A CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT: ON SOVIET LEADERS, THE "ARROGANCE OF SUPERPOWERS," AND THE "IMPOSSIBLE" U.S. ELECTORAL PROCESS

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• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
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STAT
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OCA 3742-88
Institute for
Soviet
and East European
Studies
OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES
VOLUME II, NO. 3
143
A Conversation With Senator J. William Fulbright:
On Soviet Leaders, the `Arrogance of Superpowers,"
and the "Impossible" U.S. Electoral Process
University of Miami
Graduate School
of International Studies
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Institute for Soviet and
East European Studies
Graduate School of International Studies
University of Miami
The Institute for Soviet and East European
Studies (ISEES) coordinates a multidiscipli-
nary program of analytical, policy-relevant studies
of the foreign and domestic policies of the Soviet
Union and the East European nations. Created in
1986, the Institute is designed to promote instruc-
tion and advanced research on Soviet and East
European policies, with emphasis on the Third
World in general and Latin America, the Carib-
bean, and the Middle East in particular; to coor-
dinate and promote cooperative teaching and
training endeavors with universities in the Carib-
bean, Latin America, and other foreign countries;
and to disseminate information and analyses
among the academic, business, and policymaking
communities, as well as among a wide public
audience in the United States and abroad. Through
its studies of specific East-West and East-South is-
sues presented in the Institute's Occasional Papers,
the Working Papers series, and ISEES Meeting
Reports, the Institute sponsors dialogue and
debate on key issues of national security and
foreign policy. The Institute for Soviet and East
European Studies closely collaborates with the In-
stitute of Interamerican Studies (HAS) and the Mid-
dle East Studies Institute (MESI), both of the
Graduate School of International Studies.
Members of the Editorial Board are.
Jiri Valenta, Professor of Political Science and
Director of the Institute for Soviet and East
European Studies, Graduate School of Internation-
al Studies, University of Miami. Chairman of the
Editorial Board.
Vernon Aspaturian, Evan Pugh Professor of
Political Science and Director of the Slavic and
Soviet Language and Area Center, Pennsylvania
State University.
Richard Bard, "Viewpoint" Editor, The Miami
Herald.
Ralph Clem, Professor of International Rela-
tions, Florida International University.
Melvin Croan, Professor of Political Science,
University of Wisconsin.
John Cunningham, Senior Research Associate,
Institute for Soviet and East European Studies,
Graduate School of International Studies, Univer-
sity of Miami.
HerbertJ. Ellison, Chairman of Russian and East
European Studies and Professor of History, Univer-
sity of Washington.
Charles Gati, Professor of Political Science,
Union College and Columbia University.
Jerry Hough, James B. Duke Professor of Politi-
cal Science and Public Policy Studies, Duke
University, and Senior Fellow, The Brookings In-
stitution.
Andrzej Korbonski, Director, Center for Russian
& East European Studies, Professor of Political
Science, University of California, Los Angeles.
Anthony P. Maingot, Professor of Sociology,
Florida International University.
Ambassador Ambler H. Moss, Jr., Dean,
Graduate School of International Studies, Univer-
sity of Miami.
Haim Shaked, Professor of Middle East Studies
and Director of the Middle East Studies Institute,
Graduate School of International Studies, Univer-
sity of Miami.
Jaime Suchlicki, Professor of History and Direc-
tor of the Institute of Interamerican Studies,
Graduate School of International Studies, Univer-
sity of Miami.
Jan F. Triska, Professor of Political Science, Stan-
ford University.
Virginia Valenta, Senior Research Associate, In-
stitute for Soviet and East European Studies,
Graduate School of International Studies, Univer-
sity of Miami.
Editorial Consultant Richard Pipes, Frank B.
Baird, Jr. Professor of History, Harvard University
and former Director of East European and Soviet
Affairs, National Security Council.
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A Conversation With Senator J. William Fulbright:
On Soviet Leaders,
the `Arrogance of Superpowers," and
the "Impossible" U.S. Electoral Process
Institute for
Soviet and East European Studies
Occasional Paper Series, Volume II, No. 3
Graduate School of International Studies
University of Miami
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ISEES Major
Donor List
for the academic year of
1988-1989
? IRVING KERN
? JORGE MAS CANOSA
? NORWEGIAN AMERICAN CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE
? TED RUBEL
? HERBERT LEBOYER
? IRVING SCHWARTZ
? ELLEN AND MENDELL SELIG
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A Note from the Editor
I T IS A GREAT PLEASURE to bring to our
readers another ISEES occasional paper, the
seventh in the series, based on a dialogue with
Senator J. William Fulbright, a distinguished
member of the Visiting Committee of the
Graduate School of International Studies
(GSIS) and a great University of Miami sup-
porter. Following this editorial comment, GSIS
Dean Ambler H. Moss, Jr. will introduce
Senator Fulbright and describe the sig-
nificance of his service to the nation. Here I
would restate ISEES objectives in publishing
the occasional papers and thank all those who
have made their publication possible.
The primary objective of the Occasional
Papers Series is to sponsor bipartisan dialogue
on key issues of foreign affairs and U.S. nation-
al security policies, particularly as they con-
cern East/West and East/South relations. In
this interest, ISEES has organized several
debates and conferences on timely issues--the
Geneva Summit of 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev's
perestroika, terrorism, conflict in Nicaragua,
the war in Afghanistan. Richard Pipes, Jerry
Hough, Norman Podhoretz, William Maynes,
Robert Leiken, Susan Kaufman Purcell, Arturo
Cruz, Alfredo Cesar, Francisco Lopez, Mark
Falcoff, Ambassador Harry W. Shlaudeman,
Margaret Crahan, Wayne Smith, Ambler Moss
and Vernon Aspaturian are some of the
prominent speakers whose views are featured
in this series.
With the help of supporters in Miami, ISEES
has sponsored meetings for university stu-
dents and faculty and the community at large
with nationally prominent figures including
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Congressman Dante
Fascell, Ambassador Vernon A. Walters,
General William E. Odom, and Ambassador
Jack F. Matlock, Jr. Their presentations and
dialogues with ISEES students have provided
the material for the occasional papers. The
fifth paper in the series describes the Council
on Foreign Relations group visit with Mikhail
Gorbachev in Moscow in 1987, as reported by
one of those present, John Temple Swing, Ex-
ecutive Vice President of the Council.
The occasional papers have generated
positive response and dialogue in the local
press- The Miami Herald, 7heMiamiNews-
as well as in the national press-7he
Washington Post. The sixth in the series, "The
Strategic Significance of Afghanistan's Strug-
gle for Freedom" (April 1988), is based on
General Odom's address at an ISEES con-
ference on Afghanistan, cosponsored by
ISEES sister Institute of Middle Eastern Studies.
We were very glad to see excerpts from this
paper published in The Washington Post on
May 6. 1988. Because of the ongoing great in-
terest in Afghanistan, we reprint that column
here.
As we are proud of the accomplishments of
this series, we regret its shortcomings. We
regret that we failed to identify former Senator
Charles Mathias, Jr. and Harold Brown in the
photograph that appeared in Occasional
Paper No. 5, "Impressions of Gorbachev", by
John Temple Swing. I wish to correct the error
in my introduction to General Odom's paper,
where Dr. Odom is identified as one of only
three Soviet specialists to have served as a
senior member of the National Security Coun-
cil (NSC). Other former academic specialists
on the Soviet Union who have served in senior
positions at the NSC are Zbigniew Brzezinski
and Richard Pipes. Jack Matlock, Helmut Son-
nenfeldt, William G. Hyland, Fritz Ermarth,
and Ty Cobb are the other distinguished Soviet
specialists who have served in this capacity.
Publication of the ISEES Occasional Papers
Series-like the ISEES Special Studies, the
ISEES Working Papers, and the ISEES
Reports-would be impossible without the
financial and moral support of an expanding
group of donors whose names are listed on
the cover preceding this comment.
I am indebted to GSIS Dean Ambler Moss
for helping to support this project; to Univer-
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sity of Miami President Edward T. Foote, II, for "Viewpoint" editor, The Miami Herald.
his encouragement and assistance in arrang- Without their diligent work, this and other
ing the visit of his father-in-law Senator J. Wil- publications would not have become pos-
liam Fulbright; and, for their continued sible.
encouragement, to Dr. Rita Bornstein, Vice
President of Development, and Dr. William
Butler, Vice President of Student Affairs. I also
acknowledge the dedicated work of three
Jiri Valenta
members of the ISEES Editorial Board-john
Cunningham, ISEES Senior Research As- Chairman of the
sociate, Virginia Valenta, and Richard Bard, Editorial Board
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Introduction
J ? WILLIAM FULBRIGHT is one of the most
distinguished men to have served in the
United States Senate. His education includes
three years at oxford on a Rhodes scholarship
and a law degree earned at George
Washington University. After joining the law
faculty of the University of Arkansas, he be-
came that university's president. Fulbright was
elected to the House of Representatives in
1942 and to the Senate in 1944, where he
served for thirty years. He became Chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
1959, and held that position for the next fifteen
years.
