SENATE BILL 1282

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00004R000700130015-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 79
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: November 4, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

(b)(5)
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ILLEGIB
STAT
STAT
STAT
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II
100TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
S. 1282
To provide for the imposition of sanctions against countries supporting
international terrorism, and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
MAY 28, 1987
Mr. LAUTENBERG (for himself, Mr. KERRY, MT. GRASSLEY, Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr.
SIMON, and Mr. PROXMIRE) introduced the following bill; which was read
twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
A BILL
To provide for the imposition of sanctions against countries
supporting international terrorism, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 lives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SHORT TITLE
4 SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Deterrence
5 of State-Sponsored Terrorism Act of 1987".
6 LIST OF COUNTRIES SUPPORTING TERRORISM
SEC. 2. (a) Not later than 30 days after the date of
8 enactment of this Act, and thereafter on February 1 of each
9 year, the Secretary of State shall prepare and transmit to the
10 Congress a report setting forth a list of those countries, if
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1 any, which he has determined have repeatedly provided sup-
2 port for acts of international terrorism. This list may be re-
3 ferred to as the "terrorist list".
4 (b) Not later than 7 days after the Secretary of State
5 determines that a country on the terrorist list no longer is
6 providing support for acts of international terrorism, the Sec-
7 retary of State shall prepare and transmit to the Congress a
8 supplemental report setting forth his determination, and such
9 country shall be deemed to be removed from the terrorist list
10 upon receipt by the Congress of such report.
11 SANCTIONS AGAINST COUNTRIES SUPPORTING
12 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM; WAIVER
13 SEC. 3. (a) The sanctions described in subsection (d)
14 shall be imposed against any country which is placed on the
15 terrorist list and shall be effective-
16 (1) 30 calendar days after the name of such coun-
17 try is first placed on such list, except that such sane-
18 tions or any part thereof, as the President may specify,
19 shall not take effect if, within such 30-day period, the
20 President makes a determination and report described
21 in subsection (c); or
22 (2) in the case of sanctions specified in a determi-
23 nation which is described in subsection (c) and which is
24 disapproved by enactment of a joint resolution under
95 section 5, on the date of enactment of such joint
26 resolution.
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1 (b) All or any of the sanctions, as the President may
2 specify, which are described in subsection (d) and which are
3 in effect with respect to a country shall cease to apply-
4 (1) if the President makes a determination and
5 report described in subsection (c), 30 legislative days
6 after the date of such determination; or
7 (2) if the President determines that an emergency
8 situation exists which would justify the partial or corn-
9 plete lifting of sanctions, upon his certification of the
10 existence of such an emergency situation to the chair-
11 men of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelli-
12 gence and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House
13 of Representatives and the chairmen of the Select
14 Committee on Intelligence and the Foreign Relations
15 Committee of the Senate.
16 (c)(1) The determination referred to in subsection (a)(1)
17 or in subsection (b)(1) is a determination by the President
18 that it is in the national interest of the United States, or in
19 humanitarian interests, to take the action described in the
20 appropriate subsection.
21 (2)(A) The report referred to in such subsections is a
22 report which is prepared by the President and transmitted to
23 the appropriate committees of the Congress and which
24 contains the appropriate determination described in para-
25 graph (1).
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1 (B) The President shall include in any such report a
2 detailed explanation of his reasons for making a determina-
3 tion under paragraph (1). Any part of such explanation may
4 be included, if necessary, in a classified addendum to such
5 report, except that each such report shall contain an unclassi-
6 fied summary of such explanation.
7 (C) For purposes of this paragraph, the phrase "appro-
8 priate committees of the Congress" means the Committee on
9 Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
10 House of Representatives and the Committee on Appropria-
11 tions and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
12 (d) The sanctions referred to in subsections (a) and (b)
13 are the following:
14 (1) All United States assistance for such country
15 shall be terminated.
16 (2) No technology of such country and no goods
17 (or any part thereof) which are produced, grown, or
18 manufactured in such country may be imported into the
19 United States, except that such technology or goods
20 may be imported into the United States if additional
21 duties are imposed on such imports in regulations pre-
22 scribed by the Secretary of Commerce.
23 (3) The President shall deny to all products of
24 such country duty-free tariff treatment under title V of
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1 the Trade Act of 1974 (the Generalized System of
2 Preferences).
3 (4)(A) The Secretary of State shall promptly take
4 whatever steps may be necessary to terminate any air
5 or sea transportation agreement in effect between the
6 United States and such country in accordance with the
terms of such agreement.
8 (B) Upon the termination of any such agreement
9 or, if no such agreement is in effect, upon the effective
10 date of sanctions determined under section 3(a), the
11 Secretary of Transportation shall prohibit any aircraft
12 or vessel owned directly or indirectly by the govern-
13 ment of such country or its nationals from engaging in
14 air or sea transportation with respect to the United
15 States.
16 (C) The Secretary of Transportation may provide
17 for such exceptions from the prohibition contained in
18 subparagraph (B) as the Secretary considers necessary
19 to provide for emergencies in which the safety of
20 the aircraft or vessel or its crew or passengers is
21 threatened.
22 (D) For purposes of this paragraph, the term "air-
23 craft" has the meaning given such term in section 101
24 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1301).
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1 (5)(A) The Secretary of the Treasury shall in-
2 struct the United States Executive Director of each
3 international. financial institution to vote against any
4 loan or other use of the funds of the respective institu-
5 tion to or for such country.
6 (B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term
7 "international financial institution" includes-
8 (i) the International Bank for Reconstruction
9 and Development, the International Development
10 Association, and the International Monetary
11 Fund; and
12 (ii) wherever applicable, the Inter-American
13 Development Bank, the Asian Development
14 Bank, the African Development Bank, and the
15 African Development Fund.
16 (6) The President shall exercise his authorities
17 under the International Emergency Economic Powers
18 Act (other than section 204) for the purpose of ensur-
19 ing that no such country or any national thereof may
20 transfer out of the jurisdiction of the United States any
21 property or credit in which such country or national
22 thereof has any financial interest.
23 (7) Section 901(i) of the Internal Revenue Code of
94 1986 shall apply with respect to tax credits for the
25 amount of any income, war profits, and excess profits
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1 taxes paid or accrued to such country by taxpayers of
2 the United States.
3 (e) Paragraph (2) of section 901(j) of the Internal Reve-
4 nue Code of 1986 is amended-
5 (1) by striking out "or" at the end of subpara-
6 graph (A)(ii);
7 (2) by striking out the period at the end of sub-
8 paragraph (A)(iv) and inserting in lieu thereof ", or";
9 (3) by adding at the end of subparagraph (A) the
10 following new clause:
11 "(v) which the Secretary of State has,
12 pursuant to section (2)(a) of the Anti-Terror-
13 ism Act of 1987, designated as a foreign
14 co?mtry which repeatedly provides support
15 for acts of international terrorism.";
16 (4) by striking out "or" at the end of subpara-
17 graph (B)(i)(I);
18 (5) by striking out "subparagraph (A), and" in
19 subparagraph (B)(i)(II) and inserting in lieu thereof
20 "clauses (i), (ii), and (iv) of subparagraph (A), or";
21 and
02 (6) by inserting at the end of subparagraph (B)(i)
93 the following new subclause:
24 "(111) the effective date determined
95 under section 3(a) of the Anti-Terrorism
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1 Act of 1987 with respect to a country
2 described in subparagraph (A)(v), and".
3 (f) For purposes of this section, the term "legislative
4 days" means the days on which both Houses of Congress are
5 in session.
6 POLICY TOWARD COORDINATION OF SANCTIONS WITH
ALLIES
8 SEC. 4. It is the sense of the Congress that, in any case
9 in which any sanction is imposed against a country under
10 section 3, the President should make vigorous efforts to
11 obtain the imposition of a similar sanction by the allies of the
12 United States.
13 CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW; PRIORITY PROCEDURES
14 SEC. 5. (a)(1) Notwithstanding the exception contained
15 in section 3(a)(1), the sanctions described in section 3(d) shall
16 take effect with respect to a country on the date described in
17 section 3(a)(2) if the Congress enacts a joint resolution of
18 disapproval, in accordance with this section, within 30 legis-
19 lative days after transmittal of the report required by section
20 3(a)(1).
21 (2) Notwithstanding the waiver made in section 3(b)(1),
22 the sanctions described in section 3(d) shall continue in effect
23 with respect to a country if the Congress enacts a joint reso-
24 lution of disapproval, in accordance with this section, within
25 30 legislative days after transmittal of the report required by
26 section 3(b)(I).
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1 (b)(1) For purposes of this section, the term 'joint resolu-
2 tion' means only a joint resolution introduced in a House of
3 Congress within 3 legislative days after the appropriate corn-
4 mittee of such House of Congress receives a report required
5 by section 3(a)(1) or 3(b)(1)-
6 (A) the matter after the resolving clause of which
7 is as follows: "That the Congress hereby disapproves
8 the determination of the President contained in the
9 report submitted on , as required by
10 of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987", with
11 the appropriate date inserted in the first blank and
12 "section 3(a)(1)" or "section 3(b)(1)", as the case may
13 be, inserted in the second blank.
14 (B) which does not have a preamble; and
15 (C) the title of which is as follows: "Joint Resolu-
16 tion disapproving sanctions under the Anti-Terrorism
17 Act of 1987".
18 (2) A joint resolution, upon introduction in the House of
19 Representatives, shall be referred to the Committee on For-
20 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives or, upon intro-
91 duction in the Senate, shall be referred to the Committee on
22 Foreign Relations of the Senate.
23 (3) For purposes of this section, the term "legislative
24 day" means, with respect to a House of Congress, a day on
25 which such House of Congress is in session.
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1 (c)(1) The provisions of this subsection apply to the con-
2 sideration in the House of Representatives of a joint resolu-
3 tion with respect to a report required by section 3(a)(1) or
4 3(b)(1).
5 (2) If the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
6 Representatives has not reported the joint resolution by the
7 end of 15 legislative days after the first joint resolution was
8 introduced, such Committee shall be discharged from further
9 consideration of the first joint resolution and that joint resolu-
10 tion shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House.
11 (3)(A) At any time after the first joint resolution placed
12 on the appropriate calendar has been on that calendar for a
13 period of 5 legislative days, it is in order for any Member of
14 the House (after consultation with the Speaker as to the most
15 appropriate time for the consideration of that joint resolution)
16 to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of
17 the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consider-
18 ation of that joint resolution. The motion is highly privileged
19 and is in order even though a previous motion to the same
20 effect has been disagreed to. AU points of order against the
21 joint resolution under clauses 2 and 6 of Rule XXI of the
22 Rules of the House are waived. If the motion is agreed to,
23 the joint resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the
24 House until disposed of. A motion to reconsider the vote by
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1 which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in
2 order.
3 (B) Debate on the joint resolution shall not exceed ten
4 hours, which shall be divided equally between a Member fa-
3 voring and a Member opposing the joint resolution. A motion
6 to limit debate is in order at any time in the House or in the
7 Committee of the Whole and is not debatable.
8 (C) An amendment to the joint resolution is not in order.
9 (D) At the conclusion of the debate on the joint resolu-
10 tion, the Committee of the Whole shall rise and report the
11 joint r, solution back to the House, and the previous question
12 shall be considered as ordered on the joint resolution to final
13 passage without intervening motion.
14 (d)(1) The provisions of this subsection apply to the con-
15 sideration in the Senate of a joint resolution with respect to a
16 report required by section 3(a)(1) or 3(b)(1).
17 (2)(A) If the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
18 Senate (hereafter in this subsection referred to as the "Com-
19 mittee ) has not reported a joint resolution at the end of 15
20 legislative days after its introduction, it is in order to move
91 either to discharge the Committee from further consideration
22 of the joint resolution or to discharge the Committee from
93 further consideration of any other joint resolution introduced
24 with respect to the same report which has been referred to
95 the Committee, except that no motion to discharge shall be in
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1 order after the Committee has reported a joint resolution
2 with respect to the same report.
3 (B) A motion to discharge under subparagraph (A) of
4 this paragraph may be made only by a Senator favoring the
5 joint resolution, is privileged, and debate thereon shall be
6 limited to not more than 1 hour, to be divided equally be-
7 tween those favoring and those opposing the joint resolution,
8 the time to be divided equally between, and controlled by, the
9 majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.
10 An amendment to the motion is not in order, and it is not in
11 order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is
12 agreed to or disagreed to.
13 (3) When the Committee has reported, or has been
14 deemed to be discharged (under paragraph (2)) from further
15 consideratim of a joint resolution, notwithstanding any rule
16 or precedent of the Senate, including Rule 22, it is at any
17 time thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to
18 the same effect has been disagreed to) fo7 any Senator to
19 move to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution,
20 and all points of order against the joint resolution (and
21 against consideration of the joint resolution) are waived.
22 (4)(A) A motion in the Senate to proceed to the consid-
23 eration of a joint resolution shall be privileged. An amend-
24 ment to the motion shall not he in order, nor shall it be in
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1 order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is
2 agreed to or disagreed to.
3 (B) Debate in the Senate on a joint resolution, and all
4 debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall
5 be limited to not more than 10 hours, to be equally divided
6 between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the mi-
7 nority leader or their designees.
8 (C) Debate in the Senate on any debatable motion or
9 appeal in connection with a joint resolution shall be limited to
10 not more than 1 hour, to be equally divided between, and
11 controlled by, the mover and the manager of the resolution,
12 except that in the event the manager of the resolution is in
13 favor of any such motion or appeal, the time in opposition
14 thereto, shall be controlled by the minority leader or his des-
15 ignee. Such leaders, or either of them, may, from time under
16 their control on the passage of a resolution, allot additional
17 time to any Senator during the consideration of any debatable
18 motion or appeal.
19 (D) A motion in the Senate to further limit debate on a
20 joint resolution, debatable motion, or appeal is not debatable.
21 No amendment to, or motion to recommit, a joint resolution
22 is in order in the Senate.
23 (5) If, before the passage by the Senate of a joint resolu-
94 tion, the Senate receives from the House of Representatives
25 a joint resolution, then the following procedures shall apply:
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1 (A) The joint resolution of the House of Repre-
2 sentatives shall not be referred to a committee.
3 (B) With respect to a joint resolution of the
4 Senate-
5 (i) the procedure in the Senate shall be the
6 same as if no joint resolution had been received
7 from the House; but
8 (ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the
9 joint resolution of the House.
10 (C) Upon disposition of the joint resolution re-
11 ceived from the House, it shall no longer be in order to
12 consider the joint resolution originated in the Senate.
13 (6) If the Senate receives from the House of Represent-
14 atives a joint resolution after the Senate has disposed of a
15 Senate originated joint resolution, the action of the Senate
16 with regard to the disposition of the Senate originated joint
17 resolution shall be deemed to be the action of the Senate with
18 regard to the House originated joint resolution.
19 (e) Subsections (b) through (d) are enacted-
20 (1) as exercises of the rulemaking powers of the
21 House of Representatives and Senate, and as such
22 they are deemed a part of the Rules of the House and
23 the Rules of the Senate, respectively, but applicable
24 only with respect to the procedure to be followed in
25 the House and the Senate in the case of joint resolu-
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1 tions under this section, and they supersede other rules
2 only to the extent that they are inconsistent with such
3 rules; and
4 (2) with full recognition of the constitutional right
5 of the House and the Senate to change their rules at
6 any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent
7 as in the case of any other rule of the House or
8 Senate, and of the right of the Committee on Rules of
9 the House of Representatives to report a resolution for
10 the consideration of any measure.
11 DEFINITIONS
12 SEC. 6. For purposes of this Act-
13 (1) the term "support" includes-
14 (A) furnishing arms, explosives, or lethal sub-
15 stances to individuals, groups, or organizations
16 with the likelihood that they will be used in the
17 commission of any act of international terrorism;
18 (B) planning, (Erecting, providing training
19 for, or assisting in the execution of any act of
20 international terrorism;
21 (C) providing direct or indirect financial
22 backing for the commission of any act of interna-
23 tional terrorism;
(D) providing diplomatic facilities intended to
25 aid or abet the commission of any act of interna-
26 tional terrorism; or
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2
3
4
16
(E) allowing the use of its territory as a
sanctuary from extradition or prosecution for any
act of international terrorism; and
(2) the term "United States assistance" includes
5 any assistance of any kind which is provided by grant,
6 sale, loan, lease, credit, guaranty, or insurance, or by
7 any other means, by any agency or instrumentality of
8 the United States Government to or for the benefit of
9 any foreign country, including-
10 (A) assistance under the Foreign Assistance
11 Act of 1961 (including programs under title 117 of
12 chapter 2 of part I, relating to the Overseas ?i-i-
13 vate Investment Corporation);
14 (B) sales, credits, and guaranties under the
15 Arms Export Control Act;
16 (C) sales under title I (including title III) of
17 the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist-
18 ance Act of 1954 and donations under title II of
19 such Act of agricultural commodities;
20 (D) financing programs of the Commodity
21 Credit Corporation for export sales of agricultural
22 commodities;
23 (E) financing under the Export-Import Bank
24 Act of 1945;
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1 (F) assistance under the Migration and Refu-
2 gee Assistance Act of 1962;
3 (G) programs under the Peace Corps Act;
4 (H) assistance under the Inter-American
5 Foundation Act;
6 (I) assistance under the African Development
7 Foundation Act;
8 (J) financial assistance for foreign persons or
9 groups under the Mutual Educational and Cultur-
10 al Exchange Act of 1961; and
11 (K) assistance of any kind under any other
12 Act.
0
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May 28, 1987 CO
WALLOP, Mr. MAYSIINAGA. Mr. Gem,
Mr. BITKPEREY. Mr. Mrsciaz.i., Mr.
Pwozatru. Mr. Itrisua. Mr. Bair*
MT. PACKWOOD, Ur. BOND, Mr.
