IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00004R000900080016-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 16
• Content Type: MISC

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J 1 VI\vJV V I
100th Congress
1st Session H.R.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REW
fR. STOKES (f or*himself, Mr. Boland, Mr. Beilenson, and Mr. McHugh) introduced
the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on
A BILL
To strengthen the system of congressional oversight of the intelligence
activities of the United States.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
2 United States of America in Congress assembled,
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STOKES001
?.~ 2
1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
2 This Act may be cited as the "Intelligence Oversight
3 Amnend.nents of 1987".
4 SEC. 2. WRITTEN FINDINGS.
5 Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
6 U.S.C. 2422) is amended--
7 (1) by inserting '', in writing," after "'the
8 President finds"; and
9 (2) by ins_rting '', and a copy of each such written
10 finding shall be furnished, prior to the initiation of
11 any such operation, to the Select Committee on
12 Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select
13 Committee on Intelligence of the House of
14 Representatives, or, as the case may be, to the Members
15 of Congress referred to in section 501(a)(1)(B) of the
16 National Security Act.of 1947, and to the Vice President
17 of the United States, the Secretary of State, the
18 Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central
.9 :ntelligence" before the period at the end thereof.
20 SEC. 3. DEFERRAL OF NOTICE.
21 Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
22 U.S.C. 413) is amended--
23 (1) in subsection (a), by striking ~~all applicable
24 authorities and duties, including those conferred by the
25 Constitution upon: the executive and legislative branches
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1 of the Government, and.to the extent consistent with" ;
2 (2) by striking subsection (b);
3 (3) by redesignating subsections (c), (d), and (e) as
4 subsections (b), (c), and (d), respectively;
5 (4) in subsection (b), as so redesignated, by
6 striking - . subsections (a) and (b)" and inserting in
7 lieu thereof "subsection (a)"; and
8 (5) by adding at the end the following new
9 subsection:
10 (e) Only in extraordinary circumstances affecting the
11 vital interests of the United States, and only where time is
12 of the essence, the provision to the Congress of notice of a
13 significant anticipated intelligence activity may be deferred
14 for not more than 48 hours after the initiation of such an
15 activity or the signing of a finding pursuant to section 662
16 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.".
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11 566 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE February 4, 19,s'7
contract is shipped offshore. Taxes are
not only lost, but the whole amount
moves out of the country as a debt
that we owe to other nations In the
balance of payments.
Cheaper to go offshore? For whom?
I would like to know what bookkeepers
in our Congress and administration
add so poorly.
I welcome the concern of my fellow
Congressmen over the loss of business
to our military contractors. When this
whole cycle began, it seemed that this
country was bowing under the pres-
sure of foreign governments, saying
that if we did not buy more weaponry
from them, they would stop purchas-
ing from us.
Well, we have brought more weapon-
ry from them and they are now buying
less from us. So much for bending to
intimidation; and their sales position
has been strengthened by the infusion
of state-of-the-art U.S. technology
which is being passed along in some of
these contract awards.
Mr. Speaker, I hope I do not sound
like some naive person when I express
utter shock and ataazement that we
seem to have bought the London
Bridge and the Eiffel Tower, and
every pea under' the shell that these
hungry foreign nations are hawking.
They need manufacturing and man-
ufacturing Jobs-well, so do we. Nei-
ther I, nor anyone in this body, was
elected to protect the interests of
Europe and European lawmakers, or
European or any workers abroad. We
are elected to protect the interests of
America and Americans.
Every dollar. of taxpayers' money
should be plowed back into this coun-
try., With a shrinking industrial base,
the guarantee of defense money to the
remaining manufacturing companies
will at least keep a remnant of indus-
try in this country which maintains
skills and technology needed for any
meaningful defense.
I believe, to remain a leading nation
in the world, It will take more than a
remnant of industry. It will take an
expanding industrial base, but that
will take great effort and will on the
part of everyone to turn the tides that
are tearing at our strength. I hope
with all my heart that we can achieve
this turnaround. However, in the in-
terim, to throw away the lead we have
in weapons sales and technology is
more than folly, it Is madness.