Senator Fulbright is remembered for his
principled criticism of the Johnson
administration's policy in Vietnam. Although
Fulbright had introduced the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution in 1964 at President Johnson's re-
quest, in 1965 he began to reevaluate the
desirability of the U.S. presence in Vietnam,
and, as the conflict escalated, he became in-
creasingly critical of the administration's be-
havior there. In 1968, he launched a series of
hearings which determined that the ad-
ministration had misled Congress in order to
facilitate passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolu-
tion. His powerful voice lent credence to the
anti-war movement of the late 1960s and early
1970s, and helped to popularize the senti-
ments that led to the withdrawal of U.S.
military forces from Vietnam in 1975.
It may be argued, however, that his greatest
contribution to U.S. foreign policy is his spon-
sorship of the famous scholarship program
that bears his name. Since its inception in
1946, the Fulbright Scholarship Program has
promoted and financed over 160,000 educa-
tional exchanges between the United States
and many other countries. In the words of
Ronald McCallum, Master of Pembroke Col-
lege, Oxford, "Senator Fulbright is responsible
for the largest and most significant movement
of scholars across the face of this earth since
the fall of Constantinople."
Senator Fulbright has authored several
books, including the best-seller, The Ar-
rogance of Power (1967). He has received
many awards, including an honorary Ph.D.
from the University of Miami in 1987. He
recently served as a member of the Commit-
tee on the Constitutional System, a group of
eminent American citizens who met to recon-
sider the U.S. Constitution on its bicentennial
anniversary.
During a recent visit to his son-in-law,
University of Miami President Edward T. Foote
II, Senator Fulbright graciously accepted an
invitation from Professor Jiri Valenta and me
to participate in a seminar sponsored by the
Institute for Soviet and East European Studies
(ISEES) at the University of Miami's Graduate
School of International Studies (GSIS). In at-
tendance were students from Dr. Valenta's
Soviet Foreign Policy seminar, among them
ISEES senior research associates Alvaro
Taboada, John Cunningham (editor of the
ISEES Occasional Papers Series), Ali Sheikh
and Craig Simon, and ISEES research fellows
Andrea Ewart and Roberto Lozano. Also
present was Professor Ralph Magnus of the
United States Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California.
The conversation began with a discussion
of Senator Fulbright's first-hand impressions
of the Soviet leaders he has known. It
progressed to a wider consideration of ways
in which the features of the U.S. political sys-
tem influence this country's foreign policy
decision-making process. The Senator's
recent service on the Committee on the Con-
stitutional System may have influenced his ob-
servations, as many of his comments during
the seminar reflect a passionate commitment
to the improvement of the structure and func-
tions of the U.S. government.
Readers familiar with the ISEES Occasional
Papers Series will have little difficulty in dis-
tinguishing Senator Fulbright's views from
those of past contributors such as Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Dante Fascell, and William E.
Odom. However, they will also find the
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Senator's remarks to be balanced (for he holds
both superpowers, in their arrogance, to be
responsible for the difficulties which have
characterized their postwar rivalry), and
bipartisan (for he blames the American politi-
cal system, rather than either of its parties, for
the shortcomings of the policy process in the
post-World War II era).
I am delighted that the ideas of this living
legend have been brought to publication in an
ISEES Occasional Paper.
Ambler H. Moss, Jr.
Dean
Graduate School of International Studies
University of Miami
February 16, 1988
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The Soviet Union and
the United States
S ENATOR FULBRIGHT: The most essential
difference between the U.S. and Soviet
political structures has to do with the distribu-
tion of decision-making power. In the Soviet
Union, decisions are always made, not by
great masses of people, but by some person,
or a very small group of persons. The Polit-
buro has something like twelve or thirteen
members. But the leader is Gorbachev. His
opinion on an issue is decisive. That is what
the Soviets call "democratic centralism."
In our democracy, everybody is supposed to
participate. However, we have learned
through the Iran-Contra hearings that the
president has been an overwhelmingly
decisive figure, advised by just a few people
in the National Security Council, among them
former CIA Director, William Casey. The press
just this morning has revealed that Casey had
a great influence on the President. [Excerpts
from Bob Woodward's Veil: The Secret Wars
of the CIA, 1981-1987 had been published in
major newspapers that day.] Mr. Casey's
opinions about these matters were extremely
influential because President Reagan has had
such little experience in government. Some
very harsh comments have emerged: For ex-
ample, Mr. Casey allegedly said that President
Reagan had admitted leaving show business
for a career in government because he was not
a good enough movie actor. Strangely, there
has been an attitude in this country that, if one
cannot do anything else, one can become a
politician. I used to run into that sort of think-
ing when I was a professor. Despite their lack
of qualifications, often these adventitious
leaders are entrusted with our major political
decisions.
Now, in regard to U.S.-Soviet relations, I
have been condemned as what is called a
peacenik. I have always thought that we
should make more conciliatory gestures to the
Russians. I was chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee for fifteen years. Mr.
Khrushchev spoke to the committee in 1959,
not long after I became chairman. He had odd
mannerisms, quite different from those to
which we were accustomed. Khrushchev
came to our committee because the Speaker
of the House [John McCormick] so objected to
his presence that he would not permit a joint
session to be convened, although it was cus-
tomary to do so for visitors of such impor-
tance.
Dr. Valenta: would you mind giving us a
little insight into Khrushchev's unusual man-
nerisms?
Senator Fulbright: You will remember the
way he pounded his shoe on the table at the
United Nations. Well, he was also very gruff in
his approach to people, very blunt. He looked
his part, you know; he was a rough-appearing
fellow. However, I found him rather attractive.
He was so like some of the hillbillies I grew up
with in the Ozark Mountains. And he was
quite frank and outspoken.
The refusal to allow him to speak before a
joint session was an insult to Khrushchev.
After all, he did represent an important
country, and, in itself, that violation of
protocol was bad. He came to our committee
because people from the State Department
had called and said that they were embar-
rassed. It was not the fault of the State Depart-
ment, but rather the Speaker of the House,
who was a strongly confirmed anti-com-
munist. So I invited Khrushchev to the Senate
Committee, that being the next best thing.
Khrushchev had spoken to the Press Club
that day for two hours and was scheduled to
arrive at five o'clock. My office was nearby,
and so I strolled over there at about five
minutes to five. Mr. Khrushchev was already
there, eager to get to work. He came with Mr.
Troyanovskii, his interpreter, and perhaps one
other person. Khrushchev was not sur-
rounded by anything resembling the corps of
secret service agents that usually accompanies
one of our heads of state. As to his speech, he
had prepared nothing. He spoke extem-
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poraneously, very spontaneously, with a great
deal of spirit and mirth. Mr. Troyanovskii was
a magnificent interpreter. Having grown up in
Washington, where his father had been the
Soviet ambassador, he spoke English as well
as he spoke Russian.
The interview was reported by the Commit-
tee on U.S.-Soviet Relations. We did not have
an official stenographer at the time, which was
considered appropriate under these cir-
cumstances. Much later, one of the staff
transcribed the session for publication. The
whole discourse is very interesting, but espe-
cially Khrushchev's statement that he knew
we could get along well together if the United
States would just recognize that a new com-
munity-a new kind of society--had appeared
on the international scene. He meant, of
course, the society born of the Russian Revolu-
tion. If we were willing to accept Soviet
legitimacy, he said, there would be no
problem in getting along, and our differences
could be negotiated and solved. The clear im-
plication was that there was no possibility of
conciliation or negotiation of a future settle-
ment without our recognition of their
legitimacy at the outset.
That theme has been restated by Mr.
Gorbachev's group and it has been expressed
less officially by Russian commentators. To
me, this indicates a feeling on their part that
the United States is not willing to accept Soviet
legitimacy, or to deal with the Soviet leader-
ship as its political equal. Khrushchev had
said, rather dramatically, "You do not have to
like us. You do not have to approve of us." He
pointed to the wart on his cheek and said, "I
do not approve of it. I do not like it. But I have
learned to live with it."
I think that the phenomenon illustrated so
graphically above is a very significant aspect
of Russian thinking. The psychology of the
Soviet-American relationship has always been
provocative. We Americans have always had
a supercilious attitude, never accepting the
Soviets as equals. During his first press con-
ference as U.S. President, Mr. Reagan
denounced the Soviet leadership as being
capable of any crime to achieve their pur-
poses. He later described the Soviet Union as
"the focus of evil." Reagan could not have
been more derogatory in his statements about
the Russians, although in Geneva he did make
a gesture toward correcting that tendency.
Now we see a very serious attempt in the
Soviet Union to reform the economy. This will
inevitably displace some old-timers who have
been marking time, and who have grown ac-
customed to certain privileges. They will
present great opposition. Reform is always
touch and go. Any serious reformer will run
into that problem. If he is not successful in a
couple of years he is very likely to be sup-
planted-the same way Khrushchev was.
I think that we missed a great opportunity
with Khrushchev. By not treating him as an
equal, we missed a chance to go forward. We
had some real progress, such as the Partial
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963. This agree-
ment came as a result of what was, in my
opinion, the first conciliatory gesture that we
made to the Soviet Union: Jack Kennedy's
speech at the American University in June
1963. The speech was widely reported and
has been discussed in several books. In it,
Kennedy recognized the Russian people; he
even made some tribute to their history and
what they have gone through, things that are
very sensitive to the Russians. They appreciate
it when others recognize the difficulties they
have had. As you know, about two months
after this speech, we signed the Test Ban
Treaty. I went to Moscow for the signing.
