launchers from ground-based missile launchers?
.
The test-launcher is a land-based fixed launcher used solely
for test purposes.
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Article VII, Para. 11
Does the paragraph effectively permit the Soviets to deploy
SLCMs at land-based launchers, and if so, how will the
capabilities of these SLCMs differ in capabilities from cruise
missiles prohibited under the treaty?
As the launchers permitted under this article are only fixed
launchers at test sites, no missile on such a launcher would be
mobile. We do not anticipate that either side will require .
more than a small number of missiles at such test sites at any
one time.
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Article VII, Para. 12
How do "booster stages" differ from missile stages prohibited
under this treaty?
To help verify that booster system launches are not used
illegally for INF flight-testing, the following limitations are
placed on R&D booster systems:
-- stages used in booster systems must be different from stages
used in INF missiles listed in Article III Of the Treaty.
-- booster systems must be used only for research and
development purposes to test objects other than the booster
systems themselves:
?
-- the aggregate number of launchers for booster systems must
not exceed 35 for each side at any one time;
MOM.
the launchers of booster systems must be fixed, emplaced
above ground and located only at research and development
launch sites that are listed in the MOW
-- no new types.of stages for booster systems in the INF range
band may be produced; and
-- notification of launches must be given ten days in advance.
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Article VII, Para. 12
In the past, have the Soviets ever violated SALT I or SALT II
by using research and development sites for the deployment of
systems prohibited under these treaties?
The President's Report on Soviet noncompliance with Arms
Control Agreements of 23 December 1985 made the following
finding:
The President's February 1985 Report to Congress which noted
that the evidence is somewhat ambiguous and we cannot reach a
definitive conclusion, found the activities at Plesetsk to be a
probable violation of the USSR's legal obligation and political
commitment under SALT II. Soviet activity in the past year at
Plesetsk seems to indicate the probable removal of 68-16
equipment and introduction of equipment associated with a
different ICBM."
Under the INF Treaty, however, within 30 days after entry with
force there can be no INF missiles or launchers at test sites.
Subsequent detection of a single INF missile at a test site
would be a Treaty violation.
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Article VII, Para. 12
Could the Soviets conceivably deploy systems prohibited under
this treaty at research and development sites?
No. The Elimination Protocol states that all stages of
intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles are. subject to
elimination. Even though an S$-20 ii counted as a complete
missile only when it is fully assembled, all stages of the
SS-20 are accounted for in the !IOU and are subject to
elimination. Thus the Soviets are prohibited from keeping any
stage of the SS-20 for any purpose, including for R&D boosters,
and must eliminate them all under the treaty.
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Article VII, Para 12
Why are we prohibited from on-site inspection of research and
development sites?
The sides are prohibited from stationing Treaty-limited systems
at research and development sites, consequently it is
consistent with the inspection provisions in the Treaty that
there be no OSI for such sites. The U.S. believes that the
prohibition against INF missiles at R&D sites can be
effectively monitored by NTM, especially given the provisions
to enhance monitoring contained in Para. 12 of Article VII.
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Article VIII
Para. 1
This paragraph provides that intermediate range missiles and
launchers may be located only in deployment areas, at support
facilities or in transit. Can we verify that there are no
missiles in locations outside of these areas. r
As the Treaty makes clear, the detection of a single missile or
launcher not in a deployment area, support facility or in
notified transit would be evidence of a Treaty violation.
Taken together, U.S. National Technical Means and the
verification measures provided for in the INF Treaty, including
the extensive data exchanges and on-site inspections will
facilitate the detection of potentially militarily and
politically significant violations in time to respond
effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the
violation. At the same time, NTMs and the Treaty's
verification measures will also serve is a deterrent to Soviet
cheating. No agreement is ever 100 % verifiable, but over time
the testing and production bans in the Treaty would impair the
military utility and viability of any covert force.
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Article VIII, Para. 1
Have 84 $S-20 launchers been detected outside declared areas
since the signing of the Treaty?
Prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the locational
restrictions provided for in the Treaty are not obligatory on
the Parties. U.S. information about the location of Soviet
systems involves classified intelligence.
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Article VIII
Para. 1
If so, can we verify that these particular launchers will be in
declared areas on the day of entry into force as required by
the Treaty?
If there are launchers outside of declared areas on the day of
entry into force, will we know where they are?
The Soviets must provide us within 30 days after the Treaty
enters into force with the location of all missiles and
launchers as of the day the Treaty enters into force. The U.S.
will be able to verify this baseline data with on-site
inspections. Taken together, U.S. National Technical.Neans and
the verification measures provided for in the INF Treaty will
facilitate the detection of any Soviet systems at other
locations in a timely fashion so as to protect U.S. and Allied
security.
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Article VIII
Para. 3
Under this paragraph, shorter range missiles may be located at
elimination facilities, but under para. 1 & 2, intermediate
range missiles may not. Why the distinction?
Elimination facilities are included under the definition of
missile support facilities, thus intermediate-range missiles
may be located at elimination facilities. Para. 3 on shorter
range missiles begins with a reference to elimination
facilities because shorter-range missiles may only transit to
elimination facilities, thus the locational restrictions apply
only until shorter range missiles are moved to elimination
facilities at which time they are restricted to those
elimination facilities.
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00
Article VIII, pare 5
Can we verify that all 85-20 deployment areas, bases and
facilities have been declared?
Have we detected SS-120 facilities above and beyond those
.declared in the MOU?
The Parties were required to list all deployed and non-deployed
INF missiles and launchers and their location (including those
to transit) of of 1 Nov. 87. The Soviet nukbers for deployed
and non-deployed forces are for the most part near Intelligence
Community estimates, allowing for the ranges of our
uncertainties, except for differences in agency views on the
number of non-deployed.SS-20s. Non-deployed force estimates
for IMP. systems are less certain and vary by agency, depending
on the methodology used for assessing. production.
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Article VIII
Para. 5
If so, would the Soviets be in violation of the requirement of
this paragraph that neither party shall increase the number of
facilities from those set forth in the MOU.
Neither Party has the right to increase the number of
facilities, except for elimination facilities, from those
listed in the MOU as of November 1, 1987. Thus if the Soviets
located missiles or launchers at facilities not listed in the
MOU, other than new elimination facilities, they would be in
violation of the Treaty. Any missiles and launchers not in
deployment areas or facilities listed in the MOU, or in transit
would represent violations of the Treaty.
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Article VIII
Para. 5
Will the subsequent updates required under this paragraph be
subject to Senate advice and consent in the same manner as the
original data in the MOU?
The MOU, as an integral part of the INF Treaty, is subject to
4
Senate advice and consent. In giving its advice and consent to
-
ratification of the Treaty, the Senate would not be subscribing
to the accuracy of Soviet data. Subsequent updates of data, as
required by Article IX of the Treaty, in the categories
contained in the MOU do not represent amendments to the MOU.
Thus, these would not require Senate action.
..
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Article VIII
Para. 5
This paragraph contains an exception making elimination
facilities subject to change. What are the reasons for this
exception?
The United States sought to preserve its flexibility to change
or create new elimination facilities during the period of
reductions should experience show that such changes were
needed. At the time the Treaty was signed, the United States
had not made the final decision as to where our elimination
facilities would be located, thus we did not list any
elimination facilities in the MOU. The U.S. must exercise the
exception which we sought in this paragraph to change or create
new elimination facilities when we make that decision.
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Article VIII, Para. 6
Do the Soviets have production facilities or test ranges which
have not been listed in the MOU?
U.S. information about the location of Soviet production
facilities or test ranges involves classified intelligence.
The data provided by the Soviet Union on production facilities
and test ranges in the Memorandum of Understanding are
generally within the bounds of intelligence community estimates.
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Article VIII
Para. 6
-
,
If so, may missiles covered by this Treaty be located at these
facilities and test ranges?
Thirty days after the Treaty enters into force missiles and
launchers must be located in deployment areas or facilities
listed in updates of data in the MOU or in transit. Missiles
and launchers located elsewhere would be a violation of the
Treaty. In addition, no missiles and launchers may be located
at test ranges or production facilities 30 days after entry
into force of the Treaty.
.?.
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Article VIII
Para. 6
May the U.S. inspect these facilities and test ranges to assure
that prohibited missiles are not located there? ?
Inspections may be conducted at any declared facility listed in
the MOU, except missile production facilities, either as an
existing site or formerly declared facility for 13 years after
the Treaty enters into force. Thus test ranges listed in the
MOU are subject to inspection. Facilities not listed in the
MOU are not subject to on-site inspections but are subject to
monitoring by National Technical Means.
?
a.?
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Article VIII, Para. 7
This parragraph prohibits covered missiles from being located
at training facilities. Have all training facilities declared
and agreed?
The data provided by the Soviet Union on training facilities in
the Memorandum of Understanding are generally within the bounds
of intelligence community estimates.
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Article VIII
Para. 9
Are training facilities banned?
All missile support facilities, including training facilities,
must be eliminated. After their elimination, no new ones may
be established. Thus training facilities for INF missile
systems are banned at the end of the reductions period.
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Article VIII .
Para. 9
May training missiles and launchers be placed at deployment
areas or support facilities?
Training missiles and training launchers for systems covered by
this Treaty are subject to the same locational restrictions set
forth in the Treaty for intermediate range and shorter range
missiles and their launchers. That is, they must be in
deployment areas, missile support facilities or in notified
transit between such locations.
?
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Article VIII, Para. 9
Are any Soviet missiles covered by this Treaty located at
either declared or undeclared training facilities?
In the MOU, the Soviets have listed 14 SS-20 launchers at three
training facilities: Serpukhov, Krasnodar, and the Training
Center at the Kapustin Tar test range and five 55-12 launchers
and seven SS-23 launchers at training facilities at Saratov,
Kazan' and Kamenka. The data provided by the Soviet Union on
training facilitiesa in the Memorandum of Understanding are
generally within the ranges of intelligence community estimates.
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Article IX, Pares. 1 & 2
Can we verify that all intermediate- and shorter-range missiles
produced by the Soviets are listed in the MOU?
?
The Soviet numbers for deployed and non-deployed forces are for
the most part near Intelligence Community estimates, allowing
for the ranges of our uncertainties, except for differences in
agency views on the number of non-deployed SS-20s.
Non-deployed force estimates for INF systems are less certain
and vary by agency, depending on the methodology used for
assessing production. Inasmuch as over the years the Soviets
have tested some of the intermediate- and shorter-range
missiles which they produced, such missiles would not be
included in the MOU. Finally, in drafting the Treaty, the U.S.
added provisions Which would make it difficult to maintain a
viable force using covert missiles and launchers.
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Article IX
Paras. 1 & 2
The MOU is an integral part of the Treaty, and thus subject to
advice and consent of the Senate. Will updates to the data in
the MOU be similarly subject to Senate advice and consent?
The MOU, as an integral part of the INF Treaty, is subject to
Senate advice and consent. In giving its advice and consent to
ratification of the Treaty, the Senate would not be subscribing
to the accuracy of Soviet data. Subsequent updates of data, as
required by Article IX of the Treaty, in the categories
contained in the MOU do not represent amendments to the MOU.