I am glad so many Congressmen are
now angry over these sales. I hope
they are angry enough to do some-
thing about it. I have been fighting
many bureaucrats over provisions of
law, of existing law which they are
flaunting in regard to shipping on
American-flag ships. I am always dis-
mayed at the attitude they display
toward American law; and, in in-
stances of which I have been aware,
the law has been clear, and all too
often disobeyed.
Let us make it clear, ladies and gen-
tlemen, where we stand. Once and for
all, and I I'ope that stand Is for Amer-
Ica. For American products and com-
panies and Jobs. For America's revital-
ization. I believe it Is worth the strug-
gle and the effort; and it should be
seen as the Job of every American
today.
0 1640
THE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT
AMENDMENTS OF 1987
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
GRAY of Illinois). Under a previous
order of the House. the gentleman
from Ohio (Mr. SroxEs] is recognized
for 15 minutes.
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Speaker, the
Iran-Contra controversy has raised
some very serious questions concern-
ing the. ability of the Intelligence
Committee to effectively perform its
important oversight function. I say
this not to criticize the committee, of
which I have been a member for 4
years, and will chair during the 100th
Congress, but to emphasize the obvi-
ous: No matter'how vigorously it pur-
sues its mission, a congressional com-
mittee's oversight efforts are largely
dependent on the willingness of the
executive branch to provide informa-
tion.
When the executive branch treats
the oversight process as a legitimate
and important function of representa-
tive government, and cooperates ac-
cordingly, both the oversight process
and the programs overseen usually
function at their best.
When the executive branch treats
congressional oversight as an irritant
to be avoided or overcome, the result
Is quite often a policy or program fail-
ure. Occasionally, such failures are of
such magnitude as to directly affect
the national interest.
Clearly, this has been the case with
regard to the so-called Iran initiative.
The intent to evade congressional
oversight is clear, the disastrous result
is equally clear. It has come in the one
area of secret governmental activity-
covert action-where effective congres-
sional oversight is imperative, and
where congressional access to informa-
tion must be unfettered. If the Intelli-
gence Committees are not informed of
covert actions, then no one in Con-
gress is informed and no oversight is
performed. If the Intelligence Com-
mittees are not- permitted to offer
sound advice and constructive criti-
cism before an action is initiated, then
rarely will any such advice or criticism
be heard from anyone who does not
have a direct operational or policy
connection to the particular covert
action contemplated.
In my opinion. this outsider's look is
one of the more important functions
of the Intelligence Oversight Commit-
tees. While we must endeavor to avoid
or discover Intelligence Agency abuses,
to control the monetary cost of intelli-
gence; activities, and to influence
major- policy decisions affecting the
long-term conduct of intelligence ac-
tivities, It is Just as important. to both
the Congress and the intelligence com-
munity, to be able to sit back In a de-
tached manner, listen to an intelli-
gence briefing, and suggest that the
proposed action Is a bad plan. it is
much easier to perceive the inherent
folly of a complicated plan if you did
not have a hand in Its formulation or
execution and your job does not
depend on its success.
So, there are reasons other than the
curiosity for oversight committees to
seek to know as much information as
possible. The Iran-Contra affair is in-
structive. Surely, if the Intelligence
Committee had been provided prior
notice of the Iran arms sales when It
should have been, at least one among
us might have asked some pertinent
questions; some of us might even have
opposed it; and some of us who op-
posed it might even have proferred
reasoned and persuasive arguments as
to why the proposal would not work.
Indeed, since the Intelligence Commit-
tee possesses no veto authority over
covert actions, members of the com-
mittee have, on occasion, written to
the President directly to voice opposi-
tion to a proposed covert action. Had
we been afforded the opportunity to
do so this time, at the program's incep-
tion or later, the President would have
had a better understanding of the
risks involved and of the clear aversion
of the Congress and the American
people to what appears to be an arms-
for-hostages deal.
At one time, even quite recently, in
this relatively new intelligence over-
sight process, the intelligence commu-
nity, and the CIA in particular,
seemed to recognize the value of con-
gressional oversight. At one time, the
intelligence community, and the CIA
in particular, seemed to recognize the
need to codify the oversight process
and Joined the members of the intelli-
gence committees to enact the Over-
sight Act of 1980. Also, at one time,
the intelligence community, and the
CIA in particular, considered that stat-
ute as a binding promise to keep the
intelligence committees fully in-
formed.