There was a big celebration and we were all
in the best of humor.
Valenta: Were you able toget any sense that
some of the Soviet marshals did not support
the treaty, or that Khrushchev's removal was
then being cooked up?
Fulbright: No. I do not speak Russian, and I
was not that intimate with them. I had no sense
of their inner political machinations. I was just
so pleased that we were signing the treaty. It
was the first gesture, and, I thought, a great
step forward. No doubt there was something
brewing. There are a lot of people in Russia--
just like we have Mr. [Richard] Perle here in
Washington--who do not want agreements.
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The agreement did not please everybody, but
Khrushchev also had difficulties with his
economy that could have been more respon-
sible for his colleagues' unrest.
Valenta: When you were there, did you
sense that Leonid Brezhnev was important
enough to become the next General Secretary?
Fulbright: I did not get an impression of
that. Brezhnev sat across the table, but I had
no idea he was going to be the successor. I was
an amateur, a Senator. I was representing
Arkansas. All Senators are amateurs in foreign
relations. We are not experts. Details of the
kind to which you refer in your question about
Brezhnev traditionally were handled by the
State Department. This is another subject in
which I am interested: the nature of our
government, especially our electoral system.
The lack of continuity in the Senate is a great
disadvantage for our country. I think that it is
deplorable. None of us is really an expert in
foreign affairs, although I have been involved
a little longer than others. At least I had the ex-
perience of living in England, and I spent a
year in Austria when I was young. Perhaps I
knew far more than the average Senator, but I
had not been to Russia, and was not an expert
on Russia. I was far more knowledgeable on
England, France and those countries with
which I had had first-hand relations.
Valenta: You said you met Brezhnev. How
did he strike you when you dealt with him
later on?
Fulbright: Well, he was not as attractive to
me as Khrushchev. He was a rather mushy in-
dividual. The only time I saw him later on,
when he came to this country, he got a little ir-
ritated.
Valenta: He became a good friend of
Richard Nixon.
Fulbright: Yes. That's right. Returning to my
second encounter with Brezhnev, at first he
was very pleasant. I had asked him to lunch at
the Senate, but the administration vetoed that
for security reasons. (They were very con-
cerned about everybody's security, and they
are even more so now.) So the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee met him for lunch at the guest
quarters at Blair House, which was considered
to be more secure. Anyway, Brezhnev was
there, and two of my colleagues who were
deeply interested in the Jewish emigration
problem-Jacob Davits and Clifford Case-both
attacked him on it. He would say that there
were only a thousand or five thousand or so
people whose requests to emigrate had been
turned down. The Senators challenged him,
saying that this was not true, that he was not
accurate, that he was misrepresenting the
numbers. Brezhnev finally got irritated and
sent one of his assistants to get the official
figures. A red leather booklet was brought in,
but that didn't settle anything-they had quite
a little exchange. Brezhnev was very annoyed.
Finally, he said, "I came here to make things
good, not to have a quarrel," and that ended
the conversation. The Jewish emigration issue
was a big problem; it destroyed detente. I
guess you are familiar with the Jackson-Vanik
amendment in the trade bill: It grew out of that
same problem. This issue has always troubled
our relations with the Soviet Union.
Question: Did anybody ask Brezhnev
about his wife? You know, she was reported to
be Jewish. .
Fulbright: I did not ask him.
Valenta: was he friendly on the Jewish
issue, or did he resent it?
Fulbright: He resented the challenge to his
truthfulness.
Valenta: There was a large emigration, if
one looks at it objectively.
Fulbright: Emigration went up sharply until
the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The Soviets
are very sensitive, and when Henry Jackson
attempted to force them publicly to comply
with U.S. legislative demands, they im-
mediately resented it. Emigration dropped to
practically nothing. It had gotten quite high,
around 50,000 per year-much higher than
ever before. But once the Jackson amendment
was added to the trade bill, emigration plum-
meted. This defeated not only Jackson's pur-
pose, but also the whole program of detente,
which thereafter gradually unraveled.
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Valenta: Was it your feeling that Brezhnev
was a collective- leadership man? You said
that Khrushchev was his own man, accom-
panied by.just one translator. Was Brezhnev
there with others, or by himse
Fulbright: Under Stalin, the Soviet Union
went through a period of extreme dictator-
ship, but I think that now, the Soviet leaders
are subject to some collegial restraints.
Brezhnev wrote articles and made speeches
about his collegial government, saying that he
was responsible to his colleagues on the Polit-
buro and the Central Committee. There were
various estimates, you know, that he could not
make decisions alone. And when [Premier
Alexei] Kosygin came to meet President
Johnson, there was a public statement that
Kosygin was not authorized to talk about
some of the things that Johnson wanted to talk
about.
Valenta: What else can you say about the
differences in personality and style?
Fulbright: Khrushchev was always active--
talking and joking. He always had a lot of ear-
thy jokes to tell. I wish I could remember all
of them.
Valenta: Some of them cannot be trans-
lated.
Fulbright: He was like some of our
politicians, very good at anecdotal jokes. He
was very spontaneous, a buoyant kind of fel-
low; neither Kosygin nor Brezhnev had his
spirit. Brezhnev's language seemed to be a lit-
tle more polished than Khrushchev's.
john Cunningham: 1 am interested in how
the United States can influence Soviet domes-
tic politics at the top. Do you think that the
Reagan administration is dealing with
Gorbachev's situation correctly? What can be
done, and is it in our interest, in any case, to
support Gorbachev?
Fulbright: I would think so. He strikes me
as a man who is very eager to make agree-
ments. I was very impressed by his unilateral
suspension of all nuclear testing. To me that
was very constructive. I do not understand
why we did not respond and do the same, un-
less we are just determined to go forward with
the arms race. There is a theory that many
people want to do just that. I tend to think Mr.
Perle is one of their leaders. As they see it, the
United States is so much richer than the Soviet
Union, that if we just keep up the pressure in
the arms race, the Soviet economy will col-
lapse before ours will. Then, supposedly, the
Soviets would do whatever we like. In other
words, if we keep up the contest the Soviets
will become subservient to our wishes. I think
that is totally unreal. There is, of course, no
world without risk, but if we go the other way
and reduce our expenditures on nuclear
weapons, the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI), and so forth, we can allow our economy
to grow. Yes, the Soviets could become
stronger and even more formidable op-
ponents if their attitudes do not change. These
changes take a long time, but I believe that
people's attitudes will change. Such a
generalization can be criticized, but I am cer-
tain that neither superpower will ever be able
to deprive the other of the capacity for un-
limited destruction with nuclear weapons. To
keep building more and more of them ac-
complishes nothing.
The only alternative is to try to change at-
titudes, to change people's will. Mr. Reagan
himself has changed, in talking about the need
to increase trust and confidence in each
other's purposes and attitudes. Even Mr.
Nixon was a great advocate of what he called
"confidence-building measures." In the con-
text of military might, I happen to think that
exchanges and communication are the most
efficient confidence-building measures. There
are some disparities in certain categories, but
much of the argument at the time of SALT I
was misinformed. Senator Jackson made a
great to-do that there were certain categories
of weapons whereof they had more than we;
but there were others of which we had more
than they. Jackson simply could not stand
being outnumbered in any category. The two
superpowers have sufficient equality to deter
each other. The theory of deterrence is
guaranteed by the Anti-Ballistic Missile System
Treaty (ABM Treaty). The significance of the
ABM Treaty is the recognition therein by both
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countries that there is no effective defense
against nuclear war. In other words, the whole
population of each side is hostage to the other.
I view this as an efficient deterrent.
Valenta: But how do we know that the
Soviets accept our concept of deterrence?
Fulbright: Neither side is going risk a war
with the other as long as this parity exists.
Now, neither side, even in its wildest mo-
ments, is planning to attack the other. The
trouble with SDI is that, in appearing to build
a defense against nuclear attack, deterrence
would no longer be effective. SDI is unsettling.
It destroys the basic theory of the ABM treaty.
As long as we have deterrence, we can af-
ford to respond to Gorbachev's offer of a test
moratorium. This would be a significant ges-
ture and a tremendous boost to his political
prestige at home. Perhaps he is having trouble
with domestic critics who complain about his
reform because it eliminates some people's
jobs and makes the others work harder. An im-
portant foreign policy success would help to
offset domestic hardships. That is politics; in
an imperfect world, one thing offsets another.
When I represented Arkansas, if I did a
good job representing the cotton growers, the
chicken growers, and the soybean industry,
then I had a certain leeway to take a position
on the Vietnam war that my constituents did
not necessarily approve. I could still survive,
at least briefly. I could survive because they
forgave what they considered my deficiency
and my lack of understanding of Vietnam or
Russia. I was good at the other things. That is
the way it works. I think it would work the
same way with Mr. Gorbachev. If he is suc-
cessful in his relations with us, his constituents
will forgive him for being so mean about the
reforms at home. That is a generalization.
Nobody knows for sure how far he can go.
Collegiality does affect Gorbachev, as it af-
fected Mr. Khrushchev, who, in frustration, did
a foolish thing by putting missiles in Cuba.