Thus, these would not require Senate action.
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Article IX
Paras. 1 & 2
Has the US asked the Soviet Union to declare an update of all
data pertaining to facilities associated with missiles covered
by this Treaty?
Under the provisions of the Treaty, the Soviets will be
required to provide us, within thirty days after entry into
force of the Treaty, with an update of all the data in the MOU
as of the date of entry into force. With the exception of a
provision for adding elimination facilities, the list of
facilities in the MOU may not be increased. Subsequently, they
are required periodically to update the data on the number of
Treaty-accountable items located at the remaining INF
facilities.
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Article IX, Para 1
Do we expect to be told in this update of SS-20 facilities or
launchers which were not included in the MOU?
Will we be certain at the time this data is exchanged that it
includes all AS-20 facilities and launchers possissed by the -
Soviets?
These paragraphs make each party responsible for providing the
numbers of their missile systems to be eliminated. How can we
verify that the numbers of missile systems provided by the
Soviets are accurate?
In signing the MOU, each party acknowledged responsibility for
the accuracy of only its own data. The listing of this data,
moreover, was only the first step in the stringent verification
process established by the treaty. Under this process, the
sides must exchange, not later than 30 days after the treaty
enters into force, an initial update of all data in the MOU,
current as of the date of entry into force. Each party then
has the right to conduct an initial series of "baseline"
inspections at each facility listed in the MOU (other than
missile production facilities) to verify the accuracy of the
data. Elimination of treaty-subject systems is then monitored
through OSI, not in reliance on the data provided in the MOU.
Further data updates are to be provided every six months
thereafter.
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Inaccurate data in the MOU would technically not be a treaty
violation in that the data therein is current only as of
November 1, 1987, which was prior, to entry into force of the
treaty. Inaccuracies in the initial update of data following
entry into force, however, could constitute a violation of
(Article IX (3).
?
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Article IX
Paras. 1 S 2
If the Soviet numbers are indeed accurate, does this mean that
we have not effectively eliminated "a whole class of nuclear
weapons?'
Each Party is required to eliminate all treaty limited items
for ground launched missiles in the ranges covered by this
Treaty during the reductions period. Thus an entire class of
nuclear weapons' will be eliminated. With the bans on
production and testing and the extensive verification measures
contained in the Treaty, we believe the Soviets would be
deterred from attempting to maintain a viable covert force of
missiles and launchers within this class of weapons.
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Article IX
Paras. 1 & 2 ?
Did SALT I and SALT II allow each party to be responsible for
their own data?
Only SALT II contained specific data in a Memorandum of
Understanding. This data, which was much more limited than the
data exchanged under the INF Treaty, was agreed between the
Parties. The U.S. proposed the formula in the INF Treaty in
which the Parties are held responsible for their own data in
the MOU. This formula was proposed so that the U.S. could
refrain from formally agreeing with Soviet supplied data until
the U.S. could fully implement the verification measures in the
Treaty. Baseline inspections will help give us the opportunity
to verify the data contained in the initial data update
including the elimination of any facilities listed in the MOU
but not included in the first data update.
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Article IX ?
Para. 5
Why is the information on the 'location from which missiles and
launchers are moved" provided for intermediate range missiles
under this paragraph, but not provided for shorter range
missiles?
Information on the 'location from which missiles and launchers
are moved' is provided for intermediate range missiles in order
to assist verification of the requirement in Article X that
missiles and launchers be moved from deployment areas to
elimination facilities in complete organizational units. .In
addition, since SRMs can only be in transit to elimination
facilities and most of them must be located there within 90
days after entry into force, there is less need for notifying
the locations from which they are moved.
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Article IX
Para. 5
Why is there an exception providing that notification on point
of entry and departure time of teams inspecting support
structures is unnecessary?
There is no on-site inspection of the actual process of
elimination of support structures which is to be done in situ.
Thus no information on the point of entry and departure times
of inspection teams is provided in the notification of the
intention to eliminate support structures. Other information
in the notification will assist in the verification by National
Technical Means of the elimination of support structures. In
addition, during close out inspectioni of all missile operating
bases provided for in Article XI, paragraphs 3 and 4, we will
be able to confirm that support structures at these bases have
been eliminated.
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a
Article IX
Para. 5
Why must notification be provided after transit, as opposed to
before or during transit?
The United States did not Seek prior notification of transits
in order to ensure the security from terrorists and others of
missiles and lanuchers being moved from site to site. In
addition, locations during transits are suceptible to change
and thus a prior notification would not necessarily give as
accurate information in distinguishing a bonafide transit from
an illegal treaty limited item.
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Article IX
Para. 5
Will we use National Technical Means to track transits prior to
notification?
As is currently the case, the U.S. will be using National
Techncial Means to observe Soviet INF missile movement. The
post notification of transits will assist the U.S. in
verifying, using information from a number Of sources including
National Technical Means, whether a given missile outside a
deployment area or missile support facility is an illegal
missile or a missile in permitted transit.
?
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Article IX
Para. 5
If notifications of transits were provided in advance of
transits, Instead of after, would this free up NTM for other
purpose such as seeking out Treaty violations?
No, it would not free up NTM assets. The United States never
sought prior notification of transits because serious security
considerations more than outweighed any advantage such
notifications would have given. Any missile not located in a
deployment area, missile support facility or in notified
transit would be a violation of the Treaty. Seeking out such
missiles would require the same NTM effort, regardless of the
notifications provided.
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Article IX
Para. 6
How do we know that the launchers permitted under this
paragraph will be of boosters for space launch, and not for
stages of missiles prohibited under this Treaty?
To help verify that booster systems launches are not used
illegally for INF flight testing, the following limitations are
placed on certain R & D booster systems.
-- stages used in such booster systems must be different
from stages used in INF missiles listed in Article III of the
Treaty;
-- such booster systems must be used only for research and
development purposes to test objects other than the booster
systems themselves;
-- the aggregate number of launchers for such systems shall
not exceed 35 for each Party at any one time;
-- the launchers of such booster systems must be fixed,
emplaced above ground and located only at research and
development launch sites that are listed in the Memorandum of
Understanding;
no new types of stages for such booster systems in the
INF range band may be produced; and
-- notification of launches must be give ten days in
advance.
These collateral constraints give us confidence that such
R&D booster systems do not present an attractive means of
developing an effective military system.
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Article X
Para. 3
Why are shorter range missiles not similarly required to be
removed in complete organizational units?
The U.S. proposed and the Soviets agreed to an approach under
which all deployed shorter-range missiles and all deployed and
non-deployed launchers for such missiles would be withdrawn to
elimination sites within 90 days after entry into force of the
Treaty. This requirement further obviates the need to remove
them in complete operational units.
?."
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Article X
Para. 5
Why is elimination by launching limited to 100 missiles?
The United States did not favor launching as a means of
elimination of INF missiles but finally agreed to it as an
expeditious means of getting Soviets agreement to complete
elimination of all their intermediate range missiles within the
three year time frame favored by the U.S. We sought
limitations on the number and timing of launches for
elimination, and the Soviets agreed to our proposal that such
launches be limited to 100 intermediate range missiles in the
first six months after the Treaty enters into force as well as
other restrictions which would limit Soviet ability to use such
launches as substitutes for flight testing.
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Article 1
4.
Para. 5
Why is elimination by launching limited to intermediate-range
missiles?
The United States did not favor launching as a means of
elimination and only agreed to this method for eliminating
intermediate range missiles under restrictive conditions to
gain Soviet agreement to complete their intermediate range
missile reductions within the three year time frame favored by
the U.S. We were able to gain agreement on an 18 month
elimination period for shorter range missiles without any
elimination by means of launching.
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Article X
Para. 5
Are the Soviets prohibited from using these launches for normal
troop training launch tests, or ABM testing and research?
The Treaty requires elimination by means of launch to take
place at designated elimination facilities with mandatory
on-site inspection. The Treaty prohibits missiles eliminated
by means of launching from being used as targets for ballistic
missile interceptors and data from launches for elimination
cannot be recovered except as unencrypted signals used for
range safety purposes. In addition, all 100 of these launches
must be completed within six months after the Treaty enters
into force. These and other restrictions limit the practical
use of launches for elimination for other purposes. .
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Article X
Para. 5
Can we verify that these launches will not be used for troop
training, launch testing, or ABM testing research?
All launches for elimination are subject to advance
notification and on-site inspection and will be monitored by
NTM. The Elimination Protocol provides restrictions on such
launches including that no missile be used as a target vehicle
for ballistic missile interceptors and that neither party shall
transmit or recover data from such launchers except for
unencrypted data regarding range safety procedures. We are
threfore confident that we can verify that launches are not
being used for ABM testing. Moreover, given the limited time
frame in which these launches must take place (the first six
months after entry into force) and the limited number permitted
(100 intermediate range missiles), their troop training and
flight test value will be limited.
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Article X, Para. 6
Are there any other Soviet intermediate- or shorter-range
missiles which fall under the classification of this paragraph?
??
No. The data provided by the Soviet Union on IRM and SRM which
have been tested but not deployed fall within the bounds of
U.S. intelligence community estimates.
??
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Article X
Para. 8.
Does the "or when 60 days' have elapsed imply some close outs
without on-site inspection?
If the other Party chooses not to carry out an inspection of a
declared facility within 60 days tater notification of the
scheduled date of such a site's elimination, then that site may
be considered eliminated without an on-site inspection.
However, the choice is entirely up to the inspecting Party.
Thus, the United States will have the option to inspect any
site for which it has received a formal notification of
elimination.
4.
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Article X
Para. 8
What is the utility of limiting the time available for on-site
close out inspections?
The 60 day limit on the time available for on-site close out
inspections was agreed in order to prevent one Party from
inordinately delaying the elimination of a facility of the
other Party by refusing to carry out a close out inspection.
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Article X
Para. 8
Which are the deployment areas, operating bases and support
facilities listed in the MOD that shall be considered to have
been already eliminated by virtue of meeting the conditions of
this paragraph prior to entry into force?
Any deployment area, operating base or support facility which a
party does not include in the initial data update exchanged
within thirty after the Treaty enters into force will be
considered to have been eliminated by virtue of meeting the
conditions of this paragraph prior to entry into force. All
such sites will be subject to a baseline inspection which will
also serve as a close out inspection to confirm that these
sites have in fact been eliminated. During the thirteen years
after the Treaty enters into force, they will be subject to
short notice inspections under the quotas for such inspections.
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Article X
Para. 8
What inspection rights do we have to assure that the conditions
of this paragraph have been met by any facilities exempted by
this provision?
No sites are exempted from inspections by this provision. All
declared INF facilities, except missile production facilities,
listed in the MOO will be subject to baseline inspectionss. In
the case of a facility eliminated prior to entry into force,
the baseline inspection will also serve as a close out
inspection. During the thirteen years after the Treaty enters
into force, they will also be subject to short notice
inspections under the quotas for such inspections.
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Article X
Para. 8
Does this paragraph allow the Soviets to claim that bases or
facilities have been eliminated prior to entry into force and
thus exempt them from on-site inspection?
No. All facilities listed in the MOU, except missile
production facilities, are subject to baseline inspections and
short notice inspections for thirteen years after the Treaty
enters into force.