Apparently, and regrettably, this is
no longer true. That bond of mutual
respect and trust between the commit-
tees and the CIA, which EnarE BoLA.-,-a,
Ken Robinson, Senator LtiouyE, Sena-
tor Bayh, Senator Goldwater, and
others strove so hard and so success-
fully to establish, has been broken. It
has been replaced of late by a demon-
stration of arrogance that permits
high-ranking Government officials to
look for ways to avoid the law rather
than execute it, and to reason that a
statute designed to insure prior notice
authorized no notice at all for. 10
months.
Where the Congress had agreed to
some minimal ambiguity so as to avoid
confrontation, this administration now
sees an acceptance by the Congress of
a constitutional right to withhold In-
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 1987
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'here some in the Con- the vital interests of the United States and BEILENson, in the introduction of
ognized the possibility of where time is of the essence. In such the Intelligence Oversight Amend-
stance in which Presiden- cases, and only in such cases, notice ments of 1987.
s demanded before notice could be deferred for not more than 48 I can well recall that when the
en. this administration hours. House Intelligence Committee was cre-
)ngressional recognition With these amendments, the scheme ated nearly 10 years ago there were no
!xecutive branch actions for covert action reporting will be illusions about the fact that to effec-
tive to share with the in- quite clear. First. in almost all cases. tively do its job of oversight it would
nmittees. Where once in- prior notice must be given to the intel- have to depend to a great extent on
rofessionals were eager ligence committees; second, in rare the candor of the intelligence agen-
irm their own oversight as cases, where the President believes cies.
erate with the Congress, there is an unusual degree of sensitivi- To those who might consider that a
tration now permits the ty. prior notice must be given, but it contradiction in terms, I would re-
t sensitive intelligence op- may be given to the leadership group spond, that the hard work of Intelli-
e carried out by individ- set out in section 501; and third. in gence Committee members on both
m the Congress more of a even rarer cases, where the President sides of the aisle, and in both Houses
hostile governments or must react with speed because of an of the Congress, won for us a recogni-
immediate threat to our national secu- tion. in the executive branch, that fin-
er. it is my fervent hope rity, notice may be deferred for a max? telligence oversight was something to
have hit rock botton in Imum of 48 hours. valued, and not feared.
and that the state of af- Never again, Mr. Speaker, must we be Or vu least I nthought ot ihad.
.
e described will end as hear that an activity of the U.S. Gov- Or fact of the matter is, as Mr.
began. Then the intelli- ernment is so sensitive that knowledge stated.
dttees and the executive of it must be withheld from the U.S. Sgressional TOxES SToxEs has so oversight well of aitedced. . that
intelligence coann-
begin to reestablish an at- Congress."
which the committees, - Mr. Speaker, I am pleased now to tivities is the only independent assess-
, and the American yield to the distinguished former ment of them. that is going to be
once again feel confident chairman of the Permanent Select made.
agencies are indeed to be Committee on Intelligence, the gentle- It seems to be beyond question, that
min from Massachusetts [Mr. inLeitigance initiatives, vhicn are well-
however. the Congress Bor.nr.-n] under whose chairmanship conceived. and based on sound policy
fectly clear in setting out the House Intelligence Committee at- objectives could only benefit from this
rules and must exercise its tained prominence. type of review.
tional powers. Events have (Mr. BOLAND asked and was given The tendering of advice and sugges-
-d that to rely, as we all permission to revise and extend his re- tions, or the noting of reservations, by
assurance that Govern- marks.) outside parties ought, it seems to me,
as would always act in a Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, I appre- to be welcomed by decisionmakers in-
od will when interpreting ciate very deeply the remarks of the terested in truly measuring the risks
ded vaguely at the insist- distinguished chairman of the House and the potential gains of sensitive ac-
!r Government officials. is Permanent Select Committee on Intel- tivities.
best interest of the over- ligence with respect to my chairman- This Is the "role the Intelligence
s. The actions of the Presi- ship during the 7 years that I was with Committees are supposed to play, but
-irector of Central Intelli- the select committee. it simply cannot be done if they are
he latter's general counsel Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker. by the not fully informed about intelligence
ing the prior notice provi- time the last investigative report is activities. in time, to provide meaning-
Oversight Act of 1980 re- issued on the Iran-Contra affair. I ful oversight. .