Snots. Ms. littirmswi, Mr. ORA'S-
LEY, Mr. Gaunt. Mr. Wsicuss, Mr.
Ram, Mr. KERRY, Mr. Leen', Mr.
PRYOR. Mr. Bowe and Mr. Srso-
esa?:
S.J. Res. 140. A joint resolution to desig-
nate the week beginning July 13. 1987. as
"Snow White Week"; to the Committee on
the Judiciary.
By Mr. NICKLES (for himself, Mr.
BOREN, Mr. BRADLEY, Mr. DASCHIL
Mr. DrColleen'. Mr. Dots, Mr. Exalt.
Mr. Poitz. Mr. GARD, Mr. Cron. Kr.
Benne Mr. Botunos, Mr. Buie
mare, Mr. Inouye., Mr. LUGAR, Mr.
MATSU/IAEA, Mr. METEENRADM, MT.
Mormasx, Mr. Muzzowsau, Mr.
)Iorm, Mr. Pete, Mr. PRESSLER, Mr.
PRYOR, and Mr. errevensi.
S.J. Rea. 141. A joint resolution designat-
ing August 29, 1988. as "National China-
Burma-India Veterans Appreciation Day";
to the Committee on the Judiciary.
SUBMISSION OF CONCURRENT
AND SENATE RESOLUTIONS
The following concurrent resolutions
andSenate resolutions were read, and
referred (or acted upon), as indicated:
bthBy Mr. FORD:
S. Res. 223. An original resolution relating
to e purchase of calendars; from the Com-
mittee on Rules and Administration; Placed
on the calendar.
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED
BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. BREAUX:
S. 1281. A bill to amend Public Law
97-360, and for other purposes; to the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transports ion.
=TENSION C UT-ASIDE FOR SHIPS INVOLVED
IN WORLD HEALTH CARE
? Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, the
legislation I am introducing today
would amend P.L. 97-360 under which
three surplus Federal ships have been
set aside for utilization by Life Inter-
national. Life International is a non-
profit, hLI sanitarian organization
which is e) deavoring to develop a
mercy fleet which would take aid,
technical assistance, health care,
training and education to the people
of the Third World. The bill would
extend the set aside of the three ships
until September 30, 1992, as well as
provide the necessary two-thirds of
the retrofit funding on a matching
basis. These ships will be used specifi-
cally for the provision of health care
and other humanitarian services to de-
veloping countries.
The bill is nearly identical to a bill
(H.R. 1097) that was offered by the
chairman of the House Merchant
Marine and Fisheries Committee ?
except that I would propose instead to I
make use of one of the many commer-
cial vessels now "repossessed" by the
Maritime Administration tataradl c
under the title 11 Obligation Guaran- s
ty Program. Many of these vessels are r
presently mothballed at substantial p
NGRESOONAL RECORD ? SE
NATE 8 7287
animal 004 to the Government an
are not likely to be re-sold to the cons
mercial market In the near future
Purtherrnore, the cost of retrofitting
certain of these vessel designs woul
be far less than the type of vessel pro-
posed in the Rouse legislation. I think
this represents a far more cost effi
dent proposal to achieve the very
noble and important objectives of LIS
International.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con
sent that my bill be printed in the
REcoan.
There being no objection, the bill
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
S. 1281
Be it enacted by the Senate and Nouse of
ltepresentatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled. That the
Act entitled "An act to set aside certain sur-
plus vessels for use in the provision of
health and other humanitarian services to
developing countries". approved October 22,
1982 (Public Law 97-360; 96 Stat. 1718) is
amended as follows:
(1) Section 6 is amended to read as fol-
"Sac. 6. This Act applies to?
"(1) United States Ship General Nelson M.
Walker P2-8E2-R1 currently held in the
National Defense Reserve Fleet;
"(2) the United States Ship Sanctuary
A13-20. which shall be transferred to the
National Defense Reserve Fleet; and
"(3) an offshore supply ship currently in
the possession of the Maritime Administra-
tion.".
"(2) Section 7 is amended to read as fol-
lows:
-Sac. 7. Funds are authorized to be appro-
priated without fiscal year limitation, as the
appropriation law may provide for the use
of the Department of Transportation, to
pay for not more than two-thirds of the cost
of retrofitting the vessels listed in section 6
of this Act if?
"(1) the vessels are to be used under sec-
tion 5 of this Act;
"(2) the recipient has satisfactorily dem-
onstrated to the Secretary of TransPorts-
tion that sufficient funds are available to
pay for the recipient's portion of the cost of
retrofitting the vessels;
"(3) retrofitting of one vessel is completed
before retrofitting begins on each of the
succeeding vessels; and
"(4) all work is done in the United States
shipyard.'.
"(3) Add at the end the following
"Sec. 8. This Act expires on September 30,
1992.'4
d of a variety of economic and diplomat-
-Ic penalties on such countries, and by
. requiring closer consultation between
Congress and the executive branch on
d our policy toward States that sponsor
terrorism.
Last year. Americans were the No. 1
- target of International terrorism. In
1986, roughly 27 percent of all terror-
e lit incidents involved American inter-
ests or property. 12 Americans were
- killed by terrorists, and 101 were
wounded. Even beyond the lives lost
and injured by terrorism, the damage
to America's peace of mind, its ability
to conduct diplomacy, to protect its in-
terests abroad, and to Americans' abili-
ty to travel freely in the world has
been incalculable.
Americans have the right to expect
that their Government will do every-
thing it can to stop terrorism. But de-
spite tough talk on terrorism. U.S.
policy has often neglected the key role
that States play in supporting and
sponsoring terrorism. And in neglect-
ing that role, it has continued to pro-
vide aid, credit, and other benefits to
nations long after we've identified
them as supporting and sponsoring
terrorism against Americans.
Why should we care about State
sponsorship of terrorism? Because ter-
rorist groups do not operate alone.
Their effectiveness is enhanced consid-
erably by the assistance they receive
from their State sponsors. Assistance
like money, arms, and explosives. Like
recruitment and training, passports,
infiltration and escape routes. Like
transportation, rapid communications,
safe havens, and sanctuary.
This assistance forms an elaborate
internations.1 -life support. network on
which terrorists depend. Without it,
terrorists would be out in the cold.
They'd find it a lot more difficult to
operate.
The State Department acknowledges
the key role played by State sponsors
of terrorism. The Department of
State's "Patterns of Global Terrorism:
1985, published in October of 1986,
States:
That in large measure the range and leth-
ality of terrorism in 1985 derived largely
from the active role continually played by
sovereign states?most notably Libya. Syria,
and Iran. The unprecedented degree of
backing by these states and, on some cases,
their active participation in terrorist oper-
ations continued to make international ter-
rorism, very much a problem_
The CIA has also acknowledged the
critical role of State sponsors in ac-
complishing terrorism's dirty business.
The late CIA Director William Casey
stated in Washington Post's May 22,
1986 edition that:
Libya, Syria and Iran use terrorism as an
Instrument of foreign policy. They hire and
support established terrorist organizations.
These countries make their officials, their
embassies, their diplomatic pouuches, their
communications channels, and their terrori-
tory as safe havens for these criminals to
plan, direct- and executive bombing amass)-
nation. kidnapping and other terrorist oper?
(mons.
By Mr. LAUTENBERG (for him-
self, Mr. KERRY, Mr. GRASSLrf,
MIKULSKI, Mr. SIMON, and
Paoxmrita)*
bill to provide for the im-
sanctions against countries
? mg international terrorism,
for other purposes; to the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations.
DETERRENCE OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM
ACT
Mr. LAUTETTBERG. Mr. President,
rise to introduce, along with Sena-
tors KERP,Y, GRASSLrY, MIEUISKI,
PROXMIRE, and &mos, a bill aimed at
urbing the activities of States that
upport and sponsor international ter-
orism. It would do so by creating a
resumption in favor of the imposition
and
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7288 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
And while it's often difficult to
locate individual terrorists, we have
the address of their State sponsors.
Secretary of State Shultz is required
to keep a list of pursuant to the re-
quirements of the Export Administra-
tion Act of countries that demonstrate
a consistent pattern of support for and
sponsorship of terrorism. That list
currently includes Syria, Libya, Iran,
South Yemen. and Cuba.
Despite the acknowledged role that
certain. well-identified States play In
encouraging, supporting, and even
sponsoring terrorism against Ameri-
cans. the United States has often
Tailed to penalize them for their be-
havior. In many cases, these countries
continue to receive U.S. foreign aid
dollars, arms, and access to our mar-
kets long after they have been found
to engage in a consistent pattern of
state support for terrorism. We need
to stop subdizing the very countries
that subsidize terror.
For example, Syria has been on the
Department of State's list of State
sponsors of terrorism since the list's
inception in 1979. And the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961, section 820(A)(a),
22 U.S.C. section 2371 (a) provides
that the United States may not pro-
vide any assistance to any country the
President determines supports inter-
national terrorism, unless he finds
that it is in our national security or
humanitarian interests to do so, and so
notifies Congress.
But according to a GAO report done
at my request, It was not until 1983
that we cut off Syria's economic assist-
ance, and not until 1984 that we pro-
hibited all foreign assistance to Syria.
Between 1979 and 1983, Syrai received
$113.8 million in American aid. The
GAO report also shows that it was
only last year that we ended Export-
Import. Bank programs in Syria, termi-
nated Syria's landing rights in the
United States, suspended United
States sales of Syrian Arab airline
tickets in the United States, ended the
Export Enhancement Program for
Syria, and banned the sale of sophisti-
cated technology like computers and
aircraft.
It's not that we don't have the
power to stop such policies. It's that
we haven't used it.
Although a wide range of laws on
our books permit the President to cut
off foreign aid and impose other sanc-
tions for the support of terrorism, in
many instances, these sanctions are
just not imposed.
And there are some sanctions that
we don't now have the authority to
impose, but that we should. For in-
stance, Syria and every other country
on the Secretrary of State's terrorist
list is eligible for World Bank and
other multilateral development bank
loans without protest from the United
States unless they provide sanctuary
to terrorists.
Last year. the World Bank approved
over 375 million in loans to Syria with-
ollt a single word of protest from the
United Sidles because of the their sup-
port for terrorism. Even Treasury Sec-
retary Baker conceded in hearings
before the Senate Appropriations
Committee that the United States
should have voted no on this loan be-
cause of Split's record of support for
terrorism, Instead of abstaining on
human rights grounds.
It's clear from the example of Syria
that any administration should be
compelled to spell out and to justify to
the Congress, its policy toward each
nation that supports terrorism. Con-
gress should play a more formal role
In reviewing the comprehensiveness of
sanctions on countries that support
terrorism against Americans. And,
there should be a presumption in
favor of denying foreign aid and other
benefits to countries that persist in
supporting and sponsoring state ter-
rorism.
The legislation which I have intro-
duced today requires the Secretary of
State to keep a list of countries that
exhibit a pattern of consistent State
support for terrorism, much the same
way that he now keeps such a list pur-
suant to the requirements of the
Export Administration Act. When a
country is placed on that list, a variety
of sanctions, including a cutoff of for-
eign aid, arms sales, a freezing of that
country's assets in the United States,
and other sanctions will be presumed
to go into effect within 30 days. unless
the President waives those sanctions.
If the President does not want those
sanctions to go into effect, he must,
within 30 days, submit to Congress a
detailed explanation of why the impo-
sition of any or all of those sanctions
would not be in national security in-
tt rest of the United States, or in hu-
manitarian interests. Congress then
has a period of 30 days to overrule
that decision, which it must do by
passing a resolution of disapproval.
In the event of an emergency, the
President may remove sanctions al-
ready in place by providing a certifica-
tion that such an emergency exists,
aril giving notice to the heads of the
Imelligence and Foreign Relations
Committees in the House and the
Senate.
If our country is to be taken serious-
ly when we say we want to get tough
of terror, we should not be providing
foreign aid, arms, loans, and favorable
treatment to countries that engage in
State support or State sponsorship of
terrorism. We must go after not only
the members of terrorist rings, but
those who bankroll and train the ring-
leaders?the State sponsors of terror.
Sanctions send a powerful nonmili-
tary signal to such States that we will
not countenance business as usual
with those who support the killing,
maiming, and kidnapping of Ameri-
cans. They demonstrate that we sup-
port our policies with actions as well
as words, and are prepared to incur
costs in our battle against internation-
al terrorism.
May 18, 1987
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that a copy of the bill and a sec-
tion-by-section analysis of the deter-
rence of State-Sponsored Terrorism
Act of 1987. as well as the GAO report
entitled "Terrorism. Laws Cited Im-
posing Sanctions OD Nations Support-
ing Terrorism," appear in the Ram=
after my remarks.
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
Rzcoan, as follows:
718. 1282
Re tt enacted by the Senate and Rouse of
Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
SHORT TITLE
Bacrzop 1. This Act may be cited as the
"Deterrence of State-Sponsored Terrorism
Act of 1987".
LIST OF COUNTRIES SUPPORTING TERRORISM
SEC. 2(a) Not later than SO days after the
date of enactment of this Act, and thereaf-
ter on February I of each year. the Secre-
tary of State shall prepare and transmit to
the Congress a report betting forth a list of
those countries. if any, which he has deter-
mined have repeatedly provided support for
acts of international terrorism. This list
may be referred to as the "terrorist list".
(b) Not later than '1 days after the Secre-
tary of State determines that a country on
the terrorist list no longer is providing sup-
port for acts of international terrorism, the
Secretary of State shall prepare and trans-
mit to the Congress a supplemental report
setting forth his determination. and such
country shall be deemed to be removed from
the terrorist list upon receipt by the Con-
gress of such report.
SANCTIONS AGAINST 0017NTRIRS SUPPORTING
INTERNATIONAL TERRORLSM; WAIVER
Sac. 3. (a) The sanctions described in sub-
section (d) shall be imposed against any
country which is placed on the terrorist list
and shall be effective?
(1) 30 calendar days after the name of
such country is first placed on such list,
except that such sanctions or any part
thereof, as the President may specify, shall
not take effect if, within such 30-day period.
the President makes a determination and
report described in subsection (c); or
(2) in the case of sanctions specified in a
determination which is described in subsec-
tion (c) and which is disapproved by enact-
ment of a joint resolution under section 5,
on the date of enactment of such joint reso-
lution.
(b) Al) or any of the sanctions, as the
President may specill. which are described
in subsection (d) and which are in effect
with respect to a country shall cease to
apply?
(1) if the President makes a determination
and report described in subsection (c). 30
legislative days after the date of such deter-
mination: or
(2) if the President determines that an
emergency situation exists which would jus-
tify the partial or complete lifting of sanc-
tions. upon his certification of the existence
of such an emergency situation to the chair-
men of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee of the Rouse of Representatives and
the chairmen of the Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee of the Senate.
(OW The determination referred to in
subsection (a)t1) or in subsection (b)(1) is a
determination by the President that it ik in
the national interest of the United State.
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May 28, 1087 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SEN
OS' ID humanitarian Interests, to take the
acUon described in the appropriate subsec-
tion.
(2)(A) The report referred to in such sub-
sections is a report which is prepared by the
President and transmitted to the appropri-
ate committees of the Congress and which
contains the appropriate determination de-
scribed In Paragraph
(B) The President shall Include in any
such report a detailed explanation Of his
reasons for making a determination under
paragraph (1). Any part of such explanation
may be included, if necessary, In a classified
addendum to such report, except that each
such report shall contain an unclassified
summary of such explanation.
(C) For purposes of this paragraph, the
phrase "appropriate committees of the Con-
gress" means the Committee on Appropria-
Uons and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Appropriations and the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(d) The sanctions referred to in subsec-
tions (a) and (b) are the following:
(1) Al) United States assistance for such
country shall be terminated
(2) No technology of such country and no
goods (or any part thereof) which are pro-
duced, grown, or manufactured in such
country may be Imported into the United
States, except that such technology or
goods may be imported into the United
States if additional duties are imposed on
such imports in regulations prescribed by
the Secretary of Commerce.
(3) The President shall deny to all prod-
ucts of such country duty-free tariff treat-
ment under title V of the Trade Act of 1974
(the Generalized System of Preferences).
(4 XA) The Secretary of State shell
promptly take whatever steps may be neces-
sery to terminate any air or sea transporta-
tion agreement in effect between the United
States and such country in accordance with
the terms of such agreement.
(B) Upon the termination of any such
agreement or, if no such agreement is in
effect, upon the effective date of sanctions
determined under section 3(a). the Secre-
tary of Transportation shall prohibit any
aircraft or vessel owned directly or indirect-
ly by the government of such country or its
nationals from engaging in air or sea trans-
portation with respect to the United States.
(C) The Secretary of Transportation may
provide for such exceptions from the prohi-
bition contained in subparagraph (B) as the
Secretary considers necessary to provide for
emergencies in which the safety of the air-
craft or vessel or its crew or passengers is
threatened.
(D) For purposes of this paragraph, the
term "aircraft" has the meaning given such
term in section 101 of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1301).
(5)(A) The Secretary of the Treasury shall
Instruct the United States Executive Direc-
tor of each international financial institu-
tion to rote against any loan or other use of
the funds of the respective institution to or
for such country.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, the
term "international financial institution"
Includes?
(1) the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, the International
Development Association, and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund: end
(ii) wherever applicable, the Inter-Ameri-
czn Development Bank. the Asian Develop-
ment Bank. the African Development Bank,
and the African Development Fund
(6) The President shall exercise his au-
thorities under the International Emergen-
cy Economic Powers Act (other than section
204 ? for the purpose of ensuring that no
such country DT any national thereof ma
transfer out of the jurisdicUon of the
United States any property or credit in
which such country or national thereof has
any financial interest.
(7) Section 901(j) of the Interne] Revenue
Code of 1986 shall apply with respect to tax
credits for the amount of any income, war
profits, and excess profits taxes paid or ac-
crued to such country by taxpayers of the
United States.
(e) Paragraph (2) of section 901(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended?