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Article X
Para. 9
4'
This paragraph exempts from the Treaty bases which are
converted to bases for missiles not covered by the Treaty.
What conversions are envisioned under this paragraph?
This paragraph does not exempt from the inspection provisions
of the Treaty bases that are converted to bases for missiles
not covered by this Treaty. Such bases will be subject to the
same baseline, closeout and short notice inspections as bases
which are not converted. This paragraph adds an additional
requirement that the conversion of bases must also be notified
and that the notification must include the purpose for which
the base will be converted. One conversion envisioned under
this paragraph would be the conversion of an SS-20 base to An
SS-25 base. Such an SS-25 base would thus be subject to
on-site inspection.
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..
Article X
Para. 9
What will be the range of the missiles at these converted bases?
Bases may be converted for use by missiles not covered by this
Treaty, that is, missiles with ranges below 500 km and missiles
with ranges above 5500 km.
..
si.
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Article X
Para. 9
Does the Treaty prohibit missiles at these converted bases from
carrying nuclear warheads taken off eliminated missiles?
No.
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Article XII Para. 2
Is the Basing Agreement necessary for implementation of this
treaty? If 'so, will it be transmitted to the Senate for advice
and consent?
Yes, since the active cooperation of our Allies will be
necessary for implementation of this treaty. The agreement has
been transmitted to the Senate for its information.
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ARTICLE XI
Para. 3
Why are production facilities exempt from 'baseline'
inspections?
Only missile production facilities are exempt from
interior, on-site inspection. Launcher production
facilities are subject to baseline, short-notice, and
close-out inspections. Missile production sites are
exempted because' of national security requirements; in our
case to protect non-INF sensitive activities at production
sites from Soviet inspectors.
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Article XI
Para. 3
Why may 'baseline' inspections be conducted only at known
bases and facilities as opposed to 'suspect" bases and
facilities?
We considered an 'anytime, anywhere' inspection regime.
In the context of the Soviet acceptance of our 'double
global zero' proposal, we concluded that 'anytime,
anywhere' inspections were not essential given the
extensive and unprecedented nature of our verification
procedures as a whole. Because a verification regime is
reciprocal, we also had to weigh verification benefits
against U.S. and Allied security concerns. We did not
believe it necessary for the purpose of the INF Treaty to
subject sensitive U.S. facilities to the possibility of
Soviet inspection. It was thul the conclusion of the
administration that, in the context of the INF Treaty,
'anytime, anywhere,' inspections added little to the
already extensive and unprecedented INF verification
regime when balanced against the possible risks to other
U.S. and Allied security interests which they raised.
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Article XI, Para 3
How can we be sure that "baseline" inspections will reveal all
systems possessed by the Soviets if "suspect" locations may not
be inspected?
The role of "baseline" inspections, to be conducted shortly
after the INF Treaty enters into force, is to verarfy the number
of Treaty-limited systems as listed in the data update,
specifically missiles and launchers, at "declared" facilities,
including bases at which missiles are operating, repaired and
stored. It was the conclusion of the Administration that, in
the context of the /NF Treaty, "anytime, anywhere" suspect site
inspections added little to the already extensive and
unprecedented INF verification regime when balanced against the
possible risks to other U.S. and Allied security interests.
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Article XI
Para. 4
Why are additional inspections of facilities previously
inspected under paragraph 3 after their scheduled date of
elimination prohibited?
Paragraph 3 of Article XI concerns baseline inspections.
Paragraph 4 of Article XI concerns close-out inspections.
Baseline and close-out inspections can be combined. If a
facility is eliminated prior to entry into force of the
Treaty, then we have the right to inspect that site once
under a combination baseline/close-out inspection to
determine that all Treaty-limited activities have ceased
and all Treaty-limited items have been removed. This
facility will still be subject to short-notice inspection
for thirteen years after the Treaty enters into force.
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Article XI
Para. 4
What if a facility previously inspected under paragraph 3
is not eliminated by the scheduled date?
Paragraph 3 of Article XI concerns Baseline Inspections.
All facilities listed in the MOU except missile production
facilities will be subject to Baseline Inspection. If the
Soviets notify us that a facility is scheduled for
elimination by a certain date, they know that our
inspectors have the right to inspect that facility within
sixty days after the date of scheduled elimination; if
they are unable to meet this scedule, they should notify
us that the facility will not be eliminated by that date.
We will not consider the facility eliminated until it
meets all of the conditions in Article X, para 8, i.e.,
all Treaty-limited items must be removed and all
Treaty-limited activity must stop.
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Article XI
Para. 5
Why is there a limitation that no more than half of 'spot'
inspections be made within any one basing country?
The U.S. proposed this provision to keep the Soviets from
using their quota of short-notice inspections to focus
attention excessively on a single NATO basing country.
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Article XI, Para. 6
Are "continuous" inspections limited to portals and not to the
perimeters?
The Parties can inspect the perimeters as often as they wish.
.?
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Article XI
Para. 6
Can perimeters be continuously monitored?
Yes, under the portal monitoring system all of the exits
of the facility will be monitored by sensors and U.S.
inspectors will have the right to patrol the perimeter of
the site at any time.
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?
Article XI, Para. 6
If the Soviets terminate production at a facility for12
months, will our inspectors be sent home?
4
The U.S. has an unqualified right to maintain a continuous
portal monitoring system at Votkinsk for at least three years
after the treaty enters into force. After the first two years,
we can maintain our continuous portal monitoring system at
Votkinsk until the Soviets cease final assembly of SS-25s.
When we ate notified that such assembly of 55-250 has ceased at
Votkinsk, we can remain there for an additional year. Thus,
the U.S. will be at Votkinsk for at least three years (but no
more than 13 years) after the treaty enters into force. If -
U.S. portal monitoring is discontinued in the USSR, then the
Soviets will have to discontinue continuous portal monitoring
in the U.S.
In addition, the U.S. has the right for 13 years to establish a
continuous portal monitoring system at any facility where final
assembly of a multi-stage missile that uses a stage outwardly
similar to a stage of a missile banned by the Treaty takes
place.
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Article XI
Para. 6
If termination of production comes about, how would we
know if production re-initiated?
We would use National Technical Means to help identify
any reinitiation of the final assembly of missiles using a
stage that is outwardly similar to but not interchangeable
with a stage of the SS-20. If final assembly is
reinitiated, we would have the right to reestablish portal
monitoring at the facility where final assembly takes
place. /t is important to note that the Soviets are
obligated by the terms of this provision to ensure that, we
can establish a permenant continuous monitoring system at
any such final assembly facility within six months of
initiation of eve process of final assembly; otherwise,
the Soviets would be in violation of the Treaty. As well
as NTM, naturally, we will use all avaiNetile intelligence
collection methods to monitor for illegal production.
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ARTICLE XII
Para. 1
Do the Soviets recognize general principles of
international law?
How does our understanding of these principles differ from
that of the Soviets?
Which interpretation of the principles of international
law will govern the Treaty? ours or the Soviets?
There are a number of areas in which we have differences
with the Soviets as to what constitutes lawful
international behavior. However, Article XII (1) deals
specifically with the question of NTM for verification of
the Treaty, and there our views are not substantially
different. In particular, the Soviets have not contested
the legality of using satellites for arms control
verification, and presumably would agree that under
Article XII such satellites may not be interfered with.
The same would be true with respect to NTM activities for
Treaty verification in third countries.
A
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Article XII, Para. 2
Why is interference with National Technical Means
normal training, maintenance and operations?
Does this exemption legitimize Soviet camouflage,
and deception?
permitted for
concealment
The Treaty does not legitimize concealment. Quite the
contrary, Article XII, paragraph 2(b), bans "... concealment
measures which impede verification of compliance with the
provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of
verification..."
The United States sought this provision in the Treaty as part
of a vigorous verification regime, and successfully resisted
Soviet attempts to limit the ban on concealment to any
"deliberate" concealment.
The Treaty, however, does permit concealment within the
deployment areas associated with normal training, maintenance,
and operations. This requirement reflects a balance of
verification benefits with operational requirements. In this
case, the survivability of mobile ground-launched missiles
depends in part on their ability to operate within fairly large
areas and to hide from the enemy. These wartime procedures'
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must, of course, be practiced in peacetime. One objective of
the U.S. was to ensure that we maintained the operational
effectiveness of the residual deployed INF force throughout the
drawdown period. Therefore, the U.S. sought, and the Soviets
accepted, a limited exemption to a ban on concealment to
permit, within the deployment area, concealment practices
associated with normal training, maintenance and operations.
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Article XII
Para. 2
Does this exemption represent a retreat from the SALT 'I
and II prohibition against 'deliberate' interference with
National Technical Means of verification?
No. The language on cover and concealment measures
associated with normal training, maintenance and
operations was designed to meet U.S. operational needs for
environmental shelters and camoflage in deployment areas.
The Soviets readily accepted this language. The
locational restrictions in the Treaty will apply, but the
sides will be able under this language to train their
crews -- for mobile missile crews this training involves
instruction in concealment techniques -- and conduct
maintenance and nomad operations, including storing
Treaty-limited items in environmental shelters.
For as long as possible during the reduction period, it is
important for the U.S. to maintain the operational
capability of much of its missile force. This provision
also gives the Soviets an additional incentive to make
assymmetric reductions from the outset and provides an
insurance policy against early Soviet noncompliance with
their reduction obligations under the Treaty. Moreover,
the deletion of 'deliberate' (at U.S. insistence),*44s a
step forward because we eliminate the need to make
subjective judgement about the purpose of concealment,'
while preserving our rights under this paragraph for
operational activities.
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Article XII
Para. 2
Will this exemption allow the Soviets to hide missiles in
violation of the Treaty?
The missile operating bases within the deployment area
will be subject to on-site inspection. At the end of the
three year reduction period, all Treaty-limited items must
be eliminated and all Treaty-limited activity must cease.
Because of the other major restrictions in the Treaty,
including the flight test ban and the production ban, it
will be very difficult for the Soviets to maintain an
operational covert missile force. Since the Treaty
requires both sides to eliminate completely Treaty-limited
missiles and launchers, with a combination of NTM and
on-site inspection, we will be able to create doubt in the
Soviets' minds that they can conceal Treaty-limited items
and quickly make them operational.
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Article XII
Para. 3
What is to be displayed for satellite inspection, the
missiles or the canisters?
The canisters on their launchers will be displayed. At
operational bases, Soviet SS-20s and SS-25s are stored in
canisters which are carried on their launchers.
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?.'?
Article XII !e
Para. 3
Could SS-20s conceivably be hidden in SS-25 canisters?'
An SS-20 missile is smaller than an SS-25 canister so an
SS-20 missile will fit into an SS-25 canister. However,
the Soviets will not have a strong incentive to do this.
One reason is techncial. An SS-20 probably could not be
launched from an SS-25 canister without extensive
modifications to the canister. A second reason is the
risk of detection. The opportunity to inspect (using
non-destructive imaging) every canister that leaves the
SS-25 final assembly facility with the the right to open
eight SS-25 canisters per year there, combined with
enhanced NTM monitoring and on-site inspection rights for
thirteen years at SS-20 bases including those that are
converted to SS-25 bases, is likely to deter the Soviets
from covertly hiding an SS-20 in an SS-25 canister. .
