S. 1721, A BILL ENTITLED THE "INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT ACT OF 1987."

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00004R001000110001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 6, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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ACTIO1
OCA 37-j11F8
OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
IRou"M Slip
ACTION
INFO
1.
D/OCA
x
2.
DD/Legislation
X
3.
DD/Senate Affairs
x
4.
Ch/Senate Affairs
5.
DD/House Affairs
x
6.
Ch/House Affairs
7. Admin Officer
8.
Executive Officer
9.
FOIA Officer
10 Constituent Inquiries
Officer
l t.
X
12.
SUSPENSE 2N10'187
STAT
STAT
STAT
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20503
STAT
October 6, 1987 87-5176`Y
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORAN)& ,car,
TO: Legislative Liaison Officer-
** Central Intelligence Agency
National Security Council - Courtney - X6534 - GF/WW
(OEOB - Room #381)
** Department of Justice - Perkins - 633-2113 (17)
Department of Defense - Brick - 697-1305 (06)
Department of State - Howdershell - 647-4463 (25)
Department of the Treasury - Carro - 566-8523 (28)
Department of Energy - Rabben - 586-6718 (09)
SUBJECT: S. 1721, a bill entitled the "Intelligence Oversight Act of
1987."
** Please provide written comments in the form a report that
could be sent to the Senate Select Intelligence Committee
following interagency review and clearance.
The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your
agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship
to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular
A-19.
A response to this request for your views is needed no later than
NOVEMBER 2, 1987.
Questions should be referred to Annette Rooney/Sue Thau
(395-7300) the legislative analyst in this office or to Russ
Neely (395-4800).
Cow-"waM 6&7
RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference
cc:
A.
B.
B.
A.
Donahue
Howard
Damus
B. Culvahouse, Jr.
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September 25, 1987
- CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE overnment-to make our
812852 S
that a portion of the Gauley rivers. To give people a chance to be of good t
propose I sponsored mutual responsibilities under the law
River , be established as a national heard on the proposal,
press in
recreation areaMeeaaddothandthe e Blower lue- pnafi~eabtir~ Wha r bin. a it m my YAsehas and certain as we been reported in can.
e
portiobe of th
w eps
ident stone designated as the State's first This bill will desire to protect their river-but not ~ntaken a number fsconcrete st
N reported
wild and scenic rivers.
also allow for much New -needed River boundary Gorge through Moreover, any Pladesf~sationn as a that is scenic put river. forth In to this the direction. intelligence These were Committees last
to protect the Greenbrier must ad- August. He has told us that there will
modifications the
National River. . the issue of flood control. In not be oral fiil8ings in the future, that
tine state will g givu- 1985, the region was devastated by a such findings will not authorize covert
Protecting will give people rivers in e the, their opportprfu- dress
nity to enjoy their unmatched beauty flood. Currently, the Corps of Engi? actions retro tively, and that all
will be periodically
vert Dogra
odi
p
ofr these rivers willdgo la l gaway that i lpsuggest variousialternatives subjected to review. These steps are
one is
recognize
stud toward luring more tourists south- OtOhO- ~; y?~ ni ~ti ~d public discuwill ssion nevertheless welcome and and obliged to commendable. But that
ern West Virginia. Each Year.
tourists ists visit the the New River Gorge Na- b January 1988. these are of law. hich may be subject
tional River. Being Dart of the Nation- Based on what I have heard from waivers approved by
al Park System will provide increased my constitutents and the unresolved to the President xceptions or w w special
awareness-both nationally and inter- flood control issue. I have decided not ci cu -
which are would not be highly
nationally-to the recreational oppor. to include the Greenbrier River in this stances-ones Preside stances-ones that
tunities available on these rivers. It legislation. Since there is an enormous future adminlministrstions.
will give West Vi s wild, wonder- interest in protecting the river. I will upon The any bill I furintroducing today ac-
ect the river a
cepts and builds upon the commit-
tin rivers more publicity than we could flocal plan that wUl pro in developing
ever buy. menta already made to the Intelli-
The recently funded New River while not precluding effective flood
Bence Committees by the President. It
Parkway, the Le, and the just-completed West Vir- control. does not purport to be the final
cm Turnpike' and the soon-to-be Mr. president, without a doubt, the answer. but it drepresent a oom-
copleted Interstate areas 64 will enable rivers thaotn ahiaave proposed of inclusion !n prewe butdoes to represent
and
safe. and convenient to visit these ent on modern, the gr-st where finecessary, ve attempt t improve the current
Indeed. nis s interstate Ehnactment off thiwild and s legislation will com- where of ieeve the
the bill oversight.
r is a lengthy sec
system West Virge ' Appended intelligence
rate and know among the most elabo- plement the existing greatly River Gorge
nd greatly enhance
don-by-section ppen d to analysis which sets
sate aaccessible in the Nation. National River a
forth its Pia in great chtail. I
The Ga;uley River National Recrea- Wet Virginia development
urrism.. I ht rge fish only to Purposes n several of them
lion Area rea will Dover a =4 mile scou~ag~ colleagues to pan this legislation ben.
went from Summeraville t4 Swiss. ylay ible.fi
the bill would place all of the
First
soon as D
h
,
as
With its boulder-strewn rapids' hig
ledges. narrow chutes. and tortuous By Mr. COHEN (for himself. Mr. laws bearing upon intelligence over-in the
Uni channels, this area provides one of the BIXisyn. Mr. DaCoxcixi, and sight would restru utre States
those
most spectacular whitewater expert- Mr. Mmcicowssi):
ences in the countryuntry. In 1986. S. 1721. A bill to improve the con- laws in a logical. coherent fashion. Ac-
ahitewater recreation on the Gauley oversight of certain intelli? cordinglY. the Hughes-Ryan Amend-
alone pumped over $16 million into gressional
activvi activities the Foreign Assistan efiAct of 1961. would
g, and the local economy' process by activitieswhich such strengthen
moved to that portion of the
oversight statute which udeals
The Meadow River, from the Route D branch 19 Bridge to its confluence with the approved within the execithe Se. be
and for other purposes: with limitations on the funding of in-
Gauley, in a wild and primitive con- Committee on Intelligence.
colon. For rafting enthusiasts, , thit's e illral ia~cs ovptstaxr ACT telligence activities. Moreover, the lim-
than
even more demanding
steep Y due to its narrow channel and tr e Mr. COHEN M. ducing todayy,r along a wnt, I in- Ration set forth in ith three would be expanded to coverhagen ies
steep grade.
the Bluestone. tee. SenatorstBarrsZ$, DECO sips and CIA rt hich may be branch used tot
One of he States most 4 the pristine
the United b my o
Well known for its beauty and mag- the
Mvasowsxt, a bill entitled the Intelli. lac within the executive branch for eral Well gorge, superb opportunities Bence Oversight Act of 1967, which is pro y
this itself oo ly years, applies ~ieb though to CIA.
exist ng statutory
exist for the, camping, rafting, and framework work already strengthen
Th teliminate
canoeing on the Bluestone. was Greenbrier lRiver was also stud- area and to ensure that aCongress will ctive. effective if to those under
lee current
congressional
led tudy. the the legislative Fo~uSe role continue to
the oversight of U.S. covert intel law ash pertain
, d, conducted by the oversight intelligence w chd stain
activities
s
covert and those
eligible that 133 Federal miles the tense activities, including
acv, determined
river were et fr Fpr otec lions.
activities."
