LETTER TO ROBERT GATES FROM CONSTANTINE C. MENGES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R002000050001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 23, 1988
• Content Type: LETTER

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American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
[phone]
1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036
Telex: 671-1239
June 23, 1988
Dr. Robert Gates
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, DC 20505
I am enclosing a copy of my letter to President Reagan in which I
urge that he seek full military funding for the Nicaraguan
resistance. In my view, we are at a critical, historical turning
point where the Administration could still undo the tactical
mistakes that began in August, 1987.
Also, in case you missed it, I am enclosing a copy of the
president's excellent statement of May 24, 1988 in which he was
explicit about the fact that the Sandinistas had violated both
the Arias plan and the March, 1988 truce agreement.
Congratulations on your continuing forthright public testimony
concerning Soviet international actions. If you have a copy of
the full text, I would appreciate having one so that I might cite
it in my writing.
I thought you might like to see several of my recent articles:
"The Afghan Trap", National Review, April 1, 1988.
"The Four 'Detentes"', National Review, June 24, 1988.
With Alan Keyes, "Afghanistan - victory or blunder" (to be
published shortly).
Also enclosed, is an announcement of our forthcoming meeting with
Mr. Savimbi to which you are most cordially invited.
It would be my pleasure to invite you to lunch here at AEI, and I
shall telephone to see if we can meet in the near future.
With all good wishes.
Sincerely,
Constantine C. Menges, Ph.D.
Resident Scholar
CCM/spm
Enc.
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% a VENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
The Deputy Director has seen
the attached but has made
no comment. Do you wish to
record???
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THE FUTURE OF ANGOLA
Speaker
Dr. Jonas Savimbi
President, National Union for
the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)
Panelists
Representative Dan Burton (R-Ind.)
Ranking Minority Member, House Foreign Affairs' Africa Subcommittee
*Senator Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.)
Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Alan L. Keyes, Ph.D.
AEI Resident Scholar;
Former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
Constantine C. Menges, Ph.D.
AEI Resident Scholar;
Former Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Wednesday, June 29, 1988 American Erterprise Institute
1150 17th Street, N.W.
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon Twelfth Floor Board Room
R.S. V.P.: 202/862-5829
In early May 1988, representatives of the United States, South Africa, Cuba, and the Communist
government of Angola met in London for "exploratory talks" about a Cuban troop withdrawal
from Angola. Later that month senior Angola and South Africa officials met in Congo (Braz-
zaville) for further direct talks on the details of a regional diplomatic settlement in southern
Africa. The issue came up for discussion again at the Reagan-Gorbachev summit, held in Mos-
cow from May 31 to June 2, with the announcement that a final settlement was expected by late
September 1988.
The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research will sponsor a talk by Dr. Jonas
Savimbi, president of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, focusing on the
implications of the current negotiations for Angola's future. He will be joined by a distinguished
panel of public officials and foreign policy experts who have devoted special attention to An-
gola.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release May 24, 1988
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
Two months have passed since the Congress limited United States
assistance to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance to food,
shelter, clothing, and medicine. The Congress stopped U.S.
military assistance to the Resistance, while the Soviet Bloc
continued its military assistance to the Communist Sandinista
regime in Nicaragua. Some thought that U.S. forbearance would
bring democracy and peace to Nicaragua through negotiations
between the Resistance and the Sandinista regime, but it has not.
Tomorrow, as I leave on the first leg of my trip to Moscow, the
Resistance and the Sandinistas are scheduled to meet again. The
Sandinistas will again have the opportunity to carry out the
promises they have made -- beginning a decade ago with promises
to the organization of American States -- of establishme
freedom and democracy in Nicara I/We o not need more pieces
of-paper-hear nq empty Sandinista promises and Sandinista
signatures -- we need deeds, not more words.
During the sixty-day truce established under the Sapoa Agreement
signed March 23, the Sandinistas have continued, and indeed
intensified, their repression of the Nicaraguan people. They
have not carried out their commitments under the Guatemala Accord
of August 7, 1987? or under the Sapoa Agreeznes?t. The Sandinista
have gone so far as to make it impossible to arrange through
neutral parties to deliver food and medicine to Resistance
members inside Nicaragua.
The men and women of the Agency for International Development
who have worked long and hard to ensure that the members of the
Resistance have the basic necessities of life deserve the thanks
of our Nation. The work of A.I.D. keeps the chance for democracy
alive in Nicaragua.
The United States continues to support those fighting for freedom
and democracy in Nicaragua. The Freedom Fighters of the
Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance deserve the continued support
of the United States.
if the current stalemate in the peace process persists and the
Sandinistas continue their policies of repression, then we will
call upon the Congress to reconsider its February 3 decision to
curtail assistance to the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters.
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/ 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.V%'., Washington. D.C. 20036 Tc;ex: 671-123?
June 13, 1988
The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
Dear Mr. President:
I am writing you as a citizen and as an individual who was one
of your foreign policy advisors during the 1980 campaign and
then was honored to serve in your administration for five years
(1981-86) including three years as one of your special
assistants for national security affairs. ?
On April 12, 1988, I was one of several foreign policy experts
with whom you met for about an hour for a discussion of SDI and
the freedom fighters. It was very good to see you again and
have the opportunity for such a cordial and candid dialogue.
The endi"T of negotiations in Nicaragua provides you with the
opportunity to assure that the aggressive and repressive
Sandinista regime will finally be brought to implementing the
three commitments made to the OAS in 1979: genuine democracy
with fair and free elections for the national government; a non-
aligned foreign policy; and, a mixed economy. You can help the
Nicaraguan people accomplish this by'immediately going to the
Congress and seeking a yes or no vote on full military aid for
the Nicaraguan resistance.
The Sandinistas have violated the terms of the still existing
and valid 1979 OAS negotiated political settlement and that
along with their 1979 initiation of aggression using armed
subversion provides the legitimate basis for helping the unarmed
and armed Nicaraguan democratic resistance to attain real
democracy in Nicaragua. You may recall that Speaker James
Wright unilaterally abrogated and terminated his August 5, 1987
agreement with you and instead endorsed what you correctly
called the "fatally flawed" Arias plan of August 7, 1987.
The Sandinistas violated the Arias plan and it has expired. The
Sandinistas violated the truce agreement of March 23, 1988 and
it has expired. The Sandinistas have shown during these past
ten months that they are determined to continue their aggression
against neighbors, their alliance with Castro's Cuba and the
Soviet bloc and their internal communist dictatorship. (Even
the Washington Post editorial of June 12, 1988 agrees that the
Sandinistas have violated these agreements!)