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Article XII
Para. 3
Could we detect whether SS-20s are hidden in these '
canisters?
We have the right to on-site inspection of SS-20 bases
that are converted to SS-25 bases where we will be able to
inspect any object as large as the smallest stage of any
missile covered by this Treaty. Our inspectors will have
measuring devices and radiation detection devices. With
radiation detection devices we should be able to
distinguish the SS-20 from the 55-25. Also, we have the
right to conduct continuous portal monitoring for up to
thirteen years of the SS-25 final assembly facility at
Votkinsk or any other facility where missiles are
assembled using a stage which is outwardly similar to but
not interchangeable with the first stage of the SS-20. .We
will have the right to weigh and measure all vehicles
leaving the facility. If the vehicle is large enough and
heavy enough to contain a Soviet Treaty-limited GLBM we
will have the right to inspect the interior of that
vehicle. In addition, eight times a year we will have the
right to demand that the Soviets open an SS-25 canister so
we can see the interior of the canister to determine that
?
it does not contain an SS-20.
No one of these methods is foolproof. Taken together,
however, they create a significant deterrent to cheating.
moreover, the question can be asked why the Soviets would
seek to replace their ICBMs with INF missiles.
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NO.
Article XIII, Para 1
How will the "Special Verification Commission" be constituted,
structured and staffed?
How will the Commission handle disputes?
What procedures will the Commission have to assure resolution
of disputes?
The Special Verification Commission is a body established
pursuant to Article XIII of the INF Treaty to promote the
objectives and implementation of the Treaty.
-- It is to meet at the request of either Party to resolve
questions relating to compliance with the Treaty, and
tonegotiate measures to improve the viability and effectiveness
of the Treaty.
-- The SVC could play a role in clarifying technical aspects of
specific compliance issues, or, alternatively, in developing
procedures and understandings to clarify and reduce the
possibility for future ambiguous situations.
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1,
Article XIII
Para. 1
What kind of enforcement powers does the commission have?
'10
The Special Verification Commission does not have any
enforcement powers. The Commission is one mechanism,
along with for example diplomatic channels, where the two
sides can meet to attempt to resolve questions relating to
compliance with the Treaty and to attempt to agree upon
such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability
and effectiveness of the Treaty. If we are not satisfied
with Soviet response, we can pursue a variety of means to
seek to resolve compliance questions, reserving the
ultimate right to withdraw from the Treaty.
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Article XIII
Para. 1
Will the Commission have any power to levy any penalties
against a party which violates the Treaty?, and if so,
what kind of penalties?
The Special Verification Commission will not have the
power to levy any penalties against a party which violates
the Treaty. It is one forum in which we can address
issues related to Treaty violations and attempt to resolve
them through negotiation. The Commission will meet at the
request of either side.
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Article XIII
Para. 1
How effective has the 'Standing Consultative Commission'
which monitors SALT I and II been in resolving compliance
questions regarding those agreements?
It was never intended that the SCC 'resolve compliance
questions,' but only that it serve as a vehicle of
communication for the two governments to resolve
compliance questions. Overall, we have been disappointed
that the two governments have not been able to resolve the
many questions we have raised about Soviet compliance with
past arms control agreements. The Krasnoyarsk radar
dispute is a case in point. We have discussed it
extensively in the SCC, but to no avail. Public concern
and diplomatic exchanges have been more helpful in getting
the Soviet Union to at last react to U.S. questions.
This experience we have had with the SCC led the U.S.
to propose some of the changes which were adopted in the
INF Treaty for its Special Verification Commission. We
see the SVC as one of a number of mechanisms that we will
use in implementing the INF Treaty. The convening of the
SVC will be on an ad hoc basis and we will utilize other
tools including diplomatic channels both with regard to
compliance and improving the effectiveness of the Treaty.
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Article XIII, Para. 1
How does the "Special Verification Commission" differ from the
"Standing Consultative Commission?"
No one would claim that a bilateral commission like the SCC or
the new body proposed for the INF Treaty could, by itself, deal
effectively with U.S. compliance concerns. An effective U.S.
compliance policy starts with a determination to treat
compliance issues seriously, a defense posture which gives the
Soviet Union real-world incentives to keep serious arms control
agreements alive, and various diplomatic channels through which
to raise and resolve compliance issues. These diplomatic
channels include embassy, miniserial and higher-level channels
where important issues are resolved in the overall context of
the bilateral relationship.
They also include special arms control bodies like the SCC and
the new Special Verification Commission, where arms control
compliance issues can be raised and aired by experts, and where
the other side can hopefully be made to understand the exact
character of our concerns and the importance we attach to
them. These specialized bodies obviously cannot compel the
Soviets to comply with their treaty obligations, and reliance
on them alone could not produce an effective compliance policy
-- that was never their function or their goal.
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However, the new Special Verfiication Commission can perform
important functions. It provides a regular forum for placing
compliance issues on the table, and talking them out in the
length and detail they often require. It provides a means for
working out any misunderstandings, and for resolving them where
there is the political will to do so. And it provides a
mechanism for negotiating changes to existing verification
procedures to improve the viability and effectiveness of the?
Treaty. For these reasons, the new Commission is an important
part of the Treaty scheme, even though it could not, by itself,
solve all such problems.
?
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Article XIII
Para. 1(b)
This subparagraph permits the parties. to meet 'within the
framework' of the Commission to 'agree upon such measures
as may be necessary to improve the viability and
effectiveness of this Treaty."
Since the subparagraph, however, does not provide for
Senate ratification of any *measures' which change the
substantive content of the Treaty, does this mechanism
subvert the constitutional treaty process?
Treaty amendments are subject to ratification, which for
the U.S., requires the advice and consent of the Senate.
However, the purpose of this language and the counterpart
language in the Elimination Protocol and the Inspection
Protocol is to make it possible for the parties to agree-
op changes in the detailed technical provisions for
elimination of INF systems and the conduct of inspections
without going through the ratification process. Such
changes may be agreed through the Special Verification
Commission. This procedure will not be used to change
substantive Treaty obligations, but to modify technical
details in an expedited manner to ensure that inspections
and elimination operations continue to work effectively.
We cannot expect to anticipate all technical problems
which might arise, and we need to have a means of making
timely technical adjustments.
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a.??
-2-
Under the Case Act, the Congress will be informed of
any such technical changes. Any changes which
substantively affect U.S.obligations under the Treaty will
be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.
This procedure is entirely consistent with the
Senate's constitutional role, and in fact similar
arrangements have been included in a number of Treaties
adopted in recent years. Maritime and environmental
treaties, for example, often provide for the amendment of
technical protocols or annexes without triggering Senate
reconsideration of its advice and consent.
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.?.
Article XIV
Does this Article unnecessarily restrict the President's power
to conduct foreign policy?
Article XIV simply reflects the duty of each Party under
customary international law to comply with the Treaey. This
Article is not a non circumvention provision. It does not
impose any additional obligation on the Parties, nor does it
broaden the interpretation of other obligations in the Treaty.
Further, it refers only to the assumption of obligations in the
future, and existing agreements are therefore not affected in
any event. Article XIV will not affect existing patterns of
defense collaboration or cooperation with our Allies. Nor will
this provision preclude cooperation with our Allies in
modernization. Thus this Article will not unnecessarily
restrict the President's power to conduct foreign policy.
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Article XIV
Are the prohibitions called for in this provision
constitutionally binding under U.S. domestic law?
A Treaty which is duly signed and ratified with the advice and
consent of the Senate has the force of law in the United States
pursuant to Article VI of the Constitution. .
Does this Article prohibit the President from assisting NATO
Allies to develop their own missile systems?
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Article XIV
Does this Article prohibit the President from assisting NATO
Allies to develop their own missile systems?
The Treaty prohibits us from producing or transferring a
missile, missile stage or launcher for a Treaty limited GLCM or
GLBM. It does not prohibit the production or transfer of
lesser components, technology or blueprints and the United
States rejected Soviet proposals for such prohibitions. In any
event, each such issue would have to be dealt with on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account the obligation to
comply in good faith with the Treaty.
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Article XIV
If so, does this Article provide the Soviet Union the right to
indirectly restrict Britain and France despite Soviet
pronouncements that the INF Treaty would exclude British and
French missiles?
This Article and indeed the entire Treaty places no
restrictions on the United Kingdom or France. The only
restrictions are on the United States and they are as described
above. The Treaty places no restriction on the established
United States pattern of cooperation with the United Kingdom.
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Article XV, para 2
This paragraph provides that a party to the Treaty.may withdraw
if its "supreme interests" have been "jeopardised." Is this to
be a determination made solely by the withdrawing party?
This is a determination made solely by the withdrawing party.
Article XV, however, requires the Party to include a statement
of the extraordinary events which have jeopardized its supreme
interests.
?
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Article XV, para 2
Could the Soviet Union conceivably withdraw as soon as all U.S.
Pershing Its have been destroyed?
There is no time limit on when a Party is permitted to withdraw
from the Treaty. The U.S., however, likely will not destroy
its last Pershing II until near the end of the three year
period of elimination at the same time destruction of all
Soviet SS-20's and other Treaty-limited systems will be
completed. This process will be in accord with paragraph 2 of
Article IV which states "that both parties shall begin and
continue throughout the duration of each phase" the reduction
of all Treaty-limited items.
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Article XV, para 2
This paragraph also provides that six months notice must be
given prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. If the Soviets
cheat in such a way as to jeopardize the supreme interests of
the U.S., would the U.S. have to wait six months before
withdrawing from the Treaty.
If the Soviets commit a material breach of the Treaty, the U.S.
would not have to wait six months. Under generally recognized
principles of international law, a material breach by one of
the Parties to a bilateral Treaty entitles the other to invoke
the breach as a ground for terminating the Treaty or suspending
its operation in whole or in part.
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Article XVI
This Article provides that amendments shall be effective 'in
accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party'.
Since the Supreme Court has determined that international
agreements made by the President are constitutionally valid,
does this mean that future major changes to the Treaty can be
undertaken with Senate advice and consent?
This article stipulates that amendments will enter into force
in accordance with the same procedures set forth for entry into
force of the Treaty itself. The procedures for the Treaty
include the advice and consent of the Senate to its
ratification. Thus ratification of amendments to the Treaty
will also be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.
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Article XVI
Should the Senate, for its own purposes, clarify that no
amendments to the Treaty can lawfully be made without both the
advice and consent of the Senate?
There is no reason for such a stipulation since the Treaty
subjects the entry into force of amendments to the same
procedures as the Treaty, i.e., with the advice and consent of
the Senate.
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ELIMINATION PROTOCOL QUESTIONS
Section I, Para 1
This paragraph lists among the missiles to be eliminated, the
Pershing I-A. But is this missile operational?
If not, why would the Soviets care about having it eliminated?
Does our agreement to eliminate this missile place any pressure
on West Germany to eliminate theirs?
To what extent does the including of the U.S. Pershing I-A
among the missiles to be eliminated enable the Soviets to
?capture" West German Pershing I-As.?