When we forced them out, his failure embar-
rassed the country. Then they got rid of him.
That was the last straw.
Professor Ralph Magnus: Do you think that
the Soviets in Afghanistan are making more
mistakes than we did in Vietnam?
Fulbright: I sure do, and I think they are very
embarrassed. Their Afghan campaign is very
expensive, and it has cost them a great deal of
support, even among their own allies. Nobody
approves of it. The British found Afghanistan
to be an ungovernable group of tribes. I do not
think the Soviets are going to get a great deal
of profit out of their Afghan policy. I think it is
a mistake.
Q: Are they are going to leave?
Fulbright: I think that they will. If we make
progress, if there is a change in attitude be-
tween us and the Russians, it is much more
likely. If they think that they are going to have
to stay fully armed, if they fear a real war with
us, then they are going to keep all the assets
they can. This pattern we see of relaxation in
their human rights policies, the domestic
reforms, and all of that, in many ways depends
upon progress with us. Nixon began the first
period of detente, and it looked as if it would
develop. This one might improve. Psychologi-
cally, it would be the natural thing.
Valenta: Concretely, what can we do to
help Gorbachev? He has talked about Af-
ghanistan being a `bleeding wound' in Soviet
foreign policy, but, so far, we have seen no
sign of a Soviet retreat.
Fulbright: As I have already indicated, I
think that we ought to move much more
vigorously in the field of arms control. I grant
that this is difficult. Other, less sensitive, con-
fidence-building measures are joint ventures.
In 1972, aside from SALT I and the ABM Treaty,
a lot of joint projects were set in motion. One
that made progress was linking up in space.
These measures created an attitude that we
could change the way we viewed one another.
But other projects were abandoned, such as
joint research projects in the fields of pollution
and medicine. We even had a commission to
rewrite our history books so that each side did
not represent the other in such a negative
fashion. You know, it is traditional for a na-
tion to teach bad things about rival countries
to its young. I remember when I was in school
reading histories of Waterloo and the
Napoleonic period. In comparing them, I was
struck by the extent to which the authors'
nationalities affected their frames of reference,
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and the ways in which they treated the period.
And I suspect that their versions of the
Napoleonic Wars were entirely different from
the real conflicts that took place. There was no
objectivity in the recording of historical fact.
The same is true of the manner in which the
Russians and Americans have depicted one
another.
Q. Do you think that the U.S. should link
future progress on arms control with Af-
ghanistan?
Fulbright: One cannot link everything, as a
practical matter. The main thing is to try to
make progress with Russia per se. Nixon
managed detente when we were in Vietnam
doing all sorts of things of which they did not
approve. The Soviets did not link arms control
progress to Vietnam at that time. I do not know
why we should draw linkages to Afghanistan
now. It is proper for us to voice disapproval,
but there is a big difference between voicing
disapproval and refusing to do anything in
other areas. We have to move forward on the
central issues. To be sure, it is difficult. I do not
think that one can expect a sudden change as
a result of some magnificent treaty that solves
all the differences. That is why I keep em-
phasizing the long term. Of course, most
people are not interested in the long term.
They want solutions to materialize right now.
But the long term is much surer to bring
results. There is a real value in the pursuit of
joint ventures over a period of years, putting
aside other differences.
The joint ventures that I like are education-
al exchanges. They are not as sensitive as
negotiations on arms control. We have had
good exchange agreements with other com-
munist countries, like Yugoslavia and now the
People's Republic of China. The first Fulbright
Program in China was suspended when we
did not recognize the Chinese Revolution in
1949. It has since been reinstated. After Af-
ghanistan, however, Mr. Carter said that there
would be no more agreements with the Rus-
sians. Yet even though Carter boycotted the
Olympics, imposed a trade embargo, and
suspended wheat sales, a very small exchange
program continued: the agreement we had
under IREX [International Council on
Research and Exchange]. It was so small it got
overlooked, I guess. It slipped through. IREX
is funded partly by Fulbright programs, and
partly by others. It is a very good program, but
it is much too small. As I have already said,
there are a number of people in Russia who
were once students here under the Fulbright
program. We have had some of the best, I am
often told. The people best informed about
Russia in this country are the people who have
been on the Fulbright Program. They have
lived as the Russians do, under conditions that
our diplomats and officials have never ex-
perienced. The confidence-building ap-
proach, typified by these exchange programs,
develops a background which then makes
possible more sensitive agreements in other
areas. That is my theory.
Andrea Ewart.? I certainly agree with your
general point that contact between societies
and cultures diminishes the possibility of war.
At the same time, the U.S.-Soviet rivalry is
being extended into the Third World. In my
interpretation, what h. appened In Vietnam,
and what is happening in Afghanistan, is that
the superpowers are contending for spheres of
influence. Do you think that this system of
contacts can be effective in regard to this com-
petition?
Fulbright: I think that you are quite right.
We have each been contending with the other.
We began it with our aid program after World
War II. We had money, and everybody else
was broke, so we began to distribute aid in a
big way. I was in favor of it. We had the Point
Four program under Truman--basically an
educational program to teach people the most
modern methods of production. Rather than
give them wheat and finished goods, we
wanted to teach them how to provide for
themselves. It was a good program, perhaps
the best we have ever had. Gradually, we
began to support all kinds of people. The Mar-
shall Plan was a classic success, but it dealt
with the highly developed, civilized countries
whose industries had been ruined by the war.
All they needed was an injection of capital to
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restart their machinery. They had the people
and the know-how. They knew how to
rebuild if they had the means. It worked very
well.
Well, the Russians could not match us at that
time. They did not have the funds and could
not do much. But they did have the Chinese
Revolution, which was something they hoped
would keep going, winning more converts to
communism. We were scared to death by
what we called the "yellow peril." This fear
stemmed from our traditional attitudes. All this
competition will continue. I do not expect that
we will get over that sense of competing for
the allegiance of other countries. Each super-
power believes that its system of organizing
society is the better one. Mr. Khrushchev
bragged that his socialist system would out-
perform our capitalist one. He went to great
lengths in his. speech before the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee to say that we had
misinterpreted his comment about burying us.
We had taken it to mean that he was going to
drop bombs on us. His interpretation was that
his system would outperform ours. I think he
meant it. He used to brag about how socialism
was going to give people an opportunity, how
his country would produce more goulash for
its people than we could for our people.
Q: Does Gorbachev's economic reform
prove that even the Soviet leaders now realize
that some elements of capitalist economics are
indispensable to the further success of the
Soviet system?
Fulbright: Well, I don't realize this, and I am
not altogether sure that they have reached this
conclusion. Consider the performance in
Hungary and the change in China. The
Chinese are beginning to make some
progress. What we do is not very credible to
them. But what they are doing, I think, is very
impressive.
Capitalism has its faults, too. I have seen
suffering here. We are having our troubles,
and they are not isolated incidents. We have
begun deregulating everything, which I think
is stupid. A great and complex society cannot
be run on the principle of "every man for him-
self." You cannot use a "back to the jungle"
procedure. There has to be some government
intervention. All the best-run countries I know
of use government intervention. Look around
the world and observe which countries seem
to be performing well for their citizens. The
reason that they are performing well is not dis-
cussed in the papers. The only states one reads
about in the papers are those that are having
trouble. And there is an awful lot written about
the United States recently, especially at its
highest levels of government.
Q. Do you have any comments on the ex-
cerpts from Mr. Woodward's book, which was
released recently, or on the situation with Ad-
miral Poindexter and Colonel North?
Fulbright: Our government, it seems to me,
is putting up a very bad show. I have always
thought that a government's example is far
more persuasive than its propaganda. No mat-
ter what the Voice of America or the U.S. In-
formation Agency (USIA) says, foreigners
look at what is going on here and they cannot
believe it. USIA propaganda is not effective.
We have an enormous propaganda machine.
The government spends ten times more on
propaganda than on exchanges, but I think
that the exchange programs have done ten
times more good than the propaganda
programs. Opinions differ, of course, but I
think that our public relations performance
creates an image of our country conditions
that is far worse than the reality. Our national
government is not as well run as the rest of the
country is. Most of the states are pretty well
run. My state is very well run. We have not had
a real scandal--even a rumor of a scandal-in
fifty years, or anything comparable to what
comes out in The Washington Post every day
in reference to the national government.
Q: You mentioned the importance to the
rest of the world of exchange programs. From
my travels around the world, I gather that
many people know the name Fulbright, even
though they may not know the English lan-
guage. They know a number of things about
America, and Fulbright is one of them. I am
curious, given all the benefits that Fulbright
programs and similar exchange programs
have brought to the world, as to why
Americans are woefully ignorant of the rest of
the world.
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Fulbright: They are woefully ignorant. It
only reflects the fact that we have not given
any priority to education. Generally, basic
public education is deplorable in this country.
Not only is the level of education very bad in
our public schools, the Fulbright Program has
reached very few people. Only 55,000
Americans out of 250 million have par-
ticipated. A number of them, however, have
become what I consider influential people.