Lion. Under the e provisions of the 1968 It is important to recognize at the which pertain actions-
these requirements
miles new outset that restrictions this bill upon the would place President, no Under termed in the current lawbill, "special
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. 106 miles
were classified as scenic and 27
were judged to be recreational. The either in the conduct acions areThird thde bill w sforuthe first
au-
iz t ry au-
Fo Service recommended d thNat . Itparitica are Rather, it covert
is. aimed at me Y for dthe President e expl iul it sc at u ho
river protected by the Scalee t activities,"
or
ral aI Stream Preservation Act-not by atrenthenint the congressional over- time.
r ,"
of U.S. oforeign policy obis the res
covert the Federal Government through con-
sibilit es and rolce a ofYiboth branches in s ppo actions, or "special gressionalctiti
tives. provided they are authorize in
swit the
t
alt et
h
e
e
the
Tobe sure,e aacc
d hundreds of Ve
d
a I have receive
met under current lav
in c
b ilk As I mentione numerous phone calls, and ha
with many residents of Pocahontas festiveness of any law will ultimately forth he
trust and outset. these requirements do not
and Greenbrier g the on there resin depend fth upon the of both parties. but it nev- e tail new restrictions
designed to imp o ve the
peel including the l y Protected ertheless behooves us-in the interests ns. but
of Greenbr the system of federally D
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September 25, 1987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD'- SENATE S 12853
ability of the intelligence Committees (b) The president shall ensure that any il- written record of the President's decision
to carry out their oversight of this legal intelligence activity or significant in- shall be contemporaneously made and shall
vital area. teiligence failure is reported to the lnteW- be reduced to a written finding as soon as
Recent *)erience has demonstrated Bence committee, as well a& any corrective possible but In no event more than forty.
that the current system has numerous action that has been i.. ken or is planned in eight (48) hours after the decision is made;
connection with such Illegal activity or in- (2) A finding may not authorize or sane-
flaws. This bill addresses them. It pro- telligence failure. tion special activities, or any aspect of such
vides for written authorization of (c) The President and the Intelligence activities, which have already occurred;
covert actions and prohibits retroac. committees shall each establish such proce- (3) Each finding shall specify each and
tive authorizations. It requires the dures as may be necessary to carry out the every department. agency, or entity of the
congressional oversight committees to provisions of this title. United States Government authorized to
(d) The House of Representatives and the fund or otherwise participate in any way In
be advised of all findings within 48 Senate, in consultation with the Director of such activities; provided that any employee,
hours of their being signed, but per- Central Intelligence. shall each establish, by contractor, or contras agent of a depart-
mits such notice to be limited to the rule or resolution of such House. procedures ment. agency or entity other than the Cen-
leadership of both Houses and the to protect from unauthorized disclosure all tral Intelligence Agency directed to partici-
chairmen and vice-chairmen of the In- classified information and all information pate in any way in a special activity shall be
telligence Committees where the Presi- relating to Intelligence sources and methods subject either to the policies and regula-
dent deems such limited notice essen- furnished to the intelligence committees or ions of the Central Intelligence Agency, or
tial to protect vital U.S. interests. It to Members of Congress under this section. to written policies or regulations adopted by
provides that the Intelligence Commit- In accordance with such procedures. each of such department. agency or entity. In con-
the intelligence committees shall promptly sultation with the Director of Central Intel-
tees be made aware of precisely who call to the attention of Its respective House, licence, to govern such Participation;
within Government and outside GOv- or to any appropriate committee or commit- (4) Each finding shall specify. In accord-
er7lment will be used to carry out tees of its respective House, any matter re- ance with procedures to be established pur-
covert actions, and it puts to rest the lating to intelligence activities requiring the sto subsection 501(c), any third party.
notion that the President may author- attention of such House or such committee suant u ding a foreign country, third is not
an eleing a y co ignc ou or which in agent
ize, under the rubric of covert actions, Or committees. inclu
activities which would violate the slat- (e) Nothing In this Act shall be construed of, the United States Government, or is not from utes of the United States. the ntell ice to withhold Information
otherwise subject to U.S. Government poll-
I hope this bill will receive serious that Iprovid providing e n the on Information to the the grounds Intel- de and regulations, who it is contempiated
g committees e wise se participate
consideration, both by my colleagues licence committees would constitute the un- will l be way used in to the fund d or or special otfheraerwiancer to In any
in the Senate and on the Intelligence authorized disclosure of classified informs. and
Committee and by those outside Con- Lion or Information relating to intelligence (5) A finding may not authorize any
represents ts a balanced, interest idced, this subject. - (f) As and intthis section. the term "Intel- action that would be Inconsistent with or
It dress with
m contrary to any statute of the United
ed activities" includes, but is not limit-
slue approach to congressional ional over- licence
W, ..special activities," as defined in sub. States.
tb) 'The President, the Director of Contest
-
sight of intelligence activities, which, section 503(e). below. Intelligence and the heads of all depart-
to my mind, would constitute a decid- SEC aa? REPORTING INWUJGENCE AI.TIVITIPB and entities of the United improvement over the current OTHER THAN SPECIAL ACTIVITIES. meets, agencies, ment authorized th tun or
or-
system. The Director of Central Intelligence and States otherwise vertmente to any way in f special
In addition to the bill and a section- the heads of all departments, agencies, and activity shall keep the intelligence commit-
by-section analysis, I am submitting other entities of the United States Govern- fulls and currently Informed of all sp-
the letter the President sent to the In- ment involved in intelligence activities shall tetees e fully ties which are the responsibility
of al steIIigence Committee w1tich I referred keep the intelligence committees fully and of, are engaged in by. or are carried out for activi
to earlier, and I ask unanimous con- currently informed of all intelligence actlvf- or on behalf of, any deportment, agency, or
sent that this material be printed in ties, other than special activities as defined in subsection 503(e), below, which are the entity of the United States Government. In
satisfying this othe Intelligence
the RECORD. responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are committees shall be obligation. tion furnished any Inforrna-
There being no objection, the mate-" carried out for or on behalf of, say depart- or mconcerning special any of or t-
the posser ng custody activities
rial was ordered to be printed in the meet, agency, or entity of the United S lion or towhich n is I material
cop-
RECORD, as follows: Government, including any significant an- trol of any department. agency, or entity of
S. 1721 ticipated intelligence activity; provided that the United States Government and which Is
such obligation shall be carried out with due requested by either of the intelligence corn-
the Be it enacted by t Senate and House of regard for the protection of classified tnfor- mlttee In oto carry out its authorized
Representatives of the United States of mation relating to sensitive intelligence responsibilities. order r America in Congress assembled That this source and methods. In satisfying this obli- ll ensure that any
Act may be cited as the "Intelligence Over- gation. the Director of Central Intelligence (c) The Issued President shall subsection my
sight Act of 1987." and the heads of all departments and agen- finding
ove, shall d reported to the intelligence (a),
Sscriow 1. Section 662 of the Foreign As- ties and other entities of the United States abhossible, bet g ne
sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2422) is Government in intelligence activities shall abov s later al as
than soon forty-eight pos ible hour after no
hereby repealed. furnish the intelligence committees any in- event
Sac. 2. Section 501 of Title V of the Na- formation or material concerning intelll- It has been signed; provided however, that
tional Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413) is gence activities other than special activities if the President determines It Is essential to
amended by striking the language contained which is within their custody or control, and limit access to the finding to meet estrsor-
therein. and substituting the following new which is requested by either of the intelli- dinary circumstances affecting vital inter-
sections: gence committees In order to carry out its eats of the United States, such finding may
-SEC, nil. GENERAL PROVISIONS authorized responsibilities. be reported to the chairmen and ranking
(a) The President shall ensure that the 8EC. Si). APPROVING AND REPORTING SPECIAL AG minority members of the intelligence com-
Select Committee mittees. the Speaker and minority leader of
Senate and the tee the on Permanent Select Intelligence of Commit- the (a) The President may authorize the con- the House of Representatives, and the ma-eaders tee of the House of Representatives (herein- duct of "special activities," as defined herein eKhe minority led copyof of the Senate. In
after In this title referred to as the "intelii- below, by departments, agencies, or entities gence committees") are Jsept fully and cur- of the United States Government when he ss ign hby he r sieun to shall be pthe finding,
r vidl ed to of igence rently informed of the intelligence activities determines such activities are necessary to
of the United States as required by this support the foreign policy objectives of the tee. Where access to a finding is limited to
title. Such activities shall ordinarily be con- United States and are important to the na- the Members of Congress identified herein
ducted pursuant to consultations between tional security of the United States, which above, a statement of the reasons for limit-
the President. or his representatives, and determination shall be set forth in a finding ing such access shall also be provided.