The U.S. has no deployed Pershing I-As. The INF Treaty,
however, eliminates a whole class of missile systems, --
whether these systems are deployed or non-deployed. Both the
Soviets and the U.S. have significant nukberi of non-deployed
missiles and will be required to eliminate them. The Soviets
have only non-deployed SS-5s, but they will, also have to be
eliminated.
Our agreement to eliminate all of our Pershing I-As has no
impact whatsoever on the German-owned Pershing I-A missiles.
Decisions about these German-owned missiles are solely in the
hands of the Federal Republic of Germany. The U.S. will not be
required to withdraw the U.S.-owned reentry vehicles for these
German missiles until, upon a unilateral FRG decision, these
reentry vehicles are released from the existing program of
cooperation.
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Section I, Paragraph 2
This paragraph lists among the Soviet missiles to be eliminated
the 85-4 and the SS-5. Are the softpads and silos associated
with these missiles to be eliminated under this Treaty? /f
not, what other military purposes could these softpads and
silos be used for?
The silos once used for these missiles have not been in use for
a number of years. The Soviet side at the negotiating table
stated that these silos have been rendered inoperable and have
been neglected or even turned over to civilian uses. For 13
years after entry into force of the Treaty, the U.S., however,
will be able to inspect 88-4 silos of its choosing to increase
its confidence that such silos have not been reactivated as
missile launchers.
The launch pads .(softpads) of the SS-48 and SS-5s, like the
launch pads for the Pershing II, will not have to be
eliminated. It was clear to both sides that requiring
elimination of these specific concrete slabs was unnecessary,
especially given the fact that various types of concrete slabs
are widely available to both sides and could be built without
Treaty restrictions. In the case of the U.S. side, such
Pershing II concrete pads may be useful for other purposes.
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Section I, Paragraph 5
This paragraph requires that all front sections of deployed
missiles covered by the treaty be eliminated. Thi MOU requires
that parties provide pictures of the missiles to be
eliminated. Since the front section is an integral Part of the
SS-23, and is to be eliminated in accordance with this
paragraph, would the Soviets' failure to providoi a picture of
the SS-23 front section constitute a treaty violation?
Do we have any pictures of the front sections of the SS-23? If
not, could we verify that what is being eliminated is actually
an SS-23 front section?
Our basic objective in requesting photos was to help inspectors
identify missiles for purposes of accountability. The SS-23
photo provided by the Soviets was sufficient to identify this
missile.
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Section II, Paragraph 2
This paragraph' provides for special treatment for training
missile systems. What is this special treatment, and its
rationale?
Both sides will have the right to conduct on-site inspections
to verify that the elimination procedures for training assets
have been accomplished. There is no need to remove these
training assets to an elimination site for destruction.
Because training missiles are not lethal and training launchers
cannot launch missiles, there is no need to require on-site.
inspection of their elimination procedures. U.S. training
assets are located at various facilities from which it would be
unnecessarily expensive to transport such items to elimination
facilities. This arrangement was agreed upon primarily at U.S.
insistence.
I S
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Section II, Paragraph 3
This paragraph permits the parties to remove nuclear warheads
and guidance systems from the missiles to be eliminated. Why
was this exemption created?
What is the total amount (in number and explosive power) of
warheads each party will be able to remove from the missiles
covered by the treaty?
Are the Soviets prohibited from reloading these warheads onto
newer missiles with INF for inter-contintental capabilities?
Will the United States remove its warheads from missiles prior
to elimination, and if so, what will it do with them?
The INF Treaty does not require physical destruction of the
actual nuclear explosive devices. By destroying the means of
delivering INF missile nuclear warhead devices, the Treaty will
remove the military threat posed by them. For a number of
.reasons, the U.S. determined that it would not be in our
nterest to eliminate the nuclear warhead devices themselves.
Verifying the elimination of nuclear warhead devices raises
formidable technical challenges and difficult security issues.
Intrusive verification measures could disclose sensitive
nuclear weapons information to the Soviet Union; Finally, the
nuclear warhead devices contain costly and scarce resources
which it would be imprudent to destroy.
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Each Party will be able to remove the nuclear warhead device
from its missile "front section". As "explosive power" was not
an element of the Treaty negotiations, it was not calculated.
The nuclear warhead device, however, cannot simply be
"reloaded" onto ICBMs.
The U.S. will remove its nuclear warhead devices from missile
front sections prior to elimination. DOE reports there are
currently no firm plans designating INF nuclear explosive
devices for other military uses. The INF nuclear explosive
devices will be stored pending identification of any weapon
programs in which they would be used and, if no such programs
materialize, willsbe.routinely retired and disassembled. The
DOD/DOE approach to this mater is to seek pragmatic,
financially judicious outcomes. It is clear, however, that the
availability of these INF nuclear explosive devices will have
.no impact whatsoever on force planning as such. New nuclear
delivery vehicles will not be produced in order to take
advantage of old INF nuclear explosive devices, but if new
nuclear delivery systems, in the normal course of modernization
requirements, could make use of such devices, we could save
money and other scarce resources.
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Section II, Paragraph 8
This paragraph provides for special treatment for training
missile systems. What is this special treatment, and its
rationale?
Both sides will have the right, to conduct on-site inspections
to verify that the elimination procedures for training assets
have been accomplished. There is no need to remove these
training assets to an elimination site for destruction.
Because training missiles are not lethal and training launchers
cannot launch missiles, there is. noneed to require on-site
inspection of their elimination procedures. U.S. training
assets are located at various facilities from Which it would be
unnecessarily expensive to transport such items to elimination
facilities: This arrangement was agreed upon primarily at U.S.
insistence.
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Section II, Paragraph 9
This paragraph provides, in part, that the parties withdraw
reentry vehicles released from existing programs of
cooperation. Are reentry vehicles considered to be part of the
warhead, and thus not subjected to elimination?
Does this refer solely to the deactivated Pershing I-A
missile? If so, why did the Soviets request this provision?
The reentry vehicle is that portion of a ballistic missile that
actually reenters the atmosphere and contains the nuclear
warhead device. As in the case of all other items subject to
this Treaty, these reentry vehicles are subject to elimination
in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Elimination
Protocol, and their nuclear warhead devices will be removed
prior to the elimination of the reentry vehicles.
The only such existing program of cooperation we have is that
with the FRG covering the reentry vehicles owned and maintained
by the U.S. for use on the German Pershing /-A. missiles. These
reentry vehicles will be withdrawn and eliminated only when,
upon a unilateral FRG decision, they are released from that
existing program of cooperation. We prefer not to speculate
about Soviet motivations for seeking this provision.
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Section II, Paragraph 10
This paragraph provides, in part, for the elimination of
launchers and vehicles. Why does it provide that the launchers
and vehicles for our missiles must be cut in half, while Soviet
missiles and vehicles need have approximately 1 meter cut off.
Does this enable the Soviets to maintain the integral vehicle?
What are the reasons for this unequal requiremedt?
The U.S. launchers subject to this Treaty have "prime movers"
(ten-ton tractors) that can be detached from their launcher
trailers. The Elimination Protocol permits the U.S. to
preserve those detachable ten-ton tractors -- a right we
insisted upon. Furthermore, the U.S. had the option to insist
on the same elimination procedures for its launcher trailers as
dictated for the Soviet launchers (to include cutting.off the
aft portion). The U.S. decided to cut those trailers in half
as the most cost effective approach.
The Soviet launchers subject to this Treaty do not have
detachable prime movers. In fact, these Soviet launchers are
designed in such a way that, if the trailer portion were cut
anywhere other than aft of the rear axle, the "prime mover"
portion of the vehicle would be unusable. The agreed .
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elimination procedures for both sides, therefore, permit the
Soviets to preserve, on a reciprocal basis, "prime movers" from
their launchers. These elimination procedures, however,
effectively eliminate the launch capability of the Soviet
launchers--the Soviets must remove all erector launcher
mechanisms from these vehicles and cut them in half; they must
cut off the mountings for these mechanisms: they must remove
the leveling support jacks from these vehicles and cut them in
half: and they must cut off the aft portion of the vehicles
which accommodate the erector launcher mechanisms and support
the missile when erected.
Following completion of these procedures, these Soviet vehicles
will no longer be long enough to accommodate a missile and will
lack the structural integrity required to support the erector
launcher mechanisms and missile.
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Section II, Paragraph 11
This paragraph provides for special treatment for training
missile systems. What is this special treatment, and its
rationale?
Both sides will have the right, to conduct on-site inspections
to verify that the elimination procedures for training assets
have been accomplished. There is no need to remove these
training assets to an elimination site for destruction.
Because training missiles are not lethal and training launchers
cannot launch missiles, there is no need to require on-site
inspection of their elimination procedures. U.S. training
assets are located at various facilities from which it would be
unnecessarily expensive to transport such items to elimination
facilities. This arrangement was agreed upon primarily at U.S-.
insistence.
I,
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s_
Section III, Paragraph 1
This paragraph provides for elimination of missiles by
launching. What is the rationale for permitting elimination by
launching?
Can launches for the purpose of elimination be used by the
Soviets for troop training or reliability testing?
What advantages would the Soviet gain by using elimination
launches for troop training or reliability testing?
Can we verify that the Soviets are not using elimination
launches for these purposes? Will the United States use
elimination launches for these purposes?
During the negotiations, the U.S. firmly insisted that the
missiles of both sides be eliminated within a three-year
period. The Soviets initially claimed it would be impossible
to eliminate all their missiles within a three-year
period?they proposed a five-year period of elimination.
Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze decided-to
supplement the delegations with technical experts in order to
resolve this issue. Following the meetings of those technical
experts, the Soviets agreed they could in fact eliminate all
their missiles within a three-year period as long as they were
permitted to eliminate some of them by means of launching.
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The U.S. side agreed to permit a limited number of such
launches to destruction under very strict provisions: only 100
missiles could be launched; these launches would have to take
place within the first six months; no test data can be
collected or broadcast from such launches; these launches will
be subject to on-site inspection before and during launch.
Under these conditions, the Soviets could gain very little from
such launches in terms of reliability testing. Furthermore,
the Soviets have been conducting troop training and reliability
testing on the SS-20 for over ten years--they would not stand
to gain much from a six-month extension of such training and
testing even if launches to destruction were marginally useful
in those regards.
We will be able to verify that the Soviets do not collect test
data from launches to destruction.
The U.S. has not determined whether it will eliminate missiles
by launch.
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Section III, Paragraph 2
This paragraph prohibits the use of elimination launches as
targets for ballistic missile interceptors. Does this
prohibition extend to the use of launches to track the missile
with ABM or Air Defense Radar? If not, will we use launches
for these purposes?
This provision contains no restriction on any type of radar
tracking. The U.S. is carefully considering whether it will
exercise its right to launches for destruction as well as
whether it will track such launches with various radars.
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Section III, Paragraph 4
This paragraph prohibits the transmission or recovery of data
from such missiles except for range safety purposes.
How is "range safety" defined?
Can the Soviets put telemetry packages on missiles and declare
them to be unencrypted data used for range safety practices?
