SENATE STATUS OF POLYGRAPH LEGISLATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00004R001000170024-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: November 18, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Tit r&XS0 nitL SECURITY PROGRAM Or Tit
CWTR&L C
1. SACKGROIWD
The personnel security program at the Central
Intelligence Agency has developed over many years and represents
the cumulative thinking and judgments of many individuals. The
personnel.security policies and procedures are designed to
prevent the penetration of the Agency. A strong and viable
personnel security program is not totally dependent
upon Agency's Office of Security standing alone. It is vial ttooe
Involve and have coordination and'cuoperation with other
elements of the Agency, particularly the Offices of Personnel
and Medical Services. wb" share asTor responsibilities in the
screening area.
Personnel security demands allocation of sore than
ball of the Office of Security's resources. These officers are
dedicated to the areas of prescreening, investigation,
adjudication, polygraph, security awareness, security
troubleshooting, and reinvestigation/repolygraph. The personnel
security function is supported by a network of strategically
located. field offices, and in-house polygraph capability, and a
small counterintelligence unit.
In a sense, the Office of Security is a watchdog for
the Director of Central Intelligence. The watchdog in this case
ensures that the activities of the Agency are carried out in a
canner that protects personnel, sources of information, methods
of operations and protects classified intelligence information.
In all of this there is no function more important than
personnel security, which night properly be defined as the
progran?that seeks to ensure that the Agency always employs and
is associated with people who can be trusted with the Nation's
top secrets.
II. PZR 0MURL SECURITY STASDARDS/AUTIK1RITI9$
:hm Agency's investigative and adjudicative
authorities are sat out in the National Security Act of 1947 and
the CIA Act of 1949. These authorities were expanded upon in
Sxecutivq Orders 10450 and 11036, various Agency regulations and
Director of Central Intelligence Lireetive 1/14.
Agency regulations state in part that it is imperative
that Agency personnel be persons who are of excellent
character, and of unquestioned loyalty, integrity, discretion,
and trustworthiness.` That was lifted out of 10450, and the
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Agency's standards are high because CIA's mission is vital to
national security and such is expected of those who carry it
out. The Agency necebsarily insists on standards of integrity,
personal responsibility, trustworthiness and loyalty well oeyona
what most other employers demand.
111. OFFICE OF PERSOUNZL SCREENING
', The Agency's Office of Personnel recruiters fill the
Agency's.personnel needs by utilising direct newspaper
advertising or contacts with appropriate sources in
universities, military bases, private industry,
vocation&l/technical institutions, or the referrals of current
and former employees. These recruiters are scattered throughout
the United states. of
' Once the applicant is located and identified, initial
interviews are arranged with the recruiter. Tue most promising
candidates are asked to submit seaumea and, in most cases, the
recruiter arranges for a profe.sional applicant test battery to
be administered. The recruiter will than send to Headquarters
his interview report, along with his recommendation.
A key step in the process involves the see of
expediters who are experienced processional security officers
assigned to the Vii ice of Personnel. The expediters
painstakingly review the Personal History statement submitted by
the applicant, concentrating on entries that tend to signal
trouble--the items cost likely to be falsified by the
candidate. The expediters then attempt to contact all the
applicants put into processing in order to identify and
eliminate those individuals who have made admissions which
soundly.astablish their unsuitability for Agency employment or
who will do so in a telephone Interview--normally about ten
percent::of the candidates.
IV. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES SCREENING
All applicants are required to complete medical
processing prior to entry on duty. This processing consists of
a medical evaluation, psychiatric screening, and in some cases
psychological assessments. The medical evaluation which
consist. of accepted and usual medical testing techniques, is
appraised by a medical doctor who determines whether the
applicant is physically qualified for employment.
Psychiatric screening begins with the receipt and
review of the applicant's report of medical history. 'Should
pertinent psychiatric information be noted, the report is
iviwarded toe special evaluation. bepwuding upon the nature and
extent.uf the information, tue Office of Medical Services say
requast-additional information Leos the physician of the
applicant.