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Page Two
Speaker Wright promised Minority Leader Michel that if you
sought a vote on military aid to the armed Nicaraguan resistance
he would assure this within ten days. On June 1, 1988, a bi-
partisan group of congressmen and senators led by Rep. Jack Kemp
and Sen. David Boren wrote you to request that you seek full
military and other aid for the Nicaraguan resistance.
Mr. President, I urge you to heed their suggestion. Based on my
many years of work on this issue, I believe that the days
between now and the July 4, 1988 congressional recess may be the
best chance to rescue democracy in Nicaragua and indeed all of
Central America from the mistakes made by the Carter
administration in 1978-80 and by the majority of congressional
democrats who rejected your previous requests (1984, 1985, 1987-
88).
I also believe that if you act now and mobilize the full power
of your office, there will be at least 48 sensible democrats who
with the solid group of 170 House Republicans will vote against
communist dictatorship and for freedom in Nicaragua. As both
the.-late democratic Senator Henry Jackson and you have often
said the communist objective --much more likely to be attained
if the Nicaraguan resistance continues to be denied military aid
by the congressional democrats-- is a communist Central America,
Panama and a communist Mexico on our.southern border. This can
still be prevented, and your action now can be the turning point
to success for our friends and for freedom.
With respect,
Constantine C Menges, Ph.D.
Resident Scholar
CCM/spm
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CONSTANTINE C. MENGES
THE AFGHAN TRAP
O N FEBRUARY 8, Mikhail Gorba-
chev made a dramatic announce-
ment: If the U.S. cut off aid to
the Afghan resistance by March 15,
Soviet troop withdrawal could begin
on May 15 and be completed within
ten months. He indicated that this
pullout could be "front-end loaded,"
as Secretary of State Shultz had pro-
posed, and that it would proceed re-
gardless of whether there was agree-
ment on an interim Afghan government
to succeed the Communist regime.
U.S. media immediately concluded
that "peace is at hand." The possibil-
ity of "a good settlement" is nearing,
claimed the Washington Post the day
after Gorbachev's announcement. Two
days later, a New York Times editorial
hailed the pledge as "an extraordinary
statement" that indicates that. "from
all appearances, Moscow has made the
painful decision to lose a war."
Perhaps. But the euphoria of the
press ought to be tempered by the
hard lessons of history. In 1978, after
25 years of active Soviet subversion.
the Communist Party of Afghanistan
seized power in a bloody military
coup. Within a year, the new regime
had executed tens of thousands, impris-
oned many more, and tried to destroy
religion and all other independent in-
stitutions. Out of 15 million Afghans,
more than one million have died since
the war began, and nearly five million
more-one-third of the total popula-
tion-have fled to Pakistan and Iran,
trading the abject misery of Soviet
domination for the squalor of life in
refugee camps.
Moscow has invested billions of ru-
bles in a long-term program to build
Mr. Menges. a resident scholar at the Amer-
ican Enterprise Institute, served as Special
Assistant to the President for National Se.
curer Affairs from 1983 to 1986. His forth-
comtnR book. Inside the National Security
Council. will be published by Simon and
Schuster this Junta
an infrastructure of Communist control
in Kabul. Does Gorbachev's offer real-
ly signal an abrupt about-face? Or is
it more likely that the Soviet propos-
al is part of an effort to win by diplo-
matic cunning what the Red Army has
failed to achieve by military force?
To avoid that possibility, President
Reagan has all along insisted that aid
to the resistance continue until all So-
viet troops have been withdrawn and
an independent government is in place.
He reiterated his commitment just be-
fore the 1987 Summit and again in
his 1988 State of the Union message.
ASTONISHINGLY, a faction within the
State Department appears to
have been following a different
policy altogether. These career officials
are working for a settlement based on
the 1985 Geneva draft treaty, which
would require a Western aid cutoff as
soon as a troop withdrawal begins.
Given the Soviets' history of announc-
ing mere troop rotations in Afghani-
stan as troop withdrawals, that policy
is a formula for Soviet victory.
Information about the State Depart-
ment's independent strategy first be-
came public in May 1986. when a key
supporter of the Afghan resistance. Sen-
ator Gordon Humphrey (R., N.H.), was
questioning a senior State Department
official. The official admitted that
Shultz knew about the change of poli-
cy, but would not say whether Presi-
dent Reagan knew. On February 11.
1988. the New York Times published
a report headlined "Reagan Didn't
Know of Afghan Deal," and quoted
"White House and State Department
officials" as confirming that "an Amer-
ican commitment in 1985 to end mil-
itary aid to the Afghan guerrillas at
the beginning of a Soviet troop with-
drawal was made without the knowl-
edge or approval of President Rea-
gan." This recent report is disturbingly
consistent with testimony last year and
with the pattern of State Department
actions on other foreign-policy issues.
Reports from Capitol Hill suggest
Shultz may have actually closed the
deal during a recent trip to Moscow.
"Our sources say the deal was made,"
says Don Morrissey, Legislative Direc-
tor to Congressman Bill McCollum (R..
Fla.), a longtime supporter of the Af-
ghan resistance. "It includes a front-
end cutoff of aid with a front-loaded
withdrawal of troops. None of the
Afghan alliance leaders are party to
the agreement and there are no plans
to make them." McCollum is circulat-
ing a letter (dated February 24) among
House colleagues calling on Reagan to
reject a settlement that: fails to recog-
nize the Afghan Mujahedin alliance;
demands a cutoff of U.S. aid before
Soviet troops are withdrawn; permits
the Soviets to continue aiding their
puppets in Kabul; or fails to assure
the repatriation of refugees and the
return of "tens of thousands" of Af-
ghan children forcibly removed from
their parents for "education" in the
Soviet Union. A similar letter from
Senator Humphrey has been signed by
28 of his Senate colleagues. On Feb-
ruary 29, by a bipartisan vote of 77
to 0, the Senate passed a resolution
calling for continued aid to the re-
sistance until all Soviet troops are out
and a "political solution in Kabul ac-
ceptable to the resistance" exists.
If State Department officials are al-
lowed to have their way, there is a
good chance the U.S. will accept a
defective political settlement. allowing
the Kremlin to eventually consolidate
its power in Afghanistan. After all. the
Soviet Union and its allies have fre-
quently used political settlements as
part of a strategy for eventual Com-
munist victory. In 1986. an official
Defense Department report concluded
that in at least four peace agreements
the Communist side committed "sig-
nificant violations, including military
ones . . . immediately after the agree-
34 NATIONAL REVIEW / APRIL 1, 1988
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meats went into effect, suggesting that
the Communists were planning the in-
fringements even as they were negoti.
ating." Among the examples in this
report The terms of the 1962 "set-
tlement" on Laos required North Viet-
nam to remove its ten thousand troops
through designated checkpoints in the
shortest time possible, but "only forty
left the country through International
Control Commission checkpoints." In
1973, the Paris Accords required North
Vietnam to withdraw all its forces
from Cambodia and Laos and refrain
from introducing any additional forces
into South Vietnam. In fact, "North
Vietnam never observed the cease-
fire and troop-withdrawal requirements.