4
The allowance for range safety data was driven by the U.S.
requirement to have range safety destruction packages on any
missiles that would be launched to destruction. It was made
clear at the negotiating table that this "range safety" data
would be that unencrypted data necessary to indicate if the
missile was malfunctioning in such a manner that it might have
to be destroyed in flight. We would be able to determine the
difference between this type of transmission and any telemetry.
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Section IV, Paragraph 1
What is the smallest sapport structure item, by system, limited
by this treaty, and do the provisions of this Section permit
the parties to search in situ for these items?
a
The Treaty requires the elimination of two support
structures--the launch garage (fixed structure for a launcher)
of the 88-20 and the launch pad shelter for the Pershing II.
The Treaty also provides for on-site inspection to verify that
the support structure elimination procedures required in this
paragraph have been completed.
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Section IV, Paragraph/ /
Under this paragraph, the propellant tanks of 56-4 missiles
require specific dismantling procedures. Are SS-4 soft pads
and silos similarly subject to elimination?
The silos once used for these missiles have not been in use for
a number of years. The Soviet side at the negotiating table
stated that these silos have been rendered inoperable and have
been neglected or even turned over to civilian uses. For 13
years after entry into force of the Treaty, the U.S., however,
will be able to inspect on-site six SS-4 silos of its choosing
to increase its confidence that such silos have not been
reactivated as missile launchers.
The launch pads (softpads) of the SS-4s and SS-5s, like the
launch pads for the Pershing II, will not have to be
eliminated. It was clear to both sides that requiring
elimination of these specific concrete slabs was unnecessary,
especially given the fact that various types of concrete slabs
are widely available to both sides and could be built without
Treaty restrictions. In the case of the U.S. side, such
Pershing II concrete pads may be useful for other purposes.
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Section /V, Paragraph 3(c)
This paragraph requires that training systems not eliminated at
elimination facilities be eliminated in situ.
But are both test range test and training launchers also to be
eliminated, and if so, can the parties conduct on-site
inspection of these eliminations?
How would test launchers be distinguished from training
launchers?
This paragraph deals with training assets, including training
launchers?it does not contain any provision for test
launchers. For both sides, the training launchers being
referred to are vehicles used in driver-training for
launchers. These driver training vehicles somewhat resemble
launchers and carry weight/load simulators. These vehicles
cannot launch a missile. They will be subject to the initial
baseline on-site inspection. Both sides have the right, if
they choose, to conduct on-site inspections to verify that the
elimination procedures for these vehicles have been completed.
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Section V, Paragraph 2
This paragraph provides for the elimination of missile systems
by static display. How will elimination be undertaken, and how
will we verify such eliminations?
How will on-site inspections of these systems reveal whether or
not systems have been rendered unusable, their missile
propellants removed, or their erector launcher mechanisms
rendered inoperative?
Each party shall be limited to a total of 15 such missiles,
canisters, and launchers on static display. Prior to being
placed on static display, a missile, launch canister or
launcher shall be rendered unusable for purposes inconsistent
with the Treaty. Missile propellant shall be removed and
.erector launcher mechanisms shall be rendered inoperative.
Both sides will have the right to conduct on-site.inspections
of each of the items being eliminated by this method.
On-site inspectors will have no difficulty in determining that
these missiles are inert and that, for launchers, various
erector launcher mechanisms are inoperable, if indeed they are
even fully in place.
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Protocol Regarding Inspections
Section II, Para. 2
This paragraph refers to the Basing Country Agreements. Are
these agreements an integral part of the treaty? Will they be
submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent? Will our
basing countries be exchanging notes with the Soviets? Will
these notes be made available to the Senate?
The BCA is important to our ability to implement the Treaty,
because it is the BCA that comits the Western basing countries
to permit Soviet inspectors to perform inspections called for
by the Treaty in those countries. However, the advice and
consent of the Senate is not needed -- the only obligations we
undertake under the BCA are to use our rights under the Treaty
in ways that will protect the basing countries' interests.
Once the Treaty enters into force, we will be able to do this
without any further ratification action by the Senate or
legislation by the Congress, and the SCA will not enter into
force unless and until the Treaty does. Therefore, the
President can proceed with the BCA as an executive agreement,
and there is no need for Senate advice and consent. However,
we wanted the Senate to be fully aware of its provisions and
its role, and so we transmitted it to the Senate along with the
Treaty for the information of the Senate.
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Section II/, Para 3
This paragraph provides, in part, that we may strike continuous
monitors from the list provided by the Soviets.
Is there a maximum number to which we may object?
Will KGB and GRU agents be included among the monitors?
May we also object to inspectors of "close-out", "baseline",
"elimination" and "spot" inspections and have them stricken
from the list?
We may refuse to accept continuous monitoring inspectors, i.e.,
those Soviets who will be in the US on a long-term basis, at
our discretion. While there is no such initial discretionary
right of refusal of short-term inspectors or aircrew members
under Section III(3), Section III(7) gives us the right to have
any individual proposed in either of these categories stricken
from the list of inspectors or aircrew members if we determine
that be has ever committed a criminal offense here or in a
basing country, or been sentenced for committing such an
offense or expelled (for any reason) from the US or a basing
country. If we make such a determination prior to the
individual's actual entry into the US, then he would be denied
entry as an inspector or aircrew member.
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We retain the right to have the individual deleted fromthe list
of (short-term or continuous monitoring) inspectors or aircrew
members at any subsequent time if we determine tiat.any of the
conditions mentioned above exist, or that he has violated the
Inspection Protocol conditions governing inspection activities
-- which include respecting the laws and regulations of the
country in whose territory the inspection is being carried
out. If that determination is made while the individual is in
country, then his government must remove him immediately.
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Section III, Para. 7
This paragraph provides that an inspector or aircrew member
determined by the host party to have violated conditions of the
protocol, or comitted a crime shall be removed and stricken
from the list.
Who will determine whether an inspector has violated conditions
or committed a crime?
The inspected party will determine whether an inspector has
violated conditions or committed a crime. Nevertheless, an
unfounded and unsubstantiated allegation of comission of a
crime, disputed by the inspector inquestion, would not
constitute a basis for requiring removal of the inspector.
Such an allegation made in bad faith would, in fact, raise a
compliance issue. Only if clear and convincing evidence of
commission of a crime was offered would the United States deem
the requirements of the provision met.
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Z/2?15C-C:6,;7n 715 IDCO
Section III, para. 7
Is there any due process to protect our inspectors from
arbitrary Soviet actions?
Yes, the Annex to the Inspection Protocol, entitled
'Provisions on Privileges and Immunities of Inspectors and
Aircrew Members,' protects our inspectors against arbitrary
Soviet actions. Among other things, this Annex accords
inspectors 'the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents
pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations.'
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Section IV, para. lb
This subparagraph provides that 72 hours advance notice be
given before 'elimination' inspections as opposed to 16 hours
advance notice for 'baseline', 'close-out' and 'spot'
inspections. What is the rationale for requiring additional
advance notice for 'elimination' inspections?
Baseline, close-out and quota inspections are designed to
deter the basing of undeclared missiles at declared and
formerly declared facilities. To accomplish this aim, it is
necessary to preserve an element of surprise. Thus, the
Inspection Protocol provides for the minimum amount of advance
notice that is logistically feasible. In contrast,
elimination inspections are designed to enable inspectors to
observe the elimination process. To accomplish this aim, the .
two Parties must cooperate to ensure that inspectors arrive at
the site shortly before the elimination process begins. The
Inspection Protocol provides for more advance notice to
facilitate cooperative logistical arrangements.
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Section IV, pari. 2
This paragraph provides that the time of 'close-out' and
?spot' inspections be within 4-24 hours after estimated time
of arrival at entry point while the time for 'baseline'
inspections must be within 4-48 hours. Why is additional time
necessary for 'baseline' inspections?
At the point of entry, escorts will examine any equipment that
the inspection team is bringing into the country to ascertain
that it cannot 'perform functions unconnected with the
inspection requirements of the Treaty.' During baseline
inspections, inspectors will be bringing a lot of equipment
into the country for the first time, so the equipment check
might take quite a while. After the first baseline
inspections are completed, equipment may be stored in
tamper-proof containers in secure facilities at the point of
entry. Subsequent equipment checks will be needed only for
any additional equipment that the inspection team brings into
the country on future visits.
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Section V, para. 4
This paragraph prohibits inspectors to bring in equipment or
supplies unconnected with inspection activities. Bow will it
be determined which equipment or supplies is or is not
connected with inspection activities?
Paragraph 9 of Section VI requires the Parties to agree upon
'characteristics and method of use' of inspection equipment
within thirty days after entry into force of the Treaty.
Thus, a list of permitted inspection equipment will be agreed
upon in advance. Examinations at the point of entry will be
designed to determine whether equipment being brought into the
country meets the specifications on that list. Equipment that
meets the specifications will be allowed into the country,
unless it also contains 'add-ons' not agreed by the Parties
.that could perform functions 'unconnected with the inspection
requirements of the Treaty.'
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Section V, para. 4
Could we, in any way, prevent the Soviets from supplementing
equipment and supplies at inspection sites with unconnected
items brought into the U.S. in Soviet diplomatic pouches
immune to any U.S. inspections?
Soviet inspectors will not be permitted to use diplomatic
pouches on official inspection missions. When entering the
U.S. or NATO basing countries for the purpose of performing an'
inspection, inspection equipment and personal baggage the
inspectors are carrying will be subject to Customs examination.
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Section V, para 5
This paragraph makes the Soviets responsible for transporting
our inspection teams. What assurances do we have that our
inspectors will not be unduly delayed? What recourse would we
have if such a delay was to occur?
If the Soviets fail to transport our inspectors to the site
within the nine-hour time limit we have the right to cancel
the inspection without counting it against our quota. If the
U.S. believed that there was purposeful delay, we would raise
the issue with the Soviets as a compliance question within
diplomatic channels or within the framework of the SVC.
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Section VI, para. 3
This paragraph prohibits inspectors from interfering with,
hampering, or delaying operations at inspection sites. Who
determines what constitutes interference, hampering or
delaying? What actions will be taken against an inspector who
'interferes', 'hampers' or 'delays?'
If U.S. escorts believe that a Soviet inspector is interfering
with operations at a site, they have the right to stop him.
In extreme cases, they would have the right to remove him from
the site. If, on the other hand, we believed that one of our
inspectors was accused unjustly of interfering with operations
at a site, and the Soviets responded by taking some action
that prevented him from carrying out his inspection duties, we
would have the right to raise the issue with the Soviets as a
compliance question within diplomatic channels or within the
framework of the SVC.
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Section VI, para. 5
Could this assistance actually hamper our inspectors? What
kind of recourse would we have if this was the case?
The Inspection Protocol calls for in-country escorts to assist
inspectors because such assistance will be necessary.
Naturally, one cannot exclude the possibility that an escort
might attempt to interfere with the activities of our
inspectors. In such an event, an individual inspector could
appeal to one of the other escorts to discipline his
colleague. Failing that, we have the right to raise this
matter as a compliance question within diplomatic channels or
within the framework of the SVC.
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Section VI, para. 7
This paragraph provides inspectors the right to communicate
with their local embassy over telephone lines provided the
inspected Party. Will these telephone lines be secure from
Soviet eavesdropping.