They are teachers, particularly, and they cer-
tainly bring a different attitude to their stu-
dents. Some of them are turning up in politics
and business as well. When one looks at a
smaller country like Japan, one sees how
many very influential people at the highest
levels have been in this program. They took
full advantage because they needed it. We do
not need it in the same way. Financially, our
students are much better off. The Japanese
were down and out after the war. In 1953, their
best students took advantage of it. They came
here, and now they have become leaders in
business, academia, and government. It
makes a big impression there. In many of the
smaller countries--Norway, Finland, Sweden-
-one sees a far bigger percentage of Fulbright
participants at the higher echelons than one
does here.
They are more interested. Theirs are older
cultures; ours is younger, only two hundred
years old this year. Most others are one
thousand, two thousand, and, in the case of
Japan, four thousand years old. That is the big
difference. We are a young, rich country.
People once could get rich here without any
education. They cannot do that in Japan
without going to a major university. So there
is a great incentive for discipline and educa-
tion in those countries.
Also, we have such a disparate ethnic and
cultural mix; our whole political environment
is different.
U.S. Presidential Elec-
tions
T HIS RAISES ANOTHER issue: our ap-
proach to public affairs. The way we select
our leaders has become utterly obsolete and
deplorable, and the way that we treat our can-
didates is bizarre. We have already had two
embarrassing, disgraceful incidents: the
withdrawals from the race of Gary Hart and
Joseph Biden. We would probably have a
more qualified group of contenders from
which to choose, if it were not for our electoral
system--a demeaning two-year process that
requires unlimited resources to buy television
time. Television, I think, is the major culprit. It
has been imposed upon an election system
which was already obsolete. The two together
make an impossible system.
The people many voters say they would
like to see run are not even candidates. Why?
Because the system is so bad, so disagreeable,
so demeaning, that they will not run. Sam
Nunn decided not to do it because the proce-
dure is outrageous. Few sensible, decent fel-
lows would want to get involved in that kind
of election.
Contrast this process with the recent elec-
tion in England. The campaign there lasts four
weeks. It has been estimated that the cost of
running for Parliament is about ten thousand
dollars. Here, it costs a minimum of $500,000
if one wants to run for the Senate. We will
change. I do not think that anything is per-
manent. I was a member of the Committee on
the Constitutional System with Lloyd Cutler.
Professor Hardin from California was one of
the originators of the Committee. Professor
Hardin and I thought we might be able to
move the discussion at least a little bit into the
sphere of recognition that changes in the par-
liamentary direction might have advantages
for our system. But no, Mr. Cutler put his foot
down; he would not permit anything in the
report that might undermine our faith in the
Constitution. He made a few suggestions, like
changing the terms of congressmen so that all
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would be elected at the same time for four-
year terms. These are minor amendments that
do not get at the major problems, such as a
separation of powers so extreme that Con-
gress is, in a real sense, an adversary to the ex-
ecutive. People should review our
constitutional convention of two hundred
years ago. We seem to have forgotten that the
original Virginia Plan provided that Congress
was to select the president. This method of
presidential selection would have been very
similar to the way in which the executive is
chosen in a parliamentary system, and was not
such a radical idea in 1787. Furthermore, it was
abandoned for reasons that did not have to do
with distaste for the idea itself.
In fact, it is quite clear that the Founding
Fathers were not at all in favor of popular elec-
tions. It is not radical to go back to the framers
of the Constitution to look for some construc-
tive ideas. The problem is that television
makes millions of dollars from the elections,
and thus the whole political organization of
the country is going to be as difficult to unravel
as the arms race. There is such a momentum,
and so much economic power built into this
system, that changing it will require a lot of
pressure. For instance, on the Constitution
Committee, there were a few others who felt
the way I did: Henry Reuss, Professor Hardin,
and other committee members, but we were
by no means in the majority. Most of the others
did not want to be associated with a move-
ment that would seem to undermine the
sanctity of the Constitution.
The power of Congress to impeach a presi-
dent is there, of course. But this power is used
only under extreme conditions. It is a very dif-
ficult way to proceed. We should have a pro-
cedure for a vote of "no confidence" in our
day-to-day operations. Because of television,
the president has the capacity to get the atten-
tion of all the people whenever he desires to
do so. For example, President Reagan could
tell his story about what happened in Grenada
before anybody else. We were all made to
believe that there was great danger to the stu-
dents, that there was a terrible situation, that
he had to save American lives, he had to go in.
I doubted whether this was the actual case, but
the effect could not be undone. There was no
other way. Congress--535 people--has dif-
ficulty in using television. They have been un-
able to agree on a single representative
spokesman. There has been a slight gesture:
The party out of power is now given time to
make responses to presidential addresses, but
these probably get a small audience. To the
average American viewer, there is quite a dif-
ference between seeing the President defend-
ing his policies on prime time network
television, and then seeing a relatively un-
known Congressman criticizing those
policies.
Television is giving the president the
capacity to inject himself into everyone's
living room. That was not true a few years ago.
When I first ran for Congress there was no
television. The president has the people's ear;
he can tell his story, and nobody can get equal
attention. It takes a long time to put across an
opposing point of view. When events are
moving quickly, there just is not enough time.
The structure is giving the President too much
latitude, too much control over political
decisions that ought to be shared with other
officials.
Valenta: Many American, and even Soviet
writers accepted the notion that presidential
power declined in the 1970s because of Viet-
nam and Watergate. Is President Reagan 's
showmanship responsible for the recovery?
Fulbright: Oh, yes. I think that President
Reagan has had an unusual amount of in-
fluence, at least until very recently. He is being
injured by the Iran-Contra affair and the
revelations of duplicity. The stories in the
paper about Mr. Woodward's talk with Mr.
Casey confirm much that I suspected.
Ambassador Alvaro Taboada: Is it possible
for a superpower like the United States, which
h willingly took responsibility after World War
II for supporting so-called Western culture, to
have a cohesive and consistent foreign policy
in light of what is often a divisive and incon-
sistent congressional contribution? Or do you
think that it would be feasible tf the president
were given authority to conduct the nation's
foreign policy, and were made liable or
responsible for actions unacceptable to Con-
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gress? In your opinion, what would better
enable a large country like the United States
to carry out an effective foreign policy? A
powerful executive with a popular mandate
and congressional authority to carry out a
consistent foreign policy, or a very powerful
but divided Congress seeking to conduct its
own foreign policy and thereby possibly
obstructing that of the executive?
Fulbright: When they are divided as they
have been, with Congress dominated now by
one party and the executive dominated by
another, there is not likely to be very much
cohesion. Consider the Soviet Politburo as an
extreme example of concentrated power. It is
not a democracy in our sense, but it provides
for consistency and an effective foreign policy
from the Communist Party's perspective. They
can do what they want to without quibbling
with a Congress. In a democratic system like
this one, however, if we want to ensure the
continuity of all the other benefits, the best
solution I can think of is one enjoyed by near-
ly every other democracy in the world except
ours. In a parliamentary system, the executive
is part and parcel of the party in power. So it
is routine, under a parliamentary system, that
the executive has the support of the majority
of the elected legislators, and the division
which is so characteristic of our system is
simply not a problem. Of course, our trouble
comes primarily and directly from the prin-
ciple of the separation of powers between the
executive and legislature. Our executive is in
trouble if he becomes arbitrary, as he has
recently, and violates the law and the will of
Congress. Of course, I happen to think that
Reagan was wrong. But suppose that he had
been right, and the Congress did not agree
with him? He would still be in trouble. Alexis
de Tocqueville, one of the best observers ever
to write about our country, wrote 150 years
ago that our system was not created in a way
that enables it to administer foreign policy
with efficiency. He outlined certain weak-
nesses, and we have proved every one of them
to be correct. The implications of the question
would be rectified by a parliamentary system.
I think that, historically, foreign policy has
been manageable under parliamentary sys-
tems. The British gradually evolved a par-
liamentary system from their monarchy, and
had a consistent policy for two hundred to
three hundred years--a rather successful one
from their point of view. Yes, they made a
dreadful mistake in 1914 because of their in-
ability to deal effectively with the Germans.
And other mistakes in judgment stopped them
from preventing World War II. But they were
the mistakes for which the entire government
was responsible. They were not attributable to
Parliament's interference with the executive,
but, rather, mistakes that both made together.
Division of authority was not to blame. It was
lack of judgment.
Craig Simon: One of our trueforeign policy
successes was the Marshall Plan. Perhaps it
was a success for the wrong reason. The goal
of that plan was to help to restore the West
European economy, recognizing that this res-
toration would help theAmerican economy as
well. However, it was finally sold to the
American people as something to bolster
Western Europe against Soviet encroach-
ment. We did the right thing economically,
but in a way that exacerbated East-West hos-
tility. Now the United States does not even have
thepowerto enact a program like theMarshall
Plan.
Fulbright: We do not have the money.
Simon: Even if we had the will, we have not
been able to sustain our leadership within our
own bloc. We have terrible divisions now,
motivated by protectionist hostility. Japan
should be one of our closest partners in the
world, but we are having problems. The
American people are losing confidence in US.
economic strength. We do not even .have the
self-confidence to tolerate Soviet membership
in GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade], which is supposed to be a universal
trade organization. Although other com-
munist countries have been allowed to join it,
people from the State Department simply say
that the Soviet Union is too big. The implica-
tion is that we have less confidence in the
ability of our capitalist system to serve our in-
terests. The question is: do you see this declin-
ing confidence among the American people
as something irreversible?