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CIA's mission is vital to
.ed of those who carry it
on standards of integrity.
mass and loyalty well ueyona
sonnel recruiters fill the
g direct newspaper
fate sources in
e industry,
r the referrals of current
arm are scattered throughout
ted and identified, initial
ruiter. Tie most promising
as and, in most cases, the
1 applicant test battery to
then sand to Headquarters
recommendation.
involves the use of
sslonal security officers
The expediters
story Statement submitted by
es that tend to signal
falsified by the
apt to contact all the
let to identify and
made admissions which
w for Agency employment or
w--mocroslly about tan
In-two
I to complete medical
his processing consists of
esning, and in some cases
%1 evaluation which
4 testing techniques, is
ermines whether the
employment.
a with the receipt and
0410 61 history. Should-
noted, the report-is
guiding upon the nature and
of Nsdial services may
me physician of the
? During the applicant's Headquarters processing, he or
she will complete a psychiatric history questionnaire. This is
carefully screened by a psychometrist. Depending on the mature
of the information developed, or existing recommendations in the
file, ~the psydkometrist may refer the applicant for psychiatric
interview. A report of the interview will be prepared, reviewed
and analysed by professional staff members and an appropriate
recommendation for disposition will be forwarded through command
channels.
? Psychological assessments may be requested by
operating officials and are mandatory in a number of cases. The
medical screening, but are used to match
aseesementa are not to
the skills of the applicant with his pro3ected assignment.
They may contain significant information as to the suitability
and flexibility of the candidate.
V. THE JAC1.G1OWD ISVLSTIGATIOST
? Security processing includes the scheduling and
conduct of a lull field investigation. The investigation is
designed to establish the applicant's boom fides and determine
that be or she is of excellent character, of unquestioned
loyalty, integrity, discretion and trustworthiness. Appropriate
National Agency Checks are always conducted, and the field
investigation covers the most recent 1S years of the applicant's
life. Or back to age 17, whichever is shorter.
covered, teachers, fellow students, supervisors, co-workers, and
neighbors are interviewed to the extent possible. In addition.
a minimum of five character references, including peers, are
interviewed. Police checks are conducted on all areas where the
applicant has lived, worked or attended school, and credit
reputation is established through Interviews and/or credit
reporting agencies. Suitability and security factors explored
by tpe investigator include family background, reputation and
loyalty of spouse and close relatives, as well as the
applicant's health, habits, associates, morals, loyalty,
financial standing, abilities, personality, character traits,
and foreign travels.
In summary, the background investigation explores
every legitimate facet of an applicant's life. The field
inquiry by the Office of Security is one of the most
coapxrbensive in Government today. It is closed only when all
information, favorable or unfavorable, is confirmed.
consolidated and sufficient to permit an equitable
decision--fair to the individual and fair to the Agency.
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VI. THE POLYGRAPH PROGRAM
' The CIA polygraph psogram is closely controlled and
managed by' the Office of security, following strict guidelines
established by the Director of Central Intelligence. Polygraph
examiners are generally selected from the ranks of professional
security officers who have had on-the-job experience. All
examiners are volunteers and are carefully selected for their
maturity. emotional stability, evenhandedness and dedication.
They raceiva their mace-month formal training at the CIA
Polygraph School and then must complete a nine-month
probationary period under the close actutiny of caperisncea
Agency examiners.
' Polygraph testang Lea played-a cswcaaa sole an the
Central Intelligence Agency.'* security program for the past 35
years. Ouaing this time, the t:1A Las developed incontrovertible
evidence of the value of this vital procedure.
' The CIA's caperienes with polygraph involves over
128.000 cases and close to a million "Perot* polygraph charts.
The value of the polygraph, indeed its indispensability, is
clearly reflected in the high number of security disapproval
decisions taken by the Director of Security based on information
developed during the polygraph examination.
' In the polygraph interview, only those basic questions
necessary to satisfy legitimate security concerns are asked. No
unrelated information is solicited along the my. Over and
above the initial training and probationary period, a strict
quality control program is designed to ensure that the highest
technical standards are net by examiners, whether at the
apprentice or senior examiner level:
VIl. :HE ADJUDICATION PROCESS
' :Le basic security responsibility for collating all of
the essential data on an applicant rests with the appraiser who
ensures that the investigation is complete, and that all
appropriate issues are covered in the course of the polygraph
interview. This'Personnel security officer*summaricea all the
essential elements of the case, and makes an appropriate
recommendation in terms of approval, security disqualification,
or referral-to the Office of Personnel's Applicant Review Panel
on suitability grounds.
' The adjudicative phase of security processing is
delicate and critical for all concerned. Subjectivity in the
process must be reduced to an absolute minimum. Each case is
analysed by an appraiser who has the freeaoa to vote his or her
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rlesely controlled and
7wia strict guidelines
Integ lli gence. Polygraph
se ranks of professional
ib experience. All
Lly selected for their
admess and dedication.