(1) by striking out "or" at the end of sub-
paragraph (AXII);
(2) by striking out the period at the end of
subparagraph (AX1v) and inserting in lieu
thereof ", or";
(3) by adding at the end of subparagraph
(A) the following new clause:
"(v) which the Secretary of State has,
pursuant to section (2)(a) of the Anti-Ter-
rorism Act of 1987, designated as a foreign
country which repeatedly provides support
for acts of international terrorism.",
(4) by striking out "or" at the end of sub-
paragraph (B xiXI);
(5) by striking out "subparagraph (A).
and" in subparagraph (BX1x11) and insert-
ing in lieu thereof "clauses (i). (ii), (iii), and
(iv) of subparagraph (A), or"; and
(6) by inserting at the end of subpara-
graph (B)(i) the following new subclause:
"(LII) the effective date determined under
section 3(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act of
1987 with respect to a country described in
subparagraph (AXv), and".
) For purposes of this section. the term
"legislative days" means the days on which
both Houses of Congress are in session.
POLICY TOWARD COORDINATION OF SANCTIONS
WITH ALLIES
Stu. 4. It is the sense of the Congress that,
In any case in which any sanction is imposed
against a country under section 3, the Presi-
dent should make vigorous efforts to obtain
the imposition of a similar sanction by the
allies of the United States.
corsoitessiosi ezvrew, PRIORITY PROCEDURES
Sac. 5. (aX. ) Notwithstanding the excep-
tion containe in section 3(a1(1), the sanc-
tions described in section 3(d) shall take
effect with respect to a country on the date
described in section 3(aX2) if the Congress
enacts a joint resolution of disapproval, in
accordance with this section, within 30 legis-
lative days after transmittal of the report
required by section 3(aX1).
(2) Notwithianding the waiver made in
section 3(bX1) the sanctions described in
section 3(d) sh II continue in effect with re-
spect to a country if the Congress enacts a
joint resolution. of disapproval, in accord-
ance with this section, within 30 legislative
days after transmittal of the report required
by section 3(1)X1).
(b)(1) For purposes of this section, the
term *joint resolution' means only a joint
resolution introduced in a House of Con-
gress within 3 legislative days after the ap-
propriate committee of such House of Con-
gress receives a report required by section
3(a)(1) or 3(b)(1)?
(A) the matter after the resolving clause
of which is as follows: "That the Congress
hereby clisapprnes the determination of
the President contained in the report sub-
mitted on as re-
quired by of the Anti-Ter-
rorism Act of 1987,' with the appropriate
date inserted in the first blank and -section
&ant )" or "section 3:b1(1)", ILE the case may
be. inserted in the second blank.
(B) which does not have a preamble! and
(C) the title of which is as follows: -Joint
Resolution disapproving sanctions under
the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987.
ATE 87289
? (2) A joint resolution, upon Introduction
In the House of Representatives, shall be re-
ferred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Of the House of Representatives or. Upon in-
troduction In the Senate. shall be referred
to the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate.
(3) For purposes of this section, the term
"legislative day" means, with respect to a
House of Congress, a day on which such
House of Congress is in session.
(cX1) The provisions of this subsection
apply to the consideration in the House of
Representatives of a joint resolution with
respect to a report required by section
11(aX1) or 3(b1(1).
(2) If the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives has not re-
ported the joint resolution by the end of 15
legislative days after the first joint resolu-
tion was introduced, such Committee shall
be discharged from further consideration of
the first joint resolution and that joint reso-
lution shall be placed on the appropriate
calendar of the House.
(3 xA) At any time after the first joint res-
olution planed on the appropriate calendar
has been on that calendar for a period of 11
legislative days, It is in order for any
Member of the House (after consultation
with the Speaker as to the most appropriate
time for the consideration of that joint reso-
lution) to more that the House resolve itself
Into the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union for the consideration
of that joint resolution. The motion is
highly privileged and is In order even
though a previous motion to the same effect
has been disagreed to. All points of order
against the joint resolution under clauses 2
and 6 of Rule MEI of the Rules of the
House are waived. If the motion is agreed
to, the joint resolution shall remain the un-
finished business of the House until dis-
posed of. A motion to reconsider the vote by
which the motion is agreed to or disagreed
to shall not be in order.
(B) Debate on the joint resolution shall
not exceed ten hours, which shall be divided
equally between a Member favoring and a
Member opposing the joint resolution. A
motion to limit debate is in order at any
time in the House or in the Committee of
the Whole and is not debatable.
(C) An amendment to the joint resolution
Is not in order.
(D) At the conclusion of the debate on the
joint resolution, the Committee of the
Whole shall rise and report the joint resolu-
tion back to the House, and the previous
-question shall be considered as ordered on
the joint resolution to final passage without
intervening motion.
(d)(1) The provisions of this subsection
apply to the consideration in the Senate of
a joint resolution with respect to a report
required by section 3(axl) or 3(b)(1).
(2)(A) If the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate (hereafter in this sub-
section referred to as the "Committee") has
not reported ? joint resolution at the end of
15 legislative days after its introduction, it is
In order to move either to discharge the
Committee from further consideration of
the joint resolution or to discharge the
Committee from further consideration of
any other joint resolution introduced with
respect to the same report which has been
referred to the Committee, except that no
motion to discharge shall be in order after
the Committee has reported a joint resolu-
tion with respect to the same report.
(B) A motion to discharge under subpara-
graph (A) of this paragraph may be made
on!) by a Senator favoring the joint resolu-
tion. is privileged, and debate thereon shall
be limited to not more than 1 hour, to be di-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SEN
Sided equally between Mon favoring and
those opposing the joint resolution, the
time to be divided equally between. and con-
trolled by. the majority lender and the mi-
nority leader Or their designees. An amend-
Silent to the Motion is not in otter, and It is
not in order to move to reconsider the vote
by which the motion is agreed to or dis-
agreed to.
(2) When the Committee has reported, or
has been deemed to be discharged (under
paragraph (2)) from further consideration
of a Joint resolution, notwithstanding any
rule or precedent of the Senate. including
Rule 22,11 is at any time thereafter In order
(even though a previous motion to the same
effect has been disagreed to) for any Sena-
tor to move to proceed to the consideration
of the Joint resolution, and all points of
order against the joint resolution (and
against consideration of the joint resolu-
tion) are waived.
(4 MA) A mdtion in the Senate to proceed
to the consideration of a joint resolution
shall be privileged. An amendment to the
motion shall not be in order, nor shall it be
In order to move to reconsider the vote by
which the motion is agreed to or disagreed
to.
(B) Debate in the Senate on a joint resolu-
tion. and all debatable motions and appeals
in connection therewith, shall be limited to
not more than 10 hours, to be equally divid-
ed between, and controlled by. the majority
leader and the minority leader or their des-
ignees.
(C) Debate in the Senate on any debatable
motion or appeal in connection with a joint
resolution shall be limited to not more than
1 hour, to be equally divided between, and
controlled by, the mover and the manager
of the resolution, except that in the event
the manager of the resolution is in favor of
any such motion or appeal, the time in op-
position thereto, shall be controlled by the
minority leader or his designee. Such lead-
ers, or either of them, may, from time under
their control on the passage of a resolution,
allot additional time to any Senator during
the consideration of any debatable motion
or appeal.
(D) A motion in the Senate to further
limit debate on a joint resolution, debatable
motion, or appeal is not debatable. No
amendment to; or motion to recommit, a
joint resolution is in order in the Senate.
(S) If. before the passage by the Senate of
a joint resolution. the Senate receives from
the House of Representatives a joint resolu-
tion, then the following procedures shall
(A) The joint resolution of the House of
Representatives shall not be referred to a
committee.
(B' With respect to a joint resolution of
the Senate?
(i) the procedure in the Senate shall be
the same as if no joint resolution had been
received from the House; but
(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on
the joint resolution of the House.
(C) Upon disposition of the joint resolu-
tion received from the House, it shall not
longer be In order to consider the joint reso-
lution originated in the Senate.
(6) If the Senate receives from the House
of Representatives a joint resolution after
the Senate has disposed of a Senate origi-
nated joint resolution, the action of the
Senate with regard to the disposition of the
Senate originated joint resolution shall be
-deemed to be the action of the Senate with
regard to the House originated joint resolu-
tion.
(e) Subsections (b) through (d' are en-
acted?
(1) BE exerciser of the rulemaking powers
of the House of Representatives and Senate,
and as such they are deemed a part of the
Rules of the House and the Rules of the
Senate. respectively, but applicable only
with respect to the procedure to be followed
In the House and the Senate in the case of
Joint resolutions under this section, and
they supersede other riles only to the
extent that they are inconsistent with such
rules; and
(2) with full recognition of the constitu-
tional right of the House and the Senate to
change their rules at any time, in the same
manner, and to the same extent as in the
we of any other rule of the House or
Senate. and of the right of the Committee
on Rules of the House of Representatives to
report a resolution for the consideration of
any measure.
DETL2tITION1
Sec. 6. For purposes of this Act?
(1) the term "act of international terror-
ism" means an activity that?
(A) involves a violent act or an act danger-
ous to human life that is a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any
State, or that would be a criminal violation
If committed within the Jurisdiction of the
United States or of any State; and
(11) appears to be intended?
(I) to intimidate or coerce a civilian popu-
lation;
(ii) to influence the policy of a govern-
ment by intimidation or coercion; or
MD to affect the conduct of a government
by assassination or kidnappinr, and
(C) occurs totally outside the United
States, or transcends national boundaries in
terms of the means by which such activity is
accomplished, the persons such activity ap-
pears intended to coerce or intimidate, or
the locale in which the perpetrators operate
or seek asylum;
(2) the term "support" includes?
(A) furnishing arms, explosives, or lethal
substances to individuals, groups, or organi-
sations with the likelihood that they will be
used in the commission of any act of inter-
national terrorism;
(B) planning, directing, providing training
for, or assisting in the execution of any act
of international terrorism:
(C) providing direct or indirect financial
backing for the commission of any act of
International terrorism;
(D) providing diplomatic facilities intend-
ed to aid or abet the commission of any act
of international terrorism: or
(E) allowing the use of its territory as a
sanctuary from extradition or prosecution
for any act of international terrorism; and
(3) the term "United States assistance" in-
cludes any assistance of any kind which is
provided by grant, sale, loan, lease, credit,
guaranty, or Insurance, or by any other
means, by any agency or instrumentality of
the United States Government to or for the
benefit of any foreign country. including?
(A) assistance under the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1961 (including programs under
title IV of chapter 2 of part I, relating to
the Overseas Private Investment Corpora-
tion);
(B) sales, credits. and guaranties under
the Arms Export. Control Act;
(C) sales under title I (including title III)
of the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954 and donations under
title Il of such Act of agricultural commod-
ities;
(D) financing programs of the Commodity
Credit Corporation for export sales of agri-
cultural commodities:
(E) financing under the Export-Import
Bank Act of 1945,
(F) assistance under the Migration and
Refugee Assistance Act of 1962.
(G) programs under the Peace CorpE Act;
ATE
May 98, 1987
(11) assistance under the Inter-American
Foundation Act:
(I) assistance under the African Develop-
ment Foundation Act;
(J) financial ISSISStanCe for foreign persons
or groups under the Mutual Educational
and Cultural 11xchange Act of 1961; and
(H) assistance of any kind under any
Other Act.
SiCrion-SY-Elicri011 ANALYSIS OF ANTI-
TIMM= Acr or 19117
Section 1: Title of bill: Deterrence of
State-Sponsored Terrorism Act of 1987.
Section 2: List of countries supporting ter-
rorirm:
3(&) &crawl/ of State's terrorist list ?
Within 30 days of the enactment, and there-
after on February 1 of each year. the Secre-
tary of State shall prepare and transmit to
Congress a report setting forth a list of
those countries, if any, which he has deter-
mined have repeatedly provided support for
acts of international terrorism.
Rationale.?This creates a special new list
on terrorist countries instead of using the
list kept by the Secretary of State under the
Export Administration Act. That's because
this bill sets in motion a whole process for
Imposing Sanctions that was not intended
when the Export Administration Act- list
was set up. Also, the current terrorist list
carries notice requirements for the sale of
munitions list items and the export of cer-
tain items. It is preferable to keep our sanc-
tions and the notice requirements separate.
2(b) Removal of country from list?When
the Secretary of State determines that a
country listed on the terrorist list is no
longer providing support for acts of interna-
tional terrorism, he will provide a report to
Congress with that determination within 7
days. Upon receipt of that determination,
the country will be deemed to be removed
from the list.
Section 3: Sanctions against countries
supporting international terrorism waiver
3(a) Automatic impoeftion of sanctions.?
Whenever a couritr: is I laced on the terror-
ist list kept by Sect Aisz ? Shultz under this
act, sanctions specified ki the sections below
will be imposed on that country:
(1) within 30 calendar days, unless the
President sends a written determination to
Congress that imposition of any or all of the
sanctions set out below are not in the na-
tional interest of the U.S. or in humanitari-
an interests, and explains in detail why this
Is so;
(2) if the Presider! set Is the written de-
termination specific al Dve and Congress
disapproves that firming by a joint resolu-
tion. then the sanctions shall go into effect
when the joint resolution is enacted.
Rationale. ?This preserves Presidential
flexibility and authority over foreign policy.
However, so that Congress will have the
right to learn of the President's rationale,
and have an informed basis to review that
rationale, it will be provided with his rea-
sons. So that report does not inadvertently
require the disclosure of information that
Might jeopardize intelligence sources or
methods, he may include the information in
a classified addendum to the report.
3(b) Emergency situations/changed cir-
cumstances?Any or all of the sanctions in
effect for a particular country shall cease to
apply:
(1) Changed circumstances.?If the Presi-
dent makes a determination that it is in the
national interest of the U.S. or in human-
tarian interests to remove sanctions, then
the sanctions will cease to apply 30 legisla-
tive days after the date of such a determins?
tion. Unless Congress., passes a joint resolu-
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May 28, 1987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
lion within that period Of lime disapproving
the President's determination.
(a) BeierPerion?U the President &ter-
mines that an emergence situation exists
whicb would justify the partial Or complete
lifting of sanctions. and certifies to the
Chairman of the House and Senate Poreign
Affairs and Intelligence Committees that an
emergency exists.
e(c) Deterrninatioii?
(1) The determination referred to In pub-
section (aX1) or (0X1) h a determination
that it is in the national Interest of the
United States or in humanitarian interests
not to impose sanctions.
(2)(A) Report?The report shall be pre-
pared by the President and sent to the Com-
mittee on Appropriations and Poiret= Af-
fairs of the House and Senate.
(13) Detailed erptanation.?The report
shall include a detailed explanation for the
reasons for making the determination that
it is in the national security or humanitari-
an interests of our country not to impose
sanctions. Any part of such explanation
may be provided, if necessary in a classified
addendum to such report, except that each
such report shall contain an unclassified
summary of such explanation,
*d List of sanctions?The following
sanctions are to be impose&
(1) Terminate all U.S. amistance to that
country (includes Peace Corps Volunteers,
agricultural assistance, arms sales and agri-
culture) financing, military and ezonomic
assistance, Eximbank finandnge
(2) Led the importation of technology and
goods which are produced, grown- or manu-
factured in such country into the United
Steles. or impose additional duties on their
Import via the Secretary of Commerce;
(3) Deny all products of such country
duty-free tariff treatment under the Oener-
al System of Preferences;
(41(A) Secretary of State shall take steps
to terminate any air or sea transportation
agreement in effect between the U.S. and
the country;
(B) On the termination of the agreenomt,
or if no agreement. the Secretary of Trans-
portation will prohibit any aircraft of vessel
owned by the government of the country or
Its nationals from engaging in air or sea
transportation with respect to the US.
(C) The Secretary of Transportation may
Provide exceptions for emergencies where
the safety of the aircraft or vessel or its
crew or passengers is threatened.
(6) The U.S. Executive Director of the
World Bank. the International Develop-
ment Association, the ULF, the inter-Ann.rn
can Development Bank. the Asian Develop.
ment Bank, the African Development Bank,
and the African Development Fund, will
vote against any loan or other use of funds
for that country.
(6) No country or national may transfer
out of the U.S. any property or credit in
which such country or national has finan-
cial interest.
(7) Prohibit private citizens from taking
tax exemptions for taxes paid to foreign
governments while working in terrorist
countries. Prohibit corporations from de-
ducting taxes paid to a country from taxes
paid to the U.S. government, when the
country where they are working has been
deemed to be a terrorist country.
Section 4: Coordination with Allies
-
A sense of the Congress resolution that
whenever sanctions are imposed under this
bill. the President should make vigorous ef-
forts to get our allies to do the same.
kationale:?Sanctions are most effective
when coordinated with our allies
Section 5: Concrressional reowis of Presi-
dent's decision.
Any sanction specified In this bill swill be
Imposed over the President's objection U
Contras enacts a joint resolution disap-
proving the President's determination
within 20 days of his sending that determi-
nation to Congress.
The Joint resolution will be considered in
the Senate and in the House in accordance
with expedited procedures which assure the
resolution's consideration.
Rationale?One of the problems with the
astern as it now works is that Congress does
not have an automatic process for reviewing
the President's decisions on sanctions arid
considering whether it agrees or not. This
provision provides Congress with that right.
However, It does not give Congress any
power it does not now have, since Congress
could, at any time, Impose such sanctions on
its own.
Section IL' Del n nolo
Support for Terrorisers?Purnishing arm,
explosives, lethal substances to individuals,
groups, or organizations with the likelihood
that they will be used in the commission of
any act of international terrorism; planning,
directing, providing training for, or assisting
In the execution of any act of international
terrorism; providing direct or indirect Oman-
dal backing for the commission of any ad.
of international terrorism; providing diplo-
matic facilities intended to aid or abet the
common of any act of International ter-
rorism or allowing the use of its territory as
a sanctuary from extradition or prosecution
for any act of international terrorism.