the intelligence committees. prior to the Im- that shall meet each of the following condi- the iratea Presidoeon tll promptly aPPliif y
plementation of such activities, although tions:
a.rove, of any specified
the United States Is r e- unless suble. the bsection Memc)bers of Congress
as significant
nothing requiring the approval of the intelligence immediate action by shall
committees as a condition precedent to the raquired tion of and time does finding. pin which ermit the pt rep - change in any previously-approved special a activity.
initiation of such activities
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S12954
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 05, 1987
(et As toad in this section. the term "spec * 1I(* a. OVg5S1GHT Or 15 ZLLICOrCS agt170H 60 1. CrJrntALPROVISIONS
oral activity" means any activity conducted ACTIVITIES The new Section 501 of Title V of the Ns-
in support of national fnrElgn policy nbjec- Section 2 of hie bill would replace the ex- tional Security Art of 1947 would specify
tivess abroad which is plane. d and executed isting Section 501 of the National eecurity the general responslbllitws of the President
so that the role of the United States Gov- Act of 1947 with three new sections that and the Congress for oversight of Intclli-
emment Is not apparent or acknowledged prescribe, respectively, general provisions weoceactivities.
publicly, and functions in support of such for oversight of all intelligence activttica. re- /a) Presidential Du!ws and Prior
activity, but which is not intended to influ- porting of Intelligence activities other than Consultation
once United States political procraws. special activities, and approval and report- Subsection (a) would place a statutory ob-
public opinion, policies or media, and does Ing of special activities. This revision of cur' Ligation upon Lh Presddnn! to ensure that
Intelli-
include to In. rent not geno, saiaiyeo a collect conducted by The first islto clarifyiand emphasize the the Senate Bel Committed on Iiigt armed forces t ml es of Op the ra ors United d States te by and K:wral responsibilities of the President to gence and theouse Permanent Select
the at
wbiprt to the War Powers Resolution (50 work with the Cenugtress, through the House Committee on Intelligence inferred to in
the bill as the **intelligence eommitterl:'1
-- U.S.C. 1541 ?1548), diploms'te trlhitks car' and Senate ?b,1 rlC IIntelligence nn.llitencde.nM Committeca, rM
rr are kept fully and currently informed of -- .e ^r?i:-II Inc the
sons otherwise acting pursuant to the au- W??-~ ??? "
thority of the President. or activities of the law does not fully address the obligations: of
Department of Justice or federal law en- the President. Nor does the existing statute
forccment agencies soL^ly to provide assist- reflect the commitment to consultation
once to the law enforcement authorities of with the Congress made by the President as
' a result of the lessons learned from the
foreign governments."
3. Section 802 of Title V of the Na- second o inquiries.
onal Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414) is The e sobjective is to eliminate un-
Dredesignated as section 804 of such Act. and necessary ambiguities the law. Experi-
Indicat
is amended by adding the following new once under the e current in statute has -
ed significant areas where Congressional
subsection (d): Intent may be subject to misinterpretation
`(d) No funds appropriated for, or other' by Executive branch officials, as well as
wise available to, any department. agency, gaps in the law where Congress did not ads
or entity of the United States Government. quately anticipate the need for statutory
may be expended. or may be directed to be guidance. Examples are the uncertain me-
an-expended, for any special activity, as de? jog of the requirement to report ',1n a
fined In subsection 503(e). above. unless and timely fashion." the absence of an explicit
until a Presidential finding required by sub- provision for written Presidential Pindings,
section 503(a), above, has been signed or and the need to specify those responsible
otherwise Issued in accordance with that for implementing covert actions. The aim is
subsea :!on " to clarify the Intent of Congress with re-
Sec. 4. Section 503 of Title V of the Na- spent to oversight of intelligence activities
tonal Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C_ 415) is so as to reduce the possibilities for misun-
redesignated as section 80S of such Att. derstisnding or evasion. Por purposes of clar?
? Ity, a diallnetion is made between the de-
Sgc'Tiovc?nT-Scerlow AxAi.vsts tailed provisions for special activities, which
are instruments of U.S. foreign policy, and
aatT1OM 1. agegAI Or 1fUCHS2-aYAA the requirements for other intelligence ac-
AldaprlCeT tivities (i.e., collection. analysis. counterin-
Current statutory provisions for Intelli- telligence) that are less controversial
getter oversight Include the general require- A third objective is to provide statutory
menta to inform the House and Senate In. authority for the President to employ spe-
telligenoe Committees in Title V of the Na- cial activities to implement U.S. foreign
toonal Security Act of 1947. as amended in policy done er n Congress has enot
xtent
authorized except to to thLbe e e n nt
1980, and the requirement of Presidential that the CIA was o, so,
t a
approval for CIA tArt In , Section al Security Act of 1947 "to perform such
ameofded the (22 USC Assistance 2422-the Hu?h rt oes-R1 1961, as other functions and duties related to intelli-
differences language gence affecting the national security as the
Amendmenntt)I ). The e ins National Security Council may from time to
and mope
source between of these h tmnroe provisions ahave time direct." Current law requires Presiden-
been old repeal tea) approval and the reporting to Congress
Therefsfore, Syan 1 of the bill ill Amendment In n order r to to of "intelligence operations in foreign eoun-
the sue Hughes-Ryan Rytn re tries, other than activities Intended solely
qirmenl a new Presidential gal Part rt of f a a more co- re- for obtaining necessary Intelligence." This
herent
as an Integral p doe., not provide affirmative statutory au-
herent and comprehensive statutory over- thority to employ covert means as a supple-
sight framework for covert action (or "spe- ment to overt instruments of U.S. foreign
eta] activities") and other Intelligence acthi- policy. Nor does It specify what t)'pes of ac-
ties. The superceding Presidential approval tivity are intended to be covered by the
requirement is contained in the proposed legal requirements for covert action. This
new sections 503 and 504(d) of the National has called into question the legality of
Security Act of 1947. discussed below. covert actions, such as arms transfers, un-
This change is Intended to bring current dertaken as alternatives to overt programs
law more closely into line with Executive with express statutory authority. Congress
branch policy which requires Presidential should expressly authorae covert action as
approval for covert action by any COMM a legitimate foreign policy instrument, sub'
nent of the U.S. Government. not Just by ject to clearly defined approval and report-
the CIA. Section 3.1 of Executive Order Ing requirements.