it their benefit as well as expect that the national list of lessons In 1980, during the consideration of
ag clarity to the provision. to be learned from this episode will be the Intelligence Oversight Act of that
Mr. Speaker. today, Mr. quite extensive indeed, year, the House and Senate Intelli-
Bsrr.Exsorc, Mr. McCVRDY. I also expect that Congress may gence Committees, in conjunction with
Mr. Bxowrc of California, deem it necessary to address, through. representatives of the administration
Mrs. KEr-rcmir, Mr. K. s- legislation. certain aspects of . this then in office, grappled with the most
.dr. MCHUGn. and I have" matter. in an attempt to ensure that difficult . Issue related to oversight-
ntroduce the Intelligence whatever mistakes were made are not the prior reporting of covert oper-
.mendments of 1987. _ repeated in the future. ations
mends the National Securi- We are obviously some months away After a great deal of give and take,
947 and section 662 of the from the kind of final accounting during which time both the Congress
sistance Act of 1961-the which can form the basis for such leg-
?.n amendment-in order to islation. and the executive branch understand-
the intent of those who However, in one particularly sensi. ably sought to preserve their constitu-
Oversight Act of 1980 and tive area-the form and timing of con- tional authorities, we established, in
zat the President, whoever gressional notification of covert intelli- statute, a procedure that recognized as
may "be, receives sound gence actions-it is already quite clear a matter of practice that significant
within both the Congress that there exists a serious and funda- intelligence activities, including covert
ecutive bra-nch before un- mental disagreement between the ex- opertions, had to be reported to the
overt actions. ecutive branch and the Congress over Intelligence Committees prior to initi-
ouid require that all Presi- the requirements of existing law. ation.
!ings be in writing, and that The potential for additional damage While prior notice was clearly to be
finding be provided to the to our foreign policy interests, and the the norm, we also recognized that
committees, the statutory reputation of our intelligence agencies, there might be an extremely limited
:.f the National Security through the perpetuation of this dis- number of occasions, in which the
d the Director of Central agreement is so great, that I believe President might determine, that
prior to the initiation of a that it must be legislatively resolved as notice of a covert operation could not
,n. quickly as possible. be made until after it had begun.
mould also make clear that For that reason. I am pleased to join We determined that those instances
e to Congress of all covert Chairman Lou STCKES of the House would be accommodated without doing
:st be? given. except in ex- Permanent Select Committee on Intel- violence to the general principles of
circ?umsttncss affecting ligence, and Congressmen: McHUCH congressional prenotification if the
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eistood that notice could
of eliminated
define. what vie consid-
reasonable time, for In-
committees In those in-
prior notice could not
u a result of a clear un-
.hat we were trying to es-
iures for situations, that
be. by definition. so ex-
s to defy attempts to pre-
of response that would
d, that the consensus
een achieved during the
on the bill, about the
,rmed House and Senate
Oversight Committees,
ntee. that after-the-fact
were made In the short-
ble. -
we did not feel It wise or
delineate. In statute, the
in the acceptable time for
iotification.
was an element of comity
n those negotiations. and
;ht it would endure.
unfortunately was one of
:time of the Iran-Contra
the request of the gentleman from
Ohio?
There was no objection.
PERMISSION TO EXTEND
SPECIAL ORDER
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker. I ask
unanimous consent that I be allowed
to extend the special order which I
have reserved for this evening to 10
minutes, rather than 5.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is
there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Wisconsin?
There was no objection.
Contras. but also questions ha:-e been
raised about the involvement of El
Salvadoran officials in facilitating
those same shipments.
New reports have stated that the
former CIA operatives running the
arms supply operation from the Ilo-
pango Airfield In El Salvador carried
credentials issued from the El Salva-
doran Armed Forces which identified
those individuals as United States
military advisers.
and because the impor-
11 ly informed Intelligence
now should be even more
ass must act to inject addi-
ory certitude into the no-
icess.
tion we Introduce today
requirement for prior
ce of covert activities to
nce Committees, or in cer-
:s to a statutorily defined
.oup.
ablishes a 48-hour period,
simum reasonable time,
h rare circumstances and
dispatch could combine to
to be deferred.
tment of this measure,
-ve is fully consistent with
the drafters of the Over-
1980, will strengthen the
oversight process on both
isylvanla Avenue.
that Is in the best interest
. the President, and the
I hope it will be brought
as expeditiously as possi-
RESPONSE TO CONGRESSMAN
McCOLLUM RE MILITARY AS-
SISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
a previous order of the House, the gen-
tleman.from Wisconsin [Mr. OBmr] is
rcognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, earlier
today, three Members of this House,
the gentleman from Florida [Mr.