No.
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Section VI, para. 9
This paragraph provides, in part, that during 'spot?
inspections of former missile bases and support facilities,
all measurements may be made only by the inspected Party. Why
may only the inspected Party perform these measurements? What
equipment will they use, and can we verify the accuracy of
this equipment?
Once a current INF facility has been eliminated and is no
longer involved in INF-related activity, it is possible that
the U.S. may wish to use that facility for other military
activities. To protect against Soviet collection of sensitive
information at such facilities and to avoid the charge of
having sought to break the object being inspected, the
Protocol provides that the inspected Party will perform all
measurements. However, to ensure the accuracy of the
measurements, inspectors will have the right to insist that
the inspecting Party's equipment.be used. Moreover,
inspectors will observe the escorts while measurements are
taken, and will have the right to request that a measurement
be taken again if they believe it was not done correctly the
first time.
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Section VI, para. 14
This paragraph provides that 'baseline', 'close-out' and
'spot' inspections shall last no longer than 24 hours, unless
the in-country escort consents to extend the inspection by up
to 8 hours. On what basis will the in-country escort provide
or refuse to extend an inspection? What will be our recourse
if our inspectors need more than 24-32 hours to conduct a
particular inspection?
The U.S. will develop guidelines to assist escorts in
determining whether to grant a particular extension request.
With respect to our own inspection teams, there is no reason
why they should not be able to complete inspections in the
allotted 24-32 hour timeframe.
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Section VI, para. 16
This paragraph provides, in part, that the inspected Party
' will be responsible for inspectors reaching their next site
without delay. What will be considered an 'unjustified'
delay, and who will make this determination? What recourse
would we have if our inspectors are 'unjustifiably' delayed?
The provision cited here applies only if the inspection team
decides that it wishes to proceed directly to the next site,
rather than returning first to the point of entry. If the
inspection team wishes to preserve an element of surprise, it
may choose to return to the point of entry, and then specify
the next site, in which case the nine-hour timeline discussed
above applies. Thus, the requirement that inspectors be
transported 'without unjustified delay' applies only in those
cases where the inspection team has decided to proceed
immediately to another site. Nevertheless, if the team leader
believes that he has been delayed unjustifiably he has the
right to raise his complaint with the escort. railing that,
we have the right to raise this matter as a compliance
question within diplomatic channels or within the framework of
the SVC.
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Section VII, para. 1
This paragraph prohibits the inspected Party from moving
covered missile systems after one hour after the specification
of an inspection site. Are these 'pre-inspection ? movement
restrictions to be verified by National Technical Means? Are
our National Technical Means capable of verifying compliance
with these restrictions within the time constraints of this
provision?
The pre-inspection movement restriction will be monitored by
National Technical Means. This will pose a risk of detection
for the Soviets should they attempt to violate the
pre-inspection movement restrictions. This risk of detection
will help to deter such violations.
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e.??
Section VII, Para 5
This paragraph provides that the boundaries of inspection sties
will be considered as set forth in the MOU.
Could the Soviets construct or maintain banned systems or
equipment outside the boundaries of the site, and avoid
inspection?
Through the combination of locational restrictions, movement
notifications, national technical means, and various types of
on-site inspections, we will be able to track the declared
treaty-limited items in the Soviet inventory until they are
eliminated. Also, further production is banned by the Treaty.
Additionally, the IN? Treaty bans flight-testing and training
with INF missiles. Without such testing and training, the
reliability and military utility of any covertly deployed force
would degrade over time.
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Section VII, para. 7
What is the smallest limited item of the SS-20? Will the U.S.
be able to search for that item anywhere within the entire
inspection site?
While inspecting, for example, an SS-20 missile operating
base, U.S. inspectors will have the right to search not only
for the smallest item associated with the SS-20, but for the
smallest Soviet items subject to the Treaty. There are four
such items, depending upon which dimensions one is measuring:
the SS-4 launcher, SSC-X-4 missile, SS-12 first stage and
SS-23 first stage. Any container capable of containing a
Soviet missile, missile stage, launcher or piece of support
equipment subject to the Treaty will be capable of containing
one of the four items listed above. During inspections of
Soviet missile operating bases and missile support facilitiei,
U.S. inspectors will be able to inspect any container anywhere
within the inspection site capable of containing any of these
four items. Since the SS-20 missile, missile stages, launcher
and pieces of support equipment are all larger than the four
items listed above, it follows that U.S. inspectors will have
the right to inspect any container capable of containing any
item associated with the SS-20 that is subject to the Treaty.
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Section VII, para. 8
This paragraph provides that missiles, stages or launchers or
canisters not large enough to contain a prohibited missile or
stage may be inspected only by external visual observation.
But who will do the necessary measuring, the inspectors or the
in-country escorts?
Inspectors will perform the measurements, except during
inspections of formerly declared facilities, in which case the
escorts will perform the measurements under the supervision of
escorts as described previously.
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Section VII, para. 8
Could such canisters contain SS-20s? Could we verify whether
or not such canisters contain SS-20s through external
inspection alone? Do U.S. radiation detectors have the
ability to tell how many warheads are carried inside a missile
within a canister, or where there may be empty space within a
canister?
Consider the following cases:
a
1. A Container too small to contain an SS-20 may be measured
to verify that it is in fact too small to contain an SS-20.
2. A container large enough to contain an SS-20 that is
declared not to contain a missile or missile stage is subject
to inspection by means of weighing or visual observation of
the interior to verify that it does not in fact contain a
missile or missile stage. During inspections of formerly
declared facilities, escorts may also use any other means they
choose to prove that the container does not contain a missile
or missile stage.
3. A container large enough to contain an SS-20 that is
declared to contain an SS-20 may be measured to ascertain
whether it is large enough to contain more than one SS-20. If
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it is large enough, it is subject to inspection by means of
weighing or interior visual observation to verify that-it does
not contain more than one SS-20.
4. If the container is an SS-25 launch canister, and it is
declared to contain an SS-25, it is subject to external
inspection only, including use of radiation detection
devices. Using such radiation detection devices, we can tell
whether the missile inside the canister has one warhead or
three warheads.
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Section VII, para. 10
What constitutes inaccessible, and how will it be determined?
Can we verify that such structures do not have concealed
entrances?
Consider, for example, a building with three floors that has
one elevator, which is the only means of access to the upper
floors. If the elevator is not large enough to contain a
missile, missile stage or launcher subject to the Treaty then
the upper floors are clearly not accessible to such a missile,
etc. and are therefore not subject to inspection.
Accessibility can be verified by measuring apparent 'choke
points' within a building. While we cannot verify with 100%
confidence that a building does not have hidden entrances,
inspectors do have the right to search for concealed entrances
as long as they don't violate any other conditions of the
Protocol in the process.
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Section VII, para. 11
This para provides inspection teams the right to patrol the
perimeter of inspection sites. Can this entail continuous
monitoring of the perimeter?
It could entail continuous monitoring of the perimeter for the
24-32 hours allotted for an inspection.
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Section VII, Para. 11
This paragraph provides inspection teams the right to patrol
the perimeter of inspection sites. Can this entail continuous
monitoring of the perimeter?
Yes, we can patrol the perimeter as often as we wish:
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Section VII, para. 14
This paragraph provides, in part, that during 'spot'
inspections of missile bases and facilities, launch canisters
declared to contain a missile not covered by the Treaty --
such as the SS-25 -- shall be subject to external fnspection
only. Could such canisters contain SS-20s? Can we verify
through external inspection alone that these canisters do not
contain SS-20s or other prohibited missiles?
Consider the following cases:
1. A Container too small to contain an SS-20 may be measured
to verify that it is in fact too small to contain an SS-20.
2. A container large enough to contain an SS-20 that is
declared not to contain a missile or missile stage ii subject
to inspection by means of weighing or visual observation of
the interior to verify that it does not in fact contain a
missile or missile stage. During inspections of formerly
declared facilities, escorts may also use any other means they
choose to prove that the container does not contain a missile
or missile stage.
3. A container large enough to contain an SS-20 that is
declared to contain an SS-20 may be measured to ascertain
whether it is large enough to contain more than one SS-20. If
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it is large enough, it is subject to inspection by means of
weighing or interior visual observation to verify that it does
not contain more than one SS-20.
4
4. If the container is an SS-25 launch canister, and it is
declared to contain an SS-25, it is subject to external
inspection only, including use of radiation detection
devices. Using such radiation detection devices, we can tell
whether the missile inside the canister has one warhead or
three warheads.
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Section VIII, para. ld
This subparagraph provides inspectors the right to visual
observation of elimination launchings. Does visual
observation include measurements of the actual missiles taken
inside the canister?
This paragraph gives inspectors the right to ascertain by
visual observation that 'a missile prepared for launch is a
missile of the type subject to elimination.' At a minimum,
this will involve looking at the missile inside the canister.
If that is not sufficient to ascertain what type of missile it
is, inspectors could also perform measurements. These methods
could also be supplemented by photographing the missile
immediately after launch, which should remove any doubts
whatsoever about the type of missile being launched.
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Section IX, para. 3
This paragraph provides, in part, that exits to inspection
sites may be monitored by appropriate sensors. What will be
considered 'appropriate. This paragraph also provides
inspectors the right to patrol the perimeter and exits of the
site. What kind of patrol will this be: random, regular or
continuous?
Paragraph 12 of Section IX gives the U.S. the right to weigh
and measure the dimensions of any vehicle exiting Votkinsk to
ascertain whether it is large enough and heavy enough to
contain an SS-20. Sensors at site exits will be 'appropriate'
for this purpose.
The Inspection Protocol gives us the right to patrol the
perimeter and exits of Votkinsk continuously.
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Section IX, para. 5
This paragraph requires that a number of items necessary for
inspection be provided by the inspected Party, including
'appropriate' sensors and telephone lines and radio
equipment. Why are such items to be provided by the inspected
Party? Do we have a way to calibrate the accuracy of sensors
provided by the Soviets? What rights do we have if sensors
prove inaccurate? Will communications over Soviet-provided
telephone and radio equipment be secure?
This paragraph does not call for the inspected Party to
provide sensors. Rather, it calls for the inspected Party to
provide 'the site preparation necessary to accommodate the
installation of ... appropriate sensors.' Thus, the U.S. will
supply its own sensors at Votkinsk.
Telephone lines and radio equipment are to be provided by the
? .
inspected Party because it is more efficient than it would be
for the inspecting Party to supply its own. Communications
over Soviet-provided telephone and radio equipment will not be
secure.
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Section IX, para. 6(b)
This subparagraph provides inspectors the right to install
weight sensors at exits. Do we know the weight of an SS-25
missile and canister? Would our inspectors be able to
determine if a canister contains an SS-25 or an SS-20. using
weight sensors?
Weight sensors alone are not sufficient to determine whether a
canister contains an SS-25 or an SS-20. The purpose of the
weight sensors is merely to determine whether a particular
container is heavy enough to contain an SS-20. (The Soviets
have told us the weight of the SS-20, and we will be able to
verify that weight during baseline inspections.) Any vehicle
exiting Votkinsk that is large enough and heavy enough to
contain an SS-20 will be subject to inspection according to
the procedures in paragraphs 13 and 14 of Section IX. Those
procedures will give us high confidence that no SS-20s are
exiting Votkinsk.