12333, December 4. 1981, states, "The M The overall purpose .of this bill is to use
quirements of section 162 of the Foreign As- the lessons of recent experience to establish
sistanee Act of 1961, as amended (22 USC a more effective statutory framework for
2422). and section 501 of the National Secu- executive-legislative cooperation In the field
rity Act of 1947. as amended (50 USC 413), of intelligence. Such legislation is not a
shall apply to all special activities as defined guarantee against conflicts between the
in thin Order." Replacing Itughew-Ryan branches or abuses of power. It can. howev-
with a comprehensive Presidential approval er, he!p minimize such conflicts and abuses
requirement for covert action (or ',special by emphasizing the mutual obligations of
activities") by any U.S. Government entity the President and Congress and by eliminate
gives statutory force to a policy that has not ing unnecessary legal ambiguities that
been consistently followed in recent years. invite misunderstanding on both sides.
inLwuigrrILT acuv liras UI IIV V NH.6%e ON.Cp
as required by this title. Current law im-
poses such duties on the DCI and agency
heads, but not on the President himself.
Overall responsibility should be vested in
the President because of the Importance
and sensitivity of secret intelligence activi-
ties that may affect vital national interests
and because the President may have unique
knoaiedge of those activities that he is best
suited to ensure is Imparted to the intelli-
gence committees. The terms and conditions
for keeping the committees "fully and cur-
rently Informed" are those set forth in Sec-
tions 502 and 503, discussed below.
In addition, subsection (a) would provide
that U.S. intelligence activities shall ordi-
narily be conducted pursuant to consults-
Lions between the President, or his repre-
sentatives. and the intelligence committees.
prior to the implementation of such activi-
ties This is consistent with the intentions
of the President as stated In his letter of
August S. 1987,.to the Chairman and Vice
Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Com-
mlttre. It applies to all U.S. intelligence ac-
tivitta, including collection, analysis. cour-
terinteiligence, and special activities. Addi-
4lonsl Presidential reporting requirements
for special activities are set forth in Section
803. discussed below. This new general pro-
vision for prior consultation with the intelli-
gence committees would supplement cur-
rent requirements for keepin8 the commit-
tees informed of "significant anticipated in-
telligence activities." The requirement for
prior consultations is a more complete re-
flection of the need for executive-legislative
cooperation in ilia formulation of intelli-
gence policies. For example, the President
or his representatives should ordinarily con-
suit the intelligence committees on pro-
posed Presidential Findings prior to their
approval by the President.
Subsection (a) would also retain the quali-
fication in current law that nothing con-
tained In the prior consultation or prior
notice requirements shall be construed as
requiring the approval of the intelligence
committees as a condition prrcudeni to the
initiation of such activities. Thv parallel
provision of existing law is taus (A) of
paragraph 501ia)(1).
ell Illegal Activities and Sigistvicant
Failures
Subsection (b) would require the Presi-
dent to ensure that any Iilecal intelligence
activity or significant intelligence failure is
reported to the Intelligence committees, as
well as any corrective action that has been
taken or Is planned In connection with such
Illegal activity or failure. Under current law.
paragraph 801tax3) Imposes this duty on
the DC.1 and agency heads, subject to cer-
tain conditions. The purpose is to place an
unqualified statutory obligation on the
President to ensure reporting of such mat-
ters to the committees. The President
should establish procedures for review
within the Executive branch of intelligence
activities that may have been illegal and for
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September 25, 1987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
_
reporting to the intelligence committees States involved in intelligence activities bons are the natio a with proper eterm'
tion interest as
committees
intelligence
the
ected t Dr ntaUva of the Ameri-
there furnish
Con-
a core sonable Pounds to madethat the any shallinformation or material concerning in- by the elected and the
activities (other than special ac- can people-the Pres
activity was a violation of the Constitution, teUfgetice
statuta. or Executive orders of the United tivlt.ies) which is within their custody or gress-through a process that protects nec-
Stata? The President should establish Pro- e c ,l, and which is requested by either of essary order to presidential Findings
cedures for the reporting of activities deter- the 'uttelligence committees in
Subsection (a) would provide su-
mined to be significant intelligence failures. carry out its sus subjec res pbvisioorny do the President pr auatut statutory the
The current provision requires the report- This protection sensitive is subject to the provision
conduct of special activities by departments,
Ing for tare ofn a tllme y fasacti hvion.oThis ilficant language Is source and methods, discussed below. chand f entities of the United nee-
States agencies of Ines
deleted because of its ambiguity. The intent protection of Sensitive Sources and Methods when he determ es such the United are nec-
e ne
Is that the committees should be notified The obligation to keep the intelligence canary to support the foreign policy c-
immediately whenever a determination is committees fully and currently informed Uves of the United Stales and are important
o made under procedures established by the under this section is to be carried out with to the national secu%ty of the United
President in consultation with the intelli- due regard for the protection of classified States. This determination must be set
gence committees. Information relating to sensitive intelligence fob in a --Finding" that meets certain con-
Another difference from existing law Is sources and methods. This provision is siml- ditions. The importance of this requirement
that the requirement to report Ulegal activi- Ian to the second preambular clause In the is underscored by Section ection 3 of the bill, dls-
ties or significant failures would not be sub- current subsection 501(a) which imposes cons which 3 expenditure of
ject to the preambular clauses in the cur- duties "to the extent consistent with due uses for any special prohibits ex unless and
rent subsection 501(a) which could be inter- regard for the protection from unauthorized ufunds ntil suh any Finding has been
preted as qualifying the statutory obligation disclosure of classified information and in- Issued.
to inform the intelligence committees. formation relating to intellign ~ language The current Presidential approval provi-
Subsections (c) through (e) wou des moremaccurael" The y reflects and Is Intended to lion In he Hughes-Ryan Amendment (22
Svbsons of e) through Su would retain have the same meaning as the legislative USC 2422) requires a finding by the Presl-
history of the similar preambular clause in dent "that each such operation Is important
provisions of existing law. Subsection (c) is to the national security of the United
that authorizes the a President subsection Intel existing law. new subsection
that the to establish and the Intel- The first preambular clause in the current States" The proposed
to car committees to oversight bligadura subsection 501(a) would be deleted. It tm- 503(a) would require the President to make
Subsection ctout their osam obligations, poses obligations "Itlo the extent consistent an additional determination that the activi-
s(d) is the same as the current with all applicable authorities and duties. ties ..are necessary to support the foreign
procedures the House including those conferred upon the execu- policy objectives of the United States." This
and ecWon b0 establish hat requires
and Senate se re esration furnished pro- tive and legislative branches of the Govern- conforms the statute to the Executive
ethat each This clause creates unnecessary am- branch definition of "special activities" in
twit the secrecy of information
committees that each bigulty in the law, because It has been inter- section 3.4(h) of Executive Order 12332
under and It appropriate and to ensure
House and ms y of relevant information. tine preted by some as Congressional acknowl- which refers to "activities conducted in sup-
Subsection se 0pWea rethe current nformation- edgement of an undefined constitutional au- port of national foreign policy objectives
5(e) repeats the csuba- thority of the Executive branch to disregard abroad." The President should determine
tion may not be makes clear that the intma- the statutory obligations. Recent experience not only that the operation is important to
Won co not to lvttdethis from tAct he Inoue indicates that legislation qualifying its national security. but also that it Is consist-
grounds s that providing under or of the tetms'by reference to the President's consti- ent with and in furtherance of established
the Intelligence het committees would be unu- tutional authorities may leave doubt as to U.S. foreign policy objectives.