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Fulbright: No, it is not irreversible. It is very
serious. All we need is a reasonably intelligent
leader who has the support of Congress.
Q.? You stress leadership. Do we not also
need intelligent people? The confidence
problem seems so widespread.
Fulbright: Yes, but a lot of that is due to the
political leadership. Everybody recognizes
that the presidency is the best forum--what
President Theodore Roosevelt called the
"bully pulpit." Whatever the president can do,
he can educate people. Reagan set the nation-
al tone toward Russia with his attitude right at
the beginning. He emphasized that the Soviet
Union was the "evil empire." This created a big
effect. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was quite a
leader under the circumstances, and led the
country effectively. There was one big mis-
take, of course; his effort to enlarge the
Supreme Court created considerable
animosity toward him and his program. But
outside of that, he got by very well. We have
to have some decent leadership, which is why
I emphasize the way that we select the presi-
dent. The president is a very important figure,
not just a functionary who signs papers. He
creates the attitude of the people, particularly
since the invention of television. He is far more
powerful than he used to be in that respect,
because he has direct access to people's
minds.
We are not a very sophisticated people. We
are a parochial people. Where I come from,
most people are not interested in foreign af-
fairs. They just do not understand them. The
only way you can deal with them is by per-
suasion in small steps. But they have
prejudices, and their impressions of events are
manipulated because they believe what the
president says. At least they used to believe
him; I am not so sure that they do now. I used
to be taken in by what the president said. I did
not realize that presidents lied. I found out
about this under Lyndon B. Johnson. It seems
endemic in the White House. Anyway, we
cannot manage this system without a good
president. When we do get a good president-
-which is by accident-it usually works.
I cannot over-emphasize the differences
among systems of democracy. People seem to
think that all democracies are the same, but
they are not. In our system, the incentives for
performance, for following through, are quite
different from those of a parliamentary sys-
tem. In a parliamentary system, even the Con-
gress would be far more effective, and would
attract far more capable people than it now
does, because serving there would be seen as
an essential step toward entering the execu-
tive branch. Today, presidential candidates
have to leave Congress. Howard Baker, for ex-
ample, had to resign from the Senate to run for
president. In a parliamentary system, perhaps
he would already be president. He would
probably be a good one, too, because he has
experience. Due to the present system, we
have recently elected two presidents with no
experience--not a bit in the federal govern-
ment, and none in foreign relations. Both of
them were failures in my view.
Valenta: A ny predictions for 1988?
Fulbright: No. Under this system it is dif-
ficult to say. I have no idea. They voted in
England the other day. In that parliamentary
system, one has a clearer picture of the alter-
natives for the entire executive branch before
the election. Here, I have no idea, nor do I
think that any of you know who is going to be
elected or even nominated. In the early days
of this country, the party and the Congress
nominated the candidate. This is far better
than the process that we now have. There
would be many ways to change our system,
but none of them can be implemented under
present circumstances. But the parliamentary
system has been proven by so many others: all
the Scandinavian countries, Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, and Japan. There are slight
variations. There is one hybrid: France is al-
ways a little different from all the others. The
French system imposes a president on top of
a parliament. This is not bad if the president is
not given too much power. I like systems with
ceremonial heads of state. Kings and queens
fit in very well. They take ceremonial burdens
off the chief executives, and cannot interfere
in the actual running of the countries. We
make the presidency almost impossible by re-
quiring the president to be a political leader as
well as a social lion. He goes to all the recep-
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tions and banquets, and makes speeches at
the Gridiron Club. He has to be funny, and
then he is expected to perform as a political
leader. We need to change this system, but I
am afraid that it will be difficult. I have tried to
suggest some changes, but I no longer have
influence. I argue my position, but that is all
that I can do.
One can imagine the benefits of parliamen-
tary-style reform for our Congress. If one were
considering running for Congress, and one
knew that fifteen or twenty years of good
work and good performance would make one
eligible to be president, secretary of state, and
so on, regardless of how bad one looked on
television, one might be attracted to the job.
As it is now, Congress is a dead end. One can
be there, get a good salary, but go nowhere.
The result is a lot of old-timers serving time;
some of the best people resign. I remember
that Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut was one
of the best senators--very influential and very
wise. He resigned. I had always liked him very
much, so I had lunch with him and asked,
"Why in the world did you resign?" He was
only about sixty-five years old and should
have had ten or more years in that position.
He said, "Well, it's just not any fun anymore."
He simply was not interested any longer, and
he was bored. He thought he had talents, and
he wanted to apply them, but he had no place
further up to go, so he preferred to resign and
go to New York to practice law. Others have
also resigned. Charles Mathias from Maryland,
the best Republican in Congress, declined to
run for reelection. Others have declined to run
for the presidency. This procedure is demean-
ing. One is expected to spend half of one's
time soliciting the money necessary to buy ad-
vertising on television. This is a terrible merry-
go-round. It is not working now, and it is not
going to work. If we do not have a miracle in
this next election, and get somebody that can
turn it around, we are going to have con-
tinuous trouble. I do not like to discourage
anybody. One might say that I am an old, dis-
appointed, frustrated, pessimistic old man,
but I do not make many public speeches.
When I do, I try not to come across as nega-
tive as I really feel about this electoral process.
The country is basically good. What is impres-
sive is that so many states are good states.
Arkansas does not owe anybody to speak of.
We may be poor, but we are honest, and we
are solvent, a lot more solvent than the federal
government
U.S. Foreign
Policymaking
DO YOUBELIEVE the United States has
tried to derail the Contadora process?
Fulbright: Yes, I think that it has. I was in
favor of the so-called Contadora process long
before now. We are making a mistake by
throwing our weight around and intervening
in little countries--among them Nicaragua. I
do not think that it is good policy. It is counter-
productive for big countries like the U.S. and
the Soviet Union to intervene and try to direct
the political and social systems of smaller
countries. They have to make their own mis-
takes. If our idea of society is as good as we
say it is, they will find that out on their own,
and much more quickly and effectively than if
we try to impose it on them. Intervention just
does not work. It is not a moral question. It is
a practical one.
Q: The number of scholarships granted by
the Soviet Union to students in Central
America and the Third World is much greater
than the numbergranted by the United States.
Fulbright: That is a different matter. When
the Soviets offer exchange scholarships, it is a
kind of competition to which we should not
object. The proper response to that is for us to
give scholarships, and expose more people to
our own society. It would be great to compete
with the Russians in education. Who can edu-
cate people the best? Who can promote a bet-
ter understanding of philosophy and science?
I would be in favor of that kind of competi-
tion.
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Q. The other side of this coin is the Soviet
commitment to the use of force. Given their
brutality in Afghanistan, isn't force the only
kind of competition that the Soviets really un-
derstand?
Fulbright: As long as we have deterrence,
we can compete with them in non-military
ways. If one goes back and reviews the Soviet
success record in the world over the last forty
years and compares it to ours, we do not come
out too badly. They have had as many or more
failures. The Chinese certainly did not turn
out to be such strong allies of the Soviet Union,
although we originally thought that they were.
In fact, they have become major critics of the
Soviet Union.
The existence of different social and politi-
cal systems does not seem to me to justify the
kinds of intervention in which we have
engaged. I do not know if we Americans real-
ly should believe that our system is the best
one. History may show that it is not. The
Soviets may be able to make their system
work, and, if they do make it work, we are
damned fools if we try to use force to stop
them. It is perfectly legitimate for us to try to
stop their challenge in the rest of the world by
means other than force. Persuasion is
legitimate in this context. Furthermore, inter-
ventionism does not work; in the long run, it
is not profitable. The British, in the old days,
found it fashionable to incorporate a colony
and physically to dominate it. Now, the world
outside the Soviet Union has accepted the idea
that this is no longer a civilized way in which
to behave. Everything has been decolonized
except the Russian empire, which has a very
special physical relationship with its colonies.
I am talking about the Siberian area, which
was taken long before the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion.
I am not sure that the Russians are inherent-
ly more brutal than other people under similar
circumstances. Comparable examples that
come to mind are the Americans in Vietnam,
the Germans under Hitler and the recent
violence in the Middle East.
Valenta: Would you describe Leonid
Brezhnev as a man who, as a leader, accepted
the notion of the 'arrogance of power' and
sought to enlarge the Soviet empire? You were
right, there were some defeats, as in Egypt and
Somalia. But there were successes: Ethiopia,
Angola, Nicaragua, Afghanistan. The Soviets
have a physical presence in those places now.
Has not the Soviet Union attempted to extend
its empire beyond what we can accept?
Fulbright: They may have allies in Angola,
for example, but I do not think that this is very
significant. If Angola is given some latitude,
and the superpowers stop intervening there,
the country will be able to decide for itself
what system it wants. My guess is that the An-
golans will come up with a hybrid. Soviet Mar-
xism has not proved itself to be very effective,
and our system is showing defects in certain
areas.
Q: You were in office during the Cuban
missile crisis. Can you make any comments
on this critical event?
Fulbright: I think that our attitudes toward
Cuba are greatly mistaken. We should have let
them alone a long time ago. In the meantime
they probably would have changed very
dramatically.