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Section IX, para. 9
This paragraph provides the inspected Party the right to
establish power and frequency restrictions for radio ..
communications between inspectors patrolling a site and their
data collection facility. Will this arrangement permit
communications secure from Soviet eavesdropping?
4
No, it will not permit communications secure from Soviet
eavesdropping. If U.S. inspectors require secure
communications, they will have to speak to each other inside
the inspection team headquarters. These buildings will be
constructed by the U.S., and are accorded inviolability by the
Privileges and Immunities Annex. Thus, they will be secure.
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Section IX, para. 10
This paragraph prohibits aircraft from landing within the
perimeter of monitored sites except for emergencies and with
notice. Does this provide for two types of permitted landing
No, aircraft are permitted to land only if both conditions are
satisfied. Thus, even with prior notification aircraft would
not be permitted to land at the site unless there was an
emergency.
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Section IX, para. 11
This paragraph requires the inspected Party to notify
inspectors of shipments capable of carrying a banned missile
before exiting the site. Do we know the weight of an SS-20
with front section and warheads? How would this compare to
the weight for an SS-20 without front section (provided in the
MOD)? Could the Soviets declare an SS-25 canister containing
an SS-20 to be heavier than the figure provided in the MOD,
and thus exempt it from interior inspection?
Questions about the weight of an SS-20 with front section
cannot be answered on an unclassified basis. With respect to
the last part of the question, if the Soviets attempted to
transport an SS-20 out of Votkinsk inside an SS-25 canister,
it would be subject to interior inspection, regardless of what
the Soviets declare. The U.S. has the right to weigh and
measure any vehicle exiting Votkinsk to see whether it is
large and heavy enough to contain an SS-20. Any vehicle
exiting the site that carried an SS-20 inside an SS-25
canister would be large enough and heavy enough tO contain an
SS-20, and would thus be subject to further inspection.
The nature of that inspection would depend upon what the
Soviets declare. If the Soviets declared such a vehicle to
contain an SS-25, the caninter could be X-rayed, and it would
be subject to random interior inspection (eight times per
year). If the Soviets claimed that the canister did not
contain a missile, they would be obligated to demonstrate that
claim.
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Section IX, para. 13(a)
This subpara provides inspectors the right to inspect the
interior of all vehicles exiting the plant which are large
enough and heavy enough to carry a banned missile or stage.
Does this right include inspection inside any canister carried
by the vehicle?
Consider a vehicle exiting Votkinsk that is large enough and
heavy enough to carry an SS-20. Assume that inside the
vehicle there is a container or shrouded object. Such a
container or shrouded object will fall into one of three
categories:
1. if inspectors can ascertain by visual observation or
dimensional measurement that it is too small to be or to
contain an SS-20, it is not subject to further inspection;
2. if it is declared to contain an SS-25, the provisions of
paragraph 14 apply;
3. if it is large enough to contain an SS-20, but it is
declared not to contain a missile or missile stage, the
inspected Party is obligated to prove that it does not contain
an SS-20.
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Section IX, para. 13(c)
This subparagraph makes it the responsibility of the inspected
Party to demonstrate that containers or objects large enough
to contain a banned missile or stage does (sic) not contain
such item. How would the inspected Party make such a
demonstration? Would the inspectors in such a situation have
the right to inspect such containers or objects?
In most cases, the simplest way for the inspected Party to
demonstrate that such a container does not contain a banned
missile or stage will be to open the container so that
inspectors can view the inside. However, in certain cases it
might be impractical to open the container, or it might entail
a risk of compromising sensitive information. In such a case,
if the container is too light to contain a banned missile or
missile stage, the inspected Party could weigh the container .
to prove that it is too light to contain such a missile or
missile stage. Other methods are also possible, but the
inspected Party must prove to the satisfaction of the
inspectors that the container does not contain a banned
missile or missile stage.
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Section IX, para. 14(c)
This subparagraph provides, in part, that inspectors may open
canisters exiting the site which are larger or heavier than a
missile or stage banned by the Treaty on a random basis no
more than 8 times a year. Upon opening such canisters, will
our inspectors be able to view all three stages sufficient to
accurately measure the length and diameter of all stages?
Have we ever seen an SS-20 Post-Boost Vehicle, and if not, how
will we be able to ascertain that a missile exiting the plant
is not an SS-20? In determining whether or not a missile
inside a canister is an SS-20, will our inspectors use the
current Soviet picture or our original intelligence estimate?
When examining the contents of canisters exiting Votkinsk, the
first thing our inspectors will want to know is whether the
missile inside the canister has two stages, as does the SS-20,
or three stages, as does the SS-25. That can be easily
determined simply by looking at the missile.
Assuming that the missile inside the canister has three
stages, we will still want to measure the length and diameter
of the second stage to ensure that the Soviets do not simply
add a third stage onto the SS-20. Measurement of the first
stage will tell us nothing, because the first stages of the
SS-20 and SS-25, according to the Soviets, have similar
dimensions. Similarly, measurement of the third stage does
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not help solve the problem because the SS-20 has no third
stage. However, the Soviets have given us data on the length
and diameter of both the SS-20 second stage and the SS-25
second stage. We have the right to verify the data on the
SS-20 second stage during baseline inspections. We will also
be able to confirm this data during elimination inspections.
If measurements of the second stage of a missile exiting
Votkinsk confirm that the stage does in fact have different
dimensions from the second stage of an SS-20 we will know that
the missile exiting Votkinsk is not an SS-20.
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Section X
This section provides that inspections may be cancelled if due
to circumstances brought about by "force majeure", they cannot
be carried out.
What is the definition of "force majeure" in US domestic law?,
international law?, Soviet law?
The meaning of the term "force majeure" is well understood in
international law as referring to a superior or irresistible
force outside the control of either party, which 'therefore
could not be avoided by the exercise of due care -- a condition
that would exist if, for example, a flood or earthquake blocked
access to an inspection site, preventing a scheduled
inspection. In contrast, were it to appear that the Soviets
were willfully delaying or obstructing our inspection access,
we would pursue such a matter vigorously in the Special
Verification Commission and any other appropriate channels
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_ . .
Questions from Helms Memorandum: Issue V7
Why does the Treaty and its Protocols permit the Soviet Union
to retain roughly three to four times as many nuclear warheads
as are retained by the United States?
The Treaty does not require either side to eliminate its
nuclear warheads. Because the Soviets through elimination of
all INF missiles and launchers must eliminate about four times
the capability to deliver nuclear warheads as the United
States, they are able to retain more warheads without their
delivery systems.
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?????
Why does the Treaty fail to prohibit the reloading of these
warheads or to provide safeguards against their reloading and
retargeting either on NATO or the United States?
The warheads cannot be simply "reloaded" onto or "retargetted"
on other missiles. The provision reflects U.S. wish to retain
the option of utilizing the fissionable materials and guidance
elements from INF missiles for other purposes.
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Why does the Treaty and its Protocols fail to require the
elimination of the nuclear warheads and associated guidance
systems?
The INF Treaty does not require physical destruction of the
actual nuclear explosive devices (called "nuclear warhead
devices" in the Treaty -- the packages containing the
fissionable material). Such destruction was never proposed by
either side in Geneva. We could not physically destroy nuclear
materials, nor would it be possible to verify restrictions on
nuclear explosive devices or the disposition of their nuclear
materials without exposing sensitive information. Moreover, we
?
wished to reserve the right to reuse these materials.
Both the warheads and the guidance systems are expensive and
use highly sensitive and sophisticated technology. The U.S.
wished to be able to salvage them both to prevent possible
compromise of design information during any elimination process
and to preserve the possiblity for their future use in other
systems.
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Why does the Treaty and its Protocols deny to the U.S.
inspection rights at suspect sites for systems covered by the
Treaty?
It was the conclusion of the Administration that, in the
context of the INF Treaty, "anytime, anywhere," inspections
added little to the already extensive and unprecedented /NF
verification regime When balanced against the possible risks to
other U.S. and Allied security interests which they raised.
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Why does the Treaty and its Protocols permit the retention of
15 launchers with missiles and nuclear warheads on so-called
"static display".
"Static display" is one agreed form of elimination under the
Treaty. In accordance with the terms of the Treaty, such
missiles and launchers must be rendered inoperative an4 the
location designated. The sides are permitted on-site
inspection to assure that the requirements to render the
systems inoperative have been met.
Under these provisions we may anticipate an exhibit of U.S. PIZ
and GLM at such places as the Smithsonian Air and Space
Museum. Naturally, missiles on static display will not have
nuclear warheads.
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Why does not the Treaty and its Protocols permit inspection of
$S-25 launch canisters to ensure that they in fact, contain
55-25 missiles and not the equally compatible 55-20?
At the Soviet missile final assembly facility at Votkinsk, U.S.
inspectors will have the right to measure, and image all 55-25
canisters exiting through the Votkinsk portal to ensure that
they do not contain an SS-20. Eight times a year on a random
basis, U.S. inspectors will have the right to view the
interiors of SS-25 canisters to ensure they do not contain
Treaty-limited SS-20 missiles. In addition, U.S. inspectors
will also have the right to weigh, measure and image all
vehicles that exit through the portal that are large enough and
heavy enough to contain an SS-20 and that the Soviets declare
not to contain a MEM
All 85-20 bases, including those that are converted to 88-25
bases after November 1, will be subject to on-site inspection
for 13 years after the Treaty enters into force. We will be
able to measure the SS-25 canisters at these bases. In
addition, we can use radiation detection devices to further
ascertain that such canisters at formally declared 88-20 bases
do not contain SS-20s.
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Why does not the Treaty and its Protocols require an exchange
of engineering specifications so that it can be verified that
eliminated missiles are operational systems and not factory
rejects?
The data exchanged in the Data NOU is sufficient to effectively
identify each missile without compromising sensitive
information. All INF missiles no matter what their status
(deployed or nondeployed) must be eliminated. U.S. inspectors
will be present to monitor such elimination.
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Why does the Treaty and its Protocols fail to cover all
ground-based Soviet missiles in Europe which are capable of use
at intermediate range?
Why does the Treaty and its Protocols fail to cover all
ground-based Soviet missiles in Europe which are capable of use
at shorter-range?
The INF Treaty covers those ground launched missiles with a
range of 500 to 5500 km. There is no limitation in the Treaty
on systems of a range greater than 5500 km which are being
addressed in the START negotiations.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2913/10/25: CIA-RDP90M00005R000300080001-5 c.-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/25: CIA7RDP90M00005R000300080001-5
:
Why does Article XIV (non circumvention) not make it expressly
clear that anti-tactical ballistic missile systems (ATBM) are
not considered a circumvention?
There is no need for a specific exemption for ATBM in Article
XIV, which, in any case, is not a "non circumvention" article
and does not add any new obligation to the Treaty. Article
VII, para 3 permits development of such systems ("If a GLBM is
of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter
objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not
be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this
Treaty apply.")
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2913/10/25: CIA-RDP90M00005R000300080001-5