Within three months . . . Hanoi had
already illegally infiltrated some thirty
thousand additional troops."
To these disturbing instances, we
should add the conclusion reached by
President Reagan in four annual re-
ports on Soviet non-compliance with
arms-control agreements. The 1984 re-
port concluded that "over a 25-year
span the Soviets had violated a sub-
stantial number of arms-control com-
mitments." And in 1985, Reagan said
about these vital agreements, "There is
a pattern of Soviet non-compliance."
Since the United States has made
no effective response to repeated treaty
violations, Gorbachev might reasonably
expect to be able to use the offer of
Soviet troop withdrawal-spaced over
nine months with no certain way for
the U.S. to monitor actual troop levels
-as a lever to terminate U.S. aid.
Then there would be many ways for
the Kremlin to keep Afghanistan with-
in the Soviet orbit.
Some observers have suggested that
the Soviets plan to annex (de facto)
northern Afghanistan, leaving a nomi-
nally free rump state in the south. The
Soviets have taken considerable pains
to integrate mineral-rich northern Af-
ghanistan into their own southern "so-
cialist republics," exchanging Party
cadres, building joint water projects,
and emphasizing ethnic ties between
Afghan tribes and their Soviet cousins
immediately to the north. An already
divided Afghanistan would then be
susceptible to further manipulation,
perhaps by reviving long-simmering
"Pushtunistan" separatist sentiments.
But even without annexing the north,
the proposed settlement offers the So-
viet Union ample opportunities to
maintain control over Afghanistan. For
example, it might try to divide and
demoralize the Afghan Mujahedin, as
the different resistance groups begin to
discuss the composition of the new
government and methods of Soviet with-
drawal. Held together principally by
hatred of Soviet occupation, the resist-
ance alliance would be very vulner-
able to Communist destabilization in
such a new political context. Three
groups within the alliance seek a secu-
lar government such as a constitution-
al monarchy or a Western style par-
liament, but the four "fundamentalist"
groups demand an Islamic state. The
Soviets may have proposed a role for
the former king, Zahir Shah (deposed
by a left-wing coup in 1973), in order
to aggravate these differences.
As in 1980, when the Soviets tried
to mask their domination of Afghani-
stan with a cosmetic "broad front"
government, they may try to control
the "new" government through osten-
sibly non-Communist Afghans who are
clandestine Communist allies. Moscow
will probably attempt to maintain con-
trol over the premiership, the army,
the secret police, and the ministries of
education and communication.
U.S. wavering would weaken Paki-
stan's support for the resistance. (Paki-
stan is essential both as sanctuary
for Afghan guerrillas and their refugee
families and as a conduit for getting
aid to the fighting forces within Af-
ghanistan.) Publicly, Pakistani Presi-
dent Zia ul-Haq sensibly refuses to
have anyt6i. to do with Moscow's
Puppet. Najibullah. But recent reports
are that the State Department has be.
gun to pressure Zia to go along with
its settlement.
Divisions between resistance groups
might also be exacerbated as some
leaders reject the emerging settlement
as a Soviet trap while others embrace
it as a vehicle to power. The specta-
cle of freedom-fighters warring among
themselves would sharply undermine
Western-and Pakistani-support for
them. Meanwhile, the UN-created ver-
ification system, like other verification
groups in the past, will probably over-
look Soviet violations while vigilant-
ly monitoring and limiting movement
from Pakistan into Afghanistan.
The Soviets can calculate that in-
fighting within the resistance, a U.S.
cutoff, and unobstructed Soviet viola-
tions would dramatically weaken the
resistance. Then, in late 1988, with
the U.S. preoccupied with presidential
politics, Soviet troops and secret police
could be secretly reinfiltrated in order
to cut the resistance down further.
S OVIET VICTORY in Afghanistan is
a real possibility. It can still
be avoided if President Reagan
makes sure his Administration adheres
to his own policy. How? By clearly
reaffirming that policy in public state-
ments and regularly using meetings of
the full National Security Council to
ensure his control. In addition, the
United States should be willing to
increase military aid to the resissarlee
unless the Soviets agree to withdraw
their forces and permit a truly inde-
pendent government in Afghanistan- On
their side, the resistance leaders can
declare that unless the Soviet Union
withdraws soon and permits an inde-
pendent, non-Communist government,
they will not grant amnesty to mem-
bers of the Afghan Communist gov-
ernment, and the future Afghan gov-
ernment will be anti-Soviet rather than
non-aligned. They can also let Mos-
cow know they will seek billions in
reparations for the suffering they have
endured in almost ten years of war.
Unless this defective settlement is
prevented, there is a grave probability
of a Communist Afghanistan. the dis-
memberment of Pakistan. Soviet gains
in Iran, and pro-Soviet radicals taking
power in some of the Persian Gulf oil
states. 0
AP1IL 1, 1988 / NATIONAL RaviEw 35
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~1 THE FOUR `DETENTES' /CONS
TANTINE C. MENGES
THAT OLD SUMMIT MAGIC
T cam's AN irresistible charm about
Summitry. By the time this is-
sue goes to press, Ronald Ra-
gan and Mikhail Gorbachev will have
performed the sacred rites of that old
Summit magic: hands will be shaken,
glasses clinked; the sun will shine a
little brighter, hurts rest a little easier,
because in faraway Moscow two men
who hold the fate of the world in
their all-too-human hands will have
signed a communique or perhaps some
new agreements. The substance of such
agreements seems hardly to matter. In
this style of diplomacy, it is the "new
spirit of peace," not the details, that
Counts.
Those who are not Connoisseurs of
the anus-control process may be sur-
prised to learn that the current dirta-
tioa with Moscow is the fifth in a
long line of sequels. Nowadays, the
term detente is usually reserved for the
Prolonged period of "eased tension"
inaugurated by Richard Nixon and con-
tinned during the Ford and Carter
Administrations. But a careful look at
tl-e history of Suvict-American rela-
aoos "cc World War U shows that
detente is not an isolated phenomenon,
but a re;urting temptation: in at leant
three other perit,da, Washington at-
tempted friendly relations with the
Kremlin. Each period was marked by
Summit meetings, arms-control accords,
and high expectations of a new era of
cooperation. (See chart, pp. 38-39.)