.-aiming at the CIA
a also-month
stiny of caperienceo
. crweiai role in the
;.mgrss for the past 35
aveloyed incontsovertable
egraph involves over
parste polygraph charts.
Ladispsnaability, is
security disapproval
r*ty based on information
ton.
Sly those basic questions
concerns are asked. so
; the wy Over and
iary period. a strict
aw ore that the highest
a. Whether at the
Lity for collating all of
s with the appraiser who
eta, and that all
aurae of the polygraph
icer suaaariaea all the
as an appropriate
curity disqualification.
a Applicant Review Panel
urity processing is
Subjectivity in the
minimum. Each case is
means to vote his or her
conscience in making an appropriate recoasandation--With no
pressure crow above. in all cases the total person is
considered in order to present a balancead picture which covers
both the favorable aspects of an applicant's background as well
as problem areas.
? it is a system of checks and balances. Each case is
reviewed by a number of senior experienced Security officers
share there is serious derogatory information and a negative
recommendation is being made. The final decision is made by the
Director of Security who oust weigh the evidence, keeping in
mind national security above all other considerations.
statistically, over twelve percent of the applicants put into
processing are disapproved ch strictly security grounds.
VII. TML APPLICAE RMEW'iAMLL
?" A truly effective personnel screening program involves
a team effort by the Offices of Personnel. Medial Services, and
security. Tl,is collegial approach to the screening of
candidates for employment is best reflected in the work of the
Applicant Review Panel. which ass wstablished in 1PS3 to
appraise all significant suitability information available
through the Agency screening procedures. Data is shared among
the applicant Review Panel asmbers. and is subjected to
systematic ad3udicatioa_before a necision affecting employment
is made.
? `Adverse suitability information coming within the
purview of the Applicant Review Panel any be illustrated as
follows$ '+imotional instability and immaturity. personality
idiosyncrasies, limited mental capacity including scholarship
deficiencies, physical impairment, limitations precluding .
adaptability and flexibility, poor employment record, financial
irresponsibility, including spending habits, excessive alcohol
use, and marital difficulties.
? J- representative of any one of the three offices may
refer a case to the Applicant Review Panel based on suitability
information developed during the course of the screening
process. .it may be data of such a nature that standing alone it
does notJiustify an applicant's rejection, but when related with
data existing in other offices, it may acquire greater
significance. The Applicant Review Panel is chaired by the
Office of: Personnel representative and the panel makes
recommendations to the Director of Personnel, who sakes the
decision to accept or reject the applicant's employment with the
Ayehicy.' Approximately give percent of the applicants put into
processing are disapproved by the Applicant Review Panel because
of suitability factors.
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IX. THE REI11VCUTIGATION/1tCPOLYGVAPH IdOCRAM
In making personnel security decisions, the proviso is
followed that the post is the precursor of the future. behavior
that is characteristic of a person's background tends to be
repeated in-the future. In hiring and clearing people, the
emphasis is.on learning as such as possible about their past.
.I.e emphasis of the total person--expensive and tine-consuming
though it la--pays dividends.
People no change with time. The applicant fired today
will be a significantly different person--pphysioloyically and
Nyclwlogically--teu years tros now. If the whole person
concept' is the Ley to the !pitial clearance effort, then the
'dyneaic person concept` is'bqually important is the personnel
security concerns held about on-duty personnel. A strong
personnel security program has to be an our-going effort.
In view of the sensitive intelligence and
counterintelligence mission of the Agency and in support of the
statutory responsibility of the Director of Central. Intelligence
to protect intelligence sources and methods, the Agency has
historically and traditionally maintained a program for the
periodic review of security casss, as required by DCID 1/14. At
the present time there is a review of the states of new
employees within the three-year probationary period, and this
normally involves both a reinvestigation and a repolygraph.
There is also the regular reinvestigation program that follows
thereafter on a cycle of every five years.