the thorized lcommittees d Information niw the will of Congress and thus invite evasion. In addition to reflecting these presidential
or information disclosure of classified Legitimate Executive branch concerns are determinations, Findings must meet five
sources and methods. relating to intelligence adequately met by the provision for due conditions. First. paragraph 503(51(1) would
sources and regard for protection of sensitive intelli- require that each Finding be in writing.
Subsection (f) states uthilt sed the term "1ntn- gence sources and methods, discussed above unless immediate action is required of the
e
cigence but activities," ' limited used to this section, in- anCTION $05. ATP*OV1NG AND W'oRTIIta United States and time does Finns [peermit th
t s.,, as defined in subsection n 503speciale)). , dIs dig - $?=AL Aerrvtrltia preparatJon of a written
f Special activities (or covert actions) raise can a written record of the President's deci-
curse e
cuseed below. fundamentally different policy issues from sion would have to be contemporaneously
AsIVITIEf sosi . W An sp nN A ~IOcucs other U.S. intelligence activities because made and reduced tt oa written rat rode than
section n 502 502 is i intended t to o be sub- beI they are an instrument of foreign policy. soon as possible
The e new secIndeed. constitutional authorities draw a 4$ hours after the decision is made. This re-
stantially the same as the current require- distinction between Congressional power to quirement should prevent a President's sub-
ments of subsections 502(a)'1) and (2) inso- restrict the gathering of information, which ordinate from later claiming to have re-
far as they apply to Intelligence activities may Impair the President's ability to use ceived oral authorization without further
other than special activities. This distinc- diplomatic, military. and intelligence organi- s tiiastiio~ oTM the ~ It In also subordinate's un-
tion between special activities and other in- cations as his "eyes and ears." and Congres-
telligence activities is discussed more fully sional power to regulate covert action that with the President's current policy of re-
with respect to section 503, below. goes beyond information gathering. There is quiring written Find50 (3 ax2) would restate
Fully and Currently INormed little support for the view that such special Second. paragraph Section 502 would require the Director of activities are an exclusive Presidential func- emphatically the current legal ban on retro-It would that a
Central intelligence (DD and the heads of tion.
departments. agencies and other entities to refuse two apphas the ropriate funds tn~y out Finding mFindings. t authorize orrosanction ape-
the use andfundsmay fed for ties, wh ch have aspecoccurredts of such This vin
of the United States Involved inlligence ce oemmi tees special activities
actyities to o keep the inkelligBen also consistent with the President's current
fully and currently informed of all intelli- such purposes.
ph 503( uire
gence activities, other than special activities Under current law, however, the Congres- policy. and
the defined in ti are engaged in by or Incomplete. d Tate is ambiguous. here in no express statutory that each Finding _specify -eachuand every
the carried out for or on behalf of any de- authorization for special activities: the re- department agency, or entity of the United
author to fund or
pLrtment, agency. or entity of the United quirement for
States, including any, significant anticipated alai activities appliese only to the CIA; and o he wise particiD to in anyway in the spe-
intelligence activity. Time special procedure Presidential approval procedures are not clal activities authorized in the Finding.
has intended that the President have LOW of Executive Order i12333 wh chastat
for prior paragraph g01(a) 1)l would gress specified.
rent clause (B) of es
be deleted, since it was Intended to apply to authority to conduct special activities which that no agency except the CIA in peacetime
duct
President determines that agesy is
discussed activities. to be governed by section are inconsistent he statutory requirements other may conss the
special
5
5033, , dibelow. statutes.
comm
formin
more satisfying the cub woulgationdto keep the scum- alai actvltlaiare Isub eat to milst~nlerorcta- flue." likely to achieve a particular obri~
Section 502 provide
mitten fully and currently informed. the Lion. and the scope of activities covered by Fourth, paragraph 503(aX4) would require
a procedures to be established, any third
DC1 agencies and athe nd other entities of the United remedy these deficiencies so that covert ac- with i
g
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S 12856 ' - - CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - . SENATE - . - ? September 15 1987
reported be accordance with sub-
man eleement of. cotthird rractoocountry. or co Ittractt the esl ptovviisioactivities, In subsection 5001(a) sect. icon 603(c).
mot of the U.S. Government. or 1s not nth- for prior consultations with the intelligence fe/ DSflnition of -Special Activities"
erwise subject to U.S. Government policies committees.
mirth ? definition of
and regulations, whom it is contemplated The fourth difference is that the obllp- the 8ectctbimn "special 800( 03(e) e) ac sets 'tiH nth Not heretofore,
f
will be used to fund or otherwise participate lion to infor he committees would not be
in any way in the special activity concerned. subject to a ._ _ral proviso that such obit- used Of defined used grace the term two has _
ner-
The purpose is to require the President's cep- nation shall be carried out with due retard ertheless been proval and notice to the intelligence cote' for the protection of classified Information live orders as a euphemism for the more col.
mitten when third countries, or private par relating to sensitive Intelligence sources and loquW term "covert attune". The term is
Iles outside norms) U.B. government con- methods. Instead, a specific statutory proce- adopted here not only because of its prevl-
trols. an used to help implement a covert dure would be established In subsection ?ow we within %~De~ Executive branch but as
action operation. The Intent r that proce- 503(c) for limiting the number of Members a more approptlSit designation of such ac.
dunes be established in consultation with of Congress to whom information would be thity by the U States.
the Intelligence committees to determine Imparted in exceptionally sensitive cases. As stated, the ~Ilnltion of "special activi-
when the involvement of a third party con- Moreover. sensitive sources and methods ties" set forth in section 503(e) Is based
stitutes use "to fund or otherwise partici- would also be protected under the proce- upon the definition of the term now set
pate" in a special activity and to determine dunes established by the President and the forth to section 8.4(h) of Executive order
when a private party is not "subject to U.B. Intelligence committees pursuant to subset- 17333. Issued by President Reagan on De-
Government policies and regulations." lion 501(c) and by the House of Represents- amber 4. 1981. Indeed, the first and princi-
Pifth, paragraph 503(aX5) would establish Lives and the Senate pursuant to subsection pal clause of the definition is taken verbs-
that a Finding may not authorize any action 801(d), tim from the definition in the Executive
that would be Inconsistent with or contrary le! Notice of Findings order. The exclusionary clauses, exempting
to any statute of the United States. This Is Subsection 503(c) would require the Press- certain activities from the scope of the defi-
similar to section 2.8 of Executive Order dent to ensure that any Findings issued pus. nition. are for the most part modifications
17333, which states that nothing in that suant to subsection (a), above, shall be re- of, or additions to, the exclusions contained
Order "shall be construed to authorize any ported to the intelligence committees as in the Executive order definition.