Each was ended by an act of Soviet
aggression. And. when the dust settled.
each period of detente left the West in
a relatively worse position. By contrast.
the interludes between detentes-peri-
ods of more normal relations with the
Mr. Alewges d a Resident Scholar i rAe
Aiwencan Eitterpnu lrtttltrte t" watAine-
ron, D. C Flaw 1983 to 1986 Ae serrrd ar
Special Aseirtoas to the Pl wrens for Nd.
tional Serttrtry Affairs. His new boot fe-
side the National Security CouacL wU be
pailiAed by Suwon d Schuster In July.
Soviets-seem to produce consistently
better foreign-policy results.
The first perod of detente (1943-48)
began with the 1943 Teheran Summit.
at which Roosevelt, Churchill, and Sta-
lin met to plan the postwar interna-
tional order. Stalin's presence indicated
that Western leaders expected the war-
time alliance to blossom into a cordial
peacetime relationship. "Never before
have major allies been more dearly
united not only in their war aims but
in their peace aims," Roosevelt an-
nounced to Congress two years later,
upon his return from Yalta.
Detente continued into the Truman
era with the Summit at Potsdam. Un-
der Truman, the U.S. slashed its mili-
tary forces from 12 million during the
war to under two million in 1946.
The Truman Administration also pro-
posed giving up America's nuclear
monopoly by placing all atomic weap-
ons under international control (the
Soviets rejected the plan).
For their part, the Soviets retained
some four milli n men under arms
and launched a ~ crash program to build
their own A-bomb. With Stalin's help,
Communists took power in- Eastern
Europe and launched guerrilla wars in
Greece; China, and Vietnam. The fel-
low feeling was disappearing by the
spring of 1947, when Truman promised
to aid governments relating Soviet sub-
version and promulgated the Marshall
Plan. Detente I came to a crashing
close in 1948 as a result of the So-
viets' double whammy: the Communist
coup in Czechoslovakia in February
and the Berlin blockade in July.
Stalin's death ushered in the second
period of detente (1953-56). President
Eisenhower called for improved rels-
tiom with Moscow, and the long-tailed
Korean truce talks resumed; an armi-
stir was signed In July 1953. The
following February, a Big Four (France.
Britain, U.S., USSR) foreign ministers'
meeting formally initiated Detente It,
which continued through the Geneva
Summit of July 1955. It ended in
November 1956, when Soviet troops
invaded Hungary.
Detente in had the shortest run. It
began in May 1959 with the lengthy
negotiation among the former Allied
powers over the status of West Berlin.
Other notable events during this pe-
riod were the "informal" Eisenhower-
Khruahchev Camp David Summit, and
the June 1961 Kennedy-Khrushchev
Summit in Vienna. American hopes for
good relations were. again. soon dis-
appointed: in August 1961, the Soviets
built the Berlin Wall, and then dew
nated four H-bombs (braking a mora-
torium on atmospheric nuclear tenting).
[ti 1962, the Kremlin began secretly
placing medium-range ballistic missiles
armed with H-bombe in Cuba.
The most recent era of detente be-
gan in 1972, when Nixon traveled to
Moscow to meet with Bre:ham, and
sign the SALT I and ABM accords. It
ended in December 1979. When the
Soviets invaded Afghanistan.
Are WR GAINED anything from
theme repeated nm7amal attempts
Hat mutual admiration? Well, in
1955, in the midst of D6teate q the
Kremlin withdrew its occupying troops
from Austria and agreed to respect
that country's neutrality. An important
success to be sure, especially for the
Austrians. But it is disconcerting to
find that, after all the hope= we've
repeatedly hung on detente, Austria's
liberation thirty years ago remains the
West's sole unambiguous on.
The arms agreements of the 1970s,
usually considered the crown jewel of
the detente process, haven't benefited
the West at all. SALT I. which limited
the number of launchers but not the
number of hydrogen bombs. failed to
slow the Soviet arms buildup, The
unratified SALT 11 treaty, which the
U.S. observed until 1986, "limited" the
number of H-bombe deployed to about
JuNe 24. 1988 / Nano.AL Rsvewr 37
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MAJOR U.S.-USSR TALKS
Detente i
Feb. 1945 U.S.. I1K, USSR
Summit. Yalta
July 1945 U.S., UK. USSR
Summit, potadam
ADVANCES FOR U.S.
1946 Foreign ministers'
conference
1947 Foreign ilninistcn'
conference
Return to Normal Relations
Detente Ii
Feb. 1954 foreign miaistas'
conference
July 1955 Geneva Summit
Return to Normal Relations
Detente 111
May-Aug. Foicigm ministers'
1959 conference
Sept. 1959 Camp David
Summit
May 1960 Paris Summit
June 1961 Vienna Summit
Return to Normal Relations
32 NATIONAL Ravtew / Jura 24, 1988
SETBACKS FOR U.S.
1945
Soviet effort to take northern Iran
1945
Stalin re-ignite/ civil war in Greece:
USSR ipves military aid to
Communists is China, Vietnam
1945
Yueoelovla becomes Communist
1946
soigarla, Rum--is, Albania.
Pohnd become communist
1946
Soviet puppet governments in
northern Iran ended
Oct. 1947
Cominform re-established
1947
Truman Ducuime and Marshall
Plan proposed
Feb. 1948
Cseehoslovakla becomes
Communist
April 1948
OECD formed to adatioistcr
June 1948
&riin blockade
April 1949
Maphall Plan
NATO .uabilshsd
Oct. 1949
China becomes Communist
Feb. 1950
Soviet-Cbincse treaty
Juoc 1950
North Korea attach Sooth Korea
June 1950
UN Security Council votes to
oppose North Korean attack
Oct 1952
March 1933
U-& H-bomb developed
Stello dies
July 1953
Korea a.mistiee
Aug. 1953
Soviet H-bomb developed
Aug. 1953
Irma destabilization fails
i
July 1934
North Vletnnnr becomes
Communist
April 1955
Austria becomes neutral; USSR
out
May 1955
West Germany joint NATO
Nov. 1956
Soviet invasion of Hsugary
1957
Soviet Spaml/e
March 1957
EEuuroppnn Economic Community
c) beg=
1958
Soviet Baffin ultim-ts
1959
North Vietnam begins war to
conquer South Vietnam
Nov. 1959
Cuba enters Soviet orbit
1960-1961
Congo destabilization
Oct,
1962 U.S. requires Soviet removal of
missiles from Cuba
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MAJOR U.S.-USSR TALKS -
June 1967 Glassboro meeting
June 1973
June 1974
Nov. 1974
Aug. 1975
June 1979
Atq. 1968 Soviet bloc invades
Csccltoslovakia
ADVANCES FOR U.S.