X. CONCLUSION
It is the position of the Office of security that, by
and large, the Central Intelligence Agency is composed of very
dedicated, hardworking, and capable employees. The screening
offices have served Jointly as an effective machine An bringing
on board individuals of high caliber and diverse backgrounds who
possess on extremely wide variety of education, shill, and
experience.`--At the same time, the machine screens out those,
persons who do not seat Agency security and. suitability
standards. -
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? decisions. the precise is
or of the future. Sehavior
iackground tends to be
clearing people. the
sible about their pest.
tnsive and time-consuming
Tie applicant I.ireo today
.ow-1h3rsioloS,ically and
If the "whole person
serene effort, then the
aportent in the personnel
ersonsel. A strong
an em-going effort.
elligence and
aney and in support of the
or of Central Intelligence
athods, the Agency has
is" a program for the
required by CID 1/14. At
the status of new
tiomary period, and this
ten and a repolygraph.
Lion program that follows
gaze.
Ifive of security that, by
genry is composed of very
sployees. The screening
active machine in bringing
said diverse backgrounds who
education, skill, and
Chime seresns' out those
ty and. suitability
SAI.IGIOO$D ON THL CASL
adwin G. Koore. II, was a a.IA staff employee from 1952 to
1061 when be was terminated by the Cl Dafter being convicted of
arson. etc was reinstated in 19b7. following acquittal from this
charge. He retired in 1073 co medical disability. Nis career
ban been marked by marginal work performance, chronic work
frustrations and a general reputation of being miscast in an
intelligence agency. -
.In December 1976. Moore throw a package escc ntainingfor
classified CIA documents and ransom payment _
1:00,000 aver a fence into a Soviet residence he
Soviet watchman was afraid that the package was
turnea it over to a police officer. A subsequent search of
Moore's house turned up ten boxes of CIA classified documents
dating back to the late 19508.
In May 1977, Moore was convicted on two counts of
espionage and three counts of unlawful possession of classified
Government documents. He was sentenced to 1S years
imprisonment. Be was paroled in 1979.
EWS'or CASk/COMRLCTIVE ACTIONS
? The Moore case pointed out the need tor greater
ter
emphasis an the reinvestigation/repoiygraph programs
the need to dedicate more resources to such efforts.
Following the Moore disclosures. the agency applied
additional resources and took steps to implement
reinvestigatious and repolygrapiis of staff personnel at
roughly five-year intervals.
? The Moore case illustrated a need for meaningful
ieindoctrination and security awareness programs. Again
the Agency responded by directing additional resources
toward the problem. A now mandatory security
reindoctrination program was developed and presented to
all employees. in addition. the initial security
briefing for new employees was revised and expanded.
? The Moore case demonstrated that first-line
supervisors must assume a large responsibility for
.recognising and dealing with employee suitability issues
before they become security problems. IL the Agency.
steps were taken through approved training mechanisms to
educate the Agency's supervisors about these important
duties and responsibilities.
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' The Moore case shoved that there was a need to
generate a greater awareness of the Personnel Zvalustion
board (PZR)s an interoffice panel consisting of officers
from the Offices of personnel. Security and Medical
Services who most with management representatives to
discuss-problems of employee suitability. Special
efforts were introduced after Moore to publicize the role
of PZB and to encourage greater use of the
instrumentality. As a result of these efforts, the use
and effectiveness of the PZB have increased significantly.
The Moore case surfaced the need for periodic
unannounced spot checks of briefcases and packages to
lessen the possibility Of unauthorised removal from
Agency buildings of classified materials. A special
educational program alerted all employees to their
physical security responsibilities.
' The !Goose case delivered up a more forceful
approach in the handling of the Agency's personnel
security cases.
61 The Ebore case reaffirmed that formal
compastaentation and need-to-know are viable principles
for use in the wyeucy's security irogram. ?Lis message
was transmitted throughout the Agency.
?Tha Moore case slowed that there is close
interrelationship between security and suitability
issues,, a disgruntled employee has the potential for
causing serious security difficulties regardless of the
basis for his bitterness. After the Moore case, this
point was made with unusual vigor throughout the chain of
command and with those involved with clearance
adjudications.
' The Moore case showed that Agency management had
to place greater reliance an the screening are of the
Agency,.-.particularly the Office of Medical Services which
was quite accurate in its psychological assessment of Ma'.
Moore. The Office of Medial Services now plays a
stronger role in the screening of applicants.
' Ti.. analysis of the Moore case concluded that a
vigorous repolygraph program offers the bast chance of
uncovering an individual who is deliberately violating
the security trust expected of employees. The Agency's
repol)graph program was significantly strengthened as a
result of the hour* case review.