Roberto Lozano: But this gets back to the
problem of change in totalitarian states. You
are saying that, in the long run, the people will
be able to choose the kind of society they want,
that they can have change if they want it. It
seems to me that the processes of
totalitarianism are irreversible. How, for ex-
ample, can Cuba get rid of communism,
when there is no legal way to present an al-
ternative? There are only two cases in which
communism was reversed, and these required
force: Hungary in 1919 and Grenada in
1983. There is no historical case of a peaceful
transition from communism to democracy.
Do you really think that it is possible to reverse
a Leninist regime without force?
Fulbright: I think so, in the long run. Not
right away. In Cuba, this cannot be done as
long as Castro is there. I expect that, when
Castro dies, there will be a succession crisis,
and then there will be a new approach. The
people generally have an effect upon the na-
ture of their society in the long run. That has
been the trend of history. Historically, many
authoritarian states have changed into
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democratic polities. But it takes time for chan-
ges to occur. One cannot expect them to take
place overnight. As with our own system, it is
going to take time to correct the problems in
government that we were just discussing.
It is very dangerous to attempt traditional-
style interventions with nuclear weapons
looming in the background. If we continue in
this way, a major conflict could erupt. Con-
sider a scenario in which Syria and Israel get
into a fight, with Syria seeming to be on the
verge of winning. What do you think the
United States would do? This country, you
know, is very emotional, and very subservient
to pro-Israeli views and Israeli interests. A
scenario like that, given the existence of so
many weapons, could quite possibly lead to a
major war.
Why are we sending so many ships into the
Persian Gulf? Because years ago we made a
big investment in the Rapid Deployment
Force. We bought all these ships, and people
in the military get awfully bored with doing
nothing. Everything was all set to go, and, all
of a sudden, there was an opportunity... My
God! We have 30 ships in the Gulf! No other
country has anything like it. Our interests in
the Gulf are minimal compared with
European or Japanese interests. Japan gets
about seventy to eighty percent of its oil from
the Gulf. It is important to Japan. It is not very
important to us. Should not our allies do some-
thing about it? Some of them just joined us,
but that is not the point. What I object to is the
fact that we are out in front. We are number
one. We are the most provocative of all
modern countries in this area, and in the Is-
lamic world. We precipitated a state of affairs
which is very dangerous, and we have not
seen the end of it. I will be very surprised if we
get out of it without very serious problems.
Q. Speaking of the Persian Gulf situation,
we have recently been engaged in actions
such as capturing terrorists to international
waters, and sinking Iranian gunboats. Do
you think that this greatly increases the
danger of the situation in the Guy
Fulbright: I sure do. I think that it is very
dangerous. I do not want to act like such a
peacenik that I cannot recognize the difficul-
ties. I want to find out what really works, and
what is the most effective policy. I am not ex-
clusively interested in the right way, in a strict-
ly moral sense, although principle and
practicality often coincide. Nevertheless,
overt intervention by a superpower leaves that
superpower open to taunting. Bullies have
been unpopular since the days of David and
Goliath. The little guy loves to hit the big one
in the head if he can.
Q: What does a country do if it catches the
rat laying the mines? Can a superpower
tolerate such behavior?
Fulbright: In the particular case to which
you seem to refer, since we were already
there, we had to do what we had to do. I ob-
ject to our taking the lead this way for seven
years. It was not our war, but we have become
the number one issue in it. Superpower inter-
vention is dangerous. There is not a good ex-
cuse for it. The danger to the oil supplies was
not that great, and the interruption in the flow
of oil so far has been minimal. In fact, during
the last two years, the scarcity of oil has been
replaced by a glut. The price went down from
$20 a barrel to as low as $10. I reckon that it is
back up to about $18 now. Oil was not the
problem. I do not see any good excuse for the
intervention.
Q. The Soviets are supporting both parties.
Fulbright: The Soviet engagement is very
small. The situation is like it was in Vietnam.
There, the Soviets supplied some arms; we
had 500,000 men deployed. There is a big dif-
ference in the means of intervention.
Cunningham: What do you think was the
motive of the United States when it reflagged
the Kuwaiti tankers?
Fulbright: There are a number of them. I am
just an observer like you, but it seems to me
that it was a useful way to divert attention from
the Iran-Contra scandal. Another reason is that
it gave our ships a task to perform. We have
all these ships sitting around with nothing to
do. This gives them something to do, although
it costs extra millions of dollars a day. For one
thing, it increases everybody's pay.
Q: What about the Soviet threat? Do you
buy that?
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Fulbright: The Soviets did not threaten us.
Q. In the long run, we had to be involved
because the Soviets have geopolitical ambi-
tions in the region.
Fulbright: We use that argument for every-
thing. The Soviets went in because the
Kuwaitis asked them in. They have not done
anything threatening of which to speak. The
Soviet response was to lease some of their
ships. They wanted to get a little money and it
was a good deal.
Q. it is true that the Russians have ex-
panded in the past. The situation in northern
Iran after World War His an example. It was
very hard for Harry Truman to get the Soviets
out. It took some pressure.
Fulbright: I would not say that they are nice,
easy people to get along with. I do not mean
that. We have not played the situation in a way
that strengthens our position. I think that both
powers ought to leave the smaller countries to
work out their problems by themselves,
without the big powers intervening. We are
not good enough, for if we set a good ex-
ample, they would follow it. We simply have
not yet given them a good enough example.
Q. The obvious problem in the Persian Gulf
is the Iran Iraq war, but doesn't the conflict
in the region threaten something much
larger: the international flow of goods?
Fulbright: Yes, that is involved, but nothing
very serious has happened. Most of the con-
cern is speculative. What business did the
Stark have in the Gulf? It is said that what hap-
pened was an unintended mistake on Iraq's
part. We have accepted Iraq's apologies. The
Stark was out there like a sitting duck. I
suspect that anytime a small country can give
this big, arrogant power a black eye, it will do
it, and then call it a mistake. The Israelis attack-
ed one of our ships, the Liberty, and killed thir-
ty-four people. They later said it was a
mistake. I think that they got some pleasure
out of showing this big country that it was not
so big after all.
Valenta: Do you still believe that you were
right in the debate with LBJ over the war in
Vietnam?
Fulbright: Yes, I think so. I think that history
will bear me out.
Valenta: The purge of Boris Yeltsin is seen
by many analysts as a setback for Mikhail
Gorbachev. Do you think that he is going to
recover?
Fulbright: I hope he does, but I do not
know. Actions of the U.S. government will
have some influence. Gorbachev is dealing
with a very dangerous situation. There are
tremendous internal problems, and he is chal-
lenging established privileges and positions.
What a terrific struggle it was to remove Din-
mukhamed Kunaev, just one official! And
Vladimir Shcherbitsky is still there. It is very
difficult to remove people who have enjoyed
certain privileges. There are analogies to the
French Revolution: There will be trouble for
those who want to change social relations.
Gorbachev needs very strong support from his
colleagues. Apparently, the other members of
the Politburo have supported him, until now.
They may change their minds if they see us
going the other way. Americans say the Soviet
public has no influence. That notion is not al-
together true. Party members at various levels
throughout the country have considerable in-
fluence in the long run, I think. Gorbachev is
not free to do as he pleases in the same way
as Stalin did, by brute force.
I do not know whether Gorbachev can sur-
vive. It is a big question. He is not solely de-
pendent on us, of course, but we can help the
situation by making progress on arms control.
This will relieve the Soviet economy of certain
burdens. We need relief from those same bur-
dens; we should not ignore our own economic
problems. We are now the biggest debtor in
the world. We wasted our resources in a
profligate manner for the last twenty years,
especially the last eight. Our debt has doubled
in the last seven years. In the long run, this
weakens us as an economic power in the
world. We cannot afford to do things by force,
though we act as if we can. The President has
conned people into believing that we have
never been so well off. In reality, he has un-
dermined the economy.
Valenta: It is said that the Russians prefer
Republicans in the White House. They got
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along very well with Nixon and were hoping
to make a deal with Reagan. Perhaps they still
can. Do you think it is true? Who is their' can-
didate in 1988?
Fulbright: I do not have any idea. I do not
know enough about it. It seems that most of
the differences between the Soviets and the
Americans are not fundamental. What dif-
ferences there are relate to such things as at-
titudes about human rights, and so on. Our
carping on human rights is very offensive to
the Russians. I am sure that they cannot help
but say, "Look to your own."
Valenta: We are mostgrateful to you for this
time. Thank you very much.
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For the Record
On Friday May 6, 1988 the Washington Post
reprinted a portion of the ISEES Occasional Paper
Vol. 11, No. 2 titled "The Strategic Significance of
Afghanistan's StruggleforFreedom"byLt. General
William E. Odom, Director of the U.S. National
Security Agency. The paper is a transcription of a
speech given by Lt. Gen. Odom in Miami on Oc-
tober 1st, 1987. Copies of this paper are available
from ISEES. Please seepage 21 for more informa-
tion about ordering ISEES publications.