July 1963 USSR-China dispute is public
Aug. 1963 U.S.-USSR accord to ban
nuclear tasting in air
April 196$ OAS/U.S, force stabitizti
Dominican Republic
Jan. 1967 U.S.-USSR accord to keep
offensive weapons out of space
Sept. 1968 Albania laves Soviet bloc
Aug. 1970 Accord on oorotalization-
USSR, West Germany
Sept. 1971 Accord on 8ariio--U.S., UK,
USSR. Francs
Feb. 1972 Nixon Summit in China
Washin
ton
Jae. 1973
Vietnam treaty (violated from the
start by the Communist side)
g
Summit
Oct 1973
Yom Kippur surprise attack on
lured-Soviets lave support and
had to be datarrad from seedisg
troops to Egypt
Nov. 1973
Cuban troops to help Syria
Dec. 1973
April 1974-
OPEC doubles oil price
USSR tries to make Portugal
Moscow Summit
Vladivostok
Summit
1975
April-May
Communist
South Vietnam, Catttbodia. Lams
1975
become Communist
Helsinki
Jane 1975
Mozambique beoomas Communist
conference
Nov. 1973
Angola becomm Communist
May 1976
Syrian !poops into Lebanon
1977
April 1978
ZIbivpitt bewma Communist
Afthaabtan becomes Communist
Sept. 1978
Camp David Accord-
Peb. 1979
Mardi 1979
Iran: Khomelal to power
Grerusela becomes Communist
Isr el. Egypt, U.S.
Vienna Summit
(SALT 11)
July 1979
Nicaragua becomes Communist
Dec. 1979
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
bet, 1981
Sadat anaaaiaatml
Dee. 1981
Solidarity reprenwl in Puiand
March 1982 El Salvador elections
April 1983 Reagan proposes SDI
Oct. 1983 Granada liberated
Nuv. 1983 NATO deploys INP
Jae. 19$S Reagan aeeoaseae support for
freedom-fighters
July 1985 Congress repeals Clark
Amendment
Nov. 198$ Reagan says U.S. will support
UNITA In Angola
Juwe' 24. 198$ / N*Ttow*L Ravtsw 39
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 Declassified and Approved For
13lnni or 'race ;MC-chat Is, $tout
six listen as many as either Washing-
ton or Moscow had deployed on stra-
tegic missiles when arms talks began.
T tic ttuMnen of nuclear warheads
on Soviet land- and sea-based
strategic missiles increased from
2. 445 in 1972 to 8.900 by 1985. The
Suviets' t:unventiunal-arms buildup, of
worse. also continued unabated. And
the Soviets have repeatedly violated
the terms of the at curds, from their
promise at the 1972 Summit to ob-
Serve "nor= of international conduct"
(which the United States understood
to mean an cud to subversive aggra-
$ion)., to the 1975 Helsinki human-
rights guatautccs. Frutn these experi-
ences Moscow has learned one very
bad lesson: there is no penalty for
refusing to abide by agreements. Our
passive response to each set of Soviet
violations makes it leas likely that the
next agreements will be uberved.
Uvesall. Moscow has done very
well indeed during periods of detente. i
making is greatest gains' during the
two longest episodes. During Detente I
(between 1943 and 1949) the Soviets
engaged in direct or indirect 'warfare
against Western allies in at least a
doyen different couutsies. In 1944, Sta-
tie told Communist guerrillas In Greece
and Yugoslavia to prepare to seize
-power at war's end, and Radio Mos-
cow began urging Poles to rebel
against the Nazis in order to aid the
approaching Red Army (which he then
ordered to halt for two months while
the Nazis exterminated the Polish re-
siMAIII Gghters). in late 1943, Stalin
began military aid to Communists In
China and Vietnam, and tried to an-
nex northern Iran; only Truman's
threat to launch a nuclear strike halted
the latter scheme. By 1947, Commn-
nists, aided by Soviet ooeupstion
troupe and making use of secret police
and fraudulent elections, had seized
conttul of must of Eastern Europe.
North Korea had joined the Soviet
bloc. and the Chinese Communises
were well on the way to victory (at-
tained in 1949). The Soviets made
gains during the shorter periods of de-
tente as well. notably in acquiring Cu-
ba and North Vietnam as dient-states.
The years of Detente IV were again
s period of sustained growth for So-
viet influence and a veritable bull mar-
ket (or Communist terrorism. During
40 NATIONAL Review / Juse 24, 1983
Inc 17 / V? LUG Qovtets gaincu tea new
client-states in Asia, Africa. and Cen-
tral America. South Vietnam, Cam-
bodia, Laos. Mozambique, Angola,
Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen,
Grenada. and Nicaragua. Following
established patterns, most of these new
Communist regimes then turned to sub-
verting their neighbors. The Sandinistas
gave military support to guerrillas in
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras;
Grenada aided subversives in neighbor-
Ing Caribbean democracies; and Ethio-
pis provided material support to guer-
rillas in the Sudan and Somalia.
Compare this glowing record to
what the Soviets were able to achieve
during periods of normal relations. Fol-
lowing the collapse of Detente I. the
U.S. led in establishing the Organiza-
tion of American States (1949) and
NATO (1949). among other regional
security organizations. In 1930, Ameri-
uz urged the UN to respond militarily-
to North Korea's invasion of South
Korea. And America teetered demo-
cratic, pro-Western governments in Ja-
pan and Wet Germany.
After Detente It, the West repulsed
Khrushchev's attempts to absorb Berlin.
and it established the European Eco-
nomic Community (1957). In the tea
years following Dltsate III, no new
pro-Soviet regime took power, and the
Soviet-backed Communist Insurgency in
Vietnam was stalemated (with help
from the United State). During the
six-year period of normal illations fol-
towing Detente IV-the Reagan era-
the West has gained on several differ-
ent fronts. ' 'Twelve countries (ten it
them to Latin America) have made a
transition to political democracy. More
than 330,000 anti-Communist resistance
fighters have taken up arms In six of
the tea Soviet client-states established
In the Seventies. America, overturning
the Brezheev doctrine, drove an essub-
lished Communist dictatorship out of
Grenada. Communist guerrillas in El
oaivaoor ann uuaiemara raced sipi5-
cant setbacks. And all these pins was
achieved without a single scripus US.-
Soviet military confrontation.
During each period of dtteate, the
West, desperately clinging to the illu-
sion of friendly relations, has ignored
or downplayed hostile Soviet actions.