TERRORISM: LAWS CITED IMPOSING SANCTIONS
Os NATIONS SUPPORTLNG TERRORISM
INational Security and International
Affairs Division]
U.S. Ciscinnuo, Accoteseum Orrice.,
Washington, DC, April 17, 1987.
Hon. Paiute R. Leurialasom,
U.S. Senate.
DEAR SENATOR LA1TTENBERC: This report re-
sponds to your January 12. 1987. request
that we determine bow often ad under
what circumstances laws Imposing sanctions
on nations supporting terrorism 1. eve been
Invoked.
The Export Administration Act or 1979 re-
quires the Secretary of State to compile an-
nually a listing of countries that support or
participate in terrorist acts, Currently Iran,
Libya, Serie, the People's Democratic Re-
public of Yemen. and Cuba comprise the
list. Iraq, formerly on the MC, 11/11/ removed
In 1982.
Pedeml agencies?primarily Stan . Treas-
ury, Commerce, and Transportatit n?have
identified 13 laws that authorize the Presi-
dent to invoke sanctions against nations
supporting terrorism. No central source
Identifies individual sanctions with specific
laws. However, through research and discus-
sions with agency officials, we were able to
Identify sanctions since 1979 associated with
11 of the laws. The sanctions included such
thinrs as import embargoee, export license
controls, freezing assets, terminating new
loans and credit extensions, restricting arms
sales and foreign assistance, terminating air
services, and curtailing other activities be-
tween the United Stat.es and the nations
designated as supporting terrorism. Details
regarding the sanctions and the laws are in-
cluded in appendices I through UI.
in conducting this review, we obtained ex-
ecutive orders and other documents relating
to U.E. policies on terrorism; interviewed of-
ficials of the Departments of State. Treas-
ury, Commerce, and Transportation: and
Identified specific sanctions imposed in re-
sponse to terrorist incidents occurring from
1979 through 1986. Our work was performed
from February through April 198'i in ac-
Cordance with generally accepted
merit audit audit standards.
Unless you publicly announce Its Contents
earlier, we plan no further distrIbutiOn 01
this fact sheet with 30 days from the data
of issue. At that time we will wend copies to
the Departments of State. Transportation,
Commerce, and Treasury, and make it avail-
able to other interested parties. If we can be
of further assistance, please call me On 276-
4128.
Sincerely yours.
JOAN M. MCCAW,
Associate Director,
Armored I
CICRONOLOCT OP SANCTIONS VT CoMNTRT IN
Rzsroess TO TERRORIST lecmorrs
This appendix contains profiles of thee
countries against which U.S. sanctions have
been imposed and describes the sanctions
and the authority cited by federal agencies
for these sanctions in response to terrorist
Incidents. We did not independently review
each of the sanctions to determine whether
the cited authority was appropriate.
IRAN
The Iranian students' seizure of more
than 100 hostages. including 43 Americans,
at the U.S. embassy compound in Teheran
on November 4, 1979, marked the beginning
of the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis that lasted
more than 14 months. The following actions
were taken as a result of the crisis:
Date and sanction:
November 8, 1979?Halted the shiptoein
of U.S. military spare parts to Iran. Author-
ity cited. Arms Export Control Ad..
November 10, 1979?Required all post-sec-
ondary students who were Iranian citizens
to report on residence and noo-lmadgratioo
status. Authority cited: Immigration and
Nationality Act,
November 12, 1979--Restricterd the
Import of crude oil produced in Iran and un-
finished oil or finished products made from
Iranian crude oil. Authority cited: Trade Ex-
pansion Act of 1962.
November .14. 1979?Declared state of
emergency against Iran. Blocked all Iranian
government property and interests in prop-
erty and from Iranian deposits in U.S. .
banks and subsidiaries of U.S Woke Au-
thority cited: National Emergencies Act and
International Emergency Economic Powers
Act.
April 7, 1980?Broke diplomatic relations
with Iran; closed Iranian embassy and con-
sulates in the United Staten expelled diplo-
mats and consular officials. Authority cited
Authority of the Secretary of State in mat-
ters respecting foreign affairs 22 U.S.C.
2656 (1982). Invalidated all visas issued to
Iranian citizens for future entry into the
United States; refused to reissue visas or
Issue new visas. Authority cited: Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act.
Embargoed all U.S. exports to Iran, except
food and medicine; ordered an inventory of
$8 billion in frozen Iranian assets and an in-
ventory of U.S. financial claims against Iran
to be paid out of these assets. Authority
cited: International Emergency Economic
Powers Act.
April 17, 1980?Prohibited all financial
transactions between U.S. and Iranian citi-
zens; imposed an import embargo; banned
travel to Iran of all U.S. citizens except
journalists; released for U.S. purchase im-
pounded military equipment Intended for
iran. Authority cited international Emer-
gency Economic Powers Art.
April 20, 1980?Prohibited travel to, in, or
through Iran by permanent resident aliens.
Authority cited. Executive Order 12211?
Further Prohibitions on Transactions with
Iran. April 17, 1980.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE May 98, 1987
Restricted the me of US. passports to. In,
and through Iran and regulated departures
frata and entry Into the United BUMS ID
Connection with travel to Iran by citizens
and permanent resident, of the United
States. Authority cited. Executive Order
11295-Rules Governing the Granting. lull-
ing and Verifying of US. Passports, ADS=
6. 1986. Executive Order 12211-Further
Prohibitions on Transactions with Iran.
April 17. 1980.
January 19, 1681-Transferred Iranian
frozen meets from the United States to the
Bank of England in preparation for the re-
lease and exchange of U.S. hostages.
Iranian Assets Control Regulations re-
voked and withdrawn. Authority cited:
International Emergency Economic Powers
Act.
January 20, 1981-Hostages released in ex-
change for a partial transfer of $2.9 billion
of Iranian assets.
Relations deteriorated further with the
bombing of U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut
In October 1983. Iranian involvement was al-
leged. and as a result, the following actions
were taken.
Date and sanction:
January 19. 1984-Secretary of State des-
ignated Iran as a country that supports ter-
rorism. This automatically placed foreign
policy export controls on goods and technol-
ogies that could enhance Iran's military or
terrorist capabilities. For example, export li-
censes were required for aircraft valued at
$3 million or more, helicopters over 10,000
pounds. and national security controlled
Items valued at $7 million or more destined
for military end use. Policy of denial of mu-
nitions control list items was set; and for-
eign military sales were prohibited. Author-
ity cited: Export Administration Act of 1979,
and Arms Export Control Act.
May 21, 1984-Prohibited any transfer of
blocked property in which Iran has interest
except under license from the Department
of Treasury. Authority cited: International
Emergency Economic Powers Act.
September 28, 1984-Pr. :4dent directed
stricter export controls on ll aircraft, heli-
copters. related parts, corn; onents and avi-
onic:s. Applications for expo' t of national se-
curity controlled items were to be generally
denied, with some exceptions. Authority
cited: Export Administration Act of 1979.
January 25. 1985 to January 20, 1986-
Export licenses valued at 225.8 million
denied. Authority cited: Export Administra-
tion Act of 1979.
Relations with the goverment of Iran
have not returned to norm since Novem-
ber 14. 1979, when Presid nt Carter de-
clared a national emergenc:: to deal with
the threat to national security, foreign
policy, and the economy of the United
States. Notices of the continuation of this
national emergency were transmitted by the
President to the Congress and published in
the FEDERAL Recirrsz on November 12,
1980, November 12, 1981. November 8, 1982.
November 4. 1983. November 7, 1984. No-
vember 1. 1985 November 10. 1986, in ac-
cordance with the National Emergencies
Act
LIBYA
Libyan-17S. relations declined after Colo-
nel Qadhafi's rise to power in 1969. At that
time Libya closed British and American
bases, acquired large quantities of arms, and
supported anti-Israel and revolutionary
causes worldwide. Terrorist activities includ-
ed providing sanctuary to the perpetrators
of the attack on Israeli athletes at the 1972
Munich Olympics and military support in
1979 to Uganda The United States respond-
ed to Libya removing the US. ambassa-
dor and disapproving the sale of military
weapons and related items in 1973; denying
the sale of Boeing 447 commercial aircraft
and imposing antiterrorism export controls
In 1979; and finally closing the U.S. embassy
In February 1960:
Date and sanction:
December 29, 1979-State Department
designated Libya as a country that supports
terrorism. This automatically placed foreign
policy export controls on goods and technol-
ogies that could enhance LII:iya's military or
terrorist capabilities. For example, export li-
censes were required for aircraft valued at
23 million or more, helicopters over 10.000
pounds, and national security controlled
Items valued at $7 million or more destined
for military end use. Policy of denial of mu-
nitions control list items and foreign mili-
tary sales were prohibited. Authority cited:
Export Administration Act of 1979, and
Arms Export Control Act.
October 1. 1979 to September 30, 1980-
Export licenses denied for aircraft valued at
$235.4 million. Authority cited: Export Ad-
ministration Act of 1979.
A mob attacked and burned the U.S. em-
bassy in Tripoli in December 1979 and sub-
sequent attacks were made on Libyan citi-
zens in Europe and the United States by the
Qadhall regime. The following U.S. actions
resulted:
Date and sanction:
February 15. 1980-Closed U.S. embassy in
Tripoli. Authority cited: Authority of the
Secretary of State in matters respecting for-
eign affairs 22 U.S.C. I 2656 (1982).
May 6, 1981-Libyan People's Bureau in
Washington is ordered closed; personnel to
leave the United States in 6 working days.
New travel advisory issued to American citi-
zens warning against any travel to or resi-
dence in Libya Authority cited: Authority
of the Secretary of State in matters respect-
ing foreign affairs 22 U.S.C. I 2656 (1982).
On August 19, 1981. two US. Navy P-14
aircraft were attacked by Libyan fighter air-
craft:
Date and sanction:
October 1. 1981 to September 30, 1982-
Expanded US. controls on exports of cer-
tain aircraft, helicopters, aircraft parts, avi-
onics, and off-highway wheel tractors of
carrying capacity of 10 tons or more. Denied
export licenses for off-highway 'vehicles
valued at $.9 million; four licenses denied
for aircraft and parts valued at $11.2 mil-
lion; 16 licenses denied for other commod-
ities and technical data valued at $19.8 mil-
lion Authority cited: Export Administration
Act of 1979.
December 11, 1981-Declared U.S. pass-
ports invalid for travel to. through, or in
Libya. Administration calls on Americans re-
siding in Libya to leave "as soon as possi-
ble." citing "the danger which the Libyan
regime poses to American citizens." This
sanction has been continued annually. Au-
thority cited: Executive Order 11295-Rules
Governing Granting. Issuing, and Verifying
US. Passports, August 5, 1966.
Presidential Proclamation 49072 of March
10, 1982, states: "Libyan policy and action
supported by revenues from the sale of oil
Imported into the United States are inimical
to United States national security." The fol-
lowing actions were taken as a result:
Date and sanction:
March 10. 1982-President embargoed
crude oil imports from Libya. Authority
cited: Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
March 12. 1982-President required vali-
dated licenses for all US. exports to Libya,
except food and agricultural products, medi-
cine, and medical supplies. General policy of
denying licenses for export to Libya of dual-
use, high-technology items and U.S.-origin
oil and gas technology and equipment not
readily available from sources outside the
Salted States. Authority cited: Iteport Ad-
ministration Act of 1979.
October 1. 1082 to September 30, 1984-
Denied 128 export licenses valued at 8349.6
million. Including $23.11 million In aircraft.
Authority cited: Export Administration Act
of 1979.
March 11. 1983-Terminated non-immi-
gration visa status of Libyans engaged in
aviation or nuclear studies.. Authority cited:
IramigraUon and Nationality Act.
March 20, 1984-0eneral denial of licenses
to export goods or technical data which
would directly contribute to the develop-
ment or construction of Ras Lanuf petro-
chemical complex. Authority cited: Export
Administnition Act of 1979.
January 25. 1985 to January 20, 1986-
Denied export licenses for aircraft and parts
valued at $3.2 million. Authority cited:
Export Administration Act of 1970.
April 10, 1985-Terminated availability of
bank programs and credits. Authority cited:
Export-Import Bank Act of 1045.
On November 15. 1985, the United States
determined that the Libyan government
had continued to actively pursue terrorism
as state policy and that Libya had developed
significant capability to export petroleum
products to other nations., thereby circum-
venting the March 1982 prohibition on US.
Imports of Libyan crude oil. As a result, the
following action was taken.
Date and sanction:
November 15, 1985-President embargoed
Imports of petroleum products refines) in
Libya. Authority cited: International Securi-
ty and Development Cooperation Act of
1985.
The United States determined that the
Libyan government had supported the at-
tacks on civilians at the Rome and Vienna
airports on December 27, 1985. As a result,
the President took the following actions:
Date and sanction:
January 7-8. 1986-Declared state of
emergency against Libya. Authority cited:
National Emergencies Act.
Restricted all commercial transactions in
Libya by U.S. citizens and companies; pro-
hibited all contract performance and all new
loans or extensions of credit to the Libyan
government; and blocked all property and
Interests in property of the Libyan govern-
ment and its agencies that were in or that
may later come into the United States.
Banned exports to Libya, except for human-
itarian donations such as food and clothing,
and the purchase of goods exported from
Libya to a third country; banned all travel
transactions to or from Libya by U.S. per-
sons. Authority cited: International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act.
Banned imports from Libya, except for
publications and news materials. Authority
cited: International Security and Develop-
ment Cooperation Act of 1985.
President banned sales in the United
States of air transportation which included
any stop in Libya. Authority cited: Federal
Aviation Act.
July 7, 1986-Prohibited exports to third
countries where exported goods or technol-
ogies are intended for transformation, man-
ufacture or incorporation into products to
be used in Libyan petroleum or petrochemi-
cal industry. Authority cited: International
Emergency Economic Power Act.
SYRIA
The pattern of Syrian activity in support
of international terrorism has been long-
standing and varied. From the mid-1970s to
the present. Syrians have been directly in-
volved in terrorist activities. These oper-
ations have been primarily directed at other
Arabs. such as Syrian dissidents, moderate
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May se, WI CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
Arab Mates moan as Jordan, and pro-Arafat
Pnlestiniana, as well is Israeli targets.
December 11970?The Secretary of
State deeigisided Syria as a country that
supporta tageorime Tbia automatitany
placed foreign polio export Controls co cer-
tain goods and technologies that could en-
hance Syria's military or terrorist empabile
Um. For example, export licenses were re-
quitted for aircraft valued at 63 million or
more, heliooptege over 10,000 pounds. and
national security controned items valued at
$7 million or more destined for military end
use. Policy to deny munitions control int
Items was get, and foreign military sales
were prohibited. Authority cited: Export
Administration Act of 1979; Arms Export
Control Act.
November 14, 1983?Congress terminated
economic assistance program to Syria. Au-
thority cited: Foreign Assistance Act. 1961.
By late 1983 Syria began to rely more
heavily on terrorist groups made up of non-
Syriens who had bases and training facili-
ties in Syria:
Date and sanction:
November 22. 1983?State Department
closed the AID mission. Authority cited: Au-
thority of the Secretary of State in matters
respecting foreign affairs 22 U.S.C. i 2656
(1982.)
June 1, 1086?Expanded controls on all
helicopters regardless of weight. Authority
cited: Export Administration Act of 1979.
In 1986, a Jordanian attempted to place a
bomb aboard an El Al aircraft in London.
During the November 1986 trial. Syrian offi-
cials were implicated In the conspiracy and
the aftermath. In particular, Syrian offi-
cials provided a passport., money, the bomb.
and sanctuary. The following actions were
taken as a result:
November 14, 1986?Expended controls to
prohibit export of all national security con-
trolled goods and technical data as well as
aircraft and aircraft parts and components.
The controls applied regardless of value or
end-use (refutations pending). Authority
cited: Export Administration Act of 1979.
Terminated availability of Export-Import
Bank programs. Authority cited: Export-
Import Bank Act of 1945.
Prohibited sale of tickets in the United
States for transportation on Syrian Arab
Airlines. Authority cited: Federal Aviation
Act.
Terminated air transport agreement be-
tween the United States and Syria after one
year, and Immediately suspended its oper-
ation. Authority cited: Authority of the Sec-
retary of State In matters respecting foreign
affairs 22 U.S.C. I 2656 (1982).
Continued withdrawal of U.S. ambassador
and reduced embassy staff in Damascus and
reduced Syrian embassy staff in Washing-
ton. Revised advisory statement on Ameri-
can travel in Syria to alert citizens of the
potential for terrorist activity originating
there. Advised U.S. oil companies in Syria
that continued operations are Inappropri-
ate. Authority cited: Authority of the Secre-
tary of State in matters respecting foreign
affairs 22 U.S.C. 2656 (1982).
Placed additional controls on Syrian visa
applications?all applications required to be
sent to Washington. D.C., for a mandatory
security advisory opinion. Authority cited
Immigration and Nationality Act.
morales DIDILOCRATICatertianic OF MEM (PDR
TIMM
In 1969, after a successful coup by Mersin
revolutionaries, PDR Yemen severed diplo-
matic relations with the United States. Be-
cause of this action and continued support
of international terrorism, human rights
violations, agrreasion, and avowed commit-
to Marxist principles, U.S.-PDR
Yemen relations have been Virtually non-
exigent, end the following sanctions were
ImPtieed:
Date and emetic=
December WI, 1919?The Secretary of
State designated PDR Yemen as a country
that repeatedly supporta terrorism. This
automatically placed foreign policy export
controls on goods and technologies that
could enhance PDR Yemen's military or
terrorist capabilities. Tor exempt., export li-
censes were required for aircraft valued at
$3 million or more, hilicopters over 10.000
pounds, and national security controlled
items valued at $7 million or more destined
for military end use. Policy of denial for
munitions control list Items was Implement-
ed and foreign military sales were prohibit-
ed Authority cited: Export Administration
Act of 1979 and Arms Export Control Act.