activity in violation of the Constitution or moon as possible, but in no event later than As defined In section 603(e). a "special ae-
statutes of the United Stites." Current CIA 48 hours after it has been signed. If, bower- tivity" is any activity conducted In support
policy is to conform Its operations to 8017 or. the President determines it Is essential of national foreign policy objectives abroad
federal statutes which apply to specW M& to limit seem to the Finding to meet ex- which Is planned and executed so that the
Uvities, either directly or as laws of general iraoedinary circumstances affecting vital In- role of the United States Government is not
application. This provision Is not Intended lerests of the United States, such Finding apparent or acknowledged publicly, and
to require that special activities authorized may be reported to a Members of Con- functions in support of such activity. The
in Presidential Findings comply with state' Cress-the chairman and ranking minority definition coven all covert activities under-
tory limitations which, by their terms, apply members of the intelligence committees, the taken by the United States to support its
only to another U.S. Government program Speaker and minority leader of the House foreign policy objectives towards other
or activity. For example, a statutory rest io? of Representatives, and the majority and countries regardless of the department,
lion on the overt Defense Department arms minority leaders of the Senate. This prone- agency, or element of the United States
transfer program would not apply to covert dure Is similar to the existing provision in Government used to carry out such activi-
CIA arms transfers authorized in a Finding, clause (B) of the current paragraph Use, While It applies to those activities'can.
even if the CIA obtained the arms from the 501(aX1) for limiting prior notice of "signlfi- ducted in support of national foreign policy
Defense Department under the SconomY cant anticipated intelligence activities" to objectives abroad the term encompasses
Act. When the Congressional concerns that the same 6 congressional leaders. those activities conducted by the United
led to the restriction on the Defbrse De- The principal differences from existing States Government within the territory of
psrtment program are relevant to the sled- law are the elimination of the preambular the United States, so long as they are in-
Jar covert CIA activity, those factors should clauses in the current subsection 501(a) that tended to support U.S. objectives abroad.
be taken Into account by the Intelligence qualify clause (1Xb) and the defection of The definition appiles.only to activities in
committees. the separate provision in the current subset- which the role of the US. Government is
Ibl Pulls and Currently Informed tlon 801(b) for "timely" notice when prior not apparent or acknowledged to the Public.
Subsection 503(b) would place a statutory notice is not given. These current provisions Thus, activities of the United States Gov-
obligation on Executive branch officials to have created confusion because they ernment conducted In support of national
keep the intelligence committees fully and appear, on the one hand, to require notice foreign policy objectives which are made
currently informed of special activities and of Findings to at least the a leaders while, known to the public, or which would be
furnish the intelligence committees any in. on the other hand, leaving open the possl- made known to the public or press if the
formation or material concerning special ac- bllity of postponement of notice until some Government were asked, are not covered by
tivities which they possess and which is re- time after a Finding is implemented The the definition.
quested by either of the intelligence nom- pro ed new subsection 503(c) changes the The definition also makes clear that ape:-
t of reference fn the law from notice edel activities shall not be intended to lnflu-
mlttees in order to carry out Its authorized pin
tesporsibilities. This subsection differs in prior to the Initiation of an activity to the ence U.S. political processes. public opinion.
four respects from the parallel provisions more logical point of notice Immediately policies or media. The purpose of this Ian-
o!
upon the Issuance of a Finding. guage is to preclude the use of the authority
Section 11,02 that apply to other Intelligence
Subsection 603(b) would also require that
activities in all cases a certified copy of the Finding contained in this bill to plan or execute ape
The first difference is that the obligation d b the President shall be provided to cial activities for the purpose of influencing
would be placed on the President, as well as signed of each intelligence commit- U.S. public opinion. While it Is recognized
on the DCI and the heads of departments. the chairman
tee and that it access. is limited, a statement that some special f fect activities may occasionally
agencies, and entities of the U.S. Govern- of the reasons for limiting access to the have an indirect effect on U.S. Public opin-
ment. The President may have unique Infor- of the concerned shall accompany the this no such activity may be instituted for
station concerning a special activity that coFinding py of the Finding. this purpose, and to the e extent such indirect
should be Imparted to the committees. effect can be minimized In the planning and
The second difference is that the obliga- Id) Notice ofSipnificant Changes execution of special activities. It should be
tion would be placed on the heads of depart- Subsection 503(d) would require the Presi- done. This portion of the definition relter-
ments. agencies, and entities of the U.S. dent to ensure that the intelligence commit- ates what has been longstanding policy and
Government "authorized to fund or other- tees, or, if applicable, the 8 leaders specified practice within the Executive branch.
wise participate In a special activity"- In subsection (c). are promptly notified of The definition further specifies four
rather than just those directly involved in the any significant change in any previously-ap- broad areas of activity undertaken by the
activity. This conforms to the terms of the proved special activity. The intent Is that United States Government in support of
presidential Finding requirement in subseo- such changes should be reported insofar as foreign policy objectives which are not In-
tion 503(8X3). practicable prior to their implementation. In eluded within the definition of special ac-
The third difference is that the require- accordance with procedura agreed upon by tivities even if planned and conducted so
ment to inform the committees of "any gig- the Intelligence committees and the Presi- that the role of the United States Govern-
nificant anticipated intelligence activity" dent. Such prooedura currently exist in the ment Is not apparent or acknowledged pub-
would be deleted. In the ease of special so- form of agreements entered into between licly. These include activities to collect nec-
tlvities, that requirement would be super- the DCI and the Chairman and Vice Chair- emary intelligence, military operations con-
ceded by the requirements In subsections man of the Senate Intelligence Committee ducted by the armed forces of the United
603(c) and (d). discussed below, for report- In 1064 and 1988. Any change in the actual States and subject to the War Powers Reso-
Ins 9residerAW Findings and -significant terms and conditions of a Finding would lution (50 U.S.C. 1841-188% diplomatic so.
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SPptcn ber 25.1987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 812857
tivities carried out by the Department of meant activities actually carried out covertly the Senate Select Committee, on Intelli-
State or persons otherwise acting pursuant and unilaterally by such agencies outside Bence for improving these procedures. I wel-
to the authority of the President. or activi- the United States. It would also not exclude come these constructive suggestions for the
ties of the Department of Justice or federal either assistance to law enforcement ages- development of a more positive partnership
law enforcement agencies solely to provide des of third countries, or Carrying out la'; between the intelligence committees and
assistance to the law enforcement authorl- enforcement activities outside the Unit.. the executive branch
ties of foreign governments. An explanation States. by elements of the U.S. Government Greater cooperation in this critical area
of each of these exclusions follows. which do not have law-enfor ement tuno- will be of substantial benefit to our country.