In each instance, Moscow has taken
advantage of our rose-colored glasses
to help its proxies grab additional ter-
ritory. Agreements are cheap, when
violating them costs nothing. The cur-
rent effort at detente is likely to prove
it reprise of the past. Who are the
probable casualties? Resistance fighters
in Nicaragua, Angola, and Afghanistan
for starters. And then countries, like
Pakistan, that are likely to bear the
brunt of soviet-sponsored international
terrorism. Vulnerable democratic move-
menu in Central and South America
will also surer, as will blacks in South
Africa, who may be forced to endure,
as their brethren in Ethiopia and Mo-
rsmbique have before them, the bru-
tality of Communist rule.
T n POSTWAR record sujesta that
normal. realistic relations with the
Soviet Union but serve our na-
tional intents and preserve the imter-
national order. What are the hallmarks
of a realistic foreign polW Realism
requires that we recognize hostile as
tioos throughout the world and help
our friends defeat them, and that we
withhold from the Soviet Union all
economic preferences and credits, which
give it the bard currency it needs to
maintain ib global empire. Realism al-
lows cooperative efforts such as vaifi-
able bilateral induction in offensive nu-
clear and conventional forces. But it
cannot rat on the belief that the
USSR-witich define;: itself as our en-
emy and daily carries out indirect ag-
gression aplatt our allies-etas some-
how been transformed into a friend.
Since 1943. four attempts at detente
have failed, badly. Out fifth fling with
detente will end the same way, unless
we realize that prudent realism, not
wishful thinking. is the best path to
peace and freedom. When Moscow
ends its hostile international actions,
complies with its treaty obligations,
and negotiates deep cuts in offensive
weapons, then a genuine U.S.-Soviet
detente may evolve. Until then, vigi-
lance. not relaxation. must be the
watchword. Q
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THE AFGHAN AGREEMENTS: VICTORY OR BLUNDER*
U.S. support for the successful Afghan resistance to Soviet
aggression has been an example of effective bipartisan
cooperation in foreign policy. Are the recently concluded U.N.
accords on Afghanistan a major success or a major blunder by the
State Department that could permit the Soviets to prevent
victory by the Afghan resistance?
By their reported terms the accords signed in Geneva on
April 14 make no provision for a ceasef ire in the war or for a
transition government leading to a genuinely independent and
neutral Afghanistan. In effect, they require only that the
Pakistanis immediately cease aiding the Afghan resistance and
that the Soviets withdraw their combat forces by February 1989.
Though hailed as a great event, the,,,, accords do not represent an
instantaneous happening. They set up a process, with the end of
Pakistan's support for the resistance at the start, and the
promised end of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan at the finish.
In between lies a ten month period during which the success of
Afghanistan's struggle for freedom could well be decided.
If the
Soviets
have accepted defeat, abandoned
their
*The authors are
presently resident scholars at AEI. Alan
Keyes served as Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization
Affairs
from 1985 to 1987 and was a Deputy to
Ambassador
Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick at the UN from 1983-1985;
Constantine
C. Menges
served in the Reagan administration for
five years,
including
1983 to 1986 as special assistant to the
president for national security affairs.
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historical objective of gaining access to the Persian Gulf, and
decided to permit a genuinely independent, non-communist
government in Afghanistan, the Geneva agreement could be a
positive step. If they merely intend to weaken the resistance
by coercing Pakistan into terminating aid, dismantling their
training camps and ending its cooperation, the agreE:Jent gives
them the chance to do so.
The Soviets have insisted on their right to continue
military and other support to their clients in Kabul. The United
States has likewise declared that it will continue to aid the
Afghan resistance if. Soviet aid to Kabul does not end. Nothing
in the U.N. agreement prohibits Soviet resupply of the Kabul
regime in any type or quantity, but the accord would cripple the
Western supply effort to the mujaheddin since it precludes
continued use of Pakistani territory as a staging ground for
these efforts. If the supplies cannot go through Pakistan, then
most cannot;be sent at all.
The Soviet and Afghan secret services are likely to step up
their current campaign of sabotage and terror against Pakistan--
begun in 1982, expanded since 1985-- in an effort to force its
government to cease aiding the resistance. if Pakistani leaders
try to resist these pressures and continue Pakistan's present
role, they will face increased unrest at home as their people
are wounded and killed by Soviet/Kabul-instigated terror
assaults. On June 13, 1988, the Soviet and the Afghan communist
leaders met in Moscow and Gorbachev then threatened Pakistan
2
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with "resolute retaliatory steps" unless it halted aid to the
resistance.
The Soviets have also begun to take the political offensive
by declaring Pakistan in violation of the U.N. accords and
warning that the pullout might be slowed or halted as a result.
,Gorbachev warned in his post-summit news conference on June 1
that Moscow would react to "provocations" from Pakistan and that
there would be "far-reaching consequences" if the Geneva accords
were "ruined" by continued aid to the mujaheddin. On June 7
Najibullah reitereated this warning, stating that he would ask
the Soviets to delay their withdrawal if Paksitan continued to
allow weapons shipments to the guerrillas. Najibulla also went
to the UN with the Soviet foreign minister in early June to
declare that Pakistan was in violation of the Geneva agreement.
State Department officials andlmany outside observers have
predicted the quick collapse of the communist regime in Kabul
once Soviet forces have withdrawn. If Soviet withdrawal were to
take place over a short time frame--one to two months--these
predictions might be credible (it only took days for those
forces to invade in 1979). Given ten months, however, the
Soviets would have ample opportunity further to strengthen their
clients, especially if their "withdrawal" becomes slow or
ambiguous.
Much depends on the actual number of Soviets in the country.
The Soviets claim that their military forces number 90,000,
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while western sources estimate more than 120,000. It is known
that the Soviet bloc has secret police in the country in various
guises, giving them the equivalent of an additional 10-15,000
troops. That adds up to a total force of 130,000 to 135,000
troops. Hence in the first period of the agreement the Soviets
could withdraw up to 45,000 troops and leave nearly, intact the
.901000 they currently acknowledge. Even if the Soviets withdrew
their claimed 90,000 troops during the ten month period, as many
as 45,000 could be left behind.
This ambiguity over the number of troops highlights the need
for effective verification of the withdrawal. Unfortunately,
such verification will be difficult, if not impossible. Since
the international verification team will have no reliable idea
how many Soviets are in Afghanistan at the start, progress in
the withdrawal will be difficult to confirm.
Since fighting will continu ;-- movement throughout the
country will be dangerous, and. any international verfication team
will have to rely, on the Soviets for protection. This will
certainly inhibit their ability to make the independent forays
necessary for sound judgments. They may end up relying on the
Soviets for the bulk of their information about Soviet actions.