June 5, I986?Expanded export controls to
include all helicopters, regardless of weight.
Authority cited. Export Administration Act
of 1979.
IRAQ
During 1978 to 1980 the Inuit government
reduced its support to most terrorist groups.
By April 1980 a combination of factors, In-
cluding the hostage crisis in Iran. Soviet in-
vasion of Afghanistan, and Iraq-Iran War,
caused a breach in Iraq's relationship with
the Soviet Union. This led the United States
to work toward a closer association with
Iraq. The removal of Iraq from the terror-
ist-supporting list In 1982 was attributed to
the administration's perception of an in-
creasing moderation In Iraq's attitude
toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. The follow-
ing sanctions were applied during 1979 and
1980:
Date and sanction
December 29, 1979?Secretary of State
designated Iraq as a country that supports
terrorism. This automatieeity placed foreign
policy export controls on goods and technol-
ogies that could enhance Iraq's military or
terrorist capabilities. For example, export li-
censes were required for aircraft valued at
$3 million or more, helicopters over 10.000
pounds, and national security -controlled
Items valued at $7 million or more destined
for military end use. Pone:- of denial of mu-
nitions control list items was implemented
and foreign military tales were prohibited.
Authority cited: Export Administration Act
of 1979 and Arms Export Control Act.
February 6, 1080?Department of Com-
merce suspended the export license for
eight turbine engine cores valued at $11.4
million (the decision was later reversed in
April 1980). Authority cited: Export Admin-
istration Act of 1979.
On April 7. 1980, the Arab Liberation
Front. supported-by Iraq, attacked an Israeli
kibbutz, killing three people.
Date and sanction:
August 29, 1980?State Department disap-
proved a $208 million role of commercial
jets. Authority cited: Export Administration
Act of 1979.
September 25, 1980?Suspended export li-
cense for six turbine engine cores previously
approved in April 1980. Authority cited:
Export Administration Act of 1979.
On March 1, 1982, the United States lifted
export restraints against Iraq and removed
It from the list of nations supporting terror-
ism.
In May 1982, the House Foreign Affairs
Committee voted in favor of a resolution to
restore lrae to the list of countries support-
ing terrorism. However. the State Depart-
ment announced in October 1983 that it
would not place Iraq on the list bemuse it
had no evidence that tree had supported
international terrorism since publicly de-
nouncing it in 1982.
S7293
Casa
The United States has a ion' history of
sanctions against Oararot Cuba. In the
1000a, under authority at the Trading With
the Enemy Aga a total embargo on experts,
ban on all imports, and !rem en all Debars
meets In the United States were imposed.
Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
foreign aid was denied to 0011Enties that al-
lowed their flag ships to carry goods to and
from Cuba. In the 19706. Cuba deployed
combat troops to Angola and Ethiopia, in-
creating Its influence in those areas. Cuba's
training and support of insurgents and ter-
rorists became evident In the 1980. through
activities In Nicaragua. 112 Salvador, and
Grenada. For these reasons. Cuba was
added to the list of terrorist nations in 1982.
Date and sanction
March 1, 1982?Secretary of State clads-
nated Cuba as a country that supporta ter-
rorism; embargo imposed In 1963 under the
Trading With the Enemy Act continued on
all imports and exports. Authority Cited:
Export Administration Act 01 1919.
May 15, 1982?Banned business and tour-
ist travel to Cube. Authority cited: Trading
With the Enemy Act.
October 4, 1985?Restricted entry into the
United States by Cuban government em-
ployees and members of the Cuban commu-
nist party. Authority cited Immigration and
Nationality Act
August 22, 1986?Denied preference immi-
gration VIM to persons who left Cuba for
third countries. Authority cited: Presiden-
tial Proclamation 5517?Suspension of
Cuban Immigration: and the Immigration
and Nationality Act.
On August 22. 1986, the Administration
announced a crackdown on trading with
Cuban front companies that attempted to
evade the U.S. trade embargo and increased
controls on organizations which organize or
promote travel to Cuba. Regulations regard-
ing these new controls have not been devel-
oped.
Armenia II
LAWS AND &ACTIONS IMPOSED AGAINST NA-
TIONS SUP/ ORTING TERRORIST ACTIVISM
SIN= 1979
This appendix identifies the 11 laws, cited
as the authority by federal agencies, and
the related sanctions Imposed against na-
tions who were identified by the Secretary
of State to ix repeated supporters of terror-
ism.
EXPORT LLICLIFISTRATION ACT OF Ms
Libya, Syria Iraq. and PDR Yemen-12/
29/79?Determined to be terrorist-support-
ing nations. Foreign policy export controls
Imposed on goods and technology that
would contribute to military potential or en-
hance terrorist support capabilities.
Libya-10/1/79 through 9130/80?Dented
export licenses for aircraft valued at $234.5
million.
Iraq-2/6 /80?Suspended export licenses
for eight turbine engine cores to Italy for
use in manufacturing of four frigates With
ultimate destination to Iraq (decision re-
versed in April 1980).
Iraq-8,'29/8C---Denied license for $208
million sale of commercial jets.
IISQ-9/25 /80?Suspended export of six
turbine engine cores.
Lib5'a-10,/28/81?Expanded controls on
export of certain aircraft, helicopters, air-
craft parts, and avionics and off-highwol
wheel tractors of carriage capacity 10 tons
or more.
Iraq-3/1/82?Lifted export restraints:
Iraq removed from list of nations support-
ing terrorism.
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CONGRESSIONy. RECORD - SEN
Cubs-3/1/$3-Added to the list of terror-
ist-supporting nations: embargo imposed in
1963 under the Trading With the ICriemy
Act continued on all imports and exports.
Libya-3/12/82-Required validated 11-
OMNI for all U.S. exports except food. agri-
cultural products. medicine, and medical
supplies. Cieneral policy of export license
denial for dual-use, high-technology items
and U.S.-aright oil and gas technology and
equipment not available outside the United
States.
Libya-10/1/81 through 9/30/82-Denied
export license for off-highway vehicles
valued at 8.9 million: four licenses dented
for aircraft and parts valued at $11.2 mil-
lion: 16 licenses denied for other commod-
ities and technical data valued at $13.8 mll-
lion.
Libya-10/1/82 through 9/30/83-Denied
86 export licenses valued at $14.1 million.
Iran-1/19/84-Determined to be terror-
ist-supporting nation. Imposed export con-
trols on goods and technologies that would
contribute to its military potential or en-
hance its terrorist support capabilities.
Libya-2 /20 /84--Geners.l denial of II-
cense to export goods or technical data
which would directly contribute to the de-
velopinent or construction of the Ras Lanuf
petrochemical complex.
Iran-9/28/84-Expanded export controls
on certain commodities; export of all air-
craft and helicopters, related parts, compo-
nents, and avionics were generally denied.
Libya-10/1/83 through 9/30/84-Denied
70 export licenses valued at $335.4 million,
Including $33.6 million in aircraft.
Iran-1 /25 /85 through 1/20186-Denied
export licenses valued at over $25.8 million.
Libya-1/25/85 through 1/20/86-Denied
export licenses for aircraft and parts valued
at $3.2 million.
Syria, PDR Yemen-6/5/86-Expanded
controls on all helicopters, regardless of
weight.
Syria-11/14/86-Expanded export con-
trols to prohibit all natural security con-
trolled goods and technical data (regula-
tions pending).
INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS
ACT
Iran-11/14/7P and 4/80-Blocked all Ira-
nian government property and interests in
property and froze all Iranian government
assets in the United States: embargoed all
U.S exports to Iran. except food a-nd medi-
cine and all Iranian import; and prohibited
all financial transactions between U.S. and
Iranian citizens; banned travel to Iran of all
U.S. citizens except U.S. journalists.
Iran-5/21/84-Prohibited the transfer of
blocked property in which Iran has an inter-
est except under been.% from the Depart-
ment of Treasury.
Libya-1 /74/86-Blocked all government
of Libya interests in U.S. property or under
control of U.S. citizens; terminated all new
loans or extensions of credit and contracts;
prohibited transactions by US. citizens with
Libyan entities; and restricted travel to and
from Libya by U.S. citizens; banned all ex-
ports from United States to Libya. except
for humanitarian donations: and purchase
by US citizens of goods for export from
Libya to a third country.
Libya-7 /7/86-Prohibited exports to
third countries where exported goods or
technologies are intended for transforma-
tion. manufacture or incorporated into
products to be used in Libyan petroleum or
petrochemical industry.
NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT
Iran-11/14/79. Libya-1!7/86-State of
emergency declared by the President. Both
declarations are still in effect.
ATE May 98, 1987
ARMS WOW COIRROL ACT
Iran-11/8/79-Ralted shipment of U.S.
military spare parts.
Libya, Syria. Iraq. and PDR Yemen-UI
29/79 Iran-1/19/114-Prohibited U.S. sale
or transfer of all defense articles. Denied li-
censes for export munitions list Items that
are sold commercially.
TRADE XXPANSION ACT Or 1565
Iran-11/12/79-Embargoed oil imports.
Libya-3/10/82-Embargoed crude oil Im-
ports.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
COOPERATION ACT OF IOU
Libya-11/15/85-Embargoed petroleum
product imports refined in Libya.
Libya-1/17/86-Banned Imports from
Libya, except publications and news materi-
als.
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
Libya-1/7/86-Banned sales in the
United States of air transportation which
includes stops in Libya.
Syria-11/14/86-Prohibited ticket sales
In the United States for transportation on
Syrian Arab Airlines.
EXPORT-IMPORT RANK ACT OP 1946
Libya-4/10/85 and Syria-11/14/86-Ter-
minated availability of bank programs and
credits.
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
Iran-11/10/79-Ordered all Iranian non-
immigrant students to report to the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service.
Iran-4/7/80-Ref used to re-issue new
visas and invalidated visas issued for future
use to Iranian citizens.
Libya-3/11 /83-Terminated non-immi-
gration visa status of Libyans engaged in
aviation or nuclear studies.
Cuba-10/4/85-Restricted entry into the
United States by Cuban government em-
ployees and members of the Cuban commu-
nist party.
Cuba-8/22/86-Denied preference immi-
gration visas to persons who left Cuba for
thin-, countries.
Sy - 1a-11/14/86-Placed vigorous controls
on S Tian visa applications-all applications
recitured to be submitted to Washington.
D.C., for mandatory security advisory opin-
ion.
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT 15 61
Syria-11/14/83-Terminated economic
assistance.
Libya. Syria, Cuba. Iraq, and PDR
Yemen-10/12/84-Prohibited all foreign
assistance.
TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
Cuba-5/15/82-Banned business and
tourist travel by U.S. citizens.
APPENDIX III
MAJOR STATUTES CITED SY FEDERAL AGENCIES
AUTHORIZING SANCTIONS AGAINST COUN-
TRIES SITPPORTING INTERNATIONAL TERROR-
ISM
Export Administration Act of 1979); Pub.
L. No. 96-72. 93 Stat. 503 (1979), as amended
by Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 123 (1985); 50
U.S.C. App.* 2404(b) (Supp. III 1985).
International Emergency Economic
Powers Act; Pub. L. No. 95-223. 91 Stat. 1626
(1977): 50 U.S.C. p1701 et sec. (1982).
The Federal Aviation Act; Pub. L. No. 85-
726. 72 Stat. 731 (1958), as amended by Pub.
L No. 99-83, 99 Stat. 190 (19E5); 49 U.S.C.
App. 11515 (Supp. III 1985).
National Emergencies Act: Pub. L. No. 95-
412 90 Stat. 1255 (1976); 50 U.S.C. 1601 et
sec. (1982).
International Security and Development
Cooperation Act of 1985. Pub. L. No. 95-8a.
90 Stat. 190 (1M); 22 V.S.C. 13494a-11
(Supp. III 1985).
Arms Export Control Act; Pub. L. No. 90-
829 82 Stat. 1821 (1968); as amended by Pub.
L. No. 99-3$9 1509. 100 Stat. 853. 874 (19116);
22 U.S.C. 8763. 1778 (19U).
Export-Import Rank Act of 1945: Act of
July 1. 1945. ch. 341. 59 Stat. 526; 12 U.S.C.
11135(bXIXB) (1982).
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: Pub. L.
No. 87-195 75 Stat. 424 (1961) as amended;
22 U.S.C. 52371 (Supp. III 1985).
Trade Expansion Act of 1962; Pub. L. No.
17-794. 76 Stat. 1172 (1962): 19 U.S.C. 1 1182
(1982).
Immigration and Nationality Act: Act of
June 27, 1952. ch. 477, 66 Stat. 166; 8 U.S.C.
1 1182 (1982).
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiter-
rorism Act of 1986; Pub. L. No. 09499 100
Stat. 853 (1986).
Trade Act of 1974; Pub. L. No. 93-618. 88
Stat. 1978 (1974) as amended; 19 U.S.C.
2462(bX7) (1982).
Trading with the Enemy Act; Act of Octo-
ber 6. 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 as amended
by Pub. L. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977); 50
U.S.C. App. 11 et seq. (1982).*
? Ms. MISIILSKI. I Join today with
my distinguished colleagues to intro-
duce the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987.
This important piece of legislation is
aimed at curbing State-sponsored ter-
rorism by imposing immediate sanc-
tions against countries who repeatedly
support terrorist acts.
The grim reality we face is the rising
specter of fanaticism and terrorism
worldwide. Even more frightening is
the fact these are not just isolated in-
cidents of violence perpetrated by a
deranged individual. Rather, we are
seeing increasingly more sophisticated
acts of violence, underwritten by and
with the approval of certain govern-
ments. Frequently, the target of their
attacks is an American.
In 1986 alone, 12 Americans were the
Innocent victims of terrorist attacks
abroad. Some of these people, like the
three Marylanders who where killed
when a bomb ripped through their
plane, were vacationing tourists on
their way to visit with their families.
Others, like the two American service-
men killed in a West Berlin nightclub
frequented by American soldiers, were
abroad serving their country. They
were killed because they were Ameri-
cans, were on American planes, worked
for American firms, or had some con-
nection with America.
Mr. President, we may not be able to
stop all terrorism from happening, but
we cannot stop trying. America and its
citizens cannot continue to be the
target of fanatics whose countries wel-
come our dollars and our technology,
who rely on our knowledge and exper-
tise, but who kill our citizens.
The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 will
Immediately terminate any and all
VS. assistance to governments who
are found to repeatedly support and
aid terrorist actions. This includes ag-
ricultural assistance, Ex-Ina Bank fi-
nancing, and military and economic
aid. This bill also ends the importation
of any technology and goods which
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May 88, 1887
CONGRESgiONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 7295
are produced or grown in that country,
or imposes additional duties.
I am proud to cosponsor this bill, be-
cause it sends a message that must be
heard: The United States will not deal
with any country which practices ter-
rorism as government policy.
Mr. President, I urge all of my col-
leagues to join in support of this bill.*
? Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I'm
pleased to Join Senator LAUTENBERG
and others in sponsoring the Deter-
rence of State Sponsored Terrorism
Act, which is an effort to continue the
battle against state-sponsored terror-
ism.
In the last couple of years, a number
of us in Congress have been attempt-
ing to put a stop to American Govern-
ment and private support for countries
that subsidize terror. Today, we con-
tinue that fight.
Its incomprehensible that nations
hostile to the United States have con-
tinued to receive assistance from our
Government, private individuals, cor-
porations and American-funded inter-
national organizations. Support has
continued because we have no consist-
ent antiterrorist policy in place. This
lack of a consistent policy is under-
scored by Senator LaIITERBERG'S GAO
report on terrorism that was released
today.
Under our legislation, a number of
sanctions would automatically be im-
posed against nations known to spon-
sor terrorist activities. When a country
goes on the list, an automatic cutoff of
foreign aid, arms sales, landing rights,
preferential trade benefits and other
sanctions would go into effect.
The only way the sanctions could be
countermanded is if the President
sends Congress an explanation of why
such sanctions would not be in the
U.S. nations] security interest. Never-
theless. Congress could still override
this determination by a joint resolu-
tion. In other words, our legislation
will give Congress more input in the
process of punishing terrorist coun-
tries, while also giving the President
the flexibility he may need in dealing
with these countries.
For too long, the United States has
provided the economic crutches that
have helped prop up terrorist nations.
such as Syria. Iran, and Libya. Its time
to kick these crutches out from under
terrorist countries and put an end to
state-sponsored terrorism.
I, therefore, urge my colleagues to
join us in sponsoring the Deterrence
of State-Sponsored Terrorism Act of
1987s
By Mr. WEIMER:
S. 1283. A bill to amend title XIX of
the Social Security Act to require
States to provide coverage under their
Medicaid plans for certain children
with extraordinary expenses for medi-
cal and remedial care; to the Commit-
tee on Finance.
MEDICAID 00VERAGT TOR CHILDREN ACT
? Mr. 'ATI CKER. Mr. President,
today I rise to introduce legislation
that addresses two longstanding and
largely overlooked problems: the une-
fordably high costs of medical Care
that fall Upon families of children
with catastrophic illness and the trau-
mas these costs create for such fami-
lies.
Private insurance and Medicaid ben-
efits are currently too limited for chil-
dren with catastrophic illness?both in
terms of coverage and eligibility. The
parents face overwhelming financial
as well as emotional burdens. Often,
these young parents have no savings.
If they do, they must exhaust their
assets and face a permanent and
mounting debt in order to provide care
their children need.
Consider the case of Timmy, a tod-
dler who lives in Hartford. CT. Timmy
had good health until an accident at 7
months nearly suffocated him. He sur-
vived, but his brain injuries resulted in
cerebral palsy. His father works two
minimum-wage jobs to keep the family
solvent; Timmy's mother stays home
to provide full-time care. His father's
employer does provide health insur-
ance, but there is a fairly standard co-
payment of 20 percent. Even with this
Insurance, the copaynaent required of
Timmy's family, in the first 3 months
of 1987 alone, amounted to $6,000.