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there was a peed to
Personnel tvalustion
consisting of officers
rity end Medical
epresestativee to
ility. fpecial
to publicise the role
of the
eee efforts, the use
ncressed significantly.
e rased for periodic
es mad packages to
Fed removal from
iials. A special
oleos to their
p a more forceful
ncy's personnel
that dorsal
to Viable principles
ograa. %%is message
cy.
there is close
and suitability
the potential for
as regardless of the
s news case, this
hreaghout the chain of
h clearance
Agency management had
,rooming arm of the
Medical services which
ical assessment of Mr.
ces mow plays a
pplicants.
case concluded that a
the best chance of
iberately violating
ayees. The Agency's
by strengthened as e
cornerstone of a sound security program is faith and
trust in the individual employee. The quality of
employees should be uppermost in the selection n process.
Personnel security standards must not be bent.
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690
MCKGAOIATD Cp THE CASE
.'Christopher Jchn Boyce worked for TOW. Inc., in =1
Segundo, California, from 1974 to 1976 as a document control
Clark, courier and communicator. He had access to Agency
classified and compartmented documents regarding technical
intelligence collection systems, and to cryptological systems.
During Boyce's employment at ^W. he periodically removed,
copied and returned hundreds of documents. He photographed
other documents and devices in the document control and
communications center where he worked. Boyce gave this
information to an accomplice, Andrew Caultou Lee, who sold it to
the Deviate for about $i5,000.
In January 1977,, h. Nexican police arrested loss outside
the Soviet Ambassy in Nexicu City. He was found to hive
mictofilar of Top Secret documents in his l.osseasion. Boyce and
Lee were convicted of conspiracy, espionage. and theft. Boyce
was sentenced to 40 years imprisonment, and Lee to life
imprisonment.
LESSONS 01' THE CASE/COAKELMIVE ACTIONS
The Boyce case illustrated a need to initiate
a program of selective polygraph use in private industry
on key contractor personnel having access to sensitive
?codeword documents. In the Agency an authorisation was
obtained for a pilot effort which later led to a formal
approval to establish an industrial polygraph program.
The Boyce case showed that investigative
coverage in industrial cases should be as extensive as in
staff cases and should focus on peer connections in
addition to family associations. This message was
transmitted to all Agency field office investigative
personnel.
The Loyce care determined that the application of
personnel sectiity standares in the appraisal of
-Industrial cases had to be upgraded to the level of
adjudication used in Agency staff employee cases. After
Boyce, steps were Immediately taken to tighten the
screening process an contractor cases.
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d for TM. Inc.. in M1
76 me a document control
e had access to Agency
ate regarding technical
e periodd
a to periodically removed.
umests. Mc photographed
document control and
ed. Boyce gave this
w Esulton Lae, Who sold it to
police arrested as outside
me was found to have
in his possession. Boyce and
spiomage. and theft. Boyce
eat, and SAO to life
+tested a need to initiate
mph we in private industry
aving access to sensitive
+ ih ch later authorization
formal
+strial polygraph program.
M that investigative
should be as extensive as in
ao Peet connections in
Wis. This message was
ld office investigative
mimed that the application of
in the appraisal of
graded to the level of
tatf employee cases. After
taken to tighten the
or cases.
? The boyce case surfaced a seed for a program of
periodic, unannounced. cosprehensive security audits of
industrial contractor facilities. pasources were
obtained to establish an Industrial security Branch with
the responsibility of conducting tiese security
inspections.
? ?Le Boyce case brought hose again the,close
relationship between security and suitabiaity issues i+:
the realm of personnel security. The personality and
character flaws of Christopher Boyce were the key to his
treasonable behavior !u private industry. in the wake of
the'.bese. the Agency moved to a greater emphasis upon
suitability **sees In:-the industrial cases. $L addition.
a sew Industrial pview panel was created at that time to
address suitability p*cblems in industry..
? Though essentially a personnel security failure.
the Boyce case also led to various physical security
reform measures. especially having to do with document
controls and personnel access controls.
? The Boyce case pointed to the need to improve
the lime of communication between the Agency and the
industrial security officer counterparts. Arrangements,
thercfors: were made to bold-regularly sdheduled
Industrial security Seminars to educate contractor
security officers on Agency security requirements. and to
provide a form for appropriate dialogue on patters of
nutiial interest.
? The Boyce case again showed the correlation
between effective line supervision and effective
security.. It also illustrated the importance of
involvement by all supervisors in the policies and
practices of the organisation's security. program.