This is a recipe for easy deception. Given the length of
the Soviet border with Afghanistan, the size of both countries,
the length of the withdrawal period, and the ethnic similarities
between Afghans and groups in the bordering Soviet republics, a
sizeable Soviet presence could be camouflaged without great
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difAliculty.
With a good sized residual Soviet force to back them up, the
defenders of the Kabul regime could certainly prevent a quick
victory by the Mujaheddin. During the tf.n month withdrawal
period, the Soviet and Afghan regimes will also probably use all
means trying to exacerbate divisions within the resistance
.alliance and provoke fighting among the parties. Some groups
will prefer to attack and harass the Soviets, while others will
oppose this.
Also, under the assumption that the Soviets are withdrawing
and victory is near, attention within the resistance could shift
from defeating the communist regime to deciding who should
govern Afghanistan. Might some elements in the resistance be
tempted to seek accomodation with the Najibullah regime (or some
suitable Soviet-backed replacement) in order to prevent
fundamentalist Islamic government ''from taking power?. The
Soviets will likely focus th4ir political, covert and;
military strategy on exacerbating and exploiting these and other
differences within the resistance.
If events develop in line with this pessimistic scenario, a
communist dictatorship linked to the Soviets will still rule
Afghanistan next February. Because of the U.N. accords,
Gorbachev will be able to tell the world and the Soviet people
that Pakistan, the implacable Mujaheddin (and perhaps the
United States) are responsible for the continued Soviet
presence. By agreeing to withdraw from Afghanistan and
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appearing to try in good faith to carry out the withdraw&l, the
Soviet leaders might be able to reduce disconteit in tae USSR
over their involvement in the war. Facing continued resistance,
the Soviets could be well positioned to justify continuing the
fight until the mujaheddin have been defeated or significantly
cut down. In -that. case the U.N. accords would end up
,strengthening the Politburo's ability to justify its war, while
weakening the international position of Pakistan, the resistance
(and the United States).
What impact might these accords have next September when the
U.N. General Assembly considers the annual resolution calling
for withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan? The Soviets
might argue that the resolution be replaced by a text calling
for full implementation of the U.N. agreement, chastising the
resistance for slowing or rejecting the accords, and condemning
Pakistan for violating the agreementt,`thus making a full Soviet
pullout impossible. Such a U.N. resolution would in this, case
symbolize the complicated and vulnerable posture into which the
Geneva accord might force the United States, Pakistan and the
resistance movement.
Although top Soviet officials have repeatedly declared their
desire to withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan, Soviet
actions suggest that their aims have not changed. Abundant
evidence suggests that the Soviets may be preparing a de facto
annexation of the northern half of Afghanistan. They have
concluded a number of direct agreements between Soviet muslim
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republics and the Afghan northern provinces in economic and
cultural matters, short circuiting the Kabul regime. They have
created a new province in northern Afghanistan and named both a
Northern Provinces head and a military commander for all forces
in the northern half of the country. it is unlikely the Soviets
would be taking these steps if they,.. ntended to permit a
,-genuinely independent Afghanistan.
The U.N. accords by no means constitute or guarantee victory
in the struggle to end the communist dictatorship in
Afghanistan. Instead, they complicate the struggle and give the
Soviets an excellent weapon with.which to defeat the resistance.
The 1973 Geneva accord on Vietnam led to Nobel peace prizes, in
1974. But that settlement was systematically violated by North
Vietnam. More importantly. it created the political conditions
that allowed the U.S. Congress sharply to reduce its support
for South Vietnam's efforts to defend itself. Together with the
massive communist military attacks on they South in early 1975,
that U.S. aid reduction resulted in military victory for the
communist North. The 1962 Laos accords produced a similar fate.
Rather than forming the basis for peace, these defective
agreements have been a weapon used by the communists to destroy
the morale and political cohesion of their opponents. The
Reagan Defense Department issued a report documenting these
historical facts in May 1986, but the lessons have been ignored
by the Reagan State Department.
Bipartisan supporters of the Afghan resistance, on Capitol
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Hill and elsewhere, must resist the temptation to declare a
victory. If they fold their tents now, the Soviets will quietly
steal victory away. Congress should insist that President
Reagan stand by his objective of an independent, non-Communist
government in Afghanistan, and it should pass a joint resolution
calling upon him to recognize the Afghan Resistance Interim
Government as the government of Afghanistan. A special
oversight committee should be established to monitor the efforts
made by State, Defense and other relevant Departments and
agencies to ensure that Soviet withdrawal is effectively
verified, and that there is no relaxation of efforts in support
of the Afghan resistance until all Soviet troops have in fact
been withdrawn and an independent, non-communist government
exists in Afghanistan.
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DRAFT 5
June 16, 1988
B: AFGHANAC (Tim's diskette)
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 9,1988
CONSTANTINE MENGES
Mexico hangin
n two close votes the
Democratic-controlled House
of Representatives has re-
fused to provide aid to the
Nicaraguan armed democratic re-
sistance. Nicaraguas communist
dictator Daniel Ortega responded to
the first negative vote on Feb. .3 by
calling for "complete and tow de.
feat" of the resistance.,
President Rea-
gan should now
submit his re-
quest through the
regular appropri-
ations process for
the full amount of
military and other
tance needs fbr the pepoort the resis-
(prob-
ably about 5150 million) andr seek an
up or-down vote before the July 4
congressional recess. -
He could win that vote if he and
his administration clearly state that
some congressional Democrats
seem to be trying to lose Nicaragua
to communism twice - the first
time was in 1979-81 when the Carter
administration did much too little to
assure implementation of the San-
dinista commitments to the Organ-
ization of American States that they
would be genuinely democratic.
President Reagan should inform
those who vote against his request
for full aid that in November 1988 he
will go to their congressional dis-
tricts and tell the public that the de-
feat of the Nicaraguan freedom
fighters risks not only communist
victory in Central America but also
communist takeover of Mexico in
the near future.
(In a speech on Monday, Mr. Rea-
gan indicated that the administra-
tion intends to seek renewed mili-
tary aid for the ContrasI
The late Democratic Sen. Henry
Jackson said in 1982: "Leftist revolts
in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Gua-
temala are the preliminary stage for
the ultimate assault on Mexico, the
true Soviet objective in the Western
Hemisphere."
Early in 1984 the Bipartisan Com-
mission, established at Mr. Jackson's
suggestion and led by Henry Kis-
singer, presented its report to Pres-
ident Reagan.
re Xasou toff rum*
in the balance
The commisssoa, including a for-
mer chairman of the Democratic
National Committee and Lane Kirk-
land. wrote: "As Nicaragua is al-
ready doing, additional Marxist-
Leninist regimes in Central
America could be expected to ex-
pand their ? armed forces, bring in
large numbers of Cuban and Soviet
advisers. develop sophisticated
agencies of internal repression and
external subversion:'
President Reagan echoed Mr.