What can families like Timmy's do?
Should they pay for physical therapy,
but cut back on speech therapy? Or
should they opt for speech therapy,
but forego college savings for the child
or siblings? It's clear that although
only one child becomes ill, the entire
family suffers.
Nor is the dilemma for Timmy's
family unusual. Remember the chil-
dren with cystic fibrosis, cerebral
palsy, muscular dystrophy, leukemia,
hemophilia, sickle cell anemia, juve-
nile arthritis, spina bifida, congenital
heart disease, traumatic spinal cord in-
juries, and burns?the list goes on.
Some are slowly terminal, others
stable and capable of improvement,
still others entirely curable, though at
great cost. Together they define the
tragedy of thousands of children and
families. And for each one, how well
the ailing child and his or her family
copes and adapts is contingent upon
what resources are available.
Families both above and below the
poverty line are threatened by the fi-
nancial and emotional nightmare that
catastrophic childhood illness be-
comes. Recognizing that "catastroph-
ic" is a relative term, this legislation
seeks to separate Medicaid eligibility
for catastrophic health care for chil-
dren from poverty levels defined var-
iously by each State. Instead, eligibil-
ity will be tied to a percentage level of
a family's adjusted gross income spent
on allowable medical expenses. Once
the threshold level is met, the child is
eligible for appropriate medicaid bene-
fits.
All States will be required to adopt
this catastrophic program within the
categorically needy classification of
Medicaid. By use of an early and peri-
odic screening, diagnosis, and treat-
ment CEPSDT) benefit specifically de-
signed for children with disabling and
catastrophic health Care needs, an
Interdisciplinary care coordination
team will consider each child's specific
needs and accordingly design and over-
see the individual care plans. The ben-
efit package will include but not be
limited to those already existing
within the categorically needy system
of Medicaid. This initiative recognizes
that catastrophic illness brings with it
a depletion of all family resources?fi-
nancial and emotional?and so care
and service benefits will focus on
maintaining family integrity and
adaptability. Emphasis will be placed
on home care with provision for the
essential services of respite by a skilled
caregiver and home adaptive equip-
ment as indicated.
Ninety percent of the funds for this
5-year Medicaid program will come
from the Federal Government provid-
ed that States do not change existing
Medicaid eligibility requirements and
services. The State Medicaid offices
will be responsible for the entire fi-
nancial administratin of the program
and will determine eligibility in indi-
vidual cases.
Relatively little is known about the
segment of our population that must
cope with catastrophic childhood ill-
ness because the services across the
country are fragmented by the State-
by-State Medicaid system. No recent
national studies on these families cur-
rently exist.. The legislation requires a
continuous study of the population
served over the 5-year period, an anal-
ysis of the program's cost-effective.
ness, and an assessment of the psycho-
logical and social implications of cata-
strophic childhood illness for families.
Mr. President, modern medicine has
advanced to the point where cata-
strophically ill children who once
faced the prospect of an early death
can now expect to live well into adult-
hood. But as the prognosis has im-
proved, the financial costs have
soared. How can we expect individual
families to pick up where Medicaid
and private insurance benefits end out
of their own ever-diminishing pockets?
We have a basic responsibility to the
dignity of the family and the needs of
our children. This Nation must shoul-
der the burden of catastrophic medical
expenses so that our children may ex-
perience the joy of prolonged life to
Its fullest.
Mr. President, I encourage expedi-
tious consideration of this legislation
by the Senate Finance Committee and
ask unanimous consent that the text
of this bill be printed in the RECORD at
this point.
There being no objection, the bill
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
S. 12E3
Be it enacted b.i? the Senate and Row( ef
Representatives ar the United States
America in Congress assembled.
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7296
sacnoll I. Mire TITUL negateCIL
(a) &sow Trms.?This Act may be eked
as the -Medicaid Catastrophic Coverage for
Children Act of 111111.
(b) Asairegares go Tux SOCIAL Eigcuarrs
Acr--MieePt as otherwise Specifically pro-
sided. whenever in this Act an amendment
Is expressed in terms of an amendment to.
or repeal of, a section or other provision,
the reference shall be considered to be made
to a section or other provision of the Social
Security Act.
Igt. a MUM/agree or coVERACE UNDER
ItfAIS MEDICAID PLANS.
(a) &ran Pass Rsetnitzkarr.?Section
2902( sa IOXAKL) (42 U.S.C.
1396a(aX1OXAXi)) is amended?
(1) by striking "or" at the end of sub-
clause Mi.
(2) by striking the semicolon at the end of
subelause (M) and inserting in lieu thereof
". or", and
(3) by adding at the end thereof the to]-
lowing:
-av) who is a qualified disabled child (as
defined in section 1905(r):".
(b) lemma?Section 1905 (42 U.S.C.
1396d) is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following:
'(rai) The term 'qualified disabled child'
means an individual who?
"(A) has not attained 21 years of age.
"(B) has an acute and chronic disabling
mental or physical condition (whether con-
genital or acquired). and
"(C) with respect to whom the family of
such individual has incurred expenses for
medical care or remedial care in a year that
are equal to the lesser of?
"(1) 10 percent of the family's countable
Income, or
"(ti) $10.000.
"(2) In the came of a family with more
than one child that meets the requirements
of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph
(1). subparagraph (C) of such paragraph
shall be applied by substituting '12% per-
cent' for '10 percent' in clause (i) and by
substituting 113.000' for 110,000 in clause
(ii).
"(3)(A) For purposes of paragraph (1),
except as provided in subparagraph (B). a
family's countable income for a year shall
be an amount equal to the sum of the ad-
justed gross incomes of family members for
the most recently completed taxable year.
"(B) For purposes of paragraph (1), in the
case of a child the family of which can dem-
onstrate to satisfaction of the State agency
that the family's countable income for a
year will be substantially less than its ad-
justed gross income for the most recently
completed taxable year, the family's count-
able income shall be determined on the
basis of the family's estimated income for
the year involved.
"(C) For purposes of paragraph (1), in the
case of a child that is eligible for medical as-
sistance under a provision of this title other
than section 1902(a)(10Xi)(A)(IV), the
family income of the child shall, for pur-
poses of this subsection, be determined on
the basis of the same methodology that is
applied in determining eligibility under such
other provision.
"(4) For purposes of paragraph (1). the
term 'medical care' shall have the meaning
given to such term in section 213td )(I) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and an
expense shall be treated as having been in-
curred for medical care if such expense is al-
lowable as an expense paid for such care for
purposes of section 213 of such Code (or
would be allowable but for the limitation
contained in subsection (a) of such section).
(c) BLNEJ irs ?
CONGREIVONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 28, 1987
1986 and Inserting in Lieu thereof a semi-
colon.
(2) by striking the period at the end of the
paragraph (47) added by section 11005(h) of
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1086 and Insert-
ing in lieu thereof "and",
(3) by redeeignating the paragraph (47)
added by section 11005(b) of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1086 as paragraph (48) and
transferring such paragraph after and
below Paragraph (47). and
(4) by adding at the end thereof the fol-
lowing:
"(49) provide that, for the 80-month
period beginning on October 1. 1987?
"(A) the standards for determining eligi-
bility under the plan are no more stringent
than the standards in effect on May 27,
1987.
"(B) if medical assistance is included
under the plan for any group of individuals
on May 27, 1987. the plan will continue to
Include medical assistance for such group
during such period. and
"(C) the medical assistance included under
the plan for any such group during such
period is not less in amount, duration, or
scope, than the medical assistance provided
for such group under the plan on May 27,
1987.".
(f) CONFORMING OUNCES.?
(1) Section 1902(a X17) (42 U.S.C.
1308a(aX17)) is amended by inserting "and
section 1905(r)" after "subsection (1X3)".
(2) Section 1903(f)(4) (42 U.S.C.
1396b(f X4)) is amended by striking "section
1902(aX1OXAXii)(IX) or" and inierting
"subsection (aX10)(AXIXIV) Or
(aX1OXAX11XIX) of section 1902 or".
(10 EFFECTIVE DATE.?
(1) The amendments made by this section
shall be effective for calendar quarters be-
ginning on or after October 1. 1987, and
before October 1, 1992.
(2) The Secretary of Health and Human
Services shall provide for a continuing
study, during the period for which the
amendments made by this section are effec-
tive (as specifiud in paragraph C ), of the
populations to which medical as stance is
provided by reason of such amenc of
the cost effectiveness of providinz medical
assistance to such populations, and of the
socioeconomic implications of providing
such assistance. The study shall be conduct-
ed by the Secretary, in consultation with ap-
propriate specialists. The Secretary shall
report to the Congress annually on the
progress of the study, and, not later than
April 1, 1e92, sh1,11 submit to the ''.)ongress
recommendation with respect to trie desir-
ability and feasibility of extencaing the
period for which such amendments are ef-
fective. together with any changes in law
that the Secretary deems appropriate better
to effectuate the purposes of such amend-
ments.
(1) Section 1002(ax10) (42 U.S.C.
1896a(aX10)) is amended, In the matter fol-
lowing euthiamgrebb
(A) by striking 'and' before "(IX)", and
(B) by inserting before the semicolon at
the end the following: ",(X) the medical as-
sistance made available to individuals de-
scribed in section 1905(rX1) shall, subject to
subsection (p), include the care and services
described In paragraphs (1) through (21) of
section 1005(a), and the making available of
such care and Denims to such individuals
shall not, by reason of this paragraph (10),
require the making available of such care
and services, or the making available for
such care and services in such amount, dura-
tion, and scope, to any individuals not de-
scribed in such section, and (XI) in the case
of individuals described in section
1905(rX1), the care and services specified in
paragraphs (1), (2XA). and (5) of section
1905(a) shall be made available without lim-
itation on the number of days or the
number of visits, and the making available
of such care and services to such individuals
in such amount. scope, and duration shall
not, by reason of this paragraph (10), re-
quire the making available of such care and
services in the same amount, duration, and
scope to any Individuals not described in
such section".
(2) Section 1902 is further amended?
(A) by redesignating the subsection (1)
added by section i(b) of the Employment
Opportunities for Disabled Americans Act
as subsection (o) and transferring such sub-
section after and below subsection (n), and
(B) by adding at the end thereof the fol-
lowing new subsection:
"(pX1) The care and services provided to
an individual described in section 1905(rX1)
shall be provided pursuant to a plan of we
(for providing such care and services to such
Individual) that is established and periodi-
cally reviewed by a multidisciplinary care
coordination team, in cooperation with the
Individual and his or her parents, a physi-
man, hospital discharge planner or social
worker, a visiting nurse, and a representa-
tive of the agency administerliag or supervis-
ing the administration of the the program
(established by the State under title V of
this Act) for providing services for children
with special health care needs. Such plan
shall be coordinated, to the maximum
extent practicable, with any individualized
education program or individualized family
service plan established with respect to the
Individual under the Education of the
Handicapped Act.
"(2) The plan of we established with re-
spect to an individual pursuant to para-
graph (1) shall be based upon the early and
periodic screening and diagnosis of the indi-
vidual (in accordance with section
1905(aX4XB)) and shall specify?
"(A) the care and services (described in
paragraphs (1) through (21) of section
1905(a)) that are required by the individual,
"(B) the frequency and duration of such
care and services.
"(C) the setting or settings in which such
we and services may appropriately be pro-
vided.".
(d) ft:mutat Micorca. Assn-rams PERM:T-
am?Section 1905(b) (42 U.S.C. 1396d(b)) is
amended by adding at the end the following
new sentence: "Notwithstanding the first
sentence of this subsection, the Federal
medical assistance percentage shall be 90
percenturn with respect to amounts expend-
ed as medical assistance for individuals de-
scribed in section 1905(r)(1).-.
(e) Mancitsatics Or ETTOWL?Section
1902(a) (42 U.S.C. 1396a( a)) is amended?
(1) by striking the period at the end of the
paragraph (47) added by section 9407(a) of
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
SRC. S. RELATED iscaNICAL AMEI.DMENT.
(a) WAP7ER5 FOR Bow! men Coatarusrry-
BASED Stances.?Section 1915(cX3) (42
1396n(cX3)) Is amended by striking
"and section 1902(8)(10)(B) (relating to
comparability)" and inserting in lieu thereof
". section 1902(a)(10)(B) (relating to compa-
rability), and section 19024)(10)(C)(i)(III)
(relating to single standard for income and
resource eligibility)",
(b) Errverrvx DATE.?The amendment
made by subsection (a) shall be effective as
If included in the enactment of the Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986.0
GRASSLEY:
bill to extend the date
t h licatior, must be filed for
former spouses to receive certain re-
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3initeb ettates El. mate
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
AGENDA
LEGISLATION TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS AGAINST COUNTRIES
SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM -- S. 1282
Thursday, October 15, 1987
10:45 a.m. SD-419
WITNESSES: 1) The Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg (D-NJ)
2) The Honorable L. Paul Bremer, III
Ambassador at Large for Counter Terrorism
Department of State
Panel
1) William R. Farrell, Ph.D.
Professor of Management
Naval War College
Newport, RI
2) Bradley R. Larschan, Esq.
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McClcy
Washington, D.C.
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and
International Operations/OPEN
SENATOR KERRY WILL PRESIDE
10/13/87 Monica/x45342
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a,ankutenberg
United States Senator
for New Jersey
For Immediate Release
Oct. 15, 1987
For Further Information
Jim Abbott 202/224-9708
Lautenberg Calls For Passage
of Bill to Curb State-Sponsored Terrorism
WASHINGTON, D.C., Oct. 15, 1987 -- Testif-ying today before a
Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, U.S. Sen. Frank R.
Laatenberg (D-NJ), called for passae of legislation he has
introduced which will curb the ativities of countries that support
and sponsor international terrorism.
1,.atenberg made his remarks before the Senate Foreign
Eelations Committee's SOcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and
International Operations.
"All too often the U.S. has failed to use economic and
diplomatic sanctions available to us in our efforts to bring about
an end tc international terrorism," said Lautenberg. "This
legislation would require the automatic imposition of all possible
sanctions unless the President and Congress agreed otherwise."
Under the Lautenberg bill, countries identified as supporting
and sponsoring terrorist acts would lose U.S. financial aid, credit
and other benefits, including Peace Corps volunteers, agricultural
assistance, arms sales, and military and economic assistance.
"Last year, Americans were the number. one target of
international terrorism," said Lautenberg. '"12 Americans were
killed by terrorists and 101 were wounded. Beyond the lives lost
and injured by terrorism, America has suffered damage to its peace
of mind, its ability to conduct diplomacy, to protect its interests
abroad, and to the ability of its citizens to travel freely
abroad."
"Americans have the right to expect that their government will
do everything it can to stop terrorism and to make certain that
terrorists themselves are left out in the cold."
Sanctions against countries listed by the State Department as
supporting terrorism would go into effect unless the President asks
thc Congress not to impose them.
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TESTIMONY ON PROPOSED ANTI-TERRORIST LEGISLATION
S. 1282
PRESENTED TO
THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
ON TERRORISM, NARCOTICS, AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
BY
L. PAUL BREMER, III
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCTOBER 15, 1987
STAT
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Good morning, and thank you for the opportunity to testify
before this committee. It is a pleasure to discuss with
this committee a topic which a recent Roper poll showed more
American citizens-- some 69 percent-- desired government
action on than any other foreign policy issue.
I am happy to report to you that the administration's
counterterrorism policy is showing results. The fact is
that, although terrorism continues around the world, one is
much more likely these days to read news stories about
terrorist arrests than about sensational hijackings.. And
gripping news accounts of terrorist atrocities have quietly
given way to brief reports from Western capitals on the
successful apprehension, prosecution, and punishment of
terrorists.
Progress against Terrorisn
Over the last 18 months, there has been a measurable drop in
international terrorism.
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o Prom 1981 through 1985 international terrorism grew from
some 500 incidents per year to about 800 incidents.
o But in 1986 terrorism dropped six percent. So far in
1987 it is down another 10 percent. The decline would
be greater but for Afghan-sponsored terrorism in
Pakistan.
o Contrary to the impression many Americans have,
terrorism in Europe dropped dramatically last year--
over 33 percent.
o Ard in ?1986 there were only two airline hijackings, the
lowest number since we began keeping track over 20 years
ago.
While these numbers are encouraging, they do not convey the
full sense of what is happening. Terrorism can strain and
has strained relations among even the friendliest states,
but there is, I believef.a growing Consensus about the
response to terrorism. This is the key change in our
counterterrorism fight.
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Ten years ago the terrorists seemed to have the initiative.
They attacked or hijacked seemingly at will. Their
grievances were, if not respected, often heard
sympathetically. The West was on the defensive. A number
of countries reached de facto agreements with foreign
terrorists, saying, in effect: "Do not attack our
interests, do not conduct operations on our soil and in
return, we will grant you free transit and domicile within
our borders."
In the mid-1980's, .there has been an important shift in
emphasis in the West's fight against terrorism. Now our
fellow democracies are banding together and cooperating.
The dynamics of the situation have shifted, with much of
initiative now on our side. And, over time, it has become
clear that the terrorists never keep their end of the
bargain. Sooner or later accommodation leads to blood on
your own doorstep.
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The United States has worked with like-minded nations to
develop multilateral agreements and declarations about
terrorist attacks on civil aviation, internationally
protected persons, passenger liners and hostage-taking.
These documents reflect an important degree of agreement in
principle where there was none a decade ago. In my many
contacts at the policy and working levels around the world,
I find a new sense of resolve about terrorism: a sense of
resolve which is saying, "let's let the professionals-- the
police, immigration and customs and intelligence services--
do their jobs."
Networking is a popular word these days. But networking is
not just something for yuppie stockbrokers. Among the
Interior ministers in Europe, within Interpol, within
military organizations and intelligence agencies, the
professionals are meeting each other and sharing tactics,
intelligence and ideas. There is today a counterterrorism
network and we are all benefiting from it.