McCOLLUMI, the gentleman from
Texas [bfr. ARC], and the gentle-
man from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] at-
tacked me for placing a hold on the
administration's request for additional
aircraft and other military assistance
funds for the Government of El Salva-
dor.
I would rise to a point a personal
privilege because of their attack upon
me except for the fact that I regard it
as a personal privilege to be attacked
by the three gentlemen in question.
Nonetheless, I would like to set the
matter straight on the issues which
they raised today.
Last year. at the end of November,
the administration sent my subcom-
mittee notifications that it intended to
provide El Salvador with $8.6 million
worth of fixed and rotary-wing air-
craft and $6.5. million in military as-
sistance funds for training and equip-
ment of security forces.
Since the Congress was then out of
session, and there was no way for the
committee to take a close look at those
requests, the committee put them on
hold until this session could resume.
Since that time, a number of things
have happened. First of all. a number
of the members of my subcommittee,
not just myself, asked that holds be
put on the aircraft reprogramming.
01650
ES. Mr. Speaker. I thank
nan from Massachusetts
Dl for his excellent state-
-ding this bill and am
.ave him as a cosponsor of
on.
N'ERAL LEAVE
KES. Mr. Speaker. I ask
consent that all Members
legislative days in which to
extend their remarks on
order.
,4KER ' pro tempore (Mr.
nois). Is there objection to
Also, since that time, the Hasenfus
affair and the contragate scandal have
raised a number of serious questions
about the use of United States person-
nel and facilities in El Salvador.
There have been a number of allega-
tions that American personnel in El
Salvador. during a time when funding
to the Contras was cut off, had facili-
tated the providing of supplies to the
01700
Gen. Juan Rafael Bustillo. the chief
of the Salvadoran Air Force, also has
been implicated in those stories in con-
nection with the supply network going
on.
Because of the serious allegations
raised by the Iran-Contra scandal, the
subcommittee sent the State Depart-
ment on December 5 a list of 40 ques-
tions in order to determine whether or
not any foreign assistance funds were
used for any illegal purposes whatso-
ever In carrying out those activities.
One question was this. Did the State
Department or the Defense Security
Assistance Agency directly or indirect-
ly have any role in the planning, pur-
chasing, or. delivery of arms provided
to Iran or the Nicaraguan Contras? To
date, the administration has only re-
sponded to 8 of those 40 questions.
That may not bother the gentleman
from Florida [Mr. MCCOLLUM.] with
his longstanding love for the Contras,
or the other gentleman who spoke
today, but I have an obligation to
make sure that the intention of Con-
gress has not been circumvented by
the administration. I am not asserting
that it has been, but I do have an obli-
gation to determine whether it has
been or not.
When those Members addressed the
request for police training earlier this
afternoon, the impression was left
that the administration does not have
resources available to address its anti-
terrorist programs, including the prob-
lems of insurgency and terrorism.
.I would like to point out that in
fiscal year 1988 and fiscal year 1987
the administration has had $238 mil-
lion in military aid and more than
$850 million in economic and military
aid in-total for El Salvador.
The committee approved last year
the full administration request for an-
titerrorism of $9.8 million, a 39-per-
cent Increase over the previous year's
level when foreign aid had to be cut
overall by 14 percent because of
Gramm-Rudman.
The committee earmarked for the
second year in a row $1 million specifi-
cally to assist the Government of El
Salvador and its special investigative
unit for the purpose of bringing to jus-
Contras. tice those responsible for the murders
Substantial questions have been of United States citizens in El Salva-
raised. not only about United States dor, including Corporal Kwiatkowski
personnel, paid for, I should point out, from my own district.
in the foreign assistance bill,.facilItat- During the next month I will be
ing the arms supply network to the talking with State Department offi-
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