Jackson's warning in a May 1984
television address? designed to per-
suade Democratic congressmen to
provide adequate aid for the friendly
countries of Central America: "If we
continue to provide too little help;'
President Reagan said, "our choice
will be a communist Central
America. ... This poses the
threat that one hundred million peo-
ple from Panama to the open border
on our south could Come under the
"tx ntroi of pro-Soviet regimes.
The Sandinista regime became
the aggressor in the region in 1979
when it initiated armed subversion
against its peaceful neighbors. As
President Duarte again documented
recently, this aggression continues
.despite the Arias peace plan.
Aid for the Contras began in 1982
after Me Carter. Mr. Reagan and the
Central American leaders had tried
diplomacy and economic aid as a
means of persuading the Sandin-
istas to become democratic and stop
this armed subversion. Consistent
with the right of states to defend
themselves and their allies. this aid
was and is a defensive response to
Sandinista aggression.
Former Defense Secretary Cas-
par Weinberger has told Congress
that if it cuts off aid to the Contras,
the Sandinistas are likely to expand
their support to the communist in-
surgencies in El Salvador and Gua-
temala dramatically, with full Cuban
and Soviet-bloc backing.
Mn Weinberger said this activity
might include disguising thousands
of Sandinista soldiers as guerrillas
and infiltrating them into
neighboring countries.
For example, at about 100 a day or
3,000 each month, in only about
seven months the now-weakened Sal-
vadoran communist guerrillas
would have additional forces of
21,000. Since it requires about 10 sol-
diers to contain one insurgent, this
would present the Duarte govern-
ment the truly impossible task of
adding about 210.000 soldiers - a
fourfold increase costing about S2
If Congress persists in aban-
doning the Contras, some of them
may have to leave Nicaragua or else
find themselves hutted down by the
140.000-strong Sandinista Armed
Forces, which have been supplied
with more than S2 billion in Soviet-
bloc weapons (compared with about
5200 million in U.S. funds for the
Nicaraguan resistance).
Next, the combination of a
sharply increasing communist
threat and the demoralization of the
pro-democratic groups could likely
lead to a communist Central
America in two stages.
First would come a process in.
eluding internal panic. turmoil and
polarization - perhaps one or more
military coups and the return of the
violent right - perhaps followed by
Congress' cutting vital U.S. aid to
some of the friendly Central Amer-
ican countries. Some congressional
Democrats would likely take a "let
the dust settle" approach to any
breakdown of the recently achieved
democratic institutions.
Second. the emboldened commu-
nist groups could step up terrorist.
military and political action using
the usual "broad front' approach to
deceive some non-commu ist ele-
ments into helping them take power.
History suggests that a commu-
nist victory in Central America
would probably be followed by a sus-
tained and systematic strategy
aimed at bringing the pro-Soviet
communist parties of Mexico and
Panama to power. The communist
movement within Mexico, with the
support of the Soviet bloc and Cuba.
would use the communist countries
of Central America as a base area.
just as Nicaragua has been used by
the Central American communist
movements since 1979.
Yet six decades of political stabil.
ity. 40 years of steady economic
growth. and the adaptation to the ef-
fects of the 1982 economic crisis all
testify to the strengths of the Alexi-
can political system. Mexico is likely
to remain stable, changing through
evolution, unless the internal and in.
ternationai communist movements
decide to attempt a seizure of power.
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/06/26: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000050001-8
Constantine Menges
However except for the governing
Party, only the communist move-
inent in Mexico is organized in every
area of life: a political party with
tens of thousands of members. mil-
lions of voters and a clandestine ap-
paratus: key communist labor
unions and communist penetration
of some ostensibly government-
controlled unions: peasant organiza-
tions throughout the country: a wide
array of Soviet-supported front
groups; and two large communist-
controlled coalitions of disaffected
poor, which were formed after the
onset of the economic crisis in 1982.
Tb these must be added decades
of close Mexican communist co-
operation with the Soviet Union, an
unusually large Soviet-bloc "diplo-
matic" presence in Mexico Cit' and
permission for the Palestine Liber.
ation Organization and other terror-
ist organizations to maintain facili-
ties in Mexico.
A communist strategy for raking
Power in Mexico would likely em-
ploy deception and speed to prevent
the U.S. leadership from under.
standing until too late that a commu-
nist seizure of power had taken
place.
Once the decision had been taken,
undercover communist groups
would likely deepen the economic
and political crisis by sparking
strikes, demonstrations, attacks on
tourists and sabotage of oil-
production facilities, which could
begin a sharp downward economic
spiral and deepen the misery of the
very poor in a short time.
Or communist cadres within the
military might stage a coup to "re-
form the Revolution of 1910". this
method was used in Ethiopia in 1977
and in Afghanistan in 1978. (Why did
Fidel Castro confer a medal on two
senior Mexican defense officials in
1987?) Or some elements of the gov-
erning party might openly join with
communist-controlled fronts in a co-
alition defined as "the authentic and
reformed governing parry"
All this could be accompanied by
terrorism directed at moderate
Mexican leaders by groups claiming
to represent various regional or
class interests but in fact operating
under covert communist control.
These possibilities, combined
with the lack of real knowledge
about Mexican politics among U.S.
leaders and the concerns caused by
the new communist states of Central
America, could well mean that a
communist government could be in
power before any consensus could
form in the United States about how
to help the people of Mexico defend
themselves.
The Washington Times March 9, 1988
Communist victory in Central
America and Mexico would be a
tragedy for the 100 million people
who live there, and it would confront
the United States with an enormous
threat. which would grow worse
year by year
Fortunately, this catastrophe can
be prevented if Congress provides
the funds for the Reagan strategy of
helping the people of Central
America themselves achieve democ-
racy and real peace. Since 1981 the
number of democracies has in-
creased from one to four among the
five Central American countries.
The Sandinistas came to power in
1979 by promising the OAS that they
would establish genuine democracy
and remain non-aligned. If Congress
finally provides sufficient aid to the
Nicaraguan resistance, the peopleof
Nicaragua can bring about a genu-
inely democratic government there.
The Democratic majority in Con-
gress continues to face a historic de-
cision in 1988.
Constantine C Menges is resident
scholar at the American Enterprise
Institute in Washington. He served in
the Reagan administration for five
years? including from 1983 to 1986 as
special assistant to the president for
nationi security affairs.
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