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The United States has been in the forefront of the
counterterrorism battle.
? On the eve of the Venice summit, Attorney General Meese
traveled to Paris for an unprecedented ministerial-level
meeting on terrorism with representatives of the
European Community and the Summit Seven.
o Bilaterally, we are working to tighten extradition
treaties. We provide Anti-terrorism Assistance to some
40 nations who have the will, but not the means to
resist terrorism. Our government has made made firm
diplomatic representations to a number of countries
about their relations with terrorist organizations and
we have seen results.
o We also act unilaterally when we cannot secure
cooperation or circumstances make it infeasible to
coordinate our actions. A Lebanese terrorist named
Fawaz Younis, accused of directing the hijacking of a
Jordanian airliner with U.S. nationals aboard, was
recently arrested in international waters by the FBI.
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He is jailed near here awaiting trial. This is a direct
result of a vigorous, imaginative, unilateral U.S.
action.
U.S. Government Counterterrorism Policy
The United States follows a three-part strategy for dealing
with terrorism.
1. The first element is a policy of firmness towards
terrorists. Giving in to terrorist demands will only
breed future demands, demands which are likely to be
greater than those of today. As a father, I learned
long ago that behavior rewarded is behavior repeated.
While the Iran-Contra affair may have caused some to
doubt our steadfastness in resisting terrorist demands,
I can assure you that there is no sense in the
counterterrorism community that we should change our
policy. No country, no terrorist should believe that
there is anything to be gained by threatening the United
States with terrorist action. We will not make
concessions. We will not deal.
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2. The second element of our strategy consists of practical
measures to bring terrorists to justice. By practical
measures, I mean the identification, tracking,
apprehension, prosecution and punishment of terrorists.
In the past 18 months more and more terrorists have been
tried and jailed around the world, usually after
receiving the kind of stiff sentences which were unheard
of only a few years ago.
3. -The third element of our policy, pressure on
terror-supporting states, relates directly to the
Committee's current interest, so I would like to address
it in more detail.
State support for terrorism
In the administration's view, state supported terrorists are
substantially more dangerous than those operating
independently. State sponsorship gives clear advantages to
the terrorist. For example:
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o When a terrorist obtains legitimate travel and
identification documents from a patron state, it becomes
harder to identify and track him. When Nezar Hindawi
went to London to blow up an El Al flight last year, he
carried an authentic Syrian Service passport.
o A state-supported terrorist has a ready source of
weapons and a ready means to transport them. Embassies
are exempt from search by international convention and
the baggage handlers at state-owned airlines don't
interfere when directed not to examine a particular
parcel. Once again, the Hindawi case is instructive.
His bomb came into the United Kingdom on Syria's
official airline.
o Countries like Libya, Syria and Iran make a terrorist's
work easier by providing a place to train. A terrorist
operating alone, especially if a fugitive, has a hard
time finding an isolated location to fire automatic
weapons or assemble and detonate explosives.
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o Similarly, simple refuge supplied by patron states
constitutes important support. Being able to live
without fear of immediate arrest and punishment is of
enormous psychological value to a terrorist.
? Finally, financial support from state sponsors allows
terrorists to spend more time on operations because they
need not rob banks or traffic in drugs to raise money.
Benefit to the State Sponsor
The sponsoring state receives benefits as well:
o Terrorism can be an inexpensive form of warfare. A
small group of terrorists costs less per year than a
company of regular soldiers and can cause far more havoc
in an enemy state than could that company of soldiers.
o Using terrorist surrogates makes it easier for the
sponsoring state to deny responsibility for actions
which, if taken overtly, could lead to war. Shortly
after the Abu Nidal Organization moved to Syria in 1983,
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it stage a series of attacks on Jordanian interests. I
think it no coincidence that these attacks ceased
following a Syrian-Jordanian rapprochement.
o A state can also use terrorists to murder dissidents
abroad. Qadhafi, for example, has hired terrorists to
kill Libyan opponents in many countries, including the
United States. In May, two Libyans tried to kill the
former Libyan Ambassador in Vienna. After their attempt
failed, they fled into the Libyan People's bureau
there. We believe this incident shows why European
governments should take particular care to monitor the
size and activities of Libyan embassies in their
countries.
U.S. Responses to State-Supported Terrorism
So our policy recognizes the need to deal with
state-supported terrorism. Our response should be carefully
tailored to each individual case in order to use the
leverage that works best with that particular country.
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Libya
Libya was on the U.S. Government's list of terror-supporting
states when it was first published in 1979 and remains on
the list today. Over the years the U.S. has responded to
Libyan actions with a mixture of policy tools: we closed
our embassy there and later ordered the Libyan embassy here
closed; we imposed economic sanctions, and exhorted our
friends to do the same. And eventually, we used military
force. After that, the Europeans, too, imposed political,
diplomatic and economic measures on Libya.
This policy has workec. While other nations have been
slower to respond, today Libya is politically isolated.
During the past year, Libyan-supported terrorist operations.
have declined, although Qadhafi still appears ready to use
terrorism as a policy tool.
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?'?
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Syria
Syria too is a "charter member" of the list of
terror-supporting states and, in spite of some encouraging
signs, remains on the list. While Syria has long been
involved in terrorism, she was particularly active from 1983
to 1986. As I mentioned earlier, Syria began using the Abu
Nidal Organization (ANO) as a surrogate in 1983 in a series
of attacks on Jordan. These attacks stopped following a
Syrian-Jordanian rapprochement.
While the Jordanian attacks ceased, other ANO attacks,
generally planned and trained for in Syria or in
Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon, continued. While based
in Syria, the ANO was responsible for many attacks,
including the Rome and Vienna airport massacres of December
27, 1985, and the September 6, 1986, murder of 22 worshipers
at a Synagogue in Istanbul. And Syria continues to play
host to a number of other terrorist groups.
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to the continuation of U.S. foreign assistance. By enacting
S. 1282, the Congress would establish as a firm public
policy of the United States the refusal of the American
people to subsidize regimes which sponsor international
terrorism.
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Mr. Chairman. There are two general policy
considerations concerning S. 1282 which I wish to bring to
the Committee's attention. First, and, perhaps, foremost,
is that no matter how stiff the U.S. economic sanctions
imposed against state sponsors of terrorism, nothing will
replace the effectiveness of a firm and united diplomatic
and economic response by the major industrialized states.
This was recognized at the Tokyo Summit but, as is so often
the case, there has been little or no follow up.
There is one thing the Congress can do to encourage
other states to join with the United States to oppose state-
sponsored terrorism; that is, to include within S. 1282's
13
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encouraging signs. Still we intend to keep our remaining
sanctions in place and to leave Syria on the list of
terror-supporting states until we see evidence of a
fundamental change in Syrian policy towards terrorism.
Iran
Virtually since it came to power, the current Iranian regime
has used terrorism. Over the years, it has attacked U.S.
targets, European interests, moderate Arabs and its own
dissidents.
The United States has taken an increasingly tough position
toward Iran in response to its continuing support for
terrorism and its refusal to cease hostilities in the
Iran-Iraq war. Following the bombings of the US embassy
buildings and the Marine Barracks in Lebanon, we placed Iran
on the list of countries supporting international terrorism.
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When a country is placed on that list, export controls are
imposed on selected "dual use" items. We have specifically
banned the export to Iran of a variety of items and
equipment which could support terrorist and/or military
operations, including helicopters, aircraft, outboard
engines, chemical weapon precursors and several other
national-security controlled items.
We currently are expanding the list of national security
controlled items. We are also studying other measures which
we can take against Iran, including cutting off the impOrt
of Iranian oil. This is an extremely complex issue, but let
me emphasize here that the administration is completely
supportive of the objectives of the recently proposed
legislation on the subject. We want to craft our policy so
that these objectives are best met.
Iran has been under little concerted international pressure
until recently, but is now increasingly isolated. Other
countries have been reluctant to sever profitable commercial
dealings, particularly in the absence of international
cooperation. However, Iran's continued outrageous behavior
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is beginning to exact a toll with other countries. For
example, relations with France have chilled with the onset
of the so-called "embassies war," which began when a French
magistrate demanded the right to question a non-diplomatic
employee of the Iranian embassy in Paris about terrorist
activities in France.
The Lautenberg Bill
As you can see from the foregoing review, we agree with the
underlying assumption of Senator Lautenberg's bill:
Economic pressures can be useful against countries
supporting terrorism. However, we oppose the bill in its
current form for four reasons:
1. It is seldom desireable to impose all possible economic
sanctions at one time.
Seldom is a state which sponsors terrorism solely, or
even heavily, dependent on economic relations with the
United States. That is why we need to consider most
sanctions as having an impact which is as much or more
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psychological and political than economic. And we must
keep in mind that the purpose of sanctions is to bring
about a change in behavior on the part of the target
state.
We believe it prudent to avoid the automatic linking of
economic measures to a political determination.
Remembering that it is political effect we seek, we are
more likely to succeed if we have available a range of
sanctions which can be applied over time than if we are
required to impose an an entire package imposed at once.
For example: Had we used all our economic sanctions
against Syria when it was put on the terrorist list in
1979, we would have had nothing left to reinforce the
political steps taken last November. Of course, there
may also be times when we would want to impose all the
available sanctions at once.
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2. The bill can force the President to send a mixed signal.
Senator Lautenberg's bill, it might be argued, gives the
President needed flexibility by permitting him to waive
the imposition of certain sanctions. However, this
amendment would in effect force him to send a mixed
signal by requiring public explanation of why he is not
imposing certain sanctions.
By simultaneously declaring a state to be a supporter of
terrorism and explaining publicly why he is not imposing
certain sancticns, the President invites confusion in
the target country. Since he must cite"national
interests" to avoid imposing the sanction, he would
weaken the deterrent effect of the unimposed sanction or
sanctions. Beyond that, the target country is likely to
take the President's refusal to impose a sanction as
U.S. recognition of some "mitigating circumstance."
There are times when we cannot avoid sending mixed
signals. But we should avoid requiring them in U.S. law.
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3. The bill's provision for Congressional overide sets the
stage for a potentially divisive debate at a time when
we should show unity.
Should Congress choose to exercise its option to attempt
to overide the President's decision to withold a given
sanction, the target state will enjoy the spectacle of
watching the administration and Congress debate just
what we should do to it. Such a display would surely
undermine the effects accomplished by placing the nation
on the list in the first place. Sometimes the executive
and legislative branches see things so differently that
such a debate cannot be avcided. But again, we think it
unwise to build the potential for such a conflict into
our laws.
4. The bill can reduce our chances of operating in concert
with other nations.
By tilting the playing field towards early economic
sanctions, our ability to act in concert with .other
nations is diminished. If the President follows the
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path of least resistance and imposes all sanctions at
once, we could reduce the chances of sanctions by other
nations which might be reluctant to be seen as "bowing
to U.S. pressure." Also, if we have already imposed our
sanctions, we will have nothing left in reserve to use
to complement the actions of other nations, as we did
with Syria.
I do not want to suggest that the administration is
uninterested in economic sanctions, or even in future
legislation in support of sanctions. On the contrary,
within the administration, my office has been instrumental
in leading a discussion about new measures which, after
appropriate executive branch review, we may ask for
legislation to support.
Conclusion
Much of the recent progress in counterterrorism has been
made possible by Congressional action. Our Anti-terrorism
Assistance program depends on authorizations and funding
from the Congress. Younis was arrested under statutes
passed in 1984 by a Congress eager to assist the
administration in combatting terrorism.
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The funds and authorities we have received have been used to
good effect. This will continue to be the case. Around the
world there is a cooperative spirit which we have not seen
before. After nearly 20 years of disarray in the face of
terrorism, the West is beginning to unite to confront
terrorists as criminals.
I do not want to leave the impression that our problems are
solved, that there are not disagreements among friends, or
that we will not suffer .reverses in the months ahead. I do
believe that the progress we are making is real, substantive
and permanent. We are not going to eliminate terrorism, but
we are making the world a more dangerous place for
terrorists and safer for the rest of us.
Thank you very much.
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TESTIMONY OF
BRADLEY R. LARSCHAN, ESQ.
MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NARCOTICS AND
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS OF THE
SENATE COMMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
HEARING ON
STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM AND
S. 1282, "DETERRENCE OF STATE-SPONSORED
TERRORISM ACT OF 198-"
OCTOBER 15, 1987
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MIL/SANK, TWLLU, MAULLI 45( MCCLOX, WASHINGTON, D.C.
BEFORE THE SENATE pOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS'
HEARING ON STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM AND S. 1282,
"DETERRENCE OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM ACT OF 1987"
October 15, 1987
I. INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my name
is Bradley R. Larschan. I am an associate attorney with the
Washington, D.C. office of the law firm Milbank, Tweed,
Hadley & McCloy. IL/
Mr. Chairman. It is no longer open to question
that certain states sponsor international terrorism.
According to the Department of State's Office for Combatting
Terrorism, at least 70 terrorist attacks were state-
sponsored in 1983; 125 in 1984; 96 in 1985; and 63 in 1986.
The proLiferation of state sponsors of terrorism indicates
the pervasiveness of the problem. The states most commonly
identified as sponsors of international terrorism are:
Algeria; 1/ Bulgaria; 2/ Cuba; 2/ Czechoslovakia; A/
Iran; 5/ Iraq; 6/ Libya; 2/ North Korea; 8 the Soviet
Union; 9/ Sudan; 10/ Syria; 11/ and South Yemen. 12/ In
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large part, Mr. Chairman, this state-sponsored terrorism is
aimed at the United States and our allies. State-sponsored
terrorism is low intensity, surrogate warfare carried out by
these foreign goverments as a means of conducting their
foreign policy. 12/
State sponsors of terrorism provide a range of
support for international terrorist groups. Without this
support, these terrorist groups could not hope to conduct
the scale of operations they currently perpetrate. The
support given by state sponsors of terrorism ranges from
financial backing to actually allowing their territory to be
used as a base of operations from which to launch terrorist
acts in other states and to which the terrorists return and
are granted safe haven.
Mr. Chairman, S. 1282 is an important step toward
effectively responding to state-sponsored terrorism.
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II. STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM
While I am reasonably certain we would all agree
that state-sponsored terrorism poses a significant problem
for the United States, it has been difficult for a variety
of reasons to formulate a public policy to thwart it.
Democracies are particularly vulnerable to state-
sponsored terrorism, in part because the state sponsor of
terrorism and the "victim state" play by different rules.
We in the United States adhere to rather high standards of
conduct, including observing due process and fundamental
fairness. For the most part, we are careful to fulfill our
international obligations and observe our state
responsibility under international law. One of the most
fundamental international law requirements is to prohibit
using armed force against another state. However, the
corollary of the international law requirement to refrain
from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state is that
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;
each state is under a duti to take any measure necessary to
prevent its territory from being used to launch &ttacks
against other members of the international community. 14/
This law of state responsibility is an indisputable
cornerstone of international law, the aim of which is to
promote stability and certainty in international relations.
State sponsors of terrorism, however, violate the
international law of state responsibility as it suits them.
If the more fanatical state sponsors were large military
powers, they would tend toward projecting military power to
intimidate weaker states, or even waging conventional
warfare, in the pursuit of imposing their political will on
others. However, most state sponsors are militarily
inferior to the states they oppose. After an evolutionary
process, they have adopted the tactic of using international
terrorists as surrogates to wage low intensity warfare.
From an analytical perspective, one could view these
terrorists as members of the armed forces of the state
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sponsor -- with an additibnal advantage: when convenient,
the state sponsor can deny any direct connection with the
, terrorist act.
International terrorist groups, most notably the
PLO, have been quite receptive to state sponsorship. Among
other things, state sponsors have been rather generous with
international terrorist groups. While it is impossible to
know the extent of financial assistance state sponsors give
to international terrorist groups, the amount annually is
probably in the low hundreds of millions of dollars. 15/
Equally important, certain state sponsors provide terrorists
with safe haven. Wile the terrorist is on his own when he
leaves the territory of the state sponsor, he is afforded
the lega: protection of the state sponsor when he returns.
This protection includes the refusal to extradite or try the
terrorist. 15/
At least for the moment, a sufficient commonality
of interest exists in terms of political aspirations so that
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there appears to be no end in sight to the continuation of
state-sponsored terrorism -- although it should be noted
that the involvement of particular states is cyclical, since
the use of terrorists as surrogates hinges upon foreign
policy considerations.
State-sponsored terrorism has been successful
partly because, as I mentioned earlier, we play by different
rules. The critical element to a successful policy of
sponsoring international terrorism is to gear terrorist acts
to a level short of provoking a military response from the
victim state. As we have seen over the past few years, that
threshold is quite high.
There are essentially two reasons why the threshold
for Western democracies, like the U.S., to respond to state-
sponsored terrorism is so high: first, because we
traditionally conceptualize the appropriate response in
military terms; second, because the Department of State
often asserts that a firm, public response will cause more
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harm than it will do good*.
A. Military Response.
As for the first point, any military reaction to
state-sponsored terrorism is a bold step for a democracy to
take, both in terms of its domestic politics and foreign
policy considerations. The U.S. raid on Libya is, perhaps,
the best example. The U.S. Government believed it had
sufficient proof to indicate that the Libyan Government was
responsible for sponsoring, in varying degrees, a great many
international terrorist incidents over a number of years.
And yet, the U.S. air strike was highly controversial.
There was considerable debate within the United States over:
the appropriateness of the action. Moreover, the U.S. found
little, if any, support among its allies. This raises the
rather interesting question of precisel.y how despicable a
terrorist act must be, and how much proof a government must
possess and make public, before it will again undertake a
military response against a state sponsor of terrorism. One
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thing is clear, however: *if the state sponsor of terrorism
is on the ball, it will gear its actions just below that
threshold.
B. Conflicting Foreign Policy Concerns.
Even more troublesome is the intersection of
general foreign policy concerns with the specific problem of
state-sponsored terrorism. Briefly put, this is the
recurring problem of Western governments, including the U.S.