The Boyce case delivered insights on peaessary
security reforms for communications and registry
operations. especially the 'two-man' rule whenever
handling especially sensitive information is-involved.
49-958.0 - 65 - 29
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sucrcaaouro or wn CAS!
Niliaan Pater Raapilss was a CIA staff saployse iron
tisreb wall October 1977. In apK ooisstsly August ab77, be
removed a top becret/Caspar taented annual psrtaiaing to a
sensitive technical Collection Project. so removed it it.. she
office where he was assigssa. walked out Of tho Agency
sesdgusrters Building and tea it to his apartasut. Maptl.n
resigned in October 1977 after receiving a warning letter the
previous month for poor perforaaso.. R. swbsegwstly took the
asncai to Athens. Or*", abore be sold it to a soviet Srbassy,
official for 67.000. Naspiles as. arrested by tbs Paz is August
1970 and Confessed to the theft and sale of the asnusl to the
Soviets. On 22 December 1970. he was sentenced to 40 years in
Prison.
Iigs00$ OP Q&Z/000Wrz,i AC^I008
'The saspiles ease illustrated the value of
assigning Career security offtsrs to lies aospoassts
where *bay can aoaitor operational activity closely and
opot possible personnel security problem early.
Following we $aspils. ease. a cajor drive was lasnebed
to place security Careerists in r.sidesos' In-all the
s+sjor OosPooents of the Agency. This drive is now
finished and waned successful.
' The laspil.. case shoved the need for security
awareness Progress to be ailed at Individual s ploys..
,and at Overviews. After the case broke. a Sew grog,
was sstabiishid is the office of Security for this
purpose with additional personnel dedicated s=clcaively
. toti.cunity~uination a" security education
' 'The iPaapiles case detersiasd that tb.re was a
need to conduct a Comprehensive review of now Agency
.sployees early on and Certainly before tbe end of a
tbrs-yeas 'probationary period.' subsequent to tbo
case. procedures ware establiatad to Provide such
screening by the Offices of Personnel, security and
-medical i.rvlcm, along with a psrforasaa/suitability
assessment by the supervisory chain of command. the
review Conducted by the Office of security includes both
a reinvestigation update and a polygraph reiatisviw.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP90M00004RO01000170024-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP90M00004RO01000170024-3
M
as a CIA staff asployce cram
ftsoalmatsly August ab77, be
ited annual partaioiag to a
project. so removed it true the
calked out of tb. Agency
It to his apartment. Mapiles
receiving a warning letter the
lease. I. subssqu?atiy took the
1 be 0014 It to a Soviet Sabsssy
was attested by the Val In August
and Sale of the manual to the
be one sentenced to 40 years to
Ulasttated the value Of
.y officers to lime eonpments
Vocational activity closely and
Security problem early.
0as, a major drive was lmunched
lots elm residences to all the
Agency. This drive is mow
mwaftl
v .bowed the seed for security
me aimed at Individual anpleyeee
er the ou? broke, a Sew group
+if oe of security far this
personnel dedicated exclusively
as sad Security education
.N d?teraiasd that there was a
hwiv review of now Agency
ertaialy before the and of a
pwied.? Subsequent to the
tablisb?d to provide each
at perscm?i, Security and
With a p?rforaasoe/saitability
leery e-ain of command. Tha
Ottiw of security includes both
and a polygraph r?interviw.
? The taapil?s case led to a conclusion that
physical security programing Seeded to be strengthened.
??Reasures were taken to improve compound perimeter
security by upgrading the fences, outdoor lights. alarms,
guard consoles, and badge controls. Steps were also
taken to upgrade the overall security access system.
? The Kaspiles case highlighted concerns over
:document controls. Now emphasis was given to strict
accountability for T4 Secret and other highly sensitive
documents. Disseminations of sensitive intelligence
reports were curtailed in strict conformity with the
'need-to-know` principle.
? The Supplies case brought attention to registry
speratioas, polities and procedures. following a full
review of this matter. steps were taken to establish a
separate career service for registry officers and
Information cobtrol specialists. Tighter controls were
established on the flow of documents and a program for
periodic audits of controlled documents was established.
? Tuft Kaspiles case illustrated the importance of
psychological assessment as a prelude to appointment to
sensitive positions. It the individual's self-image and
the mature of his assignment are widely discrepant.
serious maladjustment may ensue. The Agency has reacted
.-to this possibility by significantly increasing its
reliance upon psychological testing prior to employment.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP90M00004RO01000170024-3