SOME WESTERN observers have expected
Gorbachev to seek an early settlement of
the war through negotiations leading to some
form of Afghan independence. Thus far they
have been disappointed. While not placing
any confidence in the likelihood of such a
Soviet move, I am struck by what Gorbachev
could achieve by a withdrawal, conceding Af-
ghanistan to the freedom fighters. It would
make his policy of an opening to the West,
particularly for economic interaction, likely to
succeed beyond any prospects it now has. It
would help his opening to China, and it would
improve his hand in the Islamic world. At the
same time, it would remove a problem for his
domestic policy of perestroika. In fact, the ad-
vantages of an early withdrawal are so impres-
sive that one is inclined to believe that Gor-
bachev will soon decide to try to take them.
The longer he waits, however, the less impres-
sive they will be. He needs them now. They
could give his foreign policy a remarkably
positive impulse. Let us hope that he sees
things in this way because they are both in his
best interest and in the interest of the Afghan
people.
In the meantime, we are witnessing a strug-
gle of immense moral and geostrategic im-
plications, implications only dimly
appreciated in much of the world affected by
them. While we in the secure states of the West
can consider the struggle with detachment,
the Afghans cannot. And they have not. They
have chosen to resist, and they are resisting
with more success than the world believed
possible.
The Washington Post
May 6, 1988
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Publications of the
Institute for Soviet and
East European Studies
Special Studies Series
Grenada and Soviet/Cuban Policy: Inter-
nal Crisis and U.S./OECS Intervention
(Westview Press, 1986). Jiri Valenta and Her-
bert J. Ellison, editors. Sponsored in conjunc-
tion with, and published by, the Kennan
Institute for Advanced Russian Studies.
Conflict in Nicaragua: A Multidimensional
Perspective (Allen and Unwin, 1987). Jiri
Valenta and Esperanza Duran, editors. Spon-
sored jointly with The Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, London.
Occasional Papers Series
Volume I.?
No. 1. "The Geneva Summit: Implications
for East-West Relations." Sponsored jointly
with the Institute for East-West Security
Studies. F. Stephen Larrabee, Peter Hardi,
Zoran Zic, and Jiri Valenta (January, 1986).
No. 2. "Gorbachev's Party Congress: How
Significant for the United States?" Jerry Hough,
Richard Pipes, and moderator, Jiri Valenta
(March, 1986).
No. 3. "Terrorism: Reagan's Response."
Norman Podhoretz, William Maynes, and
moderator, Jiri Valenta (April, 1986).
No. 4. "Conflict in Nicaragua: National,
Regional and International Dimensions." Con-
tributors included Admiral Sir James Eberle
and Ambassador Ambler H. Moss, Jr., Esperan-
za Duran,Jiri Valenta, Vernon Aspaturian, Mar-
garet Crahan, Arturo Cruz, Jr., Mark Falcoff,
Ottfried Hennig, Ambassador Harry W.
Shlaudeman, and Virginia Valenta. Discus-
sants included Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Julio
Cirino, Alfredo Cesar, Arturo Cruz, Wolf
Grabendorff, Stephen Haseler, Robert Leiken,
Francisco Lopez, Susan Kaufman Purcell,
Wayne Smith, Jaime Suchlicki, Alvaro
Taboada, and Bruce Weinrod. (August, 1986).
No. 5. "Zbigniew Brzezinski Reflects on the
U.S.-Soviet Rivalry." Report on an address by
Zbigniew Brzezinski (January, 1987).
No. 6. "U.S.-Soviet Relations at the
Crossroads: Congressman Dante Fascell
Reflects on his Visit to the Kremlin." (May,
1987).
No. 1. "Impressions of Gorbachev: John
Temple Swing on the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions Delegation's Visit to Moscow, 1987."
(October, 1987).
No. 2. "The Strategic Significance of
Afghanistan's Struggle for Freedom." Report
on an address by William E. Odom (February,
1988).
No. 3. "A Conversation With Senator J. Wil-
liam Fulbright: On Soviet Leaders, the 'Ar-
rogance of Superpowers' and the `Impossible'
U.S. Electoral Process" (June, 1988).
No. 4. "The Washington Summit: Implica-
tions for Cuba and Nicaragua." Ambassador
Vernon C. Walters (July, 1988).
No. 5. "The U.S.-Soviet Relations: A View
From Moscow." The Honorable Jack F. Mat-
lock, Jr., United States Ambassador to the
Soviet Union (July, 1988).
No. 6. "Summit IV: Arms control and
Regional Conflicts." United States Ambassador
and Special Advisor to the President an d to
the Secretary of State, Lt. General Edward L.
Rowny (July, 1988).
Working Papers Series
No.1. "Pakistan-Soviet Relations and the Af-
ghan Crisis." Ali Tauqeer Sheikh (August,
1987).
No. 2. "Leninism With An Islamic Face." Jiri
Valenta and Ali Sheikh (September, 1987).
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No. 3. "From Ethnicity to Islam: Soviet
Strategies for Political Pacification in the Bor-
derlands." Eden Naby (October, 1987).
No. 4. "The Social and Economic Conse-
quences of Soviet Policies in Afghanistan." M.
S. Noorzoy (October, 1987).
No. 5. "Elite Strategies of Penetration and
Control in Afghanistan." Ralph Magnus (Oc-
tober, 1987).
No. 6. "Angola's Political Conformity and
Economic Independence." Robin Pekelney
(October, 1987).
No. 7. "Morality and Realism in Foreign
Policy." Andrea Ewart (January, 1988). (An
award-winning essay in the Cato Institute's
1987 competition.)
No. 8. "Aspects of the Evolution of Law in
Sandinista Nicaragua." Alvaro Taboada
(February, 1988).
No. 9. "Neocolonialism and Dependency: A
Study in the Soviet Development of
Afghanistan's Oil and Gas Industry, 1950-
1979." Donald W. Dixon (February, 1988).
No. 10. "Ambivalent Adversaries." Craig
Simon (March, 1988).
No. 11. "Summit III: Not By Arms Control
Alone." Jiri Valenta (March, 1988).
ISEES Reports
No. 1. "Soviet Specialists and Soviet Foreign
Policy." John
Campbell (January, 1986).
No. 2. "Gorbachev's Party Congress." Peter
Reddaway (March, 1986).
No. 3. "The Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Forum:
Prelude to Vienna." Warren Zimmermann and
Dante Fascell (September, 1986).
No. 1. "Under the Shadow of Chernobyl'."
Gregory Gleason and Jan Dellenbrandt (Oc-
tober 1986).
No. 2. "Research Strategies for Soviet
Studies." Robert Conquest (January, 1987).
No. 3. "Gorbachev and Latin America."
Richard Feinberg (February, 1987).
No. 4. "Problems of Communism." Sonia
Sluzar (February, 1987).
No. 5. "Gorbachev's Uncertain Future."
Wolfgang Leonhard (March, 1987).
No. 6. "Soviet and Soviet Proxy Behavior in
the Third World." Tadeusz Kucharski (April,
1987).
No. 7. "Democratization under Gor-
bachev?", Ernst Kux (April, 1987).
No. 8. "Research in the USSR" Janet Martin
(April, 1987).
No. 9. "Political Prisoners in the USSR"
Vladimir Brodsky (April, 1987).
No. 1. "The Soviet Union and Vietnam: The
Strategic Nexus." Thai Quang Tiung and M.
Rajaretnam (September, 1987).
No. 2. "Mr. Gorbachev's -'Bleeding
Wound': Is There A Tourniquet?" Louis Dupree
(October 1987).
No. 3. "The Iran/Contra Affair and US
Foreign Policy." R Spencer Oliver (Novem-
ber, 1987).
No. 4. "Sino-Soviet Relations in the Gor-
bachev Era." Zhongyi Gao and Yuezhao
Huang (November, 1987).
No. 5. "The USSR and the South Pacific."
Vendulka Kubalkova
(November, 1987).
No. 6. "Soviet Foreign Policy Decisionmak-
ing in the Gorbachev Era." Vernon V.
Aspaturian (December, 1987).
No. 7. "Perestroika and Eastern Europe."
Vladimir Raisky
(February, 1988).
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Publications of the
Institute for Soviet and
East European Studies
(ISEES)
The Institute sponsors the publication and
dissemination of research results in four
categories.
ISEES Working Papers
Timely reporting of research results on is-
sues of national concern is sponsored through
the Institute's Working Paper series.
Special Studies Series
Books, and monographs on Soviet, East
European, Strategic Studies, and Comparative
Communism are sponsored under the
Institute's Special Studies series.
ISEES Occasional Papers
The Institute's Occasional Papers series is
designed to bring to the attention of the public
major contributions of distinguished visiting
scholars and policy-makers at the University
of Miami dealing with Soviet and East
European Affairs and U.S. National Security.
ISEES Meeting Reports
Brief summaries of Institute colloquia and
symposia are circulated in the form of ISEES
Meeting Reports.
For more information about the institute's
programs or manuscript submission
guidelines, please contact ProfessorJiri Valen-
ta, Director, Institute for Soviet and East
European Studies, Graduate School of Inter-
national Studies, University of Miami, 1531
Brescia Avenue, Coral Gables, FL, 33124 (305)
284-5411.
Published for the
Institute for Soviet
and East European Studies
by the
North-South Center, University of Miami
Alexander H. McIntire
Director of Publications
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90M00005R000200090013-2
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UNIVERSITY OF
GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
P.0. BOX 248123
CORAL GABLES, FL 33124
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