Government, softening or suspending their reaction to a
state sponsor of terrorism because of general foreign policy
considerations. Perhaps the leading example of this is the
way the U.S. has dea:t with Syria -- which may very well be
the world's foremost sponsor of international terrorism.
Even though the U.S. Government reportedly has clear and
unequivocal evidence that Syria has and continues to sponsor
international terrorism, concerns about Soviet influence in
the Middle East, the regional balance of power and Syrian
President Hafez al-Assad's skillful diplomacy, among other
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factors, have greatly modirated the U.S. reaction to Syria's
role as a state sponsor of terrorism.
As Senator Lautenberg has observed, Syria has been
on the State Department's list of state sponsors of
terrorism since 1979 -- when the State Department first
began keeping this list. However, it was not until 1983
that the United States Government cut off economic
assistance to Syria -- and not until 1984 that all foreign
assistance was ended. Between 1979 and 1983, Syria was
given $113.8 million in U.S. aid. According to a GAO report
prepared at Senator Lautenberg's request, 12/ Export-Import
Bank programs were available for Syria until 1986. Also in
1986, the U.S. failed to make any attempt to block
$75 million in World Bank loans to Syria.
The continued existence of these hurdles and the
recurring problem of state-sponsored terrorism indicates
that a fundamental flaw exists in U.S. policy. Offering the
Khomeini regime arms for hostages encouraged more hostage-
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taking in Lebanon. Attemihs by the British in the early
part of this decade to conduct business-as-usual with state
sponsors of terrorism only whetted their appetite,
culminating in the shooting of a British constable in
St. James Square and the attempt to blow up an Israeli
airliner at Heathrow Airport.
Mr. Chairman, S. 1282 is a positive step toward
shaping a U.S. response to state-sponsored terrorism by
providing automatic consideration of sanctions against state
sponsors of terrorism. Albeit with considerable
Presidential discretion, S. 1282 would make it clear that
there is a price to be paid for perpetratinc international
terrorist acts against American citizens and interests.
S. 1282 is also a refreshing approach to dealing with the
two existing hurdles to responding decisively to state-
sponsored terrorism. First, economic sanctions may be
applied at a considerably lower threshold than military
sanctions. Indeed, it is nothing short of preposterous that
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the U.S. gave foreign asdistance to Syria, even as it was
sponsoring terrorist acts against Americans. Mr. Chairman,
the American people are not under an obligation to subsidize
international terrorism against anyone -- particularly
against U.S. citizens.
S. 1282 would also go far to addressing the second
problem; namely, it would make it clear to all that the
policy of the U.S. Government is to impose economic
sanctions against state sponsors of terrorism. Indeed, this
is an area where the more mandatory the process, the more
effective will be the policy. State sponsors of terrorism
should be made to understand that if they aid international
terrorist conduct, economic sanctions will certainly follow.
The essential ingredient to any terrorism policy is
certainty. U.S. economic sanctions may not prevent a state
from sponsoring terrorism; but the state sponsor of
terrorism must consider, when evaluating its self-interest,
the certainty of the U.S. response. The state sponsor must
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be under no misconceptioethat, through skillful diplomacy,
it can avoid U.S. economic sanctions. To be sure, certain
states nevertheless may sponsor terrorism; however, the U.S.
should make its position crystal clear.
If anything, Mr. Chairman, S. 1282 contains too
much Presidential discretion. Under S. 1282, a variety of
sanctions, including a cut off of foreign aid, arms sales, a
freezing of that country's assets in the United States and
other sanctions would go into effect within 30 days, unless
the President specifically waives those sanctions. If those
sanctions are waived, he must, within 30 days, submit to
Congress a detailed explanaticn of why the imposition of any
or all of the sanctions would not be in the national
security interest of the UniteJ States, or in humanitarian
interests.
While this will certainly hold the State
Department's feet to the fire, the Committee may wish to
consider eliminating all discretion -- at least with respect
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to the continuation of U.5. foreign assistance. By enacting
S. 1282, the Congress would establish as a firm public
policy of the United States the refusal of the American
people to subsidize regimes which sponsor international
terrorism.
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Mr. Chairman. There are two general policy
considerations concerning S. 1282 which I wish to bring to
the Committee's attention. First, and, perhaps, foremost,
is that no matter how stiff the U.S. economic sanctions
imposed against state sponsors of terrorism, nothing will
replace the effectiveness of a firm and united diplomatic
and economic response by the major industrialized states.
This was recognized at the Tokyo Summit but, as is so often
the case, there has been little or no follow up.
There is one thing the Congress can do to encourage
other states to join with the United States to oppose state-
sponsored terrorism; that is, to include within S. 1282's
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*
scope the anti-terrorism treaties to which the United States
is a party. These include, among others, the 1961
Tokyo, 18/ 1970 Hague 19/ and 1971 Montreal 20/ aircraft
hijacking conventions; the Hostages Convention; 21/ and the
four 1949 Red Cross Geneva Conventions. 22/ I recognize and
support the provision in S. 1282 to encourage international
cooperation to deal with state-sponsored terrorism.
However, including various anti-terrorism treaties would
give teeth to the existing international law rules; it would
also serve as a common point for Western democracies to
oppose state-sponsored terrorism. The U.S. would, of
course, be free to enact its own additional provisions.
My other recommendation, Mr. Chairman, is to bring
to bear another potent force against state sponsors of
terrorism: the truth. Congress should encourage the
administration to publicize state-sponsored acts of
terrorism. The effectiveness of this strategy was
demonstrated in 1986 when Libya's links to international
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terrorism were revealed ad publicized by the world press.
The world public was able to see for itself precisely what
Colonel Qaddafi was up to.
IV. CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman. Giving in to state sponsors of
international terrorism has only one effect: it leads to
more terrorism. S. 1282 is a big step forward to standing
up to state-sponsored terrorism. The greater the certainty
of the U.S. response to such acts, the more carefully the
state sponsor must consider its ultimate self-interest.
While no one expects S. 1282 to put an end to state-
sponsored terrorism, it is a constructive first step to
dealing with one of the most outrageous violations of
international law and human existence.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
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*FOOTNOTES
1r/ The opinions expressed herein are those of Mr. Larschan
and do not necessarily represent those of Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy or its clients.
1/ C. Sterling, The Terror Network 195-96, 254 (1981).
2./ See generally C. Sterling, The Time of The Assassins
(1983); Terrorism: The Role of Moscow and Its
Subcontractors. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Security
and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1981) (statement of Robert Moss).
2/ Report Prepared for the Subcomm. on Security and
Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, State-
Sponsored Terrorism, S. Rep. No. 56, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. [hereinafter cited as 1985 Senate Terrorism
Report). See generally The Role of Cuba in
International Terrorism and Subversion_ Bearings before
the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism, of the Senate
Comm. on Judicaary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
A/ 1985 Senate Terrorism Report, supra note 3, at 62, et
sea.
1 6
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I/ The U.S. State DepartMent has labeled Iran, "the world's
leading supporter of terrorism" in 1984. United States
Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984
4 (Nov. 1985). ee also Reagan, The New Network of
Terrorist States, 85 Dep't State Bull. 7, 7 (Aug. 1985)
(address before the American Bar Ass'n). See generally
"The Iranian hand that Stirs the Lebanese pot," The
conomist, Sept. 27, 1986, at 37, col. 1.
6/ See generally "Iraq is Now Seeking a Moderate Image,"
P.Y. Times, July 30, 1978, at A9, col. 1.
2/ "Madrid Asserts 2 Had Orders From Libya to Attack
Americans," P.Y. Times, May 11, 1986, at Al, col. 2;
"Libyan Said to Stout Targets," Wash. Post, Apr. 30,
1986, at A16, col. 3; Woodward & Tyler, "U.S. Targeted
Qaddafi Compound After Tracing Terror Message," Wash
Post, Apr. 16, 1986, at A24, col. 1; Cannon, "Reagan
Acted Upon 'Irrefutable' Evidence," Wash. Post, Apr. 15,
1986, at Al, col. 5; Fleming & Walker, "US claims Libya
plans dozens of terrorist attacks," Financial Times
(London), Apr. 14, 1986, at 1, col. 3; Lee, "American
Ambassador Charges Libyans Were Behind Disco Bombing:
Burt Says Evidence of Tie is 'Very Clear'," Wash. Post,
Apr. 8, 1986, at Al, col. 6; Oberdorfer, "U.S. Libya
Near State of Undeclared War," Wash. Post, Apr. 6, 1986,
at A35, col. 2. Hoffman, "US Accuses Qaddafi of Terror
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Master Plan," Wash. Post, Apr. 6, 1986, at Al, col. 6;
Dickey, "Libya Seen Likely to Delay Response: Diplomats
in Tripoli See Qaddafi Building World Terror Network,"
Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 1986, at A23, col. 1; Boyd, "Reagan
Based Mission Approval on Reports of Danger to Envoys,"
N.Y. Times, Mar 26, 1986, at Al, col. 4; "Reagan's Case
Against Qaddafi," Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 1986, at A23,
col. 3; Weinraub, "Terrorists Train at 1$ Libyan Sites,
U.S. Official Says," N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1986, at Al,
col. 6; 1985 Senate Terrorism Report, supra note 3, at
18-19, gI 1g2; Keller, "State Dept. Study on Terror
Group Cites Libyan Link," N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1986, at
Al, col. 3; Adelman, "Libya: A Source of International
Terrorism," 82 Dep't State Bull. 60 (Jan. 1982).
Ambassador Adelman, when he was Deputy U.S.
Representative to the United Nations, claimed that Libya
maintained a dozen terrorist training camps. Id. at 60-
61. For an excellent account of the Libyan training
camps, see C. Sterling, supra note 1, at 262-64. age
also Kifner, "Egypt Says Libya Was Behind Hijacking,"
N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1985, at A10, col. 1; Gwertzman,
"U.S. Is Stepping Up Watch On Libyans," N.Y. Times,
Nov. 27, 1985 at All, col. 1 (claiming that Libyan-
supported Palestinians were responsible for the
hijacking to Malta of Egypt Air Flight 648. About 50
people were killed in the indident; most died when
Egyptian commandos stormed the plane); Roog, "Egypt
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Reports Foiling a LiOan 'Hit Squad'," N.Y. Times,
Nov. 12, 1985, AS, col. 1; "Mubarak Assails Qaddafi,"
N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1984, at A10, col. 3; Prial,
"France Expels 5 Iranian Students, Reportedly Trained As
Terrorists," N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1983, at A5, co1.1;
Weinraub, "Libyans Arm and Train World Terrorists," N.Y.
Times, July 16, 1976, at Al, col. 1. bee cenerally
O. Demaris, brothers in Blood: The International
Terrorist Network 183-84, 187, 405-06 (1977); C. Dobson
& R. Payne, The Carlos Comples: A Study In Terror 124-
142 (1977).
One interesting aspect of Libya's involvement in
international terrorism was the call by that state's
legislature for the formation of suicide terrorist units
to attack the United States and Israel. "Suicide Squads
Urged by Libya to Hit U.S., Israel," Wash. Post, Mar. 5,
1986, at A27, col.. 3.
8/ 1985 Senate Terrorism Report, supra note 3, at 13;
Cannon, "President Assails 'Terrorist' Nations:
Unspecified Action Is Threatened," Wash. Post, July 9,
1985, at Al, col. 6; C. Sterling, supra note 1, at 103
See also the photograph purportedly of Palestinian
terrorist Abu Nidal and an unidentified North Korean
army officer. "Terrorist In Training?," Wash. Post,
Jan. 7, 1986, at All, col. 1.
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ee patterns of GlobAS Terrorism: 1984, .ffiumi note 5, at
4; 1985 Senate Terrorism Report, impiA note 3, at 10,
passim. ee also R. Cline & Y. Alexander, Terrorism:
The Soviet Connection (1984); Omang, "Soviets Using
Terrorism, Shultz Asserts," Wash. Post, June 25, 1984,
at 1, col. 1. A particularly well researched work on
the subject is S. Elad & A. Merari, The Soviet Bloc and
World Terrorism, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies,
Tel Aviv University, Paper No. 26 (Aug. 1984). See
generally Terrorism: Origins? Direction and Support.
Nearings before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981). Crozier states that the main training
camps for terrorists in the U.S.S.R. are in Moscow,
Baku, Simferopol, Tashkent and Odessa. B. Crozier,
"Soviet Support for International Terrorism,"
International Terrorism: Challenge and Response 64, 67
(Proceedings of the Jerusalem Conference on
International Terrorism 1980).
10/ "U.S. Issues a Warning on Sudan," N.Y. Times, NDv. 21,
1985, at Al2, col. 1; Randal, "U.S. Aide Tells Sudan It
Can Count on Help; But Crocker On Visit, Cites Concern
At Presence of 'Terrorists' in Khartoum," Wash. Post,
Jan 7, 1986, at A10, col. 5.
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*
11/ Bernstein, "French Link Syria To Terror Group," N.Y.
Times, Oct. 1, 1986, at A7, col. 1; "Syria 'is mother
ship for terrorists'," Financial Times, May 20, 1986, at
col. 1; Gwertzman, "U.S. Is Pressing Assad on Abu
Nidal," N.Y. Times, May 20, 1986, at A3, col. 1;
B. Rubin, "The Untouchable: Why Assad's terror goes
unpunished," New Republic, June 2, 1986, at 16; "Syria
and Terrorism," Wash. Post, May 13, 1986, A18, col. 1;
Tagliabue, "Syria Tied to Berlin Bombing and to Attempt
on El Al Jet," N.Y. Times, May 11, 1986, at Al, col. 1;
Halloran, "Israeli Defense Chief Links Syria to Abortive
Bombing of El Al Jet," N.Y. Times, May 8, 1986, at Al,
col. 1; DeYoung, "Britain, Germany Probe Possible Syrian
Role in Terrorist Activities," Wash. Post, May 8, 1986,
at Al, col. 5; Markham, "Suspect Reportedly Admits Syria
Directed a March Berlin Bombing," N.Y. Times, May 7,
1986, at Al, col. 1; Friedman, "New Syrian Ties Found in
Suicide Terror War," N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1986, at Al,
col. 4; 1985 Senate Terrorism Report, supra note 3, at
17-18, et _seq. It was reported that in 1982, the then
head of France's external intelligence service, Pierre
Marion, met Rifaat Al-Assad, the brother of Syria's
President hafez al-Assad, and the purported head of
Syria's secret services. As a result of the meetings,
Marion was quoted as saying "that Abu Nidal would no
longer operate on French territory." Marion said his
"objective was to convince him [al-Assad] to spare
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French territory" frofil terrorism. Bernstein, "Ex-Paris
Aide Gave Warning To Syria," /4.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1986,
at All, col. 1.
12/ C. Sterling, supra note 1, at 159, 254. The PFLP
reportedly maintains an elite training camp, Camp
Khayat, near Aden. Id. at 90.
12/ See, e.g., Larschan, "Legal Aspects to the Control of
Transnational Terrorism: An Overview," 13 Ohio N. U. L.
Rev. 117, 139 (1986) & sources cited therein. See
generally Friedlander, "Terrorism and Self-
Determination: The Fatal Nexus,
& Com. 263 (1980).
7 Syracuse J. Int'l L.
14/ The law of minimum standards of state responsibility was
discussed in the criminal case of The Alabama Claims
Arbitration, 1 Malloy, Treaties. Conventions.
International Acts. Protocols and Agreements between the
United States and Other Powers 700 (1910).
15/ See, e.g., Hijazi, "Ex-Aide to Arafat, Now a Foe, Says
P.L.O. Has a Fortune in Banks," N.Y. Times, June 29,
1986 at A16, col. 1. $ee also C. Dobson & R. Payne, The
Weapons of Terror: International Terrorism At Work 78-
94 (1979).
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"t
There is little reliable data on the financial
dealings and sources of funds of terrorist groups.
However, a glimpse at the magnitude of the sums involved
was given by Crozier, who reported that on Jan. 25,
1973, Libya's leader, Muammar Qaddafi, temporarily broke
with the PLO and suspended his $40 million a year
allowance. Crozier, "Libya's Foreign Adventures,"
Conflict Studies No. 41 at 6 (Dec. 1973). Another
source put Libya's contribution to transnational
terrorism at $100 million annually plus "bonuses" for
spectacular successes such as the Munich Olympics
massacre, which reportedly netted the PLO an additional
$10 million. Ellenberg, "The PLO and Its Place In
Violence and Terror," in International Terrorism In the
Contemporary World 173 (M. Livingston ed. 1978), quoting
Laffin, "Murder Incorporated," The Spectator (London),
Aug. 30, 1975. Recently the Italian Government has
probed Libyan financing of terrorism through a series of
European bank accounts. Jenkins, "Italy Probes Libyan
Banking Network," Wash. Post, July 24, 1986, at 1,
col. 4. Sterling goes on to cite former Libyan planning
minister Omar el-Meheishi as placing that country's 1976
contribution to terrorism at $580 million. C. Sterling,
supra note 1, at 260.
16/ See, e.g., Larschan, "Extradition, the Political Offense
Exception and Terrorism: An Overview of the Three
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Principal Theories of taw," 4 B.U. Int'l L. J. 231
(1986).
12/ GAO, Terrorism: Laws Cited Imposing Sanctions on
Nations Supporting Terrorism, GAO/NSIAD 87-133-FS (Apr.
1987).
11/ Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed
on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo, September 14, 1963,
20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. 676 (1963).
11/ Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, signed at The Hague, December 16, 1970, 22
U.S.T. 1642, T.I.A.S. 7192 (1971).
20/ Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal,
September 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. 757 (1971).
21/ Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded and Sick Armed Forces in the Field, signed at
Geneva, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. 3362;
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, signed at Geneva, August 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. 3363; Convention (III) Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva,
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August 12, 1949, 6 17.'6.T. 3216, T.I.A.S. 3364;
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, sianed at Geneva, August 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. 3365.
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