The exclusion of U.S activities to collect tons. ' and I pledge to work with you and the menu
necessary intelligence is intended to cover ga(znow s. Lngrt ow oil use or rvNme ros bens of the two committees to achieve it. We
all activities of the United States Govern- sraclAL ALTrYrrl=d all benefit when we have an opportunity to
ment undertaken for the purpose of obtain- Section 3 of the bill redeslgnatd section confer in advance about important decisions
ic security necessary for the national 602 of the National Security Act of 1944. affect.ingournations' secu ty.
activities clearly of the United States. While such which concerns the funding of Intelligence Specifically. I want to express my support the Congress. they are excluded from the definl- activities. as ration Su4 of the Act and adds ffodr the following key concepts recommend-by the :
subsection (d) which deals with the 1 Except in cases of extreme emergency,
Uon of "special activInasmuch as they reco
are subject to separate authorization and use of funds for special activitiesall national security of ex re should be in
oversight, and often do not require specific This provision Is intended to carry for. writing If an oral directive is necessary. a
approval by the President. This exclusion ward and expand the limitation currently record should be made contemporaneously
reiterates the longstanding policy contained contained in 22 U.S.C. 2422 (the Hughes- and the finding reduced to writing and
in the Hughes-Ryan amendment (24 U.S.C. Ryan Amendment), which would be re? b the President reduced
noon as possible.
2422) (1974) and in subsequent Executive pealed by Section 1 of the bill. The Hughes.slg` no event more than two working days
orders. Ryan amendment restricts the use of funds tut In noAll more than will be made avail-
ducted iThe exclusion of military operations con- appropriated to CIA to carry out actions thereafter. of ill be made il-
by the armed form of the United outside the United States "other than the able to Council m. Amembers ber
States and subject to the War Powers Reno- collection of necessary intelligence unless N S.C. should retroactively suthor-
lution (50 U.S.C. 1541-1548) is new, appear- and until the President had determined that =[me or sanction No Finding a should) activity.
ing in neither statute or Executive order such actions were Important to the national >~ If the Presidential diactiv any agency or
heretofore. The purpose of this exclusion is security.
to clarify a problem of interpretation Section 9M(d) would similarly provide persons outside of the C.I.A. or traditional
namely, when Is a military operation under- that appropriated funds could not be ex. Intelligence agencies to conduct a special so.
taken by the United States reportable as a pended for special activities until the Presi- Livity, all applicable procedures for approval
special activity" or covert action? The deft. dent bad signed. or otherwise approved. a of a finding and notification to Congress
nition sets forth a clear dividing line: If the Finding authorizing such activities, but it shall apply to such agency or r oruL be
military operation concerned is carried out would expand this limitation to cover the 4. The intelligence committees should
covertly by U.B. military forces and it is not funds appropriated for any department, appropriately d of of participation of
of
required to be reported to the Congress agency. or entity of the Government. not any ther Government eat agencies, private ivaatto panics.
with
under the War Powers Resolution, then It Is solely CIA- It would also cover non-appro- or na "special activity, which is reportable to pristed funds which are available to such special activities.
the Intelligence bomrn ttees under this stat- -elements from any source. over which the 5. There should be a regular and periodic
ute. The exclusion would not apply to agency involved exercises control. These review of all ongoing special activities both
covert assistance given by the United States might Include funds offered or provided by by the intelligence committees and by the
to the military forces. or to support the -third parties, funds produced as a result of NS.C. This review should be made to deter
military operations, of a third party, either intelligence activities (i.e. Proprietaries). or mine whether each such activity is continu-
governmental or to private entities. funds originally appropriated for an agency ing to serve the purpose for which It was in-
The third area excluded from the deflni- other than the agency who wishes to stituted. Findings should terminate or
Lion of special activities is diplomatic activi- expend the funds. The limitation contained "sunset" at periodic intervals unless the
ties carried out by the Department of State in section 504(d) would also apply whether President. by appropriate action, continues
or persons otherwise acting pursuant to the or not the agency concerned actually came them In force.
authority of the President. This represents into possession of the funds at issue. So long I. I believe we cannot conduct an effective
a modification of the comparable exclusion as the agency concerned had the ability to program Cl special activities without the ow
in Executive order 12333. Although most direct such funds be expended by third per. operation and support of Congress. Effee-
diplomatic activities of the United States ties-governmental or private-it could not tive consultation with the intelligence com-
are publicly acknowledged. it is recognized do so until a presidential Finding had been mittees is essential, and I am determined to
that there are many diplomatic contacts signed. or otherwise approved, in accordance ensure that these committees can discharge
and deliberations which are necessarily with the requirements of section 503(a). their statutory responsibilities in this area.
secret. The definition of special activities faCTION 4. ana)LaiGNATION OF s>OCTION 808 or In all but the most exceptional cireum-
excludes these activities so long as they are NATIONAL sscu 'r Acr OF 1947 stances, timely notification to Congress
undertaken by the Department of State, or 503 of the under Section 501(b) of the National Securl-
by persons-either government officials or Section 4 redesignates section ty Act of 1947. as amended, will not be des
private citizens-who are acting pursuant to National Security Act of 1947 as section 505, layed beyond two working dnyn of the ini-
the authority of the President. It would not to conform to the changes made by the bill. tial, of a special activity. While I believe
exclude diplomatic activities which are car- TQT or T!R Parstmo=erWs IaTrot o71 Nsw that the current statutory framework is.
vied out by persons who are not employees adequate, new executive branch procedures
of the Department of State--dither govern- GT OP TH S rod sT OFIRATIONS = op N nevertheless are desirable to ensure that
mental or private-whose authority to carry Hon. DAVr L, Boaroe, the spirit of the law Is fully implemented.
out such activities on behalf of the United Chairman. Senate Select Committee on In- Accordingly. I have directed my staff to
States is not already established by law or on t,~igen ono. Senate. Sasg esin DC. Weft for my appropriately signature executive the principles
Executive branch policy.
The fourth and final area excluded from Honorable Henry J. Hyde. set forth in this letter.
the definition of special activities are activi- Dw CHAIPYAN HOREN: In my March 31. While the President must retain the flexi-
ties of the Department of Justice or federal 1987. message to Congress, I reported on billty as Commander in Chief and chief ex-
law enforcement agencies solely to provide those steps I had taken and intended to ecutive to exercise those constitutional au-
assistance to law enforcement authorities of take to implement the recommendation of thorities necessary to safeguard the nation
foreign governments. This exclusion is also the President's Special Review Board. These and its citizens, maximum consultation and
new, reflected neither in law nor Executive included a comprehensive review of execs- notification is and will be the firm policy of
order heretofore. Its Incorpn*ation here Is Live branch procedures concerning Presiden- this Administration.
intended to clarify a problem of interprets- tial approval and notification to Congress of Sincerely.
Lion which has existed under the current covert-action programs-Or so-called special RONALD RsAGAN.e
framework namely, do law enforcement so- activitlrs. ? Mr. BENT'SEN. Mr. President. I am
tivitics undertaken covertly by U.S. Govern- In my message. I noted that the reforms pleased today to join my colleagues In
ment agencies outside the United States and changes I had made and would make introducing the "Intelligence Over-
qualify as special activities? The formula- "are evidence of my determination to return
legislation
Lion contained in the proposed definition to proper procedures Including consultation sight Continues Act of
t111 pattern ern This of leStatutory
would exclude assistance provided covertly with the Congress." co t n s the of the Intelligence statutory
to third countries by U.S. law enforcement In this regard. Frank Carluod has pre-
agencies. It would not exclude law enforce- seated to me the suggestions developed by sight process that was established 40
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812858 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 25,1987
years ago by the National Security Act that there will be no doubt as to what branches In this area a stronger and
of 1947. In the ensuing years, Congress the President has authorized and even more productive one.*
has enacted other legislation in this when he authorized it. our legislation (r. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President,
area, including most recently the For. requires that a Presidential finding be events of recent months have high-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act of in writing and that a copy of each lighted the importance of congression-
1978, the Intelligence Oversight Act of finding must be transmitted to the In- a1 oversight of Intelligence activities.
1980, and the Intelligence Identities telligence Committees within 48 hours The oversight function, performed by
Protection Act of 1982. Each of these after it is signed. Retroactive findings the two Select Intelligence Commit-
iieces of legislation responded to a re- such as were used in the Iran arms tees-one in the House and one in the
quirement that was identified at the sales would be prohibited. Senate-is thfineans by which this de.
time, ranging from the need to In other sections, this legislation mocracy recoliciles the people's right
strengthen our counterintelligence ca- would spell out for the first time the to know with the intelligence agencies
pabilities in the first Instance to a life- statutory power of the President to need for secrecy.
and-death situation where CIA agents' authorize covert actions. It also pro- Under existing law the intelligence
identities were being publicly revealed vides that no finding which authorizes agencies are obliged to keep the two
In the past. The legislation we are in- a covert action can operate contrary to communities currently informed of
troducing today, too, grows out of our statute and that no funds can be used significant intelligence activities, in-
own recent experience. for a covert action unless there is a chiding covert aHowever, ambi-
One of the lessons that we learned finding. Taken together, it seems to guiding inherent action. o existing sduring the investigation of the Iranian me that these requirements represent highlighted istin statutes
tduring
arms sales and diversion of profits to a reasonable approach to the problem were s Inherently trdr ma ly the Contras is that current oversight of regaining control over covert ac- the ticentl concluded congressional
is es important c of the that Iran-these ntra Lffair.
restatutes, particularly in the area of tions. while it the same time not In IInvestigation
ambiguities
covert action reporting, are simply not any way harming or endangering our eliminated
h that the ground
specific enough. Indeed. it had become Nation's ability to conduct such oiler- are rules arc clearly understood in both
cation conducted by the Select Com-
mittee on intelligence late last year
that there were gaps and loopholes in
our oversight laws and that there were
some Individuals within the executive
branch who exploited these loopholes
as a means of avoiding congressional
notification of a covert operation.
To be specific, there is currently a
statutory requirement that the over-
sight committees of Congress-.be noti-
fied In advance of covert actions, or
must be notified "in a timely fashion"
after the fact. This loophole of
"timely fashion" was broad enough to
allow the administration not to report
the Iranian arms sales for some 18
months. I doubt they would have re-
ported them even then, except that a
small newspaper in the Middle East
broke the story in November of last
year.
The legislation that we are Introduc-
Ing today closes that loophole by re-
quiring that the President provide
written notification to the Oversight
Committees of the Congress within for
48 hours after he has authorized a
covert action. If he believes that the
action Is too sensitive to reveal to the
entire membership of the Intelligence
Committees, he would be authorized
to limit notification to the chairmen
and ranking members of those com-
mittees, the majority and minority
leaders of the Senate and the Speaker
and minority leader of the House. No-
tification of these eight Individuals
note. I have been a member of the
Select Committee on Intelligence for
almost 7 years now. In time of service
on the committee I am the senior
member on the Democratic side.
During these years it has been my
privilege to have had weekly, and
sometimes almost daily, contact with
the men and women of our Nation's
intelligence services. The work that
they do for our country is absolutely
invaluable, and many of them routine-
ly put their lives on the line with little
or no public recognition.
Indeed, when public recognition does
occur. It can sometimes mean death, as
in the case of William Buckley who
was CIA station chief in Beirut. Buck-
ley was taken hostage, tortured, and
killed because of what he was doing
for his country-our country. There
are similar men and women all over
the world doing their Jobs in silence
and without public praise. In the
lobby of the CIA headquarters build-
ing in Langley, VA, there are rows of
gold stars carved into the wall. Each of
those stars represents a CIA employee
who was killed serving his country. Be-
neath the stars is a display case in
which has been placed an open book.
There are names in the book repre-
senting most of the stars on the wall,
but there are blank lines as well, for
some of these CIA employees still
cannot be publicly identified, even 35
Lne LX CULIV ULU WIC %,Wlsaic~ a..u
the temptation to look for loopholes is
reduced.
As an outgrowth of painstaking ne-
gotiations on these issues between the
staffs of the Senate Intelligence Com-
munity and the National Security
Council. the committee sent a letter
to the President's National Security
Adviser. The'legislation closely follows
the provisions contained in that letter.
This bill does not impose new and
more onerous burdens upon the intel-
ligence agencies. Rather, 'it clarifies
and rationalizes existing law. For ex-
ample, this bill wfl]- for the first time,
explicitly empower the- President to
authorize covert actions-and establish
a Presidential "finding" as the author-
izing document.
I am pleased to Join with my distin-
guished colleague from Maine, the vice
chairman of the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, in cosponsoring
this legislation.
By Mr. INOUYE (for himself,
Mr. EvANs, Mr. BYRD, Mr.
CRANsroN, Mr. SiMPsoN, Mr.
DECoNCiNI, Mr. BtRDicx. Mr.
DASCHLE, Mr. Muxxowsai. Mr.
McCAIN, Mr. BINCAMAN, Mr.
BoscHwrrz, Mr. CocnwAN, Mr.
CONRAD. Mr. DoxEmci, Mr.
OGRE, Mr. ORAMM. Mr. LxvIN,
Mr. MATSUNAGA, Mr. PxLL. Mr.
RsID, Mr. RIEGLs, Mr. Rocax-
rrLLxR, Mr. RUDMAN, Mr. STAr-
PORD, Mr. SANPORD, Mr. SIMON,
Mr. WIRTH, Mr. BoRn, and
Mr. M.LcxxR):
S. 1722. A bill to authorize the estab-
lishment of the National Museum of
the American Indian, Heye Founda-
tion within the Smithsonian Institu-
tion, and to establish a memorial to
the American Indians, and for other
purposes; by unanimous consent, re-
ferred jointly to the Committee on
Rules and Administration and the
Select Committee on Indian Affairs.
would insure that we do not have an- years later.
other situation where our country is Mr. President, I end with these sen-
embarked on a course of action with timents because I want to make it
potentially grave foreign policy impli- clear that in sponsoring this legisla-
cations without notifying the Congress tion today, I am not aiming it at the
that such was about to be done. men and women of the Intelligence
Unlike present law, which does not community. I am not criticizing them
require Presidential approval for for the Job they do for us each and
covert activities conducted by agencies every day. No. I am not introducing
other than the CIA, this legislation this legislation as a way of strengthen-
40 continuing
spells
approve the pattern of the process,
out fmust epersotnatime lly that
President ars, and
each covert action or "special activi- making our Nation's partnership be-
ty, " as they are sometimes called. So tween the legislative and executive
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP90M00004RO01000110001-4